July 2021

Perspective
EXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG, SCOTT SAVITZ, JONATHAN BALK, SAMANTHA MCBIRNEY, LIAM MCLANE, VICTORIA M. SMITH

Preparing Japan’s Multi-Domain

Defense Force for the Future
Battlespace Using Emerging
Technologies

N
umerous rapidly advancing and emerging technology areas—including
artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned systems, and directed-energy
weapons—will likely affect how defense operations are conducted in the
future. A critical challenge for any nation’s defense forces is how to allo-
cate investments across diverse technologies in the decades ahead to be prepared
for various types of future operations, including both gray zone situations and
contingencies.1 In this Perspective, we discuss considerations for the Japanese
Ministry of Defense (MOD) as it considers possible investments in rapidly advanc-
ing and emerging technology areas to help the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) address
future challenges.

C O R P O R AT I O N
Rapidly Advancing and Emerging facturing (Johnston, Smith, and Irwin, 2018), autonomy
Technology Areas (Kott et al., 2018), big data (Kim, Trimi, and Chung, 2014),
biotechnology (Mikulic, 2021; Organisation for Economic
Many rapidly advancing and emerging technology areas Co-operation and Development, 2009), nanotechnology
can potentially shape future warfare. There is always room (Dong et al., 2016), and the three quantum technology
to dispute which areas should be included in such a list or areas (Srivastava, 2019). As a result, Europe has become
where the boundaries are between different areas. For our known as a prominent global leader in each space. Various
purposes here, we focus on a broad spectrum of technol- countries in Europe are focused on increasing government
ogy areas under two headings: information technology and spending on both foundational research and development
physical systems. We enumerate and briefly define these (Parkinson, 2018), in addition to advancing technology-
areas in the table on the next page. specific initiatives that foster collaboration between vari-
ous sectors. For example, there are initiatives in Europe
directed at building satellite constellations for secure gov-
Advances in These Technology ernment and military communications, as well as several
Areas in Other Countries efforts focused on quantum technologies (Fouquet and
The fact that there are numerous rapidly advancing and Drozdiak, 2020; Srivastava, 2019). And although count-
emerging technology areas matters for Japan because other ing the total number of publications, patents, and related
nations are simultaneously adapting these technology areas citations over a given period is merely one of many ways to
with specific military applications in mind. gauge impact, the number continues to rise in these tech-
In recent decades, European countries have been nology areas in Europe as well (Dong et al., 2016).
increasing research and development efforts in several of Russia is also investing in these domains. For example,
these technology domains—specifically, additive manu- Russia is pursuing the development of hypersonic weapons,
partly as a response to U.S. missile defense deployments,
both domestically and closer to Russia. Several recent and
Abbreviations successful tests have reflected Russia’s commitment to
further development of these weapon systems and their
AI artificial intelligence
underlying technologies (Sayler, 2021). Simultaneously,
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
Russia has focused on modernizing enhanced electronic
EW electronic warfare
warfare capabilities to enable complex jamming and anti-
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
access/area denial operations. Enhanced electronic warfare
MOD Ministry of Defense
can provide Russia with asymmetric capabilities and force
PLA People’s Liberation Army
enablers or multipliers to engage with the North Atlantic
SDF Self-Defense Forces
Treaty Organization’s eastern flank (McDermott, 2017).

2
Technology Areas
Technology Area Definition
Information technology
Advanced telecommunication Wireless telecommunications with improved hardware, expanded architecture, and new operating procedures to
networks increase capacity and capabilities; often characterized as 5th-, 6th-, and 7th-generation hardware
Artificial intelligence (AI) Computer systems capable of human-level cognition, including machine learning
Autonomy The ability of systems to operate with limited or no human supervision
Big data The ability to handle vast data sets and transform them into useful information
Enhanced cyber warfare The use of computer code to infiltrate an adversary’s information technology networks, enabling surveillance,
disruption, and degradation; also includes defenses against such attacks
Enhanced electronic The use of the electromagnetic spectrum to disrupt, jam, degrade, or otherwise affect the other side’s systems;
warfare (EW) also includes defenses against such attacks
Quantum communications The use of the subfield of physics called quantum mechanics (involving the probabilistic behaviors of subatomic
particles) to make tamper-evident communications
Quantum computing The use of quantum-mechanical properties to make faster computers
Quantum sensing The use of quantum-mechanical properties to enhance detection and characterization
Physical systems
Additive manufacturing The process of building three-dimensional structures as a series of thin layers; often referred to as
three-dimensional printing, but it also includes four-dimensional printing, in which a printed structure is designed
to change shape when subjected to stimuli
Biotechnology The production and use of advanced materials derived from living things; military applications include improved
medical treatment of injuries; biologically based sensors; and enhanced warfighter cognition, alertness, and
strength
Directed-energy weapons Systems that use intense electromagnetic radiation, such as lasers or microwave-energy bursts, to target
adversary systems or personnel
Emerging space The increasing ability to deploy numerous, multi-mission, compact, low-cost satellites into low Earth orbit
Hypersonic glide vehicles Vehicles that glide along the edge of the atmosphere at speeds exceeding Mach 5 (6,200 km per hour) and then
descend to strike a target; they are particularly useful against fleeting targets or to overcome missile defenses
Microelectronics The increasingly advanced capabilities of small integrated circuits, which rapidly increases computing power per
unit area
Nanotechnology The manipulation and use of materials with structures in the size range of 1-billionth to 100-billionths of a meter;
these materials can evince unusual strength, durability, density, reactivity, and sensitivity
Unmanned vehicles Vehicles that do not contain humans controlling them and instead may be remotely controlled or have varying
degrees of autonomy

3
Despite its advances across some of these emerging tech- interests. Thus, understanding that the Japanese govern-
nologies of interest, Russia has not risen to prominence in ment does not recognize China as an adversary, the RAND
all 17 areas. For instance, when it comes to AI and big data, Corporation researchers responsible for this Perspective
Russia has lagged behind both the United States and China, decided that China is an appropriate baseline against which
producing fewer academic papers and innovative applica- to consider technological advancements.
tions (Polyakova, 2018). More broadly, the United States For the past three decades, China has made impressive
and China have surpassed Russia as hubs of technological progress in a comprehensive military modernization effort.
development (Dobbins, Shatz, and Wyne, 2019). This effort has been driven by evolving military strategy
Although both Europe and Russia are making signifi- and operational concepts designed to make the People’s
cant strides in several of these emerging technology areas, Liberation Army (PLA) more technologically advanced and
there are multiple reasons why Japan should not be overly better suited to fight wars. Since its founding, the PLA’s
preoccupied with either Europe or Russia. Most notably, underlying military strategy has been that of active defense
European nations are U.S. allies, so there is little to no con- (Fravel, 2019). The PLA’s strategy has focused on China’s
cern over the chance that Europe will utilize its technologi- traditional core mission of maintaining sovereignty, secu-
cal advances against Japan militarily. And although Russia rity, and territorial integrity. Although the focus of the
is ramping up efforts in hypersonic weapons and cyber and strategy has not changed, the military strategic guidelines
electronic warfare, there is still a rather significant dif- and operational approaches to the strategy have evolved. In
ferential in technological capabilities between Russia and 2015, the guidelines began to focus on winning “informa-
the United States when considering the 17 technology areas tized local wars,” recognizing the centrality of information
collectively. This means that the United States—and, by both as a domain in which war occurs and as the central
extension, Japan—has probable cause to be less concerned means to wage conflict when the dominant mode of war-
about developments in Russia. fare is confrontation between information-based systems
The same cannot be said about China. China is (Burke et al., 2020, p. 5; Engstrom, 2018). Under these
increasingly viewed as a near-peer adversary to the United strategic guidelines, using networked information systems
States because of the magnitude of China’s technology in all domains becomes a priority, and taking away infor-
investments, the breadth of technology investments across mation superiority from an adversary therefore becomes
all 17 areas, and the propensity to utilize technologies a primary objective in conflict (Burke et al., 2020, p. 7;
against the United States and U.S. interests. Multiple coun- Pollpeter, Chase, and Heginbotham, 2017).
tries all over the world are investing in these technologies Against this backdrop, the PLA has pursued several
and making significant advances, but China is the one modernization efforts. As a 2020 U.S. Department of
country that not only is most likely to succeed at becom- Defense (DoD) report to Congress details, the PLA has
ing globally dominant but also has the greatest potential been actively modernizing with new technologies and
to use said technologies against the United States and its improving its proficiencies across all domains so that it can

4
conduct a variety of air, ground, maritime, space, counter- operations. Other significant changes include the creation
space, electronic warfare (EW), and cyber operations as a of the PLA Rocket Force as a full-status service equal to the
joint force (DoD, 2020, pp. 38–91). Creating a modern joint PLA Army, PLA Navy, and PLA Air Force and the creation
force necessitates the deployment of increasingly capable of the PLA Strategic Support Force.3
equipment, including Both PLA modernization and organizational changes
• more-modern and more-mobile ground forces with contribute to the PLA’s interest in leveraging technol-
upgraded combat systems ogy to fight and win informatized wars. Thus, China has
• modern multi-role naval platforms fielding invested heavily and consistently in science and technol-
advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine ogy, and it is expected to continue to do so in the decades
weapons and sensors ahead. Although investing in science and technology for
• a growing arsenal of unmanned aerial vehicles and military purposes is not new, China’s President Xi Jinping
more-advanced EW; fighter; airborne early warn- has heightened the priority placed on defense technology
ing and control; and intelligence, surveillance, and (Cheung and Mahnken, 2018). China does not simply seek
reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft to master and apply new technologies; it seeks to become a
• longer-range and more-accurate conventional cruise leader in key technologies that have military potential, such
and ballistic missiles, including anti-ship ballistic as AI, autonomous systems, advanced computing, quan-
missiles designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers tum information sciences, biotechnology, and advanced
(DoD, 2020, pp. 40–60). materials and manufacturing (DoD, 2020, pp. 144–148;
Fox, 2020; Kania and Costello, 2018).
More recently, China has been making strides in advancing
its space, cyber, and EW capabilities.
Alongside modernization, the PLA has also under-
taken significant organizational changes meant to shift the
previously ground force–centric structure in favor of naval, China does not simply
air, and missile forces while concurrently positioning itself
to be a more efficient and integrated force for operating in seek to master and apply
multiple domains. The move that was most important for
addressing the primary command and control obstacle to
new technologies; it seeks
improved jointness was the restructuring of the PLA. In
2016, China established five theater commands with joint
to become a leader in key
operation commands to replace seven PLA Army regions.2
The change was meant to improve the PLA’s ability to con-
technologies that have
duct long-term planning and preparation for joint military military potential.

5
 With the informatization of warfare at the core of a target, including its shape, location, speed, temperature,
everything the PLA wants to accomplish, Japan and other and even the chemical composition of its paint (Scobell
states have to take notice. China is very much focused et al., 2020, pp. 95–96).
on harnessing technology for military purposes. Its 13th The goals that China has set out for itself for the next
Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), for example, lists several 30 years may seem ambitious, but China has proven itself
reforms that China is undertaking to increase its competi- capable of marshalling the requisite resources and technol-
tiveness in key defense industries, including ogies to make changes that it deems necessary. Although
• quantum communications and computing it is possible that economic slowdowns, social instability,
• innovative electronics and software large-scale domestic unrest, a North Korean collapse, or
• automation and robotics other such events could divert China from attaining its
• special materials and applications goals, planning for possible PLA success prepares Japan for
• nanotechnology a worst-case future (for several other scenarios, see Chase
• neuroscience, neural research, and AI (DoD, 2020, et al., 2015, pp. 21–24).
p. 141).
Other areas of advanced military capabilities with How Japan’s Self-Defense
disruptive potential that China is pursuing include hyper-
Forces Can Use Emerging
sonic weapons, electromagnetic railguns, directed-energy
weapons, and counterspace capabilities (DoD, 2020, p. 147).
Technology Areas
Its efforts today will have profound implications for the Although Japan does not base its defense spending on
types of capabilities the PLA could field in the coming that of any specific country, given its limited defense
decades. Many of China’s short-term goals—such as budget, Japan needs to make well-informed choices
acquiring larger quantities of conventional land-attack and among technology investments in order to ensure that
anti-ship ballistic missiles (with increasingly long ranges); the investments it makes will have the most collective
longer-range land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles; and impact. Systems that require limited numbers of person-
a host of long-range radar, jamming, anti-satellite, and nel are advantageous, given Japan’s shrinking population
cyber capabilities—are likely attainable, but goals further (particularly among young people). Japan can help deter
into the future are a bit more ambitious (Scobell et al., and counter potential aggression from other countries by
2020, p. 88). By 2030, for example, the PLA wants to com- being more effective in using emerging technology areas.
plete the world’s first quantum communications capability, In this section, we describe several key areas in which
which would include dozens of satellites and ground-based Japan could focus its efforts.
quantum communication networks, and develop a quan- As Japan anticipates potential threats, a critical chal-
tum radar capable of receiving critical information about lenge will be how to allocate MOD investments across

6
diverse technology areas to be prepared for various types
of future operations. We identify the following important
takeaways that can help inform investments in building The fact that cyber, EW,
the SDF into a Multi-Domain Defense Force over the next
two decades. and directed-energy
First, developments in some technology areas
will enable potential aggressors to have plausible (or weapons can all strike at
implausible) deniability. The use of cyberattacks, EW,
and microwave-burst directed-energy weapons may allow
the speed of light keeps
adversaries to take actions without clear evidence of
involvement. Some attacks may not even be recognized as
the pace of conflict at a
having been such. Even if Japanese officials are certain of
a specific nation’s responsibility for a particular attack, it
speed faster than what
may be difficult to prove culpability. humans can manage.
Second, the pace of warfare is dramatically increas-
ing, requiring that systems have even more autonomy.
Such technology areas as autonomy, AI, big data, advanced strengthen its capabilities despite its shrinking population
telecommunications, and quantum computing will push and limited defense budget.
decisionmaking and coordinated action to faster speeds Third, unmanned vehicles will likely play a central
than human beings can manage. The result is that Japan, role in future warfare. These vehicles can take on greater
like other nations, will need to not only employ systems risks, and greater payloads, in the absence of personnel.
that can decide and act without human intervention but To the degree that they are autonomous (as opposed to
also have the confidence to allow the systems to do so. being remotely controlled), they can also reduce person-
For example, autonomous systems will be needed to parry nel requirements. Large numbers of unmanned vehicles,
many cyber and EW attacks, but by the time a human each costing a fraction of the cost of a manned platform,
being is able to grasp the situation, the other side would can distribute themselves throughout the environment to
have an immense advantage. The fact that cyber, EW, and collect ISR and to counter adversary threats with EW or
directed-energy weapons can all strike at the speed of kinetic strikes. Given how many there are, losing some of
light also keeps the pace of conflict at a speed faster than these vehicles to enemy attack will be entirely acceptable,
what humans can manage. A further advantage of more- still leaving their collective capabilities intact. Such vehicles
autonomous systems is that they can reduce personnel will operate across multiple domains: air, sea surface,
requirements and associated costs. Employing numerous undersea, ground, and space (including dense constella-
autonomous systems would be an opportunity for Japan to tions of compact, relatively inexpensive satellites). They can

7
coordinate with one another across those domains, as well munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
as with manned platforms and fixed installations, as part reconnaissance) and targeting, it is critical to protect those
of an overarching network that enables domain awareness networks through EW and cyber defenses. Although net-
and precise targeting. works can survive the loss of individual nodes, damage to
Fourth, long-range, accurate targeting is becoming network functioning and connectivity can degrade over-
more available. Given ubiquitous sensors on unmanned all capabilities. For Japan, strengthening cyber and EW
vehicles in multiple domains (including space) and the defenses is also important for ensuring interoperability
ability of weapons to rapidly interpret data for terminal with U.S. forces; the United States will be able to integrate
guidance onto their targets, it is increasingly possible for its networks with Japan’s only if it has confidence that
long-range attacks to hit their targets very precisely, achiev- doing so would not lead to backdoor infiltration of its own
ing specific effects without wasting weapons and while networks. Effective cyber and EW attacks can fragment
minimizing the risk of collateral damage. adversary networks into disparate pieces that are incapable
Fifth, network security and disruption of the other of coordinated action.
side’s networks will be increasingly central to conflict. Sixth, the domains of conflict are expanding. In
As each side increasingly uses networks of unmanned addition to planning for the traditional air, ground, and
and manned systems for C4ISR (command, control, com- maritime domains of conflict, there is a need to treat the
electromagnetic, space, and cyberspace domains as cen-
tral to success. These domains have existed for decades
or longer, but they are becoming more important and
In addition to planning for pervasive; success in the traditional domains depends on
success in the newer ones. Moreover, although conflict has
the traditional air, ground, always had a strong cognitive component, the advent of
new technologies enables each side to influence the other’s
and maritime domains of perceptions more effectively than before, elevating cogni-
tive considerations.
conflict, there is a need to Seventh, building on the previous point, technology
areas relevant to the information domain are increas-
treat the electromagnetic, ingly important. Although precise advances are difficult
to predict, Japan can expect potential adversaries to con-
space, and cyberspace tinue focusing significant efforts on controlling the infor-

domains as central to mation environment and associated technology domains.

Other nations may seek to use various technology areas

success. in all phases of conflict to adversely influence Japanese

8
cognitive functions and shape international public opin- perceiving it differently, the resulting tensions can degrade
ion. Japan should be prepared to deal with massive mis- military performance and coordination. In a battlespace in
information campaigns by being able to quickly identify which real-time, accurate knowledge is central to effective
misinformation—ideally, before broad dissemination—and targeting, deception can make an immense difference in
by educating the public about how to properly identify reducing an adversary’s overall capabilities.
misinformation and source accurate information on an Finally, additive manufacturing, nanotechnology,
individual level. Japan has the advantage of being able microelectronics, advanced telecommunication net-
to partner with the United States and other democratic works, directed-energy weapons, and biotechnology can
nations to understand the dynamics of information flow play valuable supporting roles. Although other technol-
and how to influence it. ogy areas (cyber, EW, big data, autonomy, unmanned sys-
Eighth, deception can play a central role in the SDF’s tems, emerging space, and AI) are likely to play primary
future success. Naturally, deception has been ubiquitous roles in future warfare, others can be expected to play valu-
in warfare for thousands of years. However, emerging able supporting roles. For example, additive manufacturing
technology areas enable more-capable deception at the can enable on-demand printing of parts and unmanned
same time that knowledge of the battlespace becomes more vehicles from bulk materials, which can reduce logistical
critical to effective targeting. The emergence of unmanned requirements on ships or at remote locations. Advances
vehicles that can serve as decoys, together with the grow- in microelectronics and telecommunications can serve
ing capabilities of cyber, EW, and AI technologies to as the hardware backbone on which complex networks
manipulate perceptions, can greatly increase the ability of employing AI, big data, and autonomous systems rely.
either side to deceive the other. When a country can couple Directed-energy weapons can be used to dazzle or disable
high-signature physical decoys with autonomous cyber, key sensors and other electronics. Biotechnology can aid
EW, and AI systems to inject false information streams in medical treatment and enhance individuals’ physical or
into adversary networks, that adversary experiences con- cognitive capabilities.
fusion that leads to worse decisionmaking and critical
delays. There are also opportunities to be exploited from
the fact that AI can make mistakes that a human never Considerations in Shaping
would—for example, misidentifying a photo of a panda as Technology Investment Portfolios
being a gibbon (Goodfellow et al., 2017). Moreover, once an
Many of the types of technology areas that Japan’s MOD
adversary suspects that it is being deceived, even accurate
could benefit from do not require especially costly invest-
information may be ignored, or acted on only after a delay
ments, compared with the costs of building, maintaining,
that allows it to be corroborated. When an adversary orga-
and operating large manned platforms. Some of these tech-
nization’s commands, personnel, and information tech-
nology areas primarily require investments in personnel
nology systems are receiving conflicting information, or
who can design and oversee development of AI, big-data,

9
 fields as medicine and construction, advanced telecommu-
nications can improve the speed and reliability of civilian
The commercial sector is networks, and additive manufacturing is already being
used by manufacturers to streamline production. In the
becoming more interested information technology domain, AI, big data, and auton-
omy can help businesses increase their efficiency, capabili-
in defensive cyber ties, and profits. The commercial sector is also becoming

capabilities as the threat more interested in defensive cyber capabilities as the threat
of cyberattacks, including ransom­ware, increases from
of cyberattacks, including both state and non-state actors. Additionally, as a result
of trends in miniaturization, increased processing speed
ransom­ware, increases with lower power requirements, and software-defined
circuitry, microelectronics anchor many of the technology
from both state and non- areas mentioned in this paper. In all these cases, technol-
ogy areas that are the focus of considerable private-sector
state actors. investment can be harnessed by the MOD. Rather than
investing in developing the underlying technology areas,
what the MOD needs to do is tailor these technologies to
autonomous, cyber, and EW systems. Although these also
particular uses; recruit, hire, retain, and train individuals
require some software and hardware purchases, the overall
with the requisite skill sets; and incorporate these technol-
cost is likely to be lower than that of acquiring, operating,
ogy areas into policy, doctrine, training, and exercises.
maintaining, and providing personnel for a squadron of
Similarly, Japan may benefit from the potential to
aircraft or a fleet of ships.
exploit other nations’ organizational weaknesses. In the
In addition, Japan can leverage commercial interest
future, adversaries will likely emphasize using the full
and investments in key technology areas to aid in their
battlespace, conducting operations, and striving for effects
development and operationalization. Emerging space con-
across domains. Doing so will require these nations to
stellations provide valuable services for the commercial
integrate information and capabilities across the physi-
market in remote sensing, broadband communications,
cal and informational domains while synchronizing with
and environmental monitoring. Likewise, unmanned sys-
other lines of effort in a conflict. This will be an enor-
tems satisfy many commercial needs, such as monitoring
mous undertaking that makes such nations vulnerable
undersea infrastructure, reducing personnel requirements
to potentially multiple points of failure. Concerted cyber
for many tasks, and providing services for an aging popu-
and EW attacks that degrade the ability of adversary sys-
lation. Nanotechnology can be used to contribute to such
tems, people, and services to coordinate could help shatter

10
the other side’s overall capabilities. The pervasive use of nology; the effects might be so hard to distinguish from
deception—using coordinated cyber and EW attacks, laser normal system issues that the attacks would go unnoticed.
attacks on sensors, kinetic attacks against ISR nodes, and Other technology areas may be lesser priorities for
unmanned decoys with accentuated signatures—can have MOD investments. For example, quantum computing,
particularly deleterious effects on a highly integrated net- sensing, and communications all hold promise in contrib-
work that is meant to provide shared situational awareness. uting to future defense operations. However, these tech-
Injecting false information into some parts of the network nology areas are expensive, and they may take decades to
can lead to confusion and inter-service friction as different mature to the point that they are viable for widespread use
services disagree about what is happening, contributing to in battlefield operations.
conflict and mutual mistrust. As people and organizations
begin to question the veracity of information from par-
ticular systems—blaming sensors, big-data analytics, AI Closing Remarks
systems, individual human operators, or commanders in Given the number and diversity of technology areas with
other services—they will also be more inclined to dismiss the potential to have a large impact on future warfare,
accurate information and to selectively act on information Japan faces challenges in determining how best to invest its
that reinforces their existing biases. Moreover, these people resources in technology development to make the future
and organizations may delay particular actions until their SDF more effective. The analysis in this paper can inform
preferred sources of information provide confirmation, those choices, enabling Japan to more capably deter and
impeding their ability to keep up with the pace of the con- counter possible aggression from a future adversary that
flict. Such delays can be exacerbated by introducing cyber can employ diverse technology areas.
and EW weapons that simply slow down information tech-

11
Notes Engstrom, Jeffrey, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction
Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks to Wage
1  A 2019 RAND Corporation report defines the gray zone as “an Modern Warfare, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
operational space between peace and war, involving coercive actions RR-1708-OSD, 2018. As of November 30, 2020:
to change the status quo below a threshold that, in most cases, would https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1708.html
prompt a conventional military response, often by blurring the line Fouquet, Helene, and Natalia Drozdiak, “Europe Wants Its Own
between military and nonmilitary actions and the attribution for Alternative to Musk’s Starlink Network,” Bloomberg, December 16,
events” (Morris et al., 2019, p. 8). 2020.
2  The new commands are the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, Fox, Christine, An Entwined AI Future: Resistance Is Futile, Laurel, Md.:
and Central theater commands. Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, 2020.
3  Together, these changes demonstrate the PLA’s focus on missiles and Fravel, M. Taylor, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949,
on space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2019.
capabilities. Goodfellow, Ian, Nicolas Papernot, Sandy Huang, Rocky Duan, Pieter
Abbeel, and Jack Clark, “Attacking Machine Learning with Adversarial
Examples,” Open AI blog, February 24, 2017.
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Pollpeter, Kevin L., Michael S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham, The Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 2020.
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13
About the Authors
Jeffrey W. Hornung is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He specializes in Japanese security and foreign poli-
cies, East Asian security issues, and U.S. foreign and defense policies in the Indo-Pacific region. Hornung holds a Ph.D. in
political science.
Scott Savitz is a senior engineer at the RAND Corporation. Much of his research focuses on how to improve the effectiveness
and resilience of operational forces, as well as the impact of reallocating resources among those forces. Savitz holds a Ph.D. in
chemical engineering.
Jonathan Balk is a research assistant at the RAND Corporation with interests in emerging technologies, space systems, and
policy analysis. He holds a bachelor’s degree in aerospace engineering.
Samantha McBirney is an associate engineer at the RAND Corporation. Her primary research interests are in medical readi-
ness, medical logistics, emerging technologies (and how they are used by near-peer adversaries), and pharmaceutical supply
chains. She holds a Ph.D. in biomedical engineering.
Liam McLane is a research assistant at the RAND Corporation with interests in cost estimation, analysis of government con-
tracting mechanisms, and data collection and analysis. He holds a bachelor’s degree in economics and political science.
Victoria M. Smith is a research assistant at the RAND Corporation with interests in modeling, cost estimation, and emerging
technologies. She holds a bachelor’s degree in economics and international relations.

14
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank several people for helping us conduct this research. Agnes Gereben Schaefer and Michelle Platt were
our principal contact points for ensuring that we were fulfilling the necessary RAND requirements and keeping the project
within budget. Jim Powers, the RAND National Security Research Division quality assurance manager, read the paper and
ensured that it met RAND quality assurance standards. Laura Poole, Susan Arick, Natalie Richards, Rosa Maria Torres, and
Johanna Whittaker helped make sure our references were in order, and Allison Kerns served as copy editor.
In addition, we benefited from the expert insights provided by numerous RAND colleagues: Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga,
Steven Berner, Michael Bond, Benjamin Boudreaux, Jennifer Brookes, Kyle Bunch, Cortez Cooper, Jim Dimarogonas, Jeffrey
Engstrom, Cristina Garafola, Edward Geist, Daniel Gonzales, Derek Grossman, Gavin Hartnett, Alex Hou, John Luke Irwin,
Christian Johnson, Eric Landree, Bradley Martin, Jason Mastbaum, Mace Moesner, Jared Mondschein, Thoa Liz Nguyen,
Chad Ohlandt, Edward Parker, James Ryseff, Troy Smith, Eder Sousa, Randall Steeb, Danielle Tarraf, Padmaja Vedula, and
Rand Waltzman.
Finally, we would like to thank the officials at the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s Strategic Planning Division, which sponsored
this Perspective, and at Mitsubishi Research Institute for helping provide critical input during the research process.

15
About This Perspective
A variety of emerging technology areas will likely affect how defense
operations are conducted in the future. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces
can employ these technology areas to improve effectiveness; the forces
also need to be prepared to address threats from other nations that
might use the technology areas against Japan. The Strategic Planning
Division of the Japanese Ministry of Defense sponsored the RAND
Corporation to analyze how emerging technology areas may shape
military operations in the future.

RAND National Security Research Division

This research was sponsored by the Strategic Planning Division of
Japan’s Ministry of Defense and conducted within the International
Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security
Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis
for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence
Community, the U.S. State Department, allied foreign governments,
and foundations.

For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense

Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/isdp or contact the director
(contact information is provided on the webpage).

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