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DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Case
This petition for certiorari1 assails, on ground of grave abuse of discretion, the following dispositions
of respondent Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) in OMB-V-C-15-0115, for violation of Section 72 of
Republic Act 3019 3 (RA 3019), in relation to Section 84 of Republic Act 6713 5 (RA 6713); and
OMB-V-F-15-0001, for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Republic Act 1379 (RA
1379), viz:
a) Joint Resolution6 dated August 12, 2016 finding probable cause against Spouses Florencio
Tumbocon Miraflores (Florencio) and Maria Lourdes Martin Miraflores (Lourdes; collectively,
petitioners) for nine (9) counts and three (3) counts, respectively, of violation of Section 7 of RA 3019
in relation to Section 8 of RA 6713 and for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under RA
1379;7 and
b) Joint Order8 dated October 2, 2017 affirming with modification such finding of probable cause but
reducing on ground of prescription the counts of violation of Section 7 of RA 3019, in relation to
Section 8 of RA 6713 against Florencio from nine (9) to four (4).
The assailed OMB Joint Resolution9 dated August 12, 2016 bears the parties' respective
submissions, viz:
Complainant (respondent in this case) alleged that respondents (petitioners in this case) amassed
wealth disproportionate to their legitimate incomes. It also alleged the following:
1. From the declarations in their 2001-2009 SALNs, the total change in respondent's net worth xxx
amounted to P4,665,938.02, while their estimated total compensation xxx income for the same years
amounted to P4,920,519.00 where P3,799,170.00 is Florencio's estimated compensation,
while Pl,121,349.00 is the estimated compensation of Lourdes;
2. The computation of the real properties in their 2001 to 2009 SALNs xxx, shows that
the acquisition costs were not consistently used as there were times that the fair market value of the
properties [was] adopted/added; hence the actual value spent to acquire the properties were not
declared. The inconsistencies therefor affected the actual [Net worth] of respondents, which upon re-
computation xxx amounted to P10,237,518.02, not P4,665,938.02;
xxxx
3. Using respondents' recomputed net worth of P10,237,518.02 less their known income of
P4,920,519.00, there is a total unexplained wealth of P5,316,999.02. This amount, however, does
not take into account the expenses incurred by respondents for their numerous travels abroad and
other living expenses. The amount of unexplained wealth was taken from the acquisition costs of
assets and liabilities declared in the 2001 to 2009 SALN;
5. Although Lourdes acquired shares of stocks from the Rural Bank of Ibajay, Inc. [(RBII)] in 1989,
the value of said shares of stocks amounting to P6,497,200.00 was only declared in their 2008 and
2009 SALNs; and
6. The amounts of certain liabilities were either overstated or still declared despite having been fully
paid, such as the housing loan and multi-purpose loan (MPL) from Pag I.B.I.G. Fund Iloilo Branch
and the Ember Salary Loan from the Government Insurance System (GSIS).
In denying the accusations against them, respondents asserted that the computation of their total
income should be P12,132,519.00, an amount which is proportional to the alleged increase in their
net worth of P10,237,518.02 from 2001 to 2009.
Respondents averred that in the computation of their incomes, complaint disregarded their incomes
from their assets, i.e. fish ponds, farm and coconut lands, and financial interests in their rural
banking business that were consistently declared in. their SALNs. Also disregarded were the
incomes of their adult children. who started to earn in 2009 and other remunerations, including per
diems, representation and transportation allowances (RATA) and other fees, all constitute their
legitimate sources of funds and may cover the family expenses. Their loan of
almost P20,000,000.00 was incurred to subsidize their living and enable them to acquire the
properties added to their assets from 2001 to 2009.
To show that they declared all their properties, respondents alleged that they included in their
SALNs properties which they inherited but which are still undistributed and co-owned with the other
heirs. The costs of some assets were also declared based on the amount stated in the deeds of sale
and other costs incurred in acquiring such assets, such as loan interest, discount, accessories,
insurance, etc., and the mode by which such assets were acquired, e.g. by loan.
Respondents further explained that they did not declare in their 2001 to 2009 SALNs the Nissan
Safari Wagon, Mazda Pick-up (alleged in the complaint as Toyota Pick-up) and Kawasaki
motorcycle all registered in their names, as they are already owned, used and given to persons who
had served their family for many years. The sworn statements of Allen S. Quimpo (Quimpo), Efren
Trinidad (Trinidad) and Antonio M. Pamisan (Pamisan) were submitted in support of their claim.
Additionally, to show that their accumulated wealth from 2001 to 2009 is not disproportionate to their
sources of income/funds, respondents presented a computation of their net worth, income and
liabilities from 2004 to 2013. Allegedly, while their SALNs did not provide every minute detail of
information, they, however, provided all necessary data following the detailed and
complete requirement of RA 6713. As the SALNs were prepared in good faith, the difficulty in
determining their net worth and income should not operate to disregard the legal income from
them. 10
The same Joint Resolution shows a summary of petitioner's Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net
worth (SALNs) for 2001-2009,11. viz:
Real Properties
400,000.00
Pick-up 900,000.00
(Nissan)
Automobile 780,000.00
(Mazda)
Real Properties
Change in Explain/Unexplained
Year Networth Known Income
Networth Wealth
Too, the Joint Resolution bears the OM B's finding of probable cause against petitioners for violation
of RA 301916 in relation to RA 6713;17 and for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties.18 The
OMB held in the main:
1. By declaring amounts higher or lower than the actual costs (Acquisition Costs) of their real
and personal properties, petitioners violated the rule on submission of complete and
accurate SALNs.
2. As for the undeclared motor vehicles, petitioners admitted having bought the same, albeit
they conveniently claimed that they had given these motor vehicles to their long-time
employees as accommodation or reward. This is at best self-serving.
3. Regarding Lourdes' RBII shareholdings, she held ownership thereof since 1989 and yet
she failed to declare their value in her very first 2007 SALN. She indicated it only in her
subsequent 2008 SALN.
4. The alleged source for the purchase of petitioners' family home in Quezon City appeared
to be dubious i.e. HSBC remittances from Florencio's siblings. No documents were
presented to prove Florencio's relationship with the supposed sponsors and the latter's
financial capacity.
5. The increase in petitioners' net worth was not supported by their reported
incomes/compensations.
FIRST. The OMB adopted FIO's so-called erroneous and inaccurate re-computation. Petitioners'
1a₩phi1
SECOND. Whatever criminal liability corresponded to their SALNs for 2001-2009 had already
prescribed.
THIRD. They did not acquire any property grossly disproportionate to their salaries. They had in fact
conclusively shown that the increase in their net worth may be attributed to their ineomes or
earnings for the periods these properties were acquired.
FOURTH. There was no allegation or proof that the entries in their SALNs were intended to mislead
or deceive.
FIFTH. They had a valid justification for not disclosing or for otherwise misdeclaring some assets in
their SALNs.
By Joint Order20 dated October 2, 2017, the OMB affirmed with modification. It reduced on ground
of prescription, the counts of violation of Section 8 of RA 3019, in relation to RA 6713 against
Florencio from nine to four.
Petitioners now seek to nullify the OMB's Joint Resolution dated August 12, 2016 and Joint Order
dated October 2, 2017. They assert:
The OMB committed grave abuse of discretion when it adopted as bases of finding probable cause
the FIO's erroneous and unsubstantiated computation of their net worth, thus, violating their right to
be informed of the charges against them.
OMB committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to accord due recognition to the Court of
Appeals' Decision dated November 17, 2017 in CA-G.R. SP No.149592 clearing them of any
administrative liability pertaining to the same SALNs subject of the present case.
The OMB committed grave abuse of discretion when it resolved the cases only after eight (8) long
years since the investigation commenced in 2010, thus, violating their right to speedy disposition of
the cases against them.
The FIO's computation was based on the acquisition costs of petitioners' assets, liabilities, and net
worth indicated in their own SALNs.
Its finding of probable cause was based on petitioners' incomplete SALNs and the various
inconsistencies found therein.
Since petitioners themselves admitted having purchased and registered subject motor vehicles in
their names, they may not deny ownership thereof. The letters 23 acknowledging receipt by the
supposed persons in whose favor petitioners had allegedly conveyed these motor vehicles as a
reward for their loyal service to petitioners' family are self-serving, nay, replete with inconsistencies.
Lourdes cannot disclaim liability for her failure to declare the acquisition cost of her RBII
shareholdings in her 2007 SALN. Her bare allegation that RBII had a negative book value is devoid
of merit. Petitioners themselves had previously admitted that as condition to acquiring these
shareholdings they had to assume the liabilities of the Garcia family to RBII. This simply goes to
show that the RBII shareholdings bore a substantial value and were onerously acquired.
ISSUES
1. Did the OMB gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against petitioners
for violation of Section 8 of RA 3019, in relation to Section 7 of RA 6713 and for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties under RA 1379?
2. Did the OMB violate petitioners' right to be sufficiently informed of the charges against
them?
3. Did the OMB violate petitioners' right to speedy disposition of the cases which allegedly
got resolved only eight years after their investigation commenced?
4. Does the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149592 affect the present
criminal complaints against petitioners?
RULING
In finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 7 of RA 3019,24 in relation to
Section 8 of RA 671325 and for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under RA 1379, the OMB
made an exhaustive discussion of their alleged undervalued, overvalued, and undeclared properties
based on their SALNs for 20 01-2009; the Certifications obtained from the Provincial Accountant of
Aklan,26 Accounting Service of the House of Representatives, 27 Pag-I.B.I.G Fund 28 and
GSIS;29 and petitioners' affinnative defenses as pleaded in their Joint Counter-Affidavit,30 Joint
Position Paper 31 and Motion for Reconsideration,32 including their two-inch thick documentary
attachments.
After the evaluation process, the OMB came out with its finding of probable cause that petitioners
either undervalued, overvalued, or failed to declare certain properties in their SALNs for 2001 - 2009.
These properties included several motor vehicles, RBII shares of stock worth P6,160,000.00, loans,
and additional incomes and earnings.
ONE. Petitioners have not denied that they did fail to declare in their SALNs for 2001 - 2009 the
following motor vehicles i.e. Isuzu Elf, Nissan Safari Wagon, Mazda Pick Up and Kawasaki
motorcycle.33 They in fact admitted having purchased these vehicles in their own name and using
their own money. They claim, however, that they no longer own these vehicles because they already
conveyed them gratis et amore to their valued employees as reward for their long years of loyal
service to their family. In this regard, petitioners submitted to the OMB the letters34 acknowledging
receipt of the vehicles by these alleged beneficiaries.
We agree with the OMB that these documents, as worded, do not alter the fact that it was petitioners
themselves who bought the vehicles in their own name and with their own funds. They have not
even shown that these vehicles are no longer registered in their names after they allegedly
conveyed them in favor of the so-called "beneficiaries". Consequently, there is merit to the finding of
the OMB that these affidavits, standing alone, do not negate, nay, justify petitioners' failure to
declare them in their SALNs for 2001 - 2009. At any rate, whether these affidavits reflect the truth is
a question of fact which the Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot take cognizance of.
TWO. Under Section 7 of RA 3019, every public officer is directed to file a true, detailed, and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, including among others, a statement of the amounts and sources
of his or her income and/or earnings.
Petitioners assert that aside from the salaries and allowances they received as government elective
officials, they derived other incomes and/or earnings from the fishponds, farm and coconut lots, and
rural banking business35 they own. The record speaks for itself. Petitioners' SALNs for 2001 - 2009
are totally devoid of any single entry supposedly representing additional income or earnings derived
from petitioners' aforesaid assets. Surely, this omission, by itself is a violation of Section 7 of RA
3019, in relation to Section 8 of RA 6713.
THREE. Petitioners vigorously profess that the properties they had acquired over the years were
either financed from their salaries or from loans obtained from Pag-I.B.I.G. Fund (i.e., housing
loan36 and Multi-Purpose Loan37 ) and GSIS (i.e., Ember Salary Loan38 ). But per Certifications,
respectively, issued by Pag-I.B.I.G. Fund39 and GSIS,40 the loan amounts declared in petitioners'
SALNs were either bloated or repeatedly entered therein as loans, albeit they had been fully paid
long ago. The Court keenly notes that petitioners have conspicuously failed to refute these
damaging findings ofthe OMB.
FOUR. Regarding the RBII shareholdings of Lourdes, she claims to have acquired the same in
1989. When she joined the government in 2007, however, she did not include the value of these
shareholdings in her initial SALN. She began declaring it only in her 2008 SALN where she declared
that the asset had a value ofPhp 6,497,200.00.
Lourdes seeks to clarify though that she actually had no value to declare back in 2007 because RBII
was then of negative book value. She asserts that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) even
directed RBII to infuse additional capital to save it from receivership. The best evidence to prove this
point are the financial reports submitted by RBII to the BSP and the latter's written directive for RBII's
infusion of additional capital. Lourdes could have easily obtained these certifications from the files of
RBII itself, but she did not. What she submitted instead were supposed independent Audited
Financial Statements,41 General Information Sheet42 (GIS) and Accountant's Report43 on RBII.
Whether these documents are sufficient to excuse Lourdes from reporting the actual value of her
RBII shareholdings in her 2007 SALN is again a question of fact which the Court still cannot take
cognizance of.
For purposes of filing a criminal information, probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances
sufficient to create a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof.44 As such, a fmding of probable cause does not require an inquiry on
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. The presence or absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and a matter of defense which may be passed upon
only after a full-blown trial on the merits. In sum, whether a party's defense or accusation is valid and
meritorious and whether the evidence presented are admissible fall beyond the process of
determining probable cause. They are for the trial court to completely determine through a full-blown
trial on the merits.45
FIVE. On petitioners' right to be sufficiently informed of the charges against them, the record once
more speaks for itself. Petitioners had not once, but twice responded to FIO's charges through their
sixteen-page Joint Counter-Affidavit,46 seventeen-page Joint Position Paper47 and their two-inch
thick documents as attachments. These submissions certainly could not have come from parties
who did not sufficiently understand the charges hurled against them.
Petitioners, too, harp on the OMB 's purported eight-year delay in disposing of the cases against
them. This issue is being raised for the first time here and now. Petitioners never raised it in all the
eight years the proceedings below pended. Even then, aside from claiming here that the case had
dragged for over eight years before the OMB, petitioners have not cited the specific attendant
circumstances in support of their lamentation, e.g., the length of delay, reason for the delay,
petitioners' assertion of their right to speedy disposition of the cases against them and consequent
prejudice to them,48 if any.
In any case, whether there was inordinate delay below is another question of fact which, again, the
Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot take cognizance of.
In another vein, while indeed the CA had cleared petitioners of any administrative liability for serious
dishonesty and grave misconduct based on the same acts for which they are criminally charged, the
same does not affect the finding of probable cause against them here. For one, there is no showing
that the decision of the CA is final and executory. For another, although the criminal cases involve
the same acts or omissions complained of in the administrative cases, petitioners' absolution in the
latter does not bar their prosecution in the former, and vice versa. The quantum of evidence required
in one is different from the quantum of evidence required in the other.49
Petitioners also raise the issue of whether they can be faulted for their alternate and/or simultaneous
use of Fair Market Value and/or Acquisition Cost in the valuation of their real properties declared in
their SALNs.50 Suffice it to state that the presence or absence of good faith still is another question
of fact. We reiterate that the Court is not a trier of facts.
As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its
constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and
government employees. The rule on non-interference is based on the "respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman[.]"
An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as
the champion of the people [,] and [is] the preserver of the integrity of the public service." Thus, it
has the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal
case against an accused. This function is executive in nature.
The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter. It requires probing into the
"existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he [or she] was prosecuted."
The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better
position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of
probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the
Ombudsman.
Practicality also leads this Court to exercise restraint in interfering with the Office of the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause. Republic v. Ombudsman Desierto explains:
[T]he functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they
could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complaint.
Invoking an exception to the rule on non-interference, petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion. According to him: (a) he was not given the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses, (b) the Ombudsman considered pieces of evidence not presented
during the preliminary investigation, and (c) there is no probable cause to charge him with plunder.
While, indeed, this Court may step in if the public prosecutor gravely abused its discretion in acting
on the case, such grave abuse must be substantiated, not merely alleged. In Casing v. Hon.
Ombudsman, et al.:
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner - which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law - in order to
exceptionally warrant judicial intervention.
As in Dichaves,52 there is here no showing that the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding
probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 7 of RA 3019, in relation to Section 8 of
RA 6713 and for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under RA 1379. The Court, therefore,
adheres to the rule of judicial restraint or non-interference with the OM B's exercise of its
constitutional investigative power and its consequent finding of probable cause.
Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED and the Joint Resolution dated August 12, 2016 and Joint
Order dated October 2, 2017, in Case Nos. OMB-V-C-15-0115 and OMB-V-F-15-0001, AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.