TOPIC: PROCEDURE
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35,
UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA
and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON.
LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE
DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF
JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR,
Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
NATURE OF THE CASE:
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 35. Makasiar,
J.
FACTS:
This case is a Per Curiam Resolution on three principal issues stated below.
ISSUES:
1) Whether petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although
the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President; (NO)
2) Whether the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for
his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
cause; and (NO)
3) Whether the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against
the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit. (YES)
RULING:
1) Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of
Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of
Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal,
the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2,
1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available
under the law has lost factual support;
2) The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on
the issuance of warrants of arrest. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and
the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation. What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. It has
not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to
the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained;
3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands
undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus,
an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as
a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws
that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.
