(8)People of the Philippines VS.

Solito Tena
G.R. No.100909 (October 21, 1992)

FACTS:
Alfredo Altamarino Sr was found dead in his own residence, bore eight (8) Stab
wounds and his personal properties are missing. The Daughter of the victim
sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

The NBI conducted their investigation. Mauban Police Station Commander

informed the NBI that suspicion as to the authorship of the crime had shifted to a
syndicate. This syndicate was reportedly involved in the robbery at nearby
Municipalities and a member thereof was in detention named Adelberto Camota.
The NBI agents interrogated Camota. 

Sensing that Camota knew of the incident, the NBI agents conducted polygraph
examination on Camota, allegedly with his consent. Alberto Camota executed an
extrajudicial confession in the presence of a lawyer, admitting participation in the
robbery-killing of Alfredo Almarino and pointing to Solito Tena and three others
as his companions in the crime. Solito Tena pleaded not guilty.

Solito Tena with other accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to a prison term of
20 years of Reclusion Perpetua.

Only Solito Tena appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial confession of Camota is binding against other co-
accused?

RULING:
The judgment of conviction was based chiefly on the extrajudicial confession of
accused Adelberto Camota which repudiated by Camota in open court. Used of
Camota’s extrajudicial confession is precluded by section28, of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, viz:

Section 28. Admission by third Party.—the rights of a party cannot be

prejudiced by the act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter
provided.

This rule admits of certain exceptions, to be sure, one of which is found in section
30 of rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states:
            Section 30. Admission by conspirator.—The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.

This exception does not however apply. In order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his co-conspirator, it is necessary that (a)
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the
admission relates to the common object; (c) it has been made while the declarant
was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

Several factors bar the application of said Section 30 to the case at bar. More
importantly, camota , instead of conforming  his extrajudicial confession in court,
repudiated the same, denied knowledge of the crime charged and denied
knowing accused-appellant Tena.

The extrajudicial confession of Camota thus being inadmissible against his co-
accused and being no evidence independently of said confession,linking accused
appellant Tena to the crime, this Court declares Tena not guilty of the complex
crime of Robbery with homicide with which he is charged.

2.
Tamargo vs. Awingan
G.R. No. 177727; January 19, 2010
Facts:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were shot and killed in 2003. The police
had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and
executed an affidavit wherein he stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking
spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one
of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. Columna was arrested.
On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as “look
out” during the shooting and implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard
Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda, ex-
mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a
complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten letter wherein
the latter disowned the contents of his earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured
until he signed the extrajudicial confession. Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated
May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter. The
investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing so that Columna could clarify his
contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing, Columna categorically
admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating
prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges.
In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, however, Columna said that he was
only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing
because of the threats to his life inside the jail. The RTC judge denied the motion to withdraw
the informations and held that based on the March 8, 2004 affidavit which Columna affirmed
before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA
reversed the decision.
Tamargo appealed. Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge
Daguna, there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. Awingan and the
Antiporda’s, on the other hand, contend that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was
inadmissible against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Issue:
Whether or not the admission of Columna is admissible against Awingan and the Antipordas
Held:
Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible
as
evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule on res
inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is
considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after
the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that
the
conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in
order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b)
the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-
conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses
against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other
prosecution
evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could
corroborate.
Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence
against
respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them
3.

EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ISAGANI GUITTAP y PENGSON (Acquitted),

WILFREDO MORELOS y CRUZ (Acquitted), CESAR OSABEL @ DANILO MURILLO @ DANNY @
SONNY VISAYA @ BENJIE CANETE, ARIEL DADOR y DE CHAVEZ (Discharge), DECENA
MASINAG VDA. DE RAMOS, LUISITO GUILLING @ LUISITO (Acquitted), and JOHN DOE @
PURCINO, accused.
DECENA MASINAG VDA. DE RAMOS, Appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Appellant Decena Masinag Vda. de Ramos assails the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 92-387, finding her and accused Cesar Osabel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify the
heirs of the victims the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P67,800.00 as actual damages.

On September 1, 1992, an Amended Information for Robbery with Double Homicide was filed against
appellant Masinag, Isagani Guittap y Pengson, Wilfredo Morelos y Cruz, Cesar Osabel,2 Ariel Dador y
De Chavez, Luisito Guilling and John Doe @ "Purcino". The accusatory portion of the information
reads:

That on or about the 17th day of July 1992, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one
another, armed with bladed weapons, by means of violence, and with intent to gain, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away certain personal items, to wit:

one solid gold ring valued at P8,000.00

(1)
one diamond ring valued at P40,000.00
(1)
one necklace with pendant valued at
(1) P2,000.00
cash money in the amount of
P4,500.00
one samsonite bag valued at P650.00
(1)
one .22 Cal. Squibbman with SN 64130
(1) valued at P5,000.00
one pair of sandal valued at P650.00
(1)
one music mate (karaoke) valued at
(1) P5,000.00
one jacket (adidas) valued at P1,000.00;
(1) and
one pair of shoes valued at P1,000.00
(1)

with a total value of P67,800.00, owned by and belonging to spouses Romualdo Jael and
Lionela3 Caringal, without the consent and against the will of the latter, to the damage and prejudice
of the aforementioned offended parties in the aforestated sum of P67,800.00, Philippine Currency,
and, on the same occasion of such robbery, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one
another, armed with the same bladed weapons, taking advantage of superior strength, and employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity, and with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab both of said spouses Romualdo Jael
and Lionela Caringal thereby inflicting upon the latter several fatal wounds which directly caused the
death of the aforenamed spouses.

Contrary to law.4

Upon arraignment, appellant Masinag pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Accused Ariel Dador was discharged as a state witness while accused Purcino remained at large.

On February 15, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds Cesar Osabel and Decena Masinag GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and they are sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided by law. For insufficiency of evidence, the accused
Isagani Guittap, Wilfrido Morelos and Luisito Guilling are hereby ACQUITTED.

The accused Cesar Osabel and Decena Masinag are also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Romualdo Jael and Leonila Caringal Jael in the amount of (P100,000.00) One Hundred
Thousand Pesos plus actual damages of (P67,800.00) Sixty Thousand and Eight Hundred Pesos,
Philippine Currency.

SO ORDERED.5

During the trial, state witness Ariel Dador testified that in the evening of July 15, 1992, Cesar Osabel
asked him and a certain Purcino to go with him to see appellant Masinag at her house in Isabang,
Lucena City. When they got there, Osabel and Masinag entered a room while Dador and Purcino
waited outside the house. On their way home, Osabel explained to Dador and Purcino that he and
Masinag planned to rob the spouses Romualdo and Leonila Jael. He further told them that according to
Masinag, the spouses were old and rich, and they were easy to rob because only their daughter lived
with them in their house.

The following day, at 7:00 p.m., Dador, Osabel, and Purcino went to the house of the Jael spouses to
execute the plan. Osabel and Purcino went inside while Dador stayed outside and positioned himself
approximately 30 meters away from the house. Moments later, he heard a woman shouting for help
from inside the house. After two hours, Osabel and Purcino came out, carrying with them one karaoke
machine and one rifle. Osabel's hands were bloodied. He explained that he had to tie both the victims'
hands with the power cord of a television set before he repeatedly stabbed them, He killed the
spouses so they can not report the robbery to the authorities.

Osabel ordered Dador to hire a tricycle while he and Purcino waited inside the garage of a bus line.
However, when Dador returned with the tricycle, the two were no longer there. He proceeded to the
house of Osabel and found him there with Purcino. They were counting the money they got from the
victims. They gave him P300.00. Later, when Dador accompanied the two to Sta. Cruz, Manila to
dispose of the karaoke machine, he received another P500.00. Osabel had the rifle repaired in Gulang-
Gulang, Lucena City.

Dador and Osabel were subsequently arrested for the killing of a certain Cesar M. Sante. During the
investigation, Dador executed an extrajudicial confession admitting complicity in the robbery and
killing of the Jael spouses and implicating appellant and Osabel in said crime. The confession was
given with the assistance of Atty. Rey Oliver Alejandrino, a former Regional Director of the Human
Rights Commission Office. Thereafter, Osabel likewise executed an extrajudicial confession of his and
appellant's involvement in the robbery and killing of the Jaels, also with the assistance of Atty.
Alejandrino.

Simeon Tabor, a neighbor of the Jaels, testified that at 8:00 in the morning of July 17, 1992, he
noticed that the victims, who were known to be early risers, had not come out of their house. He
started calling them but there was no response. He instructed his son to fetch the victims' son, SPO1
Lamberto Jael. When the latter arrived, they all went inside the house and found bloodstains on the
floor leading to the bathroom. Tabor opened the bathroom door and found the lifeless bodies of the
victims.

Dr. Vicente F. Martinez performed the post-mortem examination on the bodies of the victims and
testified that since rigor mortis had set in at the back of the neck of the victims, Romualdo Jael died
between six to eight hours before the examination while Leonila Jael died before midnight of July 16,
1992. The cause of death of the victims was massive shock secondary to massive hemorrhage and
multiple stab wounds.

Appellant Masinag, for her part, denied involvement in the robbery and homicide. She testified that
she knew the victims because their houses were about a kilometer apart. She and Osabel were friends
because he courted her, but they never had a romantic relationship. She further claimed that the last
time she saw Osabel was six months prior to the incident. She did not know Dador and Guilling at the
time of the incident. According to her, it is not true that she harbored resentment against the victims
because they berated her son for stealing their daughter's handbag. On the whole, she denied any
participation in a conspiracy to rob and kill the victims.

From the decision convicting appellant Masinag and Osabel, only the former appealed, based on the
lone assigned error:

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF CONSPIRING WITH HER CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF HER ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE SAID CRIME.

The appeal is meritorious.

While it is our policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial court,6 owing to
their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grueling examination,7 where there exist facts or circumstances of weight and influence
which have been ignored or misconstrued, or where the trial court acted arbitrarily in its appreciation
of facts,8 we may disregard its findings.

Appellant contends that the extrajudicial confessions of Osabel and Dador were insufficient to establish
with moral certainty her participation in the conspiracy. Firstly, Dador was not present to hear
appellant instigate the group to rob the Jael spouses. He only came to know about the plan when
Osabel told him on their way home. Thus, Dador had no personal knowledge of how the plan to rob
was actually made and of appellant's participation thereof. Secondly, while Osabel initially implicated
her in his extrajudicial confession as one of the conspirators, he repudiated this later in open court
when he testified that he was forced to execute his statements by means of violence.
On direct examination, Dador narrated what transpired in the house of appellant on July 15, 1992, to
wit:

PROSECUTOR GARCIA:

Q.         And do you remember the subject or subjects of that conversation that transpired among
you?

A.         Yes, sir.

Q.         Please tell us what was the subject or subjects of the conversation that transpired among you
on July 15, 1992 at the house of Decena Masinag?

A.         The subject of our conversation there was the robbing of Sps. Jael, sir.

Q.         How did that conversation begin with respect to the proposed robbery of Sps. Jael?

A.         It was only the two (2) who planned that supposed robbery, Daniel Murillo and Decena
Masinag, sir.

Q.         And why were you able to say that it was Danilo Murillo and Decena Masinag who planned the
robbery?

A.         Because they were the only ones who were inside the house and far from us and
they were inside the room, sir.

xxx - xxx - xxx

Q.         On that night, July 15, 1992 did you ever have any occasion to talk with Decena
Masinag together with your companions Danilo Murillo and Purcino?

A.         No, sir.

Q.         Was there any occasion on the same date that Decena Masinag talk to you?

ATTY. FLORES:

Already answered, your Honor.

COURT:

Witness, may answer.

WITNESS:

None, sir. (emphasis ours)9

We find that the foregoing testimony of Dador was not based on his own personal knowledge but from
what Osabel told him. He admitted that he was never near appellant and that he did not talk to her
about the plan when they were at her house on July 15, 1992. Thus, his statements are hearsay and
does not prove appellant's participation in the conspiracy.
Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise,
such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence not of what the witness
knows himself but of what he has heard from others."10 The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a
witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in
writing.11 In Sanvicente v. People,"12 we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly
told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar and
fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.13

Osabel's extrajudicial confession is likewise inadmissible against appellant. The res inter allos acta rule
provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another.14 Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and
mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are
his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust,
that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to
be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against
him.15

The rule on admissions made by a conspirator, while an exception to the foregoing, does not apply in
this case. In order for such admission to be admissible against a co-accused, Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court requires that there must be independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession to prove conspiracy. In the case at bar, apart from Osabel's extrajudicial confession, no
other evidence of appellant's alleged participation in the conspiracy was presented by the prosecution.
There being no independent evidence to prove it, her culpability was not sufficiently established.

Unavailing also is rule that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible when it is used as a
corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. The implication
of this rule is that there must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which, when taken together
with the confession, establishes the guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt.16 As earlier stated,
there is no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession may
corroborate.

In People v. Berroya,17 we held that to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy,
he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That
overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may
consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of
the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute
or implement the conspiracy.

In the case at bar, no overt act was established to prove that appellant shared with and concurred in
the criminal design of Osabel, Dador and Purcino. Assuming that she had knowledge of the conspiracy
or she acquiesced in or agreed to it, still, absent any active participation in the commission of the
crime in furtherance of the conspiracy, mere knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is
not sufficient to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy.18 Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship.19

Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. Like any element of the offense
charged, conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.20 Direct proof of a
previous agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of
appellant pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest. Nevertheless,
except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that appellant performed an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.21

All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant with moral certainty. Its evidence falls
short of the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of
appellant's innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City, Branch 60 in Criminal Case No. 92-487, insofar only as it finds appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
Decena Masinag Vda. De Ramos is ACQUITTED of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. She is
ORDERED RELEASED unless there are other lawful causes for her continued detention. The Director of
Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of the date and time when
appellant is released pursuant to this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

4.
Daan v Sandiganbayan 560 SCRA 233
 
Facts:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-
24170, 24195-24196, questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining
proposal. Said accused, together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged
before this Court for three counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums
of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to
conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that
some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato,
Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did
not. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted
before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee.
 
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution, dated March 25, 2004, denied
petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the
prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its
approval.

 
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his plea bargaining.
 
Issue:
Whether the lesser offense of falsification of a public document by a private individual is
necessary included in the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer,
hence the petitioner plead guilty to the former.
 
Held:
Yes. In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient
to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of
Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by
Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his
official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of
Bato, Leyte. Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged
in this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to
such lesser offenses.

Consti II case digest: PEOPLE VS JUDGE VILLARAMA

Double Jeopardy:  requisites
FACTS:
The petitioner herein did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
0/08 grams of Methampethamin Hydrochloride wrapped in aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug.

During the arraignment petitioner plead not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued, and the counsel for the petitioner on that
time, was willing to change the please of not guilty to guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17 RA No
6425, as amended. The trial judge of the lower court granted the plea of guilty to the lesser offense

The prosecutor however, filed Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds:
1. the prosecution already rested its case.
2. the possibility of conviction of private responded for the crime originally charged was high because of strong
evidence of the prosecution.
3. the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in convicting private respondent of the lesser offense of violation of section
17, RA No. 6425, as amended, instead of the offense originally charged of violation of Section 16 of the same law,
in view of the absence of a valid change of plea.

HELD:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to the approval of the court. It usually involves the defendant's pleading
guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge.

Section 2: Plea of guilty to a lesser offense - The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may
be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included
in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.

A conviction under the plea of guilty to a lesser offense, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged
for purposes of double jeopardy.

The Supreme Court held that the rules allow such plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence
to establish guilt of the crime charged. 

The counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change of plea and his conviction to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No 4625, as amended is no longer open to review otherwise his
constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.
Such disposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's
change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege.

Section 7, Rule 117 is more applicable.

However the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
included the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances..

1. ....,
2. ....,
3. The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and the offended party.

Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16
of RA No 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.