REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.522 OF 2021
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2096 of 2021]

Nathu Singh ..... Appellant
                             VERSUS

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. .....Respondents
 AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.523 OF 2021
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2271 of 2021]

Ompal Singh     ..... Appellant
                             VERSUS

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. .....Respondents
 
   J U D G M E N T
 N.V. RAMANA, CJI. 

1. Leave granted.

2. The present Criminal Appeals, by way of Special Leave,

raise   common   question   of   law   and   are   therefore   being

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV
Date: 2021.05.28

disposed of together. 
18:03:04 IST
Reason:

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3. In   both   the   impugned   orders,   the   High   Court   of

Judicature   at   Allahabad,   while   dismissing   the   anticipatory

bail application of the respondents­accused, granted them 90

days to surrender before the Trial Court to seek regular bail

and granted them protection from coercive action for the said

period. Aggrieved by the grant of such relief, the complainants

in both the matters are currently in appeal before us.

4. As   only   a   question   of   law   is   being   raised,   it   is   not

necessary   for   this   Court   to   advert   to   the   facts   of   both   the

matters   extensively.   It   is   sufficient   to   point   out   that   in   the

first case, pertaining to Nathu Singh, the appellant’s daughter

was married to respondent no. 2 in that case on 14.02.2014.

As   she   died   under   suspicious   circumstances   in   her

matrimonial home on 02.01.2021, the complainant registered

FIR No. 07/2021 at police station Masuri, Ghaziabad under

Sections 304B and 498A, IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of

the Dowry Prohibition Act against the respondents nos. 2 to

5.

5. In   the   second   case,   the   allegations   are   that   the

appellant’s brother and the latter’s two sons were attacked by

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the respondents in that case, due to a dispute between the

parties relating to encroachment of land. The two sons were

attacked   on   their   vital   parts,   with   one   of   them   suffering   a

skull fracture as a result of which he was in a coma for one

week. The other had lacerations on his head. The complainant

registered  FIR   No.   371/20 at police station Thana Bhawan,

Shamili under Sections 307, 504 and 34, IPC.

6. The respondents in both the cases approached the High

Court   under   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.,   during   ongoing

investigation,   and   sought   protection   from   arrest.  Vide  the

impugned orders dated 08.02.2021 and 28.01.2021, the High

Court   dismissed   the   applications   of   the   respondents   but

granted them the aforementioned relief in identically worded

orders.  The  relevant  portion of the order, as extracted from

the impugned order dated 08.02.2021, is as follows: 

“…. Having heard learned counsel for the
parties   and   upon   perusal   of   material
brought on record as well as complicity
of   accused   and   also   judgement   of   the
Apex   Court   in   the   case   of  P.
Chidambaram   v.   Directorate   of
Enforcement,  AIR   2019   SC   4198,   this
Court   does   not   find   any   exceptional
ground   to   exercise   its   discretionary
jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr.P.C.
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 However, in view of the entirety of facts
and   circumstances   of   the   case   and   on
the   request   of   learned   counsel   for   the
applicants, it is directed that in case the
applicants   appear   and   surrender   before
the   court   below   within   90   days   from
today and apply for bail, their prayer for
bail shall be considered and decided as
per the settled law laid by this  Court in
the   case   of  Amrawati   and   another   v.
State of U.P. reported in 2004 (57) ALR
290   as   well   as   judgement   passed   by
Hon’ble   Apex   Court   in   the   case   of  Lal
Kamlendra   Pratap   Singh   v.   State   of
U.P. reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC).
Till   then,   no   coercive   action   shall   be
taken against the applicants....” 
(emphasis supplied)

7. Aggrieved   by   the   impugned   orders,   the   complainants­

appellants   have   filed   the   present   appeals   by   way   of   special

leave.

8. Heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellants,   the

respondent­State and the respondents­accused at length. 

9. The learned counsel for the appellants, supported by the

learned   State   counsel,  urged   that   once   the   High   Court

declined   the   final   relief   of   pre­arrest   to   the   respondents,   it

could   not   grant   them   any   further   protection.   The   learned

counsel   submitted   that   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.   does   not

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contemplate the grant of any such protection on the dismissal

of the application filed by an accused. Rather, the proviso to

Setion 438(1), Cr.P.C. specifically provides for the arrest of the

accused on a rejection of the relief sought in their application.

The   impugned   orders,   wherein   the   High   Court   granted

protection to the respondents subsequent to the dismissal of

their application, was therefore passed in excess of the High

Court’s   jurisdiction   under   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.   The   learned

State counsel further submitted that the High Court’s orders

have hampered the ongoing investigation as the police have

been   denied   custodial   interrogation   of   the   accused,

notwithstanding the fact that the nature of offences in both

cases is grave and heinous.

10. On   the   contrary,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents­

accused justified the discretion exercised by the High Court

and   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has   the   power   to   pass

such orders, in the interest of justice.

11. The   sole   question   to   be  answered  by   the  Court   in  the

present   appeals   relates   to   whether   the   High   Court,   while

dismissing   the   anticipatory   bail   applications   of   the

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respondents, could have granted them protection from arrest.

12. The considerations on the basis of which the Court is to

exercise   its   discretion   to   grant   relief   under   Section   438,

Cr.P.C.   have   been   decided   by   this   Court   in   a   catena   of

judgments and needs no restatement.

13. A recent Constitution Bench judgment of this Court, in

Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1

has clarified the extent of power exercisable by Courts under

Section 438, Cr.P.C. The Court ultimately held as follows:

“91.1.  Regarding   Question   1,   this

Court   holds   that   the  protection
granted  to a person under  Section
438 CrPC should not invariably be
limited  to a fixed period; it should
enure   in   favour   of   the   accused
without   any   restriction   on   time.
Normal   conditions   under   Section
437(3)   read   with   Section   438(2)
should   be   imposed;  if   there   are
specific   facts   or   features  in   regard
to   any   offence,   it   is   open   for   the
court   to   impose   any   appropriate
condition (including fixed nature of
relief, or its being tied to an event),
 etc.  

91.2.  As   regards   the   second

question referred to this Court, it is

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 held that the  life or duration of an
anticipatory bail order does not end
normally   at   the   time   and   stage
when the accused is summoned by
the   court,   or   when   charges   are
framed,   but   can   continue   till   the
end of the trial.  Again, if there are
any   special   or   peculiar   features
necessitating the court to limit the
tenure   of   anticipatory   bail,   it   is
 open for it to do so.”  

(emphasis supplied)

14. The   Constitution   Bench   in  Sushila   Aggarwal  (supra)

has authoritatively held that when a Court grants anticipatory

bail   under   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.,   the   same   is   ordinarily   not

limited to a fixed period and would subsist till the end of the

trial. However, it was clarified by the Court that if the facts

and   circumstances   so   warranted,   the   Court   could   impose

special   conditions,   including   limiting   the   relief   to   a   certain

period. 

15. It is therefore clear that a Court, be it a Sessions Court

or a High Court, in certain special facts and circumstances

may decide to grant anticipatory bail for a limited period of

time. The Court must indicate its reasons for doing so, which

would be assailable before a superior Court. To do so without

7
giving   reasons,   would   be   contrary   to   the  pronouncement   of

this   Court  in  Sushila  Aggarwal  (supra). If the  High Court

had   therefore   decided   to   allow   the   anticipatory   bail

application   of   the   respondents­accused   herein,   albeit   for   a

limited   period  of   90  days, the task before this Court would

have   been   somewhat   easier.   We   would   only   have   had   to

assess   the   reasons   assigned   by   the   Court,   if   any,   for   the

imposition of such special condition in terms of the judgment

in Sushila Aggarwal (supra).  

16.   However, in the present appeals, the High Court, after

considering   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,

particularly the gravity and severity of the accusations against

the respondents, rejected the application of the respondents­

accused.   It   is   after   rejecting   the   application   that   the   High

Court chose fit to grant some relief to the respondents while

directing   them   to   surrender   before   the   Trial   Court   to   file   a

regular   bail   application   within   90   days,   by   protecting   them

from any coercive action during that period. The appellants­

complainants are aggrieved by the same and are challenging

the power of the Court to pass such a protective order after

8
the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application.

17. To determine whether the Court can pass such orders, it

is   necessary   to   first   analyze   the   relevant   provision,  viz.,

Section   438,   Cr.P.C.   The   relevant   portion   of   Section   438,

Cr.P.C. is extracted below:

438. Direction for grant of bail to
person apprehending arrest

(1) Where any person has reason to
believe that he may be arrested on
an accusation of having committed
a   non­bailable   offence,   he   may
apply   to   the   High   Court   or   the
Court   of   Session   for   a   direction
under this section that in the event
of such arrest he shall be released
on bail; and that Court may, after
taking into consideration, inter alia,
the following factors, namely:­

xxx
either   reject   the   application
forthwith or issue an interim order
for the grant of anticipatory bail:
Provided   that,  where   the   High
Court  or, as  the case may  be,  the
Court   of   Session,   has   not   passed
any   interim   order   under   this   sub­
Section   or   has   rejected   the
application for grant of anticipatory
bail,   it   shall   be   open   to   an   officer
incharge   of   a   police   station   to
arrest,   without   warrant,   the
applicant   on   the   basis   of   the

9
 accusation   apprehended   in   such
application.

xxx

(2)   When   the   High   Court   or   the

Court of Session makes a direction
under   sub­section   (1),   it   may
include   such   conditions   in   such
directions in the light of the facts of
the particular case, as it may think
fit, including ­

xxx

(3)   If   such   person   is   thereafter

arrested   without   warrant   by   an
officer in charge of a police station
on   such   accusation,   and   is
prepared either at the time of arrest
or at any time while in the custody
of such officer to give bail, he shall
be   released   on   bail;   and   if   a
Magistrate   taking   cognizance   of
such offence decides that a warrant
should   issue   in   the   first   instance
against that person, he shall issue
a   bailable   warrant   in   conformity
with   the   direction   of   the   Court
under sub­section (1).
(emphasis supplied)

18. The   focus   of   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.,   when   read   in   its

entirety, clearly relates to the grant of anticipatory bail by the

Court. Section 438(1) explicitly lays down certain factors that

need to be considered by the Court before granting the relief

sought. Section 438(2) lays down the conditions that may be
10
imposed by the Court while granting the relief. Section 438(3)

dictates   the   consequences   of   the   grant   of   relief   under   the

Section.

19. The only guidance relating to what is to take place once

an application under Section 438, Cr.P.C. is rejected is found

in   the   proviso   to   Section   438(1),   Cr.P.C.,   which   specifically

provides   that   once   an   application   is   rejected,   or   the   Court

seized with the matter refuses to issue an interim order, it is

open to  the  police  to arrest the applicant. It is this proviso

that the present appellants have relied upon to argue that the

High Court, once it rejected the anticipatory bail applications

of the respondents­accused, did not have the power to grant

any further relief. 

20. At   first   blush,   while   this   submission   appears   to   be

attractive, we are of the opinion that such an analysis of the

provision  is   incomplete. It is no longer  res  integra  that  any

interpretation of the provisions of Section 438, Cr.P.C. has to

take into consideration the fact that the grant or rejection of

an application under Section 438, Cr.P.C. has a direct bearing

on the fundamental right to life and liberty of an individual.

11
The   genesis   of   this   jurisdiction   lies   in   Article   21   of   the

Constitution,  as  an effective medium  to protect the life and

liberty of an individual.  The provision therefore needs to be

read   liberally,   and   considering   its   beneficial   nature,   the

Courts  must  not  read  in limitations or restrictions that the

legislature have not explicitly provided for. Any ambiguity in

the   language   must   be   resolved   in   favour   of   the   applicant

seeking relief. In this context, this Court, in the Constitution

Bench decision of this Court in  Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v.

State   of   Punjab,   (1980)   2   SCC   565,   which   was   recently

upheld   and   followed   by   this   Court   in  Sushila   Aggarwal

(supra), held as follows:

“26.   We   find   a   great   deal   of

substance   in   Mr   Tarkunde's
submission that since denial of bail
amounts to deprivation of personal
liberty,  the   court   should   lean
against   the   imposition   of
unnecessary   restrictions   on   the
scope   of   Section   438,   especially
when   no   such   restrictions   have
been imposed by the legislature in
the   terms   of   that   section.   Section
438 is a procedural provision which
is   concerned   with   the   personal
liberty   of   the   individual,   who   is
entitled   to   the   benefit   of   the
presumption of innocence since he
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 is not, on the date of his application
for   anticipatory   bail,   convicted   of
the   offence   in   respect   of   which   he
seeks   bail.   An   over­generous
infusion   of   constraints   and
conditions   which   are   not   to   be
found in Section 438 can make its
provisions   constitutionally
vulnerable   since   the   right   to
personal   freedom   cannot   be   made
to   depend   on   compliance   with
unreasonable   restrictions.  The
beneficent   provision   contained   in
Section   438   must   be   saved,   not
jettisoned…”

(emphasis supplied)
 

21. When the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C. is analyzed

in line with the above dictum, it is clear that the proviso does

not create any rights or restrictions. Rather, the sole purpose

of   the   proviso   appears   to   be   clarificatory   in   nature.   It   only

restates,  inter   alia,   the   obvious   proposition   that   unless   an

individual has obtained some protection from the Court, the

police may arrest them. In line with the ruling in  Gurbaksh

Singh   Sibbia  (supra),   the   proviso   cannot   be   read   as

constituting a bar on the power of the Court. 

22. If the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C. does not act as a

bar to the grant of additional protection to the applicant, the
13
question still remains as to under what provision of law the

Court may issue relief to an applicant after dismissing their

anticipatory bail application. 

23. Without going into the question of whether Section 438,

Cr.P.C. itself allows for such a power, as it is not necessary to

undertake   such   an   exercise   in   the   present   case,   it   is   clear

that   when   it   comes   to   the   High   Court,   such   a   power   does

exist.   Section   482,   Cr.P.C   explicitly   recognizes   the   High

Court’s inherent power to pass orders to secure the ends of

justice. This provision reflects the reality that no law or rule

can   possibly   account   for   the   complexities   of   life,   and   the

infinite range of circumstances that may arise in the future. 

24. We cannot be oblivious to the circumstances that Courts

are   faced   with   day   in   and   day   out,   while   dealing   with

anticipatory   bail   applications.   Even   when   the   Court   is   not

inclined to grant anticipatory bail to an accused, there may be

circumstances where the High Court is of the opinion that it

is   necessary   to   protect   the  person   apprehending   arrest   for

some   time,   due   to   exceptional   circumstances,   until   they

surrender before the Trial Court. For example, the applicant

14
may plead protection for some time as he/she is the primary

caregiver   or   breadwinner   of   his/her   family   members,   and

needs to make arrangements for them. In such extraordinary

circumstances,   when   a   strict   case   for   grant   of   anticipatory

bail is not made out, and rather the investigating authority

has made out a case for custodial investigation, it cannot be

stated that the High Court has no power to ensure justice. It

needs   no   mentioning,   but   this   Court   may   also   exercise   its

powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass such an

order. 

25. However, such discretionary power cannot be exercised

in   an   untrammeled   manner.   The   Court   must   take   into

account   the   statutory   scheme   under   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.,

particularly,   the   proviso   to   Section   438(1),   Cr.P.C.,   and

balance the concerns of the investigating agency, complainant

and   the   society   at   large   with   the   concerns/interest   of   the

applicant.   Therefore,   such   an   order   must   necessarily   be

narrowly   tailored   to   protect   the   interests   of   the   applicant

while   taking   into   consideration   the   concerns   of   the

investigating   authority.   Such   an   order   must   be   a   reasoned

one.
15
26. The impugned orders passed by the High Court, in the

present appeals, do not meet any of the standards as laid out

above.  We say so for the following reasons:  firstly, after the

dismissal of the anticipatory bail application, on the basis of

the   nature   and   gravity   of   the   offence,   the   High   Court   has

granted   the   impugned   relief   to   the   respondents   without

assigning any reasons.  Secondly,  in granting the relief for a

period of 90 days, the Court has seemingly not considered the

concerns   of   the   investigating   agency,   complainant   or   the

proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.P.C., which necessitates that

the Court pass such an exceptional discretionary protection

order for the shortest duration that is reasonably required. A

period   of   90   days,   or   three   months,   cannot   in   any   way   be

considered   to be  a  reasonable one in the present facts and

circumstances. 

27. The   impugned   orders   therefore   do   not   withstand   legal

scrutiny. The resultant effect of the High Court’s orders is that

neither are the respondents found entitled to pre­arrest bail,

nor can they be arrested for a long duration. During the said

duration they can roam freely without being apprehensive of

16
coercive action. We are thus of the view that the High Court

committed   a   grave   error   in   passing   such   protection   to   the

respondents­accused.   Such   a   direction   by   the   High   Court

exceeds   its   judicial   discretion   and   amounts   to   judicial

largesse, which the Courts do not possess.

28. For   the   aforestated   reasons,   the   present   appeals   are

allowed.   The   impugned   order   of   the   High   Court   dated

08.02.2021   in   Criminal   Miscellaneous   Anticipatory   Bail

Application No. 2219 of 2021, and order dated 28.01.2021 in

Criminal Miscellaneous Anticipatory Bail Application No. 1700

of 2021, to the extent of granting protection for 90 days to the

respondents­accused   are   set   aside,   leaving   it   open   to   the

Investigating Agency to proceed in the matters in accordance

with law  and  complete  the investigation. If the respondents­

accused have been meanwhile sent to judicial custody, their

application(s)   for   regular   bail   or   any   request   for   their   police

remand made by the Investigating Officer shall be decided by

the competent Court, uninfluenced by the observations made

hereinabove.

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29. Ordered accordingly.

………………………..CJI.
(N.V. RAMANA)   

  ………………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)

…………………………. J.
(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 28, 2021

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