(SEE HIGHLIGHTED NOTES FOR RELEVANT DECISIONS)

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 233015, October 16, 2019 ]
LUIS L. CO AND ALVIN S. CO, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, C.J.:
When the information charges the accused to have forged a private document to commit fraud
against another, the crime is falsification of a private document instead of estafa. It is the recital
of the facts constitutive of the offense, not the designation of the offense in the information, that
determines the crime being charged against the accused.

There can be no complex crime of falsification of private documents and estafa because the

element of damage essential in both is the same.

The Case

We resolve the appeal filed by the petitioners to seek the review and reversal of the decision
promulgated on December 22, 2015,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the judgment rendered onFebruary 11, 2013 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 15, in Manila convicting them of estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code.[2]

Antecedents

The CA summarized the factual and procedural antecedents thusly:

Accused-[a]ppellants Luis L. Co (Luis) and his son Alvin Milton S. Co (Alvin) were originally
charged before the RTC with Estafa, as defined and penalized under Art. 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the RPC, in an Information, which reads:

That sometime during the period of March 1997 to December 1997, in the City of Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused[,] namely: LUIS L.
CO and ALVIN MILTON S. CO[,] as principals by direct participation, with unfaithfulness or
abuse of confidence, in their capacity (sic) as President and Assistant Vice President[,]
respectively[,] of Jade Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank, a thrift bank organized under
the existing laws of the Republic of the Philippines, conspiring, confederating[,] and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud Jade
Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank, its depositors and creditors[,] through the use of
deceit by authorizing the release of the total amount of THREE MILLION, (sic) THIRTY[-
-]TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE PESOS (P3,032,909.00)of the bank's funds
supposedly as payment for services rendered by ACME INVESTIGATION SERVICES,
INC. (a non-existent security agency), when in truth and in fact, no such contract existed and no
such security services were rendered by said ACME INVESTIGATION SERVICES, INC[,] in
favor of Jade Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank. Thereafter, once in possession of the
aforesaid amount of P3,032,909.00[,] the accused willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
misappropriate and convert the same for their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of Jade Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank, its depositors, creditors[,] and the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in the amount of P3,032,909.00, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Accused-Appellants moved for the quashal of the Information on the ground that the same
failed to allege facts constitutive of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
RPC. Their motion was denied; nonetheless, the RTC directed the prosecution to amend the
Information.

The prosecution subsequently filed an amended Information this time charging the Accused-
Appellants of Estafa, as defined and penalized under Art. 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, the
accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That in or about and during the period comprised between March 1997 to December 1997,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud JADE PROGRESSIVE SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, a banking
institution duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws, located at G/F Birchtree Plaza
Bldg., 825  Muelle de Industria Binondo, this City, in the following manner[;] to wit: the said
accused, Luis L. Co and Alvin Milton S. Co, President and Assistant Vice-President.
respectively, of the said bank, and taking advantage of their position as such, by means of false
pretenses or fraudulent acts which they made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of
the fraud to the effect that there exists a contract between the said bank and ACME
INVESTIGATION SERVICES. INC., a non-existent security agency, that the said security
services of which were rendered in favor of the said bank, did in fact[,] with the intent to
defraud, authorize the release of the amount of THREE MILLION, (sic) THIRTY[-]TWO
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE PESOS (P3,032,909.00) and collect the same from the
bank's funds for the purpose of paying the said security agency, said accused knowing fully well
that no such security agency existed, no such contract exists between the said bank and the said
agency[,] and no such security services were rendered in favor of the said bank and[,] therefore,
no payment in the said amount of P3,032,909.00 having been made to the agency, that such
acts/pretenses were only made by the accused for the purpose of obtaining  (sic) as in fact, they
did obtain the said total amount of P3,032,909.00 from the  funds of the bank for their own
personal use and benefit, thereby defrauding the said bank and its depositors and creditors,  to
the damage and prejudice of the said JADE PROGRESSIVE SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE
BANK, its depositors and creditors[,] and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in the said total
amount of P3,032,909.00 Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Accused-Appellants moved to quash the amended Information. They questioned the lack of
signature of the Chief State Prosecutor and the Certification by any representatives of the State in
the amended Information and the addition of new matters which changed the crime from Estafa
under Art 315, par. 1(b) to Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. Their motion was denied
by the RTC.

When arraigned, the Accused-Appellants, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Pre-trial was conducted and terminated on June 7, 2004.

Thereafter, a hold departure order was issued against Accused Appellants. Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.

The prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: Catalina Zamora (Zamora), former Chief
Accountant of Jade Bank; Minviluz Rubrico, former Deputy Liquidator of Jade Bank; Col.
Ernesto Jimeno, General Manager of Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
(PADPAO); Julie Mae Barrios, Branch Head of Metrobank, Rada-Rodriguez branch; Spenser
Say, Cluster Head of Metrobank Boni Avenue branch; PSI Wilfredo Rayos, Chief of Records
section of the Security Agencies and Guards Supervision Division of the Philippine National
Police (PNP); Raul Permejo, former messenger of Jade Bank; and Rodolfo Rante, Assisting
Deputy Liquidator of Jade Bank.

On the other hand, the defense presented the two (2) Accused Appellants on the witness stand.
The RTC denied the testimony of Josephine Bravo, a practicing accountant, as to the procedure
and banking practice of Jade Bank for she has no personal knowledge thereof.

The  Version  of the  Prosecution:

Jade Bank was a thrift bank duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with principal
office address at G/F Birchtree Plaza Bldg., 825 Muelle de Industria, Binondo, Manila. In 2001,
it was placed under liquidation by the Philippine Deposit and Insurance Corporation (PDIC).

The Accused-Appellants were both shareholders and officers of Jade Bank at the time material to
the case. Accused-Appellant Luis was a director in 1996 and Acting President in 1997 while
Accused-Appellant Alvin was Assistant Vice President in 1996 and 1997.

On April 21, 1997, Accused-Appellant Luis' secretary, Myla Jardeleza, handed Violeta Gella
(Gella), disbursing clerk of Jade Bank, a request for payment with letter billing from Acme for
investigation services and surveillance. The request was with the approval of Accused Appellant
Luis. The letter billing signed by Arturo dela Cruz as Managing Director of Acme.

The check voucher and the checks were prepared by Gella and forwarded to Zamora, then Chief
Accountant of Jade Bank. After verifying the entries and signing the billing statements, Zamora
forwarded it to Accused-Appellant Alvin for certification and then back to Accused Appellant
Luis for approval of the check voucher and manager's check. Both the Accused-Appellants
signed and certified the check vouchers and the manager's check. At the time, Zamora noticed
that the letterhead of Acme had no contact number and therein signature of Arturo dela Cruz was
similar to the signature of Accused-Appellant Alvin.

Several transactions of the same nature as above followed. Overall, the Accused-Appellants
caused the release of eight (8) manager's checks supposedly for payment for services rendered by
Acme amounting to Three Million Thirty-Two Thousand and Nine Hundred Nine Pesos
(PhP3,032,909.00), as follows:

Transaction Date  Date of Letter Voucher Manager's Amount 

Billing  Number  Check Number 
April 21, 1997  March 31, 1997  2235  348  P242,900.00
April 21, 1997  April 23, 1997  2238 350  P262,250.00
May 16, 1997  May 15, 1997 2239 468 P400,250.00
June 17, 2007  June 15, 2007 2554  584 P401,250.00
July 21, 1997  May 15, 1997  2826  722  P313,838.00
August 14, 1997  July 31, 1997 3291  845  P524,500.00
September 16, 1997  June 30, 1997  3585  1077  P627,676.00
December 2, 1997  December 1, 1997  4246  1438  P260,245.00

As it turned out, Acme was a fictitious agency as it was neither registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission nor granted with the required license by the Security Agencies and
Guards Supervision Division of the PNP. It was also not a registered member of PADPAO.

Investigations revealed that seven (7) of the eight (8) checks were deposited to Metrobank
Account No. 7-310-500212 under the names of Nelson Sia and/or Antonio Santos, alleged
officers of Acme. Said bank account, however, was opened and is owned and controlled by the
Accused-Appellants; Nelson Sia and Antonio Santos being the alias used by Accused-Appellants
Alvin and Luis, respectively.

Check No. 468, on the other hand, was deposited in Citytrust Bank Account No. 04-020-00743-1
in the names of Henry Chua, Al Mendoza, Antonio Santos, and/or Amelia Santos. This bank
account was likewise opened and is owned and controlled by the Accused-Appellants. Zamora,
who was directed to open the Citytrust account, witnessed Accused Appellant Luis sign as
Antonio Santos and Accused-Appellant Alvin as Al Mendoza. The total amount has since been
withdrawn from the accounts.

The  Version  of the  Defense:

The Accused-Appellants denied the allegations against them.

Accused-Appellant Alvin stated that, as Sales/Product Manager and Assistant Vice President of
Jade Bank, he was responsible for expanding the sales and creating new products and was under
the supervision of Arcatomy Guarin, then the Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice
President of Jade Bank. He denied having any connection with Acme and maintained that he
only signed the check vouchers after Zamora certified the correctness of the billing. He asserted
further that the order for payment of Acme was approved by Accused-Appellant Luis.

On the other hand, Accused-Appellant Luis claimed that he signed the checks intended for Acme
because all the initials from the accounting department were there. According to him, he was in
no position to approve or disapprove billing statements because such is within the authority of
the accounting department and he only signs the check if the payment is approved by said
department and the check voucher is issued with all the required initials or signatures. He also
testified that Acme provided security services to Jade Bank but that he has no direct participation
in the said agency. On cross examination, however, he admitted that he cannot remember if
Acme provided Jade Bank with security guards.

Accused-appellant Luis did not file his formal offer of evidence; thus, the RTC deemed him to
have waived his right to file his formal offer of evidence.[3]

Judgment of the RTC

After trial, the RTC convicted the petitioners of the crime of estafa. It concluded that the
witnesses and the documents presented by the Prosecution established that the petitioners had
conspired to defraud Jade Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank (Jade Bank) and its
depositors by making it appear that Acme Investigation Services had actually rendered security
services to Jade Bank despite said security agency being a fictitious entity.

The RTC disposed thusly -

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused LUIS L. CO and ALVIN

MILTON S. CO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under paragraph 2
(a) of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer four (4) years of prision
correccional in its medium period as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum and to indemnify Jade
Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank, its depositors and creditors and the Bangko
Sentral Ng Pilipinas in the amount of Three Million Thirty-two Thousand Nine Hundred and
Nine Pesos (P3,032,909.00) representing the total amount of checks paid for the alleged services
rendered by Acme Investigation Services, Inc.,

SO ORDERED.[4]

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC but modified the penalty, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the RTC, as well as the Order
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
the Accused Appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
years and Two (2) months of prision correccional,  as minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal  as maximum; and to indemnify Jade Bank the sum of Three Million
Thirty-Two Thousand Nine Hundred and Nine Pesos (PhP3,032,909.00), plus legal interests
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.[5]

With the denial of their motion for reconsideration on July 19, 2017,[6] the petitioners now bring
this appeal.

Issue

The petitioners mainly contend that the Prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove
that they had conspired to defraud Jade Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank (Jade Bank).
They submit the following issues to be considered and resolved, namely:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF

BOTH THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE ACCUSED IS
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA DEFINED AND
PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (A) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS IS DEVOID OF ANY

EVIDENTIARY BASIS SINCE IT WAS ANCHORED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF
WITNESSES WHICH LACK PROBATIVE VALUE.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE ESTABLISHED FACTS PROVED THE EXISTENCE OF

CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THE TWO PETITIONERS.[7]

Ruling of the Court

We find merit in the appeal.

I
The crime charged was
falsification of a private document, not estafa

The RTC and the CA convicted the petitioners for the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). — x x x:

xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

xxxx

To properly charge an accused with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a), supra, the information
should aver the following essential elements, to wit: (1) that the accused used a fictitious name or
false pretense that he possesses power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business, imaginary transaction, or other similar deceits; (2) that the accused used such deceitful
means prior to or simultaneous with the execution of the fraud; (3) that the offended party relied
on such deceitful means to part with his money or property; and (4) that the offended party
suffered damage.[8]

It is a fundamental tenet in criminal procedure that the recital in the information of the facts
constitutive of the offense, not the designation of the offense therein, determines the crime being
charged against the accused. Thus, we turn to the amended information to know what crime the
petitioners have been charged with.

The amended information designated the offense the petitioners committed as estafa, stating
therein that they so committed it by:

x x x taking advantage of their position as such, by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts
which they made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud to the effect that
there exists a contract between the said bank and ACME INVESTIGATION SERVICE, INC.,
a non-existent security agency, that the said security services of which were rendered in favor
of the said bank,  did in fact[,] with the intent to defraud, authorize the release of the amount of
THREE MILLION, (sic) THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE PESOS
(P3,032,909.00) and collect the same from the bank's funds for the purpose of paying the said
security agency, said accused knowing fully well that no such security agency existed no such
contract exists between the said bank and the said agency[,] and no such security services were
rendered in favor of the said bank and[,] therefore, no payment in the said amount of
P3,032,909.00 having been made to the agency, that such acts/pretenses were only made by the
accused for the purpose of obtaining (sic) as in fact they did obtain the said total amount of
P3,032,909.00 from  the funds of the bank for their own personal use and benefit, thereby
defrauding the said bank and its depositors and creditors, to the damage and prejudice of the
said JADE PROGRESSIVE SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK its depositors and creditors[,]
and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in the said total amount of P3,032,909.00 Philippine
Currency.

The aforequoted allegations indicate that the petitioners signed the billing statements and
requested payments on the basis that Acme Investigation Service, Inc. (Acme) had actually
rendered security services to Jade Bank, prompting Jade Bank to pay. In other words, the
amended information claimed that the fraud could not have been committed without the
falsification of the private documents. Under such alleged circumstances, the crime charged was
falsification of private documents instead of estafa.

It is not amiss to observe that there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of

a private document considering that the damage essential to both is the same. As a result, having
such offenses compounded or complexed in accordance with Article 48[9] of the Revised Penal
Code is inherently disallowed. We reiterate the pronouncement made in Batulanon v. People,
[10]
 to wit:

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is important

to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with
estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa,
the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the
necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People
v. Reyes, the accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer,
Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked
only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the
laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not
work for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.

In US. v. Infante,  the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the
pawn ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned
the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the
article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan
Tiao, the accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for
the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified
documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private
document.[11] [Bold underscoring supplied]

II
The Prosecution did not establish
the crime of falsification of a private document

Falsification of a private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal

Code, has the following elements, namely: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification, except those in paragraph 7, enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the
falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent
to cause such damage.[12]

The Prosecution sought to establish that Acme did not exist; that Jade Bank did not benefit from
any security services that could have been rendered by Acme; that petitioner Luis Co had signed
the request for payment in favor of Acme; and that the checks issued as payments had been
deposited under fictitious accounts the petitioners owned and controlled.

The first element of the crime of falsification of a private document was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. Several circumstances we outline hereafter show why.
First of all, the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced herein did not reliably establish
the authorship by either petitioner of the billing statements that would have stemmed from the
non-existent contract of security services. Although Prosecution witness Catalina Zamora, the
former Chief Accountant of Jade Bank, attested that she had seen petitioner Alvin Co sign the
billing statements over the printed name of Arturo dela Cruz, the managing director of Acme,
and insisted that such billing statements would have proved the fictitiousness of the contract
averred in the amended information, we have noted the observation by the RTC that on her
cross examination Zamora had denied actually witnessing petitioner Alvin Co affixing his
signature over the printed name Arturo dela Cruz in the billing statements.[13] It thus appeared
that Zamora's only basis to declare that petitioner Alvin Co had authored the fictitious and
falsified billing statements was her impression about the signatures of Arturo dela Cruz and
petitioner Alvin Co looking similar.

Zamora's impression on the similarity in the signatures, which was clearly not derived from
objective facts but upon her opinion, was testimony that had no probative value by virtue of its
being the opinion of an ordinary witness. Indeed, the Prosecution did not show that her opinion
came under any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 50, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. - The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given, may be received in evidence regarding -

(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person. (44 a)

Secondly, Zamora declared that petitioner Alvin Co had used the aliases of Nelson Sia and Al
Mendoza; and that petitioner Luis Co had used the alias of Antonio Santos. Her declarations
became relevant to enable the tracing of the money back to the petitioners. But because she
apparently had no personal knowledge on the use of the aliases by the petitioners, her
declarations to that effect were hearsay and unreliable.

Thirdly, Zamora stated that petitioner Luis Co had ordered her to fill out the application card to
open an account at Citytrust's Reina Regente Branch; and that petitioner Luis Co and three others
had signed the card in her presence. Her statement did not suffice to incriminate the petitioners in
the crime of falsification simply because there was no showing that the card thus filled out and
signed had actually been used to open the Citytrust account. The doubt against Zamora's
statement became pronounced in view of her admission that she had not herself delivered the
card to Citytrust.

Moreover, although in most situations corroboration is not necessary for as long as the details of
the crime have already been proved with sufficient clarity, we should point out that Zamora's
statement, standing alone, did not credibly establish the receipt by the petitioners of the proceeds
of the fraud. As such, corroboration by other evidence became necessary herein to substantiate
Zamora's statement if the objective therefor was to enable the traceback of the proceeds of the
fraud to either of the petitioners. The lack of corroboration accented that the Prosecution had
been remiss in discharging its duty by leaving its proof of guilt inconclusive and incomplete. It
also exposed her incrimination of the petitioners to be far from reliable and clear.

Fourthly, the Prosecution presented bank officers as witnesses against the petitioners. However,
it was notable that said witnesses did not categorically certify that petitioner Alvin Co, on one
hand, and either Nelson Sia or Al Mendoza, on the other, were one and the same person.

Lastly, Raul Permejo, another witness for the Prosecution, recalled that petitioner Alvin Co had
instructed him to deposit checks in the accounts held in Citytrust and Metrobank; and that
petitioner Alvin Co had used the name Nelson Sia in several bank transactions. Yet, Permejo was
discredited as an unreliable witness in the face of his candid admission that he had received
money from the counsel after each time he had testified in court against the petitioners. The
financial incentives cast grave doubts on his sincerity and truthfulness, and negated the
credibility of his recollections as a witness. The money was possibly a sufficient incentive for
him to pervert his recollection and capacity for truth telling, rendering him untrustworthy for
being fully biased against the petitioners. In this connection, a witness is said to be biased when
his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give
false color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false.[14]

Faced with all the foregoing circumstances, the Court cannot but consider doubtful and
suspicious the proof on the existence of the first element of the crime of falsification of a private
document. A further discussion of the remaining elements of the offense has become
unnecessary. Acquittal of the petitioners of the crime of falsification of a private document for
failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt should follow.

Absolving the petitioners of the crime of falsification of a private document likewise clears them
of the crime of estafa. We adopt with approval the commentary expressed by a respected treatise
on criminal law on the matter, viz.:

When the offender commits on a document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation. The two
crimes form a complex crime under Article 48. However, the document falsified must be public,
official or commercial.

The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing

estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. (Intestate Estate
of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong v. People, GR No. 181409, February 11, 2010). In
other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public,
official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But damage to another is caused by
the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of
the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.
On the other hand, in the falsification of a private document, there is no crime unless another
fact, independent of that of falsifying the document, is proved: i.e. damage or intent to cause it.
Therefore, when one makes use of a private document, which he falsified, to defraud another,
there results only one crime: the falsification of a private document. The damage to another is
caused by the commission of the crime of falsification of falsification of private document. The
intent to defraud in using the falsified private document is part and parcel of the crime,
and cannot give rise to the crime of estafa, because the damage, if it resulted, was caused
by, and became the element of, the crime of falsification of private document. The crime of
estafa in such case was not committed, as it could not exist without its own element of
damage.[15] [Bold emphasis supplied]

A final word needs to be said. We normally accord the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses the highest respect, and will not disturb the evaluation on appeal, but we also state that
findings on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the consequent findings of fact could be
reviewed and undone if we, as the ultimate dispenser of justice, find matters of substance and
value whose proper significance and impact have been overlooked or incorrectly appreciated and
which, if duly considered or properly appreciated, would alter the result of the case. No findings
by the trial court are impervious to the onslaught of a just and fair appreciation by a higher court.
After all, every appeal of a criminal conviction opens the entire records to review, and this is
because our oaths as judges bind and commit us to ensure that no one should be held criminally
responsible and condemned to suffer punishment unless the evidence against him has been
sufficient and amounts to the moral certainty of his guilt.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on

December 22, 2015 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
35911; ACQUITS petitioners LUIS L. CO and ALVIN S. CO of the crime charged for failure
of the Prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
and ORDERS the DISMISSAL of Criminal Case No. 03-211251 without pronouncement on
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, Carandang, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official business.