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TEAM CODE- 059

LATE LAL DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT

COMPETITION

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB &

HARYANA

In the Matter of

STATE OF PUNJAB
(PROSECUTION)
v/s
VEER
(DEFENCE)

FOR OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER:

Section 363, 366, 367, 370, and 371 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 5 and
8 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, Section 4 of the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB &

HARYANA

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OFABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................................iii
INDEX OFAUTHORITIES .................................................................................................iv
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS.........................................................................................................ix
ISSUES RAISED.................................................................................................................. xii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS......................................................................................... xiii
ISSUE 1: WHETHER COMPETENT COURT IN INDIA HAS JURISDICTION TO
TRY THE PRESENT CASE?..........................................................................................
ISSUE 2: WHETHER TRIAL OF VEER BY THE COURT OF INDIA, FOR THE
SAME CHARGES THAT HE HAD ALREADY FACED IN DUBAI, AS THAT
WOULD AMOUNT TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY?.............................................xiii
ISSUE 3: WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE
PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 363, 366, 368, 370, 371 OF THE INDIAN PENAL
CODE?..............................................................................xiv
ISSUE 4: WHETHER ALLEGED TRANSACTION THROUGH BITCOINS AND ITS
EXCHANGE INTO INDIAN CURRENCY IS CONTRARY TO LAW IN
INDIA?.....................................................................................................................
ISSUE 5: WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE
PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 AND SECTION 13 OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE
MANAGEMENT ACT, 1999?....................................................................................
BODY OF ARGUMENTS........................................................................................................
1. Competent Court in India has jurisdiction to try the present case…………..
1.1. The concerned case falls under the extraterritorial operation of the IPC……………..
1.2. The defence that the act was done partly in India and partly outside India is not
maintainable…………………………………………………………………………….
1.3. Section 188 of the CrPC supports the present trial…………………………………….
1.4. There is no need of Central Government’s permission………………………………...
1.5. Section 181 of the CrPC expressly determines the jurisdiction of the present
matter……………………………………………………………………………………
2. Trial of Veer by the court of India, for the same charges that he had already faced in
Dubai, would not amount to double jeopardy……………………………………….
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2.1. Prosecution and punishment didn’t coincide…………………………………………

2.2. Offence not similar to the previous offence………………………………………….
2.3. Foreign trial is no bar to Indian trial………………………………………………….
2.4. Veer was not tried by a court of competent jurisdiction………………………………
3. Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under sections 363, 366, 368, 370,
371 of the Indian Penal Code……………………………………………………….
3.1. Veer is liable under the Indian Penal Code…………………………………………….
3.1.1. Veer kidnapped Rohini………………………………………………………….
3.1.1.a. Rohini’s consent is vitiated by misconception………………………....
3.1.1.b. Veer iliable for punishment under S. 363 of IPC………………………
3.1.2. Veer abducted Rohini with a deceitful means…………………………………..
3.1.3. Veer abducted Rohini for slavery and prostitution………………………………
3.1.4. Veer is indulged in selling Rohini as a slave…………………………………….
3.2. Veer is liable under Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956…………………………
4. The alleged transaction through Bitcoin and its exchange into Indian currency is
contrary to law in India………………………………………………………..
4.1. Bitcoin is not a currency but a property………………………………….
4.2. Bitcoin transaction in Dubai
4.2.1. No law governs Bitcoin in Dubai and any transaction is prohibited…………
4.2.2. No agreement was made between the parties pertaining to the transaction……
4.3. Exchange of Bitcoin in India………………………………………………….
5. Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under section 4 of the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999………………………………………………………………..
5.1. Booked under Money Laundering Offences’ Cross Border Implications…………….
5.2. Cryptocurrencies as a foreign exchange under FEMA……………………………..
PRAYER FOR RELIEF…………………………………………………………………….
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations Expansions

S. Section
v. Versus
& And
AIR All India Reporter
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
Ors. Others
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Pp. Page Nos.
J. Justice
CJ. Chief Justice
ed. Edition
i.e. That is
PMLA Prevention of Money
Laundering Act
FEMA Foreign Exchange
Management Act
I.P.C Indian Penal Code
CR.P.C The Code of Criminal
Procedure
ITA Immoral Traffic
(Prevention) Act, 1956
FLCHT Federal Law on
Combination Human
Trafficking
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES REFERRED

S. Case Title Citation P.

No. No.

1 Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 753 1

2 Nirbhai Singh v. State of M.P. 1972 Cr LJ 1474 (MP) 1
3 Virsa v. State AIR 1958 SC 465 2
4 State of Bihar v. Pasupati Singh 1973 Cr LJ 1832 2
5 Re Thangavelu 1972 Cr LJ 390 (Mad) 2
6 Nishan Singh v State of Punjab (2008) 17 SCC 505 2
7 Sehaj Ram 1983 Cr LJ 993 (SC) 2
8 Imran Khan v. State of MP (1995) 1 Cr LJ 17 (MP). 2
9 Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1986 SC683 2
10 Kesar Singh v State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 753 2
11 DayaNand v State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 2
12 Ghelabhai Jagmalbhai Bhawad v State of (2008) 17 SCC 651 2
Gujarat
13 Harendra Nath Borah v. State of Assam (2007) 15 SCC 249 2
14 Raj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 15 SCC 292 2
15 Akhila Parida v. State of Orissa 1987 Cr LJ 609 (Ori) 3
16 Nagar Prasad v. State of UP 1998 Cr LJ 1580 (All) 3
17 Akhtar v. State of UP AIR 1964 All 262 3
18 Girja Devi v. State of HP 2000 Cr LJ 1528 3

19 Sukhlal Sarkar v. UOI 2012 Cr LJ 233 3

20 M Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605 3
21 Gyanendra Kumar v. State 1972 Cr LJ 308 3
22 Panchu Kumar Sardar 1984 Cr LJ (NOC) 142 (Cal) 3
23 BalerianMinji 1985 Cr LJ 1394 (MP) 3
24 Dhandayuthan v. State of TN 1994 Cr LJ 1587 (Mad) 3
25 Vijender Kumar v. State of Delhi (2010) 12 SCC 381 4
26 SamudraRajan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1997) 2 Crimes 185 (Mad) 4
27 Santokh Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 2009 SC 1923 4
28 Arumugam v. State Rep by Inspector of 2011 Cr LJ 3110 4
Police TN
29 Baleshwar Mahto v. State of Bihar AIR 2017 SC 873 5
30 Sarjug Prasad v. State of Bihar AIR 1959 Pat 66 5

31 Suresh Kumar v. State of HP (2008) 13 SCC 5

32 Bengaru Venkat Rao v. State of AP (2008) 9 SCC 707 5
33 Bablu v State of Rajasthan (2006) 13 SCC 116 5
34 Chet Ram v. State 1971 Cr LJ 1246 5
35 Bodhee Khan (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 79 5
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36 Boodh Dass (1866) PR No. 41 of 1866 5

37 Venkappa Kannappa Chowdari v. State of 1996 Cr LJ 15 (Kar) 5
Karnataka
38 Gautam Bhila Ahire v. State of 2010 Cr LJ 4073 (Bom) 5
Maharashtra
39 PidikaJanu v. State of Orissa 1989 Cr LJ (NOC) 104. 5
40 Basdev v. State of Pepsu (1956) SCR 363 5
41 Shankara Jaiswara v. State of West Bengal (2007) 9 SCC 360 5
42 Santosh v.State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 654 6
43 State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh AIR 2004 SC 1264 6
44 Lakshman (1888) Unrep Cr C 411 6
45 NgaMaung (1907) 13 Burma LR 330 6
46 JudagiMallah (1929) 8 Pat 911 6
47 Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of AIR 2004 SC 1966 6
Maharashtra
48 Dharam v. State of Haryana JT 2007 (1) SC 299 7
49 V.Subramani v. State of TN AIR 2005 SC 1983 7
50 Munney Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1971 SC 1491 7
51 NarsimhaRaju v. State 1971 Cr LJ 1066 7
52 Mohammad Hameed v. State AIR 1980 SC 108 7
53 Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) 2 SCC 333 7
54 Kashi Ram v. State of Punjab (2008) 3SCC 55 7

55 Gokoolbowree (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 33 7

56 John Scutty v. State (1824) 1 C & P 319 7
57 Ram Prasad Mahton (1919) 4 PLJ 289 7
58 Bhanwar Singh and ors. v. State of MP 1968 SCR (2) 528 7
59 Bhaja Pradhan v. State of Orissa 1976 CrLj 1347 7
60 State of UP v.Zalim&ors. 1996 CrLj 2537 8
61 Mano Dutt v. State of UP JT 2007 (2) SC 358 8
62 Parichhat And Ors. v. The State Of AIR 1972 SC 535 9
Madhya Pradesh
63 Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab 1979 AIR 577 9
64 Sikandar Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 2010 SC 44023 9
65 Kashi Ram v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2008 SC 1172 9
66 Munney Khan (1970) 2SCC 480 9
67 KanhaiyaLal v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1989 SC 1515 9
68 Babulal Bhagwan Khandare v. State of AIR 2005 SC 1460 9
Maharashtra
69 Kashiram v. State of MP LNIND 2001 SC 2369 9
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70 Yeshwant Rao v. State of MP AIR 1992 SC 1633 10

71 Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of MP AIR 1992 SC 675 10
72 Emperor v.BecharAnop AIR 1915 Bom 218 10
73 Musheer Khan v. State of MP (2010) 2 SCC 748 11
74 K Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andra AIR 1962 SC 1788 11
Pradesh
75 Pandurang Kalu Patil v. State of AIR 2002 SC 733 11
Maharashtra
76 Kanhaiyalalv. UOI AIR 2008 SC 1044 12
77 Commissioner of Police v. Narender AIR 2006 SC 1800 13
Singh
78 Pandru Khadiav. State of Orissa 1992 Cr LJ 762 15
79 Kabul v. State of Rajasthan 1992 Cr LJ 1491 15
80 Ghuraiyhav. State of MP 1990 Cr LJ 1129 (MP) 15
81 Sadhu Singh v. State AIR 1967 P&H 15
82 Pulukuri Kottaya v. King-Emperor AIR 1947 PC 67 15
83 Aftab Ahmad Ansari v. State of AIR 2010 SC 773 15
Uttaranchal
84 Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of (1955) SCR 903 15
Bombay
85 State (NCT) of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 15

STATUTES

S.No. NAME OF THE STATUTE YE

AR
1 Code of Criminal Procedure 1974
2 Indian Penal Code 1860
3 Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002
4 Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999
5 Dubai Penal Code 1987
6 Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act 1956
7 Federal Law on Combating Human 2006
Trafficking
8 Reserve Bank of India Act 1934
9 Constitution of India 1950
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BOOKS

1. A. N. Saha, Supreme Court On Criminal Law, (New Delhi, Ashoka Law House) Vol.
4 (ed. 2nd) 2008
2. Criminal Manual (Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.) 2008
3. K. D. Gaur, A text Book on Indian Penal Code, (Universal Law Publishing co.) (ed.
3rd) 2003
4. S. C. Sarkar, The Indian Penal Code (Allahabad, Dwivedi Law Agency) 2007
5. S P Sengupta, Indian Penal Code 1860, Kamal Law House, Vol 1 Edn 3rd 2015
6. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code (Nagpur, Wadhwa) (ed. 31st) 2007
7. Ram Jethmalani & D S Chopra, The Indian Penal Code, Thomson Reuters, Vol. 1,
2014
8. D.D. Basu, Commentary on Constitution of India (Wadhwa And Co., 8th ed. 2007).
9. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Wadhwa And Co., 5th ed. 2003).
10. Subhash C. Kashyap, Constitutional Law of India (LexisNexis Universal Law
Publishing, 2nd ed. 2015).
11. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (Nagput, Wadhwa) (ed. 22nd) 2006
WEBSITES

1. http://www.findlaw.com
2. http://www.judis.nic.in
3. http://www.manupatra.co.in/AdvancedLegalSearch.aspx.
4. http://www.scconline.com
5. http://www.westlawindia.com/
6. https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/FS_Notification.aspx?Id=11243&fn=2&Mode=0

LEGAL DICTIONARY

1. Aiyer P.R., Advanced Law Lexicon, (3rd ed., 2005)

2. Garner B.A., Black’s Law Dictionary, (9th ed., 2009)
3. Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, (7th ed., 2008)
4. Greenberg Daniel, Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, (4th ed.),
Sweet and Maxwell, Vol. 4
LATE LAL DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

STATEMENT OF FACTS

LOVE AND HONEYMOON:

Veer Singhania and Rohini fell in love and they decided to get married within one month i.e.
on 31st December 2018 despite the opposition on behalf of Rohini’s parents. On 5 th January
they left for Honeymoon to Dubai.

VEER MET TAYYAR:

Veer met Sheikh Abdul Tayyar during his travel. Sheikh has his business in Venice (Italy), he
was in his way to home. Later on, Tayyar invited them to visit his villa in Dubai. Thus, the
couple went to his villa, however, due to Tayyar’s tradition, Rohini has to leave Veer. Thus,
Rohini left with Tayyar’s three wives.

ALLEDGED DELUSION:
On leaving Tayyar’s residence, Veer requested to call his wife. But, Tayyar rejected his
contention and informed him that he become delusional and he didn’t have a wife. Similarly,
Tayyar’s wives, the cab driver, and the hotel manager maintained that he came alone.

VEER ENCOUNTERED BHISHAM SINGH:

Rohini’s father fearing for her daughter’s safety went to Dubai, there he encountered Veer
and he believed that Veer had indulged in human trafficking and had sold his daughter off.

CASE AGAINST VEER:

Rohini’s father lodged a case against Veer in Dubai and the Dubai police then contacted
Chandigarh police in India to enquire about the same. Therefore, he got charged under the
Dubai Penal Code and the Federal Law of Combating Human Trafficking.

THE ACQUITTAL:
Chandigarh Police claimed that he had been doing the same thing which he did 6 years back
wherein his wife was disappeared during his honeymoon. To counter this, the defence
vehemently put photographs of Veer and Rohini to suggest that they were in love. Thus, the
court acquitted Veer and ordered investigation into Ayyar’s activities.
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BITCOIN AND ARREST:

On 21st December 2019 Veer came back to India but to no avail he was again subjected to
proceeding under the IPC and Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. Therefore, on 29th
December 2019 he was granted bail on monetary consideration. However, in order to pay to
legal defence he sold his 5,000 bitcoins out of 7,000 bitcoins which Tayyar transferred to his
business account. Veer again got arrested due to his dealing in Bitcoin which was allegedly
banned in India.
LATE LAL DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

ISSUES RAISED

~ISSUE 1~

WHETHER COMPETENT COURT IN INDIA HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY

THE PRESENT CASE?

~ISSUE 2~
WHETHER TRIAL OF VEER BY THE COURT OF INDIA, FOR THE SAME
CHARGES THAT HE HAD ALREADY?

~ISSUE 3~

WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 363, 366, 368, 370, 371 OF THE INDIAN
PENAL CODE?

~ISSUE 4~

WHETHER ALLEGED TRANSACTION THROUGH BITCOINS AND ITS

EXCHANGE INTO INDIAN CURRENCY IS CONTRARY TO LAW IN INDIA?

~ISSUE 5~

WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 AND SECTION 13 OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE
MANAGEMENT ACT, 1999?
LATE LAL DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: WHETHER COMPETENT COURT IN INDIA HAS JURISDICTION TO

TRY THE PRESENT CASE?

ISSUE 2: WHETHER TRIAL OF VEER BY THE COURT OF INDIA, FOR THE

SAME CHARGES THAT HE HAD ALREADY?

ISSUE 3: WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 363, 366, 368, 370, 371 OF THE INDIAN PENAL
CODE?

ISSUE 4: WHETHER ALLEGED TRANSACTION THROUGH BITCOINS AND

ITS EXCHANGE INTO INDIAN CURRENCY IS CONTRARY TO LAW IN INDIA?

ISSUE 5: WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 AND SECTION 13 OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE
MANAGEMENT ACT, 1999?
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LATE LAL DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

BODY OF ARGUMENTS

1. COMPETENT COURT IN INDIA HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE

PRESENT CASE

1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that even though the competent Court in
India has the jurisdiction to try the present case, the same could not begin without the
prior sanction of the Central Government. This thing has been written in the proviso of
Section 188 of the CrPC and has been ruled in various judgments of the Apex Court and
various High Courts of the nation.
2. It is humbly submitted that Section 188 of CrPC talks about the procedure to be followed
in the cases where an offence has been committed outside India. However, the proviso to
this Section expressly states that “no such offence shall be inquired into or tried in India
except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.” This poviso makes it
crystal clear that in order to try any offence committed outside India, previous sanction of
the Central Government is necessary.
3. In the case of Thota Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P. and Anr1, the Apex Court of the
nation expressly stated that the Magistrate cannot begin a trial without the sanction of the
Central Government in respect of those offences which are committed outside India.
4. In the case of Samaruddin v. Asstt. Director of Enforcement,2 the Kerala High Court
expressly ruled that for directing an investigation or trial of an offence committed outside
India, the sanction of the Central Government is required and without this sanction the
Court has no jurisdiction to direct an investigation or to start a trial. 3
5. In Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India &Ors.4, the Court repeated the same thing and ruled
that the prior sanction of the Central Government is necessary for beginning a trial in
respect of the offence committed outside India. The same thing is also stated in the recent
case of Gauri Rohan Bedekar v. Sujata Sanjay Bedekar. 5

1
2011 (9) SCC 527
2
Samaruddin v. Asstt. Director of Enforcement, 1995 Cri LJ 2825
3
KN Chandrasekhran Pillai, R VKelkar's Criminal Procedure (4th ed. 2001) p.201.
4
(1993) 3 SCC 609
5
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2. TRIAL OF VEER BY THE COURT OF INDIA, FOR THE SAME CHARGES

THAT HE HAD ALREADY FACED IN DUBAI WILL AMOUNT TO DOUBLE
JEOPARDY

2.1 Veer’s prosecution by the Indian Court violates Article 20(2) of the Constitution
6. It is humbly submitted before the court that the accused has been prosecuted under Article
344 of the Dubai Penal Code and Article 2 of the Federal Law on Combating Human
Trafficking (FLCHT) and his trial before the court in India amounts to double jeopardy
under Article 20(2) of the Constitution. Article 20(2) reads as"No person shall be
prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.”It should also be noted
that the term ‘and’ used in the above mentioned provision should be interpreted
disjunctively rather than interpreting it conjunctively. The foreign courts also have noted
a maxim, namely, Nemodebetbisvexari, meaning that a man must not be put twice in peril
for the same offence. 6 Which applies equally in autrefois acquit and autrefois convict.7
7. In Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari v. State (NCT of Delhi)8 the accused was charged under the
Arms Act and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) for
the alleged kidnapping and extortion. The court acquitted him under the kidnapping case.
After a separate suit was filed against him under Arms Act and TADA considering the
same facts. However, the court set aside his sentences under Arms and TADA by
maintaining that ‘once the accused was acquitted in kidnapping case the doctrine of
autrefois acquit gets attracted’.Therefore, by emphasizing on the term ‘autrefois acquit’
in the present case, the trial is simply not maintainable as the accused has already been
acquitted by the Court of Dubai.

2.2 Veer’s trial is identical to the previous trial

8. It is submitted before the court that the test used in Article 20(2), to be precise, ‘…for the
same offence…’ means for the identical offence of the same nature. Further, it is being put
before the court that Veer has been prosecuted and acquitted for an offence and is again
tried before the court for the same offence, thus there is a clear violation of his
fundamental right.

6
MP Jain, pg. 1214, R. v. Barton [1914] 2 K.B. 5.
7
142 ; R. v. Miles (1890) 24 Q.B.D.
8
Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari v. State (NCT of Delhi).
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9. Moreover, in State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, the Supreme Court noted that "To operate as
a bar the second prosecution and the consequential punishment thereunder, must be for
the 'same offence'. The crucial requirement therefore for attracting the Article is that the
offences are the same, i.e., they should be identical. If, however, the two offences are
distinct, then notwithstanding that the allegations of facts in the two complaints might be
substantially similar, the benefit of the ban cannot be invoked. It is, therefore, necessary
to analyze and compare not the allegations in the two complaints but the ingredients of
the two offences and see whether their identity is made out...."9The court in this case
emphasized that the offence should be identical.
10. In furtherance, it is also to be noted that the accused has been again be tried under the
identical provisions. In particular he has been tried under S.363, 366, and 369 of the IPC
which is equivalent to S. 344 of the Dubai Penal Code. Similarly, in Dubai he was tried
under S. 2 of FLCHT. This section merely prescribes the punishment therefore, the main
section that has to be look upon is Article 1 of the FLCHT which explicitly enumerates
that a person shall have committed human trafficking had he solicited a person for the
purpose of exploitation [Cl.1(b)]. In the same terms he has been liable under S. 5 and 8 of
the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. The exploitation used under Article 1 clause
1 sub-clause (b) of the FLCHT clearly be equated with the prostitution. This prima facie
supposes that he has been tried under the same law and the same shall be held an
infringement to the defence of double jeopardy.

2.3 Veer’s trial in India on the same facts and for the same alleged offence amounts to
violation of double jeopardy under S.300 of Crpc.
11. It is submitted that Veer has been tried in India after his trial before the Dubai court.
Moreover, he had been acquitted by the Dubai court for the alleged offence. Further, S.
300 of the Crpc is considered to be the wider provision than double jeopardy in the
Constitution. It is because it includes the conviction as well as acquittal however, Article
20(2) only deals with the acquittal. However, the legislative intent towards double
jeopardy is much clear from the provision laid under the Crpc.
12. 300(1) of the Crpc reads as “A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent
jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such
conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same

9
State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, AIR 1961 SC 578.
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offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the
one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for
which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof.”

2.3 1. Veer has been tried once before the Court of Dubai
13. It is submitted that Veer has been tried once before the court of Dubai and to attract S.
300(1) of Crpc it is a first pre-requisite. Further, in the case of MaqboolHussain v. State
of Bombay10 it was held that the prosecution should have taken before the ‘court’ or
‘judicial tribunal’ to claim benefit under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution.

2.3.2. Court of Dubai was competent to try the matter of Veer

14. It is submitted that Veer has been tried in Dubai and the court where he was tried was
competent in nature. And to attract S.300(1) of Crpc it is the second pre-requisite. Also,
the Madras High Court in the case of Namasivayam v. State11stated that a person who has
been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction and the conviction resulted in the acquittal
or conviction cannot be tried again on the same facts.
15. Further, to attract the principle of ‘autrefois acquit’ it is not enough that that the court
which acquitted the accused should have competence and jurisdiction to try a case, rather
the court should also had a belief that such court had a jurisdiction of competence. 12It is
also to be noted that the expression ‘competent jurisdiction’ ought not to be narrowly
interpreted.13

2.3 3. Veer has been acquitted by the Court of Dubai

16. It is submitted that Veer has been tried and acquitted by the court of Dubai 14 and to attract
S. 300 of Crpc, it constitutes a third pre-requisite. Moreover, as per the above provision
any person acquitted on the previous trial would not be liable to be tried again for the
same offence. Additionally, Veer has been tried under the same facts in which he was
tried in Dubai, this prima facie violates S.300 of the Crpc.

10
MaqboolHussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1952 SC 325.
11
Namasivayam v. State, 1982 CriLJ 707.
12
RV KelkarCrpc.
13
RV KelkarCrpc.
14
Moot prop, para 10.
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17. It is further submitted that inYusofaliiMullaNoorbhoy v. R15 the court elucidated that a
plea of ‘autrefois acquit’ and ‘autrefois convict’ can only be raise when a competent court
has passed a valid order of acquittal or conviction. Similarly, in the present case the court
of Dubai was within its competence acquitted the accused. Therefore, his ground of plea
to claim that he has already been acquitted will hold well.
18. Illustration (a) to S.300 of Crpc reads as ‘A. is tried upon a charge of theft as a servant
and acquitted. He cannot afterwards, while the acquittal remains in force, be charged
with theft as a servant, or, upon the same fact, with theft simply, or with criminal breach
of trust,’.Similarly illustration (b) to S. 300 of Crpc reads as ‘A is charged before the
Court of Session and convicted of the culpable homicide of B. A may not afterwards be
tried on the same facts for the murder of B.’ Thus, in the present case Veer has been tried
for the charge of kidnapping and immoral trafficking for which he has already been
acquitted and therefore, he cannot be tried for the same facts.
19. In addition, in the case ofE.K. Thankappa v. Union of India16 the court held that when
the accused is convicted or acquitted in the previous trial, then the second trial would be
bared. In Azam Ali v. Emperor17 the Privy Council held that S.300 of Crpc would not
apply when the conviction or acquittal has been set aside, however, from the facts of the
present case it is clear that Dubai court has acquitted him and the order of acquittal has
not been reversed by any court of law. Therefore, S.300 of the Crpc would apply and thus
he is entitled to the defense of the double jeopardy.

2.3.4. Veer has been tried for the same offence under the same facts
20. It is submitted before the court that Veer has been tried for the same facts for which he
was tried in the court of Dubai. In addition, the above contention is simply an
infringement of S.26 of the Gerenal Clauses Act, 1897. The act reads as ‘Where an act or
omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be
liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall
not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence’. Moreover, the offence which the
accused is again being punished is similar to the previous offence and his trial by the
prosecution is simply baseless.

15
16
E. K. Thankappan v. Uninon of India, 1989 CrLJ 2374.
17
Azam Ali v. Emperor, AIR 1929 All 710.
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21. Also, any contention from the prosecution side that Veer is liable under S.4 of the IPC
would simply be misconvincing and baseless. The Supreme Court in Prabodh K Mehta v.
Charuben K. Mehta18(Mehta’ Case)observed that an accused even after his acquittal
again gets tried in India for the same offence, then it would simply be a blatant attack on
Article 20(2) of the Constitution and S.300 of the Crpc.
22. It must be noted that in the case of Regional Manager and another v. Pawan Kumar
Dubey19 it was held that even if there is a slight distinction in the facts of the case than the
previous trial and the accused is being tried another time with the same facts, then it
would result in a diverse consequence.

2.4 Crimes are only punishable only where they were committed
23. In the case of Huntington v. Attrill20, the Privy Council recognized and reiterated the
principle that ‘crimes are local.’ Their lordship by ‘crimes are local’ meant that the
crimes are only cognizable and punishable in the country where they are committed. It
was also held in this case that the Courts cannot execute the penal laws of another
country. This ratio of the court has also been reiterated in the case of Banco De Vizcaya
v. Don Alphonso De Borbon21.
24. In Mehta’s case22 the court observed that if a decree passed by the foreign court is sought
to be enforced directly or indirectly in the British then it would be not permissible. The
court goes on to observe that, a country cannot execute the penal laws of other country.It
is submitted that the court of one country could not directly or indirectly execute a decree
of another country. However, if it happens then it would prima facie amounts to the
indirect enforcement of the foreign decree. Therefore, if the accused has been tried before
the court of Dubai and if he gets again tried before the court of India then it is simply a
blatant use of power.
25. The Calcutta High Court in the case of Krishna Sen Gupta v. Manjula Mukherjee23
maintained that a subsequent complaint would not be a bar to the second trial only if such
person has not been discharged by the court, however, Veer has been discharged by the
court of law and therefore, his trial before the court is not valid.

18
Prabodh K Mehta v. Charuben K. Mehta, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 302.
19
Regional Manager and another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, 1976(3) SCC 334.
20
Huntington v. Attrill, 1893 House of Lords 150.
21
Banco De Vizcaya v. Don Alphonso De Borbon, [1935] K.B. 140.
22
Prabodh K Mehta v. Charuben K. Mehta, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 302.
23
Krishna Sen Gupta v. ManjulaMukherjee ,1997 (1) Crimes 48 (Cal).
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3. VEER DID NOT COMMIT THE ALLEGED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER

SECTIONS 363, 366, 368, 370, 371 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE

26. It is humbly submitted before the court that the accused has been tried under by the
Chandigarh police under Sections 363, 366, 367, 368, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code.
His trial in respect to the mentioned sections is simply misconvincing and baseless.

3.1 Veer’s trial under S. 363 of IPC is vague

26. It is submitted that Veer’s accusation under S.363 is irrelevant. It reads as ‘Whoever
kidnaps any person from India or from lawful guardianship, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall
also be liable to fine’ It is worth noting that S. 363 of IPC has to be read with S.361 of the
IPC.24 And S. 361 of the IPC specifically deals with minors. It explicitly says that
‘Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under
eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the
lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such
guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship.’
27. From the above it is prima facie that the prosecution has tried Veer for kidnapping Rohini
who is not a minor itself rather as per the facts her age is 24 years. 25 It is to be noted that
S. 363 specifically deals with the kidnapping of minor. Arguendo, even if Veer has
kidnapped Rohini then also his punishment under S. 363 is simply irrelevant.
28. Also, to attract punishment under S. 363 of IPC, an offence under S. 361 of IPC is a pre-
requisite. In S. 361 it has been clearly mentioned that kidnapping of grown up person of
sound mind would not amount to an offence under this provision. 26 It is submitted that
Veer has not committed kidnapping even then also he has been tried under the section
dealing with minor. It concludes that it is an attempt from the prosecution to distort the
facts and make Veer liable for the offence which he hasn’t even committed.
29. In the case of Emperor v. Ismail Sayadsaheb Mujawar27 the Bombay High Court held
that to attract punishment under S. 363 of the IPC, the person against whom the offence is

24
Ratanlal.
25
Moot Prop. Para 1.
26
Ratanlal.
27
(1933) 35 BOMLR 886.
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committed must be under the age of eighteen years if female and under the age of sixteen
years if male. Also in the case of Oroos Fatima v. State of U.P.28 it was held that to
attract punishment under this section the person against whom the offence is committed
must be under the age of sixteen years if a female and eighteen years is a male.
30. Similarly, in the case of Kuldeep K Mahato v. State of Bihar29the Supreme Court held
that when a girl being of 18 years was taken by the accused from one place to another
then it is said that she has been kidnapped. Here the court emphasized on the term 18 year
which is an age of minor.

3.1.1. Rohini’s consent was valid

31. It is submitted before the court that on December, 2018 Veer and Rohini allegedly fell in
love within two weeks of their meeting 30. On 31st December, 2018 Rohini married to
Veer and she consented for the honeymoon in Dubai. Further, on 5 th January, 2019 they
left to Dubai for honeymoon. Therefore, there was Rohini’s consent throughout her
journey with Veer.
32. Veer’s prosecution under section 360 of IPC will also be completely vague as this section
maintains that ‘Whoever conveys any person beyond the limits of India without the
consent of that person, or of some person legally authorised to consent on behalf of that
person, is said to kidnap that person from India.’ In the present case, Veer took Rohini to
Dubai with her consent. And as per Haribhai v. State31 a person is being moved beyond
the limits of India with the consent of the person who is being moved then it would not
amount to an offence.
33. It is submitted that Rohini’s consent is not vitiated under S. 90 of the IPC. To vitiate the
consent under this provision the following needs to be ascertained. Firstly, consent would
not be a true consent when it was obtained under the fear of injury. Secondly, the person
whose consent has been sought should be of unsound mind. Thirdly, the consent is taken
under the misconception of facts. Fourthly, the consent is taken of the person who is
below 12 years of age. Fifthly, the consent given by a person who is intoxicated will be
no consent.
34. It is submitted that the consent of Rohini in respect to marriage and in respect to
honeymoon at Dubai has been impliedly taken by her conduct. It is to be noted that both

28
1996 CrLJ 460 (All).
29
AIR 1998 SC 2694.
30
Moot prop, para 1.
31
(1918) 20 Bom LR 372.
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Rohini and Veer loved each other so and so that even after Rohini’s parent rejected Veer
to become their daughter’s spouse then also Rohini believed in Veer and got married.
This clearly shows that her consent is not caused under fear of injury. Also, she is not of
an unsound mind. In addition, there was no misconception of fact as for instance, there
was a clear cut expression from the side of Veer that he loved Rohini and would go for
honeymoon with her. Moreover, it is indisputable that she is major and her consent would
also not bar its validity under the exception of S.90 of IPC.
35. Moreover, the Guwahati High Court in the case of Md. Jakir Ali v. The State of Assam32
observed that when the victim exercises intelligence based knowledge then it is said that
such victim has consented with full knowledge. In Uday v. State of Karnataka33 the
Supreme Court considered that when a girl is 19 years of age and had a sufficient
understanding then it would not be said that her consent was caused under misconception.
36. In Deepak Gulhati v. State of Haryana34 the prosecutrix had sexual intercourse with the
accused on occasion that the accused will marry the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix was a
major and was of sound mind. She met many times with the accused and didn’t raise any
objection on their relationship. By ascertaining the facts the court came to a conclusion
that the act of the prosecutrix was voluntary and there was no misconception as to the fact
that the accused diverted the former on the ground of false promise of marriage.
Similarly, in the present case an argument that Rohini’s consent was caused by
misconception is completely vague. Rohini spent months with Veer but didn’t raise any
objection rather she accompanied him to his business meeting itself. This clearly shoes
that there was a sound ground in respect to Rohini’s consent to marry Veer and the
consent to go to Dubai for honeymoon.

3.2 Veer cannot be tried under S. 366 of the IPC

37. It is humbly submitted before the court that Veer’s accusation under S. 366 of the IPC is
simply baseless and misconvincing. S. 366 states that ‘Whoever kidnaps or abducts any
woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be
compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or
seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced

32
2007 Cr LJ 615.
33
AIR 2003 SC 2071.
34
Deepak Gulhati v. State of Haryana,AIR 2013 SC 2071. Swapan Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2009
Cr LJ 16. Karthi @Karthick v. State, 2013 Cr LJ 3765. Ravi v. State, 2010 Cr LJ 3493. VinodMangilal v. State
of MP, 2009 Cr LJ 1204.
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to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of
criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method
of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or
knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with
another person shall be punishable as aforesaid.’
38. To attract liability under this section there must be a kidnapping or abduction. Such
kidnapping or abduction must be made with an intention to kidnap or abduct the victim,
also, with an intention that she may be compelled to forced illicit intercourse. Therefore,
in order to attract this provision the prosecution needs to prove that the accused induced
the victim/women by forcing her to go from one place to other place with a deceitful
means so that the victim may be compelled to forced illicit intercourse. 35 However, the
prosecution hasn’t shown that Rohini was forced to move from one place to other. Also,
if at all Veer compelled her to move from one place to another with a deceitful means
then also she had much recourse to refrain herself from going to Dubai for Honeymoon.
39. From the above arguments it is prima facie that neither she was allegedly kidnapped nor
she was allegedly abducted. It is to be noted that only abduction can attract the alleged
accusation upon Veer. There is a clear cut demarcation between the kidnapping and
abduction. It is pertinent to note that the offence under S.366 of IPC will be proved when
it is established that the accused committed offence under S. 361 of IPC. 36 The Supreme
Court in the case of ChoteLal and Anr. v. State of Haryana37 held that to set forth that
abduction took place, the prosecution must prove that the accused was abducted for
the purpose mentioned in S. 366.
40. In the present case, the prosecution has simply alleged that Rohini went missing because
Veer sold her to Tayyar to subject her to illicit intercourse. However, there is no solid
proof which shows that the accused has actually committed the crime. Therefore, their
contention is simply baseless and Veer is being tried for the offence which he even didn’t
commit. Similarly, in the case of Goverdhan v. State of MP38the conduct of abducted girl
showed her willingness to marry the accused even after the abduction. The court held that
the accused cannot be tried under this provision. Therefore, even if Veer abducted Rohini
with a deceitful means then also his trial under this provision could not be met out.

35
Ratanlal.
36
Ratanlal.
37
AIR 1979 SC 1494.
38
(1995) 1 Cr LJ 633.
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41. In the case of State of Haryana v. Naresh39 the court held that when a girl does not resist
the accused and conveys the accused every place he went. The court held that in such
circumstances the consent is said to have been presumed. Therefore, Veer’s trial under
this section is completely vague and baseless.In one such case it was held that ‘where a
girl of 23 years of age left her parents of her own will and married a man, section 363 or
366 was not attracted.’40

3.3 Veer’s trial under S. 367 IPC is completely irrelevant

42. It is further submitted before the court that Veer’s accusation under S. 367 of the IPC is
irrelevant. S .367 of IPC runs as ‘Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that
such person may be subjected, or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being
subject to grievous hurt, or slavery, or to the unnatural lust of any person, or knowing it
to be likely that such person will be so subjected or disposed of, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine.’
43. It is submitted that the prosecution does not have a valid ground to prosecute Veer under
this provision. It has not been shown that Veer has actually disposed offRohini to Tayyar
for slavery, grievous hurt or unnatural lust. Veer loved Rohini with no metes and bounds.
Moreover, it has also been proved that Veer has neither abducted nor kidnapped Rohini.
Further, the offence of kidnapping and abduction is sine qua non to attract this provision.
Therefore, no question arises as to whether Veer committed an offence under this section
or not.

3.4 Veer’s trial under S. 368, 370 & 371 is irrelevant as well
44. The counsel for the accused puts forward a strong claim that Veer cannot be charged
under Section 370 of the IPC which categorically deals with the hazard of human
trafficking for the purpose of slavery. The technical definition of slavery that can be
deduced from Indian Slavery act, 184341 which defined it as:“If one person is controlled
by another person and violence or coercion is being used by the other person and if that
control is for exploitation for labour or sexual or others, then it is a situation of slavery.”
The elementary and essential condition of slavery can be defined in any of the following

39
1996 Cr LJ 3614.
40
1993 CrLJ 1 (All)
41
Indian Slavery Act,1843
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acts-Threat, Force or coercion, Abduction, Fraud or deception or Abuse of power.

45. To constitute the offence of slavery the main purpose and a condition which needs to be
established to fortify the claim of trafficking for slavery is inclusion of giving or receiving
payments or benefits in order to achieve the consent of person to whom the person is
handed over. The prosecution’s case on the charge of trafficking for slavery is based on a
fictional story of which there are no rock-solid proofs and evidences.
46. The testimonies are self-contradictory and the investigative agencies haven’t been able to
establish their reason of arrest of the victim owing to the short-handness of charges
imposed and the presented hearsay evidences have no legal value according to Section 60
of the Indian Evidence Act42 bears no conclusive claim. In cases of crimes of serious
nature like these, it is an insoluble requirement to present the undoubtable culpability of
the accused based on strong narrative backed by evidences.
47. In the case of Paramjeet Singh v State of Uttarakhand43it was held that “More serious
the crime, more strict proof would be requisite’. The present case involves a happy
married couple in the form of Veer and Rohini, who married with full consent and went
on holiday. Both being majors and persons with ordinary reasonability to back their life
decisions performed marriage well within their legal rights under Article 21 which
inherently guarantees an individual to choose his/her life partner as held in the case of
Salamat Ansari vs. State of UP and others.44 The prima facie evidences and testimonies
prove no signs of threat, coercion, or lack of free consent in the act. Thus, the accused had
best of the intentions with the victim in the present case.
48. Veer and Rohini’s vacation to Dubai and the incidental meet of Sheikh who showed
interest in Veer’s business are two extremely unconnected and different events. The
charge-sheet should have ideally be filed against Sheikh since the local police had a
suspicious claim about his derogatory exercise of influence to commit illegal activities
and covering it by shifting blame and framing an innocent person. The unequivocally
dubious claims of Veer’s culpability can be rejected by the absence of proof of mensrea
of the crime. In the case of State of UP v. Anurag Goyal45, the court acquitted the
accused charged under section 370 because of lack of mensrea as there was no motive and
intention which could support the haphazard portrayal of chain of events leading to
trafficking. The accused in reality is also a victim of the false charges incurred on him.
42
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. S. 60.
43
Paramjeet Singh v State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2011 SC 200
44
Allahabad High Court, CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 11367 of 2020.
45
State of UP v. Anurag Goyal, AIR 1992 SC 604.
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The accused had no motive, no intention and there is absence of proof of an act which
could even claim the Actusreas.
49. In the case of Rajan v. State Of Kerala46 before the supreme court, the accused was
charged under section 370 IPC for selling a girl cross-border and denying her the
requisites to return to the naïve place, the court in the present case acquitted the accused
on lack of evidences and proofs as the prosecution was unable to establish its claim. The
Dubai police also acquitted the accused owing to the dearth of evidences and lack of clear
narrative in the prosecution’s case 47.
50. The fact that Rohini wasn’t tortured mentally or physically anywhere in the act to negate
the blame of trafficking for slavery can be easily obtained by the hotel staff’s testimonies
as provided to the Hon’ble Court. In State v. Ashok48 the formal testimonies and the
hearsay evidence was deemed unfit and inadmissible by the court in the crime of
trafficking for slavery and prostitution, thus the accused was acquitted. The fact that Veer
received 7000 Bitcoins from Sheikh can be seen in two proximate scenarios- first one
being it is completely unconnected to the disappearance of Rohini and can be regarded as
a bonafide investment in his small venture.
51. Arguendo, the second claim can be with ulterior intention but the accused was
completely unaware of the nature of transaction and its purpose. Thus, it is the Sheikh
who made Rohini devoid her freedom and confined her to a secluded place, punishable as
compoundable offences under law.
52. The further charge under Section 371 of IPC dealing with habitual dealing in slaves is a
baseless charge on the accused as there are no evidences of previous charges on the
accused for buying, selling humans for the any monetary gains. The half-baked narrative
put forward by the prosecution regarding the divorce filed by Veer in his first marriage, is
an absurd claim. That event doesn’t have even a distant connection or shadow of events in
the present case.
53. The defence would like to plead innocence for the accused on the charges filed under
section 370 and section 371 of IPC due to dearth of evidences, testimonies and lack of
clear narrative prosecuting the accused. The prosecution has not been able to fulfil the
requirements of burden of proof and hasn’t been able to prove the crime beyond
reasonable doubt.

46
Rajan v. State Of Kerala, 1992 SCR (3) 649.
47
Moot prop. Para 10
48
State v. Ashok, 1996 AIR 736.
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3.5 Veer is not liable under S. 5 & 8 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956
54. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Veer is not liable under Section 5
and 8 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 as the act deals with prostitution, but
in the present case there is no involvement of prostitution at any stage. It is just a false
story made by the prosecution side and is totally baseless, none of the instance supports
the contention that the victim was induced or seduced to be in a prostitution.

3.5.1. Section 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 does not apply in the present
case
55. It is humbly submitted that Section 5 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 deals
with the procuring, inducing or taking person for the sake of prostitution, but in the
present case the victim was the wife of the accused, they both get married with their full
consent, and there was no inducement at all. In Dubai, the victim was confined by the
Sheikh and for that the accused in not liable at all. There are no facts which support the
contention of the prosecution that the victim was induced or taken or procured or seduced
for the sake of prostitution, thus this is just a false allegation which is totally baseless.
56. Arguendo, even if it is proved that the accused sold the victim to the Sheikh, still there is
no fact that supports this contention of the prosecution that the victim was sold with the
aim of indulging her into the prostitution. Section 2(f) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention)
Act, 1956 defines the term prostitution and states that “prostitution means the sexual
exploitation or abuse of persons for commercial purposes or for consideration in money
or in any other kind.” This thing was also held in the case of Radhakrishnan v. State of
Kerala,49 in which it was said that the activity will amount to “prostitution” within the
meaning of Section 2 (f) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 only if
exploitation or abuse of a person is done for a commercial purpose.
57. There is no instance in the present matter that supports the contention that the victim was
sexually exploited or abused for commercial purposes or for consideration in money. This
thing cannot be proved neither through facts, nor through the action of the accused.
Moreover, the general facts about human trafficking shows that the trading of humans are
done for various purposes like forced labour, slavery, strip dancing, etc. Prostitution is
just one of the, and there is no facts which shows that in the present matter the victim was
trafficked for the purpose of engaging her into prostitution.

49
Radhakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2008 (2) KLT 521
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58. The Counsel agrees to the fact that there have been various cases in which the accused
was held liable under this provision, but it is also an interesting thing to note that in all
these cases, it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was indulged in the act
of prostitution, but in the present case the situation is totally different, the victim is not
found yet. It is not proved yet that whether she got indulge in any kind of prostitution act,
and if even it got proved, then also the accused will not be held liable as there was no
inducement on his part.
59. The accused, Veer was deeply in love with the victim, she was her wife, they both were
deeply in love with each and the photographs of the accused and the victim found in
Veer’s phone confirms the same. Moreover, this fact was also confirmed by the hotel staff
that had seen the couple together were examined and they testified that Rohini and Veer
looked like a couple very much in love. 50 This thing surely casts some doubt that when
the ultimate aim of the accused was to sell the victim, then why would he behave in this
manner, even when half of his work was already completed (they both flew to Dubai).
60. Apart from this, there are many other better ways to commit such sort of crimes, why
would the accused choose this way which is the most dangerous one. Additionally, the
Court of Dubai also admitted this fact that the role of Sheikh Abdul seems dubiousin the
present matter, and thus, thus it directed the police department to investigate his role. The
Court also admitted that he has enough money and power to bribe witnesses and hotel
staff to further his ends. 51 This fact also casts a reasonable doubt that the accused is
innocent in the present matter and it was the Sheikh who has confined the victim.
61. The fact that the first wife of the accused was also disappeared during their honeymoon is
of no use in the present matter, as the investigation in that case yielded no result, it was
not found that whether there was any involvement of human trafficking or prostitution or
not. In that case also, the accused was acquitted as there was no proof which admitted his
culpability. Similarly, in the present case the accused should be acquitted based on the
lack of any solid proof.

Burden of proof

Apart from this, the burden of proof lies on the prosecution in criminal cases to prove that

50
51
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the accused is one who has committed the offence 52 and it is also a settled principle that one
has to prove title by one's own evidences and not by the weakness of evidences given by the
defendant.53 In one such case where the prosecution was not able to prove that the accused
was the one who destroyed the film, the accused was given the benefit of doubt.54
Moreover, in the case of Paramjeet Singh v State of Uttarakhand55it was held that “More
serious the crime, more strict proof would be requisite”. In order to prove the charge of
abduction and human trafficking, the prosecution needs to provide a strong proof which is
not available in the presentcase.

Accused unless proved guilty isinnocent

The principle that "the accused person is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt isproved
beyond a reasonable doubt" 56, is of cardinal importance in the present case where the
evidences showed by the prosecution side are not sufficient to prove the guilt of accused.
In the case of Kali Ram v. State of H.P.57, the apex Court of India stated that “The burden
of proving the guilt of the accused is upon the prosecution and unless it relieves itself of that
burden, the Courts cannot record a finding of the guilt of the accused. Every criminal trial
begins with the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, and the provisions of the
Code are so framed that a criminal trial should begin with and be throughout governed by
this essential presumption.”58
In the present case the accused cannot be punished as the evidences found during the
investigation are not so strong to prove hisguilt, moreover the judiciary of Dubai which
deals with much more harsher laws in respect of kidnapping and human trafficking also

52
Tukaram v State of Maharashtra, (1979) 1 SCR 810; JarnailSinghv State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 755;
Mahender Singh Dhayia v State (CBI), 2003 Cr LJ 1908 (Del); SD Soni v State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 917;
State of UP v Krishna Gopal, 1989 Cr LJ 288; TS Kotagi v Tahsildar, AIR 1985 Kan5; AvadeshKumar v
SheoShanker, AIR 1985 All 104; Ram KunwarBai v Rani Bahu, AIR 1985 MP 73; Madhusudan Das v
NarayaniBai, AIR 1983 SC 114; Shantilal v Mohan Lal, AIR 1986 J&K 61; NB Rao v Principal, Osmania
Medical College, AIR 1986 AP196.
53
Lalita James v Ajit Kumar, AIR 1991 MP 15; State of Bihar v Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684;
Special Development Area v Pooranlal, 1997 Cr LJ 3484 (MP)
54
State (Delhi Admn.) v VC. Shukla, AIR 1980 SC 1382
55
Paramjeet Singh v State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2011 SC 200
56
(Eiincumbit probation qui dicit, non qui negat) Woolmingtonv. Dpp, (1935) UKHL 1; BabuSinghv. State of
Punjab, (1964) 1 Cri Lj 566; K.M. Nanavativ. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605; Rangammalv.
Kuppuswami, AIR 2011 SC 234; Data Ram v. State of UP, (2018) 3 SCC22
57
Kali Ram v. State of H.P (1973) 2 SCC 808
58
Haji Hussain v. MadbukarPurshottamMondkar, AIR 1958 SC 376; ShivajiSababraoBobade v. State of
Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793
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discharged him from the said offences, thus this Court should also discharge him under S.
227 of theCrPC59.
In the case of KewalKrishan v. SurajBhan60it was held that “this provision (S. 227 of the
CrPC) helps in saving the accused from prolonged harassment which is a necessary
concomitant of a protractedtrial.”

Reasonable doubt

In light of all the aforementioned arguments, it is humbly submitted that there exists
reasonable doubt in the present case and hence the accused should be acquitted of the alleged
crime. A reasonable doubt must not be imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt; but a fair
doubt based upon reason and common sense arising out of the evidence of the case 61.

The prosecution's arguments are leaning towards the fact that the crime 'may have been
committed by the accused', however, they have failed to make the link between 'may have
committed the crime' and 'must have committed the crime' and that gap must be filled by the
prosecution by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence before a conviction can be
sustained. 62 Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the accused
should be acquitted in the present matter.

59
If upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is not sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.
60
KewalKrishan v. SurajBhan, 1980 Supp SCC 499; Union of India v. Prafidla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4
61
RamakantRai v. MadanRai Cr LJ 2004 Sc 36.
62
IV. Nelson R. A. , Indian Penal Code, p. 2905 , (10th Ed. 2008)
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4. THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION THROUGH BITCOINS AND ITS

EXCHANGE INTO INDUAN CURRENCY IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW IN
INDIA

62. It is humbly submitted before the court that Abdul Tayyar transferred 7,000 Bitcoins to
Veer’s business account with an intention to start a project. The transaction in Dubai and
its exchange in India are completely valid in the eyes of law. It is submitted that Bitcoin is
a type of Cryptocurrency which works on the principle of blockchain whose blocks are
encrypted and allows only peer to peer transactions without any intermediary.
63. It is to be noted that Bitcoins have been transferred to Veer’s account on 9 th January, 2019
and its exchange in India took place in 29th December 2019. It is humbly submitted before
the court that in no time after the bail was granted to Veer, he approached a broker
namely Rahamat Saeed and transferred him 5,000 Bitcoins for which he recieved
46,00,000 in cash. 63 It is further to be noted that, soon after his exchange the Chandigarh
Police took a hold of him and on his dealings with the Bitcoin under several provisions. 64
64. As of now the transaction and exchange of Bitcoin is completely legal in India. The
Supreme Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank
of India65(IMAI) struck down the RBI’s circular that had posed a ban on the virtual
currencies. The court maintained that the ban was disproportionate. Reason being that the
transaction and possession of Bitcoin is in no way made RBI to ‘suffered any loss or
adverse effect directly or indirectly, on account of the interface that the VC exchanges
had with any of them’.
65. Therefore, it is submitted that the ban imposed by the RBI has been done away with by
the Supreme Court of India and trying Veer for the possession of Bitcoin will completely
infringe the already established precedent. It is prima facie that if the accused is deprived
of the possession of Bitcoin then it would also infringe his right to trade guaranteed under
Article 19 of the Constitution which will simply be a blatant attack upon the Constitution
of India.

63
Moot prop, para 12.
64
Ibid.
65
2020 SCC Online SC 275.
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5. VEER DID NOT COMITT THE ALLEGED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER

SECTION 4 OF THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002
AND SECTION 13 OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT ACT, 1999

66. Iska sub heading bta

67. The offence of money laundering (defined u/s 3 and punished u/s 4 PMLA) is attracted
only when the laundered property falls within the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’.

Section 2(u) of PMLA, which provides that – ‘proceeds of crime’ means and includes:

 Any property derived or obtained

 Directly or indirectly
 By any person
 as a result of criminal activity
 relating to a ‘scheduled offense’ or
 the value of any such property

68. The Financial amendment in 2015 stated that the property-equivalent in value held
within the country (in a situation where property which is the ‘proceed of crime’ is
taken or held outside the country.A reading of the above definition of ‘proceeds of
crime’ also makes one more thing clear, that is extremely crucial to an understanding of
the offence of Money Laundering, which is that the offence of Money Laundering is not
an independent crime; it depends upon another crime, which is known as the ‘predicate
offence’or ‘scheduled offence’. Practically, an exoneration in the case for the scheduled
offence invariably leads to discharge in the PMLA case too, since if the basis of the
scheduled offence case is gone, A PMLA case cannot sustain on its own.
69. In the present case, Veer is alleged to have commit the crime of Human trafficking, the
proceeds of which was taken by him to India. It is pertinent to note that the court in Dubai
acquitted Veer of the above allegation because of lack of evidences and testimonies.
There can be no conclusive evidence to proof Veer’s culpability. Moreover, the hotel
staff’s testimonies prove that Veer was happy with Rohini and they made a loving couple.
The fact that Veer is a venture capitalist, his taking of bitcoins is justified for a bonafide
cause. In the Aircel Maxis telecom case, there was a de-facto acquittal of the accused
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under PMLA law when the scheduled offence was not able to be proved.
70. In Anand Chauhan vs Directorate Of Enforcement66, The court held that to avoid the
multiplicity of the cases filed, the accused was exonerated for PMLA case for his proved
innocence in the scheduled offence. There is no law with respect to the interplay between
cryptocurrencies and their involvement in the offence of money-laundering. The Supreme
Court of India has been approached to urge the executive wing to clarify the policy on
legality of cryptocurrency in India, including for the stated concern that cryptocurrency
use is in, or possess, violation of the PMLA.
71. The constitutional validity of the RBI Circular has also been challenged. However, it may
be noted that non-compliance with the Circular has not been made a scheduled (predicate)
offence under the PMLA. Thus, due to lack of precedents on this issue and clarification
put forward by the RBI that non-compliance of the circular is not a scheduled offence, it
would be absurd and illogical to deduce any culpability on Veer’s part.
72. The language of Section 24 (a) of PMLA, 2002 demonstrates that a person should be
‘charged’ for an offence under Section 3, in order for the presumption to follow. Charge
has to be read to mean a specific charge and not a vague and omnibus allegation,
However, in the present case there was an arrest warrant without mentioning the specific
charge and category of offence under PMLA to attract punishment under Section 4 of
PMLA.
73. Veer’s bank accounts, sources of earnings, assets etc. could be searched by the special
agency to negate the allegation of concealment for keeping bitcoins. The conversion of
bitcoins to the legal currency was made to be done by Veer in bonafide intention so as to
submit the proceed of taxes to the conversion centre of currencies established under The
Income Tax Act, 1961 by filing an application under section 5 of the act.

5.2 Exoneration under FEMA, 1999

74. Section 2(m), Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 goes on to define currency and
includes ‘all currency notes, postal notes, postal orders, money orders, cheques, drafts,
travellerscheques, letters of credit, bills of exchange and promissory notes, credit cards or
such other similar instruments, as may be notified by the Reserve Bank’. Also Section
2(q), of FEMA defines ‘foreign currency’ as any currency other than Indian currency.
Definition of ‘Indian Currency’ under FEMA states that Indian currency is the currency

66
MANU/DE/0928/2017
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which is expressed or drawn in Indian Rupees. It is to be noted that section 2(i) of FEMA
specifically defines the term Currency notes and include and mean cash in the form of
coins and bank notes. So it is clear from this definition that both crypto and bitcoins are
out of the preview of the definition within the FEMA Act.
75. In Shankara Rao Badam & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Anr67, it was noted that there was
application of the maxim ‘expressum facit cess aretacitum’ which represents the principle
‘when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is
excluded’ in the securities law. It can be reasonably concluded that ‘virtual currency’
should be considered excluded from the definition of currency. While it may be argued
that it may fall under ‘such other similar instruments’ under Section 2(h), but such ‘other
instruments’ need to be specifically notified by the RBI which is not the case. There is no
such declaration in respect of crypto currencies in general or Bitcoin in particular. Also in
Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh 68, RBI has merely advised the
public to be cautious regarding the trading of virtual currencies.
76. Therefore, under the provisions of existing law, Bitcoin are not currency. Keeping in view
the absence of express legislation and orders by RBI to control the contours of
Cryptocurrencies, The present case where Veer possessed bitcoins abroad cannot be
termed to be a violation under Section 15 of FEMA,1999.
77. In Internet Mobile association v. Reserve bank of India69, The SC held that
Cryptocurrencies cannot be regulated under the present securities law because it lacks
enforceability from law. There is a need for an express RBI order or legislation regarding
the same and struck down the ban on cryptocurrencies possession which made it an
offence.

78. In the case of the purchase of cryptocurrency by the buyer from a person resident outside
India, the cryptocurrency gets transferred into the buyer's wallet along with the exclusive
rights and the location of the assets will be India for all legal purposes. In the other case
where the seller sells it to the person resident outside India and the cryptocurrency gets
transferred to such person and the seller will have no rights. In both cases, the transaction
does not alter the assets or liabilities of the seller and buyer outside India, and therefore,
cannot be classified as capital account transactions under FEMA, 1999.

67
Shankara Rao Badam & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Anr, [1985] AIR SC 1416.
68
Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 271 ITR 401 [2004].
69
Internet Mobile association v. Reserve bank of India, 2020 SCC Online SC 275.
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79. When the Cryptocurrency is being transacted outside India by Indian Residents as a mode
of payment of services rendered and goods sold by a non-resident, such transaction is
most certainly to be classified as an export of goods under the Foreign Exchange
Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations 2015, In the present case there
was no service involved as the bitcoins received by Veer was ex-gratia and an act of
donation by the Sheikh, He wasn’t expecting a return service so as to make this transfer
of money as payment for service to be moulded into the export bracket of the act 70. Thus,
there was no transfer of assets to the Veer given that Bitcoins does not come under the
section 2(m) of FEMA,1999 defining currency nor it was expressly described one by
RBI. There is no sense of illegality attached with the current transaction.
80. Veer cannot be charged under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002 and Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 primarily due to his
acquittal in the scheduled offence and paucity of evidences and testimonials.
Furthermore, the equivalent assets he got ex-gracia from the Sheikh cannot be fitted into
currency under the definition prescribed by FEMA, 1999. Thus, it is not a foreign
exchange which makes it out of the purview of the compounding of offence for which the
alleged section is charged.

70
Moot Prop. Para 3
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, in the light of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, it is most humbly prayed that the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana may be
pleased to adjudge, hold and declare the following:

I. Convict Veer under section 363, 366, 367 & 361 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
II. Convict Veer under section 5 & 8 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.
III. Convict Veer under section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 &
13 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.

And/or pass any other order in favour of the State that it may deem fit in the light
of Justice, equity and good conscience.

All of which is most humbly prayed.

Place: Hon’ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana

s/d

Dated: Counsel for the State