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MOHAMMED HIJAB
Kalam Cosmological
Arguments

MOHAMMED HIJAB
 Contents Page

Chapter 1 - Introduction.................................................. .

Bibliography................................................................... .

Chapter 2 - Ibn Sina’s “Cosmological Argument”.............. 10

Chapter 3 - Al-Ghazali’s Cosmological Argument............. 31

Bibliography................................................................. 49
Chapter 4 - Ibn Taymiyyah, The Qur’an and the Cosmological
Argument...................................................................... 51

Bibliography.................................................................. 56
Chapter 5 - The Strongest Form of the Arguments............. 57
Bibliography.................................................................. 64
Chapter 6 - Conclusion.................................................... 65

2
 Chapter 1
Introduction

3
 This book is a brief examination of the different kinds of cosmological

arguments that were propounded by Kalam thinkers in the Islamicate region in

the medieval period. It is a collection of three essays that aim to examine the

two most prominent forms of the cosmological argument in this period,

propounded by Ibn Sina and Al-Ghazali. As we will come to see with Ibn

Sina’s argument, it not only functions as a cosmological argument but also as

an ontological and contingency argument (although some disagree with this

taxonomy). I will bring forward some of the most common interrogations of

these arguments and I will be referring to scholars of Jewish, Hellenistic, and

Christian traditions. I will focus on the responses and arguments of Al-Ghazali

and Ibn Sina. I have also incorporated some of the main objections from

Western Enlightenment scholars - such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and

Bertrand Russell - to the cosmological argument. In this way, I hope that the

medieval Arab discourse can re-contribute to the contemporary debate on the

philosophy of religion in Western circles.

In his famous book A History of Western Civilisation, Bertrand Russell seems

to have a cursory awareness of both Ibn Sina and Al-Ghazali (who he calls

4
 Gazel), as well as their arguments. In his famous debate with Copleston,

Russell was forced to contend with some of the arguments of Ibn Sina. These

arguments probably found their way to Copleston through Leibniz, whose

version of the contingency argument is well known in Western academic

circles. One of the primary objections of Russell (and a concern for Kant as

well) was his insistence that in order for propositions to be ‘necessary’, they

must be ‘analytic’la priori rather than ‘syncretic'la posteriori. The standard

ontological argument for God’s existence, which works on a set of a priori

first principles, was propounded by Anselm of Canterbury and proceeded in

the following way:

The Ontological argument may be put in many ways. In its original

form, it states that God has all perfections and existence is among

perfections that is the good is better if it exists than if it does not exist.

Consequently, existence is of God’s essence; to suppose that the most

perfect being does not exist is self-contradictory. (Russell, 1900:173)

5
Russell dismissed this form of Anselm’s ontological argument on the basis

that “God may be defined without reference to the good as the most real being

or the sum of all reality” (Russell, 1900:173).

In his book A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, Russell

criticises Leibniz’s form of the cosmological argument by highlighting that it

follows an a posteriori (cosmological) rather than an a priori (ontological)

approach:

It has a formal vice, in that it starts from finite existence as its datum,

and admitting this to be contingent, it proceeds to infer an existent

which is not contingent. But as the premiss is contingent, the

conclusion also must be contingent. This is only to be avoided by

pointing out that the argument is analytic, that it proceeds from a

complex proposition to one which is logically presupposed in it, and

that necessary truths may be involved in those that are contingent. But

such a procedure is not properly a proof of the presupposition. If a

judgement A presupposes another B, then, no doubt, if A is true, B is

6
 true. But it is impossible that there should be valid grounds for

admitting A, which are not also grounds for admitting B. In Euclid, for

example, if you admit the propositions, you must admit the axioms;

but it would be absurd to give this as a reason for admitting the

axioms. (Russell, 1900:175)

The first essay in this book is an exposition of Ibn Sina’s argument for the

existence of God. I will make the argument that it can be operational as a

cosmological argument, a contingency argument, and an ontological argument

all in one. This is significant as it allows us to fulfil the standard of truth that

Kant and Russell demanded from the arguments.

The prime mover argument, favoured by Aristotle and reiterated by many

others, will not be the focus of this book. This is because, although this

argument provides evidence of a ‘prime mover’ and potentially a pre-eternal

one, it does not provide evidence of an independent necessary being that

explains all things in existence.

7
Russell dismissed this form of Anselm's ontological argument on the basis

that “God may be defined without reference to the good as the most real being

or the sum of all reality” (Russell, 1900:173).

In his book A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, Russell

criticises Leibniz’s form of the cosmological argument by highlighting that it

follows an a posteriori (cosmological) rather than an a priori (ontological)

approach:

It has a formal vice, in that it starts from finite existence as its datum,

and admitting this to be contingent, it proceeds to infer an existent

which is not contingent. But as the premiss is contingent, the

conclusion also must be contingent. This is only to be avoided by

pointing out that the argument is analytic, that it proceeds from a

complex proposition to one which is logically presupposed in it, and

that necessary truths may be involved in those that are contingent. But

such a procedure is not properly a proof of the presupposition. If a

judgement A presupposes another B, then, no doubt, if A is true, B is

6
 true. But it is impossible that there should be valid grounds for

admitting A, which are not also grounds for admitting B. In Euclid, for

example, if you admit the propositions, you must admit the axioms;

but it would be absurd to give this as a reason for admitting the

axioms. (Russell, 1900:175)

The first essay in this book is an exposition of Ibn Sina’s argument for the

existence of God. I will make the argument that it can be operational as a

cosmological argument, a contingency argument, and an ontological argument

all in one. This is significant as it allows us to fulfil the standard of truth that

Kant and Russell demanded from the arguments.

The prime mover argument, favoured by Aristotle and reiterated by many

others, will not be the focus of this book. This is because, although this

argument provides evidence of a ‘prime mover’ and potentially a pre-eternal

one, it does not provide evidence of an independent necessary being that

explains all things in existence.

7
This book is not theological per se, although some of the key arguments in it

relate to theology. The focus of this book is the logical forms and consistency

of the arguments. These will be fleshed out in the third chapter.

(Russell, 1945)

8
Bibliography

Russell, B., 1945. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: American

Book Stratford Press.

Russell, B., 2008. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy ofLeibniz. New

York: Cosmio Classics.

9
 Chapter 2
Ibn Sina’s “Cosmological
Argument”

10
Immanuel Kant classifies arguments for the existence of God into three

categories, namely, the cosmological, ontological, and teleological (Mayer,

2001:19). In commenting on Kant’s understanding of Anselmian and

Leibnizian ontological arguments, Paul Guyer notes that “Kant's rejection of it

was based on the supposition that its proof is ‘ideal’ rather than ‘real’: that is,

that it only unpacks what we may have included in the concept of God but can

not establish that there is any object answering to that concept” (Guyer,

1998:28). Kant criticises the cosmological argument itself:

Why have we instead accused the cosmological idea of falling

short or exceeding its end, namely possible experience? The

reason was this. It is possible experience alone that can give our

concepts reality; without it, every concept is only an idea,

without truth and reference to an object. (Kant, 1998:510)

For Kant, the reason why cosmological arguments are limited is the exact

opposite reason of why ontological arguments are not. In other words, Kant

viewed cosmological arguments as limited in that they are an attempt to prove

11
the immaterial through the material. Kant also viewed ontological arguments

— like those offered by Anselm and Leibniz — as limited for the exact opposite

reason. An ontological argument is “a proof which argues for the existence of

God entirely from a priori premises and makes no use of any premises that

derive from our observation of the world” (Shihadeh, 2008:212), whereas a

cosmological argument bases at least one of its premises on an observable

cosmic phenomenon. The question of whether Ibn Sina’s argument for the

existence of God is ontological or cosmological (or indeed a synthesis of both)

is an interesting one, as it allows us to investigate the Kantian presupposition

that there exists a sharp binary between the physical and the metaphysical; a

priori and a posteriori. To what extent is there a divide between the two, such

that there is applicability to one format if propositions are made in the other?

More crucially, does metaphysical existence amount to ‘actual’ existence?

What are the effects of these questions on argument made specifically in

relation to God’s existence? To what extent could Ibn Sina’s argument(s) be

seen as ontological and belonging solely in the realm of the metaphysical?

The answer to these questions could change the discourse on this topic,

especially in Western circles, where medieval/Enlightenment ontological

12
 proofs are most closely associated with Anselm, Leibniz, and Samuel. This

essay will examine Ibn Sina’s epistemology and its connection with his

subsequent systematic theology. This will then be compared with other, more

‘traditional’ forms of cosmological argumentation to highlight the continuities

and discontinuities between such arguments. Finally, the implications of this

discussion on the philosophy of religion discourse will be mentioned, with

some concluding remarks on the importance of such a study in the debate on

positivism and idealism in philosophy.

In order to understand what Ibn Sina tried to establish in his main argument, it

is vital to understand his working epistemology. Such information is found in

his book al-Shifa (The Cure), in the chapter on al-Ilahiyaat (metaphysics; lit.

that which relates to divinity). However, where students of Aristotelian

philosophy will be familiar with this choice of book title, Ibn Sina

differentiates his arguments from Aristotle’s through his use of antecedent

metaphysical argumentation. Ibn Sina candidly differentiates the physical

world (or the world of tabid) and the conceptual world, designating logical

principles and mathematics as abstractions of the conceptual world (Ibn Sina,

13
the immaterial through the material. Kant also viewed ontological arguments

— like those offered by Anselm and Leibniz — as limited for the exact opposite

reason. An ontological argument is “a proof which argues for the existence of

God entirely from a priori premises and makes no use of any premises that

derive from our observation of the world” (Shihadeh, 2008:212), whereas a

cosmological argument bases at least one of its premises on an observable

cosmic phenomenon. The question of whether Ibn Sina’s argument for the

existence of God is ontological or cosmological (or indeed a synthesis of both)

is an interesting one, as it allows us to investigate the Kantian presupposition

that there exists a sharp binary between the physical and the metaphysical; a

priori and a posteriori. To what extent is there a divide between the two, such

that there is applicability to one format if propositions are made in the other?

More crucially, does metaphysical existence amount to ‘actual’ existence?

What are the effects of these questions on argument made specifically in

relation to God’s existence? To what extent could Ibn Sina’s argument(s) be

seen as ontological and belonging solely in the realm of the metaphysical?

The answer to these questions could change the discourse on this topic,

especially in Western circles, where medieval/Enlightenment ontological

12
 proofs are most closely associated with Anselm, Leibniz, and Samuel. This

essay will examine Ibn Sina’s epistemology and its connection with his

subsequent systematic theology. This will then be compared with other, more

‘traditional’ forms of cosmological argumentation to highlight the continuities

and discontinuities between such arguments. Finally, the implications of this

discussion on the philosophy of religion discourse will be mentioned, with

some concluding remarks on the importance of such a study in the debate on

positivism and idealism in philosophy.

In order to understand what Ibn Sina tried to establish in his main argument, it

is vital to understand his working epistemology. Such information is found in

his book al-Shifa (The Cure), in the chapter on al-Ilahiyaat (metaphysics; lit.

that which relates to divinity). However, where students of Aristotelian

philosophy will be familiar with this choice of book title, Ibn Sina

differentiates his arguments from Aristotle’s through his use of antecedent

metaphysical argumentation. Ibn Sina candidly differentiates the physical

world (or the world of tabid) and the conceptual world, designating logical

principles and mathematics as abstractions of the conceptual world (Ibn Sina,

13
 1960:11). Ibn Sina states that, “Sensory experience [mahsoosaat] is premised
Ibn Sina is the “culmination and crowning achievement of his philosophical
on it [i.e. mathematical abstraction]. Therefore, it [mathematics] precedes in
system” (McGinnis, 2010:149). One can anticipate here, as will be discussed,

essence sensory experience” (Ibn Sina, 1960:11). Referring to logic, Ibn Sina that Ibn Sina also sees the need to do the same thing with his argument for

argues, “looking at logic from an ‘essence’ perspective, it is clear that it is out God’s existence, in a similar way to an architect conceptualising geometric

of the scope of the sensory experience” (Ibn Sina, 1960:11). In fact, Ibn Sina designs before putting these designs into action. Ibn Sina alludes to the fact

lists many logical precepts — such as the law of non-contradiction and, vitally, that this methodology grants a definite and certain knowledge of God’s

the ‘possible’ and the ‘necessary’ — as products of mental conceptualisations. existence (Ibn Sina, 1960:15). However, a few important points of

Almost immediately, as if his reader is waiting for him to do so, Ibn Sina then consideration can be extrapolated. Firstly, Ibn Sina could be said to be a

discusses the Aristotelian ’prime mover’ concept. Ibn Sina writes, “we need to dualist insomuch as he accepts the existence of things other than the mental,

find the first cause after initially conceptualizing its existence and not on and rejects a materialistic (or positivistic) account for the existence of things.

account of it being the first mover” (Ibn Sina, 1960:14). As students of This is also because he believes that there is an intersectionality between the

Aristotle are aware, this is a crucial point of departure from Aristotelian and material (tabii) world of existence and the conceptual world of existence.

post-Aristotelian physics and metaphysics. Such theories depend on theories While Ibn Sina seems to be aware that other philosophers may have different

of motion, concluding that there must be an initial mover. According to Ibn epistemological dispositions to him, he not only produces the aforementioned

Sina, the parallel of using conceptual knowledge to determine physical counter argument to their positivistic claims, he also seemingly wants to

realities is similar to using mathematical knowledge for engineering (Ibn Sina, produce an evidence acceptable to them. Moreover, a by-product of Ibn Sina’s

1960:14). In this point, Ibn Sina stands out in stark contrast to his reasoning is that a strict idealist (in the ‘modem’ Berklian sense) may not

predecessors such as AI-Farabi. Jon McGinnis says that the metaphysics of need to engage with Ibn Sina’s cosmological argument in order to be satisfied

14 15
 that a necessary existent’ — one that all other contingent existences depend on
configuration (three-sidedness) could either be an inherent characteristic or
exists.
something which requires a causative agency; “al-illah al-failiyah” (Ibn Sina,

14). Two things can be noted here. Firstly, for Ibn Sina, causation is not

Ibn Sina makes his argument for God’s existence in three main works: Al- designated to the cosmological setting, as even a triangle needs to be ‘caused’

Shifa (which we have been discussing), Al-Najat, and Al-Ishaaraat and Al- through abstraction or causative configuration (i.e. putting three lines

Tanbihaat (his shortest of all three). Ibn Sina preambles his discursive together). Secondly, mathematical concepts do not seem to be necessary in

explication with an epistemological exposition of a similar complexion to the their existence. With this metaphysical conceptualisation in place, Ibn Sina

one we find in Al-Ilahiyaat. He mentions emotions such as fear and anger as then argues that, “if the cause was the first cause then it is a cause for all of

being non-sensory in the empirical sense in a way that attempts to remind us existence” (Ibn Sina, 1957:18). In this way, it could be concluded that Ibn

of the binary nature of the conceptual world and physically existent things Sina has already made a full ontological argument. Subsequent arguments

(Ibn Sina, 1957:7). Crucially, he makes specific mention of ‘truth’ and says made in Al-Isharaat should be read as having features of linking-togetherness

that “every truth should be regarded in accordance with its essential reality, on the one hand, as well as characteristic stand-aloneness on the other.

which with it [the subject in question] is regarded as true” (Ibn Sina, 1957:12).

To illustrate this point, Ibn Sina provides the example of a triangle and says Up to this point, it is philosophically justified for us to conclude that Ibn

that, “its reality is connected to [concepts of] straightness and lines ... they Sina’s argument is not cosmological in that it requires as much reference to

configure it [the triangle] by reasoning its three sided nature as if it were its the cosmos as a triangle does. His argument is also completely ontological in

reason for being in a material sense” (Ibn Sina, 1957:12,13). In using the that it requires only abstraction of the mind. Bearing this in mind, it is

triangle as an example, Ibn Sina interestingly mentions that its composite therefore conceivable to have a cause and effect (illah and malool) without
any reference whatsoever to the world of maadah (substance) or tabid not, in other words, wish to offer a priori or ontological proof

(material). More substantially, it is possible to make an Avicennian argument for God’s existence but rather, a new form of cosmological

for a necessary existence without reference to cause and effect. However, Ibn proof. (Davidson, 1987:298)

Sina does transition to causality and says that “if the causative agency is a

‘first cause’ then it is the cause of everything” (Ibn Sina, 1957:18). He divides Davidson further discusses, “Ibn Sina without quite realising it, developed a

existence as either possible (mumkin - or dependent on other than itself to cosmological proof that can dispense with the impossibility of an infinite

exist), and necessary (not dependent on anything to exist) (Ibn Sina, 1957: regress” (Davidson, 1987:299). Aside from sidestepping the major

20,21). Ibn Sina then reasons that there can only be one necessary existence. It philosophical debate on the nature and possibility of ‘infinite regress’ — which

is from this point onward that Ibn Sina entangles cosmology with ontology. Ibn Sina himself rejects (Ibn Sina, 1957:102) — Davidson designates Ibn

Thomas Mayer points out that “It will become clear that this crucial first fasl Sina’s conception of existence and causation as belonging only in the material

of the argument has stubbornly ontological traits, contradicting those who, world. Ibn Sina makes a cosmological argument by mentioning the example

like Davidson, deny any such element in the proof’ (Mayer, 2001:22). Herbert of movement in the sky and its connection with a will (Ibn Sina, 1957:34). He

Davidson, in his seminal work on Jewish and Islamic Kalam, does not see it references time, movement and power (Ibn Sina, 1957:165), but the question is

this way: not whether his arguments can be seen to have cosmological elements, but

whether they can be read as sufficient without reference to the cosmos.

Avicenna does not regard the analysis of the concept of Another important question relates to the first principles that Ibn Sina uses to

necessary existent by virtue of itself as sufficient to establish build his philosophy upon which, as we have seen. These principles are

the actual existence of anything in the external world. He does characteristically metaphysical and ontological. Ibn Sina’s dualism does not

18 19
prohibit him from being able to interweave otherwise purely cosmological medieval examples of how contingency arguments can easily take a

arguments into theoretical abstractions, and vice versa. cosmological form. In other words, there is no attempt in these examples to

deal with the metaphysical as it may be assumed that these are ‘ideal’ rather

Like Kant, many thinkers throughout history saw the problem in ’actualising' than‘real’, in the way Kant may have suggested. Much like Kant, the Ash’aris

the abstract, instead preferring purely cosmological conceptions. A cursory (specifically Al-Juwaini, Al-Baqillani, and Al-Ghazali) made the distinction

examination of popular medieval cosmological arguments facilitates an even between the external (real) and the mental (ontological). Fascinatingly, they

more sharply demarcated reading of Ibn Sina’s philosophy relative to such attempted to bridge the gap using the theory of particularisation (takhsis)

arguments. For example, Maimonides, who prefers an Aristotelian type of expounded at length by Al-Baqillani. In his Tamheed, Al-Baqillani uses the

argumentation that depends on time and motion, still uses the language of the Aristotelian prime mover argument to discuss contingent things in the ’real

Avicennian argument. In A Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides starts with world'. When discussing animal forms, Al-Baqillani writes that if contingent

the first cosmological principles referring to change (Ibn Mayoon, 1951:245), 'real' world objects had a reason to be a certain way rather than another, then

strength (Ibn Mayoon, 1951:251), movement (Ibn Mayoon, 1951:257), and that reason must have been either inherent or external (Al-Baqillani, 1957:24).

time (Ibn Mayoon, 1951:254). Al-Ghazali also discusses a straightforward In other words, contingent realities in the real world could be any other way,

cosmological syllogism in Al-Iqtisaad ft Al-Itiqaad, saying, “everything that and the fact that they have a particular form could be explained either

begins to exist has a cause, the world (aalarri) began to exist, therefore the contingently or necessarily. If we consider that it is necessary, then there must

world has a cause” (Al-Ghazali, 2003:26). Thomas Aquinas also argues using have been an external particulariser since, in Baqillani’s reasoning, everything

creation in his first principles in all of his arguments for the existence of God. with the same properties would emerge all at once (Baqillani, 1957:24). This

The example of Maimonides, Al-Ghazali, and Aquinas are some of the many >■
reasoning by Al-Baqillani fits in with the occasionalism that Ash’aris believe jI
I

20 21 I
bl
ill, and attempts to create a bridge between the ontological and the

cosmological. Commenting on this reasoning and on Al-Ghazali’s response to

Avicenna, Ayman Shihadeh writes, “Al-Ghazali’s objection, however, rests

on two assumptions: first, that Avicenna has only one, rather simple account

of possibility; second that possibility is either in the external world or in the

mind ... Avicenna sees no mutual contradiction between the notion that

possibility is, on one respect, a mental judgement and his assertion that the

possibility of things that come to be present in a substrate” (Shihadeh,

1998:124). From this perspective, it is clear there is a tension between the first

principle assumptions of Ibn Sina and that of his medieval Kalam

counterparts. This is because, where they found a need to bridge the

ontological to the cosmological using notions such as the theory of

particularisation, Ibn Sina did not see such a need.

Ibn Sina seemed aware that a completely cosmological conception could have

inductive limitations (pre-empting Hume). He therefore starts with a premise

of mere existence (foreshadowing Descartes). Ibn Sina’s famous declaration

22
 of “there is no doubt there is existence” (Ibn Sina, 237) bypasses the Cartesian

presupposition of self-awareness in ‘I’ think therefore ‘I’ am, therefore also

bypassing the Nietzschean criticism of the cogito. It is from this point that Ibn

Sina proceeds to dividing existence into necessary and contingent, almost as if

there is no evidence to suggest the philosophical illegitimacy in doing

otherwise. There is no Platonic world of forms that Ibn Sina refers to; he

simply conflates existence acquired through sense datum with that done so

through abstraction. In this regard, Mayer says:

Next in the fast, existence is mentally subjected to a dichotomy. Either it is

necessary, or it is not necessary. On the basis of the first division, Ibn Sina

immediately proceeds to infer the actual, extra-mental reality of God. Ibn Sina

says that the first division will amount to God, Al-Haqq (the Necessarily

Existent in Itself) and Al-Qayyum (the Self-Subsistent). In this, Ibn Sina

makes the crucial ontological move from the idea of a ‘necessary' division in

the dichotomy of existence (expressed by the technical term Wajib al-Wnjud),

23
 to the affirmation of a particular instance of it in reality, a divinity expressed mover, he did not think one was justified in justifying this cause with God ...

by the scriptural terms Al-Haqq and Al-Qayyum (Mayer, 2001:23). at best this entity is the cause of motion in our cosmos, but not the very

The question of ontology is an interesting one that can be envisaged as either a existence of the cosmos itself. In contrast, God is the very cause of all

purely ontological argument, or a synthesis between ontology and cosmology, existence itself’ (McGinnis, 2010:151).

If there can be no logical reason that dictates that a priori propositions are as

real as empirical ones, there is no philosophical justification to give more Mayer puts forth a similar point to this:

epistemic weight to one proposition over the other. Parviz Morewedge

disagrees with this, taking the Kantian view that ontological arguments are nol The complete argument can now be evaluated. Morewedge

satisfactory after designating Ibn Sina’s argumentation to pure ontology and Davidson are both correct in that the proof as a whole is

(Mayer, 2001:25). However, this in itself is an unsatisfactory conclusion, as il simultaneously ontological and cosmological. Ibn Sina

does not properly regard the aspects of Ibn Sina’s argumentation, which have initially divides existence into the necessary and the

been discussed above as clearly cosmological in nature. For example, Ibn contingent. Then: the necessary must be affirmed to exist,

Sina’s discussion on motion and planetary orbit could be invoked as evidence. unconditionally. This is an ontological train of reasoning.

Ibn Sina’s preference of an ontological argument in the first instance, namely, (Mayer, 2001:35-36)

the cosmological argument of motion mentioned by Aristotle, does not mean

that he rejected such arguments. However, Ibn Sina did not see these However, where Mayer is accurate in his understanding Ibn Sina's argument

arguments as foundational, as Jon McGinnis notes, “While Avicenna was as synthetic, he is less accurate in his saying of the contingent only existing

convinced that physics could demonstrate that there was some, first, unmoved ‘by another'. This means that while it may comprise an infinity of individuals,

24 25
it cannot be self-sufficient; this follows a cosmological train of reasoning

(Mayer, 2001:36). Mayer might have been on safer ground had he cited one of

many examples where causality or contingency are applied to aspects of the

cosmos itself, since infinity itself is a concept that could be said to exist only

in abstraction.

If one concludes - as Kant has in our introduction - that establishing the

‘existence’ of something should be done empirically, there is a hidden

naturalistic presupposition. The problem with Kant’s interrogation is that it is

circular. It assumes that a methodological physicalism should be presupposed

in the study of something that may be proved - in subsequent discursive

rationalisation - to be metaphysical. It could be argued that this is equivalent

to attempting to detect mathematics through scientific experimentation. These

forms of interrogation, together with other types, were central to the debate

between positivists and other philosophers in the early twentieth century. This

debate rendered both positivism and verificationism as less credible, which

was ultimately reflected in the Popperian shift to falsificationism in the

philosophy of science. In philosophical hindsight, these debates are critical to

26
 conceptions of cosmological arguments and their relationship with
our

ontological ones. Would dualists like Ibn Sina consider sensory existence as

'factual1 than metaphysical existence? Does the Kantian tripartite

more

typology presuppose a methodological naturalism that renders ontological

arguments - as Morewedge would concur - an unreal part of existence? Is the

proposition of an 'unreal existence' possible in the first place? The answers to

thesequestions all depend on one’s epistemological expectation. Perhaps what

Ibn Sina did - which was truly innovative - was filling the gap in the

philosophical market for metaphysical explanations that would appeal to

dualists and idealists as much is it would to physicalists. In his effort to leave

no epistemological stone unturned, Ibn Sina premised his entire argument on

ontological first principles before proceeding to mention things that are

specific to the cosmos as additional evidence. Returning to Kant’s original

complaint, it would seem that Ibn Sina anticipated his objections. He

attempted to offer evidences that would satisfy the mind’s curiosity as well as

the empiricist’s enquiry for sense datum. For Ibn Sina, the necessary being

which depends on no-one or nothing for its existence, and yet everything

27
 depends on it for its own, is equivalent to a mathematical equation which
Secondary Sources
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Davidson, H. (1987).Proq/y ybr Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in

Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press
Bibliography
Guyer, P. (1998). A Critique ofPure Reason. Cambridge. Cambridge

University Press
NB: Dates in brackets represent the publication dates.
Mayer, T. (2001). Ibn Sina’s Burhan al Siddiqin. Journal ofIslamic
Primary Sources Studies, 12:1, ppi 8-39
Al-Baqillani, A. (1957). Kitaab al Tamheed. Beirut: Al Maktabah al McGinnis, J. (2010). Avicenna. Oxford and New York: Oxford University

Sharqiyah Press

Al-Ghazali, A. (2003). Al Itiqaadfi Al-Iqtisaad. Beirut: Kotaiba Shihadeh, A. (2008). The Existence of God’. In The Cambridge Companion to

Ibn Mayoon, M. (1951). Dalalah Al-Ha'reen. Cairo: Maktabah al-Thaqafah al ClassicalIslamic Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge Univerity Press.

Deenia Shihadeh, A. (2008). Doubts on Avicenna: A Study and Edition ofSharaf al

Ibn Sina, A. (1957). Al Ishaarat wa Al-Tanbihaat. Cairo: Dar al Ma’rif Din Al Masudi's commentary on the Isharaat. Leiden and Boston: Brill

Ibn Sina, A. (1982). Kitaab Al Najaatfi Al Hikmah al Muntiqiyah wa Al-

Tabia wa-ilahiyah. Beirut: Dar al Al'faaq

Ibn Sina, A. (1960). Al Shifa. Cairo: Dar al Ma’rif

Kant, Immanuel. (1998). A Critique ofPure Reason. Cambridge. Cambridge

University Press

29
 Chapter 3
Al-Ghazali’s Cosmological
Argument

30
The issue of the etemality of the world or ‘qidum al aalam" is a central Kalam

element in discussions on proving God’s existence, especially in conjunction

with the cosmological argument. Continuing the Asharite legacy passed down

to him directly from Al-Juwaini, Al-Ghazali made the cosmological argument

that every originated thing has an originator; since the world is an originated

thing, the world has an originator (Al-Ghazali, 2003:26). The discussion of

eternity is particularly important as the notion of an eternal world confutes the

second premise of Al-Ghazali’s cosmological argument, namely, that the

‘world’ came into existence in the first place. If the ‘world’ need not come

into existence (by logical necessity or otherwise), this would entail a serious

limitation on the soundness of Al-Ghazali’s syllogism. Connected to this is the

idea of an infinite regress of causes, time, movements, and bodies. The

complex question relating to ‘infinity’ was debated fiercely by intellectual

proponents of almost every age. Al-Ghazali, as we will come to see, exerts

much philosophical energy attempting to refute Aristotelian notions of the

etemality of the world. Such ideas would be passed down to Al-Farabi, Al-

31
Kindi, and Ibn Sina, who all argued for an impossibility of an infinite regress

of causes and the logical necessity of the eternality of the world. Although this

essay will not focus on theological matters, important Islamic theology

relating to the attributes of God will be referred to when such references affect

the logical argument. Volition, which God is seen to exhibit, is important

because Al-Ghazali argues that a God with volition ought to be able to select

‘times’ and ‘places’ to do whatever He wants. Believing that this is not the

case implies that God is compelled to co-exist with the eternal world. In other

words, Al-Ghazali sees the eternity premise as one that bereaves God of His

will (Davidson, 1987:4). Al-Ghazali’s argument from particularisation is

linked to his understanding of God’s will. Moreover, Al-Ghazali argues that

the way we see the world in one way rather than in another possibly

conceivable way is evidence for a ‘specifier’ or ‘mukhasis'. On this point, it is

conceivable that the mukhasis can choose a specific time and place for the

creation of the world. On this view, God can choose to cause the existence of

time, place, and matter through ‘creation’. I will begin this essay by outlining

some of Al-Ghazali’s arguments for the impossibility of eternity/infinity, as

well as some of the main objections to these arguments. I will attempt to

32
 answer a fundamental question: to what extent is the idea of an eternal world

(or infinite regress) of causes, bodies, movements or time logically

acceptable? With this in mind, another question can be asked: what overall

impact does the implications of infinity/eternity have on Al-Ghazali’s

cosmological argument for God’s existence?

Al-Ghazali identifies many arguments of the falasifa (philosophers) for the

eternality of the world and attempts to show the philosophical ineffectuality of

such arguments (Leaman, 2000:41). Firstly, the philosophers believed in a

godlyemanation that led to the existence of the world (Leaman, 2000:41).

This emanation could be seen to be analogous to the relationship between the

sun and its transmitted light; one (the sunlight) always exists with the

necessary presence of the other (the sun). This view of emanation was

famously elaborated upon by Ibn Sina in his works. Al-Ghazali’s counter­

argument was to wonder “why God can’t post-date the creation of the

universe” (Leaman, 2000:41). Al-Ghazali mentions the following regarding

this argument:

33
 F

The adversary will ask: if it was originated by the origination existence of temporal beings with arbitrary properties (such as height, colour,

of Allah, why did it originate now (i.e. at one specific time) and shape). Such material realities require a ‘voluntary sorting agent’

and why not before this time? Is it because of the lack of (teaman, 2000:45). Al Baqillani, the teacher of the teacher of Al-Ghazali

instrument or ability or objective reason to do so or natural (tough

hr whom Al-Ghazali inherited this argument), argued that if the reason

reason? (Al-Ghazali, 2003:96) for the emergence of things in one way rather than another was due to

something inherent within such things, all things consisting of the same
Al-Ghazali goes on to further state that, “The objection is premised on two
properties would emerge at once (Al-Baqillani, 1957:24). The argument from
points. The first is to ask ‘what do you say to the one who says that the world
particularisation from this perspective could be said to denote both a temporal
had been originated by a pre-eternal entity which allowed its existence in the
and quantitative contingency of things that come into existence. An issue with
time in which it allowed to be, and that nothingness would occur for the time
to. line of reasoning is that, if understood in conjunction with Al-Ghazali’s
period which it would occur for” (Al-Ghazali, 2003:96). Al-Ghazali proceeds
syllogism mentioned above, a certain kind of circularity is created. That is to
to give the example of a man who wants to postpone a divorce with his wife.
say, if one presupposes that God is the only cause for all that exists, and one
The main argument is that creation ex nihilo does not contradict the will of
starts with the premise that ‘every originated thing has an originator’, such a
God. Al-Ghazali, like al-Juwaini and al-Baqillani before him, attempted to
premise may be accused of begging the question. In order to avoid such
argue God’s will through the theory of particularisation. Al-Ghazali makes the
circularity, some concession must be made concerning the initial explicability
argument that the existence of possible things in one time, rather than another,
of causation without direct reference to God. In his book Enquiry Concerning
or one place as opposed to another, is evidence of an external particulariser.
Human Understanding, David Hume exhibits a similar degree of scepticism
For example, an external will decides on movement rather than rest
of cause and effect. Hume reasons that there is “no argument to convince us
(Davidson, 1987:194). Physical evidence for this in the cosmos is the

34 35
 that kinds of event that we have often found to be associated in the past win comparison of Saturn and the Sun) may take 1 year to complete a rotation,

be so in future ... If we reason a priori, anything may appear able to produce whilst planet B may take 30 years. If one were divide the number of

anything. The falling of a pebble may, for all we know, extinguish the sun; or rotation years of planet A by planet B, one should expect two mathematical

the wish of a man may control the planets in their orbits” (Hume, 2017:82). answers: one answer is 1/30, and the other is infinity. In the physical world,

As we will come to see, Al-Ghazali (almost pre-empting Hume’s enquiry) this would constitute a contradiction. The 14th century Jewish philosopher

asks why, for instance, the orbits are one way rather than another (Al-Ghazali, gersonides puts this another way, saying,

2003:97). Al-Baqillani reasonably argued that, had the reason been inherent to
If the universe was eternal, the number of lunar eclipses would be infinite,
the physical object in question, all such objects with identical properties
which means that the moon would be in a state of eternal eclipse” (Davidson,
would come about at the same time and place, and in the same way.
1987:123). This argument is similar to Aristotle’s commentary of Zeno’s

Al-Ghazali makes a series of arguments that aim to show the impossibility of dichotomy paradox. Such a paradox details running to a half-way point from

a physical existence of infinity in the cosmos. He does this in many standard distance A-B, then the half-way point to that distance, ad infinitum. It would

ways, including the argument of rotating planets. This argument, put forth be assumed that such a distance cannot be traversed as it is theoretically

before Al-Ghazali’s time, questions the real existence of both infinite time and infinite. From this, Zeno concludes that motion is illusionary and there is no

infinite movements. Foreshadowing David Hilbert’s hotel paradox, Al- actual movement from one point to another. Aristotle responded by indicating

Ghazali specifically chooses cosmological examples that suppose the the feasibility of dividing the time taken just as we divide the distances taken

impossibility of an infinite amount of ‘things’ in the ‘real world’. Al-Ghazali to run. In this way, we should have a fractional answer rather than an infinite

provides a thought experiment of rotating planets in an eternal universe, which toe. Aristotle then made a distinction between a continuous line and a line

takes different times to complete a rotation. Planet A (Al-Ghazali uses the

of parts (Hughlett, 2019). From this perspective, Al-Ghazali’s

36
37
*

I
interrogations on etemality/infinity (ma la nihayci) are, to some extent >not Particularly innovative to the pre-existing medieval discourse, is not

consistent with Aristotelian cosmological themes in that they are based on one easily refttable without outward reference to other phenomena that consider

main supposition: representations of infinity in the physical world would etetnalty/infinty as logically necessary. Such phenomena include the

entail the contradiction of bigger and smaller infinities. John Philoponus Afs,otelian notion that “everything comes into existence from a substratum”

advanced this argument half a millennium before Al-Ghazali, making the (Aristotle, 19831:7) and the fact that “there can be no before and after without

point that “whatever is susceptible to greater or lesser is finite” (Davidson, time”(Aristotle, 1983:220a).

1987:118). He summarised his version of the argument in three main ways, all

of which were consistent with the Ghazalian conceptions. Philoponus said that

the world must have a beginning, since an infinite regress of past events Where Al-Ghazali may have been successful in demonstrating the

would not be possible. This is because the past would not be completed and incongruence of mathematical notions of infinity, physical time, amount of

the future would never be reached (Davidson, 1987: 118). Secondly, bodies, and movements, there still remained some important questions

Philoponus stated that the past must have a beginning, since the past is unanswered by his arguments. Such questions pertain to the initial Aristotelian

continually increased and infinity cannot be possibly increased (Davidson, differentiation (and by later philosophers) between an infinite regress of

1987:118). Thirdly, Philoponus stated that, since planets move at different causes and an eternal universe which existed pre-etemally. Aristotle argued

speeds, an infinity would include the absurdity of one’s infinity being a for the etemality of the world on account of the contradiction in the necessary

multiple of another (Davidson, 1987:118). It is in this last example that we are proposition that time would need to be created in time in order for it to come

reminded of Al-Ghazali, whose example of the rotating planets is almost into existence (Davidson, 1987:27). On this point, the statement ‘before time’

identical with that of Philoponus. Al-Ghazali’s rotating planets argument, is itself a contradiction as one presupposes the latter in order to affirm the

38
39
 former. This conception is based on the Aristotelian assumption that so (both theist and atheist) of an etemalist/creation ex nihilo argument for the

as there is movement there must be time, and there must always have been entirety of instances where all of time can be conceived either in or out of the

movement and time. In this way, Aristotle did not conceive of a reality universe makes the problem of induction an ever-persistent consideration for

external to that of this universe. John Philoponus makes this argument by ill. In this way, the problem of induction - and the claim to a fallacy of

saying that time “does not constrain God whose essence and actuality i composition - can only be finally made when perfect knowledge of the whole

transcend the universe” (Davidson, 1987:30). Pre-empting David Hume’s is acquired. The Aristotelian propositions of “everything comes into existence

famous white swan example, the Mu’tazilite Abd Al-Jabbar points to the from a substratum” (Aristotle 1:7) and “there can be no before and after

problem of induction and its relation to generalising a sample group. without time” (Aristotle, 7:220a) are as cosmologically valid as the Ghazalian

Foreshadowing Hume, Abd Al-Jabbar mentions, perhaps rather crudely, that proposition that ‘every originated thing has an originator’. Al-Ghazali would

black men cannot think that all men are black (Abd Al-Jabbar, 1964:224). have had to reason metaphysically in order to break this philosophical

This line of reasoning, while legitimate in essence, also places some limitation deadlock, and he seems to do this with an argument that is original and

on Al-Ghazali’s syllogism, which depends on a generalisation of potentially undercutting,

demonstrated causes in the cosmologies to conclude that ‘every originated

thing has an originator’. This prompted Bertrand Russell to famously respond Like Aristotle, both Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi believed that the world was

to Copleston in his radio debate, saying, “every man who exists has a mother, eternal. They viewed an infinite regress of causes as impossible. Ibn Sina and

and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a Al-Farabi both believed that, in order for infinity to be impossible, two

mother” (Allen, 1989:6). Here, Russell outlined what he saw to be a fallacy of I conditions must be fulfilled: the objects in question must exist together (at the

composition in the cosmological argument. The ignorance of the proponent

40
41
same time), and they must be arranged in order (Davidson, 1987:128).

response to this, Al-Ghazali writes:

Even if we admit that [our attempt to establish that the

argument from correspondence] is annulled by [the

philosophers’ acceptance of] successive temporal events [that

have no beginning] has been obviated, the argument [front

correspondence] can nevertheless be annulled [for the

philosophers] by [their doctrine of] human souls. For despite

being, according to them, infinite in number, [human souls] are

coexistent, since, as they claim, they endure eternally after the

corruption of the body. (Shihadeh, 2011:150)

In this way, it would seem that Al-Ghazali had undercut his philosophical

rivals by providing them with the two conditions required in order to make a

case for infinity. The 15th century Ottoman scholar Khojazada responded to

Al-Ghazali with the following objection:

42
[This argument from] human souls, too, fails to annul [the

argument from correspondence for the philosophers]. For since

there is no order whatsoever, with respect to either position

(wad') or nature (Jab*), among [human souls], the

aforementioned demonstration [from correspondence] will not

apply to them. For it will not follow from the correspondence

between the first [soul] from the first of two sets [of souls] and

the first [soul] from the second set [of souls], that the second

[soul from the first set] will correspond to the second [soul

from the second set], the third [from the first set] will

correspond to the third [from the second set], and so forth until

the correspondence is set out fully, unless, perhaps, if the mind

considers each individual [soul] from the first set and treats it

as corresponding to an individual [soul] from the second set.

The mind, however, is incapable of perceiving infinite things,

individually, whether concurrently or within a finite period of

time, for the [method of] correspondence to become possible,

and for [al-GhazalT’s] reductio ad absurdum to work. Rather,

43
 [the method of] correspondence becomes inapplicable as soon Some [SOU^SJ maY indeed be ordered in chronological

as it ceases to take its cue from both the imagination and succession, such as the souls of Zayd and his forefathers ad

reason. (Shihadeh, 2011:150) infinitum. However, with respect to their being related to the

moments of their coming into being they do not coexist, since

Al-Ghazali, anticipating this form of interrogation, makes the following point is inconceivable for those moments to coexist, and without

of importance: them they cannot be ordered [chronologically]. (Shihadeh,

2011:153)
The positional [order among human souls] follows from the

order of the moments of time in which they come into being, This argument seems wholly unsatisfactory as it only serves to prove the point

while the natural [order among human souls] follows from [the Al-Ghazali set out to make in the first instance: that the philosophers are

fact that the existence of] a child’s soul [presupposes the inconsistent with their treatment of one infinity (the conceivable infinite

existence] of his body, which [in turn] presupposes the soul of amount of human souls) and the infinite time that the ‘world’ has been in

the parent, which generates the matter of the child’s body, existence pre-etemally. But where this argument successfully points out the

(Shihadeh, 2011:153) inconsistencies of the philosophers, it acts as a philosophical double-edged

wd for Al-Ghazali. This is because it undermines his earlier arguments that

To this, Khojazada adds:
indicate to the impossibility of an infinite amount of ‘things’ in a pre-etemal

Hence, it is not possible to conceive of all [souls] as being way. If the existence of an infinite amount of immortal souls post-etemally is

ordered in succession simply on account of the successive conceivable through God’s will, then the pre-existence of an infinite number

order of the points in time [in which they come into being].

44
45
of time or bodies pre-etemally should also be conceivable if connected^ eternity (say, in the conceivability infinite amount of human souls) on the one

God’s will.
Iiaod, while rejecting the logical possibility of a pre-etemity of bodies or

movements. So too does Al-Ghazali believe in the impossibility of an infinite

It is perhaps at this philosophical juncture that Ibn Taymiyyah’s wor^
regress of time, bodies, or movement, which may not be co-extensive with the
become of great importance. In The Rejection of Conflict Between Reason
pre-etemal God. To this end, it is unclear why Al-Ghazali did not view it
Revelation, written in response to Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi (who had an identical
logically possible for God to have chosen to continue creating pre-etemally
position to Al-Ghazali on infinity), Ibn Taymiyyah writes:
into the past through his will.

That he (i.e. Al-Razi) says ‘if the originated thing was pre-
Wehave been able to analyse a few of Al-Ghazali’s main arguments and have
eternal then the regression of originated things would have
seen that some were recovered from Aristotelian tradition, while others (as Ibn
stopped at a pre-etemal non-originated entity , we say, we do
Rushd highlights) were not in line with such traditions. A third category of
not submit to this since the pre-etemal entity could have been
arguments were intended to undermine the Aristotelian positions. The major
co-extensive with originated things which also have no
strengths of Al-Ghazali’s arguments relate to his argument from
beginning. (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2011:231).
particularisation, his ability to demonstrate prima facie inconsistencies

Ibn Taymiyyah proceeds to claim that there is nothing in the Quran which between mathematical notions of infinity and cosmological (physical) ones, as

explicitly details creation ex nihilo (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2011:68). This, of course, well as his successful ability to demonstrate the theological/philosophical

is a theological area of research which may be the subject of another paper, positions of the philosophers concerning infinity in conjunction with the

The point worthy of note is that, just as Al-Ghazali, Al-Razi and others were existence of an infinite amount of human souls. The main limitation of his

able to identify the problematic nature of the falasifa believing in a post' arguments relates to his indecision to refute a pre-etemal infinite number of

46 47
 bodies, movements, or time if such things are directly connected to God’s IkI Al-Jabbar, A. 1996. Shark al Usui al Khamsa. Beruit: Maktabah

will. Al-Ghazali would have been able to make an argument against thjs

infinite regress of co-extensive bodies which have been created by God by j.Baqilaani, A. (1957). Kitaab al Tamheed. Beirut: Al Maktabah al

reasoning that it would bereave God of His will if such bodies are the direct wqiyah

product of God’s will. In this way, Al-Ghazali’s insistence on creation ex tl-Ghazali, A. (2003). AlItiqaadfi Al-Iqtisaad. Beirut: Kotaib

nihilo as the only logical possibility could be said to be questionable. Despite J-Ghazali, A. (2003). Tahufut al Falasifah. Beruit. Kotaib

Hume and Russell’s assertions that causality itself is questionable as it relates Vistotle, (1983) Physics, Books III-IV, translated with notes by Edward

to the universe, this notion cannot be not ruled out. Perhaps if causality were Hussey, Oxford: Clarendon Press

reasoned metaphysically, one may bypass the abovementioned problem of ItaTaymiyyah, A. 2009. Dar'Al Tarrud Bayn al Aql wa alNaql. 1st Edition

induction. Perhaps if Al-Ghazali, like Maimonides and Ibn Tufayl, was able to il Cairo: Dar Al Kotob al Ilmiyah.

argue the existence of God from two parallel tracks (Davidson, 1987:4), he fate, D., 2017'. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 2nd Edition ed.

may have left less room for doubt. Cambridge: Jonathan Bennett.

Secondary sources
Bibliography

Allen, D., 1989. Christian Belief in a Post-Modern World. 1st Edition ed.
Primary sources
Louisville: John Knox Press.

49
48
Davidson, H. Proofs for Eternity. Creation and the Existence of Godi

Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy. New York: Oxford University pres.

Huggett, N. (2017) Zeno's Paradoxes. The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL

Chapter 4
<https://plato.stanford.edu archives/spr2019/entries/paradox-zeno/>.

Leaman, O., 2000. A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy. Cambridge:

Polity Press.

Shihadeh, A., 2011. Khojazada on al-Ghazali’s Criticism of the Philosophers’

Proof of the Existence of God. SOAS Research Online, pp. 141-160.

Despite his critique of the philosophers and the Ash’antes, Ibn Taymiyyah has

side important contributions to the cosmological argument. Some of his

»orks on this argument include Dar’ Al-Ta‘rrud, Al-Safadiyah, Mas’alah

Hudooth Al-Aalam, and Sharh Aqeedah Al-Isbahani. We will focus on the

51

50
latter text, which translates to An Explanation of the Creed ofAl-Isfahani. lbD

Taymiyyah undoubtedly affirmed not only the term wajib al^ujood

(necessary existence), but also the rationale that led to it. Ibn Taymiyyah

connects this kind of rationalisation with Qur’anic arguments and alludes to

the fact that the argument is, in effect, Qur’anic. This is similar to Al-Ghazali

in his book Al-Qistaas al Mustaqeem. After mentioning the standard ways in

which the philosophers and Ash’arites have argued the existence of God, Ibn

Taymiyyah writes:

And from that which demonstrates the many ways in which one can

argue for the existence of the Maker, Glory be to Him, is dividing

existence into possible and necessary, and using possible existences to

prove necessary existences. The genus ‘necessary existence’ is clearly

relative to ‘possible existence’ (for this reason). This is similar to

dividing existence into emergent and eternal, and using emergent

things to reason the existence of the eternal. So, if someone says, that

is the existent thing, it is either possible or necessary, and the possible

thmg ultimately requires a necessary thing (in order to exist). This

52
I
 affirms the existence of a necessary in all circumstances. We can then

say the existent thing is either emergent or eternal, and the emergent

requires an eternal thing which affirms the existence of the eternal

thing in all scenarios. It is said that the existent thing is either

dependent or independent (self-sufficient). The dependent thing

requires an independent thing to depend on, and this affirms the

existent of the independent in all circumstances. Likewise, it could be

said that the existent thing could either be created or uncreated. This

necessitates the existence of a creator which is uncreated in all

circumstances. [From] this meaning, many of the later theoreticians

such as the author of this creed [Al-Isfahani] and his like affirm the

existence of knowledge of the creator. So, they affirm that he is a

necessary existence, and this is correct in meaning and is some of

which the divine texts have indicated with reference to Allah’s divine

names and attributes. However, the texts also indicate many meanings

which comprehensively link this meaning and others similar to it from

the perfect characteristics of Allah. This is not limited to the fact that

Allah is referenced as Al-Qayyum [the Self-sufficient/Maintainer] and

53
 1

latter text, which translates to An Explanation of the Creed ofAl-Isfahani.^

Taymiyyah undoubtedly affirmed not only the term wajib

(necessary existence), but also the rationale that led to it Ibn Taymiyyak

connects this kind of rationalisation with Qur’anic arguments and alludes to

the fact that the argument is, in effect, Qur’anic. This is similar to Al-Ghazali

in his book Al-Qistaas al Mustaqeem. After mentioning the standard ways it)

which the philosophers and Ash’arites have argued the existence of God, Ibn

Taymiyyah writes:

And from that which demonstrates the many ways in which one can

argue for the existence of the Maker, Glory be to Him, is dividing

existence into possible and necessary, and using possible existences to

prove necessary existences. The genus ‘necessary existence’ is clearly

relative to ‘possible existence’ (for this reason). This is similar to

dividing existence into emergent and eternal, and using emergent

I II II I I
things to reason the existence of the eternal. So, if someone says, that

is the existent thing, it is either possible or necessary, and the possible

thing ultimately requires a necessary thing (in order to exist). This

52
affirms the existence of a necessary in all circumstances. We can then

say the existent thing is either emergent or eternal, and the emergent

requires an eternal thing which affirms the existence of the eternal

thing in all scenarios. It is said that the existent thing is either

dependent or independent (self-sufficient). The dependent thing

requires an independent thing to depend on, and this affirms the

existent of the independent in all circumstances. Likewise, it could be

said that the existent thing could either be created or uncreated. This

necessitates the existence of a creator which is uncreated in all

circumstances. [From] this meaning, many of the later theoreticians

such as the author of this creed [Al-Isfahani] and his like affirm the

existence of knowledge of the creator. So, they affirm that he is a

necessary existence, and this is correct in meaning and is some of

which the divine texts have indicated with reference to Allah’s divine

names and attributes. However, the texts also indicate many meanings

which comprehensively link this meaning and others similar to it from

the perfect characteristics of Allah. This is not limited to the fact that

Allah is referenced as Al-Qayyum [the Self-sufficient/Maintainer] and

53
 book will
chapter assess some of the logical points, as well as the
of this

Al-Samad [the Sovereign/Independent). This is even present in his strenghs and limitations ,of these arguments. The ‘strongest form’ of these
arguments from
names the Rabb (Master) and Ilaah (Deity), and other such words. We a logical Perspective will be proposed.

have mentioned the exegesis of Surah Al-Ikhlaas in another

publication, and also the meaning of it being equivalent to one-third in

the Quran in another place. We have also mentioned that the termJ/.

Samad (means) that He is the independent one (from everything other

than him), and everything apart from him is dependent upon him. This

includes the meaning that He is the necessary existence in and of

Himself reliant upon Him. This also includes that all of existence is

existence by Him and from Him. (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2009:60-61)

As we saw with Immanuel Kant in Chapter 1, Ibn Taymiyyah saw the need

for the argument to have practical applicability in the real world. He starts his Bibliography

discursion (before the quote abovementioned mentioned) by mentioning that, ItoTaymiyyah. 2009. Shark Al-Ishbahaniyah. 1 ed. Riyadh: Maktabah Dar

in order for the category of ‘possible existence’ to have any ‘real’ meaning,it Al-Mihaaj.

must be applicable in the real world. From this, Ibn Taymiyyah’s discursive

rationalisation is not dissimilar from that of the Ash’arites in many ways,

including proving possibility based on cosmological elements. The final

54
55
 Chapter 5
The Strongest Form of the
Arguments

More discussing the ‘strongest forms’ of the arguments, it is perhaps

important to revisit the two main arguments that have been elaborated in this

look, namely, the arguments made by Al-Ghazali and Ibn Sina. Al-Ghazali

writes:

57
 We say that the occurrence of every occurrence has a cause the world
I something comes along that gives preponderance to the side of

is an occurrence it necessarily follows that it has a cause ...• • we^ ' existence over the continuation of non-existence. If the meaning of

by the world all existence other than God. And we mean by aj| these terms is fixed in the mind then the intellect would have to accept

existence other than God the bodies and their forms... We haVe this principle. (Al-Ghazali, 2013:27)

included two principles; our opponent might deny them. We say to

mentioned in the previous chapter, the main objections to this argument
As
him: which of the principles do you dispute? He might say I dispute
relate to the second premise, namely, that the world had a beginning. We
your statement that every occurrent has a cause, how did you know
discussed how a post-eternal infinite set of things is not inconceivable, even
this? We say this principle must be affirmed because it is a priori and
Is a Ghazalian conception, so long as such infinity is linked with the will of
necessary according to reason. We mean by that which is occurrent
God. Al-Ghazali attempts to prove the will of an external sorting agent
that which was non-existent and then became existent. Thus, we say,
through the argument from particularisation. A second objection relates to the
was its existence before its existence impossible or contingent? If it is
idea of causation, which was also mentioned in the previous chapter. David
false it would be impossible, since what is impossible can never exist
Hume made reference to the problem of induction, while Bertrand Russell
if it is contingent, then we mean by contingent only that which is
highlighted the fallacy of composition. Both Hume and Russell aimed to show
possible to exist and is possible not to exist. However, it is not a
that causation of the universe ought not to be a philosophical ‘given’. The
necessary existence because its existence is not necessitated by its
issue with this is that it may assume that the universe is all that exists. In
essence... We do not intend by a cause anything other than a giver of
defining the aalam, Al-Ghazali described it as everything that exists other
preponderance. In summation, for a nonexistence whose non-existence
than God. Moreover, some take causation of the universe to imply temporality
continues, its nonexistence would not change into existence unless
cannot imagine cause and effect as happening without a preceding cause
and

58 59
and a succeeding effect. In this way, as we have seen in the previous chapt completely independent. Ibn Sina, and many of the Ash’arites who were

it is impossible to argue for a time ‘before time’,proposition

as the latter fuenced by him, argued that the independent necessary being could not be a
in

would be required for the affirmation of the former. series of infinite possible things, since such a series can be conceived of in

another way and would be dependent on its parts. It could not be more than
As one may predict, discussions on metaphysical causation and mereology are
since one of the two of ‘necessary beings’ would have to be conceived of
one,
not lacking in the philosophical literature. Linking back to Chapter 1 of this
differently compared to the other being. It is illogical to presume the existence
book, I will argue that these discussions are unnecessary in reaching a
if two independent beings.
conclusion about the necessary/independent existence. As a reminder, Ibn

Sina’s argument is summarised in the following quote:

arguing on these two tracks (as proposed by Maimonides and Ibn Tufayl in

Now, the proof for the existence of God runs as follows. There the previous chapter) could take the following conditional form. There is no

is no doubt that there is existence. Every existent, by virtue of joubt that there is existence. The world is in existence. If the world had a

itself, is either possible or necessary. If necessary, then this is jeginning, it is likely to have had a cause. If it had a cause, we can infer

the existent being sought, namely God. If possible, then it will length, knowledge, will, and ability from that cause. That is because the

ultimately require the necessary existent in order to exist. In fct of that cause exhibits the consequences of an agent with those attributes,

either case, God must exist. (Shihadeh, 2008:213)

As alluded to in Chapter 1, a possible existence is an existence that could not lie world is eternal (or part of an infinite order of multi-verses), it must be

be any other way or in non-existence. The opposite of this is a necessary sher a possible/dependent existent or a necessary/independent one. It cannot

existence, in that the existence cannot be any other way - like 2+2=4-andis kanecessary/ independent one since it can be conceived of in another way. It

60 61
must therefore be possible/dependent. If this is so, it must be dependent on

either dependent entities or independent ones. If it is dependent upon other

dependent entities ad infinitum, then such an aggregation of entities will form

a series of dependent possible things. Such series can be conceived of

differently and are dependent on their constituent parts. What is required is an

independent, necessary being with no parts and which cannot be conceived of

in any other way. There cannot be more than one of such a being since it

would entail that at least one of these beings is differentiated, possible, or

dependent.

As seen in Chapter 1, the second track of the argument can be made either

ontologically (in the mind) or cosmologically (in the ‘physical’ world). In this

way, it is applicable in all conceivable realms and satisfying to materialists,

dualists, and idealists. Although this argument was initially made by Ibn Sina

with reference to causation, it does not require causation. In this way, the

arguments about causation become tertiary matters of philosophical

consideration. For these reasons, the argument made in this way is what I

consider the strongest form of the argument. It would seem that the only way

62
 refute such an argument either to deny the categories of

^essities/possibility, or to reason that only possible existences can exist, and

at existence is not contingent on a necessary existence.

63
Al-Ghazali, A. (2013). GhazalVs Moderation in Belief. Chicago: Chicago

Press.

Shihadeh, A. (2008). The Existence of God’. In The Cambridge Companion to

Classical Islamic Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge Univerity Press.

64
 Chapter 6
Conclusion

iieargument presented in the chapter discussing the ‘strongest form’ is not

L ,
A one that is logically consistent from the first principles, but also one that

65
would be theologically uncontroversial considering Judaism and Islam jn oflbn Sina’s arguments that he did not see as transgressing the primary

particular. Any medieval rendition of the cosmological argument may be jn ^ts of Islam. Similarly, Ibn Taymiyyah, whilst showing his reservations with

total disagreement with trinitarian conceptions of God, since such trinitarian ®aza'’an (an(^ Razian) rendition of the cosmological argument, did not

conceptions do not conclude with a respectable monotheism. Is Jesus a phraseology of 'wajib al-wujood or its implications. For this

necessary being, as are the father or the Holy Spirit? As we have shown, this ^son’suc^ Plirase°I°gy ’s ubiquitous in some of Ibn Taymiyyah s famous

postulation would require a redefinition of the concepts of necessity and tex^s Al-Tadmuriyyah. Mu tazilites like Abdul-Jabbar, the

independence. jalhor of SWA al-Usul al-Khamsa, also accept the phraseology of Allah

^wajib al-wujood. Shi’a thinkers such as Tusi, who commented on Ibn

Within Islam, Ibn Sina was ex-communicated (takfir) by many traditionalist 0’s Al-Isharat, also showed no rejection of such phraseology. Thus, the

scholars due to his transgression of prima facie textual understanding of .'gument presented by Ibn Sina was widely accepted in the Muslim world.

Islamic texts. Al-Ghazali ex-communicates Ibn Sina for three reasons. These fcbaps the reason for this may be theological, since the exact attributes of

reasons include Ibn Sina’s externalist beliefs, his claim that God does not fedseem to be in congruence with the basic definition of God in Chapter 112

know particulars, and his disbelief in bodily resurrection (Al-Ghazali, Ilhe Quran; a chapter where the basic definition of God is outlined. Though

2013:312-18). These three reasons for takfir are not represented in the is may be the case, it makes more sense to suggest that consensus was

arguments of Ibn Sina to the extent to which we have concluded in the final iiieved at least on the part of Ibn Sina’s argument that affirms God’s

chapter of this book. In this way, Ibn Sina’s arguments do not contradicta Pessary existence, due to the sheer strength of his logical argument.

Ghazalian (Ash’arite) understanding of God. Al-Ghazali himself accepted the

phraseology 'wajib al-^vujood’ (the necessary existence) and accepted the

66
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