MODERN TURKISH ALEVI POETRY:

SYMBOL OF KEMAL ATATÜRK AND SECULARISM

Ezgi Benli Garcia Guerrero

Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

in the Department of Central Eurasian Studies,

Indiana University

May 2019




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 ii

Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Arts.

Master's Thesis Committee

_________________________________

Gardner Bovingdon, Ph.D.

_________________________________

Marianne Kamp, Ph.D.

_________________________________

David A. McDonald, Ph.D

 iii

Table of Content

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

1. A Brief History of Alevism and the Alevi Identity .................................................................. 13

1.1. A Discussion about Identity ............................................................................................... 14
1.2. A Brief history of Alevism ................................................................................................ 17
1.3. Problems of definitions: Heterodoxy, Syncretism, and Rural Islam Discussions ............. 22
1.4. The Alevi Transformation.................................................................................................. 28

2. The Cem Ritual and The Aşıklık Tradition ............................................................................... 37

2.1. The Cem Ritual .................................................................................................................. 37
2.2. Understanding Cem Rituals ............................................................................................... 40
2.3. The Alevi Aşıklık Tradition ................................................................................................ 42
2.4. Case Studies: Political Topics in the Aşıklık tradition ....................................................... 45
2.4.1. Making sense out of a text .......................................................................................... 45
2.4.2. Interpretation of the text.............................................................................................. 46

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 60

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 63

Curriculum Vita
 iv

Notes on Text and Translation

Turkish is written in the Latin alphabet, with a few special characters:

c is pronounced like ‘j’ in jar

ç is pronounced like ‘ch’ in chocolate
ı is pronounced like ‘i’ in cousin
ğ is not pronounced, it lengthens the preceding vowel
j is pronounced like ‘g’ in gendarme
ş is pronounced like ‘sh’ in ship
ü is pronounced like ‘u’ in the French rue
ö is pronounced like ‘eu’ in the French veut

Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine. In order to make the reading easier, terms

familiar to English speakers are rendered in their most acceptable Anglicized form. The footnotes

and bibliography entries are arranged according to The Chicago Manual of Style, 17th edition

(2017).
 1

Introduction

In 2016, while scheduling a Cem ritual (Alevi religious ceremony) in Kertme, Amasya in

northern Turkey, I was listening intently to a lively discussion between an old zakir (musician in

the ritual) and an educated middle-aged man from Istanbul, on why the portrait of Mustafa Kemal

Atatürk had been hanging on the wall. According to the visitor, Mustafa Kemal was a political

figure, and as such, should not have been displayed during this religious activity. The zakir

explained that Atatürk was a leader of the Turkish War of Independence and that he regarded him

as the man who created modern civilized Turkey, a saint who came to help the nation, and as the

entire reason for their existence.

After World War I, Mustafa Kemal began a nationalist revolution in various regions of

Anatolia and organized a resistance movement against the occupation imposed by European allies

(Greece, Britain, France, and Italy). After four years of war (19 May 1919-24 July 1923), Turkey

achieved its independence and declared its status as a republic on 29 October 1923. Since that

time, Mustafa Kemal has commonly been referred to as Atatürk, meaning “Father of the Turks,”

and until the 1950s, his ideology, Kemalism, was enthusiastically embraced by the government.

Unlike many Sunni citizens in Turkey, the majority of Alevis have a deeper and more sacred

relationship with Atatürk. Alevis consider Atatürk a saint and put his portrait on display alongside

two other Alevi saints (Imam Ali and Haji Bektash Veli.) 1 This combination of religious and

political figures is quite common in Alevi households and public spaces.

The Alevis are the second largest group in Turkey, after Sunnis. Their identity is based on

religious as opposed to ethnic affiliation, since members of this group have diverse ethnic origins.

1
The appearance of Haji Bektash dates back to the thirteenth century in Anatolia. Bektashism as an organized Sufi
path began with Bālīm Sūltān (1457-1517) in the fifteenth century.
 2

Alevis hold strong resemblances to the Shi’is given their common devotion to the Twelve Imams,

including Ali and his family, yet their esoteric teachings, pre-Islamic traditions, and mystical

practices that took shape in the thirteenth century differentiate Alevis immediately from the other

sects of Islam.

Since the late Ottoman Empire, Alevis were marginalized and persecuted—as detailed in

the following chapter—due to a series of socio-political and religious conflicts. The Ottoman

repression among Alevis led to their withdrawal into remote areas and created a secrecy among

Alevi identity. However, Turkey’s transition to a secular society gave Alevis equal opportunity at

all levels and liberated them from the religious oppression of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, in the

eyes of many Alevis, Kemalism, democracy, and secular values are not only political concepts but

are also sacred concepts which gave them the freedom to live equally in the lands of Anatolia.

Kemalism fostered the social and economic integration of Alevis, but it also aimed to

homogenize the rich mixture of ethnic and religious identities in Anatolia. Kemalist sought to

construct a modern secular Turkish identity. In order to achieve this goal, they set in motion a

series of social, political, legal, education, and economic revolutions during the early years of the

Republic. These revolutions were particularly designed to promote Turkish nationalism and

secularism. The majority of Alevi population willingly accepted the reforms at the expense of their

centuries-old traditions and practices.

Although Alevi rituals gradually declined during the period of these Kemalist reforms, this

should not be seen as the main reason for the decline of Alevi practices. Starting in the 1950s, the

highly politicized atmosphere of Turkey had an impact on Alevi individuals regarding their

religious practices and political participation. The effects of the public debate on Alevism, which
 3

increased after the 1980s, led to various discursive questions: Is Alevism a culture or a religion?

Is it inside or outside of Islam? Are Alevis are secular or Muslim?2

Although majority of Alevis consider themselves as Muslims, they do not visit mosques to

pray five times a day, which is prescribed in the Quran. Cem is the religious ritual of Alevis: it

includes musical performance and dance attended by both men and women. Alevi cem rituals take

place in cemevis (cem house) and are conducted by a dede (Alevi spiritual leader) who belongs to

an ocak (Alevi saintly lineages, hearth). Although Alevi ocak system remains to be studied, some

documents claim that every ocak has a genealogical attachment to the Twelve Imams. 3

For the Cem service (on iki hizmet, or 12 services/offerings), the zakir, who is also known

as an aşık (poet-singer) is charged with playing and singing sacred Alevi music. While an aşık is

a symbol of the cem ritual, an aşık may also perform in various locations outside of the ritual

context, representing the traditional Alevi music through their lyrics. The contemporary aşıks and

their performance in public spaces make Alevi music a symbolic performance to present Alevism

and Alevi political ideologies. Thus, aşıks play an important role in defining and representing the

Alevi perspective in modern Turkey.

This study will try to situate the contribution of aşıks’ performance of Alevi music in

relation to Alevism and the Alevi identity. It explores Alevi aşıks’ responses to political issues by

focusing on the subjects and symbols that they use in their poems. What I explore in this study is

the integration of the traditional Alevi music with the ideology of Kemalism and secularism.

2
These questions concerning the nature of Alevis are mentioned in both academic and non-academic publications.
Dialogues with the current government failed due to the theological arguments asking Alevis to worship in mosques
if they are a part of Islam. Recent discussions about the Alevi question are mentioned in Borovali & Boyraz (2015).
3
Due to the difficulties of reading the manuscripts, the documents related to Alevi history areare understudied.
Alevi documents are preserved by Alevi families, but most of them are in bad condition? Or not available? due the
conditions of private archives. In addition to that, they have “errors, misspellings, and major lapses” in the text. For
a detailed discussion of Alevi ocaks and documents, see Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, “Documents and ‘Buyruk’
Manuscripts in the Private Archives of Alevi Dede Families: An Overview,” British Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies 37, no. 3 (2010): 273–86.
 4

Research Question: The Role of Aşıklık

There are very few extant Alevi written sources. Alevism is predominantly passed down

through performance-based activities, meaning Alevi poetry and music performed during the

religious worship service. Thus, I look into Alevi music to understand how Alevis experience the

forces of history. Among many distinct Alevi music genres, this study focuses on traditional folk

music called aşıklık, and the adoption of secular values within this tradition. Before further

explaining my research question, I would like to take a moment to briefly explain the aşıklık

tradition.

The Turkish meaning of the word aşık translates as “lover.” Aşıklık (the practice of aşık)

tradition is similar to minstrelsy tradition or the tradition of troubadours in France. Since the

fifteenth century, the term aşık is used interchangeably with ozan (bard, poet-singer) to define

those “who recite folksongs and certain kind of popular tales” in Turkish folk literature. 4 Aşıks

perform with the instrument called bağlama, compose their own poems by using traditional tunes

and make slight changes, and usually include traditional phrases.5 It is important to note that

zakirlik (zakir-hood) in cem rituals is known as “cem aşıklığı,” which is a representation of aşıklık

in the ritual context. Thus, the terms zakir and aşık may be used interchangeably in the discussion

of Alevis music. I define zakir as a temporary position of Alevi aşık during the ritual. Once the

ritual is completed, the zakir’s duty is over but being an aşık is a life-time role. In this study, I

often use the term aşık, which will cover the function of zakir.

Sometimes dedes know how to play bağlama and perform during the ritual, which

increases the respect to the instrument. Bağlama is conceived as an intermediary which brings the

4
İlhan Başgöz, “Turkish Folk Stories about the Lives of Minstrels,” The Journal of American Folklore 65, 258
(1952): 331.
5
Bağlama also known as saz, a long-necked string instrument.
 5

sacred knowledge to one’s world. Thus, the capability of playing bağlama is a highly respected

within the Alevi community. The aşıklık still preserves its traditional structure, but individual

Alevi aşıks are closely bound to politics due to increasing impact of politics in individual’s life.

Focusing on the figure of Kemal Atatürk, one can see that not only is he displayed around Alevi

spaces but also his secular values are integrated into Alevi narratives, particularly in folk music,

to defend Alevi ideology in opposition to political Islam.

The central topic of this study is the poetic representation of secular values and Kemal

Atatürk in the aşıklık tradition. Considering the significance of aşıklık within the Alevi community,

I inquire whether aşıklık and individual aşıks have any role transmitting political ideas to the Alevi

community.

Theoretical Framework: Analyzing Alevis

The role of individual Alevi aşıks in defining Alevi identity in Turkey is the concern of

this study. In order to understand the Kemalist phenomena in Alevi aşık tradition, it is necessary

to grasp the dynamics of Alevi identity. Since the 1950s, the academicians from various fields

have been developing models and analyses to study identity. In this study, I build my general

examination of Alevi identity on Barth’s theory of boundaries, which focuses on the maintained

boundaries rather than the objective group characteristics. Focusing on the boundary mechanisms

makes room for exploring the ethnic and cultural changes among Alevi groups.

In the 1990s, the term intersectionality, which feminist scholars use in various fields,

became a key factor for understanding identities as multi-layered, involving gender, class, race,

and various other factors such as religion. Starting from my understanding of Alevi subjectivities,

I take the notion of intersectionality as a framework to analyze the situational aspect of Alevi
 6

identity. I interpret aşık texts as an intersection of religious, political, and class concepts, which

also demonstrate the multi-layered Alevi identity.

As a second important concept of this study, I also focus on the importance of rituals. Ritual

theorists have already urged us to consider rituals as a way to establish and maintain communities. 6

Following that, in recent years, performance theorists suggest that all kinds of performances

(playing, walking, lecturing, etc.) can serve as a ritual and create strong feelings among

individuals. The performance of aşıks outside of cemevi forces us to consider liminality and

transformations in non-ritual situations. Victor Turner’s emphasis on transformation process in

rituals allows me to mention the role of Alevi aşıks as a sacred symbol of the rituals. I build my

analysis of Alevi aşık performance and its capability of transforming Alevi individuals into

different stages based on the social relationship that they created during the cem ritual.7

Methodological Approach:

In order to pursue this research question, I employ the method of close reading of poems

and I focus on the poetry of various different aşıks to illustrate my arguments. A close reading of

aşık poetry will help us to achieve a deeper understanding of the political use of mythical narratives

in Alevism and Alevi interpretation of religion and politics. I provide examples from five well-

know aşıks who staged out Alevi music in non-ritual context after the 1950s in urban areas. Aşık

Veysel, Ali Izzet, Sulari, Daimi and Akarsu are Alevi aşıks who performed in various Alevi spaces

as well as commercial arenas such as public concerts, festivals, TV channels or cultural venues in

6
Emile Durkheim, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, and Claude Levi-Strauss are some of the theorists leading the discussion
of myths and rituals.
7
The detailed discussion of identity is in the following chapter, A Brief History of Alevism and the Alevi Identity. The
importance of ritual is explained in the second Chapter, which focuses on the cem ritual and aşıklık tradition.
 7

urban centers. I analyze their work in detail with an emphasis on specific themes, such as Mahdi

doctrine, martyrdom, unity and togetherness (birlik ve beraberlik), independence, and motherland

(vatan), to study the Kemalist phenomena. Their poetry encapsulates the history of Turkish

politics, the Alevi question, and religious and ethnic conflicts in Turkey.

I use primary sources such as interviews, autobiographies, sound and video performances

to understand aşıks and their texts. Besides primary sources, participant observation is an important

method for my analysis. My personal participation both in Alevi rituals and other cultural

platforms strongly informed my perspective on Alevi music and put me in an advantageous

position in terms of understanding the importance of music-making in Alevi communities. The

fact that I have been playing bağlama for decades also gives me an opportunity to closely follow

developments in Alevi music. Thus, I am able to access intimate knowledge by performing,

participating, and observing Alevis in Alevi spaces.

However, this study has limits due to its small-scale examples. The Alevi music genre went

through different periods of political exploitation, commodification, westernization, and

syncretism with other musical genres. By focusing on single aspect of Alevi music, I attempt to

show the interrelationship of Alevi narratives and Kemalist discourses in the tradition of aşıklık.

The most important component of this study is my being a member of Alevi community. Thus, it

is also important to remember that this study is written from the standpoint of an Alevi person. My

experience as an Alevi musician represents a self-reflection in my analytic choices. As Naples

debates, “[t]he reflexive practices we employ are, in turn influenced by what we understand as a

‘standpoint’ and how we asses our positionality.” 8 Thus, my reading and interpretation of Alevi

8
Nancy A. Naples, Feminism and Method: Ethnography, Discourse Analysis, and Activist Research (New York:
Routledge, 2003): 48
 8

music may overemphasize certain facts related to Alevi self-identifications, and my involvement

may restrict my analysis in the studied subject.

Survey of Literature: Alevi Identity and Aşık Tradition

One of the methods of this study includes a broad reading of existing literature related to

aşıks and aşıklık authored by scholars and journalists. Since the late 1980s, Alevi literature gained

momentum partially as a result of the Alevi revival. Many academic publications devoted to

Alevis, for example, dealt with Alevi historical developments, Alevi identity as a secular version

of Islam, Alevi political movements and Alevi musical traditions. 9 Through this literature review,

I tried to imagine how I might add something valuable to this conversation. Alevi music has been

a topic of research which emphasizes its significance in Alevi belief and practices. Taking off from

the fact that music has an essential role in Alevi rituals, I turn to the aşıklık tradition which is a

reference point for Alevi self-understanding.

In recent years, the number of scholars who investigate the role of music in constructing,

expressing, or symbolizing identity has increased. There are many interesting studies about music

and identity that underline, for example, how identity is put into action through performing,

listening, and music-making.10 The corpus of “music and identity” created a thematic foundation

9
Some of the examples as follows: one of the first major works concerning Alevi history is Krisztina Kehl-
Bodrogi’s dissertation, later on revised and translated into Turkish, Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi et al., Kızılbaşlar /
Aleviler: Anadolu’da yaşayan ezoterik bir inanç topluluğu üzerine araştırma, 2012; for secularism discussions, see,
Karin Vorhoff, “‘Let’s Reclaim Our History and Culture!’: Imagining Alevi Community in Contemporary Turkey,”
Die Welt Des Islams 38, no. 2 (1998): 220–52; Markoff’s study explores the revitalization of Alevi traditions in
contemporary Turkey, Irene Markoff, “The Role of Expressive Culture in the Demystification of a Secret Sect of
Islam: The Case of the Alevis of Turkey,” The World of Music 28, no. 3 (1986): 42–56.
10
See Martin Stoke’s edited collection of seminars, dedicated to the study of social construction and control of
identity in music. Martin Stokes, ed., Ethnicity, Identity, and Music: The Musical Construction of Place, Berg Ethnic
Identities Series (Oxford, UK ; Providence, RI: Berg, 1994); see Turino’s study to understand how music interacts
with individual and collective social life. He demonstrates how knowledge and communication generated by the act
of making music, Thomas Turino, Music as Social Life: The Politics of Participation, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2008).
 9

brick and shaped the current understanding of music research. There are several scholarly works

about Alevi musical cultures that shape my understanding during this research.

Most scholars of music and identity in Turkey have focused almost exclusively on

nationalism and have centered on the critics of nationalism, partially due to the state intervention

over Turkish folk music. In 1996, a pioneering article, written by Orhan Tekelioğlu, discussed the

modernization process of Turkish music. 11 Tekelioğlu articulated the musical fusion of East and

West in Turkish music and underlined the proactive restructuring strategies of the Turkish state.

Tekelioğlu’s article highlights the hybrid forms of Turkish music, especially arabesque music and

its rising popularity, as a result of the “authoritarian cultural policies imposed from above.” 12 In a

subsequent study, Ayhan Erol deals with the authoritarian policies of the Turkish state and brings

Bourdieu’s “symbolic violence” into the discussion. According to Erol’s account, dismissive

behavior of the institutions towards “[t]he musical values of the people and their popular

experiences” is an example of symbolic violence operated by the state. 13 Erol analyzes the Radio

and Television Council, and field recordings to show that folk music archives are designed

according to nationalist standards.

The aim of fieldwork sponsored by state institutions was to create a modern and national

music. Within the same framework of nationalism, there are studies that focus on what kind of

roles were attributed to folk music in the construction of a new society in the early Republican era

11
Orhan Tekelioğlu, “The Rise of a Spontaneous Synthesis: The Historical Background of Turkish Popular Music,”
Middle Eastern Studies, 32, 2 (1996): 194–215.
12
Tekelioğlu, 1996:208. For a detailed, English-language research on the arabesque music, see Martin Stokes, The
Arabesk Debate: Music and Musicians in Modern Turkey, Oxford Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology
(Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1992).
13
Ayhan Erol, “Music, Power and Symbolic Violence: The Turkish State’s Music Policies during the Early
Republican Period,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 15, no. 1 (2012): 43, 49.
 10

(1922-1952), and what functions were installed in which institutions. 14 The tradition of aşıklık as

a part of Turkish folk music was at the center of Turkey's national building project. Kemalist

reformists eliminated certain songs and replaced foreign words in folk poetry (Kurdish, Armenian

or Laz language) with Turkish terms to create a national and homogenous language. 15

It is possible to observe a an embrace of Turkish nationalism among Alevi aşıks. However,

Alevi aşıks and their self-motivated turn to secularist and nationalist narratives cannot be

interpreted solely as a nationalist project. Alevi aşık genre is historically a tradition that always

had an oppositional attitude toward authority figures.16 From that perspective, Kemalist discourse

in aşık genre forces us to reconsider the primary motivation of Alevis. Despite the heavy emphasis

of nationalist policies in music scholarship, the Alevi perspectives were known to some scholars.

For example, Başgöz’s compilation of Alevi aşık Ali İzzet Özkan draws attention to Alevi

worldview to explain Ali İzzet’s poetry. 17 Başgöz focuses on the alteration of Ali İzzet’s poetry

during the various political stages of the Republic and shares his interview notes to interpret his

poems. By including Alevi accounts, Başgöz’s case study invites us to consider the Alevi

perspective before making any analyses and overgeneralizing the aşık tradition. Another important

source that emphasizes the Alevi worldview is Markus Dressler’s article investigating the fusion

14
For an exhaustive summary of the early Republican era, see Özgür Balkılıç, Temiz ve Soylu Türküler Söyleyelim:
Türkiye’de Milli Kimlik Inşasında Halk Müziği, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015).
15
İlhan Başgöz and Arzu Öztürkmen’s early works demonstrates the approach of newly established Republic to folk
poem, tales and dances, see İlhan Başgöz, “Folklore Studies and Nationalism in Turkey,” Journal of the Folklore
Institute 9, 2/3 (1972): 162–76; Arzu Öztürkmen, “Individuals and Institutions in the Early History of Turkish
Folklore, 1840-1950,” Journal of Folklore Research 29, 2 (1992): 177–92.
16
See Duygulu’s monographic review of aşık poetry. Melih Duygulu, Alevî-Bektaşî müziğinde deyişler (İstanbul:
Duygulu, 1997), see also Selçuk Duran, Âşıklık Geleneğinden Protest Müziğe Ali Asker, Kalkedon Yayıncılık ;
Biyografi Dizisi 314 (Fatih, İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayıncılık, 2015). Duran’s study focuses on aşık Ali Asker, and
explores the protest nature of aşık music by providing historical background of aşıklık.
17
İlhan Başgöz, Aşık Ali İzzet Özkan, 2nd ed., Indiana Üniversitesi Türkçe Programları Yayınları (Istanbul: Pan
Yayıncılık, 1994).
 11

of religious and political identities in modern Alevi poetry. 18 He draws attention to the rise of

political Islam and the decline of secularism to understand Alevi subscription to Kemalist

principles. Dressler’s main argument for the devotion of a religious group to secularism is the

Alevi’s multidimensional understanding of religion. According to Dressler, an Alevi perspective

“does not distinguish between religion and politics in terms of sacred and profane but in terms of

inner and outer meaning.”19 This comment brings the conceptual presumptions of religious

terminologies into the discussion, which will be detailed further in the following chapter. Overall,

his explanation of Alevi interpretation of politics and religion accounts for the conceptualization

of political elements in mystical Alevi music. Dressler’s approach to Alevi identity provides an

example for this study examining the secular narrative of aşıklık.

No doubt, identity is one of the most debated topics in Alevi literature. After many

discussions concerning Alevi re-politicization and their collective identity, recent studies attempt

to analyze Alevi politics of identity in a local context.20 Martin Sökefeld’s detailed ethnographic

research which conceptualizes Alevis as a multi-dimensional community with plural identities is

equally significant for my understanding of Alevi communities.21 He suggests imagining Alevi

identity in three aspects: “difference, multiplicity, and intersectionality.” According to Sökefeld

“Difference is what makes identity,” which can be explained by Barthian notion of boundaries. 22

18
Markus Dressler, “Turkish Alevi Poetry in the Twentieth Century: The Fusion of Political and Religious
Identities, Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, 23 (2003): 109–54
19
Dressler, 2003:139
20
See, for example Karin Vorhoff, “‘Let’s Reclaim Our History and Culture!’: Imagining Alevi Community in
Contemporary Turkey,” Die Welt Des Islams 38, no. 2 (1998): 220–52; Tord Olsson et al., Alevi Identity: Cultural,
Religious and Social Perspectives : Papers Read at a Conference Held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul,
November 25-27, 1996 (Istanbul: Swedish research Institute in Istanbul,1998).
21
Martin Sökefeld, Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in Transnational Space (New
York: Berghahn Books, 2008).
22
Sökefeld, 2008: 20. A similar notion of difference as a form of boundary has been discussed earlier by Fredrik
Barth, for a detailed theoretical discussion see the following chapter (Chapter 2).
 12

In the Alevi context, Sökefeld argues that “common baseline of identification as Alevi is the

emphasis on difference from Sunnis.” 23 In this sense, “[Alevi] identity makes sense only because

there are [multiple] other identities.” 24 Finally, the different identities intersect and often conflict

with each other within individual agents.

I build on these studies through my examination of aşıklık during highly politicized periods

in modern Turkey. I contribute the historical process of traditional Alevi music by focusing on the

particular role of aşıks and analyzing their poems from its political context.

Organization of the Study

This study is organized around two chapters. The first chapter explores the Alevi

interpretation of religion and politics by introducing Alevi beliefs and history. In this regard, I give

a brief account of Alevism, Alevis’ position in the Ottoman Empire, and the Alevi social and

political transformation during the Turkish Republic period. I furthermore show the problems of

definition about Alevis to explain the perspectives on Alevism.

The second chapter focuses on Alevi religious worship, Cem ritual, and the function of

aşıklık tradition in Alevi communities. This part also underlines the increasing visibility or aşıks

in other platforms and media outlets and examine their influence on Alevi individuals. To address

the adoption of secular and democrat values in Alevi music, I focus on aşık examples and interpret

poems wherein republican ideology is represented. Finally, I introduce different aşıks as case

studies, and I interpret their poetry concerning the political and religious elements that they have

been used.

23
Sökefeld, 2008: 115
24
Sökefeld, 2008: 20
 13

1. A Brief History of Alevism and the Alevi Identity

This chapter aims to provide, first, a theoretical discussion about Alevi identity, and later,

an overview of Alevi history, emphasizing the concepts that have been used to define Alevism.

While the introduction underlined the religious aspect of Alevi identity and their adoption of

Kemalist thought, it does not mention who the Alevis are, how many Alevis reside in Turkey, or

which languages they speak. Before further exploring the application of Alevi identity to

traditional folk music, it is essential to take a moment to explain what I mean by Alevis and Alevi

identity.

The introduction underlined that Alevism denies the tenets of Islam but is attached to the

twelve Imams and the “God-Muhammed-Ali” mythology. They have esoteric teachings and their

practices are affiliated with mystical traditions of medieval Anatolia. They speak Turkish, Kurdish,

and Zazaki languages. However, it is important to explain that any attempt to define Alevism

would fail to consider the diverse perspectives among Alevis and would raise questions about the

intention of the commentator. Some of the definitions stress Alevism’s ties with Islam and some

of them present Alevism as an alternative to Islam or a lifestyle. Most arguments in Alevi studies

happen due to the lack of a clear definition, or rather, due to the attempts to define Alevis according

to specific categories such as ethnicity, religion, nation, or ideology. Defining a prerequisite for

Alevis or providing population numbers would require me to consider ambiguous perspectives and

speculative figures. 25 Therefore, the provided definition of Alevism excludes the problems of

population number, ethnicity and other seemingly objective topics. In the following pages, I intend

25
The unofficial figures regarding the Alevi populations usually estimated at between %15 to %25 of the
population. However, official censuses do not collect data about any ethnic or religious identities in Turkey.
 14

to provide a brief overview of Alevi history and identity, the problems of Alevi definitions, and

the transformation of Alevi identity in the twentieth century.

1.1. A Discussion of Identity

During the past century, arts, humanities, and social sciences have been fairly preoccupied

by the concept of identity. Among many scholars who have focused on cultural variations, a

conceptual shift from commonalities within groups to boundaries of groups within humankind was

made by social anthropologist Fredrick Barth.26 The primary definition of ethnic groups at the time

Barth wrote pointed out shared cultural values as their critical feature;; however, Barth saw this

feature of ethnic groups as an “implication” or “result” of their “boundary making.” 27 Barth’s

approach to ethnic groups as a form of social organization suggests focusing on boundaries rather

than the objective group characteristic. According to Barth, “The features that are taken into

account [in a social organization] are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which

the actors themselves regard as significant.”28 For Barth, group actors emphasize, and researchers

should note, the element or elements distinguishing the group from the others, which are often

regarded as strangers. As long as the boundaries of a given group are maintained, the other

biological or cultural changes will not affect “the positive bond” among the group members. It is

important to note that a group may form from multiple previously separate groups, by the expedient

of forming a boundary between the embracing group and an “other.” The positive bond “depends

26
Fredrik Barth (1928 – 2016) was a Norwegian social anthropologist. Barth’s seminal work Ethnic groups and
boundaries is based on a symposium held at the University of Bergen, bringing research results from different
locations and ethnic groups, see Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries the Social Organization.
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).
27
Barth, 1969: 11
28
Barth, 1969: 13
 15

on the complementarity of the [several ethnic] groups with respect to some of their characteristic

cultural features.”29

The main theoretical departure of my concept of Alevi identity is based on the Barthian

approach, which helps me to explain the interdependence of different groups under the umbrella

of Alevi identity. There are at least three main categories (Kurdish Alevi, Turkish Alevi, and

Zazaki Alevi) and various sub-categories based on cultural and social differences among Alevis.

However, ignoring all those categories, Alevis tend to define themselves not by reference to their

nation, ethnicity or linguistic characteristics but by comparison to Sunnis. By referring the

boundary between Alevis and Sunnis, I try to show that Alevis tend to stress Alevi in-group

sameness (ignoring differences of language and culture), and to emphasize Alevi-Sunni difference

as the most important boundary.

It is also important to underline the discursive usage of identity when we talk about any

group. The recent critiques of identity have pointed out that the notion of identity is too broad to

be used as an analytical category. Brubaker draws our attention to the usage of “categories of

ethnopolitical practices” as “categories of social analysis,” and proposes to replace identity with

more particularistic terms. 30 According to Brubaker, to rethink “ethnic groups” is not to “dispute

their reality, minimize their power or discount their significance; it is to construe their reality,

power and significance in a different way.” 31 In another article that focuses on words of caution,

Brubaker and Cooper argue that conceptualizing “all affinities, affiliations, all forms of belonging,

all experiences of commonality, connectedness, and cohesion, all self-understanding and self-

29
Barth, 1969: 19
30
Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity without Groups,” European Journal of Sociology, 43, 2 (2002): 166. See also Rogers
Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society 29, 1 (2000): 1–47.
31
Brubaker, 2002: 168
 16

identification in the idiom of ‘identity’ saddles us with a blunt, flat, undifferentiated vocabulary.” 32

Thus, the notion of identity is too vague to be use as an analytical category. While identity implies

“sameness across time and persons,” the authors emphasize on “self-understanding” and explain

that “[self-understanding] is not restricted to situations of flux and instability, [and it] may be

variable across time and across persons.” 33 Brubaker invites us to think about “groupness,” as an

“event, as something that ‘happens.’” 34 This approach allows us to recognize the relationship

between Alevis and categories, such as ethnic or nation. Following that, he brings the cognitive

perspectives to our focus: “Ethnicity, race and nationhood exist only in and through our

perceptions. […] They are not things in the world, but perspectives on the world.”35 Recently, we

have seen a shift among Alevi people between different categories or a fusion of categories due to

the efforts of what Brubaker calls “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.”36

In this context, Alevi aşık performances are one of the many group-making efforts,

establishing a secularism and Kemalism among Alevi groups. Alevi aşık texts that I examine in

this study connect Alevis with socialist groups and link Alevism with Kemalist principles. Whether

consciously or not, aşıks are ethno-political entrepreneurs, engaged in discourses that present

Alevis as guarantors of laicism and ultimate enemies of Sunni fanatics.

The different categories that Alevis emphasize appear at particular moments, for example,

when Alevis make claim for their rights concerning the political representation and equal rights

such as mother tongue-based multilingual education for Kurdish citizens. Both the one-party and

multi-party regimes of Turkey have perceived the Kurdish claims as divisive requests. In the

32
Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 2
33
Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 18
34
Brubaker, 2002: 168
35
Brubaker, 2002: 174
36
According to Brubaker “reifying groups is precisely what ethnopolitical entrepreneurs are in the business of
doing.” Brubaker, 2002: 167
 17

context of Kurdish movement, the hostility and suspicion towards Alevism increased. The

identification of Alevi groups as Kurds became a lot more salient in Turkey, leading to divisions

between Kurdish Alevis and Turkish Alevis, and hinder the opportunity for the Alevis to have a

powerful voice in their struggle for recognition.

The ethnic group-making efforts among Alevis may disrupt the Alevi efforts in political

arena, but it fails in general to disrupt the religious, social, and cultural interactions between Alevis.

Alevi commonalities, especially the cem ritual cross the boundaries between various Alevi

subgroups. Alevis assert their differences from non-Alevis when they seek access for equal

citizenship rights, and matters such as secular education, religious freedom, or a state recognition

of Alevi houses of worship called cemevis. Drawing on this argument, a person can be identified

as Kurd, Alevi or secular depending on his or her perspective on and relationship with the given

category, which is another appearance of intersectionality within Alevi groups.

Thus, this distinction between the groups and categories helps us to understand when and

how Alevi people identify themselves and perceive others in ethnic, national or political terms.

The following discussion about the historical phases of Alevis will flesh out the fact that there is

an ongoing construction of Alevism.

1.2. A Brief history of Alevism

Alevi studies are referred to by several different names in English, such as Alawis, Alevis,

Alevis-Bektashis or Kızılbaş/Alevis.37 Anatolian Alevis should not be confused with the Arab

Alawis, known as Nusayris. Alevis and Bektashis are often not distinguished; the Bektashi Sufi

order is present within Alevism and scholars often use both names interchangeably. The

37
I use the “Alevi studies” to cover the research in the study of Alevism.
 18

combination of both terms as “Alevis-Bektashis” is chosen when referring to both groups

concurrently. In this study, I will use the name Alevi to refer Anatolian Alevis, the term Alevi-

ness to refer the Alevi identity, and the concept Alevism (Alevilik) to cover the Alevi belief and

practices.

The term “Alevi” is a modern and a self-designated name which became popular in the

1850s. Historically, Alevis, as we know them today, trace back to Kızılbaş (Redhead, in reference

to the red turbans) communities in the early sixteenth century in Anatolia. The Kızılbaş

communities were the nomadic Turcoman tribes who converted to Safavid cause and obeyed the

charismatic leader İsma’il (1487-1524), who later established the Safavid Dynasty with the help

of Kızılbaş communities.38 In 1501, İsma’il established the Safavid Empire, took the royal Iranian

title of “Shah,” and became the leader of the Safavid order. Shah İsma’il, the conquering messiah,

politically influenced Kızılbaş communities, who settled in the disputed territory between

Ottomans and Safavids.39 Şahkulu rebellion in 1511 was the initial uprising of Kızılbaş against the

Ottoman Empire due to political conflicts.40 After the Battle of Chaldiran (1514) between the

Safavids and the Ottomans, in which the Ottomans were victorious, the tension between the

Kızılbaş communities and the Ottomans increased. The Ottoman Sultan was particularly concerned

about the Kızılbaş in lands under his control. Following the battle, the Kızılbaş communities within

the Ottoman territory launched a series of rebellions during the sixteenth century. 41 In a severe

38
The root of the Kızılbaş movement was the continuation of the mystic beliefs of the dervish groups that existed in
Anatolia since the 13th century. For a detailed account of Kizilbash history see Kathryn Babayan, “The Safavid
Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi’ism,” Iranian Studies 27, no. 1/4 (1994): 135–161.
39
Shah Ismail presented himself as an incarnation of heroes from Iran's cultural past, prophets’ family, and God.
The oldest and most authentic version of Shah Ismail’s divan (collected poems) is V. Minorsky, “The Poetry of
Shāh Ismā’īl I,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 10, no. 04 (February 1942): 1006 – 1029.
40
Şahkulu was a dervish, Safavid sympathizer, died during the rebellion. For a detailed discussion on Şahkulu
Rebellion see, M. Çağatay Uluçay, “Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padişah Oldu?,” Tarih Dergisi 6, no. 9 (1954): 61-74;
41
For an overview of the sixteenth century political and religious conflicts between Ottoman and Safavids, see Saim
Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevîlik, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013).
 19

response to their challenging the Sultan’s political authority in Anatolia, the Ottomans stigmatized

and persecuted Kızılbaş groups.

Regarding the conflict between the Ottomans and the Safavids, as Karolewski states,

“[b]oth parties began to emphasize the religious differences between each other in order to

legitimize their aggression against the Muslim neighbor.”42 The religious emphasis that came out

of the political supremacy of the Ottomans also led to the development of “legalistic Sunnism as

Ottoman state doctrine” during the later period of the rule of Suleyman I (1520-66).43 The

Ottomans established Sunni orthodoxy and structured accusations of heresy and disobedience

against Kızılbaş/Safavids.

During the rule of Shah Abbas I (1587-1629), the successor of Shah Isma’il, the Safavid

Empire gradually institutionalized another branch interpretation of Islam, Twelver Shi’ism. Once

the former approach of Shah Isma’il was abandoned, Shi’ism was accepted as the legal religion of

the state.44 Although accusations of heresy were leveled at Kızılbaş/Safavids, it is important to

acknowledge the split between Kızılbaş and Safavids to understand the origins of the Alevi

movement in Anatolia. While Kızılbaş system has a Sufi concept, considering every member equal

(mürid), the Safavids’ desire to be a sedentary empire created a conflicting function between

Kızılbaş pirs and Safavid shahs.45 According to Kızılbaş historian Karakaya-Stump, until the mid-

seventeenth century, there was still “a complex spiritual hierarchy” between the Shi’a Safavids

and Anatolian Kızılbaş due to the loyalty of charisma which believed to be transmitted to member

42
Janina Karolewski, “What Is Heterodox About Alevism? The Development of Anti-Alevi Discrimination and
Resentment,” Die Welt Des Islams 48, no. 3/4 (2008): 440.
43
Markus Dressler, “Inventing Orthodoxy: Competing Claims for Authority and Legitimacy in the Ottoman-Safavid
Conflict,” in Legitimazing the Order: Ottoman Rhetoric of the State Power, Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus
Reinkowski (Leiden et al., 2005): 151
44
While Roger Savory have understood the Twelver Shi’ism as an opposition to Ottoman Sunnis, Babayan
considers Imamite adaptation as an internal issue within the Safavid movement. Babayan, 1994: 142
45
Babayan, 1994: 137
 20

of the Safavid Shahs.46 During the Isfahan phase (1590-1722), the centralization of new Imamite

Shi’i identity, which believed in a succession of twelve divinely inspired imams, completely

revised the spiritual and political concepts of the Kızılbaş.47 Thus, the “exotic beliefs” of the

Kızılbaş were undermined by the new Safavid political theology and by the end of the seventeenth

century “the sharia-minded version of Islam became hegemonic, putting an end to the era of

exchange and tolerance.”48

The Safavid conflict, the institutionalization of Sunnism, and the policies of centralization

within the Ottoman Empire gradually marginalized Anatolian Kızılbaş groups.49 Following these

policies, the Kızılbaş traditions were stigmatized with official accusations of the term kafir (non-

believer) due to their esoteric concept of god (bāṭini). One of the most common allegations against

Kızılbaş groups were based on rumors such as sexual immorality and adultery (zina).50 Similar

accusations arose for Alevism as a post-Kızılbaş movement due to their religious rituals in which

both women and man participate together. 51 Karolewski writes on this issue:

Since Kızılbaş tradition is esoteric, non-members are excluded from ritual gatherings and
most parts of community life. This secrecy […] raised Sunni suspicion. It is often argued
that the secret gatherings of Kızılbaş were to conceal nothing else than the unmoral acts
that they were accused of. 52

46
Karakaya-Stump translates a letter which belonged to an Alevi family (Dede Kargın) from 1624, mentioning the
Safavid Shah as a mürşid-i kamil (spiritual guide). Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, “Kızılbaş, Bektaşi, Safevi İlişkilerine
Dair 17. Yüzyıldan Yeni Bir Belge” in Journal of Turkish Studies: Türklük Bilgisi Araştırmaları 30, 2 (2006): 119
47
Babayan, 1994: 142
48
According to Babayan sharia-minded Islam “[had] appealed to Imamites and the crypto-Sunnis for whom the
advent of the Mahdi was part of their eschatological beliefs,” for Imamites, Sufis were moved away from Islam and
their doctrines were considered as heretics, see Babayan, 1994: 137, 146, 161
49
The Ottomans issued imperial commands (fermans) to propagate the Kızılbaş heresy idea and promoted anti
Safavid/ Kızılbaş writings. see Karolwski, 2008: 441
50
For a summary of accusation see C. H. Imber, “The Persecution of the Ottoman Shī‘ites According to the
Mühimme Defterleri, 1565—1585,” Der Islam 56, no. 2 (1979)
51
For example, the phrase “Mum söndü” (extinguishing the candle) is one of the accusations, implying sexual
immorality during the Alevi rituals, where the candles are lighted throughout the ritual.
52
Karolewski, 2008: 447
 21

Still, in modern Turkey, the Kızılbaş name is attributed pejoratively to Muslim people who

interpret religion differently from the followers of Sunni Islam. The majority of Sunnis in Turkey

regularly revive similar accusations, intentionally insulting Alevis with stereotypes and otherwise

alienating them. For example, the debate between Sunnis on whether they can eat food prepared

by an Alevi is one of the micro-aggressions that Alevis encounter. Another public debate is

whether it is permissible for a non-Alevi to marry an Alevi or not. The discourse is closely

associated with discussions of halal and haram and whether Alevis are Muslims or not.

To sum up, the political and social discrimination against Alevi communities traditionally

forced them to live at the edge of society and in remote areas. As a result, there is limited

information regarding Alevis from the late-seventeenth until the mid-nineteenth century. The

extant buyruks (sacred texts, lit. Command) and manuscripts allow us to understand the traditions

and history of both Kızılbaş/Alevis.53 However, the fact that many documents are hidden and

usually dispersed among Alevi families raises difficulties for Alevi studies of Alevism. The

compilation and interpretation process of these written documents raises much speculation. Karin

Vorhoff summarizes the historiography challenge in Alevism:

Alevi authors are able to reconstruct Alevi “history” successfully at […] will because the
fragmentary documentation of Alevi and Bektashi history allows one to deal quite flexibly
with would-be facts. In this regard, even scientific research has to guess more than it can
state.54

Although I endorse Varhoff’s emphasis on fragmentary documents, I believe Alevi

documents can construct only a part of Alevi history. The increasing adherence to texts among

53
Buyruk text was published for the first time in Turkey in 1958. See Sefer Aytekin (ed.) Buyruk. (Ankara: Emek
Basım-Yayınevi, 1958). There are different copies of Buyruks both in private and public archives. For a brief,
overview of the documents, see Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, 2010: 273–86. It is possible to classify other sources of
Alevism as follows: Manuscript works, certifications (icazetname) or genealogy (secere), and other archive
documents written Alevi ozans, especially Fuzuli’s (14th Century) and Yemini’s (15th century) works.
54
Karin Vorhoff, “‘Let’s Reclaim Our History and Culture!’: Imagining Alevi Community in Contemporary
Turkey,” Die Welt Des Islams 38, no. 2 (1998): 236
 22

Alevi scholars ignores the capacity of oral transmission. In the case of Alevis, which centered on

dedes and babas (lit. elders, functioning as spiritual leaders), it is equally important to give

reference to Alevi narratives and oral literature.

1.3. Problems of definitions: Heterodoxy, Syncretism, and Rural Islam Discussions

The emergence of Alevis in Anatolia was a socio-religious process that coincided with

Ottoman assimilation and centralizing policies. Since the late-nineteenth century, our

understanding of Alevi beliefs within the Islamic practices has been dominated by the Western

concept of heterodoxy. The label of “heterodox Islam” for Alevism started with Christian

missionaries who encountered Alevi groups in Eastern Anatolia in the 1850s. 55 The missionaries

documented their interactions with the Kızılbaş/Alevis and documented near-term Alevi history

through their publications until the early years of the twentieth century. Although their deliberate

attempts to associate Christian elements with Alevism failed, their references to Alevi

communities influenced international discourse on Alevism, and more importantly, transferred

normative concepts of “heterodoxy” and “syncretism” into Alevi studies. 56

Transferring the orthodox/heterodox binary into the discourse of Islam leads to ambiguity

regarding Alevi studies. Heterodoxy is usually considered the opposite of orthodoxy; however,

orthodoxy could not be understood without its difference from heterodoxy. Robert Langer

55
For a summary of Christian missionaries see Hans-Lukas Kieser, “Muslim Heterodoxy and Protestant Utopia. The
Interactions between Alevis and Missionaries in Ottoman Anatolia,” Die Welt Des Islams 41, 1 (2001): 90
56
The heterodox assertions can be found in Hasluck’s work. Hasluck argues that Alevis were Christians, who
converted to Islam, see F.W. Hasluck, Christianity and Islam Under the Sultans (London: Clarendon press, 1929);
F. W Hasluck, Heterodox Tribes of Asia Minor (London: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and
Ireland, 1922). Most of the encounters of missionaries published at American Board of Commissioners for Foreign
Missions, (1821-1934), The Missionary herald, (Boston: Published for the Board by Samuel T. Armstrong.) For a
critical review of Christian missioners’ archives see Ayfer Karayaka-Stump, “Alevilik Hakkında 19. Yüzyıl
Misyoner Kayıtlarına Eleştirel Bir Bakış ve Ali Gako’nun Öyküsü,” Folklor/Edebiyat 29:1 (2002): 301-324
 23

underlines the relativity of this term and notes that “something is orthodox or heterodox depending

on one’s perspective and standpoint.” 57 Lager suggests that orthodoxy “should be understood as

the dominant resource of those in power, who use it to regulate authorized, legitimate versus

unauthorized, illegitimate activities.”58 Using such a relative term as orthodoxy to refer to the

conceptual differences in the Islamic context elevates the dominant point of view, Sunnism, and

marginalizes the Alevis along with other variants. In another article, Langer & Simon criticize the

usage of “Eurocentric interpretive categories” and argue that the heterodox/orthodox binary

“fail[s] to grasp the pluralism and complexity characteristic of Muslim religious life.” 59

In one usage, orthodoxy is paralleled with Sunnism. This meets with the Islamic topos that
right belief and right behaviour would consist in following the sunna of the Prophet and
heresy in opposing him. “Orthodoxy” is not an uncommon translation of sunna. However,
to equate orthodoxy with Sunnism results in a definition which is too narrow and too broad
at the same time. Obviously, Sunnism is not the only orthodoxy in Islam. 60

In this sense, adopting heterodoxy in Alevi studies as an analytic description is an apparent

deficiency because it tries to delegitimize Alevism by ignoring its socio-religious structure. To

continue Langer & Simon’s argument: Alevi eschatological concepts do not make sense in

discussions due to the Western terms adopted which has no proper categories for comparison with

other Muslim groups. Therefore, even Alevis themselves favored the concept of heterodoxy to

have a conversation about identity in modern religious discourse.61 Alevis argue for their

recognition and equal citizenship by using theological perspectives which are constituted through

57
Robert Langer, “Yezidism between Scholarly Literature and Actual Practice: From ‘Heterodox’ Islam and
‘Syncretism’ to the Formation of a Transnational Yezidi ‘Orthodoxy,’” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
37, no. 3 (2010): 394
58
Langer, 2010: 394
59
Robert Langer and Udo Simon, “The Dynamics of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy. Dealing with Divergence in
Muslim Discourses and Islamic Studies,” Die Welt Des Islams 48, no. 3/4 (2008): 274
60
Langer & Simon, 2008: 274-275.
61
Another interpretation of favoring the word heterodoxy, according to Karolewski, is because “the Turkish quasi-
equivalents have extremely negative connotations [and] serve as insults (e. g. sapık or kafir, which both mean
heretic, non-believer).” Karolewski, 2008:437
 24

reference to Sunnism. However, the Sunni references links to a specific view of history; and the

heterodox/orthodox discussion above demonstrated that these references have political undertones.

The heterodoxy discussion goes hand in hand to a certain degree with syncretism.

Syncretism in theology denotes the combination of particular cultures and religions. There have

been many discussions of authenticity and traditions in humanities, criticizing the notions of purity,

and considering syncretism as a neutral process. 62 Yet within religion, using the term religious

synthesis is an approach intended to exclude other claimants to religious authority and authenticity.

Application of such a category to Alevism raises the primary question of whether there is any

religion or culture that is purely authentic. All religions and rituals are constructed through the

processes of synthesis and erasure. Thus, syncretism is a “contentious” term, “taken to imply

‘inauthenticity’ or ‘contamination,’ the infiltration of a supposedly ‘pure’ tradition by symbols and

meanings seen as belonging to other, incompatible traditions.” 63

The usage of both syncretism and heterodoxy as terms for defining Alevism leads to

constructing Alevism as a ‘deviation’ from a supposedly more authentic Islam and implies ‘less’

authenticity. From that perspective, Stewart and Shaw offer to recast syncretism as a “discourse”

and underline that authenticity is about power and agency:

What makes them ‘authentic’ and valuable is a separate issue, a discursive matter involving
power, rhetoric and persuasion. Thus both putatively pure and putatively syncretic
traditions can be ‘authentic’ if people claim that these traditions are unique, and uniquely
their (historical) possession. 64

62
For examples Hobsbawm and Ranger point out that many traditions interact and borrow from each other. They
categorize traditions as invented traditions and gradually develop traditions. E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, eds.,
The Invention of Tradition, Canto Classics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
63
Charles Stewart, Rosalind Shaw, and European Association of Social Anthropologists, Syncretism/Anti-
Syncretism: The Politics of Religious Synthesis (London; New York: Routledge, 1994): 1
64
Stewart and Shaw, 1994:6
 25

In the light of this discussion, we see that Sunni tradition successfully established itself as

the religious authority of Islam. Definitions claiming that Alevism is a syncretic and heterodox

religious tradition are a way to essentialize Alevis and unauthorize their religious activities by

giving privilege to a “great” Sunni tradition. The reliance on a particular and essentialized concept

of Islam plays a major role in constructing identities. The religious discussions in Turkey describe

Islam through Sunni traditions by excluding any other interpretation. This religious essentialism

constructs Alevi identities in one simplified form and gives little room to discuss their

interpretations. Religious and political authorities in Turkey are, of course, well aware of the

historical development of Alevism. As Bowen explains, “Islamicists [specialist in the study of

Islam] base their general accounts of Islam largely on scripture and on a relatively narrow range

of Middle Eastern social forms. These forms are assumed to play out, more or less accurately, a

single, scripturally embodied Islamic culture.” 65 Scripture-based Islam does not facilitate

discussions of, for example, Alevi cem houses or rituals which could make equal claim to be

mosques and the daily prayer. Analyzing Alevism requires a non-essentialist approach, which is

the capability to reflect on one’s own understanding.

Alevi discussions are still dominated by the Eurocentric categories of religion and the

essentialist approach of theologists that claim what is necessarily linked to Islam. In the 20th

century, the influential politician and historian Mehmet Fuat Köprülü and the scholars who

followed his footsteps structured a widely accepted framework based on these essentialized

concepts, heterodoxy and syncretism, as well as the degree of literacy. 66 Similar to the religious

65
John R. Bowen, “On Scriptural Essentialism and Ritual Variation: Muslim Sacrifice in Sumatra and Morocco,”
American Ethnologist 19, no. 4 (1992): 656
66
For Köprülü’s narrative on Anatolian religious traditions see Türk Edebiyatında Ilk Mutasavvıflar; regarding
Anatolian Islam and Turkish Sufism see Anadolu’da Islâmiyet and Bektaşiliğin Menşeleri. Two other famous author
who widely use the term “heterodox Islam” is Irene Melikoff and Ahmet Yasar Ocak. Melikoff’s and Ocak’s many
 26

constructions of Christian missionaries, Köprülü’s works overemphasized the Turkic elements of

Alevism. According to Köprülü, Kızılbaş/Alevism was a “folk religion” with a combination of

nomadic Turkmen customs (shamanistic traditions), popular Sufi practices (especially Yeseviye

order), and some extreme Shi’a elements.67 He also explains the different traditions in Anatolian

Islam by positing a correlation between socioeconomic level and religious preference. Köprülü

considered Alevi dedes and babas who were believed to be in contact with the sacred as successors

to the pre-Islamic shaman/bards. According to his works, while the orthodox version of religion

and its high culture understand the “sophisticated” texts of Islam, the illiterate Anatolian

Kızılbaş/Alevis adhere to their dedes and religious leaders and remain oblivious to the great

tradition of classical Islam.

Although Köprülü’s framework is widely circulated among Alevi communities, several

scholars challenge his work, and argue against the syncretism and heterodoxy norms that are

attached to Alevism. 68 Dressler, for example, suggests that Köprülü’s conceptualization of

Kızılbaş/Alevism “as ‘heterodox’ Turkish Islam [..] served to connect the modern Turkish nation

with its most ancient roots, and integrated the Kızılbaş-Alevis into the national fold while

simultaneously re-inscribing their religious difference.”69 Likewise, Karakaya-Stump reviews the

works established around heterodoxy and Alevism as Islamized shamanism. For the assertations of pre-Islamic roots
of the Qizilbash traditions see, Irene Melikoff, Sur les traces du Soufisme Turc. (Editions Isis: Istanbul, 1992.); see
also, collected articles of Melikoff, Uyur İdik Uyardılar / Alevilik-Bektaşilik Araştırmaları, trans. Turan Alptekin,
2nd ed. (Demos Yayınları, 2009); Ahmet Yasar Ocak, Babailer Isyani - Aleviligin Tarihsel Altyapisi (Dergah
Yayinlari, 2011); Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Alevî ve Bektaşî Inançlarının İslâm Öncesi Temelleri: Bektaşî
Menâkıbnâmelerinde İslâm Öncesi Inanç Motifleri, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000).
67
Extreme Shi’a is a translation of ghuluww term, which Babayan offers to replace with exaggeration, since the
ghuluww concept exceeds the borders of mainstream Islam. Extreme Shi'a sects have the features of Sufism and the
Alid mythology, which some of them considers the Fourth Caliph, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, as a
marginal, rebellious hero. Some of them have the idea of reincarnation and various recollections of God, such as
dhikr and sama rituals.
68
For a detailed critic on Köprülü’s work, see the second chapter of Markus Dressler, Writing Religion: The Making
of Turkish Alevi İslam, Reflection and Theory in the Study of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
69
Markus Dressler, “How to Conceptualize Inner-Islamic Plurality/Difference: ‘Heterodoxy’ and ‘Syncretism’ in
the Writings of Mehmet F. Köprülü (1890–1966),” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 3 (2010): 258
 27

empirical grounds of the Köprülü paradigm in light of recently emerged Alevi documents, which

further demonstrate the complex socio-religious structure of Alevism. 70

Most discussions about the nature of Alevism ignore the socio-religious structure of Alevis

known as ocak sistemi (hearths system, family lineage). Ocaks organize around individuals (pirs

and mürsids) who come from hereditary groups (seyyeds) claiming descent from the Twelve

Imams and undertake the responsibility of spiritual tutorship in Alevism. An individual has to born

into the family of talips (followers) to be a member of the given ocak.71 The translation of the

complex social order of Alevis into general structure of Islamic faith usually suffers from lack of

nuance, thus ocaks should be analyzed within Alevism’s own tradition. The traditional Alevi

worldview and ethics are shaped through the ocak system, and this lineage system allows Alevi

groups to sustain their inner/esoteric (batini) interpretation of Islam via interactions.72 Dressler

(2010) suggests distinguishing Muslim orientations as charisma-loyal and scripture-loyal,

underlines Alevis as a charisma-loyal groups, which avoids labeling Alevis with heterodoxy,

heresy and disobedience with more grounded approach.73

As I have summarized, there has been a long history of discrimination and violence toward

Alevis from the late-seventeenth century Ottoman Empire to today’s so-called “new Turkey”

70
Ayfer Karakaya-Stump offers to abandon the term heterodoxy and syncretism due to the misrepresentation of
Alevism, and she particularly highlights the prominent position of Sufi movements in Anatolia in “The Wafā‘Iyya,
the Bektashiyye and Genealogies of “Heterodox” Islam in Anatolia: Rethinking the Köprülü Paradigm.” Turcica
(44) 2012-2013: 279-300;
71
Karakaya-Stump has shown that many ocaks received their religious authorizations (icazetname) from an early
structure of Sufi order, Wafa’iyya (13 th-16th century). Her work also shows that various groups revered Ali and the
family of the Prophet aligned with these Sufi groups. See, Karakaya-Stump, 2012.
72
Alevi teachings are detailed further in the second chapter during the interpretations of Alevi poems
73
Dressler, 2010: 259-560
 28

period.74 After the proclamation of the Republic, the physical violence was replaced by epistemic

violence aimed at the nature of Alevism.

1.4. The Alevi Transformation

The anti-Kızılbaş/Alevi attitudes of the late Ottoman period manifest themselves as rumors

and prejudices against Alevis in today’s Turkey. This section will emphasize the transformation

of Alevi identity over the course of Turkish political upheavals. The twentieth century had

significant effects on the formation of Alevi identity due to political movements and the violent

attacks against their identity. In order to understand the social and political transformation of Alevi

identity, one needs to know the different periods of Turkish history.

Studies about Turkish politics and history usually categorize periods within modern

Turkish history as the Kemalist or Republican era (1923-1950), the Democratic Party era (1950-

1960), the left-wing political movement era (1960-1980) and the military intervention by Junta

(1980), and the rising Turkish-Islamists synthesis after the 1980s turned into a moderate Islam

after the 2000s. During each of these periods, Alevis sought political and social equality and access

to economic power. Dressler mentions three phases of Alevism in the twentieth century which

parallel Turkish history: “First, secularization understood as decline of religious beliefs and

practice; second, a turn to leftist ideologies, and third, a cultural and religious reorientation.”75

This transformation of Alevism can be explained through Barth’s notion of “constraint on inter-

74
“New Turkey” is a slogan used excessively by the current government (AKP, The Justice and Development Party)
and the president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He combines the phrase of “new Turkey” with the slogan
saying, “One nation, one country, one flag, one state.” This demonstrates the nationalist agenda that is governing
Turkey now. On the other hand, President Erdoğan employs the Islamic brotherhood sign, known as Rabia, to
intensify these four elements in his nationalist discourse. The message of the AKP government is a mixture of
Islamism and nationalism which gives no room for Alevis.
75
Markus Dressler, “Religio-Secular Metamorphoses: The Re-Making of Turkish Alevism,” Journal of the
American Academy of Religion 76, no. 2 (2008): 284
 29

ethnic contacts,” which refers to the political regimes that discourage interactions and transactions

between groups.76 The distrust towards Alevis and “the lack of opportunities to consummate

transactions” between Alevis created new orientations and meanings concerning their identity.

Regarding the political participation of Alevis, Barth’s framework suggests that “if a person is

dependent for his security on the voluntary and spontaneous support of his own community,”

members of the group need to express themselves with their behavior, which supposed to strength

the given identity. Following Dressler’s categorization, I will elaborate on each era and provide a

brief overview of each stage to explain the Alevi behavior within the Turkish State.

After the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, many reforms took place with the intention

of building a secular and modern country. These revolutions aimed to replace the former Ottoman

society, which was regarded as a backward traditional society, with a contemporary civilization.

Kemalism was the state ideology of Turkey, aiming to create a new nation with the following six

pillars: republicanism, nationalism, statism, secularism (Turk: laiklik), populism and

revolutionarism-reformism. Among the many principles of the newly emerged Republic,

nationalism and secularism are crucial for comprehending the political and ideological crisis

confronting Alevis in the twentieth century. Before I turn towards the transformation of Alevis in

Turkey, I will take a moment to give some background about Turkish secularism and nationalism.

These two principles of the Republic differ from the Western examples which supposedly

inspired Kemal Atatürk. Although Turkey is “a democratic, secular and social state governed by

rule of law,” Turkish secularism does not exactly refer to a strict separation between the

government and the religious world, but to aggressive state control over religion. 77 The

76
Barth, 1969: 36
77
“The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by rule of law, within the notions of
public peace, national solidarity and justice, respecting human rights, loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based
 30

formalization of Turkish secularism has raised the question of whether this secularization was a

separation of state and religion or whether “it was an irreligion aimed at the systematic liquidation

of Islam.”78 In the early stages of the Republic, Kemalists considered religion and individual

religiosity as a threat to their modernization agenda. The nationalist agenda of the country aimed

to create a modern state with less religion and more Turkish-ness. The closure of madrasah and

shrines, banning religious-based clothing, and introducing the Latin alphabet were some of the key

reforms that were meant to break ties with the Islamic-Arabic past. However, the rapid pace of

change in society widened the gap between elites and masses. Under the opinion that Turkish

society had not yet developed an intellectual civil society to comprehend Kemalist reforms, the

elite ignored the masses, and reforms took place under the influence of this Jacobin perception. 79

In order to maintain Kemalist ideology, the control over religion was a legitimate step to

stop Islamic “backwardness.” An institutionalized example of this control is the Directorate of

Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, hereafter Diyanet) which established in 1924, the

regulation and administration of all issues dealing with belief and ritual. Yavuz explains the

purpose of Mustafa Kemal and Diyanet as follows:

… the [Diyanet] exists to promote love of homeland, the sacredness of the military and
civil service, respect for law and order, and hard work for the development of Turkey. In
other words, it has the arm of the state to educate and socialize new “Turks” according to
the needs of the Republic. The establishment of the [Diyanet] also was expected to
nationalize Islam. Turkish secularization therefore has not recognized the autonomy of
religion but rather has tried to control it strictly and has used religion for its own
nationalizing and secularizing goals. 80

on the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble.” See Turkey. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [The Constitution
of the Republic of Turkey], Article 2. 1982.
78
Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1964):479
79
Jacobin was a political movement during the French revolution, indicates a centralized and strong government.
80
M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, Religion and Global Politics (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,
2005): 49
 31

Although Diyanet is established to control religion, it absorbed the Ottoman clergymen,

which became key figures driving Islamization after 1950s. Diyanet drafts a weekly sermon

delivered to mosques, and employs thousands of Imams and religious functionaries, who are

technically civil servants of the government. Two other important institutions dedicated to

nationalism were the Turkish Historical Society (Turk Tarih Kurumu) and the Turkish Language

Society (Türk Dil Kurumu). These two entities emphasized narratives of pre-Islamic connections

among Turks to create a new historical theory as well as to maintain a distance from other Muslim

countries. Following these state-funded campaigns, many academic works (especially historical,

linguistic, and anthropological) were conducted to “imagine” a Turkish nation. “The Turkish

History Thesis” and the “Sun-Language Theory” are well-known products of the Turkish state-

building process.81 Without a doubt, the reimagining of Alevis as “Islamicised Turks” was one of

many projects of the one-party era.82 The nationalist histography and policies in dealing with

Alevis show that the concerns about Alevis continued during the post-empire.

The efforts of the Kemalist secular state resulted in specific institutions that elevate the

Sunni Muslim Turkish majority. The control over religion made Sunni Islam more powerful in

public discourse in comparison to other religious and ethnic groups of Anatolia, which were also

challenged by the nationalist discourse of the Republic. The mainstream interpretation of Turkish

nationalism has a strong religious connotation. The “nationalism” ideology is rendered as

Milliyetçilik in the Turkish language. The millet (people) system divides the population into

communities by faith. 83 The Ottoman Empire practiced this millet system and interpreted their

81
Sun Language Theory is a hypothesis that argues all languages originated from Turkish, see Erik Jan Zürcher,
Turkey: A Modern History, 3rd ed (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004):190
82
Most frequently, French academician Melikoff defined Alevism as a “Shamanist Islamisation,” see Irène
Melikoff, “Les Origines Centre-Asiatiques Du Soufisme Anatolien,” Turcica 22, (1988): 7–18.
83
Millet system is a designated name for Ottoman politics that accommodates the Non-Muslim communities within
the Empire in exchange for a special tax. The system consists of “local communities with certain measure of
autonomy vis-a-vis the local representatives of the government.” Zürcher, 2004): 12-13.
 32

multidimensional society according to a religious binary: Muslims and non-Muslims. The Turkish

model of nationalism is a sort of legacy of this millet idea which seeks Turkification and

Sunnification while simultaneously ignore other categories.

Explaining the role of secularism and nationalism, it is safe to say the Kemalist reforms

prescribed a new Turkish identity to different ethnic groups who lived in Anatolia. However,

citizens of alternative identities, such as ethnic Kurds, who were unhappy with these reforms,

reinforced and politicized their identities seeking access to wealth and power.84 In other words, the

aggressive revolutions of the newly-founded Republic did not help to unify the society. The elite

interpreted every action of ethnic and religious groups as an attempt at Islamic revival, and the

masses were overwhelmed and intimidated by state intervention in every aspect of social life.

Coming back to the secularization phase in Alevism, it is not hard to understand why Alevis

celebrate modern Turkey and its secularist reforms. Overall, the Kemalist secularism was a

“rejection of the ideology of Islamic polity.”85 Disestablishing Islamic law liberated Alevis from

religious discrimination and gave an opportunity for social and economic integration. Thus, Alevis

welcomed Kemal Atatürk, enjoyed equality in society, and became among the most loyal

supporters of his reforms. Starting from 1950s, the revival of Islamic traditions symbolized the

return of Ottoman oppression for Alevis, who maintained the past violence and massacres in their

collective memories. 86

In the second stage of transformation (1960s), Alevi traditions declined and became tied to

left-wing political ideologies. When nationalist parties started to relax Kemalist principles and

84
Yavuz, 2005: 52
85
Berkes, 1964: 499
86
After the 1950s (especially after each military coup) the resources of Diyanet have been expanded and the Islamic
education have been increased. The statements of Diyanet include more guidance to the nation.
 33

adopt pro-Sunni Islam policies in the 1960s the tension between Kemalist military and the

nationalist government increased, and the military carried out its first coup in the 1960. 87 For

similar reasons, the nationalist Prime minister Demirel was removed from the office in March

1971 and in September 1980. The increasing polarization between right and left political groups

affected Alevis and they became disinterested in Alevi traditions as a result of the rise of socialist

solidarity with socialist non-Alevis. Alevis turned to socialist and communist parties to address

issues of social and economic equality. In addition to the political polarization, the massive

migration of the rural population to urban areas broke the communal ties among Alevis.

Subsequently, their social practices, such as participating in religious ceremonies or simply

personal interactions with dedes and other followers (talip) gradually declined. This decline had

serious consequences for Alevis since they do not have their own educational structures for the

transmission of sacred knowledge.

Alevis, therefore, began to identify themselves with “the universalistic worldviews offered

by socialism and Marxism.” 88 The discursive tone that led the nature of Alevism materialized

during the period between the 1970s to the 1990s. Although many Alevis turn against religion,

they still acknowledge their Alevi identity by reinterpreting the religious aspect of Alevism. 89

The communists/socialist party affiliation increased the hostility and suspicion towards

Alevis among state actors and pious Sunni citizens, and the tension quickly turned into communal

violence. During this period, there were many attacks by the militant Sunni majority in Alevi

neighborhoods. The massacres in Maraş (December 1978) and Çorum (between May and July

87
Starting from 1950s, the government showed more tolerance to religious communities (Nurcus and Nakşibendis),
and guaranteed protection. The religious wiriting and the social organizations of these groups increased and utilized
to promote political ideology.
88
Dressler, 2010: 287
89
See the Sökefeld’s research to read the interesting relation between Alevism and Marxism, Sökefeld, 2008: 95
 34

1980) aimed at Alevis demonstrate the severe violence and polarization in Turkey between Alevis

and Sunnis. Hundreds of Alevi people died in both events. During the days of incidents, the doors

of Alevi houses were occasionally painted with a red cross and Alevi families, their houses and

shops were attacked by militant Sunnis. Following to the Maraş massacre, the martial law was

announced in several cities including Istanbul and Ankara. 90 In the end, the extreme violence and

unrest within society triggered the 1980 military coup, which resulted in a far more conservative,

nationalist government.

This brings us to the third stage characterized by the revival of Alevi identity. In the

aftermath of the 1980 military intervention, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis developed as a new

national identity to reduce leftist ideologies as well as the religious influence of other Islamic

countries. The government allowed and supported Islamist institutions both financially and

ideologically. Islamic symbols entered the public spaces and school curricula, the number of

religious schools (İmam Hatip) increased, and the number of Islamic groups expanded in society. 91

In this rapid Islamicization, religious forces obtained political and economic strength. Several

parties with an Islamic agenda were founded under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan after the

military invention. 92 For many Alevis, this situation was alarming and threatening to Kemalist

reforms. The construction of religious Alevi identity began to re-emerge in the mid-1980s as a

result of the rise of the political Islamic movement.

90
There are numerous publications on those events, for an English-language source, also mentioning the shifting
boundaries among Alevis, see Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden, eds., Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive
Overview, Social, Economic, and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia, v. 88 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2003).
91
Yavuz, 2005: 127
92
Erbakan (1926-2011) was also the Prime Minister of Turkey (1996-1997). After the military coup he was banned
from politics for violating the separation of religion and state. The founders of National Order Party (1970-71) and
its successors created a National View (Milli Görüş) movement which was a fusion of Islam and Turkish
nationalism. The parties followed this movement are the National Salvation Party (1972–1980), the Welfare Party
(1983–1998), the Virtue Party (1997–2001), and the Felicity Party (2001– present).
 35

Having lost their trust of the state after Maraş and Çorum massacres, another significant

attack that is imprinted in the collective memories of Alevis is the Sivas massacre in 1993. Thirty-

seven people lost their live in a mob attack mobilized by Sunni-fundamentalists during the Pir

Sultan Abdal Festival.93 The images that had been recorded by a news agency shows that the fire

lasted for hours without any intervention of police or the fire department. The government’s

attitude towards this assault paved the way for the Alevi revival. The feelings of past violence

associated with the Sivas massacre have strongly shaped Alevis’ political and religious identity. 94

Alevi networks and institutions gathered momentum after this event, and Alevi activists began to

stress the Alevi religious identity and demand for legal recognition by the state.

The urbanization of Alevi segments brought social skills and intellectuality to new

generations. Today, Alevis are able to establish associations, institutions, and media outlets for

political mobilization. These institutions were able to establish cemevis (cem house, recognized by

the state as cultural houses), TV channels and periodicals for the expansion of Alevi knowledge

and the demonstration of their continuing resistance against pro-Sunni programs of the

government. The newly constructed cemevis are not just covering religious activities but they have

other activities for what Özdemir calls “developing Alevi identity.” 95 The new cemevis have

venues for conferences, social gatherings and some cemevis also cover some other areas such as

the training of dedes or group bağlama and semah training.

93
Pir Sultan Abdal is one of the important Alevi saints and poets of the sixteenth century.
94
For a detailed analysis of the past massacres in the collective memory of the Alevis, see Nil Mutluer, “The
Looming Shadow of Violence and Loss: Alevi Responses to Persecution and Discrimination,” Journal of Balkan
and Near Eastern Studies 18, no. 2 (March 3, 2016): 145–56,
95
Ulaş Özdemir, “Rethinking the Institutionalization of Alevism Itinerant Zakirs in the Cemevis of Istanbul,” in
Landscapes of Music in Istanbul, ed. Alex G. Papadopoulos and Asli Duru (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2017):144
 36

The current Alevi resistance against “Sunni democracy” penetrates to the Alevi individuals

via activities in cemevis, media outlets, and other cultural forms such as gatherings in music

festivals or private events. 96 Especially after the 1990s, the visibility of zakirs/aşıks on the radio

and TV channels and in music scenes increased the Alevi mobilization. Certain individuals

changed the outlook of zakirhood and subsequently aşıklık tradition, which will be discussed

further in the part two.

The preliminary institutions of the Republic which promoted Turkification and

Sunnification developed after 1950s and the following governments regarded Alevis as a potential

threat. The threat of arbitrariness and violence created a lack of trust for the state actors among

Alevi groups. As Barth’s framework argues, this lack of trust reinforced Alevis to recline on other

elements to perpetuate themselves. In the Alevi context, emphasizing socialist values and engaging

with political parties can be explained as strategical manipulations of Alevis to sustain their

identity.

96
The “Sunni democracy” term is used to denote the religious rights designed by Sunni authorities with Sunni
understanding of religion.
 37

2. The Cem Ritual and The Aşıklık Tradition

2.1. The Cem Ritual

I have introduced the development of the Alevi question, then, I emphasized the anti-Alevi

discriminations during the Ottoman rule, which one can observe the similar prejudices against

Alevis in modern Turkey. Before the Alevi music and its importance on Alevi subjectivities can

be discussed, the Alevi ritual has to be introduced.

The most explicit element of Alevism is the cem ritual. Cem rituals are based on oral

traditions. Alevi documents and manuscripts (menakıbname, erkaname, buyruk) are also used as a

reference point with regards to the instructions about the cem ritual. Further, there are examples of

Alevi-Bektashi poems, which animate the cem ritual and mention the sacred feelings generated

during the ritual. Cem rituals consist of twelve services, meaning both the designated roles of

participants, and the actions that they undertake. The following chart lists and explains the twelve

services in cem rituals.97

Dede Conducts the cem ritual

Rehber Assists the dede and helps other participants

Gözcü Maintains the order of the ritual

Çerağcı Lights the candles

Zakir Plays and sings the music repertoire

Süpürgeci Sweeps the carpet98

İbrikçi Pours water from the pitcher and distributes

Lokmacı Takes care of the food

97
The names of the twelve services can be called differently in some regions.
98
Süpürgeci sweeps carpet symbolically during the ritual, purifies the circle (meydan).
 38

Semahçı Dances the semah dance

İznikçi Cleans the cemevi

Bekçi Ensures everyone arrived safely to their houses

Peyik Announces the cem to the neighbors

There are few differences between rituals depending on regions and ocaks, but they all

follow the basic principle of Alevism, which is the devotion to God-Muhammed-Ali trilogy. The

comments and the order that I listed are my personal observations of the ritual in Kertme cemevi.99

Figure 1: Kertme Cemevi. Alevi religious ceremony. Zakir is playing saz. The image on
the left is Ali. Three portraits hang on the top right wall, from left to right: Imam Ali,
Haji Bektash Veli, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Top of the window, quote from Haji
Bektash Veli (13th century): “Educate your women”. Amasya, Turkey. February 2, 2016

Cem rituals focused upon a small circle around dede and other recognized elders of the

community. Dede presides over the ritual and gives educational speeches about Alevi beliefs and

99
Kertme Cemevi is a village located in Amasya, Turkey. The population of the village is one-hundred thirty.
 39

practices throughout the ritual. “Cem olmak” means to be gathered and united, thus, the main idea

of cem is rızalık (consent). Dede greets his talips (followers) and other participants with the phrase

of “Rıza şehrine hoşgeldiniz” (Welcome to the city of consent). The first step is attaining social

harmony among and between the participants. Thus, before proceeding to the ritual, dede ensures

that no one is resentful of each other by asking the question of “Rıza mısınız?” (Do you consent?

/ Do you agree?) Once the resentments and conflicts have been disclosed in meydan (circle),

everyone gives their consent three times, exclaiming: “Rızayız!” (We agree!) Soon after that, aşık

begins his service by performing songs which are categorized by their thematic content.

Aşık’s performance includes different musical forms, for example, mersiye tells the story

of Karbala and the martyrdom of Hüseyin (one of Ali’s children), düvazimam and tevhid honor the

Twelve Imams, miraçlama tells the story of the prophet Muhammed's ascension, which is

performed together with the semah dance.100 In principle, aşık revitalizes the melancholic

memories of Alevis by singing all those particular forms along with many deyiş.101 In many

examples of Alevi-Bektashi deyiş, we see God as an immanent truth, emphasizing the vahdet-i

vücut (unity of existence), which is the philosophy that interprets everything as a shadow of God. 102

The cem’s repertoire has a de facto form, but aşıks’ musical experience, as well as the local styles

of the community, determine the structure of the Cem ritual.103 In that case, we understand that the

100
The other Alevi musical forms are followings: deyiş, nefes, gülbank, vahtedname, mersiye, and semah. For a
detailed explanation of each category, see Ulaş Özdemir, Kimlik, Ritüel, Müzik Icrası: İstanbul Cemevlerinde
Zakirlik Hizmeti, (Kadıköy, İstanbul: Kolektif Kitap, 2016):103-115
101
Deyiş (religious hymn) has a broader narrative, includes different references and incorporates with the symbol of
Alevi values and feelings.
102
For a detailed discussion on vahdet-i vücut (unity of existence) and Alevi-Bektashi doctrines, see John Kingsley
Birge, The Bektashi Order of Dervishes (London: Luzac Oriental, 1994): 87-161
103
Depending on the ocak different instruments and styles appear in Cem repertoire. Ulaş Özdemir, “Rethinking the
Institutionalization of Alevism Itinerant Zakirs in the Cemevis of Istanbul,” in Landscapes of Music in Istanbul, ed.
Alex G. Papadopoulos and Asli Duru (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2017):147-148
 40

musical performance of aşık is critical for the ritual and subsequently, for the expression of

Alevism.

Aşık performance continues by other services, interspersed with the dede’s prayers and

blessings, which corresponded with participants affirmative call “Allah, Allah.” Although rituals

mostly take place between dede, aşık, and twelve services, the people around the meydan have a

special role in the sense of participation. Their gestures and quiet singings create a rhythm that

becomes part of songs and dances. The participants place their hands to their hearts or lips to

express their respect to the mentioned sacred names and swing from side to side rhythmically,

which functions as a physical commentary to the ritual.

2.2. Understanding Cem Rituals

Ever since the myth-ritualist theory of religion suggested the importance of rituals in

establishing the community, theorists began to see belief and practices as united, and one is

compelled to reconsider belief as a part of practice. According to Emile Durkheim, “religion is an

eminently social thing,” and what makes religion appealing is the positive impression that we

derive from the act of ritual. 104 The rituals are the living enactment of the experience of god, which

gives joy, energy, and enthusiasm to the believer.105 In addition to the positive impression of

rituals, Durkheim also finds similarities between religious rituals and ordinarily occupations, such

as events of music and dance:

[…] every festival has certain characteristics of a religious ceremony, even if it is of purely
secular origin. In every case, its effect is to bring individuals together, to put the masses
into motion, and thus induce a state of effervescence—sometimes even delirium—which
is not without kinship to the religious state. 106

104
Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen E. Fields, (Paris, F. Alcan, 1912; New
York: Free Press, 1995): 9. The Elementary Forms considered as the most mature work of Durkheim.
105
Durkheim, 1995: 386
106
Durkheim, 1995: 386-387
 41

The music and the dance semah are the most distinctive elements of the cem ritual, which

generate the strong feelings that Durkheim emphasizes. There are other ways and domains that

Alevi groups revitalize the feelings of cem ritual. Aşıks are the ones who carry these feelings

outside of cemevi by performing at various locations. The visibility of aşıks in public gatherings,

festivals, concerts, TV and radio programs, and muhabbets (private gatherings) spreads the sacred

feelings of a ritual to every corner of one’s life. What an aşık accomplishes for individuals can be

found at the outside of cemevi. Thus, listening Alevi aşıks at music festivals or the radio can be

functioned as worshipping.

In ritual theory, authors like Victor Turner and Richard Schechner emphasize the idea of

ritual as a performance. 107 Turner's work concentrates on liminality and refers ritual as a

transformation process. The transportation occurs by witnessing and participating to the

performance or even by entering the ritual space. Turner argues that the symbols observed during

the ritual are “the specific properties of ritual behaviour,” which contain massive information about

the activity field. 108 In this regard, bağlamas, candles, portraits, names, or even gestures that are

made throughout the cem ritual are the symbols filled with Alevi teachings. Alevis too describe

some symbols as sacred and illuminating. Bağlama is often called the “stringed Qur’an” (Telli

Kuran) and kissed before holding it as a demonstration of respect. Similarly, aşıks receive the same

respect because of their performance that narrates the sacred and sentimental stories of Alevism.

“Aşığın sözü, Kuran’ın özü” (The word of an aşık is the essence of the Qur’an) is a phrase that

regards the aşık by general consent as a medium that conveys Alevi teachings. Listening to the

107
Victor Turner’s early works introduce the concept of social drama, see his first major work Victor Turner, The
Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1967, 2002); Richard Schechner is
a pioneer of performance studies. Schechner employs ritual as drama and a part of the performing art, see, for
example Richard Schechner, The Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance, (London: Routledge,
2004); see also, Richard Schechner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play, (London: PAJ
Publications, 1982).
108
Victor Turner, [1967], 2002:19-20
 42

divine voice of aşık with the sacred instrument bağlama carries Alevis into a different state of

mind, or as Turner refers, a state of transformation.

Performances in rituals “mark identities” and “bend time.” 109 What makes aşıks so special

among Alevi individuals is the divine relationship that arises during the cem ritual.110 Thus, the

sacred relationship between aşıks and Alevi individuals travels around in time and space. This

relationship intensifies by means of the other special features related to the aşıklık (aşık-hood)

tradition. To understand the Alevi aşık development and their influence on Alevi individuals better,

it is necessary to mention some important elements of this tradition.

2.3. The Alevi Aşıklık Tradition

As I mentioned at the introduction, aşıklık is an old and common tradition in Alevi villages

and towns. According to the folk stories in the nineteenth century, in order to be an aşık, one should

receive a cup of drink in his dream. In Alevi traditions, in addition to this dream motif, one needs

to get permission of his mentor (usta) or a spiritual person (pir or er) before composing poetry. 111

While some aşıks use their last name as a pen name, some aşıks use a name that reflects their

character or a name has been whispered to their ear in their dream. Although aşıklık does not

belong exclusively to Alevis, it is still a widespread tradition among rural Alevi villages.

Regarding the lack of written documents in Alevism, Alevi traditions are passed down through

spoken world. Thus, the importance of oral literature for maintaining the traditions of Alevism has

109
Richard Schechner and Sara Brady, Performance Studies: An Introduction, 3. ed (London: Routledge, 2013): 28
110
This argument can be found at Goffman’s study of everyday life. Goffman argues that “when an individual or
performer plays the same part to the same audience on different occasions, a social relationship is likely to arise.”
See Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Nachdr., Anchor Books (NY: Doubleday, 1990): 15
111
For a detailed study on dream motif in aşıklık, see Ilhan Başgöz, “Dream Motif in Turkish Folk Stories and
Shamanistic Initiation,” Asian Folklore Studies 26, 1 (1967): 1-18.
 43

been emphasized by many folklorists.112 Both Alevi and Sunni aşıks traditionally travel

neighboring villages or cities and perform in public events or private gatherings.

Aşıks poetry mentions variety of personal and social issues, such as love, separation, death,

or friendship. Before the 1980s, one of the main venues for aşıks to perform were the coffee houses,

where aşıks compose their poetry spontaneously and compete their musical and poetic talents with

each-other. The performance of aşıks are not merely virtuosic. Although the music usually

occupies a secondary place in aşıklık tradition, the musical accompaniment is important to draw

attention to the lyrics. Erdener’s study of the Turkish coffee houses underlines the importance of

using familiar tunes and proper words to increase the interest of the audience.113 Aşıks use

traditional tunes (makam) and familiar phrases and make slight chances when they compose their

songs. According to Erdener, the shared musical repertoire reinforces the bond between the

audiences and the performers, which “makes the event a shared social experience.” 114

Turkish folklorist Başgöz defines aşık as an “actor, musician, reciter, and poet in one.” 115

Among all these qualifications, I should add that aşıks are also activists. Once aşıks begin to

compose poetry, they articulate the plight of the society, give references to actual facts,

sarcastically criticize certain events or individuals, and invite everyone to listen to their conscience.

Given the low literacy rate in rural villages of Anatolia, aşıks function almost like journalists. They

observe current events, storify and share them with the public. Aşık poems and folk stories are

instructive and a major source for understanding moral concepts. While some aşıks compose a

new music, some of them inspired by old folk music and circulate old songs with their own lyrics.

112
For example, Irene Markoff, “The Role of Expressive Culture in the Demystification of a Secret Sect of Islam:
The Case of the Alevis of Turkey,” The World of Music 28, no. 3 (1986): 42–56. İlhan Başgöz, Folklor Yazıları
(İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1986)
113
Yıldıray Erdener, The Song Contests of Turkish Minstrels: Improvised Poetry Sung to Traditional Music, Milman
Parry Studies in Oral Tradition (New York: Garland, 1995).
114
Erdener, 1995:80.
115
İlhan Başgöz, 1952: 332
 44

Although the debate of the effect of literature as old as Plato and Aristotle, in the 1930s,

the Turkish intellectuals hosted a similar debate to make use of literature. Folk literature was a

major source for moral growth and to harvest Turkish nationalism. The following quote from Ziya

Gökalp suggests collecting folk tales and poems with a nationalist criterion:

Folk tales are the most valuable treasure of the nation […] when all the tales are collected,
those which are instructive for children and useful for national spirit should be selected,
and the remainder must be thrown away. 116

Knowing the growing interest in folklore during the Republic period, the poetry of Alevi

aşıks who had esoteric interpretation toward religion “endowed the secular policy of the Republic

with strong ideological support.” 117 The Alevi poems that include esoteric interpretations were

useful for the construction of Turkish national identity. The articulations of Alevis as ‘real Turks’

by the language and history institutions of the one-party era diminished the Alevi element, which

was regarded as a potential threat to Muslim Turkish homogeneity.

During the Republican period, Alevi aşık music shifted from authentic themes to the

populist ideologies of Kemalism. It would be a mistake, however, to imply that Alevi aşık music

was uncontaminated by politics before Kemalism. The most pervasive and seminal personas of the

classic aşıklık tradition, especially the poetry of Yedi Ulu Ozan, express social and political

criticisms of elites and the oppressive Ottoman government. 118 The point that I would like to

underline here is the prominent role of aşıklık in the twenty-first century as a major outlet of

political protests and leftist propaganda.

116
Ziya GokAlp, “Masalları Nasıl Toplamalı” Halk Bilgisi Mecmuası, 1 (1928): 22 quoted in İlhan Başgöz,
“Folklore Studies and Nationalism in Turkey,” Journal of the Folklore Institute 9, 2/3 (1972): 167
117
Başgöz, 1972: 168
118
Yedi Ulu Ozan: “Seven Great Poets” or “Seven Grand Poets”. The names under this category of Yedi Ulu
Ozan are Nesîmî (d. 1418), Hatayi (d. 1524), Pir Sultan Abdal (d.1550), Fuzûlî (d. 1556), Yemînî (fl. early sixteenth
century), Virânî (fl. early sixteenth century), and Kul Himmet (fl. late sixteenth century).
 45

In the 1960s, economic and social urbanization took place and aşıks who migrated to the

city encounter with different circumstances, suffered from impoverishment and were involved in

the highly politicized atmosphere of the cities. Thus, the topics and musical styles of the aşıklık

tradition is gradually changed. Aşıks created a new hybrid form which includes political and

religious symbols as well as a synthesis of folk and popular music. Without going into further

details of nationalism and urbanization, I would like to bring up the case studies to provide concrete

examples for the change in the aşıklık tradition.

2.4. Case Studies: Political Topics in the Aşıklık tradition

2.4.1. Making sense out of a text

In order to get a clear understanding of the Alevi aşıks, it will be meaningful to pause, and

introduce how I make sense out of aşık texts. The fusion of Kemalism and Alevism in Alevi poetry

invites us to view contemporary aşıklık as an intertextual form of literature where political and

religious categories overlap. Intertextuality, in its broadest manifestation, demonstrates the

interconnectedness of all texts. 119 According to Graham, “intertextuality […] foregrounds notions

of relationality, interconnectedness and interdependence in modern cultural life,” and further notes

that in postmodernist era, “it is not possible any longer to speak of originality or the uniqueness of

the artistic object […] since every artistic object is so clearly assembled from bits and pieces of

already existent art.” 120 Aşık poetry is plural, depends on reader’s interpretation and a combination

of “the dialogic voices” which exist in the minds of Alevi audiences.121 My understanding and

119
The term was formulated initially by Julia Kristeva in the mid-1960s who combined ideas from Mikhail
Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism. See In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics to find Bakhtin’s arguments concerning the
novel’s dialogical character. Bakhtin’s essays collected in The Dialogic Imagination. Kristeva’s intertextuality term
could be found her essay ‘Word, Dialogue, Novel.’ M. M. Bakhtin and Caryl Emerson, Problems of Dostoevsky’s
Poetics, Theory and History of Literature, v. 8 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
120
Graham Allen, Intertextuality, The New Critical Idiom (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2011): 5
121
Allen, 2011: 198, 209
 46

interpretation of aşık poetry related to a vast oral history and existing literature on Alevism as well

as Turkish politics. No doubt, Alevi interpretation of aşık texts are different from the other groups

who do not have the same dialogs among themselves.

In this study, it is not possible to seek out the aşık, and ask him what he or she intended.

However, there are other factors that influence our perception. Beside my participation,

understanding the settings in which discourse occurs also contributes to my interpretation process

of aşık poetry.122 Most of the poems are recited during important events, such as economic crisis,

military coup, or violent acts. The social and political context is an important part of text analysis,

which will provide an extra dimension to the meaning of poems.

2.4.2. Interpretation of the text

As I go through the aşıks text during the Republican period, I notice certain concepts that

aşıks regenerate: Mahdi doctrine, martyrdom, unity and togetherness (birlik ve beraberlik),

independence, motherland (vatan), and Kemal Atatürk. On the one hand, aşıks repeatedly use these

concepts, thereby boosting Kemalist values and channeling Alevism into a socio-political

identity.123 On the other hand, they evoke the memory of Alevi persecutions and reactivate feelings

of rebellion, as the vehicle for Alevi movement. Often Alevi aşıks plainly express their love to

Kemal Atatürk, as in Aşık Veysel (1894-1973):

Let us cry to Atatürk

The whole world is bleeding
He was the commander of the nation
The death has arrived, souls are weeping
[…]

122
Cokely describes seven major steps in cognitive processing and he lists the factors that influence interpreters and
their interpretations, see Dennis Richard Cokely, Interpretation: A Sociolinguistic Model, Sign Language
Dissertation Series (Silver Spring, Md: Linstok Pr, 1992).
123
Dressler introduce the fusion of religion and political themes in Alevi poetry.
 47

Surely, this world is mortal

Where is the lion of God?
Races, kinds, communities, all creatures
They all are weeping124

Veysel was born in 1894 in Sivas. Since he had witnessed to the battles and the early days

of the Republic, his poems engage with various issues. Kemal Atatürk died in November 10, 1938.

“The lion of God” (Allah’ın aslanı) is a religious metaphor that is used for Ali. In cemevis, the

portrait of Ali usually includes a lion, lying down at Ali’s foot. Using the metaphor of lion to

describe Atatürk gives Alevis the allusion of a sacredness. Aşık Veysel, who also worked as an

instructor in halkevis (community houses), is a highly regarded poet in Turkey. 125 In 1965, Turkish

Grand National Assembly decreed to give him an award for his contribution to Turkish language

and his service to the nation. Throughout his life, Veysel wrote many poems supporting national

unity and togetherness, emphasizing the Alevi-Sunni conflict:

God is unique, the prophet is truth

Lord of the universe is absolute
Stop the discrimination,
Here comes the time [to stop]

Kurdish, Turkish or Circassian

We all are sons and daughters of Adam
We have been martyrs and veterans together
[…]
What is Yezid, who is Kızılbaş?
Aren’t we all brothers and sisters?
Our fire will burn all of us
The only remedy is to quench
[…]
Veysel, don’t diverge to right or to left
Just wish unity from the God
What polarity brings is only trouble
The real question is the humanity question (Oğuzcan, 1984: 57-58)

124
Aşık Veysel, Aşık Veysel, Kalan Müzik, Compact CD, vol. 1, Aşık Veysel Arşiv, 2001
125
Halkevi was an enlightenment project to educate citizens in the rural areas and strength the reforms of newly
established Republic
 48

The function of Veysel’s poem is to emphasize the virtue of being human, to animate the

independency sprit and to remind that they all fight shoulder to shoulder for freedom. In short, he

invites people to see beyond religion and race. Veysel mentions an important name: Yezid (Yazīd

I or Yazīd ibn abi Sufyan) (647 – 683), who was the second caliph of the Umayyad caliphate. Yezid

and his adherents killed Ali’s son (Imam Hüseyin) at Kerbela in 680. Thus, Alevis use the name

Yezid to only curse someone. Veysel’s comparison of Yezid and Kızılbaş points out the political

stigmatization for each group through names. His metaphor “our fire will burn all of us,” refers to

the hatred between Alevis and Sunnis. He gives the message saying that hatred is a curved blade.

Although Veysel’s poem rarely target individuals, the following example, Bu Yolda (On

this path), expresses his negative thoughts about the prime minister Adnan Menderes, who was the

leader of Democrat Party:126

What is the point of this Vatan Cephesi (Homeland Front)

Vatan (Homeland) belongs to People, doesn’t it?
The question is the election anxiety of Menderes
There is no Menderes, but merely People on this path

Although Menderes’s party constitution promised to protect secular values, the

government created favorable conditions for religious groups during his leadership. 127 After three

general elections, in the late 1958, Adnan Menderes established a public organization called Vatan

cephesi to “restore his authority” and to gather his supporters under a non-partisan organization,

which was the period that he began to “exploit religion for political ends.” 128 Veysel’s poem,

written before the 1960 military coup, implies that Vatan Cephesi is nothing but the struggle of

126
Adnan Menderes was the Prime Minister between 1950 and 1960. The military preceded a coup against the DP
government on May 27, 1960. Adnan Menderes was charged with the violation of the constitution and executed on
September 17, 1961.
127
Yavuz, 2005: 61-62
128
This argument is made by Feroz Ahmad, see Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London; New York:
Routledge, 1993): 113
 49

Menderes. He symbolically asks the meaning of vatan and underlines that homeland, Turkey,

belongs to its citizens. Knowing the humanistic emphasis of Veysel’s poetry, it is possible to

speculate that using the name “people” instead of Turkish indicates his inclusive approach to

everyone. However, the poem also explicitly expresses anti-Menderes ideas. Accusation against

Menderes eventually led to the execution of him and left a mark of the unfortunate episode in

Turkish social memory.

Ali İzzet Özkan (1902-1981)

Democrat Party and its policies was subjected to another Alevi aşık, Ali İzzet Özkan, who

was from Höyük village in Sivas. Ali İzzet, in his 70-year of aşıklık adventure, had joined various

political activities and worked as a bağlama teacher in Ankara halkevi. His political affiliations

make him one of the most politically engaged aşıks in the recent history of Turkey. His opinions

about political issues are reflected in his poems” sometimes he praised, but often denigrated the

political actors of Turkey. 129 He was a well-known aşık and he visited many cemevis in different

villages to serve as a zakir. Besides performing in Alevi spaces, starting form 1940s, Ali İzzet

began to perform in urban areas in Ankara, the capital of Turkey. In 1950s, the transition into a

multiparty system made it possible for Ali İzzet to criticize the Republican party for its

totalitarianism and economic discourses. After the elections in 1950’s, he celebrated the victory of

Democrat Party (DP) as in the following verses:

129
The following poems of Ali İzzet Özkan are taken from İlhan Başgöz’s book, where he compiled more than
hundred poems from Ali İzzet’s manuscripts and published books. This book had been published by Turkey’s
largest private lender Isbank in 1979. After the 1980s military coup, the book had been removed from the shelfs due
to the oppression from Diyanet. The second edition of the book published with the collaboration of Indiana
University Press and Pan Press, see İlhan Başgöz, Aşık Ali İzzet Özkan, 2nd ed., Indiana Üniversitesi Türkçe
Programları Yayınları (Istanbul: Pan Yayıncılık, 1994). Başgöz have been encountered with Ali İzzet several times
during his fieldworks. He also published an article about the aşıklık that includes the biographical details of Ali
İzzet, see Başgöz,1952: 334
 50

The king has died, the image has broken

We got rid of the ignorance
The palace of cruelty has demolished
We got rid of the captivity
[…]
Here is the Mahdi democracy
Shut the voice of the cruel [ones] 130

The poem considers the last days of the Republican party as a cruel kingdom. After many

failed attempts for transition to multiparty system, DP had established in 1946 with the

international and domestic pressure against 27 years of Republican regime. Democrat Party with

their liberalist discourse offered hope for overcoming economic crises and the authoritarian

regime. Major Alevi cities supported DP in the historic 1950 national elections. The poem above

perceives the Democrat Party as the Mahdi, which supposed to save them from the Republican

cruelty. However, his early enthusiasm quickly fades:

We thought Democrat Party was a young lady

It turned out to be an [ugly] widow
We had fallen for their honest and clean faces
It turned out as dark faced and guilty

Within the Turkish cultural context, using the word widow (dul) is an insult. Ali İzzet

demonstrates his disappointment and anger to DP by insulting them. During the 10 years of ruling,

DP left the paternalistic state, adopt capitalist system and supported free market rules. As a

conclusion of the democratization and liberation projects, DP also aspired to religious freedom.

The DP’s support for religious organizations brought government institutions closer to some

fundamental Sunni Islamic organizations. 131 The DP’s religious program definitely heightened the

tension between the military and the government, but it was not the only factor for the military

coup in 1960s. The Turkish economy was suffering from rising inflation, and a lack of confidence

130
Başgöz, 1994:38
131
For a detailed relationship analysis between Islamic groups and government, see Yavuz, 2005.
 51

was growing within Menderes’s own party. Ali İzzet’s description of those turbulent days and his

call for Atatürk as follows:

Atatürk, hero of the last days,

Turkey's condition got bad, come back!
The country is in the hands of discord and rebellion,
Brothers conflict with each other, come back!
[…]
Those whose sheikh is a Satan, those who are Satan themselves, multiplied,
Hell rose again, what happened [to] paradise?
Everything goes up in price, only the prayer remains
[…]
The great Turkish son gets punished
Thieves and traitors have got the job
Scarcity and starvation rule the country
[…]
Tell [to] my magnificent Lord, let him send the Mahdi,
Let him come together with Ali and Battal Gazi132
Let break the hands of those who throw stones after you,
The careless and ignorant ones are repentant, come back!133

According to Başgöz’s note, Ali İzzet composed this poem right before the military coup

in 1960.134 He mentions Turkey’s bad economic situation and the rising inflation rate and uses the

religious symbols, such as satan or hell, to describe the circumstances. While associating the

government authorities with evilness, Ali İzzet perceives Atatürk as “the great Turkish son” and

as the Mahdi who will save Turkey. Over time, the impression of Atatürk as a religious symbol

gets stronger in Ali İzzet’s poetry. In another poem, Ali İzzet declares Atatürk as the commander

of God’s army:

The army of the God [is] the army of the Turk

The commander [of the army] is Atatürk
The enemy runs away from [Atatürk’s] majesty
He is the lion of the God!
[…]
If Mahdi Kemal Pasha didn’t arrive
Mosques were going to turn into churches

132
Battal Gazi is a legendary mystical hero that is widely mentioned in the Turkish folk literature.
133
This translation is taken by Markus Dressler’s article, see Dressler, 2003.
134
Başgöz, 1994: 39
 52

Studies of philosophy was the constitution

Atatürk had taught us the knowledge

The dragon with giant steps and blue eyes

The dragon with golden hair and sun-faced
The dragon with honest words and peace
Atatürk has brought peace at home, peace in the world 135

In his description of Atatürk, Ali İzzet uses various metaphors. The dragon, for example,

is a symbol of power in old-Turkic mythology.136 Ali İzzet uses the dragon image to describe the

strong and victorious character of Atatürk. However, the “sun-faced dragon” is an interesting

definition that demonstrates a connectedness with the sun figure in Alevi-Bektashi teachings.

Moon and son are metaphors which are often used for Ali and Muhammed in Alevism. The

philosophy (ilm-i hikmet) and knowledge (irfan) that are mentioned in this poem are listed in the

Alevi concept of four gateways and forty doctrines. The fundamental idea of the Alevi-Bektashi

order declares that there are four gateways (dört kapı) to reach God and each gateway has forty

doctrines (kırk makam).137 In this case, Turkey’s constitution is associated with the mystical Alevi

path. A further astonishing aspect of this poem is the line, “Mosques were going to turn into

churches.” I interpret this populist approach as a defensive answer for the irreligious accusations

against Kemal Atatürk. 138 The public Alevi discourse uses the similar reasonings to defend

Kemalism against anti-religious accusations.

135
There two different version of this poem. Some verses in Ali İzzet’s manuscripts are not published in his book,
see Ali izzet Özkan, Mühür Gözlüm, (Ankara, Ulusal Baski: 1969), for the manuscripts, see Başgöz, 1994: 112
136
Celal Beydili, Türk Mitolojisi Ansiklopedik Sözlük, Yurt Kitap-Yayın, Ankara 2005, s. 191
137
The four gateways are the followings: Şeriat (sharia), tarikat (mysticism), marifet (knowledge), and hakikat
(turth). Birge explains the meanings of these four gateways by taking the idea of sugar. “One can go to the
dictionary to find out what sugars is and how it is used. That is the Şeriat gateway to knowledge. One feels the
inadequacy of that when one is introduced directly the practical seeing and handling of sugar. That represents the
tarikat gateway to knowledge. To actually taste sugar and to have it enter into oneself is to go one step deeper into
an appreciation of its nature, and that is what is meant by marifet. If one could go still further and become one with
sugar so that he could say ‘I am sugar,’ that and that alone would be to know what sugar ism and that is what is
involved in the hakikat gateway.” For a detailed explanation of gates and rules, see Birge, 1994: 102
138
Although irreligious is an accusation referred a person’s faith, in Turkish society is frequently used to imply the
neglect of moral values. Atatürk’s secular attitudes and reforms such as the abolition of the caliphate (March 3,
1924), raised the accusation of irreligious for him.
 53

Davut Sulari (1925-1985)

Another Alevi aşık who appraised Kemalist values is Davut Sulari. Similar to Veysel and

Ali İzzet, the aşık Sulari too calls for national unity. However, it is important to pay attention to

the political circumstances to provide a clear analysis in Sulari’s works. Aşık Sulari (1925-1985)

was from Çayırlı village in Erzincan. He received his dream cup when he was seventeen years old

and he began to participate in many musical activities from that age.139 He was a very talented

aşık, often traveling around Turkey and Europe for concerts, and was also a dede, conducting cem

rituals. He was also very influential among a new generation of aşıks with his advanced skills of

singing and playing. 140 Sulari was singing to a different audience than previous two Alevi aşıks.

After 1960s coup, the rise of political Islam and Kurdish separatism were challenging the unity,

secularity and solidarity of the Turkish state.

I’m Davut Sulari, patriot poet

The mountains and meadows [of Turkey] are like heaven
We all are Turkish, nothing more
My beautiful Anatolia, my beautiful Turkey!141

The line “we all are Turkish” concerns the ethnic conflict between Turkish and Kurdish

groups, which includes both Sunni and Alevi citizens. Starting from 1960s, the oppression against

Kurdish groups became increasingly violent and it turned into an armed conflict between the

Turkish government and Kurdish groups (The Kurdistan Workers' Party or PKK) during the

1980s.142 Sulari’s poem presents Anatolia as a land where everyone is Turkish. As a spiritual leader

139
Sadık Yalsızuçanlar, Efendiler Bağı: Davut Sulari, Yaşamı ve Şiirleri (Istanbul: Karacaahmet Sultan Kültür
Derneği, 2009).
140
For example, Ali Ekber Çiçek (1935-2006), who was a famous folk musician often mention Sulari’s name in his
interviews as a role model for his musicianship.
141
Ali Yakici, “Davut Sularî ve Ozanlik Geleneği İçindeki Yeri” (Gazi Üniversitesi, 2006):265
142
The first major attacks of the PKK started in 1984. Since then, the PKK has re-emerged with different structures
and political visions, engaged in revolutionary leftist movements and post-Marxist discourses. For a socio-political
 54

of Alevis, Aşık Sulari’s emphasis on “my beautiful Anatolia” is an influential approach for Alevis.

Alevis, as they search for a recognition in political arena, deny their ethnic identities to not being

regarded as enemies of the nation. Thus, the majority of Alevis, including the Kurdish-speaking

Alevis, feels obligate to show their loyalty to the nation.143 Alevi organizations as well as important

figures such as aşıks, make statements regarding the peace and national unity among the ethnic

identities.

The role of being dede and playing in cem rituals accord with Sulari’s musical styles. He

composed many mersiye and deyiş, where he tells the story of Karbala and the sufferings of Twelve

Imams. He put his whole sorrow and excitement into his work by using religious symbols. Sulari

was also deeply affected by the conflict between rightwing conservatives and leftwing socialists.

In 1977, Sulari openly insults Milliyetçi Cephe (MC) government, charging it with separatism.

Milliyetçi Cephe (National Front) was a coalition among right parties that established in 1975.

The following poem starts with Sulari’s speech explaining his purpose in composing this

poem: “I address [the government]: put yourself together, do not divide the country […] setting

brothers against brothers is unworthy […] I am not contumelious, I only consider the benefits of

[Turkey].”144

MC Government has the wrong attitude

That is not how statism works, oh friend!
[…]
Adana, Maraş, Antep and Çayırlı
You’ve provoked sectarianism, your hands are bloody
You have the Yazid’s blood, you ill-minded
Davut Sulari will never stop, oh friend!

understanding of the Kurdish movement, see Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden, “Understanding Today’s Kurdish
Movement: Leftist Heritage, Martyrdom, Democracy and Gender,” European Journal of Turkish Studies. Social
Sciences on Contemporary Turkey, no. 14 (June 1, 2012)
143
The expectations from ethnic groups within the hegemony of nationalism, the ethnic identity formation and
maintenance discussed in Brackette Williams’s work. Brackette F. Williams, “A Class Act: Anthropology and the
Race to Nation Across Ethnic Terrain,” Annual Review of Anthropology 18 (1989): 401–44.
144
Temmuz’un İkisi, “Davut Sulari - Mc Hükümeti” YouTube video, 4:47, Sep 27, 2012
 55

Sulari’s purpose is to draw attention to the country’s biggest problem, which is the

increasing violence between ultra-nationalist groups (ülkü ocakları) and the Left organizations

such as Revolutionary Road (Dev-Yol / Dev-Sol). Between the years of 1975 and 1980, the

government developed an Islamic discourse to challenge the secularist and the leftist hegemonic

forces.145 During the period, the cities that Sulari mentioned were divided, the Republican party

leader Bülent Evecit’s meetings were attacked regularly, and the unrelenting violence caused

hundreds of dead and thousands of wounded. “Your hands are bloody” gives us the message that

the only group responsible for this is the MC government. Sulari’s reference to sectarianism

implies the government’s attitude against Alevis. Although the poem is not explicitly religious,

the word “Yazid” articulates an Alevi response to political matters and relates the Kerbela myth

with a contemporary political experience. Sulari’s deep concern for the increasing sectarianism

can be seen in the following poem:

Get up Atatürk, İnönü, and Gürsel baba146

Human beings have been dying
The hostile efforts of the tribe of Sufyan
Human beings have been fettering
[…]
Throughout history, Sunni and Alevi
The heart’s fire is non-stop rising
[…]
Davut Sulari’s sadness won’t end
Where are the Alevis of my Turkey?
There is birth, there is death, come on go forward!
Human beings have been sacrificed 147

Similar to Ali İzzet, Sulari too recalls for Atatürk, İsmet İnönü (1884-1973), the second

president of Turkey and Cemal Gürsel (1895 –1966), the fourth president of Turkey. Sulari’s poem

145
Yavuz, 212
146
Baba is used refer an old and respected man.
147
HALK MÜZİĞİ ARŞİVİ, “Davut Sulari – Atatürk İnönü Kalk Gürsel Baba” YouTube video, 5:07, Nov 23,
2016,
 56

draws a devastating picture of murdered, fettered and sacrificed people. His purpose in this poem

to highlight the government’s violence in a time when the arbitrary arrests, tortures, and

unidentified murders of left party affiliates were a part of daily news. A key phrase “the tribe of

Sufyan” (kavmi süfyan) requires a closer examination. “The tribe of Sufyan” refers to the lineage

who established the Ummayyad Caliphate. Ummayyad Caliphate was founded by Muawiyah, who

attacked Ali’s army in 657 and whose successor Yezid killed Ali’s son Huseyin and his family in

the Battle of Karbala. According to Sulari, once again, Alevis were “sacrificed” by the same enemy

with the same “hostile efforts” of political interests. There is apparently a clear update of Karbala

myth within the aşıklık tradition. Sulari utilizes the Karbala memory and creates a victim mentality

to transmute Alevi anger into a criticism of the government.

Aşık Daimi (1932-1983)

Another example that address the left-right conflicts composed by Aşık Daimi, who was in

the music scene around the same period with Sulari. Aşık Daimi was born in Istanbul but raised in

Tercan province of Erzincan. Daimi spent most of his life in Istanbul, working in the Istanbul

Radio Station as a folk musician. The country’s climate of terror in 1970s is mentioned in his

poetry as well:

If we, friends, are not united

We will be scattered (sürüm sürüm)148
If we are not truly brave soliders
We will be scattering (sürüm sürüm)

If the fanatic (softa) doesn’t get out of the way

There is no escape from this pain
If the barriers are not eliminated
We will be scattering (sürüm sürüm)

148
Sürünmek is an idiom and it means to be miserable. If you are miserable, you creep (lit. sürünmek) on the floor.
You can also sürünmek to something, which means to rub against. I choose the word “scatter” to give a similar
meaning. In Turkish, duplications of words (ikileme) are commonly used to strength the meaning.
 57

If you are an aşık, [you believe] in justice

Don't be fooled by ignorance
If religion affects the politics
We will be scattering (sürüm sürüm)

Until we lose our heart to God

Until we mature Atatürk [Kemalizm]
Until we exile dastards
We will be scattering (sürüm sürüm)149

Aşık Daimi composed this poem right after the violent act that occurred in Tunceli, a city

located in the middle of Eastern Anatolia, in 1969.150 When a theatre play called Pir Sultan Abdal

was disallowed by the police forces, a tumult broke out between stage actors and the police and a

fellow citizen was killed by the police.151 The pain that is mentioned in Daimi’s poem is referring

the rising violence between leftist civilians and the police. Daimi’s phrase “true brave soldiers”

(özü gerçek er) is referring to “erler” and/or “pirler”, which are the common Alevi names to

describe spiritual and charismatic leaders. The word activates a particular meaning, perceiving the

ones who are the true soldiers as the ones who fully understand Kemalism. This line manifests

Kemalism as a moral philosophy that coincides with Alevi religious values.

It’s soon that your time is up

Don’t think you will get away with what you did
The oppressed will get his due from the oppressor
Even if hundred revolutionists had to be sacrificed 152

This stanza clearly demonstrates threat and revenge for the Nationalist Front. One of the

significant features of aşıklık is the ability to take the initiative and use a language skillfully to

influence an audience. This influence has been built over time through repetitions. Their method

149
Yadigar Aydın-Orhan, Aşık Dâimi - Hayatı ve Eserleri, (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 1999): 360
150
Yadigar Aydın-Orhan. (Aşık Daimi’s daughter), in a telephone conversation with Yadigar Orhan, March 2019.
Tunceli is a city located in the middle of Eastern Anatolia and the majority of the population is Kurdish and Alevi.
151
“Tunceli’de Polisle Halk Çatıştı: 1 Ölü 11 Yaralı,” Cumhuriyet, August 23, 1969: 1,7.
152
Süleyman Zaman, Derinliklerin ozanı Aşık Daimi: yaşamı, felsefesi ve şiirleri (İstanbul: Can Yayınları,
2008):116
 58

of raising awareness, as in previous examples, is either to use powerful religious connotations or

to animate certain feelings by uttering threats. Sulari’s statement about oppressed and oppressor

give message to Alevis, who had been oppressed for centuries. The following line is about Alevi

allegiance to democracy and the revolutionist principles. Here, using the word sacrifice is another

symbolic usage of victimization discourse, revitalizing the past sacrifices of Alevis.

Muhlis Akarsu (1948-1993)

The increasing anxiety of Alevi population with the rise of Sunni Islam can be seen in

many aşık poems. Some aşıks have special efforts to emphasize democracy, secularism, and

national unity. Some aşıks approach differently and emphasize their apprehension, despair and

sorrow. For example, Muhlis Akarsu’s following poem does not give advice but introduce

democrats and Alevis in general as victims:

While humanity was whole

They cut us into slices
They pricked a dark thorn to our wounds
They shot us right before the destination
[…]
Akarsu is wandering around with troubles
This dark smoke won’t leave us alone
Their only card is religion and faith
They destroyed us at the five times prayer 153

The poem has a negative and desperate message, and it is equally discriminatory because

of the pronoun “their.” According to Akarsu, their religion and five times prayers are the reason

why Alevis are suffering. Akarsu’s implication of “religious card” considers religion as a populist

policy of the government. The “dark smoke” metaphor is used to explain the venomous emotions

153
Süleyman Zaman, Muhlis Akarsu: hayatı, yaşamı, sanatı, şiirleri (İstanbul: Can Yayinlari, 2006): 204
 59

and troubles around Alevis. Akarsu’s dichotomization of theirs and ours can be seen in another

example:

Our belief is obvious friends,

Wherever the democracy is, we are there
We don’t believe the words of fanatics (softa)
Wherever the democracy is, we are there

Our dead [people] won’t arise from the dead

Don’t give useless fetwas to people
We don’t observe separatism
Wherever the democracy is, we are there

We know that the human is God, the God is human

Our rose blooms in the hearts
Akarsu says we all brothers and sisters
Wherever the democracy is, we are there. 154

The poem clearly starts with a loud-voiced and clear message: We, Alevis, are democrats.

The poem has an imaginary talk with Alevi people. There is a clear reference to the past Alevi

victims in his words “our dead [people]”. This could be the people who lost their lives Karbala,

Maraş or Çorum, or at the political conflicts. The audience is left with their own imagination. A

key line “the human is God, the God is human” is an apparent description of Alevi beliefs, vahdet-

i vücut and marifet, the final gateway.

In sum, the reading process of all these poems helps us to realize the intertextual relations

between preceding texts and the aşık poetry. While the linguistic signification of words (Ali,

Yazid, Karbala, softa, etc.) made possible to interpret the poems, the close reading of the text

through historical events triggers allusions and provides extra dimensions to the text. All these

poems embed social and political rhetoric and create moral judgments among Alevi individuals

while simultaneously activate religious meanings.

154
Zaman, 2006: 80
 60

Conclusion

In the first chapter, I explored the anti-Alevi attitudes both during the Ottoman Empire and

the Turkish Republic. The Sunni orthodoxy establishment in the Ottoman territory allowed

Ottomans to stigmatize, marginalize, and persecute Alevi communities by the accusations of

heresy. The discussion of Alevi identity showed that the religious oppressions and epistemic

discussions about Alevis had a great impact on Alevi self-identification and self-understanding.

The discussions questioning the nature of Alevism created a perception that signifies the Sunni

Islam has a higher value, that Alevis are less authentic, uncontaminated and Alevi practices

inherent in rural nomadic groups.

The Alevi resentment continued during the highly politized atmosphere of 1960s and 1970s

in modern Turkey. The Left and Right conflicts increased the sectarian tension between Alevis

and Sunnis, the massacres in Maraş, Çorum, and Sivas crystallized the boundaries. These acts of

violence created a modern martyrdom concept among Alevis, allowing them to connect their past

experiences of Karbala and the Ottoman persecutions with contemporary experiences. This chapter

also showed that the historical events of violence have been important for Alevis and the

development of Alevi organizations. During the Alevi Revival, Alevis mobilized to react to the

discrimination against their religion and worldview. In this context, it is safe to say that Alevi sense

of community maintains its structure at least in part, due to the feelings of victimization.

In the second chapter, I discussed the importance of cem ritual in Alevi communities and

explained the role of aşıks in this ritual. Cem, as a reference point in Alevi individuals, has an

important role in establishing and maintaining the community. Alevi music both in rituals and in

non-ritual contexts contain ritualistic behaviors and symbols. The selected poems showed that

Alevi music contains ritualistic symbols and revitalizes the past memories of Alevis.
 61

Due to effective rhetoric and respected position, Alevi aşıks have power to utilize Alevi

music for political and social movements. Knowing that the religious figures in Alevi communities

lost their authority during the Republican era, Alevi aşıks, as folk musicians, became even more

influential figures among Alevis. The performances within rituals generate sacred feelings and

help to transform individuals into a different state of mind. Aşıks retain the power of transformation

and they bring individuals to the ritualistic moment through their performances. Although aşıks

are free from the ritual drama in their performance in festivals, televisions and radios, or

muhabbets, their charisma and the routine of performing deyiş still give the sacred impression to

Alevi communities.155 Aşıks thus preserve their divine voices at all times. As a consequence, I

argued that aşıklık does not only transfer Alevi teachings to new generations, but it also introduces

a conceptualization of history through lyrics. Alevi aşıks offer an alternative means of knowledge

production based on interpretations of past experiences and present circumstances. The rhetoric in

aşık poems that produced by intertextuality brings a religious meaning to current events.

Contemporary Alevi aşıks who share concerns, both social and political, established a new

character in this tradition and turned it into a type of resistant performance against nationalist and

Islamist politics.

The aşık poems that I studied illustrated the long-existing suppression of Alevis, the nostalgic

longing for the Atatürk and secularism, and the anxiety about Islamist policies. My analysis of the

poems allowed us to see ever changing the dynamics of Alevi communities. In particular the

historical phases of Alevis demonstrated that Alevis are an interactive and self-aware group

surviving in different political and social events by constructing Alevism according to particular

According to Goffman, “The pre-established pattern of action which is unfolded during a performance and which
155

may be presented or played through on other occasions may be called a “part” or a “routine.”
 62

movements and contexts. The historical discussion on Alevism allow us to follow Alevi struggle

for recognition and religious freedom. Each the historical phase has a reflection in Alevi aşıklık

tradition. The functions of Alevi music can be an example analysis showing that Aleviness can be

expressed in many ways.

The example poets and many others, who serve as zakirs in cem rituals carry their performative

skills to non-ritual contexts, meaning everyday life. Performing Alevi music in private and public

gatherings do not erase the ritualistic character of the music as well the musician. After 1960s, the

increasing visibility and popularity of aşıks shows that aşıks music is filling an important gap about

Alevi representation. The sacred relationship between bağlama and aşık, which is unfolded during

the cem ritual continues in various locations. This study draws attention to everyday performance

of Alevi music, which declare and repeats manifestations concerning Alevi identity and Alev
 63

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 Curriculum Vita
Ezgi Benli Garcia Guerrero

EDUCATION

M.A. Indiana University, Central Eurasian Studies, May 2019

M.A. Haliç University, Turkish Music, January 2016
B.Sc. Istanbul Technical University, Music Technologies. June 2013
B.A. Istanbul Technical University, Musical Performance, February 2012

PROFESSIONAL & TEACHING EXPERIENCE

East Asian Studies Center, Indiana University

Program Assistant 2018 – Present
• Organized, coordinated, and managed the various programming and activities throughout the
academic year.
• Prepared and promoted bi-weekly colloquiums, contacted guests, arranged hospitality for guests
coordinating with the School of Global and International Studies’ Financial Service.
• Developed feedback reports to assess efficiency and effectiveness of colloquiums.
• Maintained the Center’s social media presence and ongoing updates of website.

Dept. of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University 2017 - 2018

Graduate Assistant
• Assisted Ottoman and Modern Turkish Studies with teaching related activities.
• Taught a section on Contemporary Turkey, including current events, foreign and
domestic policies of Turkey.
• Planned lessons and assignments, graded papers and exams.

Turkish Flagship Center, Indiana University 2017- 2018

Digital Media Manager
• Managed all social media accounts, and designed flyers and video clips for marketing, various
events, and ongoing announcements.

Language Tutor 2017- Present

• Tutored Turkish language one-on-one for advanced and intermediate students.
• Organized conversation tables and language activities for all Turkish learners.
• Mentored six students in preparations and presentation of class projects.

Midwest Alevi Cultural Center, Chicago 2016 – Present

Instructor
• Planned and taught folk music based upon Alevi-Bektashi Culture.
• Organized and supported group activities to strengthen collaboration and community
engagement.

Dept. of Cultural and Social Affairs, Avcilar Municipality, Istanbul 2014 - 2017
Officer and Instructor
• Designed events and developed strategies to help community outreaching engagement projects
for a social change in the district.
• Taught introduction to Turkish folk music and instruments in classrooms of 18 to 24 students.
Gulumse Kindergarten, Istanbul, Turkey 2013 - 2017
Preschool Art Teacher
• Developed innovative classes to introduce K-5 students to basic art concepts.
• Taught classic piano according to student ability and skill level.

LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE
Project Co-coordinator
“Young Women Leaders’ Summit.” Project of Minister of EU Affairs. Istanbul, Turkey, March 2015
• Assisted and supported the project manager in their daily duties that was attended by 25 young
students.
• Provided materials and information for participants.

Art Coordinator
“International Women Mayor’s Summit” and “Women’s Saga.” Istanbul, Turkey April 2015
• Planned the themes of sessions, provided logistics support, scheduled a formal dinner for the
speakers during the project.
• Scheduled meetings with other staff members to design the project and regular rehearsals of the
public concert.

Student Organizer
“SOCIAL Media,” EU Youth in Action Project. Eslöv, Sweeden, November 2014
• Offered students recommendations to improve their performance in the project and presentations.
• Directed and edited ten minutes video as a final outcome of the project, emphasized cybersecurity

PUBLICATIONS and PRESENTATIONS

“Alevis Through the Lens of Education Policy in Turkey” 5th World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies
(WOCMES), Seville, Spain 16-22 July 2018
“Art and Music in Turkey” Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, US, 16
September 2017
“Worship and Action: The Function of Music in Turkish Alevi Culture” Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN, US, 16 April 2016
“İlk Kadınlar” [First Women]. Journal of Avcılar Culture and Art:1/2: 68-71.

WORKSHOPS ATTENDED
International Union of Folklore Associations Caravan, Italy, France, and Spain, June 2014 Euro-Cities
Culture Forum, Strasbourg, France, October 2014