CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2: EQUAL PROTECTION

Case Digests by:

1SS-A
University of the Cordilleras
College of Law
2021

JESUS GARCIA v. HON. RAY ALAN DRILON

G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

FACTS:
rivate respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a
victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner. The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully
comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and
extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment as it would be an “exercise in futility.” Petitioner filed before the CA a
petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses,
and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Thus, this petition is filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection
clause.

HELD:
No. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guaranty of equal
protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by
a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary. I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

ANTONIO SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW

NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12
months, as Chief Officer. However, on the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to
accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer (lower salary
than Chief Officer) upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be
Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano
refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two
months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.

Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared
illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.

On appeal, the NLRC modified (lowered the awards) the LA decision based on the provision
of RA 8042.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x in case of termination of overseas employment without

just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

RULING:
YES, the subject clause violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that:
“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the law.”

Under the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A) No. 8042, Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs) are classified into two categories. The first category includes OFWs with
fixed-period employment contracts of less than one year. In case of illegal dismissal, they are
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second
category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more. In
case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award equivalent to only three (3)
months of the unexpired portion of their contracts. These different ways of computing the
money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods discriminate
one (1) category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subject
them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries
for three (3) months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, simply because
the other category’s unexpired contracts fall short of one year.

In addition, those OFWs belonging to the first category are likewise put on a disadvantaged
position compared to local workers with fixed-period employment who are entitled to the
award of salaries for the remainder of their fixed-term employment, in case of illegal
dismissal.

Considering these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the 5th paragraph of Section
10, Republic Act (R.A) No. 8042 contains a discriminatory classification, since in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged,
it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with
fixed-term employment.

The subject clause unfairly singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage, thus violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY v. JOY CABILES

G.R. No. 170139 | August 5, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work
as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate
repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned
a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket
to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint about illegal dismissal with the NLRC against the
petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA
affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally
dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of
her repatriation, and attorney’s fees

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.

RULING:
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary
should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment
contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court
ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has
not been passed at all.”

The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

G.R. No. 192935 | December 7, 2010

FACTS:
The Philippine Truth Commission was enacted on July 30, 2010. It was signed by the late
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III. Its nature is to investigate reported cases of graft and
corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo administration.

ISSUE:
Whether the Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent
and manifest. It must include the previous and subsequent administrations before the
Arroyo administration.

The equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace

all persons who naturally belong to the class. The classification must not be based on
existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included
in the class.The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.

LAO ICHONG (on behalf of other alien residents, corporations, and partnerships
adversely affected by R.A. No. 1180) v. JAIME HERNANDEZ (Secretary of Finance) and
SARMIENTO (City Treasurer of Manila)
G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." Aims to nationalize
the retail trade business. Among the main provisions are: (1) a prohibition against persons,
not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly
or indirectly in the retail trade;… (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business…
Hence, Ichong, and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, attacks the constitutionality
of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.

ISSUE:
Does Republic Act No. 1180 denies alien residents the equal protection of the laws?

RULING:
No. Republic Act No. 1180 does not deny alien residents the equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to
remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and
control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that
the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and
by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor
the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly
evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that
in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power
and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and
has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be
said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered
by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CAYAT

G.R. No. L-45987 | May 5, 1939

FACTS:

Cayat, a resident of Baguio and a member of a non-Christian tribe was found guilty of
violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of
A-1-1 gin) which is not a native wine.

Section 2 of Act 1639 prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the
non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their
so-called native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.

Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due process and
it is an improper exercise of police power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Act No. 1639 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection
clause.

HELD:
NO. From the Spanish era until the present, the government's attitude towards
non-Christian tribes has been consistent, often with sacrifice and hardship, but always with
conscience and humanity.

The administration has struggled to determine "those feasible ways of advancing their
civilization and material wealth." Instead of leaving them alone, the current administration
selected the latter option since it was more in keeping with compassion and national
morality. With this in mind, the Legislature enacted Act No. 1639, ensuring them the
blessings of peace and concord, while facilitating and not hindering their quick and steady
march towards civilization and culture. So the Act must be read and used in this perspective.

A statute based on reasonable categorization does not violate the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws. To be fair, a classification must:
 (1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act 1639 meets these criteria. The categorization is based on genuine, not fictitious,
distinctions. It is founded on civilization and culture, not "accident of birth or parentage," as
the appellant's counsel claims. A non-Christian tribe is a group of indigenous of the
Philippine Islands who live in tribal relationships separate from established settlements.
 This difference is justified, given the Act was designed to address the unique needs of
non-Christian tribes. The rare situations of some members who have now attained cultural
equality with their Christian brethren cannot alter the classification's rationality.

Finally, a simple reading of the Act reveals that it applies equally to all members of the class.
Its applicability may be unjust to certain non-Christians due to their cultural level, but this
does not negate its application to everyone.

The Act is also not an abuse of the state's police power. The police authority is believed to be
the most tenacious and least limitable of all government authorities. It is the law of
overriding necessity and is a power coextensive with self-protection. As long as the action is
not as arbitrary or capricious as to violate an individual's rights, it is a lawful exercise of the
police authority.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian
tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to
hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate
purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater
Philippines.

All actions taken thus far to promote public policy towards them recognize their
fundamental right to parity in the enjoyment of the same privileges as their Christian
brothers. According to our constitution, this court can only investigate whether the
Legislature had the right to pass the statute. If the power exists, as we believe it does, then
the soundness of the policy established and the methods taken to further it are not concerns
for this court to decide. Even if educated non-Christians suffer as a result of the law's
implementation, the all-encompassing concept of salus populi suprema est lex justifies it. When
the public safety or morality necessitate a class of people to stop doing something, the
Legislature's hand cannot be held back by minor inconveniences. The nation's interests
trump their own interests.

IMBONG v. OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819 | April 8, 2014

FACTS:

Despite the calls to withhold support thereto, the Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President’s approval, challengers from various sectors of society asked the
Court to strike down RA 10354 as unconstitutional. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the controversy, as presented in
fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention. A perusal of these shows that
the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of the RH Law on the ground that it
violates, among many others, the right to the equal protection of the laws.

Petitioners claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor, as it makes them the
primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. Petitioners
further argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.

They also add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether the RH Law violates the equal protection of laws.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court held that equal protection does not require the universal
application of the laws to all without distinction. Classifications may be sanctioned. What is
required is equality among equals.

The RH Law does not discriminate against the poor. It is, in fact, pursuant to Sec. 11, Art.
XIII, which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
prioritizing them in health development matters.

Moreover, there is a substantial distinction between public and private educational

institutions that justifies the latter’s exemption as there is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction
and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG

PILIPINAS
G.R. No. 148208 | December 15, 2004

FACTS:
Republic Act (RA) 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) abolished the old Central Bank of the
Philippines, and created a new BSP. Almost 8 years after the effectivity of RA 7653, the
Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against
BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary from further implementing the last proviso in
Section15(c), Article II of RA 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Article II, Section
15(c) of RA 7653 (Exercise of Authority) provides that:

"In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall ... (c) establish a human
resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment,
transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with
 sound principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board’s approval, shall be instituted as
an integral component of the Bangko Sentral’s human resource development
program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as
closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758
[Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, that compensation and wage
structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be
in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758."

The Association alleges that the proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes
of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade
[SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class).

It is contended that this classification is “a classic case of class legislation,” allegedly not
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the
BSP personnel’s position.

In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious,
and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that
R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of
the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and
(b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees
have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented.

Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law,
respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal
nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this
petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the
transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.

ISSUE:
Whether the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

HELD:
YES, the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

The Equal Protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate – so long as the classification
is not unreasonable. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons themselves, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.

In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG
20 and above) from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) was intended to address the BSP’s
lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not
intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file and the resulting discrimination or
distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the
legislative sense. However, in the subsequent passages of the amendment on the charters of
other Government Financial Institution (GFI), the surrounding circumstances of the case
changed.
The subsequent amendments of the other GFIs’ charter (i.e., express authorization to
determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure, and explicit exemption –
without distinction as to salary grade or position – all employees of the GFI from the SSL)
resulted to the oppressive results of Congress’ inconsistent and unequal policy towards the
BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFI. In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact
that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the
seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP
o Rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC
getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also
arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences
between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
o The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and
continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees of the exemption from
SSL breached the latter’s right to equal protection.
o The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA

TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. CITY OF MANILA, represented by
DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM
G.R. No. 122846 | January 20, 2009

FACTS:
In 1992, Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the Ordinance No. 7744 that prohibits hotels,
motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments from offering
short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or “wash up” rates or other similarly concocted
terms, in the City of Manila.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC) et. al. filed a petition on the ground that the
Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels
in Manila.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 7744 is unconstitutional

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights.
Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for
obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up.
Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected
only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.

VILLANUEVA v. JBC
RICHARD RICALDE vPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 211002 |January 21, 2015

FACTS:
XXX,10 years old then, woke up as “he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something
inserted in his anus.” He saw that Ricalde, 31 years old, a distant relative and textmate of
XXX, “fondled his penis.” Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room
to tell her what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual
organ.

RTC found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault. CA
affirmed the conviction but lowered the amount of damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not XXX’s failure to categorically state that a penis was inserted into his
anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice
fatal.
2. Whether or not the absence of trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of
spermatozoa disproves penile or object penetration.
3. Whether or not the invocation of “variance doctrine” is proper.
4. Whether or not the slightest penetration into one’s anus constitutes rape through
sexual assault.

HELD:
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as “instrument or object
rape,” “gender-free rape,” or “homosexual rape.” The gravamen of rape through sexual
assault is “the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice.”

First issue: NO
The Court held that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his or her genital or
anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was committed. In People v.
Soria, the Court ruled that “We find it inconsequential that “AAA” could not specifically
identify the particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is
important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require
“AAA” to identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be
contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.”

Second issue: NO
Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal
orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal
orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not
contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and
consistent with human nature.

The Court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the
possibility of convictions for rape based on the victim’s credible lone testimony.

Third issue: NO
Variance doctrine
 Variance doctrine is provided under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. It states:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily

includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former continue or form part of those constituting the latter.

In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven
during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime
of rape through sexual assault.

Fourth issue: YES

XXX testified that he “felt something was inserted into his anus.” The slightest penetration
into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape.

Long line of cases consider a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing
jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply
by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victim’s anal
orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault.

The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of
penetration is not important. Rape is an “assault on human dignity.”

KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al., v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 221318 | December 16, 2015

FACTS:
RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a
mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in order to establish a
clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through
the adoption of biometric technology. RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters
whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for validation.” “Voters
who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of application
for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated .”COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among others,
the said Resolution provides that: “the registration records of voters without biometrics data
who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications
for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be
deactivated. Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing
the constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as
well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an
unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property. 

HELD: No.
The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right
of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right
to reasonably regulate.The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases
that registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for
such right. The process of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote. Thus,
although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply with
the registration procedure in order to vote Thus, unless it is shown that
a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive
requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution -that is, one which
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person’s
ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good -the same cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional, as in this case.

I-UTAK v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206020 | April 14, 2015 | J. Reyes

Facts of the case:

The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 (providing for the implemented rules of
RA No. 9606 (Fair Elections Act)) in connection with the May 2013 and all subsequent
elections. Section 7(f) of the said resolution prohibited the posting, displaying or exhibiting
of any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized common poster
areas, in public areas, or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
Section 7(g) enumerated the public places referred to in Section 7(f), among them:
a. (Item 5) Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries,
pedicabs, and tricycles, whether motorized or not, and
b. (Item 6) Public transportation terminals, such as BUS TERMINALS, airports,
seaports, DOCKS, piers, TRAIN STATIONS, and the like.
The resolution provides that the violation of items 5 and 6 under subsection (g) shall be a
cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or
operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under
Section 9 of the Fair Elections Act.
Petitioner 1-UTAK sought the clarification from the COMELEC as regards the application of
the said items in the resolution, requesting the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation
of such provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post
election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution denying 1-UTAK’s request to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed provisions.

Issue: Are Section 7 items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
constitutional?

Ruling:
NO. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free
speech clause, but also of the equal protection clause.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may
pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the 4 requisites of valid
classification be complied with:
1. It must be based upon substantial distinctions
 2. It must be germane to the purposes of the law
3. It must not be limited to the existing conditions only
4. It must apply equally to all members of the class

It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.
9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of the
purported class. However, the classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is
not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of the law.
A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other
properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government
either a franchise or a permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition
imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership
per se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner affect the
franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and
transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already
explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use
by the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed
to express their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their
properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and
transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and
transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is
likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other
properties. Admittedly, any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and
transport terminals would be seen by many people. However, election campaign materials
posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public, e.g., commercial
establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is no reason to single out
owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting of election
campaign materials.

Further, classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of private
vehicles and other properties bears no relation to the stated purpose of Section 7(g) items (5)
and (6) of Resolution No. 9615, i.e., to provide equal time, space and opportunity to
candidates in elections. To stress, PUVs and transport terminals are private properties.
Indeed, the nexus between the restriction on the freedom of expression of owners of PUVs
and transport terminals and the government's interest in ensuring equal time, space, and
opportunity for candidates in elections was not established by the COMELEC.

MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA

AUGUST 16, 2016

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007,
after a committee hearing and consultations with various stakeholders, on imposing a ban
against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao
City. Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the said ordinance and took effect on March 23, 2007
after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao Pioneer.
Pursuant to Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly
enforced three months thereafter. Then the Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and
Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in
the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, and sought for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The residents living within
and adjacent to banana plantations in Davao City led by Wilfredo Mosqueda, joined by other
residents of Davao City, (Mosqueda, et al.) submitted their Motion for Leave to Intervene
and Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction.
A serious challenge being posed against Ordinance No. 0309-07 rests on its supposed
collision with the Equal Protection Clause. The respondents submit that the ordinance
transgresses this constitutional guaranty on two counts, to wit: (1) by prohibiting aerial
spraying per se, regardless of the substance or the level of concentration of the chemicals to
be applied; and (2) by imposing the 30-meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao
City regardless of the sizes of the landholding.

ISSUE:
whether Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates equal protection clause

RULING:
The SC said equal protection was violated since the ordinance made no substantial
distinctions when it prohibited aerial spraying per se regardless of the substance or the level
of concentration of the chemicals to be applied, and when it imposed the 30-meter buffer
zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the size of landholdings.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
Equal protection neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things
without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is
directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection
envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another. In other words, a valid classification
must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class.
The total ban on aerial spraying runs afoul with the equal protection clause because it does
not classify which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially even as reasonable
distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid
substances to the public health, livelihood and the environment.

SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION v. DSWD

25 April 2017

FACTS:
The case at bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug
Corporation (petitioner) against the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National Council on Disability
Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of
2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior
citizens and persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and treating them as tax deduction
due to the reason that claiming it affects the profitability of their business. The petitioner is a
domestic corporation engaged in the business of drugstore operation in the Philippines
while the respondents are government' agencies, office and bureau tasked to monitor
compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, promulgate implementing rules and regulations
for their effective implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke licenses of erring
establishments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens PWDs does not violate the
petitioner’s right to equal protection of the law
2. Whether or not the definitions of Disabilities and PWDs are vague and violates the
petitioners right to due process of law

HELD:
1. Yes. The subject laws do not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another." For a
classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be
germane to the purposes of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

2. No. The definitions of "disabilities" and "PWDs" are clear and unequivocal. Section 4(a) of
R.A. No. 7277, the precursor of R.A. No. 94421 defines "disabled persons" as follows:

(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a
mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or within the
range considered normal for a human being[.] On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is
defined in Section 5.1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 as follows:

5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined under Section 4 of [R.A.
No.] 7277 [or] An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and
Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as amended and their integration into the
Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes. This is defined as a person suffering
from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory
impairment, to perform an activity in
a manner or within the range considered normal for human being. Disability shall
mean
(1) a physical 1or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of
such individual;
(2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an
impairment. In view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic Act No.
9257 and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9442 are hereby declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.

NATIONAL ARTIST v. EX. SEC.

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE v. PROFESSIONAL

REGULATORY BOARD of REAL ESTATE SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION COMMISSION
715 SCRA 293 (2014) | G.R. No. 197676 February 4, 2014

FACTS:
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was
signed into law on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to
professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing,
registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers,
appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment,
real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP),
in the exercise of its consumer regulation functions. Such authority is now transferred to the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of
Real Estate Service (PRBRES) created under the new law.

Petitioners sought to declare as void and unconstitutional some provisions of R.A. No. 9646.

According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates Article
VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that "[e]very bill
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate
trade and business to the Human Settlements Commission, now the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), which authority includes the issuance of license to sell of
subdivision owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3) it
violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers’ most basic
ownership rights, the right to use and dispose property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of
the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal protection clause as
no substantial distinctions exist between real estate developers and the exempted group
mentioned since both are property owners dealing with their own property.

Additionally, petitioners contended that the lofty goal of nurturing and developing a "corps
of technically competent, reasonable and respected professional real estate service
practitioners" is not served by curtailing the right of real estate developers to conduct their
business of selling properties. On the contrary, these restrictions would have disastrous
effects on the real estate industry as the additional cost of commissions would affect the
pricing and affordability of real estate packages. When that happens, petitioners claimed
that the millions of jobs and billions in revenues that the real estate industry generates for
the government will be a thing of the past.

After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
the trial court rendered its Decision2 denying the petition. The trial court held that the
assailed provisions are relevant to the title of the law as they are intended to regulate the
practice of real estate service in the country by ensuring that those who engage in it shall
either be a licensed real estate broker, or under the latter’s supervision.

The trial court said that the questioned provisions do not preclude property owners from
using, enjoying, or disposing of their own property because they can still develop and sell
their properties except that they have to secure the services of a licensed real estate broker
who shall oversee the actions of the unlicensed real estate practitioners under their employ.
Since the subject provisions merely prescribe the requirements for the regulation of the
practice of real estate services, these are consistent with a valid exercise of the State’s police
power. The trial court further ruled that Section 28(a) does not violate the equal protection
clause because the exemption of real estate developers was anchored on reasonable
classification aimed at protecting the buying public from the rampant misrepresentations
often committed by unlicensed real estate practitioners, and to prevent unscrupulous and
unethical real estate practices from flourishing considering the large number of consumers in
the regular course of business compared to isolated sale transactions made by private
individuals selling their own property.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 28(a) is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.

RULING:
No Violation of Equal Protection Clause.

Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 exempts from its coverage natural and juridical persons dealing
with their own property, and other persons such as receivers, trustees or assignees in
insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings. However, real estate developers are specifically
mentioned as an exception from those enumerated therein. Petitioners argue that this
provision violates the equal protection clause because it unjustifiably treats real estate
developers differently from those exempted persons who also own properties and desire to
sell them. They insist that no substantial distinctions exist between ordinary property
owners and real estate developers as the latter, in fact, are more capable of entering into real
estate transactions and do not need the services of licensed real estate brokers.1âwphi1 They
assail the RTC decision in citing the reported fraudulent practices as basis for the exclusion
of real estate developers from the exempted group of persons under Section 28(a).
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having
a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to
the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and
future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.

R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for the
development of "a corps of highly respected, technically competent, and disciplined real
estate service practitioners, knowledgeable of internationally accepted standards and
practice of the profession." Real estate developers at present constitute a sector that hires or
employs the largest number of brokers, salespersons, appraisers and consultants due to the
sheer number of products (lots, houses and condominium units) they advertise and sell
nationwide. As early as in the ‘70s, there has been a proliferation of errant developers,
operators or sellers who have reneged on their representation and obligations to comply
with government regulations such as the provision and maintenance of subdivision roads,
drainage, sewerage, water system and other basic requirements. To protect the interest of
home and lot buyers from fraudulent acts and manipulations perpetrated by these
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, P.D. No. 957 was issued
to strictly regulate housing and real estate development projects. Hence, in approving R.A.
No. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the necessity of imposing the new licensure
requirements to all real estate service practitioners, including and more importantly, those
real estate service practitioners working for real estate developers. Unlike individuals or
entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots,
houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is
highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.

The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property
owners exempted under Section 28(a) and real estate developers like petitioners, and the
classification enshrined in R.A. No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose.
The Court thus rules that R.A. No. 9646 is valid and constitutional.
Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome
only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and
only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce,
in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

Indeed, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a
statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt;
that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable
basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger
must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor
of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted."

DISINI v. SOJ
G.R. No. 203335 | February 11, 2014

FACTS:
Cyberspace is a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and
ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. Through cyberspace, a person is able
to be productive by sharing and retrieving information like academic resources/reference,
communication and commerce.

However, there are also tomfooleries happening. To prevent such, and punish their
perpetrators, the government assert the Cybercrime Prevention Act. The cybercrime law
aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.

Here, the petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission
as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize
violators.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause under
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.

RULING:
No , Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting does not violate Equal Protection clause.
Section 4(a)(6) focus on Cybercrime Offenses. It provides:

(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such
a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with
the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the
registrant, in case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

The petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection
clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer
the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any
other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well-known
billionaire-philanthropist named “Julio Gandolfo,” the law would punish for
cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his
pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it happens to be his real name.
Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law
should recognize the difference.

But, there is no real difference whether he uses “Julio Gandolfo” which happens to be his
real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name
that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain
name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not
ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.

Thus, Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the
internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others is valid and constitutional.

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

G.R. No. 192531 | November 12, 2014

FACTS:
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was
enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately,
on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following day.

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City,
La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 2009 addressed to
petitioner, denied the claim, stating:

We regret to inform you that we cannot give due course to your claim because you are no
longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by
CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.

The denial was appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which
affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and
lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.

HELD:
Yes, the Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims
of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
The March 17, 2010 decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No.
SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the
benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
The court explained that Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not
intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of
being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and
legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated
"dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants
and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was
crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all
parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.

b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in

contravention of the equal protection clause

To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the
Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded,
prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the
Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state
to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against
illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the
claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since
the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing
government concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights
of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On the
contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that employees and
their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected
disability or death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so
narrowly interpreted.