DFMEA

Purpose

To deepen understanding and refine

your current approach to Design
FMEA’s.
Definition of FMEA

A Failure Mode and Effect Analysis uses a

disciplined technique to identify and help eliminate
product and process potential failure modes.
o By ID of potential failures
o Assessing the risks caused by failure modes and Identify
corrective actions
o Prioritizing corrective actions
o Carry out corrective actions
Design FMEA's
Current practices/concerns?
 DFMEA/PFMEA Information
Interrelationships

Boundary (Block) Process Flow

Diagram, P- Diagram, Diagram
Etc.

DFMEA PFMEA
Design FMEA Process FMEA

Process Control
Design Verification Plan
Plan & Report
(DVP&R)
 Potential Key Product Characteristics
Development
Requirements Documents
!
•Regulatory
•Dimensional
•Cosmetic
! Robustness Tools
Req. Spec. Document !
Drawings Boundary Diagram
Warranty History P-Diagram Item / Action Results
C O Current D
Process Potential Response &
Potential Potential S l c Design e R

Interface Matrix
Step Cause(s)/ Recommended Target S O D R
Failure Effect(s) of e a c Controls t P Action
Mechanism(s) Actions Complete E C E P
Mode Failure v s u e N Taken
Of Failure Date V C T N
s r c
Function Prevent Detect

DFMEA

Special Characteristics Matrix

10 POTENTIAL CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS
S 9 Safety/Regulatory
E 8 POTENTIAL
V 7 SIGNIFICANT

Cascade Technical E
R
6
5
CHARACTERISTICS
Customer Dissatisfaction

Requirements Into Special I

T
4
3
ANOYANCE
ZONE
Product Characteristics Y ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
2
Appropriate actions /
1 controls already in place

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OCCURRENCE
Example analysis
Pencil Assembly
Block-Diagram
Step 2 P-diagram
Step 2 P-diagram
 P-Diagram (Parameter diagram)

Example of a P-DIAGRAM
Interface matrix
Interface matrix
Functional requirements
Function and Mode
Function and Mode
Function and Mode
Effects and severity
Effects and severity
 Severity Column
Item / C O D Action Results
Process Potential Current Response &
Potential Potential S l c Process e R
Step Cause(s)/ Recommended Traget S O D R
Failure Effect(s) of e a c Controls t P Action
Mechanism(s) Actions Complete E C E P
Mode Failure v s u e N Taken
Of Failure Date V C T N
s r c
Function Prevent Detect

Severity
Column
AUTOMOTIVE EXAMPLE SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA

SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA

EFFECT CRITERIA: Severity of Effect
RNK.

Hazardous- Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without
without warning 10
warning

Hazardous- Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with
with warning 9
warning

Very High Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of primary function). 8

Vehicle/item operable but at a reduced level of performance. Customer very

High dissatisfied. 7

Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable.

Moderate Customer dissatisfied. 6

Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at a

Low reduced level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied. 5

Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most
Very Low customers (greater than 75%). 4

Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50%
Minor of customers. 3

Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by
Very Minor discriminating customers (less than 25%). 2

None No discernable effect. 1

FMEA General
● For High Severity 9/10
 Occurrence Column
Item / C O D Action Results
Process Potential Current Response &
Potential Potential S l c Process e R
Step Cause(s)/ Recommended Traget S O D R
Failure Effect(s) of e a c Controls t P Action
Mechanism(s) Actions Complete E C E P
Mode Failure v s u e N Taken
Of Failure Date V C T N
s r c
Function Prevent Detect

Occurrence
Column
Occurrence Evaluation Criteria

SUGGESTED OCCURRENCE EVALUATION CRITERIA

Probability of Likely Failure Rates Over Design Life Ranking
Failure

≥ 100 per thousand vehicles/items 10

Very High: Persistent failures
50 per thousand vehicles/items 9

20 per thousand vehicles/items 8

High: Frequent failures
10 per thousand vehicles/items 7

5 per thousand vehicles/items 6

Moderate: Occasional failures 2 per thousand vehicles/items 5
1 per thousand vehicles/items 4

0.5 per thousand vehicles/items 3

Low: Relatively few failures
0.1 per thousand vehicles/items 2

Remote: Failure is unlikely ≤ 0.01 per thousand vehicles/items 1

*Note: Zero (0) rankings for Severity, Occurrence or Detection are not allowed
Example of Significant/ Critical Threshold
Special Characteristics Matrix

10 POTENTIAL CRITICAL
9 CHARACTERISTICS Safety/Regulatory
S
E 8 POTENTIAL
V 7 SIGNIFICANT
E 6 CHARACTERISTICS
Customer Dissatisfaction
R 5
I 4 ANOYANCE
T 3 ZONE
Y 2 ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

Appropriate actions /
1 controls already in place

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OCCURRENCE
*Used by permission of Ford Motor Company
Design Verification (Current Design Controls)

▪ Think of Design Control in two ways; Prevention and

Detection. List them separately.
▪ To save time, add any new (untried) prevention/
detection ideas to the document under Recommended
Actions column.
o Prevention is specifically related to reduction or elimination of a
cause.
o Detection is how well the test or series of tests may find the
design flaw
– Causes
– Failure Mode
Detection Rating
SUGGESTED DETECTION EVALATION CRITERIA
DETECTION CRITERIA RNK.

Design Control will not and/or cannot detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
Absolute subsequent failure mode; or there is no 10
Uncertainty Design Control.

Very Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/
Very Remote 9
mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism
Remote 8
and subsequent failure mode.

Very Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
Very Low 7
and subsequent failure mode.

Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
Low 6
subsequent failure mode.

Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism
Moderate 5
and subsequent failure mode.

Moderately Moderately High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/
4
High mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
High 3
subsequent failure mode.

Very High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism
Very High 2
and subsequent failure mode.

Almost Design Controls will almost certainly detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
1
Certain subsequent failure mode.
Analysis Of Risk
▪ RPN / RISK PRIORITY NUMBER
▪ What Is Risk?
▪ Probability of danger
▪ Severity/Occurrence/Cause
Evaluation by RPN Only
▪ Case 1
o S=5 O=5 D=2 RPN = 50
▪ Case 2
o S=3 O=3 D=6 RPN = 54
▪ Case 3 WHICH ONE
o S=2 O=10, D=10 = 200
IS WORSE?
▪ Case 4
o S=9 O=2 D=3 = 54
Example
▪ Extreme Safety/Regulatory Risk
o =9 & 10 Severity
▪ High Risk to Customer Satisfaction
o Sev. > or = to 5 and Occ > or = 4
▪ Consider Detection only as a measure of Test
Capability.
Example of Significant/ Critical Threshold
Special Characteristics Matrix

10 POTENTIAL CRITICAL
9 CHARACTERISTICS Safety/Regulatory
S
E 8 POTENTIAL
V 7 SIGNIFICANT
E 6 CHARACTERISTICS
Customer Dissatisfaction
R 5
I 4 ANOYANCE
T 3 ZONE
Y 2 ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

Appropriate actions /
1 controls already in place

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OCCURRENCE
*Used by permission of Ford Motor Company
 Actions
Your Company Name Here Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(Design FMEA)
System FMEA Number:
Subsystem Page of
Component: Design Responsibility: Prepared by:
Key Date: FMEA Date (Orig.): (Rev.):
Model Year/Vehicle (s):
Core Team:
Item Action Results
c Potential Responsibility
Potential Potential s l o Current R.
Cause (s)/ c D Recommended & Target Actions
Failure Effect (s) of e a Design e P.
s Mechanism (s) c Action(s) Completion Taken
Mode Failure v u Controls t N.
s Failure e Date s o D R.
r c e c e P.
Function v c t N.
 Actions
EXAMPLE:

Project: Date Of
Meeting:

Issue Issue Status/ Issue Action Action Action Person Resp. Completion
Number Open Date Champion Number Date Team Date
143
Re-rating RPN After Actions Have Occurred
Your Company Name Here Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(Design FMEA)
System FMEA Number:
Subsystem Page of
Component: Design Responsibility: Prepared by:
Key Date: FMEA Date (Orig.): (Rev.):
Model Year/Vehicle (s):
Core Team:

Item Action Results

Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect (s) of e l Cause (s)/ c Design e P. Action(s) & Target
v a c t N. Actions S O D R.
Mode Failure s Mechanism (s) u Controls e Completion e c e P.
s r c Taken
Failure Date v c t N.
Function
Re-rating RPN After Actions Have Occurred
▪ Severity typically stays the same.
▪ Occurrence is the primary item to reduce / focus on.
▪ Detection is reduced only as a last resort.
▪ Do not plan to REDUCE RPN with detection actions!!!
o 100% inspection is only 80% effective!
o Reducing RPN with detection does not eliminate failure mode,
or reduce probability of causes
o Detection of 10 is not bad if occurrence is 1
FMEA in a continuous flow process
●Steel Making example:
!
▪ Design FMEA was performed on a Crankshaft to
determine the best material for the product being
considered. This was a critical application.
!
▪ Key features such as Geometry, Strength, Duty Cycle,
were described to the Steel producer.