Republic of the Philippines notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in

SUPREME COURT any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me,
Manila and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
EN BANC PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in
trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of
the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. thereon, is exhausted..
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
xxx xxx xxx
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. 12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
LABRADOR, J.: situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may
have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his
dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to
executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should
govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
CHRISTENSEN DANEY. decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was
xxx xxx xxx also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, legitimate from the time of her birth.
now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the V
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286,
49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also
these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines,
as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's
The most important assignments of error are as follows: brief:

I In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of

record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901,
HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
INHERITANCE.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and
II stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time
he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING
AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the
CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW. United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some
nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and
III came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES. Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon
liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to
IV the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney";
Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS. In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California
shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in question
 herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et
5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York,
migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short law of the country where it is situated.
visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
California. and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, regardless of the country where said property may be found.
however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29) The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of
the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private
United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by to no other than the private law of the State of California.
acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may
same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the
shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled
case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which follows:
he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But
if he went on business which would require his presence for several
weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property
connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular governed by the law of his domicile.
business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not
exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of
many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where
State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines. law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be
recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus: the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec.
7, pp. 13-14.)
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws
rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France,
the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France.
i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?" The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among
X's next of kin.
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to
accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There
which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,
law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the
be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)
getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to
law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute
they look always to internal law as the rule of reference. of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court
would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their
respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-
two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of
to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for
the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol.
forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected 31, pp. 523-571.)
the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit
had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted
the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would to as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are
happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also
hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi. to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been
considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject
of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine
 involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" (b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases question to the same system of law.
result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the
law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.) xxx xxx xxx

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the
The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium
determining the question before it, must take into account the whole in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether
law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in
then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian
jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of
of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference
authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296) back to his own law.

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule,
its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly,
are quoted herein below: each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
country' means the whole of its law. most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

xxx xxx xxx When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and
leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
theses: completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the
same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
application of foreign laws.
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has
effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at
shall respect: the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of
intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a
bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner,
and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin
the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of
the act in question occurred. civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process
of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
 practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.) of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving
his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained California, not by the internal law of California..
the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against
domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are appellees.
bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must
enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad. Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not
be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national
law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in
the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws
rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when
a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not
refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was
a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its
own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if
the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law
of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton
vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.)
cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case
at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear
to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state
of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the
California Civil Code.