Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 205015               November 19, 2014

MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This case stemmed from Ma. Mimie Crescencio's (petitioner) conviction for violation of
Section 681 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, 2 otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines (Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 277,3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofTalibon, Bohol, Branch
52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, on August 12, 2008. 4 The Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. CR No. 01162, dismissed the appeal in its Resolution 5 dated April 15, 2011 for
failure to serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). The CA, in its Resolution6 dated November 19, 2012, also denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.

The Facts

Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest products in the
vicinity of the house of the petitioner, Eufemio Abaniel (Abaniel), the Chief of the
ForestProtection Unit of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) -
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Talibon, Bohol, together with
Forest Rangers Urcino Butal (Butal), Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos (Ramos) went
to the petitioner’s house at Balico, Talibon, Bohol on March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon
arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under the house of the petitioner and at
the shoreline about two meters away from the petitioner’s house. As the DENR
personnel tried to investigate from the neighborhood as to who was the owner of the
lumber, the petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR personnel entered
the premises of the petitioner’s house without a search warrant. 7

Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, which is equivalent to 452 board feet,

were discovered. When the DENR personnel asked for documents to support the
petitioner’s claim of ownership, the latter showed to them Official Receipt No. 35053
issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly bought the said lumber. However,
when the DENR personnel scaled the lumber, they found out that the dimensions and
the species of the lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in the receipt. The said
receipt showed that the petitioner bought 10 pieces of red lawaan lumber with sizes
2x6x18 and 5 pieces with sizes 2x8x16 on March 13, 1994. On the other hand, the
lumber in the petitioner’s house, on March 15, 1994, was 24 pieces of
magsihagonlumber of three different sizes, to wit: 20 pieces 2x6x18; 3 pieces 2x8x18;
and 1 piece 2x10x12.8

Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the
confiscation of the lumber, asked for police assistance, and told the petitioner that they
were going to transport the confiscated lumber to the DENR office for safekeeping.
Seizure Receipt No. 004157 and a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume
of Lumber Being Confiscated,9 which showed the value of the lumber to be 9,040.00,
were issued to the petitioner. Forest Rangers Butal and Ramos corroborated Abaniel’s
testimony.10

SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel for police assistance,
he and PO3 Antonio Crescencio went to the house of the petitioner where they saw
some lumberwhich was later loaded on a cargo truck. Thereafter, they escorted the
transport of the lumber to the DENR office in San Roque, Talibon, Bohol. 11

On the other hand, the lone witness of the defense, Lolita Crescencio, admitted that the
seized lumber were owned by the petitioner but claimed that the latter bought it from
Pengavitor Enterprises of Trinidad, Bohol and from Java Marketing in Ubay,
Bohol.12 However, the defense had only the Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by
Pengavitor Enterprises which, however, did not tally with the forest products
confiscated.

On May 17, 1994, the petitioner was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
City, Bohol, with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277.
The Information13 alleged:

That on or about the 15th day of March, 1994, in the municipality of Talibon, Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with intent to possess and to gain for her own benefit, without any legal
document as required under existing jurisprudence, laws and regulations, and without
any lawful authority under existing rules and regulation of DENR Forest Management
Sector, willfully, unlawfully and illegally possess and have under her custody and control
forest products consisting of twenty-four (24) pieces of magsihagon lumber with a
volume of 452 board feet and a total value of Nine Thousand Forty (₱9,040.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines. 14

During the arraignment on July 15,1997, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.Thereafter, trial ensued.15

On August 12, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment 16 convicting the petitioner of the
offense charged and sentenced her to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years and six (6) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayoras maximum. The RTC also ordered the confiscation of the seized
lumber owned by the petitioner.17

As expected, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. However, in its
Resolution18 dated April 15, 2011, the CA dismissed the appeal outright because the
petitioner failed to furnish the OSG a copy of the Appellant’s Brief in violation of the
Rules of Court. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA,in
its Resolution19 dated November 19, 2012. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The Issue

The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA’s dismissal of the appeal due to
the petitioner’s failureto serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief to the OSG is proper, in
view of the attendant factual circumstances and in the interest of substantial justice.

Ruling of the Court

In this case, the petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure
and submits that the CA erred in dismissing her appeal purely on the basis of mere
technicalities.

Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy of affording
litigants the amplest opportunity for the determination of their cases on the merits and of
dispensing with technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when the
purpose of justice requires it.20

The Court has constantly pronouncedthat "[t]he rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid,technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure – not
override – substantial justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with caution so
asnot to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure thatall litigants are
granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free
from the constraint of technicalities."21

It is clear that without at all touching on the substantive aspects of the petitioner’s
cause, the appellate court opted not to decide the case on the merits. The subject of the
appeal was the decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner of violation of the Forestry
Code and sentencing her to suffer an imprisonment of no less than six (6) years to
eleven (11) years.

In this case, there is nothing in the record that shows any deliberate intent on the part of
the petitioner to subvert and delay the final disposition of the case. In fact, when the
petitioner learned that her appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to serve a copy of
her Appellant’s Brief to the OSG, she immediately confronted her previous counsel who
denied having filed such brief. Asthe petitioner was very much worried of being
incarcerated, she asked her previous counsel to withdraw from the case. Thus, the
petitioner submits that the outright denial of her appeal is due to the incompetence and
ignorance of her former counsel who even lied about the fact thathe has indeed filed an
Appellant’s Brief.

As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate

excuse as to call for the appellate court’s indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or
gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (b) when
application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property;
or (c) where the interests of justice so require.22

Here, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel to serve a copy of the
Appellant’s Brief tothe OSG is a persuasive reason or a compelling justification to
forego the Rules of Procedure as the wanton recklessness or gross negligence of her
counsel has deprived her of due process of law which will result in the outright
deprivation of her liberty.

In this regard, the Court agrees that the CA should have taken a liberal view of the rules
and ruled on the meritsof the appeal, especially when what is involved is no less than
the petitioner’s liberty.

Nonetheless, even if the Court brushes aside the technicality issue, it will still find that
the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the petitioner’s culpability.

In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a) she had the supporting
documents to show that she bought the questioned lumber from legitimate sources; and
(b) the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the DENR personnel was illegal
and, thus, the items seized should not have been admitted in evidence against her.

The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
23
seizures.  Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of certainexceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain
view.1âwphi1 Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an
officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence.24

There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant
when they went to the house of the petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the
petitioner’s house, the lumbers were lying under the latter’s house and at the shoreline
about two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It isclear, therefore, that the
said lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the
petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a
warrant. Section 8025 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of
the DENR or any personnel of the Philippine National Police to arrest, even without a
warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense orthe forest products gathered or taken by
the offender. Clearly, in the course ofsuch lawful intrusion, the DENR personnel had
inadvertently come across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner.

The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, as well

as her subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of the Forestry Code.
Under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, there are two distinctand separate offenses
punished, namely: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land withoutany authority; and (2) possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.26

In the second offense, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and
removal of the forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
withoutthe proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber
comes from a legal source is immaterial because the Forestry Code is a special law
which considers mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
documentation as malum prohibitum.27

In the present case, the magsihagonlumber were admittedly owned by the petitioner but
unfortunately no permit evidencing authority to possess said lumber was duly
presented. Thus, the Information correctly charged the petitioner with the second
offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the
proper documents. The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that the
lumber was confiscated from the petitioner, namely: a Statement Showing the
Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated on March 15, 1994, seizure
receipt, a photograph of the house of the petitioner, and a photograph of the confiscated
lumber. Moreso, the direct and affirmative testimony of the DENR personnel as state
witnesses on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes the
petitioner’s liability.

As to the imposable penalty on the petitioner, the RTC imposed an indeterminate

sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11)
years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayoras maximum.

The Court does not agree. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated
pieces of lumber, as appearing in the Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and
Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated is ₱9,040.00 which is alleged in the Information.
However, except for the testimonies of Abaniel and Butal that this amount is the
estimate based on prevailing local price as stated in the apprehension receipt they
issued, the prosecution did not present any proof as tothe value of the lumber.
Clearly, this evidence does not suffice. The Court had ruled that in order to prove the
amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the prosecution must present more than
a mereuncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the absence of independent and
reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty
under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant
circumstances of the case.28 Hence, the lower court erred in finding that the value of the
confiscated lumber is ₱9,040.00 for no evidence of such value was established during
the trial.

Accordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the minimum penalty under Article
309(6)29 of the RPC, whichis arresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods.
However, considering that violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is punished as
Qualified Theft under Article 31030 in relation to Article 309 of the RPC, the statutory
penalty shall be increased by two degrees, that is, to prision correccionalin its medium
and maximum periods or within the range ofthree (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-
one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days, considering that
there are no attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
offense.

In accordance with current jurisprudence 31 and taking into account the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the Court finds it proper to impose on the petitioner, in view of the
circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of frmr (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision correccional, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the Decision on August 12, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court of Talibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Ma. Mimie Crescencio is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four ( 4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice