G.R. No.
146364, June 3, 2004
COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
December 8, 1985 – Pursuant to a Kasunduan, petitioner Pajuyo lent his house to private
respondent Guevarra to live in for FREE provided that the latter would maintain the cleanliness and
orderliness of the house.
Guevarra voluntarily agreed to vacate the premises on Pajuyo’s demand.
Upon Pajuyo’s demand on September 1994, being in need of the house, Guevarra refused to vacate
therefrom. Claimed that like him, Pajuyo is also a squatter, hence, the latter has no rover the lot.
Hence, Pajuyo filed an ejectment suit against Guevarra with the MTC.
MTC: In favor of Pajuyo.
Subject property was the house and not the lot.
Guevarra’s use of such was only by Pajuyo’s mere tolerance.
Guevarra’s refusal to vacate the house on Pajuyo’s demand made Guevarra’s continued possession
of the house illegal.
RTC: AFFIRMED.
Kasunduan established landlord-tenant relationship.
The terms of the Kasunduan bound Guevarra to return possession of the house on demand.
Rejected Guevarra’s claims of a better right under Proc. 137; in an ejectment suit, the RTC has
no power to decide Guevarra’s rights under these laws. The RTC declared that in an ejectment
case, the only issue for resolution is material or physical possession, not ownership.
CA: REVERSED; Ejectment case is without factual and legal basis.
Pajuyo and Guevarra are SQUATTERS; lot owned by the government. Hence, in pari delicto – in
equal fault. Hence, the court will leave them where they are.
Perez (who sold the lot to Pajuyo) was also a squatter.
The Kasunduan is not a lease contract but a commodatum because the agreement is not for a
price certain.
Guevarra has a better right because, Pajuyo only resurface the lot on 1994. Proc 137 was issued
on 1987 and Guevarra, at that time, has already in possession of the lot.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Kasunduan is a commodatum and not a contract of lease?
2. WON parties are in pari delicto?
3. WON the unlawful detainer case shall be decided under the Kaunduan?
HELD:
1. NO.
Pursuant to Art. 1933, a contract of commodatum is one where one of the parties delivers to
another something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and
return it.
Essential features: (1) Gratuitous; (2) the use of the thing belonging to another is for a certain period.
Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after expiration of the period
stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is constituted. (Art.
1946)
If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for temporary use.
(ibid.)
If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the thing at
will, in which case the contractual relation is called a precarium. (Art. 1947) Under the Civil Code,
precarium is a kind of commodatum.
Case at bar:
Kasunduan was not essentially gratuituous.
While it did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good
condition.
As to the effects of KASUNDUAN:
Relationship based on tolerance is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of
permission would result in the termination of the lease. The tenant’s withholding of the property
would then be unlawful.
Assuming it is a commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over
possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or to return the thing
received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or contracts of commission, administration and
commodatum. These contracts certainly involve the obligation to deliver or return the thing
received.
The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of Guevarra’s recognition of Pajuyo’s better right of
physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad faith. The absence of a contract
would not yield a different result, as there would still be an implied promise to vacate.
As to possession:
It is for the proper government agency to decide who between Pajuyo and Guevarra qualifies for
socialized housing.
Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment .
FORCIBLE ENTRY UNLAWFUL DETAINER
The plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of But in unlawful detainer, the defendant
his land or building by means of force, unlawfully withholds possession after the
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Thus, he expiration or termination of his right to possess
must allege and prove prior possession. under any contract, express or implied. In such a
case, prior physical possession is not required.
It was Pajuyo who was in actual possession of the land form the fact that Guevarra had to seek
Pajuyo’s permission to temporarily hold the property.
Pajuyo’s absence did not affect his actual possession of the disputed property. Possession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the
ground before he is deemed in possession. One may acquire possession not only by physical
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will. Actual or physical
occupation is not always necessary.
2. NO. Not applicable
Art. 1141 & 1142 – “The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ‘ex dolo malo non eritur actio’
and ‘in pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis.’ The law will not aid either party to an illegal
agreement. It leaves the parties where it finds them.”
Not absolute – XPN: Where the application of the pari delicto rule would violate well-established
public policy.
To shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly invite mayhem and
lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from possession of the lot that the latter had
illegally occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would leave them where they are.
Nothing would then stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at
all cost.
Possession is the only issue in an ejectment case.
Pajuyo is Entitled to Physical Possession of the Disputed Property.
GRANTED.
