The Airbus safety magazine

#29

Safety
first
Safety first, #29 January, 2020. Safety first is
published by Airbus S.A.S. - 1, rond point Maurice
Bellonte - 31707 Blagnac Cedex/France.
Publisher and Editor: Yannick Malinge,
Chief Product Safety Officer.
Safety first
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Guillaume Timothy
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 editorial
YANNICK MALINGE Dear Aviation colleagues,
SVP & Chief As we begin a new decade, we can reflect on the last 10 years that show the continually
Product Safety Officer decreasing accident rates decade upon decade. Flying is safer today than ever before,
even when faced with the constant growth of our industry. Unlike some of the commentary
about aviation safety issues, which may present differing perspectives, the facts show that
the most significant improvements in the safety of flight are evident over the last 20 years.
However this does not mean we can be complacent as it is clear that society expects zero
accidents, and this must be our goal.

Prevention of aviation accidents is a long journey that we started many years ago and together
with all key actors. Sustaining aircraft and technological evolutions towards safer operations,
strengthening competencies with innovative training solutions, fostering a speak-up culture,
and sharing safety strategies are our key enablers. By applying a proactive risk management
mindset, implementing safety enhancements as appropriate and in a pragmatic way, we
are reinforcing the trust of the flying public by making air travel even safer again in the next
decade.

Through sharing safety information in this issue of the Safety first magazine, we begin 2020
as we mean to go on - always keeping safety as our priority.

I extend my best wishes to all of you for a happy and safe New Year in 2020 and beyond.
Safety
first
The Airbus Safety magazine

Also available in app

and website versions

Visit us at safetyfirst.airbus.com
 NEWS
The 26th Airbus Flight Safety Conference will be
held in Singapore from 23-26 March 2020
This event provides the opportunity for Airbus to exchange with its
customers on how to reinforce resilience in our Air Transport System.

With this objective forming the theme of our next conference, we will address
the topics of safety at the interface of maintenance and flight operations and
revisit the visual challenge. To prepare the future, we will share initiatives for
reinforcing pilot skills and review the subject “Resilience and Autonomy - At the
Service of the Pilot” focusing on the foreseeable evolution of aircraft functions
and flight operations.

ATTENDANCE & INVITATIONS

Invitations for this event were sent to all our customer airlines and operators
in January. Please contact Airbus if you need to update your information.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 005

Safety
first #29
OPERATIONS
P06
GNSS Interference

AIRCRAFT
P14
Takeoff Surveillance
& Monitoring Functions

OPERATIONS
Flight Operations
P24
Managing Severe Turbulence
Cabin Operations

P36
Ground Operations

Maintenance
Safe Aircraft Parking
OPERATIONS
GNSS Interference

GNSS Interference
Signals from the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
are one of the main inputs used for aircraft positioning or time
reference for Communication, Navigation and Surveillance
functions on-board most of the Airbus aircraft.
Operators report an increasing number of events related to the
loss of GNSS signals due to Radio Frequency Interference (RFI)
during operations in some areas of the world.
This article explains the causes of RFI, the effects on the
aircraft systems and provides recommendations for flight and
maintenance crews.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 007

The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) began in 1978

when the first satellite of the Global Positioning System (GPS)
constellation was launched. The full operational capability of
GPS was declared in 1995. In 2000 the full availability was
granted to provide improved performance of the GPS position
for civilians. The number of users and uses consequently
increased, especially in civil aviation.

RADIO FREQUENCY
INTERFERENCE (RFI)

A low power signal sent from space

The GPS signal is a low power signal. It is comparable to the power emitted by a
60W light-bulb located more than 20,000 km away from the surface of the earth.
This means that the signal could easily be disturbed by any ground source located
near an aircraft and emitting in the GPS L1 frequency band (1575.42 MHz +/-10
MHz), leading to the loss of GPS data (fig.1).

Main known sources of RFI

TV broadcast
Personal Privacy Protection of GPS Military (fig.1)
station
Device (PPD) sensitive sites repeater RFI Main sources of RFI
malfunction

Personal Privacy Devices (PPD)

Some of the reported disturbances were caused by portable Personal Privacy

Devices that jam a GPS signal in the immediate area to avoid tracking. Operational
disruptions at airports due to a loss of the GPS signal in the area around the airports
have been caused when these devices were activated in the vicinity of an airport.

Protection of sensitive sites and VIPs

Certain sensitive sites may be protected using GNSS RFI for security reasons,
such as correctional facilities or sites where dignitaries or political figures are
living or visiting. Aircraft operating in the vicinity of these sites may be affected by
interference with the GPS signal.
OPERATIONS
GNSS Interference

GPS repeater

GPS repeaters are used to make a GPS signal available inside a hangar during
aircraft maintenance. GPS repeater signals have caused interference with actual
GPS signal in some reported events, causing reception issues on aircraft located
close to the hangar.

TV broadcast station malfunction

A TV broadcast station malfunction reportedly disturbed the GPS signal and

affected aircraft operations.

Military GPS RFI in conflict zones

GPS RFI can also cause loss of the GPS signal in flight if too close to areas of
military conflict. These areas are often known and NOTAMs inform flight crews
that they may encounter interference close to these areas. It can be the case that
military RFI activity is not known in advance or communicated leading to loss of
GPS signal without prior notice.

GNSS spoofing
Some of the known RFI sources are reportedly capable of emitting signals that
mimic GNSS signals.

Objectives for such spoofing include providing GNSS positioning service

within hangar with repeaters, preventing GNSS receivers to compute position
over prohibited area or triggering geo-fencing responses as part of anti-drone
measures.

There are no reported events of GNSS spoofing leading to wrong aircraft

position and timing on any Airbus aircraft to-date. However, Airbus constantly
monitors the emerging threats and launched investigations to further evaluate
GNSS spoofing threat and its possible consequences.

EFFECTS ON AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS AND ASSOCIATED
COCKPIT EFFECTS

Airbus aircraft Impact on the aircraft position computation

are designed to be GNSS RFI can cause the loss of GNSS position and timing. Even if GNSS plays
robust to GNSS a major role in the aircraft positioning system, Airbus aircraft are designed to be
robust to GNSS signal loss. The use of other sources of data (IRS, VOR and
signal loss DME) enables the aircraft systems to maintain a position computation capability.
A loss of GNSS inputs does not lead to a map shift or to an erroneous position
computation by the Flight Management Systems (FMS). In the case of a loss
of GPS signal, the FMS switches from the mixed GPS/IRS position to an IRS-
DME/DME position or IRS-VOR/DME or pure IRS in order of priority. Refer to
the FCOM description of the FMS position computation for more detail.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 009

Potential loss of some navigation and surveillance

functions as well as of certain operational
capabilities
Certain navigation and surveillance functions or operational capabilities may be
lost if there is a loss of the GPS signal (fig.2). This is because the need for high
accuracy and integrity of GPS position data is not met (e.g. for RNP AR, SLS,
GLS, etc.) or when functions rely only on available GPS data for position or time
reference. All, or some of the cockpit effects listed in (fig.2) may be triggered in an
order that depends on the confirmation time of each system’s monitoring function
and how long the GPS signal is lost.
(fig.2)
GPS signal loss and its associated effects were temporary in most of the reported Potential effects of the loss of the GNSS
events. The lost functions and capabilities were recovered immediately after aircraft signal on systems/functions with their
moved out of range from the source of the radio-frequency interference. associated cockpit effects

Potential effect on Main Cockpit effects

systems/functions/
operations
A300/A310 A220 A320 A330/A340 A380 A350

GNSS NOT
Downgraded aircraft NAV GPS
AVAIL on
position computation x FAULT NAV GNSS
EICAS
GPS NAV GPS x FAULT x FAULT
Impact on RNP operations PRIMARY UNABLE RNP GPS PRIMARY LOST on ND NAV PRIMARY
(RNP4, RNP 2, RNP 1) LOST on ND on EICAS LOST on ND
Loss of RNAV (GNSS) and CDU
capability

APPROACH NAV RNP AR

NOT AVAIL CAPABILITY
Loss of RNP AR DOWNGRADED
on EICAS
Navigation

N/A GPS PRIMARY LOST on ND N/A

capability NAV RNP AR
CAPABILITY
LOST
Loss of the GLS function
N/A N/A NAV GLS x FAULT
(No GLS approach)
Loss of the SLS function LPV NOT
NAV SLS
(No LPV approach) N/A AVAIL N/A N/A N/A
x FAULT
on EICAS
Limited FLS function
FLS LIMITED TO F-APP+RAW on ECAM STATUS
(only available for VOR N/A N/A
F-APP+RAW on FMA
or NDB approaches)
Loss of OANS/ANF SMS FAIL
N/A N/A ARPT NAV POS LOST on ND
function on EICAS
TAWS
Loss of the Predictive TERR MODE NAV GPWS
MAP FAIL SURV TERR SYS x FAULT
TAWS functions "FAULT" light TERR DET FAULT
on EICAS
ADS-B
Surveillance

Loss of ADS-B out No alerting NAV ADS-B RPTG ADS-B POS RPTG LOST
OUT FAIL
reporting system x FAULT Memo
on EICAS

Loss of the ADS-B IN NAV ADS-B TRAF FAULT or SURV ADS-B

N/A N/A N/A TRAFFIC x
(ATSAW) function NAV ADS-B FAULT
FAULT

Loss of ROW/ROPS N/A N/A SURV ROW/ROP LOST

OPERATIONS
GNSS Interference

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

During Flight Preparation

Check RFI NOTAMs

Operators should consider the NOTAM related to known or expected areas with
GNSS RFI when planning flights. If a NOTAM is applicable to the flight, then the
availability of non GNSS-Based routes, procedures and approaches (such as
ILS, VOR and DME) must be checked for the affected area.

During Flight
Application of ECAM/FCOM procedures

Flight crews must follow the associated ECAM or FCOM procedures if a loss
of GNSS signal occurs during flight with a cockpit effect described in (fig.2).

It is not Recovery of the signal

necessary to Loss of GPS information is usually temporary and the normal navigation mode
deselect GPS in based on GPS data (“GPS PRIMARY” or “NAV PRIMARY”), as well as the
the case of RFI as communication and surveillance functions, are recovered as soon as the aircraft
leaves the area affected by RFI. It is therefore not necessary to deselect GPS
this would prevent in the case of RFI as this would prevent the aircraft from recovering its full
the aircraft from capabilities when the GPS signal is restored.
recovering its full Zones with ADS-B OUT required
capabilities when
If the GNSS loss occurs in an area where ADS-B OUT is required per regulation,
the GPS signal is the flight crew should notify ATC of the loss of ADS-B OUT and report that this
restored is due the loss of the GNSS signal.

After a flight with suspected loss of GNSS signals

Report to Maintenance

At the end of a flight where the effects of a loss of GNSS signal were experienced,
the flight crew should report the event and cockpit effects to the Maintenance
to investigate and confirm if the event was due to RFI or a result of a system
or equipment malfunction.

Share information

Operators should report any identified suspected GNSS RFI events to regional
(e.g. ANSPs) and international organizations, such as EUROCONTROL’s
Voluntary ATM Incident Reporting (EVAIR). This will facilitate and accelerate
GNSS RFI event confirmation or resolution, and enable the publication of a
NOTAM to share information to all other operators flying near the affected area.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 011

MAINTENANCE
CONSIDERATIONS

At the end of a flight impacted by a transient loss of GNSS, a confirmation should

be done to make sure that the effects encountered were due to RFI and not to
a system or equipment malfunction.

Transient loss of GNSS in an area with known RFI

At the end of a flight affected by transient GNSS loss within an area with known
RFI, Airbus recommends that maintenance personnel reset the system and test
both Multi-Mode Receivers (MMR).

To ensure that there was no system failures, Airbus also recommends a system
test of any equipment affected by a loss of GNSS signal based on the cockpit
effects observed during the flight. Should any system test fail, maintenance
personnel must perform troubleshooting in accordance with the associated
Trouble-Shooting Manual (TSM) task.

Refer to the “GNSS loss and GNSS interference on Airbus aircraft” ISI article
ref 34.36.00049 available on the Airbus World portal for more details and a list
of the related AMM/MP tasks for system tests.

What if the interference is still present on ground?

It the GNSS is still impacted by RFI on ground, the aircraft should be moved
out of the RFI area. A dispatch under MEL conditions should be considered if
this is not possible to do so.

Transient loss of GNSS in areas not known for RFI

At the end of a flight affected with transient GNSS loss within an area without
known RFI issues, Airbus recommends that maintenance personnel confirm the
root cause of the GNSS loss by studying all potential sources: aircraft system
failure, GNSS constellation anomaly, environment masking, multipath or space
weather events such as ionospheric scintillation. When all these potential causes
are eliminated, RFI can be suspected. In this case, aircraft data should be
sent to Airbus for further investigation. A list of the information items to report
is provided in the “GNSS loss and GNSS interference on Airbus aircraft” ISI
article ref 34.36.00049, available on the Airbus World portal.
OPERATIONS
GNSS Interference

The number of reported transient GNSS loss due to radio-frequency

CONTRIBUTORS:
interference is increasing. The loss of GPS signal can cause a downgrade
Julien FRARD of the aircraft position computation capabilities. However, Airbus aircraft
Flight Operations are designed to maintain position computation capability without a GPS
Support Engineer
Customer Support
signal by using IRS or ground Navaids data.

Certain navigation and surveillance functions may be lost temporarily.

Laura MARTIN SACRISTAN
Radio Navigation & When radio-frequency interference is encountered during flight, the
Surveillance Systems flight crew will be alerted to any loss of function or capability. The flight
Engineer crew must then use the relevant ECAM/FCOM procedure associated
Customer Support to these cockpit effects.
Diane RAMBACH In most reported cases of radio-frequency interference, there is a return
Avionics System
to normal operations immediately after the aircraft has moved away from
Engineering
Design Office the affected area.

François TRANCHET During flight preparation, precautions should be taken when flying to or
GNSS Expert above known area of RFI to avoid operational burdens.
Design Office
When it is confirmed by the maintenance that RFI is suspected in an
Timo WARNS area not know to be impacted, the information should be shared with
Aircraft Information the aviation community.
Security Expert

With thanks to Pierre DUHAMEL

from the A220 In-service
Engineering-Avionics and
Marc LE-LOUER from the
Flight Operations Support
Safety first #29 | January 2020 013
AIRCRAFT
Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions

Takeoff Surveillance
& Monitoring
Functions
Airbus has continuously improved takeoff safety since the
“TO CONFIG TEST” pushbutton was first introduced on A300
and A310 aircraft, and with the development of the Takeoff
Surveillance (TOS1 & TOS2) and Takeoff Monitoring (TOM)
functions.
The TOS2 package that was initially developed for the A350
is now available for A320 family and A330 aircraft. This is an
opportunity to review the checks that are performed by each
function, from cockpit preparation to takeoff.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 015

This article supersedes “The Takeoff Securing function” article

published in the Safety first issue #8 (July 2009).

SECURING THE TAKEOFF

There have been several events during takeoff over this last decade. In certain
cases, the aircraft took off with incorrect trim or flaps settings, which increases the
risk of runway overrun or tail strike event. Erroneous parameters were sometimes
used for the performance calculation, leading to incorrect takeoff speeds or Flex
thrust computation. On other occasions takeoff data was not updated in the FMS
following a late runway change, leading to takeoff without the correct performance
data in the FMS. A number of aircraft started takeoff from a taxiway intersection
when the computed performance was for the entire length of runway. There were
also takeoffs starting on a taxiway or from the opposite QFU. Finally, few cases of
residual braking leading to an abnormal aircraft acceleration were reported during
takeoff roll.

Most of these events can be avoided by complying with the FCOM Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP). Indeed, several crosschecks enable the flight crew
to identify discrepancies. These examples however show that errors can still be
made, which typically occur when there are stressful situations, high crew workload,
last minute changes or demanding ATC requests.

Airbus developed Takeoff Surveillance and Monitoring functions to provide additional

safety-nets to support the flight crew during takeoff preparation and takeoff roll.

Evolution of the Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring

functions on Airbus aircraft

The “TO CONFIG TEST” pushbutton was first introduced on A300/A310 aircraft.
When pressed, it checks the correct aircraft configuration for takeoff. If the aircraft
configuration is not correct, the CONFIG light comes on the Master Warning Panel
(A300) or an ECAM alert triggers (A300-600/A310).

Airbus introduced the first step of the Takeoff Surveillance functions (TOS1) on A320
family aircraft in 2009 and then on A330/A340 aircraft in 2013. TOS1 improves the
checks performed on flaps and trim settings and adds a check of the performance
parameters entered in the FMS (aircraft weight and takeoff speeds).

The second step of the Takeoff Surveillance functions (TOS2) was introduced
on A350 aircraft in 2018 and is now available on A320 family and A330 aircraft.
TOS2 checks that the aircraft is positioned on the intended runway and that the
expected takeoff performance – based on data entered in the FMS by the crew – is
compatible with the runway distance available.

The Takeoff Monitoring function (TOM) was first developed on A380 in 2018 and is
now also available on A350. TOM monitors the acceleration of the aircraft during
the takeoff phase and warns the flight crew if a lower-than-expected acceleration
is detected.
AIRCRAFT
Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions

TOS CHECKS DURING

COCKPIT PREPARATION

ZFW and takeoff speeds check (TOS1)

During the cockpit preparation, TOS1 checks for gross errors on weight or
takeoff speeds inserted into the FMS. The MCDU/MFD can display the below
scratchpad messages (fig.1).

• ENTRY OUT OF RANGE: Inserted Zero Fuel Weight value is outside of the
correct range.
• TO SPEED TOO LOW (A320/A330) or T.O SPEED TOO LOW CHECK TOW
AND T.O DATA (A380/A350): Inserted takeoff speeds do not respect the
required margins with minimum control (VMCG, VMCA) or stall (VS1G) speeds.
• V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE: Inserted takeoff speeds do not respect the rule
V1 ≤ VR ≤ V2.
• CHECK TAKE OFF DATA: The flight crew changed the takeoff runway but
takeoff speeds that were entered are applicable for another runway. The takeoff
speeds are therefore invalidated and must be either re-entered or re-validated.

Lift-off distance check (TOS2)

TOS2 computes the Lift Off Distance (LOD) expected with the performance dataset
entered by the crew (weight, thrust, Flaps, OAT and VR/V2) and compares it with
the available runway length of the takeoff runway selected in the FMS. The LOD
computation takes into account any takeoff shift entered in the MCDU/MFD. If
the available runway length is lower than the LOD, the MCDU/MFD scratchpad
displays a T.O RWY TOO SHORT message (fig.1).

(fig.1)
TOS1 and TOS2 potential scratchpad
messages during cockpit preparation
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 017

TOS CHECKS AT ENGINE START

Lift-off distance check (TOS2)

TOS2 re-performs a LOD check at engine start, using actual fuel quantity
data now available from the fuel system. If the available runway length is lower
than the LOD, the MCDU/MFD scratchpad displays a T.O RWY TOO SHORT
message (fig.2).

First engine
start

(fig.2)
TOS2 potential alert at first engine start

TOS CHECKS DURING

TAXI PHASE (T.O CONFIG
PUSHBUTTON PRESSED)

During taxi, the SOP request the flight crew to press the T.O CONFIG pushbutton.
TOS functions then perform the following checks:

Flaps check (TOS1)

TOS1 checks consistency between the Flaps setting inserted by the crew in
the Takeoff PERF page and the actual flaps setting. If there is an inconsistency,
this will trigger the F/CTL FLAP/MCDU DISAGREE (A320/A330/A340) (fig.3)
or F/CTL FLAP/FMS DISAGREE (A350/A380) ECAM message.

Trim Check (TOS1)

TOS1 also compares the trim setting entered by the crew into the Takeoff PERF
page with the actual Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) position and with the
trim computed by the FAC/FMGEC/FE based on the CG value provided by the
fuel management system. If an inconsistency is detected, this will trigger the
F/CTL PITCH TRIM/MCDU/CG DISAGREE (A320/A330/A340) (fig.3) or
F/CTL PITCH TRIM/FMS/CG DISAGREE (A350/A380) ECAM message.
AIRCRAFT
Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions

Takeoff speeds check (TOS1)

TOS1 performs an additional takeoff speeds check in the same way as it was
done during the cockpit preparation phase. If one of the checks fails, the Flight
Warning System triggers an ECAM alert and displays the associated MCDU/MFD
scratchpad message (fig.3):

• T.O SPEEDS TOO LOW

• T.O V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE
• T.O SPEEDS NOT INSERTED

Lift-off distance check (TOS2)

TOS2 performs an additional LOD check. If the available runway length is lower than
LOD, the Flight Warning System triggers the ECAM alert T.O RWY TOO SHORT
(fig.3) and displays the associated scratchpad message.

(fig.3)
TOS1 and TOS2 potential alerts when the
T.O CONFIG pushbutton is pressed

TOS CHECKS AT TAKEOFF

THRUST APPLICATION

When the flight crew initiates the takeoff roll by setting the thrust levers to takeoff
thrust, TOS2 provides additional safety nets by checking that the aircraft is on the
intended runway and that the required liftoff distance is compatible with the available
runway distance, taking into account the real aircraft position on the runway.

Check of takeoff start position (TOS2)

When the crew applies takeoff thrust, TOS2 checks if the aircraft is positioned
within an area that contains the takeoff runway entered in the FMS (fig.4).

If the flight crew applies takeoff thrust when the aircraft is still on a taxiway and
outside the runway area, this will trigger the red ECAM warning NAV ON TAXIWAY.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 019

The alert can also be an amber caution depending on the FWS standard.

If the flight crew applies takeoff thrust while the aircraft is positioned on a different
runway from the one entered into the FMS, this will trigger the ECAM caution
NAV NOT ON FMS RUNWAY.

Lift-off distance check (TOS2)

When the flight crew applies takeoff thrust, TOS2 performs a final LOD check
based on the real aircraft position. If the runway distance available in front of the
aircraft is lower than the computed LOD (e.g. an aircraft commencing takeoff
from a wrong runway intersection or from an incorrect runway with an insufficient
length), this will trigger the red ECAM warning T.O RWY TOO SHORT (fig.4).

(fig.4)
TOS2 potential alerts at takeoff
thrust application

De-activation of TOS 2 function

The T.O SURV pushbutton switch de-activates TOS2 function to avoid spurious alerts if the Navigation/Airport
database information for a particular airport is not up-to-date. This pushbutton switch is installed on A320/A330
aircraft equipped with the TOS2 and can be installed on A350 as an option.

(fig.5)
Example of the T.O SURV pushbutton switch
on A320 aircraft
AIRCRAFT
Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions

TAKEOFF MONITORING (TOM)

TOM provides an additional safety-net during the takeoff roll. From 30 kt, it
compares the expected acceleration with the real acceleration of the aircraft.
If the difference between the real aircraft acceleration and its expected
acceleration is more than 15 % when the aircraft reaches 90 kt, TOM will
trigger the red ECAM warning T.O ACCELERATION DEGRADED.

TOM can be de-activated on A350 aircraft using the T.O SURV pushbutton
switch (if installed).

(fig.6)
TOM alert displayed if the difference
between the aircraft’s actual acceleration
and its expected acceleration is more than
15 % when the aircraft reaches 90 kt

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

SOP ensure correct takeoff preparation

and request checks for error identification
Adherence to SOP ensures takeoff preparation is completed correctly regardless
of whether an aircraft is equipped with the Takeoff Surveillance and Monitoring
functions. Correct takeoff preparation by the crew is ensured by promoting the
following:

• A takeoff briefing should be relevant, concise and chronological

• The takeoff performance computation should be independently performed
by both flight crew members and crosschecked
• Ensure accurate aircraft positioning data by systematically inserting T.O SHIFT
during the departure phase when the takeoff will start from an intersection.

The Takeoff Surveillance and Monitoring functions must be considered

as a safety net and are not replacements for full application of SOP actions.

An up-to-date Navigation/Airport database is key

TOS2 function relies on the FMS Navigation Database (for A320/A330/A380)
and on the Airport database (for A350). Therefore the database must be up-to-
date to fully take advantage of the TOS2 function. An outdated database may
lead to spurious TOS2 ECAM alerts or non-triggering of an alert.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 021

NOTAMs impacting the TOS2 function

NOTAMs that modify the runway length available may not always be incorporated
into the Navigation/Airport database. Airbus recommends that Operators
evaluate the impact on TOS2 of these NOTAMs and request that their flight
crew deactivates the function to avoid spurious alerts if necessary (fig.5).

Takeoff Surveillance alerts and RTO

Airbus recommends to reject the takeoff if TOS2 ECAM alerts are triggered at
takeoff thrust application – including:

- NAV ON TAXIWAY
- NAV NOT ON FMS RUNWAY
- T.O RWY TOO SHORT

Takeoff Monitoring alert and RTO

Many ECAM alerts are inhibited between 80 kt and 400 ft (takeoff inhibition
phase). Any warning received during this period must be considered as
significant. For this reason, Airbus recommends to reject the takeoff if the
T.O ACCELERATION DEGRADED warning is triggered. The TOM function is
designed so that if this warning appears when the aircraft reaches 90 kt, the
flight crew can safely perform a rejected takeoff before V1.

SUMMARY & AVAILABILITY OF

TOS AND TOM FUNCTIONS
Focusing on the types of event that were reported to Airbus in the last ten years (fig.7)
shows that the takeoff surveillance and monitoring functions would detect the Summary of the potential occurrences
majority of them and alert the flight crew. addressed by TOS and TOM functions

Design
Mitigation
T.O Configuration P/B TOS1 TOS2 TOM
Potential
Occurrences

Wrong CG/trim Yes (check of Trim vs

Yes (Trim inside green band)
setting FMS and computed CG)

Wrong flaps setting Yes (Flap not in CLEAN Yes (Actual Flaps vs
or FULL) FMS Flaps)
Erroneous FMS Yes
Takeoff Speeds
Runway too short Yes
for takeoff
Incorrect aircraft Yes
position at takeoff
Degraded
acceleration Yes
at takeoff
AIRCRAFT
Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions

The table below summarizes the availability of the TOS and TOM functions on
the various aircraft types. The availability for retrofit depends on the exact aircraft
configuration (FMS, EIS, ADIRU, and FWS standards). For more details on the
system pre-requisites, operators are invited to contact Airbus customer support.

Aircraft Type T.O CONFIG P/B TOS1 TOS2 TOM

A300 Basic No No No

A310 Basic No No No

A300-600 Basic No No No

Under
FMS
A320 Basic Option feasibility
R1A*
study

Under
FMS
A330 Basic Option feasibility
R1A*
study

A340 Basic FMS

R1A* No No

A350 Basic Basic Basic Basic**

Under
A380 Basic Basic feasibility Basic
study

* TOS1 is basically activated on all aircraft fitted with FMS2 release

(fig.8)
1a and later standards (see below table for availability)
Availability of the Takeoff Surveillance
and Monitoring functions
**Available on A350-1000 in 2020

Aircraft HONEYWELL FMS THALES FMS

Types & Delivery Delivery
Engines MSN* MSN*
Date Date
A320 CFM56 4379 Aug-10 4030 Sep-09
A320 IAE 4066 Oct-09 4110 Dec-09
A320neo All aircraft
A330 GE 1458 Nov-13 1276 Jan-12
A330 PW/RR 1425 Jun-13 1627 May-15
A330neo All aircraft
(fig.9) A340 Retrofit only
Availability of the TOS1 (Release 1A * Manufacturer Serial Number: first aircraft with FMS release
FMS standard or later standards)
for A320/A330/A340 aircraft
1a or later standard installed in production line
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 023

Airbus developed the Takeoff Surveillance TOS 1 & TOS 2 and Takeoff
CONTRIBUTORS:
Monitoring (TOM) functions to provide an additional safety-net against
Daniel LOPEZ FERNANDEZ the risks of runway overrun or tailstrike at takeoff that may occur due to:
Director Product Safety
Enhancement - Errors in takeoff performance computation, or errors when entering
Product Safety takeoff data
- Takeoff starting from an incorrect position
Marie PALARIC
TOS/TOM Product Leader - A degraded acceleration condition, where the aircraft’s actual
Engineering Aircraft acceleration is lower than the expected acceleration during the
Performance takeoff roll.

Annabelle BLUSSON The TOS2 was initially developed for the A350 aircraft and it is now
Flight Operations Support available for the A320 family and on A330 aircraft.

It is important to remember that these Takeoff Surveillance functions

are enhancements that act as an additional safety-net. They do not
replace the correct application of SOP by the flight crew.
OPERATIONS
Managing Severe Turbulence

Managing Severe
Turbulence
Severe turbulence encounters may cause injuries to passengers
and cabin crew. If turbulence is unavoidable, using best
practices, applying recommended techniques and following
procedures will help to reduce the risk of injuries.
This article is about turbulence encounters, their risks and tips
for how to avoid them. It provides references and links to the
relevant publications. It also highlights how communication
between the flight crew and cabin crew can be most effective
to manage the risks and recalls procedures and best practices
to apply in the case of severe turbulence.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 025

ANALYSIS OF AN EVENT

Severe turbulence during approach

An A320 aircraft was facing severe thunderstorms on approach into its destination
airport. Trying to find their way to the final approach path, the crew passed the
boundary of one of the thunderstorms by approximately 4 NM. The aircraft was
suddenly caught by a significant updraft followed by a downdraft, resulting in
a g-load close to zero and the disconnection of the autopilot. Both pilots were
surprised by the shift of the g-loads but they did not react on the sidestick. Assessing
and accepting the minor altitude deviations, the flight crew then reengaged the
autopilot and landed safely. There were no injuries to any passengers or crew.

Event analysis
The flight crew actions were in accordance with the FCTM recommended
techniques when encountering turbulence. After the initial updraft and AP
disconnection the flight crew resisted the potential instinctive reaction to use
manual inputs on their sidesticks to fight against the turbulence. This limited
the risk of over-control on the sidestick, allowing the A320’s flight control laws
to cope with the effects of the turbulence.

The cabin was already secured for landing with everybody seated and seatbelts
fastened, which was a key factor in the prevention of injuries to passengers
and cabin crew.

WHAT CAUSES TURBULENCE

AND HOW TO AVOID IT?
Several phenomenons create turbulence. Here is a list of the main contributors
and how to anticipate, detect and avoid them when possible.

Convective weather
The first and most obvious is the convective weather where air is heated by the
earth’s surface. Hot air rises and causes strong air displacements. Convection
associated with high humidity leads to the formation of thunderstorms that can
cause turbulence.

Using weather forecasts to predict convective weather

Flight crew must anticipate any potential route deviation and plan extra fuel
to avoid any expected storms shown on the weather forecast analysis during
their pre-flight preparation. The weather forecast should be regularly updated,
especially during long haul flights, because meteorological conditions can be
changeable.
OPERATIONS
Managing Severe Turbulence

Using the weather radar to detect and avoid convective weather

NOTE Storms contain a large quantity of liquid water that can be detected with
the on-board weather radar . Knowing the capabilities and limitations of the
For more information about the use
weather radar installed on the aircraft is essential as well as being familiar with
of the on-board weather radar,
the techniques for using the weather radar to optimize the chance to detect
refer to:
convective weather.
• FCOM AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS –
Avoiding Storms
SURVEILLANCE - Weather radar
• FCTM AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS –
Severe turbulence can be met inside a cumulonimbus cloud. However, it can
WEATHER RADAR
also be met outside of the cloud as we have seen in the event described above
• P ilot’s guide from the radar
where the aircraft was 4 NM outside the boundary of the storm. As a rule of
manufacturer
thumb, storm cells should be avoided by 20 NM laterally and preferably upwind
• “Optimum use of weather radar”
to avoid risk of encountering hail. A storm cell must not be overflown by less
article published in Safety first #22“
than 5000ft separation. Avoiding the storm cell by flying around it is preferred
in july 2016
because turbulence can extend well above the visible top of a cumulonimbus.
• “Getting to grips with surveillance”
High vertical expansion cells with top over 25,000 ft should not be overflown
brochure issue 2 (2018)
due to potential of strong turbulence.
• “RDR-4000 IntuVue™ Weather
Radar Pilot Training for Airbus
Aircraft” video from HONEYWELL.

NOTE
For more information on avoidance
of convective weather, refer to the
“Avoidance of convective threats”
video from the Airbus Destination
10X sharing platform.

Clear Air Turbulence

Clear Air Turbulence (CAT) is due to the difference of speed of air masses at
high altitude. Severe turbulence is generally encountered at altitudes higher
than 15,000ft when flying across the boundary between the two masses.

Using weather forecast and pilot reports

The on-board weather radar cannot detect CAT as it does not contain water
droplets. Using the weather forecast is the main method to predict when CAT may
be encountered during a flight. Flight crews may also be informed of the potential
to encounter CAT from pilot reports sent from aircraft that have previously flown
through the affected areas to ATC and to the Operators’ operations control centre.
There are turbulence information sharing platforms that have been developed by
airlines or third parties to share turbulence data and provide real time information
to flight crews about the locations of turbulence.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 027

Mountain waves (fig.1)

Lenticular clouds indicating the presence
of mountain waves
Windy conditions in mountainous areas can cause air to be directed upwards by
the face of the mountain that causes a wave effect downwind of the mountain
range. Severe turbulence may be encountered when flying through theses
waves. The effects of mountain waves can be felt up to 100 NM downwind of
the mountain range and up to the cruise altitude of airliners.

Anticipating mountain waves

Mountain waves are predictable in certain mountainous areas when there are
specific meteorological conditions. it is important that operators inform flight
crews when the conditions are likely to cause mountain waves on the planned
flight path. Pilot reports are also invaluable to help inform other aircraft that may
be approaching an area where there are mountain waves.

Lenticular clouds observed downwind of a mountain range is a good indicator

that mountain waves may be encountered in the area.

Wake vortices

The pressure difference between the upper and the lower side of an aircraft’s
wing creates a wake vortex at its wing tips. Wake vortex may cause severe
turbulence depending on the weight of the aircraft generating the vortices and
the distance from it. The typical signature of a severe wake vortex encounter
is a small roll initiated in one direction followed by a much more significant
roll in the opposite direction.

To reduce the risk of a wake turbulence encounter, the flight crew must comply
with the aircraft separation minima.

An upwind lateral offset can be used to avoid entering wake turbulence if the
flight crew suspects that the aircraft may encounter it.
OPERATIONS
Managing Severe Turbulence

NOTE
For more information on wake
vortices, refer to:

• FCTM PROCEDURES-NORMAL
PROCEDURES-Supplementary
Procedures-Adverse weather-
Wake Turbulence
• “Wake vortices” article published in
Safety first #21 in january 2016.
• “Wake vortices” briefing on the
Airbus Worldwide Instructor News
(WIN) website.

Perturbation due to ground obstacles and

boundary layer effect

Ground obstacles such as mountains or buildings can create turbulence that

can affect aircraft trajectory at lower altitudes in windy conditions during takeoff
and landing phases.

Some airports are known to be susceptible to turbulence in certain wind

conditions due to its surrounding infrastructure, hills or mountain ranges in close
proximity . Operators should ensure that their pilots are kept informed when
turbulent conditions are expected at the departure and/or arrival airports.

EFFICIENT COMMUNICATION
BETWEEN THE COCKPIT AND
THE CABIN IS KEY
Efficient coordination and communication between flight crew and cabin crew is
essential to safely manage turbulence. It begins with using common terminology
in precise and specific communication, both before and during the flight.

The Turbulence Scale

Turbulence is classified into three categories. To ease identification, each category
is based on the impact to the aircraft’s trajectory and the effects felt in the cabin.
Using common terminology ensures that the flight crew and the cabin crew share
the same understanding of the level of turbulence expected. This enables the
cabin crew to perform the appropriate duties in order to effectively manage the
cabin during turbulence.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 029

Light Turbulence Moderate Turbulence Severe Turbulence

Light turbulence Moderate turbulence Severe turbulence

momentarily causes causes rapid bumps or causes large abrupt
slight, rapid, and jolts. changes in aircraft
rhythmic bumpiness altitude and attitude
without noticeable with large variations in
changes in aircraft airspeed.
altitude or attitude.

Cabin Condition

•L
 iquids shake but •L  iquids splash • Items fall or lift off
do not splash out of out of cups the floor
cups •T  rolleys difficult • Loose items are
•T
 rolleys can still be to manoeuvre tossed about
maneuvered with little • Difficulty walking the cabin
difficulty in the cabin • Impossible to walk
•P
 assengers may •D  ifficulty standing • Passengers are forced
intermittently feel a without holding onto violently against their
slight strain against something seat belts.
their seat belts. •P  assengers feel
definite strain against
their seat belts.

Preflight briefing
The preflight briefing is the opportunity for flight and cabin crews to discuss
the forecasted weather and the possible effects on flight conditions together.

The flight crew will inform the cabin crew of any expected turbulence events
and provide the estimated flight times and locations of possible turbulence.

Anticipated severe turbulence

When approaching an anticipated area of turbulence:

• The flight crew should advise the cabin crew on how much time is available
to secure the cabin and galleys, as well as informing them of the level and
expected duration of the turbulence encounter.
• A Passenger Address announcement requesting the passengers to return to
their seat and fasten their seatbelt should be made.
• The cabin crew should ensure they inform the flight crew when the cabin is
secured.

Unanticipated severe turbulence

When entering an unexpected area of turbulence, the flight crew must switch
the seatbelt sign ON and make an announcement to the cabin requesting
passengers and crew to fasten seatbelts immediately using the Passenger
Address system.
OPERATIONS
Managing Severe Turbulence

After a severe turbulence encounter

It is important that the flight crew informs the cabin crew when the aircraft is
clear of the severe turbulence so that cabin crew can check for passenger
injuries, give first aid if necessary, calm and reassure passengers and check
for any cabin damage. The purser should then provide a cabin status to the
flight crew detailing the number of injuries and any cabin damage.

MANAGING SEVERE
TURBULENCE FROM
THE COCKPIT

Flying through turbulence is sometimes unavoidable despite the best efforts to

prevent this. The flight crew must use the recommended procedure to limit the
Autopilot is impact of the turbulence on the aircraft’s trajectory and limit the risk of injury to
designed to cope passengers and cabin crew.
with turbulence
Prepare the cockpit before entering an anticipated
severe turbulence area
Any loose objects in the cockpit must be cleared or secured before entering an
area where turbulence is expected. Shoulder harnesses should be firmly fastened
and locked.

Keep autopilot ON
Autopilot is designed to cope with turbulence and will keep the aircraft close to
the intended flight path without the risk of overcorrection. The recommendation
is to keep autopilot ON during a turbulence encounter. A pilot may be tempted
to “fight against turbulence” when manually flying the aircraft and may overreact
to sudden changes in the trajectory in some cases.

The flight crew should consider autopilot disconnection if autopilot does not
perform as desired.

Keep autothrust ON (except A300/A310) and use the

QRH turbulence penetration speed if turbulence is
severe
The turbulence penetration speed/Mach, also known as Rough Air speed/Mach
(VRA /MRA), can be found in the QRH. This speed provides the best protection
against reaching structural limits due to gust effect whilst maintaining a sufficient
margin above VLS.

VRA /MRA should be used in severe turbulence. Managed speed can be kept
when in light or moderate turbulence.

On A300/A310 aircraft, the flight crew should disconnect the autothrust and
set the target thrust to maintain VRA /MRA.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 031

On fly-by-wire aircraft, use manual thrust when

autothrust variations become excessive
If the autothrust variations become excessive on fly-by-wire aircraft, the flight
crew should disconnect autothrust and manually adjust thrust to the value
provided in the QRH.

In cruise, consider descent to a lower Flight Level

Choosing a lower FL enables the flight crew to increase the aircraft’s margins
before buffet onset.

the pilot should

only make careful
and considered
corrections to
counter any
significant deviation
from the intended
flight path

Advantage of the fly-by-wire technology in manual

flight
If the autopilot disconnects on a fly-by-wire aircraft, the flight crew can still
utilize the advantages of the fly-by-wire technology to cope with turbulence. If
the sidestick remains in its neutral position, the aircraft's flight control system
will compensate for turbulence effects by aiming for a 1g flight path and a
constant roll attitude. Therefore, if the pilot is only making careful and considered
corrections to counter any significant deviation from the intended flight path,
this will allow the flight controls to stabilize the aircraft, whereas continuous
pilot sidestick inputs could induce further destabilization.
NOTE
Do not “fight the turbulence” For more information on the
handling of turbulence, refer to the
The pilot must not “fight the turbulence” in manual flight to maintain the aircraft’s FCTM “PROCEDURES - NORMAL
trajectory or altitude. Only applying smooth sidestick/control column inputs and PROCEDURES - Supplementary
allowing some reasonable variations from the intended flight path will reduce Procedures - Adverse weather -
the risk of overcorrection that can cause unnecessary accelerations, which Weather Turbulence”
may increase the risk of injury to passengers and cabin crew.
OPERATIONS
Managing Severe Turbulence

Do not use rudder

NOTE Do not use rudder to counter the turbulence if in manual flight. Violent rudder
For more details on the handling of inputs can cause additional aircraft trajectory destabilization and stress on the
overspeed in cruise, refer to: aircraft structure.

• FCTM PROCEDURES - ABNOR- Don’t overreact to temporary overspeed excursion

MAL AND EMERGENCY PRO-
CEDURES - Miscellaneous The flight crew may observe temporary overspeed situations when encountering
- Overspeed severe turbulence due to the changes in wind intensity or direction. The flight
• “ Management of Overspeed crew must not overreact to temporary overspeed excursion since the use of
events in cruise” article published VRA/MRA ensures sufficient margins to structural limits. The recommendation
in Safety first #28 in July 2019 is to keep the autopilot ON and autothrust ON and accept the temporary
• "What About Overspeed Prevention overspeed excursion.
and Recovery?" briefing from the
Airbus Worldwide Instructor News In final approach, use autothrust
(WIN) website.
The use of autothrust and managed speed in final approach enables the aircraft
to benefit from the Ground Speed Mini function that will adapt the managed
target speed to the wind variation close to the ground.

NOTE Severe turbulence reporting

For more information on the The flight crew must make a logbook entry to report any severe turbulence
Ground Speed Mini function, refer encounter so that maintenance crew are alerted to perform the necessary
to the “Control your speed during inspections of the aircraft before the next flight.
descent, approach and landing”
article published in Safety first #24 It is also recommended to report severe turbulence events to Airbus to assess
in July 2017. the effects of the high loads on the aircraft and assess what checks may be
necessary before commencing the next flight.

MANAGING SEVERE
TURBULENCE FROM THE CABIN

Anticipated severe turbulence: a prioritized

preparation
Once advised by the flight crew of an anticipated turbulence, the cabin crew should
prioritize their duties based on the time available before the turbulence encounter
in order to best prepare the cabin, as per CCOM recommended procedure:

NOTE • First, they must stow and secure large items such as trolleys and remove bottles
from the cabin and galley surfaces. Any hot liquid must be safely disposed of
For more information on turbulence • The cabin crew must then secure the cabin and ensure all lavatories are
event reporting, refer to the “High unoccupied
Load Event Reporting” article • Once the cabin is secured, the cabin crew must secure the galleys
published in Safety first #26 in July • Cabin crew must then return to their station, fasten their seatbelt and inform the
2018. purser that the passengers and themselves are secured
• Then the purser must inform the flight crew that the cabin is secured.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 033

Unanticipated severe turbulence: ensure personal

safety first The cabin crew
must ensure their
Most injuries in the cabin happened to passengers or crew members not own personal
seated with their seatbelt fastened during severe turbulence. Cabin crews are
more exposed to risk of injury due to sudden turbulence because they are safety first if sudden
often standing during service. The cabin crew must ensure their own personal severe turbulence is
safety first if sudden severe turbulence is encountered. The cabin crew must
take the nearest available seat and securely fasten the seat belt. The nearest
encountered.
seat may be a passenger seat.

BEST PRACTICE
Tidy cabin and galleys for safe flights
Any loose object in the cabin can become a projectile during turbulence. It is key that
Keeping the cabin and galley tidy throughout the flight reduces the risk of passengers are
injuries and damage to the cabin should an unexpected turbulence event
occur.
encouraged to
Passenger awareness on the use of seatbelt
keep their seatbelt
fastened at all
The most effective way to prevent injuries during turbulence is to keep
seatbelts fastened. It is therefore key that passengers are aware of this and times.
are encouraged to keep their seatbelt fastened at all times.

Passengers must be made aware that they are obliged to comply with the
FASTEN SEATBELT sign at all times when set to ON.
OPERATIONS
Managing Severe Turbulence

An Analysis of Reported Severe Turbulence

NOTE 240 severe turbulence events were reported to Airbus between 2014 and 2018.
For more information on the
handling of turbulence in the cabin, Injuries to passengers and cabin crew occurred on:
refer to:
• 30 % of long haul flights where severe turbulence events were reported
• CCOM: • 12 % of short haul flights where severe turbulence events were reported.
- A BNORMAL/EMERGENCY
PROCEDURES – TURBULENCE Passengers tend to unfasten their seatbelt during long haul flights to move
MANAGEMENT around the cabin and use the lavatories more during long haul flights and this is
- A BNORMAL/EMERGENCY likely to be the reason for the higher rate of injuries when compared to the figures
PROCEDURES – SAFETY for short haul flights. Furthermore, the majority of the injuries that are reported
OPERATIONAL AWARENESS on short haul flights mainly affects cabin crew whereas both cabin crew and
- T U R B U L E N C E T H R E A T passenger injuries are reported for long haul flight severe turbulence events.
AWARENESS
• “ TURBULENCE MANAGEMENT” It is further evidence of the need to inform passengers on the importance of
Chapter of the “Getting to Grips having their seatbelts fastened during the flight and for the crew to manage the
with Cabin safety” brochure cabin and secure themselves appropriately in anticipation of severe turbulence
published in 2015 by the Airbus and during the event.
Flight Operations Support
department. Post turbulence cabin duties
When the flight crew confirms that the aircraft is clear of the turbulence, the
cabin crew can leave their seat, check with passengers for any reports of injury,
provide first aid if necessary and reassure other passengers. The cabin should
then be checked for damage.

Once the situation assessment is done, the purser must report any injury or
damage to the flight crew.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 035

Severe turbulence can cause injuries to passengers and cabin crew as

CONTRIBUTORS:
well as damage to the cabin. Flight crew must ensure they are aware
Robert GRAEF of and use all available means to prevent flying through areas where
Expert pilot turbulence will be encountered. If turbulence is unavoidable then FCOM
Flight Operations Support
procedures and recommended techniques must be applied to limit risks
Jean Paul VIEU of injury to passengers or cabin crew and damage to the cabin:
Cabin Operations
Engineer - Cabin Safety • Keep autopilot ON
Enhancement • Keep autothrust ON and use the QRH turbulence penetration speed
Flight Operations Support if turbulence is severe
• If the autopilot is disconnected, only use careful and considered inputs
With thanks to Domenico
SPATARO from the Product Safety on the sidestick and take advantage of the fly-by-wire capability to
Enhancement Department cope with turbulence.
• Do not use rudder to counter turbulence
• Use manual thrust when autothrust variations become excessive
• In cruise, consider descent to a lower Flight Level and don’t overreact
to temporary overspeed excursion.
• In final approach, use autothrust to benefit from the ground speed
mini function
• Report any severe turbulence encounter to the Maintenance at the
end of the flight with a logbook entry.

Communication between the flight crew and the cabin crew enables
safe and efficient management of the cabin before and during turbulence
events.

Cabin crew should remember that they must first ensure their own safety
by immediately seating in the closest available seat and securely fasten
their seatbelt in the case of sudden severe turbulence. Assisting other
cabin crew or passengers should only be resumed when the flight crew
confirms that the aircraft is clear of turbulence.

Encouraging the passengers to keep their seat belts fastened at all times
when they are seated and ensuring that the cabin and galleys remain
tidy during the flight is the most effective means to limit the risk of injury
to passengers and cabin crew in the case of unexpected turbulence.
OPERATIONS
Safe Aircraft Parking

Safe Aircraft Parking

Incorrect or incomplete application of the parking procedures
at the end of a flight can lead to unexpected aircraft movement
potentially resulting in injuries or significant damage from a
collision with ground obstacles. Several cases of this type of
event during maintenance are reported to Airbus each year.
This article provides an overview of the parking brake architecture
and explains the importance of checking accumulator pressure
before applying the park brake, and then confirming there is
sufficient hydraulic pressure at the brake unit. It also describes
the safety enhancement available on A320 family and A330/A340
aircraft and gives recommendations for chock design
and placement.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 037

This article applies to A300/A310/A320/A330/A340/A350/

A380 aircraft. It does not apply to A220 aircraft as they are
equipped with electric brakes.

ANALYSIS OF AN EVENT

After landing and taxi in, the A319 was approaching the parking position at the
gate. The pilot applied pedal braking and checked the accumulator pressure
value on the BRAKES and ACCU PRESS indicator. The accumulator pressure
indication was in the green zone as expected. The pilot set the parking brake
handle to ON but did not confirm that there was sufficient brake pressure showing
on the indicator. He released the brake pedals and switched off both engines. The
aircraft began to roll forward and it collided with the airbridge. After the collision,
the flight crew checked the BRAKES and ACCU PRESS pressure indicator. It was
now showing that there was sufficient pressure at the brakes. If the accumulator
pressure indication was green and the indicator was showing sufficient pressure
at the brakes after the collision occurred, then why did the aircraft roll forward
after the brake pedals were released with the parking brake on?

Investigation
The crew correctly checked the accumulator pressure indication before setting
the park brake to ON but they forgot to confirm the brake pressure indication
before releasing the brake pedals and switching off the engines. Decoding the
DFDR and troubleshooting identified there was a problem with the Parking Brake
Selector Valve (PBSELV) causing it to open very slowly. Even though the park brake
handle was set to ON, when the pilot took his feet off the pedals, the parking brake
pressure was not yet sufficient and this allowed the aircraft to roll forward. When the
Parking Brake Selector Valve finally rotated to its open position the brake pressure
indicator was finally showing sufficient pressure at the brake, but it was too late.

The SOP recommends checking the brake pressure on the triple indicator after
the parking brake handle is set to ON and before releasing the brake pedals.
This would have informed the pilot that the hydraulic pressure at the brake unit
was too low to hold the aircraft in its parked position with only the park brake.

THE PARKING BRAKE

ARCHITECTURE

The parking brake application relies on the hydraulic pressure provided by one or
two hydraulic pressure accumulator(s) (depending on the aircraft type) when the
engines are not running. The accumulator(s) provide sufficient hydraulic pressure
for the parking brake over a 12 hour period without repressurizing.

When the parking brake handle is set to ON, the Parking Brake Selector Valve
(PBSELV) opens, allowing hydraulic pressure to apply the brakes and hold the
aircraft in its parked position.
OPERATIONS
Safe Aircraft Parking

Accumulator(s) pressurization
Accumulators are units that are automatically pressurized by their associated
hydraulic system when the aircraft’s engines are running. They can also be
manually repressurized (or refilled) by pressing the Accu refill/reinflate pushbutton
(A300-600/A310/A350/A380) or by switching the yellow (A300/A320) or blue
(A330/A340) electrical pump to ON on the overhead panel.

The BRAKES and ACCU pressure indicator:

An essential indication of a safe parking
configuration
On A300-600, A310, A320 family, A330, A340 and A380 aircraft, the BRAKES
(fig.1) and ACCU pressure indicator located on the center instrument panel enables the
Functional schematics of the parking flight crew to quickly check the available accumulator pressure on its upper part
brake system and the actual pressure applied to the brakes on its lower part (fig.1).
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 039

On A300 aircraft, the YELLOW ACCU PRESS indicator located on the overhead
panel provides yellow accumulator pressure indication to the flight crew. The brake
pressure indicator located on the center instrument panel provides measurement
of the actual pressure applied to the brakes (fig.2).

On A350 aircraft, the ACCU pressure indicator provides pressure indication from
both green and yellow accumulators. The flight crew can check the pressure
(fig.2)
applied to the brakes on the SD WHEEL page or check that the PBSELV is open
Functional schematics of the parking
and that sufficient pressure is applied to the brakes when the Slat/Flap display brake system for A300 and A350 aircraft
shows the green PARK BRK indication (fig.2). (A350-1000 not represented)

Cases of incorrect application of the parking brake

reported in service
There are two reasons that were identified as root causes of the incorrect
application of the parking brake reported in service:

Incorrect opening of the Parking Brake Selector Valve (PBSELV)

The incorrect opening of the PBSELV does not enable the hydraulic pressure to
reach the brakes as expected as it was the case in the event described above.

Insufficient accumulator pressure

Insufficient accumulator pressure limits the friction applied on the brake discs and
may lead to unwanted aircraft movement.

The insufficient pressure may be due to a leak in the hydraulic system or in the
brake system itself. It can also be due to a long aircraft stay on ground (more than
12 hours) or following numerous parking brake application and release without
accumulator repressurization.
OPERATIONS
Safe Aircraft Parking

RECALL OF THE PARKING

PROCEDURE

The correct application of the FCOM parking procedure enables the flight crew
to detect if there is a defect that could cause incorrect application of the parking
brake.

(fig.3) Step 1: Accumulator pressure check (Engines running and brake pedals
Example of the parking procedure pressed)
on A320 aircraft

The first step is to check the accumulator pressure on the BRAKES and ACCU
PRESS indicator (ACCU Pressure indicator on A350) before applying the parking
brake. The accumulator(s) pressure must be in the green band (fig.3).

If the pressure is not sufficient, the flight crew must keep the brake pedals pressed
and contact the ground operator to put chocks in place before switching off the
engines and make a logbook entry once the aircraft is parked to alert Maintenance.

Step 2: Parking brake application (Engines running and brake pedals still
pressed)

If accumulator pressure is sufficient, the parking brake selector can be set to ON.

Step 3 & 4: Check of the brake pressure, pedal brake release and engine
shutdown

To ensure that the PBSELV opened correctly and that sufficient hydraulic pressure
is provided to the brakes, it is essential to check the left and right brake pressure
on the BRAKES and ACCU pressure indicator (or that the green PARK BRK
indicator is displayed on the Slat/Flap display on A350). If the indicators show
insufficient parking brake pressure, the flight crew must keep the brake pedals
pressed and contact the ground operator to put chocks in place before switching
off the engines and then make a logbook entry to alert Maintenance.

NOTE
What if the aircraft starts to move after parking brake application?
On A300 and A310 aircraft, the parking brake handle must be set back to OFF
to recover normal pedal braking to stop the aircraft.
On A320 Family/A330/A340/A350 and A380 aircraft, normal pedal braking
has priority over parking brake, so pedal braking can be directly used to stop
the aircraft.
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 041

NOTE
Why is it not recommended to leave the parking brake ON
with hot brakes?
The SOP recommends to set the parking brake brake back to OFF once the
chocks are in place when the brakes are hot (refer to FCOM for temperature
values). This is to prevent transmitting heat to the brake pistons potentially causing
seal degradation, hydraulic fluid overheating and generation of a black aggregate,
that can reduce the piston running clearance and then lead to brake dragging.

ALSO BEWARE DURING

MAINTENANCE!

An illustrative event reported to Airbus recently involved an A319 aircraft, which It is essential
was being towed to the gate to resume operations after maintenance activities.
The operator on the ground requested the person seated in the cockpit to set to check the
the parking brake to ON before disconnecting the towbar from the nose landing braking pressure
gear. They turned the parking brake handle to the ON position without checking
the accumulator pressure on the BRAKES and ACCU pressure indicator or
indications and/
confirming the brake pressure. The ground operator disconnected the towbar or that chocks are
and the aircraft began to roll backwards and away from the tow tractor. The
person in the cockpit attempted to stop the aircraft by pressing down on the
in place before
brake pedals but the aircraft continued to roll because there was no hydraulic disconnecting
pressure present in the normal braking system. The aircraft eventually came the towbar or the
to rest after colliding with ground obstacles.
towing truck.
This example shows why it is essential to check the braking pressure indications
and/or that chocks are in place before disconnecting the towbar or the towing
truck. Inflation of the accumulator(s) using the Accu reinflate pushbutton or the
appropriate electrical pump pushbutton (depending on the aircraft type) will
provide sufficient accumulator pressure for parking brake application for up
to 12 hours.

AVAILABLE SAFETY
ENHANCEMENT: THE PARKING
BRAKE MONITORING FUNCTION
BRAKES PARK BRK FAULT
PARK BRK.............................OFF
Airbus introduced the parking brake monitoring function on A320 Family/A330/ . BEFORE ENG SHUTDOWN
A350 aircraft. This function detects any discrepancy between the parking brake CHOCKS..................CONSIDER
handle position and the PBSELV. The BRAKES PARK BRK FAULT ECAM
warning (fig.4) triggers if the PBSELV does not open when the parking brake (fig.4)
handle is set to ON, and reminds the flight crew to consider requesting ground Example of an ECAM alert provided
personnel place chocks at the wheels before shutting down the engines. by the Parking Brake monitoring function
OPERATIONS
Safe Aircraft Parking

This modification is installed on A320 family aircraft built from October 2010 (serial
number 4468 onward), on A330 aircraft built from January 2011 (serial number
1187 onward) and on all A350.

This parking brake monitoring function modification can be retrofitted on earlier

A320 Family/A330/A340 aircraft by the following Service Bulletins:

• SB A320-32-1381
• SB A320-31-1353
• SB A330-32-3244
• SB A340-32-4285
• SB A340-32-5105

GROUND OPERATION
RECOMMENDATIONS

Chocks Placement
At the gate (transit)

Airbus recommends to first place a set of chocks on one wheel of the nose landing
gear as soon as the aircraft comes to a stop. Then two sets of chocks should be
placed on the outboard wheels of the main landing gear only when the engines
(fig.5) are switched off and spooling down. Chocks on the NLG can now be removed
Recommended location if it is required (fig.5). The ground operator must notify the flight crew that the
of chocks during transit chocks are in place.

A300/A310/
A320 A330/A340/A350 A380
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 043

Night stop, long stay or windy conditions

(fig.6)
For a night stop, a long stay or in the case of strong wind, Airbus recommends to
Recommended location
keep the nose landing gear chocks in place and also secure the inboard wheels of chocks during night stop, long stay
of the main landing gear with additional sets of chocks (fig.6). or in strong wind conditions

A300/A310/
A320 A330/A340/A350 A380

During Maintenance

Specific chocks placements may be required for a maintenance task. The chocks
placement guidance in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) should be followed.

Chocks design
Many different types of chocks are used by ground operators throughout the world.
Airbus participated in a study to define an optimum design for chocks that can
solve recurrent issues faced in operation such as:

- Chocks durability
- High weight with associated handling difficulties
- Reduced efficiency on wet and contaminated aprons
- Difficulties to remove chocks before pushback with risk of delay

The recommended chocks are made of urethane type material and have an
asymmetric design enabling optimum efficiency depending on if the apron is dry
or wet/contaminated (fig.7).

For more information, refer to the AIR4905 revA document published by SAE (fig.7)
international that provides general considerations for the design and use of aircraft Example of chocks with asymmetric
wheel chocks. design adapted to apron state

Dry ground surface Wet or contaminated ground surface

(limited weight applied (increased weight on the chocks
on the chocks for easy removal) to increase friction on the ground)
OPERATIONS
Safe Aircraft Parking

To ensure that an aircraft remains safe and stationary when using the
CONTRIBUTORS:
parking brake, flight crew or maintenance personnel must first ensure
Laurent COUTURET that sufficient accumulator pressure is available using the BRAKES and
Product Leader ACCU pressure indicator before setting the brake handle to ON. If the
A380/A300 Braking
and steering -
indicator is in the green band, they can set the parking brake to ON and
Engineering confirm using the pressure indicator that sufficient pressure is applied to
Customer Services the brakes. If not, they must wait until chocks are correctly placed at the
wheels before releasing the brake pedals and switching off the engines
Willy-Pierre DUPONT
or disconnecting from the towing vehicle. Maintenance must be alerted
Senior Expert
Airport Operations about the issue to troubleshoot and rectify.

Didier GENDRE When chocks are required for ground operations or when the parking
Ground Operations brake pressure is insufficient, chocks must be correctly placed at the
Engineer aircraft’s wheels. Airbus recommends chocks made of urethane type
Airport Operations material with an asymmetric design that allows them to be orientated for
the most efficient holding friction on wet or dry apron surfaces.
David PIERRE-ANTOINE
HO Braking and
Steering Systems
Engineering
Support
Customer Services

Peimann TOFIGHI-NIAKI
Flight Operations
Support Engineer
Flight Operations
Support
Safety first #29 | January 2020 045
ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN PREVIOUS
‘SAFETY FIRST’ ISSUES
Available in the Safety first app and website: safetyfirst.airbus.com

Issue 28 Issue 23

July, 2019 January 2017

• Overspeed Event with Crew • Safely Flying Non-Precision Instrument Approaches

Take-over and OEB49 Application • Introduction to the Soft Go-Around Function
• Management of Overspeed Event in Cruise • Preparing Flight Crews to Face Unexpected Events
• The Adverse Effects of Unrealistic Simulator Scenarios • Safety, Our Shared Destination
• Preventing Fan Cowl Door Loss
• Correct Escape Slides Maintenance for Issue 22
Successful Slides Deployment
July 2016
Issue 27 • Pitot Probe Performance Covered
On the Ground
January, 2019 • 180° turns on runway
• Engine Thrust Management - Thrust Setting at Takeoff • Optimum use of weather radar
• Prenventing Inadvertent Slide Deployments
• Preventing Violent Door Opening due to Issue 21
Residual Cabin Pressure
• Lessons Learned About the Teach-In Function January 2016
• Control your speed... in cruise
Issue 26 • Lithium batteries: safe to fly?
• Wake vortices
July 2018 • A320 Family Aircraft configuration
• Look out for Ice Ridges on the Lower Nose Fuselage
• High Load Event Reporting Issue 20
• Using Aircraft as a Sensor on Contaminated Runways
• Thrust Reverser Deployment in Fight July 2015
• Control your speed... during climb
Issue 25 • Lateral runway excursions upon landing
• Fuel monitoring on A320 Family aircraft
January 2018 • Hight-altitude manual flying
• Are You Properly Seated?
• A Recall of the Correct Use of the MEL Issue 19
• Protecting Aircraft and Passengers from Cargo Fire
January 2015
Issue 24 • Tidy cockpit for safe flight
• Landing on contaminated runways
July 2017 • Understanding weight & balance
• Control your Speed... During Descent, Approach and Landing • Wind shear: an invisible enemy to pilots?
• Troubleshooting Airframe Vibrations
• Preventing Falls from Height
• Progress to Pinpoint anAircraft’s Position
 Safety first #29 | January 2020 047

Issue 18 Issue 14
July 2014 July 2012
• Control your speed... at take-off • Thrust Reverser Selection means Full-Stop
• Safe operations with composite aircraft • Transient Loss of Communication due to
• Learning from the evidence Jammed Push-To-Talk A320 and A330/A340 Families
• A320 Family cargo Containers/ pallets movement • A380: Development of the Flight Controls - Part 2
• Parts Departing from Aircraft (PDA) • Preventing Fan Cowl Door Loss
• Do not forget that you are not alone in Maintenance
Issue 17
Issue 13
January 2014
January 2012
• Airbus Brake Testing
• Hard Landing, a Case Study for Crews • A320 Family / A330 Prevention and Handling
and Maintenance Personnel of Dual Bleed Loss
• Aircraft Protection during Washing and Painting • The Fuel Penalty Factor
• Flight Data Analysis (FDA), a Predictive Tool for Safety • The Airbus TCAS Alert Prevention (TCAP)
Management System (SMS) • A380: Development of the Flight Controls - Part 1
• Flying a Go-Around, Managing Energy • Facing the Reality of everyday Maintenance Operations

Issue 16 Issue 12
July 2013 July 2011
• Performance Based Navigation: • Airbus New Operational Landing Distances
RNP and RNP AR Approaches • The Go Around Procedure
• Atlantic Airways: Introduction of RNP AR 0.1 Operations • The Circling Approach
• Flight Crews and De-Icing Personnel – Working together in • VMU Tests on A380
Temporary Teamwork for safe Skies • Automatic Landings in Daily Operation
• Low Speed Rejected Take-Off upon Engine Failure
• Late Changes before Departure
Issue 11

Issue 15
January 2011
January 2013 • What is Stall? How a Pilot Should React
in Front of a Stall Situation
• The Golden Rules for Pilots moving from PNF to PM • Minimum Control Speed Tests on A380
• Airbus Crosswind Development and Certification • Radio Altimeter Erroneous Values
• The SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE Procedure • Automatic NAV Engagement at Go Around
• Post-Maintenance Foreign Objects Damage (FOD) Prevention
• Corrosion: A Potential Safety Issue
ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN PREVIOUS
‘SAFETY FIRST’ ISSUES
Available in the Safety first app and website: safetyfirst.airbus.com

Issue 10 Issue 5
August 2010 December 2007
• A380: Flutter Tests • New CFIT Event During Non Precision Approach
• Operational Landing Distances: A New Standard for • A320: Tail Strike at Take-Off?
In-flight Landing Distance Assessment • Unreliable Speed
• Go Around Handling • Compliance to Operational Procedures
• A320: Landing Gear Downlock • The Future Air Navigation System FANS B
• Situation Awareness and Decision Making
Issue 4
Issue 9
June 2007
February 2010
• Operations Engineering Bulletin Reminder Function
• A320 Family: Evolution of Ground Spoiler Logic • Avoiding High Speed Rejected Take-Offs Due to
• Incorrect Pitch Trim Setting at Take-Off EGT Limit Exceedance
• Technical Flight Familiarization • Do you Know your ATC/TCAS Panel?
• Oxygen Safety • Managing Hailstorms
• Introducing the Maintenance Briefing Notes
• A320: Dual hydraulic Loss
Issue 8
• Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems Operations
July 2009 Based on GPS Data

• The Runway Overrun Prevention System

• The Take-Off Securing Function Issue 3
• Computer Mixability: An Important Function December 2006
• Fuel Spills During Refueling Operations
• Dual Side Stick Inputs
• Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Damage
Issue 7
• Pitot Probes Obstruction on Ground
February 2009 • A340: Thrust Reverser Unlocked
• Residual Cabin Pressure
• Airbus AP/FD TCAS Mode: A New Step • Cabin Operations Briefing Notes
Towards Safety Improvement • Hypoxia: An Invisible Enemy
• Braking System Cross Connections
• Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2
• Fuel Pumps Left in OFF Position Issue 2
• A320: Avoiding Dual Bleed Loss September 2005
• Tailpipe or Engine Fire
Issue 6
• Managing Severe Turbulence
July 2008 • Airbus Pilot Transition (ATP)
• Runway Excursions at Take-Off
• A320: Runway Overrun
• FCTL Check after EFCS Reset on Ground
• A320: Possible Consequence of V /M Exceedance Issue 1
• A320: Prevention of Tailstrikes January 2005
• Low Fuel Situation Awareness
• Rudder Pedal Jam • Go Arounds in Addis-Ababa due to VOR Reception Problems
• Why do Certain AMM Tasks Require Equipment Resets? • The Importance of the Pre-flight Flight Control Check
• Slide/raft Improvement • A320: In-flight Thrust Reverser Deployment
• Cabin Attendant Falling through the Avionics Bay • Airbus Flight Safety Manager Handbook
Access Panel in Cockpit • Flight Operations Briefing Notes