Self-Knowledge: Robert Reid, Knowledge (1896) - Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C

The definition of knowledge is a matter of ongoing debate among
epistemologists. The classical definition, described but not ultimately

endorsed by Plato,[5] specifies that a statement must meet three criteria in
order to be considered knowledge: it must be justified, true, and believed.
Epistemologists today generally agree that these conditions are not
sufficient, as various Gettier cases are thought to demonstrate. There are a
number of alternative definitions which have been proposed, including
Robert Nozick's proposal that all instances of knowledge must 'track the
truth' and Simon Blackburn's proposal that those who have a justified true
belief 'through a defect, flaw, or failure' fail to have knowledge. Richard
Kirkham suggests that our definition of knowledge requires that the
evidence for the belief necessitates its truth.[6]
Robert Reid, Knowledge (1896).
In contrast to this approach, Ludwig Wittgenstein observed, following
Thomas Jefferson Building,
Moore's paradox, that one can say "He believes it, but it isn't so," but not
Washington, D.C.
"He knows it, but it isn't so."[7] He goes on to argue that these do not
correspond to distinct mental states, but rather to distinct ways of talking
about conviction. What is different here is not the mental state of the speaker, but the activity in which they
are engaged. For example, on this account, to know that the kettle is boiling is not to be in a particular state of
mind, but to perform a particular task with the statement that the kettle is boiling. Wittgenstein sought to
bypass the difficulty of definition by looking to the way "knowledge" is used in natural languages. He saw
knowledge as a case of a family resemblance. Following this idea, "knowledge" has been reconstructed as a
cluster concept that points out relevant features but that is not adequately captured by any definition.[8]
Self-knowledge
“Self-knowledge” usually refers to a person's knowledge of their own sensations, thoughts, beliefs, and other
mental states.[9] A number of questions regarding self-knowledge have been the subject of extensive debates
in philosophy, including whether self-knowledge differs from other types of knowledge, whether we have
privileged self-knowledge compared to knowledge of other minds, and the nature of our acquaintance with
ourselves.[9] David Hume famously expressed skepticism about whether we could ever have self-knowledge
over and above our immediate awareness of a "bundle of perceptions", which was part of his broader
skepticism about personal identity.[9]
The value of knowledge

It is generally assumed that knowledge is more valuable than mere true
belief. If so, what is the explanation? A formulation of the value problem
in epistemology first occurs in Plato's Meno. Socrates points out to Meno
that a man who knew the way to Larissa could lead others there correctly.
But so, too, could a man who had true beliefs about how to get there, even
if he had not gone there or had any knowledge of Larissa. Socrates says
that it seems that both knowledge and true opinion can guide action.
Meno then wonders why knowledge is valued more than true belief and
why knowledge and true belief are different. Socrates responds that
knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because it is tethered or
justified. Justification, or working out the reason for a true belief, locks
down true belief.[10]
The problem is to identify what (if anything) makes knowledge more

valuable than mere true belief, or that makes knowledge more valuable
than a mere minimal conjunction of its components, such as justification,
safety, sensitivity, statistical likelihood, and anti-Gettier conditions, on a Los portadores de la antorcha (The
particular analysis of knowledge that conceives of knowledge as divided Torch-Bearers) – Sculpture by Anna
Hyatt Huntington symbolizing the
into components (to which knowledge-first epistemological theories,
transmission of knowledge from one
which posit knowledge as fundamental, are notable exceptions).[11] The
generation to the next (Ciudad
value problem re-emerged in the philosophical literature on epistemology Universitaria, Madrid, Spain)

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The definition of knowledge is a matter of ongoing debate among

epistemologists. The classical definition, described but not ultimately

The value of knowledge

The problem is to identify what (if anything) makes knowledge more

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