Understand Political

Philosophy
Mel Thompson
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Contents
Meet the author v
Only got a minute? vi
Only got five minutes? viii
Only got ten minutes? x
1 Introduction 1
What is political philosophy? 1
An historical perspective 5
How do you decide what is right? 9
Justification, not just clarification 12
The modern agenda 13
The structure of this book 18
2 Looking for the good life 21
Why ancient Greece? 21
Plato and the Good 27
Aristotle’s political options 35
Cynics, Stoics and Epicureans 40
Mediaeval otherworldliness 41
Renaissance realism and principled dreaming 43
3 The social contract 48
Contracts, dilemmas and war games 49
Hobbes: an alternative to chaos 52
Locke and the principles of democracy 55
Rousseau: the tyranny of the general will 65
Still relevant? 69
4 Ideas, systems and ideologies 74
What is a political ideology? 75
Starting with freedom and democracy 77
Starting with established values and traditions 82
Starting with equality 85
Starting with personal or national development 95
Starting with the environment 100
The future of ideologies 103

Contents iii
 5 Equality and fairness 106
Utilitarianism and capitalism 107
Distributive justice 114
Rawls and fairness 115
Equality of self-direction and moral regard 121
Monochrome conformity 123
Democracy 125
6 Freedom 131
Negative freedom 134
Positive freedom 143
Freedom and the law 148
7 Rights, justice and the law 154
Justice handed down? 155
Justice from the people 158
Rights 159
Political authority 167
Legislation 175
8 Gender and culture 184
The essence of womankind 186
Women and freedom 189
Gender and distinctiveness 195
Multiculturalism 199
9 Nations, war and terrorism 211
States 211
What should the state do? 217
Sovereignty, identity and representation 227
The just war theory 235
Terrorism 240
10 The global perspective 249
The international dimension 251
Sovereign states 257
Global networks 259
Moral and religious perspectives 266
Politics and climate change 272
Postscript: what hope humankind? 278
Glossary 280
Taking it further 285
Index 288

iv
Meet the author
Welcome to Understand Political Philosophy!

It seems to me that there is nothing more immediate and relevant

than the question ‘What is the good life, and how may it be
achieved?’ Whether or not we take a direct interest in national
or local politics, we cannot avoid being caught up in the laws,
traditions and values of the society within which we live, and
the ‘good life’ (whatever we mean by that) cannot practically be
achieved in isolation from other people. Hence, even for those
sceptical about the political process or the integrity of politicians, it
is always going to be worthwhile to stop and reflect on the values
we hold and the sort of society we want to live in. I hope that this
book, which inevitably tries to cover a wide range of topics in a very
short space, will encourage you to explore these things further, and
to reflect on all the crucial issues – about individual freedom, justice,
equality, the use of power, warfare, human rights and so on – that
form the bedrock of political debate.

Mel Thompson, 2010

Meet the author v

 Only got a minute?
Some subjects are optional, but this one is not; for unless

you are going to risk extreme loneliness and starvation,

you will always need to deal with other people, and thus

with the political sphere – not necessarily with the world

of local or national politics, but ‘political’ in the broad

sense of the ideas and rules by which society is governed.

Political philosophy is concerned with the basic

principles and values that underpin political life. It asks

‘What is the best way to organize society in order to
allow all its citizens to enjoy the good life?’ It sets about

trying to balance the desire for freedom against the

need for justice, or the right of an individual to better

himself or herself economically against the desire for

fairness and a concern for the poorest in society. Open

any newspaper, and you will be confronted with issues

of right and wrong, about whether a law is fair, or what

should be done with those who break it. There will be

accounts of war and the suffering that it causes – leading

vi
to questions about whether it is ever right to go to war in
the first place, or how it should be conducted to minimize

the suffering of ordinary people. We all assume that we

should be able to go about our ordinary lives without fear

of terrorist attack, or arbitrary arrest, or being exploited

by a ruling elite. And we do so because we have a basic

sense of fairness, justice and freedom.

From Plato onwards, philosophers have grappled

with questions about justice and equality, about the

values that make for a stable society, and about how

people should participate in the governing of society.

How can this best be done? What sort of government

is most likely to deliver what we need and want? These

questions form the basis of political philosophy.

Only got a minute? vii

 5 Only got five minutes?
Political philosophy is not the same thing as politics. Politics is
about the nuts and bolts of running a state, but politics only exists
because people need to organize themselves in order to achieve
certain basic ends – of which the most important are freedom and
fairness. It is very general, abstract terms such as these that are the
core concepts for political philosophy.

But that is not to suggest that political philosophy should be

conducted in some ivory tower. Listen to any debate between
politicians and you will hear them arguing that their particular policy
is best able to deliver freedom or fairness. In other words, political
views and actions are only justified with reference to the basic ideas
of political philosophy.

Political philosophy is essentially a branch of ethics – the study

of how people behave morally. We know what we mean when
we say that someone is morally good; we assume that they will
be principled in their personal life and their dealings with other
people. But what is the equivalent of the good person when it
comes to the way in which nations behave?

There is also a debate about how much a government should do.

Some argue that a government should leave the individual free to
organize his or her own life, and take the minimum in tax. Others
think it fairer if the state provides much more, and increases
taxation accordingly.

So the basic discussion is about what government should provide.

But there is another important issue to resolve: How much do we
want to be involved in the decisions made by those who govern us?

Almost everybody agrees that democracy – rule by the people – is

the ideal. Under a democracy, everyone has an opportunity to vote

viii
and therefore to influence what happens in government. However,
it’s one thing to vote in an election once every four years or so, quite
another to have the ability to influence political decisions more
directly. Should there be more direct and regular accountability on
the part of a government to the people who elected them into office?

These questions have now provided us with a general agenda for

political philosophy:

We need to establish what we mean by the good life and which

political systems can help us achieve it. Is authoritarian rule most
effective? Is democracy the only way to achieve control over the
misuse of power by governments? Is equality best achieved by some
form of socialism?

We need to consider how to balance freedom and fairness. In other

words, it might be possible to create an absolutely fair society,
but only by ensuring that everyone keeps strictly within narrowly
defined rules. On the other hand, if freedom is paramount, then
you have to accept that there will be winners as well as losers.

For much of the twentieth century, communism operated in ways

that eliminated personal freedom. The horrors of Stalin’s rule
in the Soviet Union may seem obviously evil, but collective
farming, the rejection of private enterprise and so on, were all key
features of communist political philosophy. On the other hand,
liberal democracy and economics, which had triumphed over the
old socialist states by the end of the twentieth century, brought
with it huge disparity of wealth between citizens, and made
everyone vulnerable to global financial and economic crises.

So getting the right balance between freedom and fairness is

fundamental. One person’s abstract philosophical discussion
can become a matter of life or death for those who live under
an extreme political regime. There is nothing more important
than knowing how to judge the validity and effectiveness of
governments.

Only got five minutes? ix

 10 Only got ten minutes?
Facts and values
In politics, discussions generally start with facts, but quickly
move on to consider values. The facts in question may be set out
in books on political science, sociology or economics. All of those
subjects are about how the political world is. But in a discussion
about politics, you are likely to be asked about whether you think
it is right that it should be like that. Is it right that the British
prime minister should be able to set a date for a general election
to suit his party or personal interest? Is it right that we should
accept immigrants into the country? Questions like these cannot
be answered by a recital of the facts. We know what is the case,
but need to discuss what ought to be the case!

Once you start down that route, you are asking about the norms
and values by which politics may be judged. This approach requires
you to get to grips with fundamental questions about value and
purpose. You need to ask what government is for, and whether we
need more or less government. By asking such questions, you are
doing political philosophy.

Moral values and the fundamental ideas about how society should
be run form the basis of political debate and government. Political
philosophy is the key tool for shaping up those political ideas and
values.

Learning from the past

In this book we shall be looking at thinkers and political systems
of the past. What did Plato or Aristotle have to say about the
various forms of political life in ancient Greece, about what we
mean by justice, and about who is best suited to rule? How did
Hobbes think a stable and strong government could be established?
The political philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries was concerned to make sure that people should be fairly
represented in government, a development that provided the

x
foundation of modern democracy. Then you have the impact of
economics – seen in the free market views of Adam Smith, or later
in the theories about the economic basic of social change developed
by Karl Marx. At one level you can only appreciate the works of
these thinkers by looking at the context in which they worked. But
they are absolutely relevant to questions about politics today.

So, for example, Machiavelli thought that the first concerns of any
government are security and stability. Hence, he is willing to give
more powers to a ruler, and is prepared to compromise on freedom
and rights if necessary, in order to maintain national security.
Today we still argue the rights and wrongs of this approach.

John Locke explored the separation of law from government, and

his work is still relevant today, when there are complaints that the
government are putting pressure on the judiciary.

So when we are doing political philosophy, we need to run back

and forth between the great thinkers and works of the past, and
our present world and its political dilemmas.

Nations, states or what?

In thinking about an ideal form of government, we tend to focus
on the nation-state, but it is worth pausing to reflect on just how
fluid that concept is. You do not have to go far back in history
to find much of Africa and the Far East controlled by trading
companies based in European powers. States like Yugoslavia
have been artificially created and then pulled apart again. Germany
is formed by an alliance of smaller states. States, as we think of
them now, are human creations, not simply chunks of land. They
arise and change. Land is disputed, as in the Israel–Palestine
conflict.

States tend to be sovereign within their borders, and to intervene

in them is a serious matter. But we also need to reflect on whether
the state is still the most appropriate vehicle for governance. We live
in a world where there are competing circles of influence – the
United Nations, the European Community and so on.

Only got ten minutes? xi

 Multinational discussions are increasingly essential for dealing
with multinational or global issues. But where should authority
reside?

Economics and ideology

Economics and politics are closely related. Take the causes of the
world-wide credit crisis and recession that was triggered in 2008.
The assumption was made that people want to own their own
homes, and thus that it is a good thing to offer them mortgages.
But the commercial gain from doing that meant that many people
were being encouraged to borrow more than they could afford.
The risk involved with lending such money was then shared out
among financial institutions. Everyone felt better off, many within
the banking world pocketing bonus payments. Then the problems
struck, with defaults on home loans, an unwillingness to lend
money, followed by the business failures and all this made worse
by consumers being reluctant to spend on goods at a time of
uncertainty.

And what happens?

The world finds that it needs political as well as economic
measures to help ameliorate the situation. Public money is spent
propping up organizations or companies whose failure is seen as
having unacceptable social and political consequences. In these
circumstances, people start asking: Could we do things differently?
Are our priorities the right ones? Is this policy sustainable or does
it have long-term consequences for the country or the world? So
fundamental questions are triggered off as a result of what starts
out as an economic policy.

Fairness
There have been many attempts to establish what we mean by
fairness and how it might be applied across society. In his book
A Theory of Justice John Rawls introduced the idea of justice as
fairness, and presented a ‘thought experiment’ in which a group of
people meet together to decide how they should divide up resources
between them, but none of them know if they are poor or rich.
In such circumstances, Rawls argued, people would always seek

xii
to help the poorest, since they might themselves be poor. That
argument produced considerable discussion, not least because in
practice people are never able to forget who they are. But it does
raise a fundamental question, it is clear that there are deeply held
views about what is fair. People may not look for absolute equality
but they have a strong sense of fairness. If you agree with Rawls,
then any difference in the way in which people are treated should
favour the least well-off. In practice, it appears that the reverse is
often the case.

Achieving fairness generally involves passing laws and raising taxes.

By what authority does a state have the right to impose taxes
and laws on you? Well, one answer is that you do not get a
choice – whether you are born in a country or choose to move there,
you automatically accept the political and social system that exists.
You can seek to reform it, of course, but that is another matter. But
do you trust rulers, and if you don’t, do you have the right to replace
them? In a democracy the people can remove the elected government
and replace it by another through the ballot box. That does not stop
governments from manipulating the electoral process in order to
improve their chances of re-election, not does it ensure that everyone’s
vote is equally effective. But at least there is some semblance of
accountability.

Practical thinkers
Many philosophers have taken an active role in politics,
campaigning on behalf of particular social and political issues.
Jean-Paul Sartre took to the streets of Paris with the protesting
students in 1968, and among present-day French intellectuals,
Alain Badiou continues to campaign on behalf of those who work
in France sans papiers – in other words, without legal permits.
Bertrand Russell was particularly involved with the Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament, and going back further you have
John Stuart Mill who supported the political campaign for
women’s rights, and earlier Rousseau’s thought influenced the
French Revolution and Locke’s the American Constitution. And
going back as far as Socrates, we find that philosophers take an
active role in challenging the establishment.

Only got ten minutes? xiii

 Philosophy is a process of careful and creative thought, taking
the big questions and tackling them fearlessly. It may not tell you
exactly what views you should hold on any one political matter,
but it will certainly give you a rational basis upon which to make
up your own mind.

xiv
 1
Introduction
In this chapter you will learn:
• about the questions addressed by political philosophy
• why political philosophy is about values rather than descriptions
• how political ideas have developed historically
• what issues are covered by political philosophy.

What is political philosophy?

 How does politics contribute to the well-being or otherwise of
humankind?
 What is the good life, and how is it achieved?
 What principles and values should be used to shape and judge
political institutions?
 What sort of society will best allow its citizens to flourish?
 What do we really mean by equality, justice, freedom and so on?
 Is it ever right to go to war, or to rebel against a government?
 What responsibility should governments have for dealing with
the global issues of terrorism or the environment?

Political philosophy is concerned with all these questions and many

more. It is about good government – what it involves, how it is
regulated and how it is brought about. It is about the principles
that help us to decide whether or not any particular government
is to be judged good or bad. And, of course, that requires an

1. Introduction 1
 examination of the fundamental principles of government – why
we need it, what its goals should be, how it is to be regulated and
how, if it goes wrong, it may be repaired or replaced.

Political philosophy may be seen as a branch of ethics, or moral

philosophy. Ethics looks at all issues of right and wrong in the way
people treat one another, while political philosophy limits itself to
the specific issues related to our collective or political life. It is the
ethics of social organization, applied across society, rather than
between individuals. So, for example, utilitarianism as an ethical
theory (seeking that which appears to offer the greatest benefit for
the greatest number) when applied to society as a whole, is used to
justify democracy, which aims to take the preferences of all citizens
into account through the democratic process.

Part of the task of political philosophy is to establish whether

or not there are objective criteria for deciding between right and
wrong. Does everything depend upon the wishes of the people, or
are there universally applicable rational principles for organizing
good governance?

Insight
It is important to get a balance between the moral
responsibility of individuals and that of society. Do good
people make a good society, or does a good society make
its people good? Where you stand on that question will
determine how you see the role of politics.

But just as ethics requires us to give a rational justification for our

actions, so too political philosophy examines the justification for
political institutions and ideologies. Is democracy fair to everyone?
Is there such a thing as a good dictatorship? It also examines key
ideas – fairness, justice, the rights of individuals or communities – to
see how they are related to one another, and how what they describe
may be achieved.

Would it be fair if everyone in society received an equal share of

goods and services, no matter what they contributed by way of

2
work? Or would it be fairer if everyone were allowed to earn and
keep as much as they could? Should important decisions be taken
by everyone, or only by those whose experience and knowledge best
qualifies them to decide? These are fundamental questions – not
about how society actually operates, but about how it should operate.

In other words
The shorthand way of expressing this is to say that political philosophy
is normative. Just as ethics may be descriptive (this is what people do)
or normative (this is what they should do), so politics, sociology and
economics are descriptive (this is how the political system, society or
the economy works) whereas political philosophy is normative (this is
what constitutes a just, fair or free society).

It is equally important to appreciate what political philosophy is

not. It is not concerned with describing actual political societies
or institutions: that is the study of politics. Nor is it the study of
the way in which nations and empires have developed and spread
globally: that is the study of political geography (although a
knowledge of politics and political geography is useful for anyone
interested in political philosophy). Nor is it the study of how
finance, trade and the markets shape society: that is economics.
Rather, political philosophy is concerned with the rational and
normative justification of political entities.

Political entities?
Well, yes – because ‘the political’ is not simply limited to what
happens at a national level. International bodies are equally
relevant, as may be local groups, city states, trade unions,
international companies, trading systems, shareholders and
directors of companies, and even families. You could argue that
‘political’ can apply to all those situations where groups of people
organize themselves for mutual support or action – though this is
a contentious view.

1. Introduction 3
 Politics itself can be a practical, mechanical business – sorting out
how best to deliver agreed benefits and so on. However, if it were
only that, there would be few political issues to discuss – every form
of government would be judged simply on the basis of its efficient
delivery. But life is not that straightforward. People disagree about
the principles upon which society should be run – and it is these
disagreements about principles that form the basis of political
philosophy.

Ends and means

‘Where ends are agreed, the only questions left are those of
means, and these are not political but technical …’

‘… political theory is a branch of moral philosophy, which

starts from the discovery, or application, of moral notions
in the sphere of political relations.’
Isaiah Berlin ‘ Two concepts of Liberty ’
a lecture given in Oxford, 1958

In other words, political philosophy should be about ends – about

what you seek to achieve through politics. Once the ends are
agreed on, politics and economics are the disciplines that see to
their delivery. But, of course, political and economic systems tend
to generate their own ends, so these too are scrutinized within
political philosophy.

Political philosophy is certainly not limited to the Western

tradition. In China, for example, both Confucius and Lao Tzu
wrote about how people might live together – indeed the Confucian
tradition had a huge impact on Chinese culture and politics for
millennia. Unfortunately, there is no room in this book to explore
the history of political ideas other than those in the West, but that
would be an interesting follow-up to the ideas discussed here.

4
Philosophy is never written in a vacuum. It is always coloured by
the general assumptions and ideas of its day, even though the best
philosophers ask radical questions and challenge those assumptions.
Thus, for example, when we look at the work of Plato or Aristotle,
we know that they are writing against the background of the
politics of their day. When they talk about democracy, for example,
they are not referring to modern representational democracy, but
about the direct system of government where a relatively small and
privileged number of people made decisions about how the city-
state (or polis) should be governed. Perhaps more than in any other
branch of philosophy, political philosophy therefore benefits from
being seen in context. So we will start with a brief historical review.

Insight
A key question here: Are there absolute principles that should
be applied to all societies, or should each political system be
judged in the light of the particular circumstances, history
and culture of that particular nation or era?

An historical perspective

ANCIENT GREECE AND THE MEDIAEVAL WORLD

As exemplified by Plato and Aristotle, the political philosophy

of ancient Greece addressed the issue of the good life and how it
might be lived in society. Against a range of political structures
of their day, they sought to root politics in metaphysics – in
other words, in a fundamental understanding of the nature of
humankind and the end or purpose of life. This was later taken
up in a religious context, with the idea that the right form of
government was one that reflected the natural order itself, as
created by God, establishing a mediaeval hierarchy for earth and
heaven. But in Renaissance Italy, conflicts between city-states, and
the intrigues of political life, suggested that there were occasions
when cunning, rather than godly obedience, might prevail.

1. Introduction 5
 Thinkers here include: Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Machiavelli.

THE RISE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Following the Reformation and the English Civil War, the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the development of a
very different approach to politics. This is the period in which the
wishes of the individual became paramount, and political structures
were justified on a basis of a social contract or agreement between
individuals. Rights and freedoms were debated, the French had
a revolution and the American colonies broke away from British
control. The end of that period also saw the rise of utilitarianism as
an ethical philosophy, which resulted in political systems being judged
according to their ability to deliver the greatest benefit to the greatest
number of citizens. This led to the development of democracy. The
question was no longer about the fundamental essence of humankind,
but about the best way to organize our society.’

Thinkers here include: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, Burke

and Paine.

THE EVOLUTION OF SYSTEMS

General systems of thought tend to create political philosophies as

part of their overall understanding of reality. Kant, for example,
produced rational principles for judging right and wrong,
independent of anticipated results, inclinations or individual
wishes. His famous ‘categorical imperatives’ – that something
is only right if one could wish everyone else to adopt the same
principle of action, that people should be treated as ends and never
only as means, and that we should behave as though legislating
for a kingdom in which everyone is an autonomous and free
human being – have huge political implications. Hegel explored
the idea that society was constantly changing in a dialectical
process, and Marx took this idea up and formulated his concept
of ‘dialectical materialism’ in which political change comes by
way of class struggle. You also had the impact of Darwin and
the idea of evolution through natural selection, and the attack on
democracy by Nietzsche, who saw it as supporting the weak at the

6
expense of the strong. And, at the other extreme, Mill developed
the implications of utilitarianism, and argued for liberal values and
freedom. By the end of the nineteenth century there was a huge
range of political systems of thought.

Thinkers here include: Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mill and Nietzsche.

Insight
If you are ever in doubt about the practical relevance
of political philosophy, consider the impact of Marx’s
philosophy on the lives of millions of people in the twentieth
century, or the development of democratic ideas two hundred
years earlier.

THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES

The traumas of the twentieth century concern the clash of political

ideologies that have deep roots in political philosophy. There was
the massive rise and fall of communism, the challenge of fascism
in Italy and Germany, and the steady global growth of democracy,
riding on the back of capitalist economics. Millions died in that
troubled century for the sake of political ideologies. But during
much of that time political philosophy was in the doldrums. Like
ethics, it came under the criticism that normative judgements
(saying that something is right or wrong) were meaningless,
because they could not be justified on the basis of facts. Hence, for
some years, much political philosophy simply explored the origins
of political structures and the meaning of key terms, without
working from normative first principles. There were exceptions,
of course, including those mentioned below, who challenged
ideologies.

Thinkers here include: Berlin, Hayek and Popper.

THE LATER TWENTIETH CENTURY AND THE DOMINANCE

OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

By the last three decades of the twentieth century, there was

a progressive decline in socialism and communism, with the

1. Introduction 7
 liberal democratic tradition in a position of dominance. Political
philosophy was revived, largely as the result of the work of
John Rawls, whose seminal A Theory of Justice challenged
utilitarian assumptions and re-instated normative philosophy to
the political process. The rise of feminism questioned the male-
dominated philosophy and politics of the past, and along with
it normative assumptions about the purpose of life and what
constitutes fairness in society. There was also discussion about
the scope of ‘the political’, the relationship of ideas to power, the
nature of rights, the existential implications of politics and the
need to explore new patterns of work and living.

Thinkers here include: Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin, Habermas,

Arendt, Foucault, Oakeshott, Sartre and Gorz.

Being selective …
Political philosophy is not the same as the history of political
ideas. An historical investigation requires you to pull together all
the evidence and see how things are related to one another, who
influenced whom and so on. Philosophy is about ideas. So it is
more important to select thinkers and get to grips with their ideas
than try to cover absolutely everything that has been said. This
book is therefore selective in terms of the thinkers and arguments
to be included, but endeavours to cover the main themes. This is
particularly true of philosophers of the modern period, but those
wanting to follow up in more detail might do well to start with
the works of the thinkers mentioned above.

… and original
At the back of the book there is a brief list of suggestions for
further reading, and this includes classic texts from the great

8
 thinkers of the past. However carefully one may summarize an
argument, there is nothing quite like getting back to the original.
To read sections of Plato’s The Republic, Machiavelli’s The Prince
or Locke’s Second Treatise on Government is to be confronted with
their authors’ ideas in the boldest way. If you want to discuss
the place of education or family life, argue with Plato; if you feel
that all politicians are out to maintain their own power, savour
Machiavelli; if you are concerned with controlling the powers that
should be given to a government, get into reading Locke. Dialogue
with these thinkers is what counts when it comes to getting to
grips with political ideas.

The agenda continues to change, and the twenty-first century has

thrown up a whole new range of issues, from terrorism to global
markets, to the power of the internet, to the environment. But
first let us be clear about the function of political philosophy with
regard to that agenda.

How do you decide what is right?

Any normative judgement (i.e. any judgement about what is right

or wrong) needs to be justified with reference to something about
which the person making the claim and those hearing it are agreed.
If you say ‘This is a good mobile phone’, people are likely to know
what you mean, because everyone is in broad agreement about what
a phone should do. Does it work well? Do you get a good signal?
Is it stylish? Does it have a built-in camera, MP3 player and so
on? There can still be disagreements – one person would swap the
MP3 player for longer battery life – but the fundamentals are not in
question, because it is very clear what a phone is and what it does.

Things are not that straightforward with political philosophy.

As we shall see in Chapter 2, the ancient Greeks had views about
the nature and purpose of human life, and so they were able to

1. Introduction 9
 assess political ideas in terms of whether or not they could help
people achieve their full potential as human beings. But what if
there is no general agreement about what human life is for?

The ‘social contract’ approach gets around this problem by basing

political authority on an agreement – either a literal one, or an
implied one – between the people, or between them and their
rulers. In other words, people band together for their mutual
benefit and decide the terms under which they will live. Thus,
even without an overall agreement about what people want, a
democracy should enable at least a majority of them to have the
government they think stands the best chance of reflecting their
preferences.

In modern debates there are further levels of complication.

Postmodernism challenges the idea that there can be a single ‘right’
way of seeing things, or that there is any established purpose in
human life. If we want a sense of purpose, we have to provide it
ourselves. But if a sense of purpose is contrived, how can it be used
to give any objective justification of one political system rather
than another. Without an objective measure, how can anything
be ‘better’ than anything else? Added to this is another dimension,
for in a multicultural society there is likely to be a variety of
views and values, some of which may conflict with others. It is
therefore increasingly difficult to find a common basis upon which
to establish the necessary building blocks of certainty in political
debates.

But even before the advent of postmodernism, there was a time –

roughly from World War II through until the early 1970s – when
there was general scepticism among philosophers about making
normative judgements. In other words, they questioned whether
moral statements could be shown to be true or false – and it was
widely held that they were either the expression of one’s emotions
or approval of something (emotivism) or were recommending a
course of action (prescriptivism). In either case, they lacked the sort
of certainty and proof that science was offering in its description of
the physical world.

10
Insight
In moral philosophy, it is always important to distinguish
between facts and values. Just because something is the
case, it doesn’t follow that it should be the case. Political
philosophy is particularly concerned with the latter.

During that period, the moral theory of utilitarianism (judging

actions according to whether they offered the greatest benefit to
the greatest number) tended to dominate political thinking.
A political system could therefore be judged according to whether
or not it delivered benefits to the people – something for which
there could be hard evidence, and which could be demonstrated
by statistics.

But utilitarianism has its limitations, as was pointed out in 1971 by

John Rawls. His ‘thought experiment’ (which we shall examine on
page 116) suggested that people could establish rational and logical
rules for the distribution of resources. This triggered off a range
of debates, and exposed the problem that, based on utilitarianism
alone, it is difficult to see how minorities could be protected from
the power of majorities.

But fundamental questions remain:

 How do you know what is right?

 On what basis can you decide the best way to conduct
political life?
 How can you justify or effectively criticize a political system?

Some political philosophers (for example Michael White, in his

Political Philosophy: an historical introduction), have argued
that political philosophy needs to be grounded in a ‘normative
anthropology’. In other words, that there needs to be agreement
on (or at least rational justification of) views about the value and
purpose of human life. Without that, there is no solid foundation
for political ideas. Other philosophers do not see that as essential.
You may want to take your own view on this, after looking at the
various arguments.

1. Introduction 11
 Justification, not just clarification

Some see philosophy’s main task as clarifying concepts. That

would imply that the task of philosophy is to look at the key ideas
in political debate – freedom, rights, justice, democracy, and so
on – and to examine what people really mean by them, and how
they are related to one another. That is the sort of philosophy that
clears the mind but does not necessarily change the world.

But there is another tradition of political philosophy. Marx

famously declared that he wanted to change the world, rather than
just interpret it, and many other political thinkers have impacted
on the course of history. Rousseau’s writings were to influence
the French Revolution and Locke’s the American Declaration of
Independence. Nietzsche’s work was read by Mussolini and Hitler
(and sadly misused by them), and socialist ideas lay behind the
setting up of the welfare state and health service in Britain. Until
recently, neo-conservative views in the United States influenced,
among other things, American foreign policy with respect to the
Middle East and the Iraq War. Discussions about terrorism and
how to resist it are not just about words, but are desperately
important in terms of security and human rights. So political
concepts are not just there to be clarified, they also need to be
examined and challenged.

Insight
Between the first and second editions of this book, Barack
Obama took over from George W. Bush as President of the
United States of America, and has since provided us with
an illustration of the way in which a change of political
philosophy can make a difference to the priorities and
practical decisions of political life.

Political ideas are potent; but are they valid? The only way to
establish that is by taking a two-stage look at them. First of all
they need to be clarified: What exactly do we mean by fairness, or
equality, or democracy? But secondly, they need to be justified: On

12
what basis can you argue for the fairness of this or that political
system? On what basis can you justify taking military action?

Like ethics, political philosophy is therefore concerned with the

practical. It addresses issues of immediate concern to everyone
and examines ideas that have – for good or evil – shaped the lives
of whole generations. When some crucial event takes place – a
war, an economic crisis, a global threat, a spate of terrorist
attacks – people will naturally ask fundamental questions about
how we should deal with such things. Politicians are required to
find answers and implement them, but they need to be guided by
principles about how we should live and how society should be
governed. So circumstances are always throwing up new questions
for political philosophy.

The modern agenda

Political philosophy has changed considerably during the last 40

years. Before the 1970s most political philosophy involved looking
at constitutions, how they were justified and how well they served
to benefit the lives of citizens. After that time, the focus tended to
shift towards key concepts such as:

 freedom
 justice
 equality of opportunity
 rights
 fairness in sharing material resources
 political authority and security.

In other words, the focus changed from the political structures

within which people live, to those things that the individual might
justly expect the state to provide or to facilitate.

But the problem is that these concepts may compete with one
another. If everyone were given complete freedom, there might be

1. Introduction 13
 no justice or fair sharing. If everyone were forced to be equal, and
to receive a fixed share of material goods, individual freedom to
improve one’s situation in life would be curtailed. What one person
may see as justice and fairness, another may see as an infringement
of his or her individual rights.

A key feature of political philosophy is negotiating between these

principles, and getting them to interlock for maximum benefit. But
‘maximum benefit’ suggests some form of distributive justice – in
other words, that society should be so organized that everyone
receives a fair and appropriate share of resources. For some,
that economic agenda remains central to the task of political
philosophy.

But there are many other areas where principles conflict. On the
one hand, people argue for freedom of the press, on the other for
privacy for the individual. Are these compatible?

Privacy and press freedom

Both the Press Complaints Commission and European case
law uphold the principle that people have a right to go about
their business without being hounded by the press or paparazzi.
Privacy is regarded as a right that applies equally to the relatively
unknown person and the celebrity. On the other hand, celebrities
deliberately put themselves in the public eye – that is what makes
them celebrities. Does that imply that they have set aside their
right to privacy? We may ask:

 Does the public have a right to know what celebrities are

doing, simply because they are celebrities?
 Should the press be inhibited in its reporting, simply because it
might be embarrassing for those who otherwise benefit from
press attention?

Article 8 of the Human Rights Act protects the right to family life
(and therefore suggests that media intrusion should be restrained),

14
 while Article 10 gives people the right to know where there is a
public interest.

How do you balance freedom of information against the right to

privacy?

An example:
Media coverage of celebrity adultery may be trivial, but beneath
the surface there can be serious issues of principle. For example, at
the end of 2006, a sports personality managed to get an injunction
against a man with whose wife he had been having an affair,
preventing him from selling his story to the press. The grounds on
which he obtained it were that such media coverage would inhibit
the possibility of reconciliation with his wife.

The cheated-on husband, while free to tell friends and family what
had happened, was not able to make it more widely known. There
are two questions of principle here:

 Should it be made illegal for someone to tell their own story, on the
grounds that it might adversely affect someone else? What about
freedom of speech?
 Should the press have a right to expose celebrity adultery, if no
genuine public interest is served by doing so?

With the twenty-first century there arrived issues that were

not on the radar in earlier times. The last two decades of the
twentieth century saw the progressive failure of socialist and
communist regimes, leaving the United States of America as the
sole superpower. Liberal democracy and capitalism seemed to
have become the only viable political and economic option. Indeed
Francis Fukuyama, in his book The End of History and the Last
Man (1992) argued persuasively that there was a universal desire
for the freedoms and benefits of modern western society, and this

1. Introduction 15
 implied that the liberal-democratic view, in the form of individual
freedom and free-market economics, would be the destination
of choice for everyone. That view was reflected in the ‘neo-
conservative’ agenda in the USA, which we shall need to consider
later.

To some, there is nothing more to discuss – the old Soviet-style

planned economies have failed, labour and socialist parties have
opted for the centre ground, and liberal democracy and free-market
economics have triumphed. The sole criteria for political success
are an ever-increasing standard of living and the provision of more
and more consumer goods within secure national borders. All a
government needs to do is adopt the policies that deliver on its
economic promises.

Insight
That may be fine when an economy is powering ahead, but
what of times of recession? It is one thing to appeal for votes
when you can honestly offer the prospect of good times
ahead, quite another to do so when cuts in public expenditure
seem inevitable.

But there are other huge issues to be addressed within the modern
world. With global communication and economic structures, we
have the issue of the relationship of individual nation states and
international bodies. Post-colonial issues for the developing world,
and multicultural ones in the developed world, both cut across
the traditional national and cultural boundaries. These concerns
include:

 civil rights
 feminist thinking
 globalization
 international responsibility – both in terms of war and the
environment
 religious elements in political divisions
 climate change and political ecology
 terrorism.

16
These newer issues cannot be dealt with simply in terms of the
older discussions between socialist and capitalist priorities. The
rising threats to the newly-dominant, liberal-democratic view of
society come from exactly those groups who reject the individual-
centred philosophies of the social contract and utilitarianism,
handed down from the period of the seventeenth to nineteenth
centuries, in favour of submission to a larger sense of purpose
and meaning, whether religious or cultural.

Money and power are great motivators – for individuals and

also for states – and a cynical manipulation of political goals in
order to generate them, either for a ruler or a particular section
of the population, is always a temptation. Machiavelli took a
wry look at the strategies for maintaining power in Renaissance
Italy, and his comments remain relevant today. Politics can be
a game to be played with high stakes by those fuelled by the power
it offers.

Who offered what, when, on

inheritance tax?
A spat between the British government and the Conservative
opposition in October 2007 concerned inheritance tax. The
Conservatives claimed that the government had only offered to
reduce the liability for inheritance tax because they had promised
to do so, if they came to power, at their party conference. The
government insisted that its own plans to do so predated the
Conservative promise.

Tax cuts are a great incentive when it comes to voting for one
party or another. On the other hand, one person’s tax cut is
another’s loss of social provision.

How can a politician be completely objective about taxation

levels in a politically competitive environment?
(Contd)

1. Introduction 17
 Does tax inevitably provide an opportunity for a Machiavellian
manipulation of figures and intentions?

But to the more profound question ‘What is life for?’ the suicide
bomber, the aid worker and the venture capitalist may have very
different answers. Political philosophy itself depends on establishing
at least some basic answer to that question, for without that there
is nothing to counter the accusations that money and power rule
over reason and principle in the political sphere, and it makes little
sense to discuss the rights and wrongs of political organizations and
actions.

The structure of this book

Chapters 2 and 3 look at two broad periods of history: the first

from ancient Greece through to the Renaissance; the second
taking developments in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
developments – the social contract and utilitarianism. Chapter 4
moves on to examine the ideas and ideologies that came to dominate
the twentieth century – including communism, socialism, liberalism,
conservatism and so on – while recognizing that their roots go back
to the nineteenth century and beyond.

But since political philosophy is concerned with key concepts, in

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 we shall look at equality and fairness, then
freedom, and finally rights, justice and the law. Clarifying these
concepts and seeing how they relate to one another is absolutely
central for a good grasp of the subject.

But there are two perspectives that need special consideration.

The first concerns the place of women in society. Most of the
thinkers in the history of political philosophy have been men,
and men have dominated political life. A feminist perspective is
therefore essential. The second acknowledges that many – in fact,

18
most – nations are now multicultural; some through immigration,
but more generally from the global impact of commerce and
communication. How do we achieve fairness and respect for
individuals in a society where cultural values are varied? Should
ethnic minorities maintain their own traditions, or should they
conform to a national norm? At one end of the scale of answers
to this question comes the desperately sad phenomenon of ethnic
cleansing. These issues are the focus of Chapter 8.

In Chapters 9 and 10, the book explores the position of the

individual nation state in a world of multinational corporations,
global markets and global threats. Sovereign states are no longer
as sovereign as they were! Threats, whether from terrorism, war
or climate change, respect no national boundaries.

The book then concludes with some observations and thoughts

about the future of political philosophy, and offers a range of
suggestions for further reading, including a list of classic texts.

Presenting the subject …

Most books present an argument; they are written because the
author feels that he or she has a particular point to make, or a
gap in existing knowledge to fill. By contrast, this book seeks to
present political philosophy itself as a subject.

Without trying to argue to any one conclusion, it attempts to

open up the issues and set them in context, along with an agenda
for the modern debate. If some questions appear rhetorical, or
show political bias one way or another, that is the inevitable result
of attempting to unpack and get to grips with the issues. Overall,
it is left for the reader to draw his or her own political conclusions.

1. Introduction 19
 10 THINGS TO REMEMBER
1 How political philosophy and politics differ.

2 Political philosophy is a branch of ethics.

3 A normative judgement is about what should happen, not

necessarily about what does happen.

4 All political philosophy depends on a view of what constitutes

the good life.

5 Politics is not an end in itself, but a means of enabling people

to live well together.

6 Political philosophy was influenced by the growing importance

of the individual during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.

7 The traumas and warfare of the twentieth century resulted

largely from clashes of political ideologies.

8 Multiculturalism makes is difficult to establish a commonly

agreed sense of what is right.

9 Democracy is closely related to utilitarianism (the moral

theory that the right is what gives the greatest benefit to the
greatest number).

10 Political philosophy is concerned with how political systems

should operate, not just with the meaning of political
language.

20
 2
Looking for the good life
In this chapter you will learn:
• about political thinking in ancient Greece
• about Plato’s ideal ruler
• why Aristotle aimed at the good life
• of mediaeval unworldliness
• of intrigues and dreams in the sixteenth century.

Some conception of what the good life is about is fundamental

to political philosophy. When people speak about fairness, or
equality, or justice, they do so because they want people to be
treated properly, and given the possibility of living well. The basic
question for political philosophy is this: What sort of political
structure will enable people to live well?

If we do not know what it means to live well, if we have no idea

about those things that enable people to live life to their greatest
possible capacity, then we have no hope or basis of assessing
the political aspects of life – because politics is not an end in itself,
but a means to an end, and that end is the good life.

Why ancient Greece?

Like so much else in Western philosophy, the agenda for later

debates was set in ancient Greece. Then the fundamental questions

2. Looking for the good life 21

 were: ‘How can we live the good life?’ and ‘How should we
organize our civic life?’ These were asked against a background of
small city-states – some democracies, some oligarchies, some ruled
by tyrants. Their world was very different from ours, but many of
the issues with which they battled remain with us to this day.

One reason why it is important to take note of the political

thinking of ancient Greece is that, within that society, political
life was regarded as the necessary vehicle for achieving justice in
society and, for each individual, a way of developing personal
qualities or virtues. In other words, personal values and goals
were to be expressed in the context of the polis, or city-state.
Aristotle described man as a ‘political animal’, and the idea that
an individual should not wish to be involved in civic life was
unthinkable.

The classical period of Greek political thought, represented by the

work of Plato (428–348) and Aristotle (384–322), ran from the
early fifth to the late fourth centuries bce. By that time, Greece had
established itself into about 750 self-governing city-states. Each
polis, as these were called (from which we get the term ‘politics’)
had its own particular form of government. Most were very small,
many having less that 1000 citizens, but the largest – Athens – had
45,000 citizens. These poleis had been in existence for up to 400
years before the classical period, so Plato and Aristotle were not
devising some new theory of politics, but were putting together a
logical justification for political structures that had been around for
a considerable time. In addition, as we shall see, Plato in particular
was trying to link the structures of political life to his overall view
of the world, and of the place of reason within it.

The last 30 years of the fifth century bce had been a time of
considerable bloodshed and violence. The Peloponnesian War
of 431–404 bce came to an end with the defeat of Athens at
the hands of Sparta, when its democracy was overthrown and
replaced by the rule of the Thirty Tyrants (which was backed by
the Spartans, and led by Plato’s cousin, Critas). Political opponents
were executed, free speech was restricted and all who appeared

22
to challenge or threaten the political status quo were punished.
The Tyrants were overthrown the following year and democracy
reinstated, but that did not imply total freedom of thought or
speech – Socrates managed to survive the rule of the Tyrants, only
to be put on trial and executed four years later for challenging
established ideas.

It was not a time of idyllic peace and simplicity, but one that was
as ruthless and unpredictable as any modern era.

POLITICAL LIFE

Both Plato and Aristotle argued that the polis was needed because
people were not self-sufficient, and that some things could only
be achieved communally. At the same time, both felt that political
life was a natural function of humankind – reading these
writers, there is never a sense that one can opt to be a lone
individual, separated off from others. And, if there was a major
distinction to be made between nature (physis) and law (nomos),
it was that man-made laws should be rooted in the nature of
humankind.

Political life was life in the polis. It was not a separate option for
professional politicians, which the ordinary person (following a
personal and economic agenda) took an interest in only when he or
she was directly affected. Rather, political involvement was implicit
in civilized living, not an optional extra, and Aristotle (Politics,
1.2.1253) said that the person who lived separate from a polis was
either a beast or a god.

However, Athens was also concerned to protect individuals,

allowing them basic freedoms and also giving them protection
from undue interference from agents of the polis. But it was clear
that individual citizens could only flourish if the polis within which
they lived was stable and secure – all were bound together, with
responsibilities towards the welfare of one another. Indeed, for
Aristotle, shared activity and goals were a route towards personal
happiness and fulfilment.

2. Looking for the good life 23

 Political life was closely bound up with the idea of virtues. These
were not simply private moral values, but those qualities without
which it was not possible to live and flourish within a polis. The
Athenians were therefore willing to define the qualities that made
for a good citizen and people were encouraged to participate
politically on the grounds that the polis provided the context for
living the good life.

Insight
Notice how very different this is from the modern idea that
the individual is sovereign and that politics does little more
than enable him or her to live securely and to prosper. For
the ancient Greeks, living well was essentially taking one’s
place in a communal enterprise called the polis.

But Athenian democracy was quite different from modern

representative democracy. First of all, neither women nor
slaves could take part – which therefore eliminated a majority
of the population. But secondly, it was conducted directly
and immediately by those who were qualified, not by selected
representatives – and that, of course, is why a majority of people
could never have taken part, since they did not have the leisure
to do so. It is important to remember that Aristotle assumed that
those who met at the public meeting would know one another,
and that this would influence the way in which the debate was
conducted.

The matters to be discussed and voted on in the public meeting

were sorted out and proposed by a council. Members of that
council were chosen by lot from among representatives from each
of the local areas of the polis. Every free male was eligible for
holding office in the polis, and most were chosen by lot, rather
than by election. The only exception to this, in Athens, was for the
posts within the army, for which a particular talent was necessary.

Everyone eligible would thus have an opportunity to take an

active part in political life. Aristotle argued that, when citizens
come together for the process of decision making, they are

24
better collectively than any excellent individual might be. Hence
there was respect for the give and take of argument, and the
assumption that final decisions would be the better for it. Freedom
of speech reflected the sense that all citizens were free and equal.
The individual citizen was to think of himself as part of the
polis, jointly responsible for its operation, not as a private and
autonomous agent who could opt for minimal political control.
And, of course, the right to speak in the assembly, and to be
considered an equal citizen, went along with an obligation to
serve in the military and to defend the polis.

However, there were limits to free speech, especially when the

polis felt that it was threatened by the views of an individual.
The most famous example of this was the fate of Socrates, who
was condemned to death by a jury in 399 bce for impiety (i.e.
not recognizing the established gods of the city) and ‘corrupting
the young men’ of Athens. Such a trial and punishment was the
exception rather than the rule, however, and probably reflects
the climate of suspicion and fear at the end of the fifth century
which was the legacy of the rule of the Thirty Tyrants.

NECESSARY VIRTUES

Protagoras – the first political theorist – was a sophist, whose

thoughts are known through Plato’s dialogue that is named after
him. He offers a myth for the origins of politics – namely that
when people gathered together to form societies, they generally
failed because of human violence towards one another, but the
gods provided two virtues to enable society to work:

 Aidos – moderation and respect for others

 Dike – justice.

Political wisdom, he argued, springs from these two virtues,

which every citizen should possess, on pain of death, and which
they should teach to their sons. And it is the personal qualities
of moderation and respect for others that, when combined with
justice – the term that Plato seeks to define in The Republic – is at

2. Looking for the good life 25

 the heart of the attempt to establish a society that is both fair and
equal in its treatment of citizens.

Politics and ethics

Normative political judgements may be thought of as the social
aspect of ethics, in that they make claims about how one should
live in the community. In studying ethics, there are two important
and closely-related theories that originated together in the Greek
period – ‘natural law’ ethics and ‘virtue’ ethics:

 The natural law approach was based on a conception of the

essence of human life and therefore what was fundamental to
human existence (e.g. the right to protect one’s life if threatened).
 The virtue approach was based on examining those qualities
that enabled human beings to flourish.

If human beings are fundamentally political animals, as Aristotle

suggested, then engaging in politics is absolutely natural, and
attempting to live as an isolated individual is unnatural. Qualities
such as respect for others and the quest for justice are therefore
not arbitrary and optional extras, but express something
fundamental to human life, something without which we are
in danger of becoming sub-human.

Socrates is credited with saying that ‘the unexamined life is not

worth living’, but it was equally true that – as far as qualified adult
males were concerned – the non-political life was equally not
worth living.

For Protagoras, it was important that everyone should have

something to contribute to the welfare of the polis, while accepting
that those with the most talent would clearly be able to offer
more. But notice how different this is from life in most modern
democracies. The central features of life revolve around a person’s

26
family, friends and work. Unless they belong to the minority of
political activists, or become involved in local politics, the political
is something that they view on the TV, and is assessed in terms of
the benefit or otherwise that they receive from political institutions.
Most are only marginally engaged, turning out to vote if they think
the issues at stake will affect them personally.

Today, the economic benefits that the individual receives have

become the baseline for evaluating political performance. Not so
in ancient Greece. With its slavery, the inferior position given to
women, and its frequent readiness to go to war, it was not always a
comfortable society in which to live, but it was one that established
political engagement as the norm of civilized life.

Insight
We still tend to judge a political regime according to
the degree of participation by its citizens, asking ‘Is it
democratic?’ and, if so ‘Is its democracy effective? Can people
make a real difference to the way in which they are governed,
or does it offer democracy in name only?’

Plato and the Good

Plato’s political views are to be found in Gorgias and in his late

works, The Statesman and Laws, but by far his best-known work
and the key to his philosophy is The Republic. This book, like his
other works, is set out in dialogue form, with Socrates debating
the nature of justice with a range of characters who represent the
various political viewpoints. It is very readable, and touches on so
many philosophical issues that it is an ideal starting point not just
for a study of political philosophy, but for philosophy in general.

WHAT IS JUSTICE?

In the dialogue, various options are presented. The debate opens

by Thrasymachus arguing that justice is whatever is in the interests

2. Looking for the good life 27

 of the stronger – a view that remains popular today, and leads
ultimately to a cynical rejection of the whole political process. This
is rejected in the dialogue by Socrates (through whose mouth Plato
expounds his own philosophy). He recognizes the deeply selfish
elements in human nature – as illustrated by the myth of the ring
of Gyges. Armed with a ring that makes him invisible and thereby
free to do whatever he likes, Gyges seduces the queen, kills the king
and takes over the throne. It suggests that, given the opportunity
to behave with impunity, people will be motivated by their own
selfish interests. What Plato wants is to offer a higher vision of
ethics and the political virtues.

Insight
Gyges gets away with it by becoming invisible and thereby
concealing what he does. A key feature of good governance is
transparency – having one’s actions open to public scrutiny.

Another argument, put forward in The Republic by Glaucon, is

that human nature needs to be restrained for the general benefit of
society. In other words, there needs to be an agreement to prevent
harm by restraining self-interest. In this, Plato anticipates the whole
‘social contract’ basis of political philosophy, but again he sees it
as inadequate.

His own view comes in an extended exploration of the nature

of the self and of the state. He describes three aspects of human
beings: the appetites, the spirit or directing element, and reason.
His ideal for the human being is a situation where reason rules over
spirit and appetite. And this, of course, links reason with his whole
notion of the best form of life – if virtue and knowledge are one and
the same, then a life ruled by reason will also be the most virtuous.

In the same way, he argues that there are three classes of people
in the state: the workers (corresponding to the physical appetites),
those whose role it is to defend the state (corresponding to the
spirited element) and finally the philosophers (reason). He argues
that justice is done when each part of society is treated correctly
according to its nature, and hence – since an individual is best ruled

28
by reason – the state should be ruled by Guardians who are trained
as philosophers.

Plato is effectively trying to explain the value of justice to those,

like Thrasymachus, who see it as an inconvenience, or as a set of
rules to be avoided if possible, in striving for the benefit of the self.
What he tries to show, by making the analogy with parts of the
self, is that justice is essential for human flourishing, even within
the self, quite apart from its effect on other people.

In Books 8 and 9 of The Republic, Plato sets out the dangers of

promoting the spirited and appetitive aspects of humankind above
that of reason. He criticizes states that put courage above all other
virtues – notably Sparta – since courage needs to be tempered by a
sense of moderation and kindly disposition towards others. He would
not have thought much of modern military dictatorships, nor a society
where most people are regarded only as politically docile consumers.

VIRTUE AS KNOWLEDGE

The key to Plato’s political thought is his conviction that

knowledge and virtue are one and the same. Whatever is
reasonable is right; whatever is right is reasonable. He holds that
injustice is caused by ignorance, and therefore the man of reason
will always act justly. For Plato, philosophers have a reasoned
understanding of reality – their right to rule derives from their
understanding of reality, and of what is in the interests of all who
live within the polis. They alone have a natural understanding of
those ethical principles that encourage humankind to flourish and
the political structures within which this can happen.

Insight
This is still relevant. We may not refer to politicians as
philosophers, but we expect them to have sound moral
principles and a clear understanding of the needs of every
section of society. Factional interests and a desire for power
undermine good governance; Plato’s aim is to train people to
overcome them.

2. Looking for the good life 29

 THE CAVE

In one of the most famous passages in all philosophy, Plato

describes prisoners in a cave, chained to face a wall upon which
shadows move to and fro, cast by objects being moved between
them and a fire which burns behind them. Having known nothing
else, the prisoners mistake the shadows for reality.

One prisoner is freed, and forced to turn to see the objects and the
fire, and then – painfully – he moves up into the light beyond the
cave. Having seen the light of the sun, he realizes that the shadows
are no more than unreal, ever-changing copies, and not reality
itself. He then descends again into the cave to explain this to the
other prisoners, but they reject his claims as foolish and continue
to concentrate on predicting the patterns and movements of their
shadows, which is the criterion by which they judge one another
to be successful.

This analogy is generally used to highlight Plato’s theory of

knowledge – the difference between individual things (the shadows)
and the corresponding eternal realities. But it is equally an
account of the folly of political life. Those who concentrate
on the passing shadows – trends, focus groups, opinion polls
and the media in a modern context – are unable to appreciate
the fundamental realities and principles that alone will bestow
wisdom.

Hence, those who are to rule the state – the Guardians – need to be
trained and equipped to do so in such a way that they do not fall
into the temptations of impartiality and self-interest, but constantly
use as their reference the sun beyond the cave – his ‘Form of the
Good’.

The sceptic asks …

Someone may claim to know ‘the Good’ and therefore to have
the authority to rule, but how do you know? How can that claim

30
 be judged, other than by someone who has an equal knowledge of
the Good? And how can you know who is qualified to do that?

With no external means of judging a claim to knowledge, we slip

down into modern relativism and postmodernism – a buffet of
views to be sampled at will.

Scratch the surface of Plato’s argument, and you might find that it
leads to rule by an unchallengeable intellectual aristocracy.

PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP

In order to create the right conditions for the training of Guardians,

Plato advocates censorship, since many of the classical tales present
images of heroes that are ruled by their emotions and aggressive urges,
and are far from good examples of the virtues he wants to promote.

Furthermore, he needs to propagate the ‘noble lie’ that people

are naturally born into one of the three classes – the workers, the
warriors, and those who are destined to rule. He wants to present
this as a divinely ordained hierarchy, with each section of the
population doing what it is created to do – a convenient myth for
maintaining the status quo.

This is an example of his tendency to see the good of the whole

polis as taking priority over the rights of individual citizens – but
he believes that establishing polis-focused justice will, in the long
run, also benefit every individual within it. Like much propaganda,
Plato’s is created for the best of intentions – to keep the lower
orders comfortably in their place!

Insight
The implication of Plato’s argument is that most people do
not know what is in their own best interest, and therefore
that the propaganda that keeps them in their place is
ultimately for their own good.

2. Looking for the good life 31

 TRAINING TO RULE

In order to produce his required Guardians, Plato proposes what

amounts to a system of eugenics and the destruction of family life.
Breeding would be restricted to the healthiest and most athletic of
the eligible age range, and their offspring would be brought up and
educated communally, so that they would have no knowledge of
their particular parents, and thus avoid bias, regarding all those of
an appropriate age as potentially their parents, and thus treating all
with respect.

For reflection
Clearly, what Plato had in mind would go against what we
would now see as the fundamental rights of both parents
and children. But he was not describing an actual state, nor
was he ever to be challenged to put his proposals for training
the Guardians into practice. His argument is about what would
be required to produce ideal rulers.

 To what extent are we prepared to accept fallibility and

partiality in our rulers, given that they have not been selected
at birth and trained for their role?

Plato also considers it important that rulers, as individuals, should

be free from the temptation to accumulate gold or silver, for fear
that, once they start to accumulate benefits from their office, they
will turn into tyrants seeking their own advantage, rather than the
good of the polis.

Insight
It is still generally agreed that politicians should act for the
common good, and that those who seek personal gain and
narrowly selfish interests are not fit to rule – exactly the
position that Plato is taking in The Republic.

32
But for all the draconian measures that Plato seems to want
to impose, his intention is not to promote politics or political
power as such. Everything in The Republic aims at promoting the
right conditions for its citizens: conditions that allow an ethical
environment within which they can fulfil themselves.

HIS OPTION

In The Republic Plato rejected various political options:

 Tyranny, because a single person, although perhaps initially

representing and appealing to the ordinary people, may
become corrupted by power.
 Timocracy (rule by the most powerful), because those who are
in power because of their status are liable to be aggressive and
more likely to declare war.
 Oligarchy (rule by a wealthy or privileged elite), because
it is likely to encourage huge differences between rich
and poor.
 Democracy, because it tends to anarchy.

In his critiques of these options, he tries to balance the need

for stability and insight into the best way to run society, with
a recognition that people tend to go for what is in their own
interests, and that most of these forms of government are
in danger of favouring those by whose power they have been
set up.

After the riots in Burma

Kevin Doyle, writing for The Guardian (13 October 2007),
interviewed people in Rangoon following the repression of
the pro-democracy demonstrations. Amidst the general sense
of helplessness and the anti-government resentment, one
man took a pragmatic line on the options which originally
faced Plato:
(Contd)

2. Looking for the good life 33

 ‘Democracy does not fit well in Burma, the generals are gangsters
but at least they can run things. These democratic parties have no
experience of running the country.’

So what qualities make for a good leader? Is integrity and

vision essential, or can it be trumped by experience and
determination?

Plato’s option, of course, is that the ideal state should be run by

Guardians who are philosophers, motivated by insight and reason
and immune from selfish concerns. But it is a curious feature of
the Guardians that, when they are finally ready to take on the
responsibility of running the polis, in the latter part of their lives
and after their strict regime of education and training, Plato
considers that they will do so only reluctantly, preferring the life
of the philosopher to that of the ruler.

Conviction politicians
One tends to assume that those running for office in a democracy,
or who rise up through the ranks to become a military dictator,
achieve their position because they have either a desire for power,
or a genuinely altruistic desire to make a difference to people’s
lives.

An indifferent politician is a failure and an indifferent candidate is

the least likely to be elected. Yet it is Plato’s contention that such
indifference to their own position of authority is a key feature of
those best suited to rule.

Conviction politicians rally support and get things done; yet they
can never be absolutely balanced in their judgement – for if they
were, they would retain a degree of scepticism about their own
‘convictions’ that would undermine their position.

34
 Was Plato right in thinking that pure reason, unbiased and focused
on eternal truths, is really what makes for a good and effective
ruler?

The chief aim of Plato’s Republic is the production of excellence:

breeding couples are selected for maximum quality of offspring and
those born imperfect are left to die. It is a society ruled by a carefully
groomed and trained elite. But however much the prevailing liberal-
democratic sensibilities of the modern political world may find
Plato’s ideas offensive at times, they offer an interesting challenge.

Plato’s system overcomes the danger that rulers with one-sided

or biased views will be elected on the basis of promises that they
cannot keep. If every ruler were free from family or other partisan
ties, unconcerned about personal wealth or prestige, no doubt their
choices would be the most wise and beneficial. But would you
want to live in a paternalistic society, where an intellectual elite
condescend to stoop to organize the political regime along lines
reasoned out with disinterested precision?

Aristotle’s political options

Aristotle’s political philosophy is set out in his Nicomachean Ethics
and Politics. In Politics, he asks why it is that political institutions
come about in the first place. He recognizes the need for people to
band together to help secure the necessities of life, but he considers
that the state is one step beyond that, in that it is basically an
association of kinship groups and villages who come together in order
to establish a constitution that would allow them to live the best life
possible. In other words, rather like utilitarian ethical arguments,
people bind themselves to one another because they are looking for
the greatest benefit for the greatest number, and find this in some form
of political constitution, offering peace and a measure of protection.

2. Looking for the good life 35

 For him, therefore, human beings are, by their very nature,
political. His goal, eudaimonia (poorly translated as ‘happiness’,
but really embracing the general sense of living and acting well),
involved choosing to live as part of society. To reject society was to
revert to the life of beasts. Only in participation can the individual
fully realize his (not ‘her’ unfortunately – but we’ll come to that
later) potential.

Aristotle carried out a survey of the various forms of political

organization to be found in his day and assessed their value.
He was critical of those states where power was in the hands of
one person (a tyranny) or a few people (an oligarchy), or even the
rule of the mob, which is how he viewed democracies. He favoured
those that were monarchies, aristocracies or polities. Although
noting the difference between rule by a single person, a small
number or by the majority, he also considered that it was more
important to see on whose behalf the government operated. If on
behalf of the majority of citizens, it met his approval; if on behalf
of a minority or an elite, he saw it as perverted.

His last option – a ‘polity’ – describes a political situation where

everyone can participate in the decision-making process, but only a
few would actually take responsibility for ruling. His ‘polity’ came
closer to what we would now think of as representative democracy,
than does ‘democracy’, which in his day implied rule by the whole
polis. Like Plato, he had no illusions about the inability of most
people to make informed political choices. For Aristotle, man is
both a rational and a political animal, and his aim (like that of
Plato) is to apply reason to issues of political rule.

Natural law and politics

Aristotle initiated what is known as the ‘natural law’ approach
to ethics. In other words, he argued that everything had a fixed
nature and purpose within the world and that, once these were
known, actions could be judged good or bad according to whether
they contributed to or frustrated that purpose.

36
 The same basic argument applies to politics. Aristotle assumed that
the task of the state was to help people live well, and that meant
helping them to fulfil themselves. His assessment of political
systems therefore follows from his ‘natural law’ approach to ethics.

It is challenged – both in ethics generally and in politics – by those

who argue that we do not have a fixed essence, but are free to
set our own purposes and goals in life, and do not need to be told
how to lead our personal ‘good life’ by anyone else.

LAW AND CONSENT

At the end of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle points out that his

intention has been to understand what is good, and thereby to
make himself and others good. But he recognizes that most men
are ruled by desires and needs rather than by reason. He therefore
argues that laws are needed in order to guide them to become more
virtuous – in other words, he seems to be saying that obedience to
law becomes a necessary alternative to self-direction by reason, for
those incapable of the latter.

Personal choice or legislation?

The fortieth anniversary of the 1967 Abortion Act sparked off
discussion about whether the law on abortion in Britain should
be revised. Some claimed that it was the right of the woman to
choose whether or not to have an abortion. Others wanted to retain
statutory control, both on the time limit for abortions, and also on the
process by which the permission of two doctors is required. Should
the government be expected to legislate on such personal issues, or
should it be left to individuals to reason it out for themselves?

An Aristotelian natural law argument would suggest a balance

between the right to life of the foetus, and the right of the mother
(Contd)

2. Looking for the good life 37

 to defend her own life and well-being, if it is threatened by the
prospect of giving birth. That is an argument based on reason. The
issue, however, is whether everyone is capable of making a mature
and balanced judgement, or whether laws need to be framed to
express what the ‘reasoning’ majority believe to be right.

A more stark version of the same issue is the rule applied in China
a few years ago, forbidding couples to have more than one child.

Should governments take a paternalistic view and legislate on

personal matters, or should these be left to individuals, with
governments doing no more that providing a secure framework
within which freedom can operate?

In Politics, Aristotle criticizes militaristic states with imperialist

intentions to increase their land and power, on the grounds that
they actually undermine themselves, because they encourage similar
traits in their citizens, who want to gain as much power and
influence as they can. Hence they breed instability and discontent.
This he contrasts with a state that allows and encourages freedom
and participation, where citizens are willing to serve in the army to
defend the state, on the basis that they feel they have a stake in it.

Aristotle thus argues for a partnership between ruler and ruled,

recognizing that rule can be imposed on people for only so long
before they will want to rebel. Hence, he is putting forward
what amounts to a consent-based approach to government. And
that consent-based approach represents the balance between the
potential anarchy of a direct democracy and the inflexibility of a
rigid monarchy or military dictatorship. Such choices were very
relevant in Aristotle’s own day, and they remain so now. Stability
in government depends on the consent of the people.

NATURAL SUBORDINATION

Aristotle argued that some people were better suited to be ruled

than to rule. In this category he placed both women and slaves, on

38
the grounds that they did not reason well and would therefore be
unable to rule themselves.

It was therefore appropriate that slaves should take orders, and

he assumed that they would actually welcome the control of
‘higher’ beings, who would provide for them an ordered and
purposeful life. In other words, if the slave cannot organize a
proper life-plan, then someone else needs to do so – and thereby
the master is enabling the slave to maximize his or her life,
by performing a necessary function of rational control.
Slavery actually meets the needs of the slave, not just those
of the owner.

Aristotle considered the position of women to be rather

different. He thought that they were quite capable of rational
deliberation, but that they were not effective in applying reason
to the process of living because they were overruled by their
passions and emotions. They needed the rational guidance
of men.

The argument used here is parallel to that used today in the case
of children. Their reason is seen as immature, and therefore they
need to be helped by those in authority over them (e.g. parents) in
order to guide their progress.

Of course, it might be valid to ask whether Aristotle’s views

are justified solely on the basis of his argument, or whether he
was using his argument to justify a political and economic
structure, based on slavery, which was so deeply embedded
in the society of his day that its overthrow would have been
unthinkable.

Insight
If people are unequal in their ability to set and follow a
reasonable life-plan, is paternalism in the political sphere
inevitable? Most people don’t want to be told how they
should live. But would you want to live in a society ruled
‘by the mob’ as Plato and Aristotle would have seen it?

2. Looking for the good life 39

 Cynics, Stoics and Epicureans

After the classical period of Plato and Aristotle, there was a shift of
focus away from the city-state, and towards the individual. Three
groups of thinkers are relevant here: the Cynics, the Stoics and the
Epicureans.

Diogenes of Sinope (400–325 bce), most famous for sleeping in

a barrel and having no more possessions than he could carry,
rejected the conventions of social and political life, and was
therefore called a ‘cynic’ – in other words, he was ‘like a dog’.
Until then, belonging to a polis was assumed to be essential – it
gave you status, citizenship and protection. But Diogenes, when
asked to which polis he belonged, replied that the world (cosmos)
was his polis; hence he may be seen as the first cosmopolitan man.
That was a remarkable view to take at the time, although, to be
fair, Diogenes probably presented it in rather a negative way, as
rejecting the limitations of a single polis, rather than embracing
cosmopolitanism as global citizenship. But his view reflects a shift
away from seeing the individual as part of the state, to seeing the
state as an option imposed on an otherwise free individual.

The Cynics, in rejecting social conventions, were precursors of

modern anarchists. They saw politics as, if anything, a hindrance
to living the good life, and delighted in flouting the accepted norms
of their day. Stoics, on the other hand (e.g. Seneca and Marcus
Aurelius) tended to be more moderate in their views, although
maintaining the value and significance of the individual.

The Stoics taught that one should live in conformity with the logos,
or rational principle within everything. In this, they were not far
removed from Aristotle’s view that everything had a purpose or
‘end’, and that its good came in fulfilling itself. Some Stoics, like
Zeno (332–265 bce), tended to side against conformity to laws,
while others, like Cicero (106–43 bce), were more concerned to
argue for balance and the need for people to work together for
the common good. But politically they emphasized the individual

40
and his or her personal integrity. In particular the Meditations
of Marcus Aurelius (121–80 bce), although a set of personal
reflections rather than a systematic work of philosophy, give the
most direct insight into the Stoic view, and in particular the view
of someone who achieves high political office – in his case, Roman
emperor.

The other group of thinkers to mention here are the Epicureans.

They held that the world was an impersonal place, indifferent to
human welfare, and that it was up to individuals to seek their own
happiness. They sought this in simplicity of living, rather than
extravagance, and gathered together to share a communal life with
those who held similar views.

Although fascinating, there is no scope here to explore the thinking

of these groups; they are mentioned only to make a single point –
that even among the thinkers of ancient Greece and Rome, there was
a choice between the more centralized view of politics and the more
individualistic. Does the state exist for the sake of the individual,
or the individual for the sake of the state?

Mediaeval otherworldliness

In political philosophy, it may be tempting to jump straight from

the work of Plato and Aristotle to the seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century thinkers (like Hobbes and Locke) whose ideas have been
directly influential on modern political developments. However,
there are two other perspectives that need to be taken into account –
one is the impact of the Christian religion on political thought, and
the other is the revival of the small-scale political entity in the cities
of Renaissance Italy.

The religious perspective is well illustrated by St Augustine’s City

of God. Augustine (354–430) made the clear distinction between
the worldly city (the City of Man) and the heavenly abode of the
faithful (the City of God). His argument was that people live in two

2. Looking for the good life 41

 worlds, with two sets of commitments, but that the earthly ones
were of little value when compared to the heavenly. Therefore, the
devout should not set great store by politics, and the only function
they required of the state was that of protection – although even
that was doomed to failure, because sinful human nature always
led to strife.

One of the key questions during the mediaeval period, therefore,

was the relationship between the Church and the state – between
heaven and earth. It was believed that God had ordered and
established society, and provided for it to be guided by the Church.
Hence the devout were expected to accept the established secular
authorities. The divine right of kings was part of that structure – the
king ruling by the authority of God. It is also important to recognize
that, as far as Europe was concerned, the Church had an authority
that transcended the particular nation or monarchy. Rather than
political authority being established by and for the people, you
have authority being handed down from above – from God, via
the Church and its approved secular rulers, to the people.

However, when we look at some features of that period (e.g. the

Crusades) we find that spiritual goals were based on solid social
and economic foundations, and that the various conflicts over
power and authority were not so different from those of later
times. The declared spiritual goals frequently masked the real
political aims, and intrigue was found equally in Church and state.

Insight
A key question remains to this day: Should religion become
involved with politics, or should it stand aloof and deal only
with ‘spiritual’ matters? The former risks compromising
religious ideals; the latter risks accusations of irrelevance and
inertia.

In the thirteenth century the writings of Aristotle were once

again being studied, taught in newly established universities,
and intellectual life was able to question political and religious
authority. Seeking to combine the philosophy of Aristotle with

42
Church teaching, Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) took a positive view
of politics and law, because he believed that God had provided
humankind with reason, and permitted secular authority to act
on his behalf. However, the law should be ‘natural law’ – in other
words, based on nature as interpreted by reason – and if the secular
law was at odds with natural law, then the latter should take
precedence. Thus the hierarchy was clearly established that the
Law of God took precedence of the laws of man.

Overall, however, Aquinas took a more positive view of the secular

realm than did Augustine. He even argued that the discipline of
obeying the law, even if only from fear of punishment, had value,
as it could lead both to peace and to the development of virtue.

Historical interest only?

Not at all. In the twenty-first century we have international
terrorist organizations – including, of course, al-Qaeda – that
follow a fundamentalist ideology that is both religious and
political. In mediaeval Europe, a person might be required to
obey the laws of their particular country, but was aware of a
higher responsibility towards the laws of God, as interpreted by
the international organization of the Church. In the same way,
there are radical Islamist groups today who challenge people
to set what they interpret as the requirements of jihad (divinely
sanctioned struggle) above their duty to obey the laws of the
land. The issue of the relationship between religious and political
allegiance continues to be relevant.

Renaissance realism and principled dreaming

For an utterly different approach to political philosophy, we can

turn to a writer whose cynical observations of the power politics

2. Looking for the good life 43

 of Renaissance Italy led his name to become synonymous with
political intrigue – Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527).

Having spent his life in the political circles of his native Florence,
close to the seat of power, Machiavelli wrote The Prince, which
appears to be a handbook for the aspiring leader – setting out the
best policies for holding together a state and increasing its power
and authority. He shows that there are times when a ruthless
but decisive ruler is more effectively able to control and benefit a
nation than a more gentle but indecisive one.

Machiavelli is readable and stimulating, and he has that unusual

quality of combining a serious and reasoned argument with wry
observations of actual life and situations. How far he was making
serious suggestions, and how far irony was his main weapon, is a
matter for debate; his lively mind is not. The Prince is a great book
of political philosophy, because it sets out its goals, looks at what
is required to fulfil them, and then looks at the principles involved
in doing so. It is realistic, rather than utopian.

In terms of political philosophy, Machiavelli sees maintaining the

security and integrity of the state as paramount. All else in terms of
ethical or political theory takes second place. If it is necessary to be
harsh, cruel even, in order to maintain security, Machiavelli sees it
as the right thing to do.

In particular, Machiavelli’s advice requires that a ruler should be

flexible, and should learn to anticipate the actions of others and
respond accordingly. In particular, his view is one that is always
pragmatic – know what you seek to achieve and then find the most
effective way of achieving it. When others are crafty, adherence to
absolute moral or political principles is a hindrance to maintaining
one’s position.

While Machiavelli was plotting success in Italy, Sir Thomas More

(1478–1535) was rising through the English political ranks to
become Lord Chancellor to Henry VIII. As a scholar and humanist,
he was a very principled man, and paid for it with his life – for,

44
having opposed the king’s right to make himself head of the
Church in England, he was executed for treason.

His Utopia is a wonderful book which, in fictional form, tells

of an account of a far-off island, named Utopia, and established
that name as a term for a social and political ideal. On the island
of Utopia, small self-governing cities trade with one another and
people only work as much as is needed to provide the necessities
of life. All are equally responsible for getting work done and, with
no hangers-on in the form of priests or aristocrats, each person’s
share of work is modest. All, both men and women, are equal, and
gold and silver are treated as worthless, thus avoiding avarice and
economic competition, but allowing public heaps of gold to be
used to pay mercenaries to take care of external defence.

In many ways it is a vision of a socialist state, utterly different from

the Tudor monarchy, but More insists he isn’t making what could
be seen as political proposals. What he sets down is simply an
account of what has been described to him about a far-off place, and
he comments that some of the ideas appear strange, even ridiculous.

Machiavelli’s The Prince was written in 1514, and More’s Utopia

in 1516. Both are enjoyably readable books, from minds that
sought to make sense of the political intrigues, possibilities and
principles of their day. They raise political questions that are still
relevant and which form an interesting historical backdrop to the
flurry of new political philosophy that arose in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.

Balance still needed

The balance between utopian and Machiavellian approaches – in
effect, between idealism and realism – is still necessary if political
ideas are to be credible. This is illustrated by the following
quotation from The Audacity of Hope (Canongate, 2007) by the
future US President, Barack Obama. He speaks of those ordinary
(Contd)

2. Looking for the good life 45

 citizens who have grown up amidst the political battles, but have
found their own way to make peace with their neighbours and
with themselves:

I imagine they are waiting for a politics with the maturity to

balance idealism and realism, to distinguish between what
can and cannot be compromised, to admit the possibility that
the other side might sometimes have a point. They don’t always
understand the arguments between right and left, conservative
and liberal, but they recognize the difference between dogma
and commonsense, responsibility and irresponsibility, between
those things that last and those that are fleeting.

Distinguishing between the lasting and the fleeting is, of course,

exactly what Plato was on about with his analogy of the cave.

46
 10 THINGS TO REMEMBER
1 In the ancient Greek polis, politics was not optional for
citizens.

2 Plato and Aristotle wrote against a background of violence

and political upheavals.

3 Plato believed that philosophy – in the sense of a clear,

rational view of the nature of reality – was essential for a good
ruler.

4 Plato held that the good society was one in which each section
of the population fulfilled its own particular role.

5 Aristotle believed that, in the interests of security, it was

important that people should be governed by consent.

6 Diogenes the ‘Cynic’ saw freedom in being ‘cosmopolitan’.

7 Both Stoics and Epicureans gave priority to the individual,

rather than the state.

8 The relationship between religion and politics was a significant

feature of mediaeval political thinking.

9 Machiavelli describes the problems of gaining and maintaining

power, placing ends above means.

10 There always needs to be a balance between idealism and

realism.

2. Looking for the good life 47

 3
The social contract
In this chapter you will learn:
• about the principles that established modern democracy
• why Hobbes thought a strong ruler was necessary to prevent
chaos
• why Rousseau was in favour of a kind of tyranny
• about controlling executive power.

Stalin ruled the Soviet Union by terror: people were not free to
challenge or question the state; dissidents were sent to the camps,
or were killed. In September 2007, pro-democracy demonstrations
in Burma were ruthlessly put down by the military junta. Its
actions were widely condemned, and commentators spoke of the
military as acting against the wishes of the people.

There is no doubt that Stalin was firmly in control of the Soviet Union,
and two years after the demonstrations the military are still firmly in
control of Burma. But should they be? By what right do governments
or dictators rule? People may be controlled by threats and held in
check by fear, but is that a legitimate exercise of political authority?

 When is it right for people to change an established political

system (as happened in Eastern Europe, leading to the break-
up of the Soviet Union)?
 When is it right for one nation to seek regime change in
another, claiming to do so for the benefit of its people (as
the USA did in launching its attack on the regime of Saddam
Hussein in Iraq)?

48
You can only get answers to those questions once you decide by
what authority a government can rightly be established.

A related question is the authority a state should have over its

citizens: Why should we obey the government and its laws?
Do we do it on the basis that the government had a mandate to
rule, because its party received the largest share of the vote? Do
we do so on the more pragmatic basis that, if the laws of a
state did not exist and command respect, the country would fall
into a situation of anarchy, leading to mutual harm and mistrust?
Or do we obey simply on the basis that we will be punished if
we don’t?

And at what point should we be free to reject and replace that

government if it appears to be going against our wishes? Is a
government to be judged on a utilitarian basis – that it produces
the best result for the greatest number of people – even if it does
not produce the best result for me as an individual?

But of course, there is a difference between power and authority.

Anybody can force someone to do something by threatening to
use power against them. But that does not mean that the person
has ‘authority’ to do so. Authority implies agreed legitimacy. A
law or an action is politically authorised if, and only if, it has the
backing of a legitimately established government, and one way of
establishing that legitimacy is to base it on an agreed contract made
between people and their rulers – the social contract.

Contracts, dilemmas and war games

In the 1950s, with the opposing nuclear arsenals of the USA and
the USSR, there developed a ‘cold war’ in which the theory of
nuclear deterrence ensured that neither side would attack the
other on the basis that the other had sufficient weapons in reserve
that they could strike back with devastating consequences. The
MAD (mutually assured destruction) threat was seen as the way
of ensuring that neither side would attack the other.

3. The social contract 49

 But the thinking behind that kind of strategy came from game
theory, and one of the most significant of such games is known as
‘the prisoner’s dilemma.’

The situation:

Two prisoners are arrested and both are charged with two crimes –
a lesser one for which there is sufficient evidence to find both guilty,
and a more serious one for which conviction will only be secured
if one of them agrees to confess.

The offer (made to each prisoner):

 If you confess to the more serious crime, you will receive

a very light sentence, but your co-accused will serve the
maximum sentence.
 If you both confess, you will each receive a sentence that is
less than the maximum, but greater than the light one you will
receive if you alone confess.
 If neither of you confesses, you will receive the maximum
sentence for the lesser of the crimes. (i.e. more than if you
alone confess to the more serious crime, but less than if you
both confess to it).

The assumption of this dilemma is that each prisoner is self-

interested and therefore not concerned with the sentence that the
other will receive. What should they do?

The dilemma here is one of trust. If they agree that neither will
confess, each will receive the more modest sentence. On the other
hand, if one confesses, but the other does not, he will receive the
lightest sentence, at the expense of the other. But, the problem is
that each knows the other has the same choice. Each could go for
trying to get the minimum sentence at the expense of the other.

Going for self-interest is not always straightforward. If you think

the other person will keep his or her promise, you could cheat

50
on your side of a bargain, and thereby gain an advantage. On the
other hand, you know that the other person will be reasoning in
the same way, and may therefore be equally tempted to cheat
on you. How do you resolve this?

Insight
This dilemma also applies to the commercial world, where
companies may be tempted to agree between themselves to fix
their prices to protect their profits. Consumers would prefer
that each tries to outbid the other, thereby forcing down
prices. This touches on the whole question of the benefits,
or otherwise, of free-market economics.

TRUST AND CONTRACTS

Faced with potential conflicts and mistrust, the best options might
seem to be to make an agreement together for mutual protection
and support, or to give full authority to an agreed ruler or judge.
Both of these imply a contract: the first between citizens of a state,
the second between each citizen and the chosen government or ruler.

The idea of the political contract has a long history. In his dialogue
Crito, Plato puts forward the argument that, by choosing to live in
Athens and accepting its protection and the benefits it offers, one is
obliged in return to obey its laws. He has Socrates argue that, if a
person does not want to obey the laws in Athens, he should go and
live elsewhere.

But the renewed interest in contract came about because, with the
new thinking produced during the Renaissance, and the upheavals
in Europe caused by the Reformation, there emerged a society
in which emphasis was increasingly placed on the individual.
Rather than seeing society as a God-given structure within which
individuals were required to fit, thus fulfilling their purpose within
the whole, there was a view that people should be able to get
together and take their own responsibility for the political rules
under which they should live.

3. The social contract 51

 Thus we arrive at seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
contractarianism – in other words, the attempt to find a rational
justification for the modern nation-state, based on the agreement of
the people. This period set the foundations of modern democracy
and liberalism – and thus forms the basis of modern political
thought.

Key questions to ask about representation and consent are:

 Does this government represent me fairly?

 How do I give (or withhold) my consent for it to act in
my name?
 Am I considered to have given my consent to a nation’s
political system simply by being born there? If not, at what
point am I asked for my consent?
 What if I belong to a minority and all political decisions are
made in favour of the majority? Does that mean that I will
never be treated fairly (from my perspective) in a democratic
system?

Today, most people favour some form of democracy – that people

should agree together to support a government, rather than having
one imposed on them. That has come about, to a considerable
extent, through the work of thinkers who supported the idea of
a social contract – including Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.

Hobbes: an alternative to chaos

When a nation restricts civil liberties or the free-flow of

information in the name of security, when it become defensive,
when it insists on maintaining tight border controls to defend itself
against terrorist threats or illegal immigrants, or when it claims
absolute authority, it follows a line of reasoning that goes back to
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679).

52
Hobbes wrote at the time of political conflict – the civil war in
England, the challenge to royal authority, the execution of Charles
I and the setting up of the Commonwealth. Hobbes favoured
the monarchy, and was forced to flee to France in 1640. His
best-known work, Leviathan (1651) – the title of which refers to
the state, named after the great beast in the Book of Job, whose
magnificence quelled all questioning – reflects his view of the
authority of the monarchy. The charge against the king, at his trial
in 1649, was that he claimed ‘an unlimited and tyrannical power to
rule according to his will, and to overthrow the rights and liberties
of the people of England’.

So the key questions for Hobbes concern how and why a

government is established, and what authority it should be given.

Understandably perhaps, he holds a rather bleak view of human life

and of the potential of society to descend into chaos and bloodshed.
He thinks that most human behaviour is motivated by desires that
lead to conflicts of interest and therefore disputes. He assumes that
mutual agreement alone would not be sufficient to settle such disputes,
unless there were to be some overall authority to enforce compliance.

Therefore, the only hope for protection in a dangerous world is

to band together, to set up a powerful ruler or government, and
to agree to be committed to its authority. Failure to secure such
an authority leaves people vulnerable to a basic trait of human
nature, namely that everyone is going to be out for him or herself.
In such circumstances, few will have the trust required for projects,
like trade and education, that require cooperation. He famously
described life for humankind in its natural state as ‘solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish and short’, lacking all that makes for civilized
living, trade, learning and so on. And just as, in the earlier ‘natural
law’ approach, the first natural right of every human being is
self-preservation, so the first duty of the state is to protect against
threats to life, both internal and external.

State power is legitimized by being set up by the agreement of the

people, for their mutual support and protection. The key thing

3. The social contract 53

 to appreciate about Hobbes’s main argument, however, is that
authority is given to the ruler, rather than just loaned. Individual
wills are given up in favour of the single sovereign will.

But the problem with this is that, once set up between individuals,
the sovereign power does not have an on-going agreement with
each of the citizens, but has absolute and unchallengeable authority.
Of course, given Hobbes’s background, that would seem perfectly
reasonable, for once the sovereign power is open to challenge, each
and every citizen may start to doubt its authority and refuse its laws –
and you are back on the slope down to anarchy and civil strife.

Power and authority

Power is the ability to do something; authority is the right to
do it. A military junta may have the power to repress its people,
maintaining control through fear, but that does not mean that
they have the right to do so. To have authority requires that
power is acknowledged by the general consent of the people.
And that, of course, is the purpose of a social contract. Only with
acknowledged authority is it possible to settle disputes without
the need to resort to brute force.

On the other hand, to have authority without power makes a

government vulnerable, and denies it the ability to perform what
Hobbes saw as its primary purpose, namely providing security for
its people.

The main argument against Hobbes is that his social contract does
not make a government sufficiently accountable for its subsequent
actions. But he adds one qualification, to use his phrase, ‘except
where my life is threatened’. This would suggest that, in extreme
circumstances, authority is not simply given, but is loaned and the
condition of that loan is that the government provides security.
Given that Hobbes’s whole purpose is to establish an authority that

54
provides security and avoids anarchy, this is reasonable. Hobbes
allows people to rebel, but only if absolutely necessary in order to
protect themselves.

Insight
In times of uncertainty, Hobbes appears to be the thinker
of choice, since he offers the prospect of secure, tough
government to which all are committed, with none of the
problems of political compromise that come from a more
representative democracy. The price to be paid is that people
lack freedom to change and improve a government.

Locke and the principles of democracy

John Locke (1632–1704) welcomed the ‘glorious revolution’ of
1688, when William of Orange arrived in England to establish a
constitutional monarchy, and James II emigrated to France, thus
showing that it was possible to remove and replace a ruler without
bloodshed or national trauma, in stark contrast to the upheavals
of the Civil War earlier in the century. His Second Treatise on
Civil Government (1689) was a justification of that new political
situation – a triumph of compromise that would establish a
monarchy and strong leadership, but allow control to remain
in the hands of the people.

In Locke’s work we find much that has contributed to the modern

liberal democratic tradition, and his ideas were to influence both
the French and American constitutions. The reason why Locke is
crucial in political philosophy is that he argued for representation
in government, with ways of ensuring that governments are held
to account.

Key to Locke’s argument is that a government should establish

laws by consent of the people, and should then be held
accountable, so that no ruler can be above the law. Hence the
institutions of government are agencies for the implementing

3. The social contract 55

 of law, rather than having absolute power to make and change
the law. This is what distinguishes Locke’s position from that of
Hobbes.

Representation
In a representative democracy, it is important that those who
attend parliament on behalf of their constituents are able to
reflect their wishes, and to act as those individual voters would
wish them to act. Without that, it makes no sense to claim that
democracy represents the wishes of the majority of people. This
may be compromised if loyalty to a political party claims priority
over loyalty to voters.

Locke was not as negative as Hobbes concerning the natural state.

He believed that, in the absence of laws or political control, where
people would be absolutely free to choose what to do, some would
still be willing to work together for mutual support. However,
he argued that such a state did not offer protection for a person’s
‘property’, and thus that they would remain in fear:

This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free,
is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason
that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others
who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by
the general name – property.

And he pointed out that the natural state lacked two things:

Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law. Received

and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and
wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies
between them …

56
 Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known and
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences
according to established law.
Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chapter IX

PROPERTY

Locke saw that, in a state of nature, people could hunt animals

and gather food, and thereby take for themselves what would
previously be regarded as common. The act of hunting had made
it theirs, and they therefore considered themselves to be entitled to
it. He thus established the principle that the act of labour – mixing
one’s own efforts with what nature provides – is the basis for
property.

Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to

all men, yet every man has a ‘property’ in his own ‘person’.
This nobody has any right to but himself. The ‘labour’ of his
body and the ‘ work’ of his hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property.
Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chapter V

For Locke, people are essentially free to take their own interests
seriously; they have a right to work for and keep wealth, and if
they have invested their time and energy in a project, even one
that has taken natural resources that might originally have been
considered to belong to everyone, then they are entitled to keep
them for themselves. This right to own and defend one’s property
is a central feature of the freedom of the individual; the state is
there to protect private interests, and to create the conditions
of security that allow commerce. Naturally, the organization
of defence and law requires the raising of funds through taxation,
but Locke argues that this should be with the consent of the
majority.

3. The social contract 57

 Whose land is it?
If, as Locke argued, the earth was common to all, and made
into ‘property’ by being mixed with a person’s labour, who really
owns it?

The Chagos islands are in the middle of the Indian Ocean. They
were first populated in 1776 by slaves from Senegal, Mozambique
and Madagascar, brought to the islands by French colonists. But
the British ruled the islands from the early nineteenth century,
and their inhabitants eventually became British citizens.

But in 1966 the British government leased the main island

(Diego Garcia) to the USA for the construction of a huge air
base, evicting about 2000 people from their homes and forcing
them to leave the island and move to Mauritius or the
Seychelles.

In 2004, the High Court ruled that their expulsion was unlawful,
but the British Government still banned them from returning
home. Finally in May 2007, they won the right to return to what
they consider to be their ‘motherland’.

This raises the following questions:

 Who actually ‘owns’ Diego Garcia?

 Should it be owned at all?
 When a piece of virgin land (or in this case an archipelago of
65 coral islands) is occupied, should it, as Locke argued, become
the ‘property’ of those who work to make it their home?
 From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, European
countries acquired an extensive portfolio of colonies throughout
the world. Did they therefore ‘own’ those countries?
 When newly arrived colonists encounter an indigenous
population, who has the right to the land?

58
 LAWS AND EXECUTIVE POWER

Locke also distinguishes between the legislative and executive aspects

of government. The legislative side establishes the laws by which
the state will be run. The executive sets about implementing them,
and part of that implementation is the setting up of an impartial
legal system. Hence the right of parliament to endorse or hold to
account a government, and if necessary to change it. This remains
an essential part of modern representative democracy. In Britain,
the Prime Minister and other ministers are required to present
themselves before the House of Commons to explain their actions
and their proposals for legislation – and these can then be scrutinized
and, if appropriate, changed, before they can become law.

Insight
Hence the significance of the crisis of confidence in the UK
following the 2009 revelations about MPs’ expenses; in a
representative democracy, it is essential that people feel able
to trust their representatives to deal honestly and effectively
on their behalf, and that requires confidence in their personal
integrity.

MAJORITY RULE

How do you protect a minority or an individual from the wishes

of the majority? And how do you establish that everyone has given
consent to be governed in this way? Locke himself recognized this
issue and made a distinction between consent that is given directly,
in the making of an agreement, and consent that is tacit. Naturally
enough, most people will be judged to have given tacit consent,
since they have not actually been present to set up the government
in the first place.

If rule is by consent, then I should be able to select and direct

those who are set up to control me. But the laws are set up by the
consent of the majority. How does an individual or a minority
respond when the will of the majority – or at least, the government
for which a majority has voted – goes against their own interests?

3. The social contract 59

 This may be termed ‘the paradox of sovereignty’: that people
are subject to a ruler who is actually selected to act as their own
agent.

Beware politicians bearing gifts …

An example of this problem is seen every time there is a general
election in the UK (and probably elsewhere also). When it comes
time to be elected, the government, seeking a further mandate
from the people, makes promises to the people about what they
will do for them. In other words, it asks to be given authority, and
therefore needs to promise to do what will be most popular. A
government that promised nothing would hardly be expected to
be voted into office. How can governments be honest about the
tough or unpopular actions they might need to take, if they have
to pitch their offer to the people in this way?

There is another fundamental problem here. The whole reason for

establishing a social contract was that people, left to their own
devices, could not always be trusted to keep their own contracts
with one another, and hence everyone would be vulnerable to
exploitation by all the others. How then can people be trusted
to keep the social contract they make with the government?

The logical answer to this is that they can’t. If a small number of

people defy the law, they may be punished for it. If a majority
complain that a law is unjust, or seek to change the government,
the fact that they are a majority appears to give their action
legitimacy.

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

From simple democracy in ancient Athens, we have moved to a

situation of representative democracy, necessitated by the sheer
number of people involved. Hence it is clear that if representatives
are to be voted into office, those voting must have a clear idea of

60
what they will intend to do, to ensure that they will reflect the
wishes of voters.

This is made more complex by the party system. Where the person
standing for election belongs to a party, it is assumed that he or
she will follow that party’s position on the major issues under
discussion. From time to time, of course, in order to represent
constituents, a representative may need to go against the party
line. But that is the exception rather than the rule.

Britain’s two-per-cent effective

democracy
Britain has a representative democracy, which suggests that
everyone’s vote counts. However, with a first-past-the-post system
(in which each constituency elects its own representative on the
basis of a simple majority, with no account being taken for the
number of votes given to the other candidates), the results in most
constituencies are a foregone conclusion. The final result, in terms
of a balance of parties in the House of Commons, depends on some
900,000 voters (two per cent of the total number) who happen
to live in marginal constituencies, where the swing will decide the
final result. Political parties therefore tend to pitch their offer to
the ‘middle ground’, since that is where the final decision rests.

However, a system of proportional representation tends to give

a more balanced, but less decisive result, with hung parliaments
and governments being formed of more than one political party
and therefore being prone to instability. We therefore face a
familiar dilemma:

 Do you go for fairness, even if that makes the decision-making

process more difficult?
 Or do you go for a pragmatic way of achieving a decisive result,
even if most people are, in effect, disenfranchised?

3. The social contract 61

 It is assumed that, where a government is formed from those
of a particular party who have gained a majority of seats, that
government will put into effect those things that the party
presented to the electorate in its campaign. Hence the government
may claim to have a mandate from the electorate to put into effect
the manifesto or platform upon which it campaigned.

But notice the problem this causes. In a representative democracy,

only a majority of elected members need support the party
which seeks to put itself forward to govern. Hence, at any one
time, the government in power can, at the very most, claim to be
implementing ideas voted for by a majority of the people, and
it is quite likely that, for any one particular piece of legislation,
it will represent only a minority view, since not every elected
representative in a party will give equal support to the legislation,
and not every voter who supported him or her will necessarily have
approved of that aspect of the party’s manifesto. Thus, unless you
have a referendum on each and every piece of legislation (which
would not be practicable in a modern democracy), it is impossible
to know what percentage of the population actually support it.

How many votes?

We tend to assume the principle of has always implied one person
one vote. However, John Stuart Mill, in his Considerations on
Representative Government, 1861, suggested that manual workers
should have a single vote, merchants and bankers should have a
few votes, but university graduates should have rather more. Is
that utterly unreasonable? Quite apart from any considerations
about whether everyone’s vote counts towards the final result,
there is a serious question about whether one can trust everyone
to cast their vote in an informed and responsible way. But how
do you decide who qualifies? There is a tendency for politicians to
dismiss elections results they don’t like by describing them as an
instinctive reaction to some particular circumstance, rather than
take them as a considered judgement. Although it is politically

62
 incorrect to suggest that not everyone is entitled to an equal
say, consider this: If your life depended on the votes of a group of
people gathered in a room, would you be happy for those people
to be chosen at random?

It is also clear that, in any representative democracy which is

organized along party lines, decisions about those things that fall
within the responsibility of the executive, will (through a natural
desire to stay in power) reflect the interests of the ruling party.
This would include, for example, the decision about when to call
a general election. In other words the consent and mandate of the
people, which alone legitimizes those in office, can itself be timed
to benefit those presently in office.

Will he, won’t he?

In late September and early October 2007, during the conference
season for the British political parties, there was much speculation
about whether the new Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, would
call an early general election. In the end, he didn’t, and when
challenged by the opposition in May 2009 to go to the polls,
he suggested that it would lead to ‘chaos’, a comment that
prompted mirth amongst politicians.

Political parties represent different groups of people within a

democracy. To be fair, a democratic process should favour all
equally. But a sitting Prime Minister can call an election as and
when the polls suggest that (in the to and fro of political life) the
presently ruling party stands best chance of being returned to
power.

 Is that fair? Does it not mean that the election process is

always biased in favour of the existing party of government?
(Contd)

3. The social contract 63

 There are other questions to be asked about political parties
within a representative democracy, in particular concerning
the requirement that MPs vote along party lines on some
issues, rather than according to their individual judgement of
the particular interests of their constituencies.
 Does the party system over-simplify political issues, by giving
people a crude choice between parties, rather than expecting
individual representatives to be responsive to their particular
wishes?

To what extent, then, should a representative democracy with a

party system claim to be able to put into effect a government which
accurately represents the people? And if it admits the limitations of
any such process, is there any better way of operating?

Might it be possible, for example, to hold a referendum on major

issues? The problem here is that the framing of the straightforward
question that it puts to the electorate in a referendum is in the
hands of the government – and the way the question is framed
may influence the result. Hence, with the best will in the world, the
process of democracy is no more than an on-balance probability
that the government is putting into effect the wishes of the people.

A key question is this: If a government is elected on a mandate, and

the circumstances that led to the formulation of that mandate change,
is that government entitled to act differently from the way it promised
the electorate? That might appeal to common sense. On the other
hand, if it then acts against its own mandate, does it not become an
elected dictatorship – acting against the expressed wishes of the voters?

‘Twas ever thus!

David Hume, commenting on the British balance of power between
the monarch, the House of Commons and the House of Lords,
suggested (in his essay ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’, 1741)

64
 that peers should be made for life and should not be hereditary.
The Lords should be elected and no commoner should be allowed
to refuse a seat in the Lords if offered it. He sees an effective
House of Lords as a good corrective to the possible whims of the
sovereign and the power of the Commons. The effect of such
reforms would be that:

By this means the House of Lords would consist entirely of

the men of chief credit, abilities, and interest in the nation;
and every turbulent leader in the House of Commons might
be taken off, and connected by interest with the House of
Peers.

More than 250 years later, Hume’s comments are still relevant,
although whether turbulent leaders of the Commons are
mellowed by becoming Lords is a matter of debate!

Insight
It seems to me that democracy is always a matter of
compromise – an ideal of representation that no actual
democracy today is able to put into effect. The question is:
How do you ensure that the inevitable compromises are fair?

Rousseau: the tyranny of the general will

If people were not so foolish as to walk around brandishing

the latest mobile phones and iPods, there would be far less
street crime, because the temptation to snatch and run would be
diminished!

In essence, that was the view of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) a

philosopher and man of letters, whose personal life was remarkably
colourful, and whose political and social views were to influence the

3. The social contract 65

 French Revolution (even though he himself did not live to see it). He
contrasted the natural state of humankind with the very unnatural
conditions of society. In their natural state people would simply
take what they needed for life, they would not be tempted to steal
from others because the whole notion of private property would not
exist. It is the privatizing of things that leads to social unrest.

Nevertheless, people do in fact live in society and are open to the

corruption that comes with it, so how then might they regain their
freedom and innocence? Are freedom and civil society compatible?

That, in effect, is the question that lies behind one of the great
‘one-liners’ of political philosophy, the opening of his book
The Social Contract:

Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.

In The Social Contract he seeks to reconcile freedom and authority.

He argues that one is obliged to obey the state because it represents
the ‘general will’ – not just the will of the majority, but what
everyone would really want, from a moral point of view, if they
considered the situation rationally and took into consideration the
interests of all.

Rousseau considered that, if you are enslaved by a particular

interest or desire, you are not truly free, even if you are allowed to
follow it. Freedom means freedom also from your own inclinations
and passions. Hence Rousseau could accept that, in order to
be truly free, people should obey the general will, rather than
following their own untrustworthy particular wills. If everyone
were wise enough, they would see that true interest and fulfilment
would come by following the general will.

But here comes the catch. People are not always wise. They may
not appreciate that the general will represents their own best
interests. They may not appreciate that following the general will
is their path to true freedom. Therefore it may be necessary for the

66
state to force people to do what they would ‘really’ (if they were
wiser) want in the first place. To use Rousseau’s chilling phrase,
they should be ‘forced to be free’.

Back to Plato
Plato argued that philosophers should rule, since they alone were
able to appreciate the eternal realities, rather than the passing
shadows of everyday existence. Using a ‘noble lie’ if necessary,
the lower orders would be kept in their place – which would be for
their own good and the good of the city-state as a whole.

What Rousseau presents in the idea of the general will, is not so

different – what those who govern the state deem to be in the
interests of all, will be imposed on all, since it is in their own best
interest.

One problem with Rousseau’s approach is that it assumes two

things: that everyone wants the same thing – in other words, that
the general will represents the self-interest of all – and that it is
a moral and political obligation of every citizen to follow that
imposed self-interest. But:

 the first is, factually, impossible to establish (unless you can

have a vote on every issue)
 the second is not something that facts alone can decide; it is a
matter of personal choice.

You may point out something to be the course of action that,

in your opinion, is in my best interest, but as a free individual, I
should be able to decide whether I want to accept or reject your
advice. To do other than that, if I have good reasons for rejecting it,
is to render self-contradictory the notion that it is in fact my ‘best
interest’ – it cannot be ‘best’ for me unless it is what I freely choose.

3. The social contract 67

 But how are people to decide on what legislation to agree on?

Will it be by common agreement, or by sudden inspiration? Has

the body politic an organ for expressing its will? … How would a
blind multitude, which often knows not what it wishes because it
rarely knows what is good for it, execute of itself an enterprise so
great, so difficult as a system of legislation?
The Social Contract, Chapter 6 (translated by H.J. Tozer)

His answer is that a superior intelligence, in the form of a

wise legislator, is needed to perform that task. Such a role is so
exalted that Rousseau sees such a person as believing himself
capable of changing human nature and ‘substituting a social
and moral existence for the independent and physical existence
which we have all received from nature’. The problem is that, for
its own good, the people will need to be changed for the better.
That goal, for the best of reasons, has been the inspiration of
many a dictator.

Insight
Notice that, at this point, Rousseau seems to be reverting
to the view – that good governance requires continuity and
strong leadership – that had earlier been taken by Hobbes,
with the monarch now replaced by a wise legislator.

General will or gut reactions?

Milder than the French Revolution, but similar is some
respects, was the revolution in the UK parliament as a result
of the expenses scandals revealed in May 2009. In response
to newspaper reports about what MPs had been claiming, the
court of public opinion turned against members of the House of
Commons as a general class, with a ‘get rid of the lot of them’ gut
reaction. Although understandable, that was unreasonable, since
a majority of MPs had behaved fairly and morally in claiming

68
 expenses. The danger of any situation where something is claimed
in the name of the general will, is that the balanced view is lost.
It is even more dangerous for a politician to claim to be acting on
behalf of the general will, since – without having everything he
or she says scrutinised by a body representing public opinion – it
is all too easy for a course of action that is motivated by partisan
politics to be justified as though it represented the will of all.

Rousseau mocked the British for being free only when they held
an election, between which times they were content to submit to
the rule of their government. That may be a valid criticism of any
representative democracy, but is it any worse than continually
being told that the government knows what you really want and
then forcing you to have it?

Fluoride and families

Should fluoride be added to our drinking water? After all, it would
improve the state of our teeth and would therefore be in the
interests of all. Rousseau would not hesitate. And what else might
be considered the general will argument? Should the Chinese be
‘free’ to have only one child, in order to limit population growth?

Still relevant?
To some, the discussions of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries may seem of historical interest only, but is that necessarily
so? John Rawls, who is credited with doing more than anyone
else to raise interest in political philosophy over the last 30 years,
presented in his A Theory of Justice, a thought experiment that
involved people agreeing together on the basis for the redistribution

3. The social contract 69

 of wealth within their society. We shall look at this important
book later (page 115) but for now we should notice that the task
of trying to justify the basis for politics may still depend on some
form of contractualism, and therefore look back to the earlier idea
of the social contract.

All modern ideas about respect for the individual, equality of

opportunity, or the independence of the judiciary, for example,
assume that government is done by consent, and in a way that
satisfies the majority of citizens. Liberal democracy – now seen
by many as the only viable political ideology – finds its origins in
seventeenth-century debates. Hence, to appreciate the present, it is
important not to forget the discussions of the past.

Focus groups and spin

Are the British really only free when they hold a general election,
as Rousseau suggested? Today, governments may use focus
groups and polls as a means of gathering information about what
the public wants. But exactly how that information is used and
presented, and how it is taken to justify political action, is more
subtle. Facts, once used in political debate, tend to acquire a
certain ‘spin’ – and newspapers add another spin of their own.

 Do governments tell people what they want to hear, or do they

tell people, based on poll evidence, what they think people
want to hear?
 How do you balance the rights of the individual with the
need for decisive action on the part of government? That is a
question as relevant now as in the eighteenth century.

Of course, there is always going to be a fundamental problem

with any contractual approach to establishing the authority of the
state: even if it works well as a ‘thought experiment’, it does not

70
represent the actual situation. David Hume commented (in his
essay ‘Of the Original Contract’, 1741) that:

Almost all governments which exist at present, or of which there

remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either
on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a
fair consent or voluntary subjection of the people.

He is not saying that contractual consent is wrong as a basis

for government, but simply that it is not the actual basis for
government. Most people, he argued, do not think that they have
given consent to the government; they have simply been born into
that country and its authority. People are not free to leave
their country – especially if they are poor and know no foreign
language – and they therefore have no choice but to accept the
government that they are given.

Hence, any agreement between government and people is, for all
practical purposes, imposed on the vast majority of citizens by
accident of birth. That, of course, does not prevent them from
subsequently criticizing their government – which is the provision
made by Locke and enshrined in representative democracy – but
it does show the very artificial nature of claiming a contract as the
basis for their obedience.

CREATED OR DISCOVERED

Finally, notice the huge shift that has taken place as we move from
the ancient Greek and mediaeval world to the seventeenth century.
In earlier political thinking, the task was to align the operations of
society with a sense of ultimate purpose, so that people could live
the good life and flourish. It did not depend on what individuals
thought might be to their benefit, but upon a serious consideration
of the purpose of life. An ideal form of government was out there
to be discovered.

Now, with the theories of social contract, the emphasis has shifted
to what people want. Whether it is the basics of democracy, the

3. The social contract 71

 negotiations of the prisoner’s dilemma or utilitarianism, it is the
wishes and preferences of people that count. Government is to be
constructed and shaped to fit our wishes.

The problem, from the standpoint of the individual citizen, was

how – once you have created your Leviathan, or your general will –
you retain some sort of control over that political beast. How
do you then avoid the possibility that you, as an individual, will
have your freedom curtailed for the supposed benefit of the whole?
Here it is Locke, rather than Hobbes or Rousseau, who provides
the effective possibility of political reform: the people are in charge,
and they can change a government that does not satisfy their
intentions.

Insight
This leaves open a fundamental question: Are the wishes
of individual people a wise and secure basis on which to
establish government and law?

72
 10 THINGS TO REMEMBER
1 How power and political authority differ (the latter implies
agreed legitimacy).

2 There is always a problem of trust, if each person seeks his or

her personal benefit.

3 Hobbes sought strong government as a cure for instability.

4 Locke established the principles upon which modern

representative democracy is based.

5 It is important to establish a bal ance between executive power

and the authority of the people’s representatives.

6 There are problems with establishing and imposing a general will.

7 Rousseau saw society as corrupting natural innocence, by

offering temptations.

8 There is a difference between doing what people want and

doing what is good for them.

9 Most people do not get an option, but are required to accept

the political system into which they are born.

10 Contractualism suggests that the good life is not something

given by nature, but something to be agreed on and created.

3. The social contract 73

 4
Ideas, systems and ideologies
In this chapter you will learn:
• the difference between political philosophy and political
ideologies
• the principles upon which political ideologies are based
• what the major political ideologies claim.

We have already seen that, from ancient Greece to the mediaeval

world, political ideas were linked to an overall view of the good
life and how it might be achieved. We also considered the social
contract approach to philosophy, which developed alongside the
rise of democracy and the increased awareness of the value and
rights of the individual.

By the second half of the nineteenth century, these two streams of

political thought had been joined by another, represented by the
work of thinkers such as Kant, Hegel and Marx. It was the era
in which people were becoming aware of evolution and change.
This was true, of course, in terms of Darwin and natural selection,
but it was equally a feature of the nineteenth-century awareness of
social and political change.

Hegel (1770–1831) is the philosopher who is key to this approach.

He argued that reality was always embodied in the historical
process, and that a nation was, in effect, the physical expression of
the moral law, having a life over and above that of the individuals

74
who comprise it. In other words, he considered that it was possible
to see social and political change as part of an overall rational
system. In this system history unfolds in a process of dialectical
change: one state of affairs (a ‘thesis’) develops from within itself
its own opposition (an ‘antithesis), and these two are then resolved
(in a ‘synthesis’), a process which repeats over and over. For Hegel,
this process expressed the Geist, or spirit of the age, which gave
meaning to people’s lives.

So political philosophy blends views of the good life, issues of

contract and also broad systems of thought, such as developed by
Hegel and later by Marx.

These form the broad base of ideas, concepts and systems of

thought that are the subject matter of political philosophy. But
when it comes to popular political debate, people seldom have time
to go back and explain their ideas with reference to first principles,
or get involved in ideas about some overall explanatory system
such as Hegel and Marx expounded. Instead, they tend to opt for
a pre-packaged political ideology.

What is a political ideology?

A political ideology is a set of ideas, values and arguments that

hang together to give a coherent overall view of what society
should be like. By the twentieth century there was a wide range
of competing political ideologies on offer: socialism, communism,
conservatism, liberalism, nationalism, fascism, anarchism and –
more recently – environmentalism.

One danger with ideologies is that they are too convenient.

They offer a way of gathering together ideas into a simplified
package which can easily be used as a label or badge, and people
tend to cling to them passionately and not always rationally.
In reality, each of them embraces a wide range of views and
ideas.

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 75

 The outline of these different ideologies is a matter for politics,
rather than political philosophy, but we need to be aware of them,
partly because they are used in political debate, but also because
they tend to be based on one or more key ideas and values:

 freedom and democracy

 established traditions and values
 justice and equality
 personal and national development
 respect for the environment.

These basic ideas may conflict with one another: freedom for one
person might lead to injustice for another; absolute equality might
stifle personal development. So ideologies tend to take one of these
as foundational, and will, if necessary, compromise on the others.
For example, if you take freedom as your foundational value, you
may need to allow inequalities in society if everyone is free to work
to improve their situation, and you will probably want to limit what
a government can do to curtail freedom, even if it is done in the
name of justice or equality. On the other hand, if equality is seen as
foundational, people’s personal freedoms and ambitions may need
to be restricted if they go against the needs of society as a whole.

Insight
Politics will always be a matter of compromise in a democracy,
because people’s needs and abilities are so different and cannot
all be equally satisfied. The important thing is to establish and
negotiate between foundational values.

We shall therefore take a brief look at the major political

ideologies, but first a note about the generally accepted way of
labelling ideas and ideologies.

Right, left or centre

The terms ‘right’, ‘left’ and ‘centre’ are regularly used in political
discussions. They are not new, but go back to the eighteenth
century. The meanings of the terms are as follows:

76
  In general, the ‘left’ refers to ideologies that favour social
equality and what they regard as a progressive agenda for
society. Various socialist and Marxist ideologies would come
under that category, as indeed would anarchism.
 By contrast, the ‘right’ embraces those ideologies that are
more conservative by nature, favouring only gradual change
and mindful of established tradition. It is also used for those
ideologies, such as fascism, that accept an authoritarian and
often nationalistic approach.
 The ‘centre’ is generally used for the liberal ideology, but it
may also refer to those of either right or left who are of a
moderate disposition and favour broad consensus. Hence the
term ‘centre-right’ may be used for moderate conservatives,
and social democrats may refer to themselves as occupying
the ‘centre-left’ of the political spectrum.

Starting with freedom and democracy

If freedom is taken as the foundational value, then a society will
seek to allow individuals to maximize their life opportunities
without hindrance from government. Legislation will be kept to a
minimum, sufficient to protect people from harming one another,
but otherwise, society should tolerate in an individual or group
whatever does not interfere with the freedom of others.

At one extreme, you have libertarianism. This argues for complete

freedom for the individual, and sees the state as exercising minimal
control. But this position raises some questions:

 What are the consequences of allowing everyone to do exactly

what they want?
 People need to work together in society – is that compatible
with complete freedom?
 Can I be free to take drugs, refuse to pay taxes, have sex with
children, without these things impacting on the lives and
welfare of others?

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 77

  Does a non-interventionist view of government benefit only
the articulate better-off who stand most chance of doing what
they like?
 Does government have any role (as Plato and Aristotle argued)
in shaping and guiding the life of individuals, rather than just
responding to their wishes?

Such questions about freedom (to which we shall return in

Chapter 6) tend to suggest that we should take a more moderate
position – liberalism.

Liberalism, as we know it today, developed in the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries. It is an ideology based on respect for the
individual, and seeks to enable the individual to retain control of
his or her life to the maximum extent possible, to be limited only
by the necessity to ensure that this same liberty is available to
all other people as well – a view clearly set out in the nineteenth
century by John Stuart Mill.

Liberalism is often associated with individualism – the claim that

individuals should be free to make their own choices and that the
state should provide an environment in which such individual
choices can be made and put into effect.

However, this liberal quest for freedom takes several different

(and to some extent, conflicting) directions. If I wish to be free, it
is reasonable that I should want to be free economically as well as
politically. I may want to start a business and will want to do so
with the minimum of state interference or regulation. This has led
to what is sometimes referred to as neo-liberalism which is the view
that there should be a largely de-regularized, low-tax economy.

Curiously, neo-liberalism may be seen as part of the ‘new-right’ – and

thus have roots as much in conservatism (see page 82) as traditional
liberalism. Freedom of trade is not simply the freedom of the
individual; it is the freedom to develop and increase the value of one’s
business, and that can only happen in a competitive environment.
Deregulation may lead to better goods and services being produced,

78
as each provider is required to compete against all others for a
share of the market. The freedom to win also implies the freedom
to lose, so a deregulated economy may be both threatening and
challenging.

Typical of this approach was that of Margaret Thatcher when

Prime Minister of the UK. By cutting regulation and taxes and
selling off state businesses and council houses, it was argued that
people would be encouraged to take responsibility for themselves,
and keep more of their own money to do with as they wished,
buying health care and education from the private sector if they so
chose. Although notionally conservative this approach was clearly
what we would call neo-liberal.

The great libertarian economist Adam Smith (1723–90) argued

that the state should not interfere with the private interests of
individuals or with the working of the free market. Once freed
from political control, capitalist free-markets spring up naturally
(as argued, for example, by the modern economist Milton
Friedman). Hence, the neo-liberal tradition, in removing
political control to limit the economic freedom of individuals,
encourages economics to take on a life of its own in shaping
society.

Adam Smith did not deny that a capitalist system delivered

inequality of wealth. His point, however, was that the overall
wealth of a nation would increase. In other words, even if the rich
became proportionately richer, what they generated would also
improve the situation of the poorest.

Putting the economy first?

In some political discussions it is assumed that the prime aim of
government is to encourage an increase in the standard of living
of its people and therefore an increase in the choice of goods and
services on offer. Delivering economic success seems to be the
(Contd)

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 79

 first responsibility of government, once internal and external
security is taken care of.

 Is it universally agreed that economic development is the main

goal in life?
 If other factors – the quality of the environment, for example –
were given priority, what implications might that have?

The other development of liberal thought, and one which arose

directly out of its original respect for the autonomy of the
individual, is that of civil and human rights. If a person is to be
respected, then their rights must be defended. Yet the defence of
human rights may well require legislation and the imposition of
restraints on those who would exploit others. Hence the same
liberal value of respect for the individual may find itself on very
different sides of the debate about economic freedom. Giving
people complete economic freedom may well leave open the
possibility of inequality and exploitation. Regulating them in
favour of the basic rights of the individual may be seen as the
frustration of a natural form of self-expression and development.

The dilemma for a liberal is how to protect and encourage

individuals at one and the same time – how to prevent them from
harming themselves, while granting them the freedom to do so if
they wish.

PARTICIPATION

Thinkers such as Hannah Arendt (1906–75) argue that there

is little scope in modern liberal democracy for participation in
the political process. She looks to a more republican level of
participation – in other words, like the republics of ancient Greece
and the Italian Renaissance – in which a significant number of
people are directly involved with political decision-making on
behalf of the people as a whole. This links to the idea of the ‘public

80
sphere’ (a term introduced by Jürgen Habermas, b. 1929,
a German social thinker and philosopher). Everyone has two
spheres of operation in their lives, one public and the other private.
For Arendt and Habermas, the public one should be given greater
prominence. The danger of modern liberal society is that the
individual is considered as interested only in their ‘private sphere’
as a consumer of goods and services for themselves and their
family, whereas political engagement is a matter of getting involved
with the whole public arena of political debate and action.

Habermas’s ideal of the public sphere is in stark contrast to what

is often found in democracies today – namely that decision-making
is limited to a minority of enthusiasts or professionals, working
within political parties. The bulk of citizens may or may not opt to
vote in a general election, but otherwise see themselves as no more
than passive recipients of a political system into which they have
no effective input. The ideal of republicanism, and of the ‘public
space’ which is its modern articulation, is one of participation,
of each person being able to engage in the political process at an
appropriate level.

ANARCHISM

Pushed to its logical extreme, the quest for freedom leads to

anarchism. This is the view that government is at best unnecessary
and at worst harmful. It has a long history and is associated
with very different thinkers. Of those already mentioned in this
book, Diogenes the Cynic certainly resented any type of rule or
the requirement that one should conform to the expectations of
society, and Rousseau felt that the natural state of humankind was
corrupted by society.

Anarchism as an ideology developed in the nineteenth century and

is particularly associated with the work of William Godwin (1756–
1836), Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–65) and Peter Kropotkin
(1842–1921). As you might expect, anarchists were not well
organized with a single, centrally agreed political agenda! There

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 81

 are many different forms of anarchism, some emphasizing freedom
of the individual, others the value of collective action, but all seem
to hold the basic view that humankind can flourish naturally and
spontaneously once political constraints are removed. Anarchism
therefore holds a positive view of human nature and potential, but
a generally cynical view of the value of political structures.

Insight
‘Anarchist’ is the term commonly used for someone who
rejects all rules even if the result appears negative and chaotic.
True anarchists have a far more positive approach – seeking
a situation which will allow the free flourishing of each
individual.

Starting with established values and traditions

For some, established values and traditions are not to be set aside
lightly, especially if they are seen to be effective in regulating
society. Conservatism is less an ideology and more a general
attitude towards society and politics. It sees value in the established
traditions of society, promotes law and order, seeks to cherish
what has been achieved in the past, and encourages respect for
authority. If there is to be change, it should be cautious, based on
experience rather than abstract thinking.

The classic text expressing the heart of conservatism is Edmund

Burke’s Reflexions on the Revolution in France, published in 1792.
Burke (1729–97) appeals for a slow process of change in society,
one which recognizes the cumulative wisdom of the past. He, of
course, was in favour of a constitutional monarchy, set alongside
the democratic institutions of government, as had been established
in England. To understand the force of Burke’s argument one
has only to read his implacable opponent, Thomas Paine. His
Rights of Man was written to counter Burke’s argument at every

82
step. Looking at the battle between their positions you see
the fundamental division between conservative and socialist
thinking – with Paine pushing for the overthrow of all restraining
authority and a deep trust in the ability of people to agree
together, and Burke constantly arguing caution and trust in
the establishment.

Modern conservatism has been modified to fit the spirit of the

age and has taken on the key features of liberalism. Indeed, the
neo-conservative agenda in terms of the economy is very much
one of liberal laissez-faire. Hence, you have Margaret Thatcher’s
‘liberal’ economic reforms, presented from a conservative point of
view, and aimed at rolling back the amount of state interference in
people’s lives. Under John Major, the Conservative party argued
for the theme of ‘back to basics’, and it has tended to be the
party of law and order, lower taxation, respect for authority and
the defence of private property, along with a sense of duty and
national pride.

Neo-conservatism, a feature of political thinking in the USA,

particularly during the presidency of George W. Bush, is rather
different from conventional conservatism, and more heavily
dependent on the liberal economic agenda. As outlined by
Fukuyama (in America at the Crossroads, 2006) it has four
distinguishing features:

 the internal character and the values embodied in a political

regime are important, and should be expressed in its foreign
policy; hence the foreign policy of the USA should reflect its
liberal democratic values.
 the belief that the USA should remain engaged in foreign
affairs and should use its power for moral purposes
 a sceptical view of the value of social planning
 a sceptical view of the ability of international law or
international institutions to be effective in securing security
and justice.

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 83

 In particular, as described by Fukuyama, the neo-conservatives
consider that it was right for the United States to use its military
power to achieve a ‘benevolent hegemony’ of those parts of the
world that it considered to be of strategic importance.

Insight
The shift from neo-conservatism to traditional liberal values
is well illustrated by the changes in US policy, both domestic
and foreign, when President Obama took over from President
George W. Bush.

We will consider the neo-conservative position again, in

connection with the role of the state, and the response to
war and terrorism. For now, however, it is important to note
that the conservative and neo-conservative positions tend to
emphasize what they see as a moral responsibility to maintain
traditional values. Exactly how traditional those values are,
or how they may be justified rationally, is of course another
matter.

Mill’s criticism of following custom

The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing
hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing
antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better
than customary, which is called, according to circumstances,
the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1863)

But notice that neo-conservatism stands closer to libertarianism

than the old-style, custom-based conservatism against which Mill
is arguing here. Neo-conservatism pushes a libertarian economic
agenda.

84
Starting with equality

If you take fairness and equality as your foundational value, you

will be concerned that everyone in society receives what they need,
and that a privileged minority does not control a nation’s economic
base in order to benefit at the expense of others.

To some extent this is already being considered in Plato and

Aristotle (although with huge reservations, since women and
slaves were largely ignored or patronized in their thinking). It is
also reflected in ‘social contract’ thinking, which emphasizes the
responsibility of the people for their own destiny, rather than being
under the control of an unaccountable or autocratic ruler.

But with the nineteenth century – with huge changes to society

brought about by the industrial revolution, the development of
capitalism and the formation of an urban, industrial working class –
this thinking developed into the socialist and communist ideologies.

Socialism sprang out of a practical concern for the working class

and a revolt against the social impact of unfettered capitalism.
It argued that capitalism needed to be tempered by political or
social aims. Slave labour and child labour are now illegal, not
for capitalist reasons, but for social ones – even if profitable, they
should not be allowed. Philosophers such as Bertrand Russell
(in his lecture ‘The Case for Socialism’) have argued against a
general tendency, inherent in capitalism, to encourage inequality,
to ignore the plight of those who are unemployed, and to allow
the development of an underclass. Socialism presented itself
as something of a moral crusade against the fundamentals of
capitalism – which led to alienation, exploitation and treating
people as commodities and as cogs in an economic wheel.

Robert Owen (1771–1858), an early socialist, argued (in A New

View of Society, 1814) that small groups of people, responsible
for their own work, could band together and rule themselves in
a co-operative fashion. He believed that people were influenced

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 85

 by their environment, and so set about forming a community for
mill workers, he himself having worked as a manager and owner
of cotton mills in New Lanark, Scotland. He saw his reforms as
something of a moral crusade, improving the conditions of working
people. Interestingly, when in 1813 he sought funds from people
who were prepared to invest in his milling business for a more
modest return (five per cent) in order to give him scope for his social
reforms, one of those to do so was the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham.

In some ways, such socialism was not so far removed from the
views of early anarchists, who argued that people could work
together quite well without the imposition of political control
on behalf of the state – but they did so in the very different
circumstances of the newly industrialized working class. Self-
government through reason, getting beyond the old established
divisions of the past (including the divisions brought about by
religion) was Owen’s theme.

Broadly, a socialist ideology seeks to redistribute wealth in favour

of the least well-off, to restrain those aspects of capitalism that
might produce socially unacceptable consequences. Socialists
wanted the production of goods to be geared towards the benefit
of society, and not simply left to free-market capitalist economics.
Hence trade unionism developed as a movement representing the
interests of working people, and aiming to improve the terms and
conditions under which they give their labour.

Therefore the fundamental distinction between a capitalist and a

socialist society is about whether the needs of capital dominate
over those of society, or vice versa. In practice, of course, almost all
states fall in between those two extremes – the main thing is to sort
out where the balance point comes.

Permission needed?
Having quoted Mill’s criticism of a conservative approach, it is
only fair to note that, in On Liberty, he is equally critical of a

86
 society where the state organizes everything – a tendency of
socialist states. In context, however, Mill was actually arguing
against the dominance of bureaucracy, which he saw exemplified
by Russia under the rule of the czar.

In countries of more advanced civilization and of a

more insurrectionary spirit, the public, accustomed to
expect everything to be done for them by the State, or
at least to do nothing for themselves without asking from
the State not only leave to do it, but even how it is to be
done, naturally hold the State responsible for all evil which
befalls them, and when the evil exceeds their amount of
patience, they rise against the government and make what
is called a revolution; whereupon somebody else, with or
without legitimate authority from the nation, vaults into
the seat, issues his order to the bureaucracy, and everything
goes on much as it did before; the bureaucracy being
unchanged, and nobody else being capable of taking their
place.

 All too often ‘they ought to do something about it’ is an

excuse for political inactivity!

MARX AND COMMUNISM

Karl Marx (1818–83) famously said ‘Philosophers have only

interpreted the world in various ways, the real point is to
change it’ and, without doubt, his own political philosophy
has been hugely influential, and shaped much of the history of
the twentieth century. His principal work was Das Kapital,
published in 1867. The literature on Marx is vast, and it is
unrealistic to try to summarize his work in this short section, but
it is important to place him within the overall development of
political philosophy.

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 87

 Marx argued that political and social structures were
fundamentally rooted in economics, and specifically in the
production and distribution of goods. He therefore interpreted
history in economic terms and as shaped by the struggle between
the social classes, with capitalist employers facing their employees
as once landowners faced their peasants.

Everything is seen in terms of the class struggle, and in the context

of society as a whole.

Marx was influenced by Hegel’s dialectic (see page 75) but

considered that it was driven by the material and economic basis
of society. Hence, his theory is called dialectical materialism.

Marx thought that, in a capitalist system, wage labourers,

producing something from which someone else makes a profit,
become alienated from their work, and are treated as impersonal
things – machines whose sole purpose in life is production.
He saw the capitalist process leading to more and more wealth
being concentrated in the hands of a small number of ‘bourgeoisie’,
with the working ‘proletariat’ declining into poverty. He argued
that this would eventually lead those workers to rise up against the
bourgeois owners of property, gain common ownership of the means
of production, and establish a classless society – the dictatorship
of the proletariat: communism.

Communist ideology generally involves a high degree of state

control, since private enterprise and capitalism were features of the
failing, earlier regime. It also entails the provision of the essentials
of life in the form of a welfare state.

Within the ideology there have been significant differences of

emphasis. Under Lenin, the state gained power, whereas Trotsky
wanted less formal power to be in the hands of the communist
party machine, and more direct involvement of people in political
decision-making. Mao, in China, was faced with a different
situation from that envisaged by Marx, and saw the ordinary
working people in the agricultural environment as ready to lead

88
a revolution, as opposed to Marx’s assumption that the
agricultural world would need to give way to an industrialized one
before such a revolution could happen.

However, under communism, the apparatus of the state, far from

withering away, which was Marx’s original prediction, grew and
became increasingly directive in terms of every aspect of human
life, defensive of their ideology. Political debate was discouraged,
and those with dissenting ideas brutally repressed.

The other key factor in assessing Marxist ideology is that it

predicted the eventual self-destruction of capitalism, and the
flourishing of a classless, communist society. In practice, of
course, capitalism has flourished into the twenty-first century,
and Marxist states have failed to deliver the equality and freedom
promised, and have therefore failed or been overthrown, or have
compromised with the capitalist system, or have retreated behind
strict ideological borders.

For Soviet communism, a terrible dilemma emerged in 1956, when

the truth about Stalin’s rule of terror was finally acknowledged
and denounced by Khrushchev at the twentieth congress of
the Communist Party. It is sometimes referred to as ‘the great
contradiction’ and can be expressed thus:

 Was Stalin’s rule the inevitable product of economic structures

that created it?
 Or was it the cult of personality that allowed Stalin to rule in
that way, shaping society and standing above the law?

If you take the first of these options, then the inevitable march
of dialectical materialism led to a disaster, not the ideal society
and the rule of the proletariat. Marx argued that a society would
produce the leaders it needed. Hence the Soviet system itself could
be blamed for producing Stalin.

But if you take the second of these options, it means that dialectical
materialism itself is fundamentally wrong, and that change happens

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 89

 through the influence of individual rulers, not the working-out of
the dialectic.

Faced with the reality of what had happened in the Soviet Union
under Stalin, it suddenly seemed that Marx’s most basic view of the
nature of political change was either fundamentally flawed, or its
results utterly unacceptable. It was a traumatic acknowledgement
from which communism never really recovered.

Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992), in his book The Road to

Serfdom (1944) criticized all ideologies based on collectivism –
namely the idea that economic activity should be organized
centrally by the state – on the grounds that collectivism led
naturally to totalitarianism. He believed that central planning
would never achieve fairness in the distribution of resources,
which was best left to market forces, and the ability of people to
get together spontaneously and co-operate for mutual benefit. In
practice, the huge centralized economy of the Soviet Union under
Stalin, for example, was seen to be hopelessly inefficient, bogged
down in bureaucracy, and maintained by totalitarian ruthlessness.

Another major criticism of Marxist communism came from

Karl Popper (1902–94). Marx saw progress of society as
scientifically determined by dialectical materialism, but Popper
argued that this was bogus science, since Marxists would not
allow anything to refute their theory, and that it led to a fixed
and totalitarian view of the future. This was in line with his main
contribution to the philosophy of science – falsification – namely
that in order to test a theory, one needs to know what would
show it to be false, since no genuine theory is compatible with
contradictory pieces of evidence. Marxists would allow nothing
to count against the truth of dialectical materialism, therefore,
he argued, the theory could not be genuinely scientific. This
undermined the foundations of communist social theory.

Insight
Marx gathered evidence and – like any scientist – devised
an explanatory theory. Subsequent history has shown his

90
 predictions to be wrong and therefore – whatever social
benefits a communist regime might appear to offer – it is
no longer rational to believe that the dictatorship of the
proletariat is inevitable.

CONSUMERS AND THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION

Socialism traditionally considered the collectivization of the means

of production as a necessary step on the way to its political goal.
Once the state has direct control of the means of production,
the economy could be run for the sake of satisfying the genuine
needs of the people, whereas under capitalism, ever-increasing
needs are stimulated in people in order to feed the needs of a self-
perpetuating capitalist system.

Chicken and egg on phones

Are new mobile phone models produced in order to meet the
needs of those who will use them? Or are new possible uses
devised in order to sell more mobile phones?

Of these two options, the second seems the more likely, given the
way in which the market is stimulated within a capitalist system.
Yet, from the point of view of those who enjoy the newly devised
benefits, does that really matter? If the end result is that everyone
has a more interesting or attractive piece of equipment, does it
matter whether its production was the result of philanthropic
idealism, or the desire for enhanced profits?

The overall success of capitalism and the failure of planned

economies have meant that – broadly speaking – the socialist
position today is not one that would try to eliminate the capitalist
system, or the general principles of supply and demand that are
built into it. Rather, it suggests that capitalism should be gently
regulated, recognizing that naked competition (as presented by

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 91

 Plato’s Thrasymachus, where justice is whatever is in the interests
of the stronger) does not always give an acceptable social outcome.

Modern social democracy is the result of this fusion of socialism

with a recognition of the benefits to working people that can
be brought about by an economy that delivers ever-increasing
standards of living. And that recognition has moved modern
socialist parties a considerable distance towards the liberal agenda.

Left versus right on housing?

Until the 1980s, Britain had a growing (though never adequate)
stock of council houses for rent. People who could not afford to
buy their own homes had a reasonable prospect of renting, albeit
after waiting their turn for the next property to become vacant.
Then in the 1980s the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher,
advanced the policy of selling off council houses to their tenants,
thereby claiming to set them free into the world of property
ownership.

That housing stock was not replaced, and even in the first decade
of the twenty-first century relatively few new and affordable
homes are available for rent, at the very time when the cost of
home ownership is still beyond the means of many young working
people. Former council houses have sometimes changed hands
many times. Having originally been sold to their tenants at a
discount, they may now come on the market at a price beyond
the reach of those who three decades ago would have been able
to rent them.

Here is a clear example of the old left–right divide on policy:

 The old socialist policy was to provide affordable housing.

 The liberal/conservative policy was to give people the
flexibility of home ownership, releasing the energy locked up
in the inertia of renting a drab property for which one did not
have responsibility.

92
 Today, all sides admit that there is a serious need for more
affordable housing, but the last decade of rule by New Labour has
not seen a return to the earlier socialist policy of building massive
new council estates.

Insight
Emphasis on home ownership for all, with banks willing to
lend more than many borrowers could repay, led to the sub-
prime mortgage failures in the USA, which in turn triggered
the global credit crunch and resulting recession. Houses
became assets to be traded, rather than places to live.

SOCIALISM AND THE WORK-BASED ECONOMY

André Gorz was a major European contributor to thinking

about socialism and capitalism, who was also concerned with
political ecology – relating political decisions to lifestyle and
environment. In Capitalism, Socialism and Ecology (1991) he
criticizes ‘the domination of the economic rationality embodied
in capitalism’. In other words, from a socialist point of view, he is
concerned not just about the social impact of economics, but about
what he saw as the domination of political thinking by economics.

A critique of the supply and demand

economy
If the price of agricultural produce or the level of wages
were determined by the laws of supply and demand,
most of us would have died of starvation long ago. In all
industrialized nations, the relative prices of goods and
services are regulated by the state; if they weren’t society
(Contd)

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 93

 wouldn’t be viable. … The fact is that the market is, by
definition, the outcome of the activities of individuals each
pursuing his or her immediate interests. Thus a higher
authority, the state, is required to take responsibility for
defending the general interest, including the existence of a
market system.
André Gorz, Capitalism, Socialism and Ecology
(pp. 82–3)

Work and workers had changed – from full-time jobs performed by

a solid body of working-class mainly male labourers, to a mixture
of part-time jobs, short-term contract jobs and other precarious
employment arrangements, often in the service sectors, performed
by a more diverse work force including a much larger proportion
of women. Gorz referred to those in such work, along with the
unemployed, as the ‘post-industrial proletariat’. The situation is
also changing because work may now no longer be the key feature
of people’s lives – people want to work fewer hours in order to
pursue other cultural or social activities.

Gorz argued that it is no longer necessary for wages to be paid in

relation to the number of hours worked, because some processes
require less labour than they did before, and that the tradition of
paying for hours worked is continued simply in order to maintain
domination over the new post-industrial proletariat. He believes
that the new proletariat should be guaranteed the right to a
sufficient basic income so that they do not have to be anxious
about the temporary and fragile security brought by work.

If society no longer needs the number of workers or man-hours

it once did, then there should be some other way of allowing all
to have an income, and to share out such work as is available.
The capitalist system, by contrast, makes the struggle for work
competitive, and thereby forces its value down, enabling companies

94
to make greater profits. Gorz is therefore looking for a society
where fairness does not depend on the work contribution, but
without taking away the competitiveness or efficiency of companies
(since he acknowledges that there is no alternative economic
theory to capitalism – he’s not going back to the old planned
economy). He argues for a guaranteed wage, funded by indirect
taxation, which would therefore have no effect on the balance of
competitiveness between companies.

In other words
Even if capitalism is the driving force in a competitive market, the
priority for a socialist like Gorz was to find a way in which everyone is
guaranteed a fair share of resources, irrespective of what he or she can
contribute in terms of marketable skills.

Postscript to Gorz
André Gorz died in 2007. President Nicolas Sarkozy described him
as ‘a major intellectual figure of the French and European left
who spent all his life in a profound analysis of both socialism and
capitalism’. In 2006, then aged 83, he wrote an open letter to his
wife of 58 years, Dorine, telling the story of their love. She was
terminally ill, and he could not bear the thought of attending her
funeral. On 22 September 2007, having written letters explaining
their action to friends and officials, and leaving instructions for
their funeral, they ended their lives together.

Starting with personal or national development

In a world that is changing and developing, it is important for both
individuals and nations to set goals and aspire to achieve them, and

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 95

 these can become the key feature of a social, political or personal
ideology.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) is a most fascinating and

challenging philosopher, best known for his claim that God
is dead and that humankind must therefore take responsibility
for its own future. At a time when Darwin’s theory of natural
selection, and the idea of evolution generally, was bringing
new perspectives to an understanding of the human species,
Nietzsche boldly saw man as poised on a tightrope moving
from beast towards a higher future form: his Übermensch or
‘superman’.

He declares his Übermensch to be the meaning of the earth and in

a key passage says:

All creatures hitherto have created something beyond

themselves: and do you want to be the ebb of this great tide,
and return to the animals rather than overcoming man?
Thus Spoke Zarathustra translated by R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin.

His affirmation of life is expressed as a ‘will to power’ – not the

crude power of Plato’s Thrasymachus, but a will to affirm life, to
develop and move forward. In this he criticizes both Christianity
and democracy, since he believes that they hold back the strong
for the sake of the weak. Indeed, Christianity appears to him to
celebrate weakness and to willingly accept a ‘slave morality’ of
protection, rather than a ‘master morality’ of self-development
and the cultivation of the noble virtues.

Nietzsche is heady stuff, but well worth reading. For our purposes we
need only touch on some political implications of his work – namely,
that evolution and personal development, both for the individual and
for society, can be taken as a foundational value. In other words,
producing the Übermensch is the starting point – the necessary
function by which society, and therefore a political system, is to be
judged.

96
Sadly, Nietzsche was read by both Hitler and Mussolini, and a
caricature of his work was taken as justification for their militant
nationalism and, under the Nazis, for the most extreme form of
racism, with brutal results.

Nationalism is not a political ideology, but is an expression of

political power, related to the nation state. It is compatible with
other ideologies, but sets over them the priority of the development
of the nation state, giving added weight to patriotism, and
often emphasizing the importance of the nation as opposed to
international or religious organizations.

At the extreme right, nationalist sympathies move towards

fascism. Here the national identity is used as a backing for the
introduction of a totalitarian regime, with opposition to liberal
ideas, and a requirement for individuals to conform to the
national or cultural stereotype. Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in
Germany and Franco in Spain are examples of this approach –
in each case there seems to have been a considerable cult of the
leader, in which the ruler is seen as the embodiment of national
ideals.

But fascism is not without its philosophical backing. Hegel had

argued that individuals find in the state the expression of their
collective will and consciousness. They therefore seek an ideal state
and an ideal leader, gathering and giving focus to their collective
aspirations. An early exponent of this fascist ideology was the
neo-Hegelian philosopher Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944), who
ghost-wrote Mussolini’s A Doctrine of Fascism. His theory of
actual idealism was intended to overcome the gap between ideas
and action, so that people expressed their philosophy through
political commitment. Similar sentiments are also to be found
in Heidegger, who supported the views of the Nazi Party in
1933 on the grounds that people needed a sense of direction,
decisiveness and self-affirmation which could only be given
by a strong leader. He argued this in a strongly nationalistic
context, believing that the German Volk has a special struggle
and mission.

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 97

 To change the world …
Gentile has the dubious distinction of being philosophy’s only
political ghost writer but his ideas stand in interesting contrast
to those of Marx. Where Marx took Hegel’s dialectic and based
it in the material, economic world, Gentile retained a dialectic of
ideas. Both believed that their philosophy would change society;
both were idealists. Whether their value as philosophers should
be completely tarnished by the political structures that grew from
their ideas is another matter.

When Machiavelli considered what was required to hold power in a

city-state in Renaissance Italy, he saw clearly that ruthlessness was
sometimes more effective than indecisive kindness. The priority for
a ruler, in his view, was the security, integrity and strength of the
state – that was his foundational value, and all that he allows by
way of freedom or equality must take second place to establishing it.

So the key question here is:

To what extent should the development of the state, in terms of its

strength, security, stability and economic viability take precedence
over the values of freedom and equality for its people?

DICTATORS

The key feature of dictators is that they stand above the rule of law
and the political process. They reflect many different ideologies,
from the extreme left to the extreme right, but share a ruthless
determination to organize and control the nations they lead. Some,
like Stalin, cause the death of millions.

The head of a military coup may become a dictator, simply because

of the rigid chain of command and the absolute nature of military
discipline, preventing a challenge to established authority – as

98
in the case of present-day Burma. However, a dictatorship may
sometimes be justified in terms of its ability to control an otherwise
unruly situation by force; Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq and held the
country together only by the brutal suppression of opposition. It is
relevant to ask whether anything less than a dictatorship is capable
of holding together a state with such opposing internal factions.
On that question, only time will tell.

Historically, dictators have generally come to power in situations

which required decisive political action, and have sometimes been
welcomed by the people for the benefits that decisiveness can offer
in terms of the efficiency of the services provided by the government.
The problem is that, once in power, it is difficult to remove them,
since they control the military and other means of effecting change.

The pro-democracy demonstrations in Burma have so far failed to

remove the military rule of General Than Shwe, simply because the
generals have the power to repress the demonstrations. That is the
nature of military dictatorships.

In other states, military rule may be imposed or maintained on

the grounds of national security. In 2009, North Korea continued
to defy international calls for it to halt its nuclear programme,
conducting an underground test of a nuclear device and continuing
to test-fire missiles over Japanese airspace. Its media proudly
announced that it was taking these actions because of continuing
threats to its security from the USA and Japan. Although no
such threats actually existed, the perception of external threat
was necessary in order to justify military expenditure out of all
proportion to the size and needs of the country.

Insight
Nations, like colonies of ants, are always at their most
effective when facing external threats, mobilizing their
resources to repel potential invaders. Security is the first
responsibility of government, so a government is strengthened
if the nation is under threat – whether that threat is real or
merely perceived.

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 99

 Starting with the environment

With 6.5 billion people on this planet, limited natural resources,

and a global economy that encourages increased consumption of
goods and services, it is not surprising that human impact on the
environment is growing, and the recognition of this has led to the
development of a set of ethical and political guidelines that challenge
existing ideologies.

Capitalism and the environment

An economic system that requires constant growth, while
bucking almost all serious attempts at environmental regulation,
generates a steady stream of disasters all on its own, whether
military, ecological or financial.
Quoted from Naomi Klein’s book The Shock Doctrine:
The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Allen Lane, 2007,
which offers a critique of neo-liberalism.

To some, mention of the environment suggests that the operation

of industry, transport and so on should take into account the
environmental impact. This may be fine in itself, but it does not
address the fundamental assumption of capitalism that there will be
an ever-increasing number of goods and services, produced to meet
stimulated needs. To some (for example André Gorz) this seems
to be no more than a partial response to the global environmental
crisis, since it leaves the structure of production that causes
environmental damage in place.

The alternative is a more radical ecological approach which steps

back from the economic assumptions of capitalism and asks why
we need to increase our standard of living (which is usually taken
to be identical with our levels of consumption). This approach
would suggest that quality of life may be improved by consuming

100
less rather than more – approaching life and its values from the
ecological perspective, and then refining our perceived needs and
desires in the light of that perspective rather than simply pressing
on with the assumption of increased production.

Scramble for the seabed

John Locke argued that you acquired property by mixing your
labour with the resources provided by nature – ploughing up virgin
land is, in effect, to stake your claim on it. But should there be
limits to the legalized appropriation of what is freely available to
all? If so, how might they be set?

Under the UN Law of the Sea Convention, due to come into effect
in a few years’ time, every island, however small, will qualify
for a 350-mile zone in the surrounding ocean for the exclusive
exploitation of minerals and hydrocarbons. Hence small islands,
like Rockall in the North Atlantic, or Ascension or the Falklands
in the South, would take on new status, as potential sources of
wealth for the nation that ‘owns’ them (in these examples, the
UK) and is therefore able to extend its territorial claims. This raises
the following questions:

 What right should an individual nation have to such stretches

of open ocean and its resources?
 What might be the global impact of finding even more fossil
fuel resources?

Political ecology is the term generally used for this re-shaping of

political thought to take into account the fact that people depend
on an environment that is increasingly threatened by their own
activity. But there is a fundamental question to be asked:

Should the environment be protected for its own sake, or

because of its value for humankind?

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 101

 Those who take the latter view point to the need for biodiversity,
for example, because it is often from rare plant species that we
derive new medicines. Equally, they may argue that damage to the
environment will have a direct impact on the quality of life, or even
the survival of the human species.

Those who take the former view (generally termed deep ecology)
argue that we should get beyond an anthropocentric view of nature –
that the environment should be protected, irrespective of whether we
can see any direct benefit to humankind in doing so. This is related
to the moral argument for animal rights – that other species are not
there simply for entertainment or food for humans, but should be
valued in themselves and treated with respect.

Clearly, political ecology involves a whole raft of issues, from

climate change and pollution to the dangers of exploiting the
earth’s finite resources and the extinction of other species. At one
time, such issues might have been regarded as primarily of moral
concern to individuals, but in recent decades it has become clear
that no individual, and indeed no single nation, is able to tackle
these issues alone. Any fundamental change will require political
decisions to be taken at a global as well as a national level, and
the activity of individual citizens (for example, in recycling or the
economical use of resources) will need some measure of political
support in order to be effective.

This environmental ideology is seen in the various Green Parties

within politics, as well as those organizations such as Friends of
the Earth and Greenpeace that campaign on green issues. With
the increasing awareness of the importance of these issues, they
are also being addressed by the other political parties. Hence we
have an ideology that is not simply linked to a distinctive political
party, but is able to engage people from across the political
spectrum, recognizing that other values cannot be maintained if
the environment itself is destroyed. At whatever level it operates,
the nexus of ideas and values represented by environmentalism and
ecology will present a significant challenge to existing political
and economic systems and values.

102
The future of ideologies

As the twentieth century came towards its end, the consensus

view was that socialism, as a political theory and system, was
dead. The attempt to manage national economies on ideological
lines could not match what the free markets could offer by way of
innovation and improvements in lifestyle. Even the traditional class
structures within capitalist economies looked dated, as old class
consciousness gave way to overlapping circles of allegiance in
a multicultural, money-motivated, consumer-orientated
environment.

Francis Fukuyama (in The End of History and the Last Man,
1992) argued that the global aspirations of people to share in
the benefits of modern life would eventually lead them all to
chose a liberal democratic form of government and a capitalist
economic system. He wrote, of course, in the light of the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the global retreat of socialism and
communism.

Fukuyama thus saw no ‘coherent theoretical alternatives to liberal

democracy’, but assumed that – like wagons moving towards a
town – everyone would eventually end up in the same place, even
if some had gone off the road or taken a different route, or some
were making slower progress than others. In other words, that we
are all headed in the same direction politically.

Eighteen years is a long time in politics, and Fukuyama has since

disowned his original support of the neo-conservative agenda
in the USA, in particular its foreign policy and response to the
attacks of 9/11 (see page 240). It is far from clear today whether
everyone who is free to choose would automatically opt for liberal
democracy and a free-market approach. As we shall see later, there
are other elements in play today, in particular the rise of religious
fundamentalist ideologies, that cut across any simple economic
assumptions. A suicide bomber is not out to increase his or her
share of material benefits!

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 103

 In general, the starkly contrasting ideologies that proved so lethal
in the course of the twentieth century are now mellowing. The
agenda has changed and new global issues pose questions to which
the old ideological responses give no satisfactory answer. Liberal
democracy may have won the day in terms of global influence,
but as time goes on there is an increasing number of questions to
be asked of its approach. It is also increasingly challenged from a
religious and particularly a fundamentalist perspective as well as
from the perspective of political ecology – seen particularly in the
issue of global warming.

The old packages of ideas that formed the ideologies of the

twentieth century are seen by some as no longer sufficiently flexible
to do justice to the complex set of issues facing global, national
and local communities today. Hence, rather than getting stuck with
ideological labels, it is important for political philosophy to address
its fundamental ideas directly, and it is to these that we must
now turn.

104
 10 THINGS TO REMEMBER
1 An ideology is a ready-made package of political ideas.

2 Each ideology is based on a foundational value.

3 Foundational values (e.g. freedom, equality) may conflict with

one another.

4 The liberal ideology is based on freedom.

5 The conservative ideology tends to be a pragmatic acceptance

of established political ideas.

6 Marxism is based on economics, and on the observed struggle

between social classes.

7 Nationalism is less an ideology than an expression of political

power, taking the individual nation as paramount.

8 Political ecology takes environmental issues into account in

deciding political goals.

9 Environmental issues transcend the older ideologies, and

protection of the environment may be a foundational value.

10 The ideologies that shaped the twentieth century are

inadequate to cope with twenty-first century global issues.

4. Ideas, systems and ideologies 105

 5
Equality and fairness
In this chapter you will learn:
• about what constitutes a fair sharing of resources
• about the impact of the economy on political life
• about capitalism and equality
• about democracy and the problem of minorities.

The phrase ‘It’s the economy, stupid’, first used during Bill Clinton’s
successful presidential campaign against George Bush in 1992,
highlights the way politics and politicians are judged today. In 1992
it referred to the fact that America was in recession, and the Clinton
campaign team wanted to show that this was a failure of the Bush
administration. Increasingly, governments are being judged on
their ability to deliver on the economy, and opposition parties
are concerned to set out their economic policies, in the hope that
electors will trust them to run the country better than the present
administration. When it comes to election time, therefore, the
economy is key. But why should the economy have such importance
in the assessment of political life?

Essentially, people want to feel that they are being treated fairly,
for example, that they are not paying too much tax relative to what
they receive back from the government. They complain if another
section of the population is being given benefits that they are
denied – whether it is tax incentives or social security payments –
on the grounds that people should be treated equally and fairly.

106
 Foundational values
When thinking through any problem, it is useful to start by
establishing your own foundational values – in other words,
principles that you hold which you are unwilling to compromise on.

Two key foundational values for political philosophy are equality

and freedom. We have already seen that the first is generally
taken as the starting point by philosophers who favour a socialist
approach to politics, the second by those of a liberal persuasion.
In examining issues of equality and fairness, the key question is to
what extent liberty is compromised in order to secure them.

There are, of course, many other ways in which people want to be

treated fairly and equally, but the sharing out of material resources
is a good place to start, and to do this we need to step back and
look at two key features of the political landscape: utilitarianism
and capitalism.

Utilitarianism and capitalism

Utilitarianism is the ethical theory based, broadly, on the idea that
the right thing to do is that which offers the prospect of the greatest
benefit to the greatest number of people involved. Developed by
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–73), it
is probably the most widely used ethical theory today. There are
three main forms of utilitarianism:

 act utilitarianism assesses the results of particular actions

 rule utilitarianism adds to this a consideration of the overall
benefit offered to society in maintaining general rules
 preference utilitarianism requires that everyone’s preferences
should be taken into account – in other words, taking note of
what people see as to their benefit, rather than telling them.

5. Equality and fairness 107

 The ‘principle of utility’ therefore requires that a political system
should be judged according to whether it produces more or less
benefit, welfare and happiness for the greatest number of its
citizens. In terms of political philosophy, utilitarianism would
therefore seem to be a logical implication of democracy. If everyone
can take part in electing a government, the expectation is that the
government will then operate to the benefit of the majority. Indeed,
that principle, although not couched in utilitarian terms, goes back
to Plato and Aristotle. In a just society, it is the interests of the
majority, rather than those of an elite, that should prevail.

Prison officers’ pay and inflation

When Gordon Brown argued that prison officers should not be
offered a pay deal that went beyond the Government’s two per
cent ceiling on public sector pay claims, he said:

We have succeeded in tackling inflation and having a stable

economy because of discipline in pay over these last ten years
… We will do nothing, nothing to put that at risk, because
an absolutely essential element of maintaining discipline in
the economy [is] so that people [can] have jobs and higher
standards of living.
Quoted in an article by Ben Russell, The Independent, 31 August 2007

 Notice here that the argument is not about the relative value
of the work prison officers do, or about the inherent fairness or
otherwise of their present pay. It is about the effect of individual
settlements on the overall economy. It is an economic rather
than a political answer to the question of pay settlements.
 The problem is that a settlement of 30 per cent for company
directors, since it applies to a small number of individuals, will
have relatively little effect on the overall economy. The more
numerous the group claiming a pay rise, the more macro its
economic effects.
 The implication of this is that, for the benefit of all, those
groups of workers whose wages have a significant impact

108
 on the economy need to have their aspirations overruled for
the general good. Minorities who have no such impact are not
required to conform in the same way.
 Here we see the impact of a utilitarian political assessment –
‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ takes precedence.

Capitalism is generally regarded as the obvious way of delivering

what a utilitarian assessment requires, and it is assumed that the
task of government is to get out of the way and allow capitalist
market forces to deliver the goods, providing the standard of living
that people want.

Indeed, nineteenth-century utilitarianism generally held that the

government should not interfere in the bargaining between workers
and the owners of capital, on the grounds that a free-market economy
would actually yield the greatest good for the greatest number.

Hate supermarkets?
 Should there be free competition in the retail grocery sector?
 Is competition always to the benefit of the consumer?

In Britain, when there is a danger of unfairness in the way that

a particular sector of the market is working, the Competition
Commission can be requested to carry out an examination of the
way things are working, and whether as a whole it operates in the
interest of the consumer. In particular, it can assess whether one
or more companies hold such a dominant position in the market
that they distort the freedom of consumers to choose what to
buy or of other companies to compete effectively.

If a company is successful, in capitalist terms, it yields profits for

its owners (or shareholders) and this involves being competitive
by controlling costs and so on. Smaller businesses are unlikely to
(Contd)

5. Equality and fairness 109

 be able to compete with those that are larger and therefore have
more clout in the marketplace.

Those who enjoy the benefit of good local shops can opt to use
them. Those who are only concerned with convenience or price
will go wherever it suits them. Ultimately, the market determines
who wins and who loses. That is the basis of the free market.

 Does that make it fair?

 Success is not a political feature, but an economic one. But
whether economics should be the only consideration is a
political question.

An additional feature of the economics of food is that the

spending power of the major supermarket chains means that they
can drive down the prices they pay their suppliers. Some of these
are among the poorest in the world. A report in 2007 from Action
Aid found that workers in Bangladeshi garment factories could be
paid as little as 5p an hour, and Indian workers processing cashew
nuts only 30p a day.

 The free-trade argument would be that trade is the best

way out of poverty, and that low wages are better than none.
Whilst acknowledging that the bulk of the profit on each item
goes to the supermarket, free-traders would say that this
system is still to everyone’s benefit in the long run.
 The counter argument is that such trade arrangements
effectively trap the poorest in their poverty, and that more
responsibility needs to be taken on the part of supermarkets to
ensure that their suppliers treat their workers fairly.
 Trade is seldom free, of course. Agricultural subsidies and the
system of tariffs and quotas ensure that a certain measure of
control and protection is given to producers in the developed
world, at the expense of third-world producers. Free-traders
would see this as unjust.
 Finally, however, there is the simple fact that people like to buy
cheap clothes and food, and, if they continue to do so, aware

110
 of the source of such goods, then they implicitly approve of the
trade done by the supermarket. The choice of goods marked
‘Fairtrade’ enables shoppers to register the fact that they want to
buy in a way that is fair to the original supplier. As with organic
food, the economics of the retail market mean that if the public
are willing to pay more, it will happen.

Socialists might argue that industries should be nationalized, so that

everyone, rather than just the shareholders, profit. On the other side,
a neo-liberal or conservative view of this would be that efficiency
and profit are the incentives that drive business forward, and that
end up benefiting everyone involved. Both arguments are utilitarian.

Clearly, fair competition between companies is thought to be good

from a utilitarian perspective, but where competition is deemed
unfair, it would seem that, by regulating the degree of market
dominance allowed, governments may ensure that utilitarianism
trumps capitalism – since the benefit to the majority takes
precedence over the right of a company to dominate the market.

Insight
Free-market competition works best in a climate of economic
growth. When recession strikes, people tend to look for
protection from the effects of a downturn, rather than accept
the natural effects of the free-market – loss of profits, with
resulting falls in pay and rises in unemployment.

ISSUES FOR UTILITARIANISM

When we say that everyone should have the best possible health
care or a reasonable standard of living in retirement, we are not
making a utilitarian assessment about what would benefit society
as a whole, we are making a case for what we consider to be the
reasonable expectation of the individual, and what would be
considered a just arrangement for society. In other words, the
judgement is based on an assessment of what constitutes a civilized

5. Equality and fairness 111

 life for the individual. It would be right to promote such a civilized
life, even if society as a whole did not benefit from it. In other
words, there are some basic rights that should take precedence
over general benefit. A fundamental question for utilitarianism is
therefore: Do human rights trump utilitarian benefits?

Another question: How do you assess who is involved, and therefore

whose interests should be taken into account? Should that be done on
a local basis, or in terms of the workforce of a particular company?
Should it be regional or national? Indeed, should it be global?

When it comes to global warming or restrictions on international

trade, the interests of the citizens of one country may well conflict
with the overall interests of the global community. Which utilitarian
assessment do you take into account – the local or the global?

The other side of this coin is the complaint that, in any utilitarian
assessment, minorities get trumped by majorities, and are therefore
discriminated against when it comes to having their preferences
taken into account.

This, of course, applies to both utilitarianism and democracy.

ISSUES FOR CAPITALISM

Capitalism is essentially a mechanism for generating wealth, and

it requires that the profit motive is primary. But unrestrained
capitalism may produce results (conditions of working people,
effects on the environment, etc.) that people find unacceptable. In
other words, the social or environmental price of generating wealth
for those who own capital may be seen as unacceptably high.

In practice then, looked at theoretically, political direction and

free-market capitalism look incompatible, since the economic
principles that drive capitalism are not political. However, most
states feel the need to impose politically motivated legislation upon
industry in the name of fairness, by anti-monopoly legislation,
for example, or by rules that apply to the environmental impact

112
of products, or their marketing (for example, restrictions on the
advertising of tobacco products).

Marx thought that working people were threatened by alienation – for

rather than being able to take pride in what they produced, they were
reduced to cogs in an impersonal wheel of production. That is still a
relevant threat, but along with it goes ‘commodification’ as all aspects
of the individual’s life is given monetary rather than personal value –
from the job to the notion of fame, everything has its price and place.

Minimum wage and workplace

regulation
The imposition of a legal minimum wage and restrictions on
the conditions under which people are to be allowed to work
are political restrictions on capitalism. Small businesses often
complain about such restrictions and the amount of ‘red tape’
associated with them.

If people are prepared to work for less than the legal minimum
wage, should they not be allowed to do so? How do you encourage
firms to offer better conditions of work? Should you vary the levels
of tax on profits according to the quality of the work experience
that a company provides? Is that too much interference in the
operation of capitalism? Might it stifle competition?

Capitalism depends on success within markets, based on the

technology required to produce and sell, and the information
needed in order to do so. Neo-liberalism tends to free capitalism
from restrictive legislation, on the assumption that the generation
of profit is, in itself, a valid aim of business.

But are capitalism and utilitarianism capable of achieving fairness

in society, or is something more needed?

5. Equality and fairness 113

 Insight
A sense of fairness sometimes cuts across what free markets
allow. Hence, when a banker – even if not responsible for
losses – is seen to receive a huge pension, people say it is
unfair. In times of economic expansion such things pass
relatively unnoticed. The implication is that justice requires
transparency and public acceptability.

Distributive justice
It is often assumed that the key feature of good government is its
management of the economy. In other words, what people want
is an ever-increasing standard of living, and a government is put
in power in order to deliver the goods. There are, of course, other
factors – people want schools, hospitals, roads, security – but even
the provision of these takes on economic and political significance,
since the most wealthy are more likely to use private medicine,
education and so on, whereas the poorer have no choice but to
accept what the state supplies.

A key question asked of government, therefore, is whether it

provides services that reflect good value for money (money that the
people have provided in taxes), on the assumption that the more
efficient a government is, the less tax it will have to raise and the
more money people keep in their own pockets.

But there are problems with this:

 In a global market, the economy of any one country is heavily

dependent upon what is happening elsewhere in the world.
An individual government is not able to determine or counter
global trends.
 Whether the economy should deliver higher standards of
living is a political question which is not often asked, since its
answer is assumed.

114
  The question tends to assume that economic indicators (the
inflation rate, level of employment and so on) are neutral
with respect to political decisions – and thus able to be used
to compare the performance of governments. In fact, the very
things that are used as a measurement are part of the political
decision-making process.

Conservatism and socialism tend to divide on this, with conservatives

expecting to pay less tax, and accepting – where possible and
appropriate – a reduction in services, allowing individuals freedom
to choose how to spend the additional money they have available
after tax. The socialist tendency, having a particular concern for the
poorer sections of society, generally favours better public services (on
which those they represent depend) with, if necessary, increases in
tax, which fall proportionately more heavily on the wealthy.

But how do you decide how goods should be distributed? Do you

do so on the basis of:

 what people need?

 what people deserve?
 equal shares for all?

Marx held that people should give according to their ability and
receive according to their needs. Is that a realistic aspiration? In
terms of distributive justice, one thinker has dominated discussion
for more than 30 years: John Rawls.

Rawls and fairness

The revival of interest in political philosophy in recent times is
often seen as having been initiated by John Rawls’s book A Theory
of Justice (1972), and his view of justice as fairness has been
influential; many agree with it but equally many who see things
differently have been provoked to respond to it and point out

5. Equality and fairness 115

 its shortcomings. Rawls wanted to show that a broadly liberal–
democratic view of the distribution of resources could be given firm
and logical foundations. He was also critical of the application of
utilitarianism to the issue of justice and fairness.

Rawls (1921–2002) presented a ‘thought experiment’ in order

to get to grips with the logic of any redistribution of resources.
Imagine a group of people gather together to decide how resources
are to be distributed (he calls this the ‘original position’). Each
is able to say what is in his or her own best interest, but none of
them knows who they are or what their position is in society. In
other words, they do not know if they themselves are rich or poor.
Rawls argues that each of them, since they will not know if they
are in fact the poorest in society, will not want to legislate in any
way that would adversely affect themselves if that were the case.
He therefore argues that such people, thinking through the logic of
their position, will opt for two things:

 That each person should have equal rights to the most

extensive system of liberty, provided that it does not prevent
others from having similar liberties.
 That, if there are to be any inequalities in the distribution of
resources, such inequalities should always be such as to benefit
the least advantaged in society, and also that all should have a
fair and equal opportunity to secure offices and positions.

Now there are a number of significant points to make about

Rawls’s argument. The first is that he clearly comes from a liberal–
democratic position, seeking freedom for all, whilst maintaining
social justice in the distribution of wealth. What he seeks to do in
his thought experiment is to frame a logically coherent framework
to support that wish.

In other words, rather as Immanuel Kant had argued that ethics

should be based on pure practical reason, without any thought of
personal rewards or results, so Rawls is arguing that redistributing in
favour of the poorest is what everyone would see as the logical thing
to want, if they were not influenced by their own social position.

116
But it is also important to appreciate that Rawls is concerned as
much with the process by which fairness is established as about
the final result. He wants to show that it is possible, through pure
logic and people’s natural self-interest, to establish rules for a fair
distribution in society without reference to any external authority.

Whether or not one agrees with Rawls, it is clear that there is

a deeply held view about what is fair. People may not look for
absolute equality – simply because it is a practical impossibility
and would not last for long, since some are more able to generate
money than others – but they have a strong sense of fairness in
terms of who has what.

For example, a chief executive of a bank that has received government

money in order to compensate for bad trading practices and the
threat of bankruptcy is likely to be condemned for receiving a huge
payoff or pension. Distributive justice would suggest that such glaring
inequalities of treatment between ordinary bank employees (many of
whom may be made redundant as a result of poor management) and
those who are responsible for the decisions are simply unfair.

If you agree with Rawls, then any difference in the way in which
people are treated should favour the least well-off. In practice, it
appears that the reverse is often the case.

RAWLS ’ S CRITICISM OF UTILITARIANISM

What Rawls offers is a form of ‘ideal contractualism’ – a modern

version of the social contract theory of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries – which he hoped would provide an alternative
to utilitarianism. He believed that a social contract approach
takes the individual more seriously than does utilitarianism, since
it does not require an individual to sacrifice any benefit in favour
of society as a whole. This, of course, is a major problem with
utilitarianism, for majorities always seem to trump minorities.

But Rawls also felt that utilitarianism was at odds with our usual
moral judgements. In other words, we have an intuitive view of

5. Equality and fairness 117

 what is implied by fairness which does not necessarily comply
with the conclusion of a utilitarian assessment of benefits. This
is a widely held criticism of act utilitarianism – that there are
occasions when a weighing of the potential benefits of a course
of action to all those involved does not give a result that a morally
sensitive person finds acceptable.

Rawls therefore wanted to establish a ‘reflective equilibrium’

between the principles of justice and people’s ‘considered moral
judgements’. He wanted his proposal for fairness to be compatible
with firm moral traditions that people already hold, and he has
an underlying moral assumption that individuals deserve the right
to equal respect. In other words, the ‘original position’ is not
autonomous as a way of establishing principles of justice – for it
depends on prior moral positions or ‘intuitions’.

R.M. Hare (1919–2002) is one of those who felt that this rigged
Rawls’s argument to give anti-utilitarian conclusions which Rawls
himself held from the start. In other words, Rawls works on
basic assumptions that are part of the modern liberal democratic
tradition, and then devises an artificially contrived situation that
attempts to establish them on the basis of pure logic.

Insight
People do not always act on the basis of reason alone. More
important are their deeply held convictions and values, which
they acquire through their family, their social group, their
experience, or through religion. Both political philosophy and
ethics need to take this into account.

PROBLEMS WITH RAWLS ’ S ‘ ORIGINAL POSITION ’

Here is a major problem: Thought experiments are just that; they

do not reflect what happens in real life. There never was and never
will be a situation in which people do not know their place in
society, and of course Rawls never suggested that there could be.
But does this attempt to construct an unreal situation in order to

118
show the logic of self-interest give a result that can be translated
into the real world? This question lies behind a criticism of Rawls
from a communitarian standpoint.

Communitarians argue that people are always embedded in society;

that we are who we are because of our place in our community,
what we do, how we relate to others and so on. Hence you cannot
meaningfully take from people the awareness of who they are, for
that is essential for any form of political awareness and decision-
taking. Hence the decisions taken by those in Rawls’s ‘original
position’ may sound logical, but they cannot reflect what actually
happens when people get together.

That does not mean that people might not, for altruistic reasons,
opt for a form of justice that does not benefit them personally – but
if they do so, they do so with their eyes open. In actual fact, many
people might want to take a risk – to opt for a situation where, if
they are better off, they can benefit still further. They may reckon that
the risk of losing out is worth taking. In some ways this is typical
of the entrepreneur within a capitalist system, reckoning that it is
better to take a risk in the hope of making a greater profit, rather
than playing safe and making very little.

Hence, even if Rawls’s logic is sound, it is not and can never be the
sort of logic that real people in real political situations can use.

FAIR OPPORTUNITIES

A very different approach from that of Rawls was taken by Robert

Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), another hugely
influential book. Nozick’s view is that priority should be given
to the right of individuals to generate wealth and retain it for
themselves. He thinks it is wrong for the state to impose equality
by taxing those who have made money in order to contribute to
services for those in need. Nozick argues that it is perfectly all right
to give to someone if you so choose, but not to have society force
you to contribute. This, of course, reflects a strong tradition of

5. Equality and fairness 119

 charity giving in the USA. Where state taxation and provision are
less, the opportunity for individual moral responsibility to provide
for people increases.

Whereas Rawls thought that you could abstract people from

their background in order to get some ideal view about principles
of justice, Nozick argued that it was important to include the
historical acquisition of property in assessing justice. In other
words, he recognized that a key feature of a person’s identity is
what they possess and how they came to possess it. Also, people’s
abilities are linked with their background, education, opportunities
in society and so on. So it is difficult to see how any justice can
be established unless the economic and social background of
individuals is taken into account.

Fairness is a philosophical concept based on the understanding of

how the different parts of society work together, what they need,
and how they can flourish. Sounds familiar? Of course – for here
we are back with Plato and his threefold division of society. For all
the limitations of Plato’s The Republic, at least it recognizes that
different people have different needs.

And should those who have the natural ability to succeed beyond
that of their fellows be prevented from flexing their economic
and political muscles? Even if all were equally provided for, they
would not remain economically equal for long. Here we are back
with Nietzsche and his sense of humankind being in the forefront
of evolution, moving forward and aspiring to overcome itself,
working towards the arrival of the Übermensch and the next
stage of evolution.

Absolute equality may sound fine, but how would you give
people the incentive to work and contribute as much as they
can, if they receive the same in return, whatever the value of
their contribution? Is it natural that people should expect to
receive the benefits of their contribution and consider that
to be only fair?

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Insight
Notice how this relates to the political ideologies outlined in
the last chapter. It reflects the conflict between the socialist
view of equality, the liberal view of freedom, and the
conservative view that government should interfere as little as
possible with the natural, economic status quo.

Equality of self-direction and moral regard

Equality is a foundational concept for much political debate and
political philosophy. The American Declaration of Independence of
1776 claimed ‘all men are born equal’ as the starting point for setting
up its political system. We have already considered distributive justice
as a way of treating people equally, but what else is implied by it?

There are different forms of equality:

 Equality of opportunity – even if people end up in different

positions in terms of wealth and achievement, because of their
differences in abilities or intelligence, they should all have the
same opportunities presented to them. Thus, for example,
access to schooling or job opportunities should be equally
open to everyone.
 Equality of goods – this has already been considered, and
suggests that people should receive an equal share of resources. In
practice, of course, except in the most restricted of communities,
such equality cannot be maintained for long, because people
make very different uses of whatever resources they are given.
 Equality of rights – that there are basic rights offered to
all alike, such as the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, or freedom from persecution on grounds of colour,
race, religion and so on.
 Equality of respect – however different people may be in their
abilities, they should all receive the same degree of respect,
simply by being a member of the human species.

5. Equality and fairness 121

  Equality of representation – the idea that everyone should
have the same opportunity to vote, or in any other way
take part in the process of government. Thus, for example,
members of parliament claim that they are available to all
their constituencies equally. Not all will make use of that
availability, but at least it is offered.

These various aspects of equality contribute to two very basic

requirements for a fair and equal society – equality of self-direction
and of moral regard. The first of these is the right of an individual
to decide how he or she should live, and to take actions as far
as possible, to put in place life-plans that aim at giving
self-fulfilment.

Not all philosophers have argued for this. Aristotle claimed that
women and slaves were not able to reason, or at least to reason
effectively (in the case of women), and therefore they needed to be
directed by men. Indeed, the thrust of his argument is that they will
benefit from this, and lead happier lives, since they are supplied
with an organized way of living that they would not be able to
achieve if left to their own devices. This view continues to be found
wherever an authority claims to know what is in the interests of an
individual, even if it is not what he or she wants.

Equality of moral regard is essential for establishing a fair way

of dealing with those who are most vulnerable. In considering a
person’s rights, and the moral obligation of society towards them,
it is crucial that who they happen to be is disregarded. Hence,
it should make no difference morally, whether the person under
consideration is young or old, male or female, a citizen or an illegal
immigrant – all should have equal moral consideration.

Insight
The fact that an immigrant is working illegally should not
remove their entitlement to the protection offered by the law
against exploitation. The issue of their illegal status may need
to be considered subsequently, but it should not prevent that
equality of moral regard.

122
Another way of expressing the scope of equality within political
discussion is simply to say that people should be treated with
equal consideration.

Monochrome conformity

John Stuart Mill, surveying nineteenth-century England in his

discussion of freedom, observed a rather sad fact about the
majority of people:

Comparatively speaking, they now read the same things, listen to

the same things, see the same things, go to the same places, have
their hopes and fears directed to the same objects, having the
same rights and liberties and the same means of asserting them …
All the political changes of the age promote it, since all tend to
raise the low and lower the high. Every extension of education
promoted it, because education brought people under common
influences. Improvement in the means of communication
promotes it … Increase of commerce and manufacture promotes
it … The ascendancy of public opinion … forms so great a mass
of influence hostile to individuality that in this age the mere
example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend a knee to
custom, is itself a service.
On Liberty (p. 83)

The influence of the global media in the twenty-first century has

increased this pressure to conform. This might seem a major
problem with the quest for equality and fairness – where all receive
the same treatment, the same opportunities and are bombarded with
the same advertising, individuality and eccentricity are threatened.

Whether that is in fact the case is open to debate; some might claim
that ‘difference’ is celebrated more than conformity in most liberal
democracies. But it serves as a warning that, even if there is no
attempt to impose absolute equality, there is a natural tendency
for education and capitalism to promote it.

5. Equality and fairness 123

 Insight
Equality of opportunity is one thing, uniformity is quite
another. This is particularly true in multicultural situations,
where distinctiveness can be celebrated, although all ethnic
and cultural groups expect equal treatment. What Mill argues
is that equal opportunities, offered within a capitalist system,
tend to mask differences.

The most dangerous situation, of course, is one where equal

consideration depends on political conformity, since any
government operating on that basis offers benefits only to
those who show unquestioning allegiance to its particular point
of view.

Individuality on the web

It is interesting to reflect on the equality offered by the social
networking sites on the internet. Individuals can now publish and
share information about themselves and interact with others
wherever they are on the globe. While this reflects a newly
created zone of equal opportunity, it also preserves – indeed
celebrates – individuality. The internet provides a space, perhaps
for the first time, in which huge numbers of people can interact
with one another, while preserving their own identity and
individuality.

CITIZENS OR CONSUMERS?

Hannah Arendt (1906–75) was concerned to explore the modern

equivalent of the Greek polis, namely a society in which people
could act together as equals and become engaged in the political
process. She commented on the danger in modern society of
allowing individuals to be treated as consumers rather than
citizens. In other words, they are reduced to passive recipients of
whatever the government considers to be in their best interest,
rather than active participants in the political process itself.

124
If management of the economy is key to political success, economic
well-being is the key to voter satisfaction, and voter satisfaction is
the key to remaining in power. But is that an adequate basis for
political decision-making in a democracy? The danger, where a
consumerist approach is taken, is that people will be assumed to
be controllable and conformist, provided that they are promised
suitable material gains in return for their support in the polls.

NOT FOR LONG!

In this chapter, we have so far been concerned with how goods

should be distributed in order to establish fairness in society. But
there are some philosophers – for example Ronald Dworkin (b.
1931) – who point out that, however fairly the sharing out of goods
in some original position might be, that fairness will not last for
long, because some people will be more skilled than others in trading
what they have. Those who are industrious might reasonably claim
that they deserve the extra resources that they accumulate, and that
it would be wrong to re-distribute them. But other factors come
into play – one person may be struck down with illness, a freak
storm may damage the home of another, a harvest may fail. These
unpredictable factors will start to create inequalities. Of course, one
person may choose to insure against such unpredictable happenings,
while another may not. Is the uninsured person thereby contributing
to his or her future plight? If so, it would be unreasonable to
complain if some unpredictable but insurable event occurs.

This recognition of the way in which fortunes change strengthens

the view that people cannot really be abstracted from the
communities and world in which they live. In an uncertain world,
a redistribution of resources cannot preserve equality for long.

Democracy

The term ‘democracy’ is derived from the Greek word demos (people)
and kratos (power). It is ‘people power’ in the sense that people are
able to choose and change a government by a process of election.

5. Equality and fairness 125

 Democracy would seem to be the logical expression of equality.
It asserts that every adult in a society, provided that he or she
qualifies in some basic way, is able to express a view about the way
society is governed. Just as Bentham’s principle of utility argues
that the right thing to do is what offers the maximum benefit to the
greatest number, so a democracy is the right form of government,
according to utilitarianism, since it conforms to the wishes of the
majority.

Or is it? In Aristotle’s day, democracy was only for a male

minority; women and slaves had no say in government. And his
justification for that was simply that participation should be
limited to those capable of making informed judgements, and that
requires the ability to reason and a measure of financial security.
Although Kant favoured democracy, he never considered that it
should extend down to wage labourers, and thought that nobody
should vote who did not earn his own living by business or a
profession. And Nietzsche felt that democracy would hold back the
development of the strong. When you consider how to wield power
effectively, as described by Machiavelli in The Prince, you may
wonder whether power is best exercised by those in the precarious
situation of always being at the mercy of the people at the next
election.

Plato disliked democracy because it appeared to him to be mob

rule – now it has become the political option of choice. Indeed, it is
often assumed that, once freed from the imposition of military or
religious dictatorships, nations will automatically follow the wishes
of the people and establish democracies. In practice, however, once
established, democracy is carefully ‘managed’ by the government
of the day. Voters are made promises, they are bombarded with
advertisements from contending political parties, their choices are
limited, and the outcome is statistically predictable, once a general
tendency in voting has become apparent.

A crucial question for democracy is this: How do you protect the

welfare of minorities? If a simply democratic vote decides what will
happen, then a minority – almost by definition – loses out. Perhaps

126
the assumption is that people will be in a majority for some issues
and a minority for others. But that still means that, generally, the
majority will get its way.

One possibility is that you have a constitution that requires an

overwhelming majority vote in order to deprive a minority of its
rights, but although that may modify the perceived injustice, it does
not remove it.

Regional assemblies may solve the problem where geographical

differences between electors are seen as crucial – thus, it is
important for those living in Northern Ireland, Wales or Scotland
to have a measure of political independence, and an assembly for
their own part of the nation, rather than having all issues decided
in a parliament that will always, by virtue of the numbers involved,
be dominated by England.

Aided by the popular press, majorities may dominate minorities,

which is a clear issue for any democratic or utilitarian system. But
informed agreement is equally confusing. In a modern democracy
(where voting is done through the proxy of focus groups and
opinion polls most of the time), the outcome of issues depends to
a considerable extent on the way in which they are presented by
the government, and whether there is an alternative view to be
presented by opposition parties. In other words, public opinion is
always open to ‘spin’. Facts are more difficult to establish, and it is
assumed that only a few people will know all the facts and issues
on any one topic.

Citizens’ juries
In both Britain and the USA (where they originated) citizens’ juries
gather groups of people to discuss policy ideas put forward by the
government. Whether those ideas are developed further depends
on the reactions to them by the members of the juries. Those who
serve on the juries can call witnesses and hear evidence before
(Contd)

5. Equality and fairness 127

 giving their own verdict on the policy under discussion. Questions
to consider include:

 Do they give people a genuine say in what is to happen?

 What is the difference between a jury and a focus group?
 Is this genuine democracy in action, and is it likely to engage
more people in the political process?
 How else might individuals play a more direct role in the
process of democratic decision-making?

Governments are there to persuade people. If a government has

a working majority, the political party providing the government
need not be unduly concerned about short-term adverse poll
ratings – but when these becomes sustained, or an election is
approaching, is there added pressure to present and sell issues in
a way that will please the electorate?

Single-issue voting
A referendum provides a check on the process of representative
democracy. In a referendum, everyone is able to vote on a
specific issue – thus getting around the problem of establishing
whether representatives elected to parliament are able to reflect
accurately the wishes of the electorate. It is the nearest a modern
political system gets to the original form of simple democracy.

However, there is a fundamental difference between a modern

referendum and original democracy – namely that the framing
of the question to be put to people can influence the way in which
they vote. There is no scope for the discussion of the issue across
the whole electorate, with a view to providing a subtle answer
to the matter in hand. It remains a rather crude yes/no decision,
and hence is open to manipulation and media influence. Seldom
are political options able to be resolved by a simple choice, and
people may vote the same way for many different reasons.

128
Democracy can mean many things. To Plato it was rule by an
unthinking majority. To the ‘social contract’ proponents in
the eighteenth century, it was the new voice of the people in
establishing their control over government. Today, representative
democracies are, in general, carefully managed, manipulated and
predictable systems of government – hovering between centralized
government by a professional political elite, and government by the
occasional whim of a minority of people in marginal constituencies.

5. Equality and fairness 129

 10 THINGS TO REMEMBER
1 Issues of fairness tend to require a balance between equality in
society and the freedom of the individual.

2 Capitalism and democracy tend to be justified by utilitarian

moral arguments.

3 A utilitarian desire to benefit everyone equally may conflict

with the rights of minority groups or individuals.

4 Marx thought that capitalism would produce alienation

among working people, by treating them as cogs in a machine.

5 For Rawls, the ‘original position’ is one in which people

do not know their own place in society.

6 No ‘thought experiment’ reflects what happens in real life.

7 People tend to feel that it is fair for them to keep what they
have inherited or gained legally, even if they choose to share it.

8 There is a danger that citizens will be regarded only as

consumers.

9 Democracy always has a problem with minorities.

10 Democratic governments generally attempt to persuade people

as much as listen to them.

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 6
Freedom
In this chapter you will learn:
• about negative and positive freedom
• to consider whether free speech should be limited
• about Mill’s view that you should be free to do what you like,
provided you harm nobody else.

Freedom is probably the most fundamental and crucial concept in

political philosophy. Everyone agrees that freedom is a good thing,
but it raises many questions:

 What is the purpose of being free?

 Do I simply want society to impose no restraints on what
I can do?
 Do I want to be free to plan out my life as I wish?
 How does my desire for freedom square with the very clear
need for some sort of political and social order?
 If what I want to do conflicts with the interests of others, how
will my freedom to do it be reconciled with their freedom to
stop it?

If there were no problems with freedom, there would probably be

no need for political philosophy or, indeed, politics. We have an
issue because it is clear that, in a complex society, people cannot
simply do their own thing without recognizing that what they
do impacts on others, and that they are impacted upon in return.

6. Freedom 131
 Hence, politics is a way of negotiating between ordered constraint
and freedom of the individual. The key questions are:

 How is the idea of liberty related to the need for law and for
political control?
 Where is the line to be drawn between things that should be
left to the individual and things where conformity to the state
is the best option?

Clearly, complete freedom for everyone would lead to chaos and

anarchy (in the common meaning of that term), and it would be
incompatible with the complex nature of society – you cannot
organize education, health care, defence, and so on, if everyone is
free to do whatever they like, because all those things depend on
people being predictable and conforming to basic rules to enable
society to work. On the other hand, nobody would consider it right
for people to behave like ants, obeying fixed rules and dedicating
all their energy unthinkingly to the benefit of the colony as a
whole. The severest criticism of some socialist and communist
states is that they have attempted, for the general good, to deny
people freedom to live as they choose. Clearly, there has to be a
balance.

Insight
Freedom is always a compromise between what I want for
myself and what others want from me.

Forget determinism …
The freedom debate within political philosophy is not the same as
the more general argument about determinism. Is a virus ‘free’? Is
a tree ‘free’ to grow? From a scientific perspective, every event is
conditioned by antecedent causes. There is a good argument for
the idea that everything we ever do is determined by the past. In
that sense we are never free, and never can be.

132
 But that is not the sense in which we consider freedom here. For
our purposes we are concerned with people’s experience of being
free to choose what to do. We need to assume that, without
externally imposed rules, they will be free.

Except (and this is a very big ‘except’), there have been those
(notably Hegel and, following him, Marx) who have argued that
the process of change within society has an historical inevitability,
and that what might be experienced as free choice is simply our
own working out of a process of change that can be measured and
predicted. Individual freedom can then be restricted on the basis
that, if people were aware of the tides of historical change, they
would understand that what feels like an imposed restriction is in
fact inevitable.

For now, however, we will set this particular option aside, and
concentrate on freedom as experienced by an individual within
the political system.

The basic question is simply: Why should I accept anyone

else telling me what to do? Why should I not simply do what
I like?

This leads towards a negative definition of freedom – in other

words, freedom is what is left to you once other people’s
interference in your life is taken into account. In its positive
sense, however, freedom is about choosing how to live, what
to do, and the having the ability to set our own agenda and
goals.

These two senses of freedom – negative freedom and positive

freedom – were famously set out by Isaiah Berlin in a lecture
entitled ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, delivered at the University of
Oxford in 1958, and itself a very good starting point for anyone
interested in political philosophy.

6. Freedom 133
 Negative freedom

This is freedom from those things that limit what we can do.
Philosophers who concentrate on this form of freedom attempt to
define the minimum freedom that should be allowed to individuals
in order for them to maintain their dignity as human beings. It is
freedom ‘from’ rather than freedom ‘to’.

John Stuart Mill (1806–73), whose work On Liberty is a key

text for considering this approach to freedom, suggested that
human creativity would be crushed without a suitable level of
freedom. Isaiah Berlin disagreed with this, arguing that creativity
can flourish even within the most repressive of regimes. This is a
crucial point, because if Mill is right, then freedom ‘from’ restraints
is absolutely essential if you are to have the freedom ‘to’ express
and develop yourself as a creative individual. On the other hand,
if Berlin is right, then an awareness of the ‘freedom to’ can enable
positive and creative living, even in those situations where external
conditions are harsh and restrictive.

MILL’ S ‘ HARM ’ PRINCIPLE

Mill recognized that not every society was ready for its individual
members to take responsibility for freedom in the way he was
about to propose. In the case of what he calls ‘backward’ states:

Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with

barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the
means justified by actually effecting that end.

Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things

anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of
being improved by free and equal discussion.
from On Liberty

In other words, up to the point at which they can act as

autonomous, thinking individuals, all that people need is a
benign ruler who will tell them what to do.

134
 For reflection
How do you judge when a society or individuals within it are
sufficiently mature and autonomous to accept the freedoms that
Mill is about to recommend for them?

Are most people really ready to exercise their freedom responsibly?

What about children, or the senile, or those with major emotional
or psychological problems, or those with a very low IQ?

Mill pointed out that in ancient Greece the rulers thought it

appropriate to issue guidelines for how people should behave
and what they should think. Mill was against that – in a civilized
society, people should be free to make up their own minds. To
impose an idea on others is to assume that you are infallible, and
that is simply not the case.

Contrast this with Plato, who thought that the philosophers

should be able to control and tell people what to do. Plato felt
that it was the responsibility of rulers to guide people to behave in
a way that was to their own good.

Mill wanted to maximize freedom. He argues that:

… the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised

over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is
not a sufficient warrant.

Because:

Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.
from On Liberty

6. Freedom 135
 In other words, even if you think that it would be to someone’s
benefit, or long-term happiness, that they should be compelled to
do something, or refrain from doing something, that is insufficient
reason for interfering. Even if one can see that someone is going to
harm themselves, they must not be stopped from exercising their
freedom from doing so. The only limitation is that they should not be
permitted to harm anyone else. A person should be free to plan their
life to suit their own character, and have complete liberty of ‘tastes
and pursuits’, even if others think them ‘foolish, perverse, or wrong’.

Smoking on trains
Following the UK ban on smoking on trains in 2007, Charles
Kennedy, former leader of the Liberal Democrats, was caught
having a smoke on a journey from Paddington to Plymouth. He
wrongly argued that he was allowed to light up, provided that he
leant out of the window to do so.

Mill would probably have been on Kennedy’s side – since he

was directing the smoke outside the train, and therefore only
harming himself. On the other hand, the legislation followed
Mill’s line in that, overall, the freedom to smoke detracts
from the freedom of other passengers to breathe
smoke-free air.

On this basis, Mill argues for liberty of conscience, thought and

feeling, and of expression, and also the freedom to unite together.
In other words, you should be freely allowed to think, speak and
act as an individual – and gather other people together to do, think
or act – provided that no harm is done to others in the process.

The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing

our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to
deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.
from On Liberty

136
Insight
A key problem is that we often do not appreciate all the
consequences of what we do. Without realizing it, our
freedom may be limiting that of others. In any competitive
environment, all are free to win, but when one person does
so, others have their freedom to win curtailed.

FREE SPEECH

If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one
person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more
justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power,
would be justified in silencing mankind.
from On Liberty

A key feature of Mill’s view of liberty is freedom of speech, of

which the quotation above is the clearest and most extreme
expression. However, there are certain restraints that might be
placed upon it, in the light of his ‘harm’ principle – since the
expression of a point of view can be taken as incitement to hatred
or to revolution. Hence there are restrictions on the freedom of
expression devised to prevent offence being given on grounds of
religion, race, gender, sexual proclivity or age.

The problem with this is to know exactly what might be deemed

to cause offence or harm. What about humour or irony? Can a
comedian not make reference to religion, gender, sex, race or age
in a joke? Is the intention as important as the words used?

Ahmadinejad at Columbia University

In September 2007, the President of Iran, who had come to
New York to speak at the United Nations, was invited to take part
in a political debate at Columbia University. In the course of the
debate he was attacked as a ‘petty dictator’. But should he have
been invited to the debate at all?
(Contd)

6. Freedom 137
 Comments reported in The Independent on 25 September, ranged
from:

I feel that he should have the right to speak. Demonizing

him is not going to change anything in the world.
(An Iranian-born student)
to:

It is hard to say who is the greater moral monster, the

President of Iran or the Dean of the University who has said he
would have invited Hitler before the Second World War.
(A professor of medicine)

Whatever the political differences between the USA and Iran,

there is here a fundamental issue of free speech and a willingness
to debate. Is allowing debate to take place – even with ‘enemies’ –
more or less harmful than refusing them a platform?

In November 2007, the Nobel Prize winning scientist, James Watson,

whose pioneering work on DNA is universally acknowledged and
admired, made some remarks suggesting that some racial groups had
levels of intelligence that were different from others. His speaking
engagements in Britain were cancelled, and Ken Livingstone, Mayor
of London, said ‘Such views are not welcome in a city like London’
and Watson returned to the USA, saying that he wanted to try to
save his job, having been suspended from his post in Spring Harbor
Laboratory, Long Island (from which he subsequently resigned).

He had explained that he had not meant to imply that black people
were less intelligent than white, and apologized unreservedly
for any offence caused, but that was not enough to prevent the
retribution. In an article in The Observer (21 October 2007) by
Henry Porter, entitled ‘His views are hateful. But so is the attempt
to deny him a voice’, Colin Blakemore, Professor of Neuroscience
at Oxford, is quoted as saying ‘Jim Watson is well known for being
provocative and politically incorrect. But it would be a sad world

138
if such a distinguished scientist was silenced because of his more
unpalatable views.’

So, in considering this situation, we need to balance Mill’s ‘harm’

principle, with his insistence on freedom of speech, even for
someone who is in a minority of one. However, Mill would restrict
the freedom to express views in a situation where they are likely
to stir up trouble. Hence he would have no problem with the idea
of restricting free speech where it is liable to ‘incite to hatred’ –
indeed, he would see that as exactly the kind of situation which the
law should intervene to prevent.

OBJECTIONS TO MILL

There are at least two fundamental objections to Mill’s view of the

freedoms that should be permitted to individuals. The first is:

 That every action may have an effect on others, even if we are

quite unaware of what that effect might be. In other words, it
is naive of him to assume that what I do in the privacy of my
own home is not of immediate concern to other people.

To take an extreme example, downloading child pornography is

done privately, and it can be argued that the material is already
available on the web, waiting to be purchased, and therefore the
act of making any particular download does not materially harm
anyone. Now the act of downloading might not affect anybody
else, but it is regarded as a serious criminal offence, because the
trade in child pornography is based on the sexual exploitation
of children. The person who downloads the result is therefore
implicated in its production, and therefore in the prior harm done
to those children. In the same way, the private act of taking illegal
drugs cannot be separated from the harm that may be caused to
others through the exploitative nature of the drugs trade.

Hence, although those acts appear to be done in private, Mill’s

argument would still condemn them on the basis of the prior
harms done. This does not deny that there may be situations where

6. Freedom 139
 private activity should be permitted because it genuinely does not
harm anyone else – it simply suggests that we need to be extremely
careful when we try to draw the boundary between private acts
and their public implications.

Recreational drugs
If you can smoke and drink excessively in the privacy of your own
home, why should you not be free to use other drugs, too? After
all, you would be potentially harming no one but yourself. The
counter argument is that harm is done through the illegal trade
that makes those drugs available.

But those who argue for the legalisation of all recreational drugs can
then make the point that it is their illegal status that encourages the
crime and exploitation involved in a black market. Hence the harm
is done by the illegality, not by the drugs themselves.

But even if there were no illegal trade, should you be allowed to

harm yourself? Should medical care be provided for those who
deliberately contribute to their illnesses? Accounts of drug abuse
frequently speak of the impact on friends and family, so should
the ‘harm’ principle extend to them?

The second objection is even more fundamental, from the

perspective of political philosophy:

 It is that the state ought to be concerned with the moral

welfare of citizens; they should not be left to decide what they
will do to themselves.

We have already noted that Plato and Aristotle thought that the
state had a responsibility to provide the conditions under which
people could lead the good life – and therefore that questions
determining the nature of such a good life were rightly part of
political philosophy.

140
For Mill, however, the responsibility that the ancient Greeks gave
to the state is now given to individuals. People are to determine for
themselves what their good life will be, and the task of the state
is to allow them to pursue that good life by all means possible,
provided that it does not restrict the ability of all others to do
the same.

But was he right to place so much emphasis on the individual?

Today we recognize that people’s views are coloured by the media
and by the general attitudes of society, and these may both be
influenced by governments. Governments are expected to take
views on health, the environment, education, civil disobedience,
respect for authority and so on. But by doing so they are
influencing the sphere of life that Mill might have regarded as the
responsibility of the individual alone. Therefore, given the nature
of the media and society, is it fair to ask if Mill’s individualistic
approach is still a realistic one?

Insight
Is it ever possible, in modern society, to make a choice that is
not, in some way, coloured by the media or the expectations
of society? I am free if I am able to choose; but I can only
choose because I am given options – and those options
depend on society.

BASIC FREEDOMS

Of course, the degree of freedom to be allowed to the individual

depends on whether you think that people, left to their own
devices, will work together harmoniously, in which case you can
allow them maximum freedom. If, like the philosopher Hobbes,
you sense that, in their natural state, it is every man for himself
with resulting chaos, then you will probably want to constrain
freedom rather more.

Benjamin Constant (1768–1830), writing in France following

the French Revolution and the rule of Napoleon, contrasted the
‘Liberty of the Ancients’, which was in effect the freedom to take

6. Freedom 141
 part in republican political life, as exemplified in ancient Greece
and Rome, with the ‘Liberty of the Moderns’, which he set out in
terms of those things which individuals could do without fear of
government control or restraint.

In other words, he made the distinction between positive and

negative freedom. For him, it was also a contrast between the
attempt of the French Revolution to return to a republican
tradition of civil life, which did not really result in the freedom
intended, and the ‘Glorious Revolution’ in Britain in 1688, which
established the rule of law under a constitutional monarchy,
guaranteeing basic freedoms to individual citizens. It is clear
that, despairing of the former, Constant opted for the latter form
of freedom. He sets out some basic freedoms, which are widely
adopted as the minimum, namely, liberty of:

 religion
 opinion
 expression
 property.

He believed that society should protect each individual against

punishment or constraint in striving for these four freedoms.
Defining freedom in this way, of course, tends to promote an
individualistic view of humankind – in other words, that we
define ourselves mainly by what we as individuals choose to do,
rather than seeing ourselves as small parts of a larger social
whole.

As Constant was well aware, this is a tradition that developed

in modern times. If you go back to ancient Greece, there was
far more of a sense that the individual could only function
and fulfil his or her purpose through participation in the
whole social and political context. For Aristotle, man was a
political animal, not an individual animal that just happened,
for his own personal benefit, to agree with others about how
to live together. But that, of course, is a matter of ‘positive
freedom’.

142
Positive freedom

Positive freedom is the freedom to choose what we will do with

our lives, to set goals and to work to achieve them. Should or can
governments promote such freedom?

The danger with this approach, as presented by Berlin, is that

there is a temptation to suggest that people should have a ‘higher’
freedom than that which they actually choose for themselves.
In other words, it is tempting for those in power to suggest that
people are ignorant of their own potential and best interests.

There is a danger of telling people that they are truly free, when
you have actually imposed upon them a notion of what they should
be ‘free’ to do. And it is a short step from that to restraining people
who have a lesser or more selfish notion of what they should be
free to seek in life.

Berlin, in his lecture ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, quotes Kant as

saying ‘Paternalism is the greatest despotism imaginable’. There is
always the danger that a well-meaning reformer will come to treat
people as material to be shaped by his chosen reforms, whether
they choose to be so helped or not. And those imposed goals, and
the imposed freedom to achieve them, are really just another form
of control.

A clear example of the imposition of positive freedom is seen in

the work of Rousseau. As we saw above (page 65), Rousseau
argues that people’s true happiness and freedom lies in setting
aside their own particular wills and finding their true freedom by
aligning themselves with the general will of the people. Rather than
remaining slaves to their own passions and inclinations, they would
then experience the freedom of giving themselves to the greater
political enterprise. And, of course, if people do not recognize
that their own best interest and freedom lay in that direction, they
would have to be – in Rousseau’s own chilling phrase – ‘forced to
be free’.

6. Freedom 143
 Mill opposed this approach. He said

Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as

seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as
seems good to the rest.
(On Liberty, p. 18)

Berlin argues that, for a society to be free, it is essential that no

rules are regarded as absolute. In other words, it is always the
right of the individual to interpret and understand a rule as it
applies to him or her, and nobody should be forced to act in an
inhumane way. It is also important for such freedom to be based
on a definition of what it is to be a human being. People need to
be able to develop an idea of the end or purpose of human life;
they should be free to consider and discuss this, and to modify it
as seems appropriate. In the end, this is not something that can be
imposed on people, it is something that they have to embrace for
themselves.

Insight
I complain that I cannot do what I want, therefore I am not
free. You tell me that if I align my wants and goals with
something else (namely what you think I should want) then I
will be free to achieve them. But is freedom to conform true
freedom?

Another aspect of positive freedom, as proposed by the

French socialist philosopher Gorz (see page 93), concerns the
encouragement of participation in the political order (rather
along republican lines, as found in the ancient Greek polis) by
offering every citizen a payment, so that they would not need to be
employed in order to enjoy and contribute to society. This suggests
that we may not be free to do what we like because we are too
busy earning money – freed from that need, we would be free to
use our time more creatively.

On the other hand, the offering of such a freedom would cut across
so many of the assumptions about work and the economic order,

144
that it is difficult to see how it could be implemented without some
wholesale changes in society and its values.

School uniform
Where a uniform is required, freedom is …

 tying your tie very short

 hitching your skirt higher than generally permitted
 wearing odd socks
 wearing a shirt but no jacket on a freezing morning

(examples of pushing the boundaries of negative freedom).

Where no uniform is required, freedom is …

 coming to school dressed identically in jeans and tee shirts

 freely accepting the slavery of fashion

(examples of a limited attempt at positive freedom).

EFFECTIVE FREEDOM

It is important to distinguish between being legally allowed to

do something, and actually being able to go and do it. A law
could be passed allowing everyone, if they so wish, to run a
mile in two minutes. That would not, however, increase their
effective freedom, because, although allowed to do so, they are
physically incapable of it. Having a minimum of restrictions and
a maximum of possibilities is fine, but in the real world most
people will never have the opportunity either to become all that
they are allowed to become, or to need to be restrained from doing
everything that is possible for them to do. Their effective freedom
depends on actually having the means and ability to do what they
choose.

6. Freedom 145
 This idea of effective freedom relates back to the consideration
of fairness in Chapter 5. The quest for a fair society – whether
through the sort of agreements suggested by Rawls, or through a
utilitarian assessment of benefits – is at the same time a quest for
a society in which effective freedom is maximized. To be treated
unfairly is to have one’s potential limited, and therefore to be
denied things that would be possible if one had a fairer share
of resources. Poverty is not just a matter of having insufficient
money or resources, it is also about not being free to do the
things that people with more money are freely able to choose
to do.

Insight
It seems to me that a political system should be judged by
the degree to which its people are able to take advantage of
freedoms that are offered, not just by their entitlement to
them. The fundamental question: What difference does that
freedom make to me?

Effective freedom is also improved if society is stable and well

organized. In his essay ‘On Civil Liberty’, David Hume, concerned
with the balance of freedom and authority, and surveying the
benefits of different political forms, commented on how improved
life had become under monarchies:

It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly

said in praise of republics alone, that they are a government of
Laws, not of Men. They are found susceptible of order, method,
and constancy, to a surprising degree. Property is there secure,
industry encouraged, the arts flourish, and the prince lives secure
among his subjects, like a father among his children.

Although he does not believe that monarchy is an ideal form of

government, here he is taking a pragmatic line. If laws are drawn
up and applied fairly, and property is made secure, people are less
likely to live in fear and thus their effective freedom is increased.

146
 In other words
In order to be free, I need to feel secure. If I am constantly trying
to guard and protect myself, I can’t plan and live my life as I would
wish.

FEAR OF FREEDOM

The French existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre argued that

existence precedes essence – in other words, we do not have a fixed
self to which we need to conform, but we construct who we are as
we go through life.

But this brings with it a terrible responsibility, namely that we

are free to choose not just what we shall do, but also who we
shall become. For Sartre and other existential philosophers, such
as Martin Heidegger, this kind of freedom is something from
which many people are tempted to run. It is a threat as well as a
challenge. It is far easier to adopt some fixed role or mask than to
be faced with the freedom to shape our own lives.

Insight
Negative freedom is that carved out by adolescents, pushing
the boundaries of what parents will allow. Positive freedom is
the scary prospect of being an adult, alone in the world and
fully responsible for success or failure.

THE TRIADIC ALTERNATIVE

Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive freedom was

challenged in 1967 by an American legal philosopher, Gerald
MacCallum. He argues that these were two aspects of a single
concept. Freedom occurs when an agent is free from external
constraints so that he or she can do or become certain things.
This suggests that freedom is a ‘triadic’ concept, i.e. it is based
on three things: the agent, the thing or things that limit what the
agent can do, and what it is the agent wants to do.

6. Freedom 147
 In other words, we only seek freedom from constraints because we
want to be free to do something. The experience of freedom only
makes sense if we are both ‘free to’ and ‘free from’. Perhaps that
is why negative freedom (removing all restraints) is so scary and
confusing unless one has a definite goal, and thus a reason to
use such freedom creatively.

Freedom and the law

Both Rousseau and Kant argue that if laws were devised that were
entirely rational, they would give freedom, because they would
require people to do exactly what a rational person would want
to do for him or herself anyway. This assumes that society is
comprised of free individuals, each of whom is autonomous and
acts in a rational way, both for his or her own benefit and in order
to allow all others to do the same.

This is the ideal that lies behind Kant’s ethics. The three forms of
his ‘categorical imperative’ are the criteria which, according to pure
practical reason, determine if something is morally right. They may
be summarized as:

 Something is right if, and only if, you can will that the
principle (or maxim) upon which you act should be made a
universal law – in other words, that everyone else should also
be allowed to act on the same principles as yourself.
 Act in such a way as to treat all others as ends in themselves,
rather than as mere means to your own ends.
 Act as though you were legislating for a kingdom of ‘ends’,
in other words, a society where everyone is a free and
autonomous individual.

Notice how this overall view of morality fits with ideas of

freedom and the law. They form the rational principles that
should guide the actions of a free and autonomous person, living

148
in a society where everyone else is free and autonomous also.
The law is compatible with freedom, because the law expresses
fundamental rational principles that allow the same measure
of freedom and respect for others that you would wish shown to
yourself. If that is the case, then why do you need rules at all?
Why not allow everyone to be free and allow their rationality to
prevail?

This may be well argued as an ideal against which to measure the

freedom allowed in actual societies, but is it ever going to be a
realistic option?

The problem – and it is a problem that we shall see repeated

many times in the study of political philosophy – is that people
do not live up to the standards set for them by some philosophers.
If everyone were fully rational and not motivated by irrational
impulses or their physical or emotional needs, then society
would work perfectly on rational lines, and nobody would sense
that their freedom was being constrained. However, life is not
like that; we have a problem simply because people act from
irrational motives, whether internal to themselves or externally
imposed.

Rational politicians
Even if they start off with the best of intentions, personal views
and ambitions may influence politicians. Hence the ability to
reason – even in those with political responsibility – is not a
sufficient guarantee of reliable decision-making. The fallback
position, where commonsense and goodwill fail, is always the need
for tighter legislation.

Hence, in practice, the law generally acts in line with the ‘negative’
rather than the ‘positive’ approach to freedom – in other words,

6. Freedom 149
 it sets boundaries to the scope of freedom given to an individual.
Law becomes a necessary protection to guard against the failure of
reason and morality.

Mill saw law as a restriction of liberty. In all situations where you

can get along without the law, it is fine to do so. If you cannot do so,
then the law needs to be imposed to a degree sufficient to prevent one
person’s liberty from causing harm to others. Hence, a liberal society
is likely to want a minimum of law, and thus a minimal government.

IN WHOSE INTEREST?

Legislation would seem to be necessary when reason fails to deliver

an acceptable result. But in whose interest should law be framed?
If there is a dispute, each side may appeal to a legislator to offer a
settlement or compromise. But is it ever possible to be sufficiently
detached to be able to frame laws that are – and are seen to be –
absolutely fair?

How do you decide between conflicting interests, where the

freedom of one appears to preclude the freedom of the other?

Freedom for geese or humans?

In April 2006, Chicago City Council voted to make it illegal to
prepare and sell foie gras in any of the city’s restaurants, on the
grounds that the geese were tortured by being force-fed through
tubes to make their livers expand to 20 times their natural size.
Chefs launched a campaign against this, arguing that such legislation
would violate a fundamental human right of their customers to
choose what to eat. At a special fundraising dinner, to defy the
wishes of the local politicians, every dish contained some form of
the livers of the unfortunate geese. The questions to consider are:

 Is it right to legislate on what would normally be considered

matters of personal morality? Is that what local politics should
be about?

150
  Do individuals have any absolute right to satisfy their
personal preferences, if what they do (or in this case, eat)
offends others?
 If foie gras eaters have that right, what about paedophiles,
voyeurs or cannibals?
 If, in a democracy, a majority want foie gras banned, should
that view prevail over the minority who want to eat it?
 To what extent should individuals be forced to do what is in
the general interest of, in this case, geese?

Two years later, in April 2008, the ban was repealed in the interest
of consumer choice!

And this dilemma applies equally to smoking in public places, the

right to walk naked in public, and the recreational use of certain
drugs. Every act of legislation curtails freedom, but protects
others from those who would want to exercise it. A parallel
argument can be made about whether it is right for a government
to take a country to war if a majority of its citizens are against it.
All of these issues show the limits of a utilitarian or democratic
process of decision-making.

Whether it is ever realistic to think that the law, or the government,

can determine what I would freely want for myself if I were
thinking rationally and objectively, may depend on a fundamental
problem for philosophy. Is society basically just a collection of
individuals, or are individuals created by the society within which
they live?

The first possibility may seem obvious, and can lead to arguments
about whether there is any such thing as society, over and
above people and their families. The second possibility becomes
reasonable once we recognize that almost everything we do, or
think, or desire, comes as a result of communication or sharing
in society. I could never aspire to be a doctor if I lived in a social
vacuum – for being a doctor is about dealing with other people

6. Freedom 151
 who are sick, the whole social notion of medicine, the way that it is
funded and so on. So what appears to be an individual choice is in
fact a socially conditioned option.

Freedom is always freedom within a society, it is a freedom to

develop in ways that society may have suggested to me (positive
freedom) and in ways that it allows (negative freedom) – but either
way, it is a social phenomenon. Solitary freedom is like the Zen
notion of one hand clapping!

152
 10 THINGS TO REMEMBER
1 There is a difference between negative and positive freedom.

2 The state needs to step in and impose laws where individuals

do not exercise their freedom responsibly.

3 For Mill, the only valid reason to limit freedom is to prevent

an individual from harming others.

4 There is a debate about the extent to which the state should be

concerned about the moral welfare of individuals.

5 Constant set out four basic freedoms; those of religion,

opinion, expression and property.

6 Rousseau thought people should be forced to be free, since

they often fail to recognize their own best interests.

7 There is a difference between effective freedoms and those to

which one is merely entitled.

8 Freedom can be a threat as well as an opportunity.

9 Reason alone may not be sufficient to regulate freedom;

legislation may be needed.

10 Freedom makes no sense for an isolated individual.

6. Freedom 153
 7
Rights, justice and the law
In this chapter you will learn:
• about the balance between the individual and the state
• to consider what rights an individual should have
• about the limits of the law and of political authority.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created

equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.
The American Declaration of Independence (1776)

The view that individuals have rights that should be upheld by law
is a central feature of the broadly liberal approach to politics and
is based on the two ideas we have already considered: equality and
fairness.

But however ‘self-evident’ some truths may seem to be, they raise
questions:

 How do you establish a fair balance between the rights of the

individual and the political requirements of the state?
 How do you define justice? Do you start with the needs and
aspirations of the individual and then assess how a state
should enable them to be satisfied? Or do you start with the
need to maintain a secure and prosperous state, and then

154
 assess what part individuals should be allowed or encouraged
to play within it?
 Since control is exercised by law (or by brute force, if law
breaks down) how do you ensure the independence of the
judiciary, so that the law is not simply a tool of control in the
hands of political leaders?

There is a whole range of issues here, but in this chapter we can

touch on only some of them.

Justice handed down?

In The Republic, Plato argued that justice would benefit everyone

in society; it was not simply a way of protecting the weak from the
strong by offering them rights. Promoting justice was the result of
seeing ‘the good’ itself, rather than being swayed by the passing
interplay of events – the shadows on the back wall of the prisoners’
cave.

But Plato thought that justice could not be understood by everyone,

but only by those who were suitably educated. The responsibility of
the Guardians was therefore to grasp and hand down justice to the
unenlightened. Individuals could flourish only if the state were well
ordered, and if a ‘noble lie’ about the status of the lower orders
was needed in order to keep them in their place, such bending of
the truth was a price worth paying.

In other words, for Plato, justice and law were handed down to
people from the Guardians, who alone knew what was in the
people’s own best interest and that of the polis.

Aristotle, equally, saw justice as the result of education in the

virtues of tolerance and respect, but he also considered that the
truest form of justice was a kind of friendship – in other words, a
mutual exchange that could promote human flourishing. But he
was realistic about who, in the polis, could establish such justice.

7. Rights, justice and the law 155

 In Politics, Book IV, he suggests that the state should be ruled by
the middle classes, since the well-born tended to be arrogant and
the poor to commit petty crimes, while the middle classes were
more susceptible to rational argument!

Insight
Those with nothing to lose may take risks; those with most
to lose are likely to be conservative and cautious. Does
that suggest that those in the middle will be balanced and
rational? I am far from sure that human nature works in
quite that way.

So when it comes to rights, justice and the law, the Greeks were
concerned primarily with the state rather than with the individual.
You simply could not trust the majority of people to set their own
laws. Citizens could take part in debates and vote, of course, but that
process was not open to everyone, and although both would have
accepted that a bad ruler might need to be overthrown, neither Plato
nor Aristotle would have sanctioned lightly any form of public revolt.

Natural subordination?
The clear implication of this argument is that some are more
naturally suited to rule than others, and that people should
know their place and keep to it. It is claimed that, by each taking
an appropriate role in society, based on inequality and natural
subordination, all will benefit.

This is very different from the democratic approach but, since in

modern democracies a majority does not take an active part in
politics, is it not in fact what happens? A minority of professional
politicians and civil servants take decisions and then (with whatever
spin is necessary) explain them to the people. Although preserving
an appearance of democratic equality, one might argue that such a
situation is not so different from that of ancient Greece.

156
So who determines justice? What happens when a military
dictatorship imposes rule, claiming that it does so in order to
prevent civil unrest and chaos? Who can decide between rulers and
people? And where there is long-term confrontation between rulers
and people, can the state really be secure?

And who controls truth in such a situation? Plato sanctioned

the ‘noble lie’ about the invariable nature of the three classes of
society. But what about a ‘noble lie’ about all civil unrest being the
result of criminal elements or foreign trouble makers?

Military crackdown
Following the pro-democracy demonstrations in Burma during the
last week of September 2007, the military junta clamped down on
the protests. Monasteries were surrounded by troops, preventing
the monks from continuing to take part in the demonstrations,
parks were closed, the internet was disrupted, as were mobile
phone connections. Troops fired on crowds using rubber bullets
and tear gas. Live rounds were also used, and people were killed.

Other freedoms that were curtailed included the freedom of

speech and the freedom of association – any groups gathering
together in a public place were swiftly disbanded by the military.

The last time there were demonstrations on this scale was in 1988
when 3,000 people were killed. Burma has been under military
rule for 45 years. A military regime can control the country by
using fear and the naked use of force where necessary. It seems
impervious to the international condemnation of its actions, and
a UN call for additional sanctions against the regime was vetoed
by China, a key trading partner with Burma.

How stable is such a regime? Eventually, where a people are kept

in check through the threat of violence, a smaller and smaller
number of people at the heart of the military tend to receive a
(Contd)

7. Rights, justice and the law 157

 disproportionate benefit to the disadvantage of almost everyone
else. There can sometimes be a very rapid break-up of the
power base in such situations, with the potential for a return to
democracy.

It is interesting to observe that the military used old-style

physical force to put down the demonstrations, whereas the
demonstrators and others used modern technology – determined
to smuggle out information about what was happening through
mobile phones and the internet. Technology facilitates the spread
of information beyond national boundaries.

Justice from the people

Article 21 of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights

states that: ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government’. In other words, it endorses democracy
as the system of government best able to deliver human rights.
And this follows from the whole social contract approach, which
we examined in Chapter 3. Governments are set up through
the agreement of the people, and part of that agreement is that
individuals accept that they will be bound by the law that the
government makes.

Governments establish political authority and impose that

authority through law – that is a key feature of the internal
stability and security of a state. The fundamental question to ask
of a democratic system therefore is this: To what extent is the law
therefore produced by the people, as opposed to being imposed
upon them?

We shall return to this question later, in considering the place of

legislation. For now, we need to keep in mind the fundamental
issue of principle here – that within a democracy, it is the people
who, through their elected representatives, shape what laws are

158
passed. In addition, of course, we have the principle that the
application of justice through the courts is separate from the
executive power of government. This is designed to give added
protection from the arbitrary use of government power.

Notice that, from a liberal–democratic point of view, justice is

agreed between people, and may be applied on a utilitarian basis –
laws are aimed at expressing the wishes of the majority of the
people. This leaves out of account any question of what constitutes
the good life, or human flourishing, and whether law can
contribute to this. In a democracy, the government is not expected
to improve the people, but to do what they want.

Insight
Religion promotes moral values, both individual and social,
whereas democratic politics is about the implementation of
agreed values. Sometimes religion becomes political – e.g.
the Islamic imposition of Shari’a law – other times politics
becomes religious or philosophical, attempting to influence
people’s values and their understanding of what life is for.

Rights

 What are the basic rights that every individual should be

entitled to?
 How can those rights best be protected?
 Under what circumstances, and for what reason, should
a state remove the rights of individuals? (For example,
someone who has committed a crime, or is a danger to the
public, might have the right of personal liberty removed, by
being put in prison.)

In August 1789, the National Assembly of France, ‘believing

that the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man
are the sole cause of public calamities and of the corruption of
governments’, set out its Declaration of the Rights of Man, the first
article of which declared that ‘Men are born and remain free and

7. Rights, justice and the law 159

 equal in rights’ and those ‘natural’ rights were said to be: freedom,
property, security, and the right to resist oppression.

The rights that are set out in that declaration remain familiar:
people are to be considered innocent until proven guilty; authority
resides with the whole state, and not with factions; people have
the right to security, property and freedom of speech. The general
sense of the declaration is that the individual is to be free from the
arbitrary exercise of power and protected by the law.

A few years earlier, as the American colonies were on the verge

of declaring their independence from Britain, an American
political campaigner, Thomas Paine (1737–1809), shot to fame
through the publication of a pamphlet entitled Common Sense. He
called for independence for the colonies, throwing off the monarchy
and establishing a new republican government which would provide
a more equal distribution of wealth, getting rid of the privileges of
the gentry. A political system, he argued, should be based on reason
and democracy. His pamphlet sold 150,000 copies!

But Paine is best known for his book Rights of Man, published
in two parts in 1791 and 1792 – a radical attack on Reflections
on the Revolution in France by the British conservative political
thinker, Edmund Burke (1729–97), which had been published the
previous year. Although Burke had supported the independence of
the American colonies, he was critical of the revolution in France,
and argued for gradual change in society and the preservation of
established tradition, rather than revolution. He also accepted a
system of natural subordination. This, Paine could not tolerate.

Opposed to all rule by power or religious authority, Paine argues

that the basis for political life should be a social compact – an
agreement between people to work for the common good (rather
than between the people and their government), since people exist
before governments:

The fact therefore must be, that the individuals themselves, each
in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact

160
 with each other to produce a government: and this is the only
mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only
principle on which they have a right to exist.
From Rights of Man (second part)

He supported the claims of the French Declaration of the Rights

of Man, particularly in the exercise of the ‘natural rights of every
man’ – the only limits to freedom being that one should not
thereby impede others from exercising a similar freedom (exactly
the argument that Locke had made). It had also made the point
that the law should only prohibit those things that are hurtful to
society, and therefore nobody should be prevented from doing
anything that is not specifically prohibited by the law, nor should
they be required to do anything that is not set down in law.

Insight
Notice here the divide between the law and morality. One may
do something which is legal, i.e., not specifically forbidden by
law, but which may be judged immoral. Morality may shape
law, but law does not – in itself – shape morality, for people
may equally obey out of fear as out of conviction.

Paine made an important distinction between ‘natural rights’ (as

they had been proclaimed by the French) and ‘civil rights’:

 Natural rights – ‘are those which appertain to a man in right

of his existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or
rights of the mind, and also all those rights of acting as an
individual for his own comfort and happiness’.
 Civil rights – ‘are those which appertain to man in right of
his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its
foundation, some natural right pre-existing in the individual.
But to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not,
in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those
which relate to security and protection’.

(The quotations come from Rights of Man (second part).)

7. Rights, justice and the law 161

 NATURAL RIGHTS

We need to pause to consider what is meant by a ‘natural’ right.

There are no rights in nature. The wildebeest, chased by lions,
escapes into the river only to be devoured by crocodiles. There is
no court to which the poor creature can appeal against being eaten.
Life and death are determined by physical nature, strength and
cunning. The strongest survive and breed, and thus each species
develops.

The whole idea that people have rights which they can use to argue
against some injustice done to them is the product of the system of
agreements and laws that are established within the state. Rights
and the law, and indeed the whole idea of justice, act as a check
and balance to ensure protection for individuals. Rights would
be redundant in a society where everything was done fairly to the
satisfaction of all.

Hence ‘natural rights’ and ‘natural law’ are not found in nature,
but are the result of nature being interpreted by human reason. So,
for example, the most basic feature of a ‘natural law’ approach
to ethics is that everyone has the right to self-defence – because
clearly, defending your life is a basic function of all living things,
and it would be unnatural to expect someone not to act to preserve
themselves. But that is a rational interpretation – to say that
everyone, when threatened, actually defends him or herself, is
no more than an observation (and, of course, it may not always
be true), but to say that everyone has a right to do so is quite a
different thing – it is offering a reasoned justification for what
happens.

Bentham famously called natural rights ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’, and

argued that rights were not ‘natural’ but were established by the
human subject by consent and agreement. In a natural state (as he
observed in ‘savage’ nations) there is no security, no laws and no
government.

162
His argument goes like this:

 That which does not exist, cannot be destroyed and does not
need protection.
 Natural rights do not exist, therefore it is nonsense to set them
out and claim to defend them.

He was therefore against anything which defined a basic right

that an individual could claim simply by virtue of being born. As
far as Bentham was concerned, the only basis for rights was that
of ‘general utility’. Hence, for him, man-made law and rights go
together – you have rights because the law determines them. But
where there is no law, as in the state of nature, you can therefore
have no rights.

This has led to a criticism of Bentham’s utilitarian position, on the

grounds that it offers no absolute or final point of reference, no
basic requirement that human beings should be treated in certain
ways simply by virtue of being human.

Comment
In many ways, this is rather like the argument that there is no
morality in the process of natural selection. If nature progresses
through a struggle to survive, and species dominate and consume
one another in that struggle, it is strange to claim that any one
species might have a ‘natural right’ not to be killed and eaten
by another. Rights come about simply because humankind has
(Bentham would say for the purpose of utility) devised laws, and
from them has given rights.

However, there are those who argue forcefully for natural rights.
John Finnis (b. 1940), Professor of Law at University College,
Oxford, argues that there are basic ‘goods’ that have intrinsic value,
including life itself, knowledge, friendship and religion. People may

7. Rights, justice and the law 163

 think that some of these ‘goods’ are more important for them than
others, but they cannot logically be measured against one another;
all are valuable and none should be ignored. His main work on this
is Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1979) which
sets out to examine those rights that are required by practical
reasonableness and which can be delivered through the law.

But this, of course, follows the general ‘natural law’ approach that
reason can understand and interpret the fundamental, essential
nature of reality. To be human implies certain things, quite apart
from any subsequent legal agreements.

Insight
The difference between Bentham and Finnis here is
fundamental to both political philosophy and ethics. Either
everything is justified on the basis of rational agreements (and
may therefore vary according to who makes the agreements
and why), or it is justified by a rational interpretation of
natural qualities (and is therefore permanent and universal).

STARTING WITH RIGHTS

Two years after John Rawls published his Theory of Justice,

another Harvard academic, Robert Nozick (1938–2002), produced
Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), which took a very different
view of the starting point for justice.

Nozick’s argument took as its starting point the Kantian view that
people should always be treated as ends in themselves and not as
means to ends. Hence, while Rawls’s idea of justice as fairness
suggested that it might be right to redistribute wealth in order to
benefit the least well-off in society, Nozick is concerned to defend
each person’s rights, including the right to hold property.

He argued that, even if everyone were given an equal share of

goods, they would soon start trading and some would end up
with more than others. So it is necessary to look at justice in terms
of an on-going historical process. People have acquired what he

164
terms ‘holdings’ and they are free to trade these as they wish, but
such trading is based on consent. He objects to any attempt to
undermine that basic right to property, and views taxation for
the purpose of redistribution as a form of slavery – since it attacks
the rights and holdings of individual people (making them, in
effect, a ‘means’ to the end of a politically devised idea of a just
society).

The task of the state, therefore, is simply to protect individuals

and their property. What they do with themselves and their
possessions is up to them, not up to the state.

This is a basic libertarian position, and Nozick was to moderate his

views in later works, but it remains a powerful argument in defence
of rights, and a reminder that the rights of individuals should
not be negotiated or shared on utilitarian grounds, but should be
protected as a basic requirement.

Ronald Dworkin (see particularly Taking Rights Seriously, 1977)

argued that a right should not be something that a person can
exercise only if it is to everyone else’s benefit, or justified on a
utilitarian basis, but is something that can be claimed even in the
most difficult of circumstances.

In other words, a right is something that, in order to protect myself,

I can insist on. Whereas in a democracy there is always the danger that
the majority inevitably wins out over the minority, the introduction of
rights means that individuals and groups can be protected.

A note on tolerance
You tolerate a different point of view if you disagree with it, but
accept that the other person has a right to hold it. A tolerant
society is one that accepts the fundamental legal and political
rights of individuals. It may not be a harmonious society, or a ‘fair’
one, but it is one where basic rights are respected.
(Contd)

7. Rights, justice and the law 165

 The Soviet Union under Stalin was extremely intolerant. People
were spied upon, and any word or gesture that suggested a view
other than that sanctioned by the Government was severely
punished. The aim of that kind of society is to maintain uniformity
and compliance. The aim of a tolerant society is to enable variety,
discussion and disagreement, without people’s basic rights to life,
freedom or property being under threat.

 The issue to consider is whether you should tolerate the

expression of views that are themselves intolerant.

The 1970s is not universally regarded as the most exciting or inventive

of decades, but it certainly was in terms of political philosophy. Notice
the dates of significant publications mentioned in this section: Rawls,
1972; Nozick, 1974; Dworkin, 1977; Finnis, 1979. These and others
generated a whole new interest in political philosophy.

RECOGNITION

Isaiah Berlin pointed out that, when it comes to the individual

within society, a sense of recognition is important. People need to
feel that they count for something, and that their views are being
taken into account. Hence, people will sometimes put up with a
considerable amount of repression if it is done by their own class,
or within a democratic structure. They are more likely to rebel,
or at least harbour a sense of grievance, if it is imposed by an
individual or a group who claims superiority.

People sometimes demand rights, not because they will immediately

want to exercise them, or because they are presently prevented
from doing something they want to do, but because they feel that
those rights acknowledge their place within society. Hence stability
and respect for law are likely to be promoted in a situation where
the authority to rule, or to make law, is acknowledged by the
people, rather than imposed on them. So the key question is how
people establish and justify political authority.

166
Political authority

In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes clearly saw the danger of a

lawless state where everyone was out for him or herself. Without
security, there would be little scope for commerce or co-operative
activity, and life would slide into a state of chaos and end up
‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. He therefore wanted
people to accept the authority of a ruler, and to commit to accept
that authority even if they themselves had played no part in setting
it up.

His views need to be taken in the context of the English Civil War,
Commonwealth and Restoration. During this period, in which
a king who claimed the divine right to rule was beheaded, and
a commonwealth was set up only to be replaced by a restored
monarchy, society was constantly threatened by change and
uncertainty, and bloodshed was the result of a clash of strongly
held views about the nature of authority. Hobbes insisted on
strong government. But others, including Locke, wanted to ensure
that people had control over the government, rather than have an
unchallengeable government imposed on them.

Hobbes believed that once a government is established in a single

person or a single assembly, all have to accept the authority of that
ruler. Without that, Hobbes felt, there could be no guarantee of
security. All have to give up their individual will on the condition
that all others give up theirs as well, and thus all are equal in
trusting the government that has been established.

However, Hobbes had a single ‘get out’ clause, and that was
that one could refuse to accept the authority of a ruler in any
case where one’s life was threatened – a crucial and fundamental
‘right’.

By contrast, Locke established the principle that government

should be held to account by the people. Locke sees people as using

7. Rights, justice and the law 167

 the government as an agent of their own authority. Governments
do what we want; if not, we replace them. The American
Declaration of Independence made it clear (following principles
set down by Locke) that a government derives its just powers
from the consent of the governed, and that people have a right
to dismiss that government and set up another. And, of course,
that was the point of the Declaration, since the former colonies
were complaining about and therefore breaking away from
British rule.

And, of course, it was Locke’s ‘agency’ approach to government

that became the norm for justifying democracies.

In any political system, good governance depends upon the

acceptance of authority. In a democracy, this requires that
representatives are trusted to carry out the will of those they
represent. Genuine political authority requires the consent of the
people, and those regimes that are kept in power only by force are
inherently vulnerable to overthrow.

Key questions:

 Should people be able to vote only once every few years at a

general election?
 Should they be able to dismiss and replace their chosen
representatives?
 How accountable is the executive power to the elected
representatives, and how often are those representatives
accountable to the people who elected them?

Authority versus power

Power represents the ability to do something, whether what is done
is right or wrong. Of course, some might argue that might is right,
and that the power to do something is therefore sufficient

168
justification for it. On the other hand, it is more widely believed
that, if you have the power to do something, the question
remains as to whether it is right to do it. That question is one of
authority – authority represents an agreement that the power may be
exercised.

In a democracy, those in power need to be authorized by the

people. A policeman may have power, represented by any weapons
he carries, but he also needs authority if he is to act – for the
authority lies in the agreement that those who are trained and
qualified to act as police, expressed often by wearing a particular
uniform, are to be obeyed in certain, pre-determined circumstances.
Thus, a member of the police, whether on of off duty, whether
armed or not, would not, for example, have authority to request
sexual favours from a passer by! Their authority is defined and
limited, but it also gives them the right to do things (for example,
lock a person up) which would be illegal if done by a citizen who
was not a member of the police.

Those who have authority but little power must persuade, if they
are to be obeyed. Some might argue that the United Nations (UN)
comes under that category. Individual states, especially if they are
powerful, can simply ignore UN resolutions. The bluff is called on
authority if it lacks visible and effective power.

Almost everything we do is regulated in some way. We drive on

a chosen side of the road, pay taxes in order to have healthcare,
education and other services provided for us. We are obliged to
behave in ways that are agreed as acceptable, and will be arrested
and jailed if we disobey basic rules about private property, or the
right to life.

We submit to the authority of the state in almost all areas of our

lives – but should we do so?

 What are the advantages to us as individuals from obeying

authority?
(Contd)

7. Rights, justice and the law 169

  If we think that a rule is wrong, do we have the right (or,
indeed, the obligation) to protest against it or disobey it?
 Should society legislate as much as possible in order to provide
all we might need, and have maximum order? Or should we
for minimal intervention, allowing individuals to decide as
much as possible for themselves, and legislating only when
absolutely necessary?

For Locke, every individual is required to accept the majority

decision, since this is the only way to get unified action, and
because the government is given authority by people to act on their
behalf. In the same way, people, through their social contract,
agree that the government has a right to impose taxes and so on.
But again, there is a limit to this. Locke holds that one should not
be obliged to accept any situation where there is a direct threat to
one’s life or property – the same reservation made by Hobbes.

But here there is a fundamental problem. How can society be

stable if individuals have the right to reject their chosen rulers
every time their own particular position is threatened by an action
taken on behalf of a majority?

You appoint someone to act on your behalf. If that person is an

accountant or a lawyer, you will use them only as far as they put your
own wishes into effect. In politics, the appointment of the agent is
done in favour of a majority; therefore there will always be a minority
who are subject to a government that does not reflect their wishes.

Likewise, there will always be situations, even in a democracy,

where taxes or laws or restrictions of freedom are imposed on
people against their will. The fact that a majority has agreed that
this or that politician or government will act on its behalf does not
detract from the consequent frustration of the minority.

It is, of course, exactly this problem of dealing with minorities that

is a weakness of the utilitarian approach to political life. There
needs to be some agreement on fairness or on basic rights that does

170
not depend on a utilitarian assessment of the greatest benefit to the
greatest number – otherwise, minorities lose out every time.

But at what point should you rebel against a government or a

particular law? For Hobbes, it is the point at which your life is
threatened. For Locke that same threat extends to your property.
But that might be used to justify rebellion on the grounds of
punitive taxation. Is that reasonable?

It may also be fairly argued that, in a democracy, where public opinion

can change a government, the rights of free speech and free association
allow people to demonstrate and make their objections known. Hence,
the more rights that people can exercise, the more possible it becomes
for them to engage with and influence the political process.

Despotism legitimized?
Even the most liberal of philosophers may sometimes regard
despotism as a legitimate form of government, if those to be
governed are not capable of engaging effectively in the political
process. In Chapter 6 on freedom, we saw that Mill claims that:
‘Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with
barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the
means justified by actually effecting that end’.

 Would Plato have agreed with this? Do rulers always know

best? And do they have a moral obligation to patronize and
control people if they consider it to be for their own benefit?
 Does this validate the decision of a ruler to impose a state
of emergency or martial law, if the people are seen as ‘out of
control’ in some way?

ANARCHY

The logical alternative to the acceptance of political authority is

anarchy – the view that each individual should be autonomous and

7. Rights, justice and the law 171

 self-governing, and that it is wrong and unnecessary to set up an
external authority to control individuals in society. In other words,
anarchy is the view that people should be left to organize their lives
in their own way.

It can be argued that anarchy can work within small communities,

where everyone knows everyone else, because informal agreements
can be made between members in order to organize how to get
things done. The only sanction for someone who did not fit in with
those informal agreements would be exclusion from the community
or, at the very least, the disapproval of his or her fellow members.
For anarchists, such organization is interpersonal, and works from
the bottom up, rather than the more usual political authority which
is imposed from above by an already established government.

Housemates rule?
Perhaps, in evaluating whether ‘communitarian anarchy’ – in
other words, rules being established within small face-to-face
groups – could work, one might reflect on the popular TV series
‘Big Brother’. Clearly, what we witness here are the sorts of
tensions and alliances that form when a small number of people
are separated off from the rest of the population and put into a
confined space.

The whole idea is to see who is best able to thrive in that

situation. Some will become unpopular, some popular. Some will
try to guard their independence of the group, others will be better
at assessing and working alongside other people.

But, looking at Big Brother, one might well ask whether anarchists
are naïve in assuming that rule could come from the bottom up
or, indeed, whether Hobbes was right in arguing that everyone
needs strong political leadership.

172
So, anarchy can be seen in either a positive or a negative way.
Positively, it is the view that left to their own devices, people
are quite capable of co-operating with one another for mutual
support, without the need for imposed rules. Negatively, it is used
to describe a situation in which, without rules, it is everyone for
themselves – exactly the sort of chaos that Hobbes wanted
to avoid.

Rules for family life

Should parents be allowed to smack their children? Is that a matter
for legislation or common sense? At what point does the desire
of government to make sure that children are protected become
intrusive on what is usually regarded as a personal and private
matter?

Should you be told when to eat, or how often to have sex? Should
parents be required to get their teenage offspring to bed at a
predetermined hour, on the grounds that they should not crawl to
school next morning having spent half the night playing computer
games or using chat rooms?

Many would argue that a family is exactly the right environment

for positive anarchy. Some parents might feel that a more
negative sense of anarchy, or even a Hobbesian vision of
chaos, might result if they did not ‘lay down the law’ to their
offspring.

Anarchy is not just another term for chaos, it is a serious view and
worthy of discussion. Almost everyone approves of some measure
of anarchy, particularly in matters of sex. If you argue that what
consenting adults do in private should remain outside the sphere
of legislation, you are – to use the term correctly – in favour of
‘anarchy’ in the bedroom!

7. Rights, justice and the law 173

 TIME AND ACCEPTANCE

David Hume (in A Treatise of Human Nature (1740), Book III,

Part ii, Section viii) commented on the British monarchy:

Tho’ the accession of the Prince of Orange to the throne might at

first give occasion to many disputes, and his title be contested,
it ought not now to appear doubtful, but must have acquir’d
a sufficient authority from those three princes, who have
succeeded him upon the same title. Nothing is more usual, tho’
nothing may, at first sight, appear more unreasonable, than
this way of thinking. Princes often seem to acquire a right from
their successors, as well as from their ancestors; and a king, who
during his lifetime might justly be deem’d an usurper, will be
regarded by posterity as a lawful prince …

In other words
Once a political system is established and demonstrates that it works
effectively, that fact alone will give it a measure of legitimacy.

The same is true of laws. What may be seen as an illegitimate

infringement of personal freedom when first introduced, may later
become accepted as a practical and commonsense measure. The
compulsory wearing of seatbelts in vehicles, the requirement for
vehicles to pass an annual test of roadworthiness, having to wear a
crash helmet on a motorbike and not smoking in public places all
limit personal freedom, but all are widely accepted.

Hence, theoretical arguments about how political authority may

be justified will never be the whole story, since they overlook the
pragmatic and historical aspects. People do not come to power
in a vacuum; they do so in a matrix of historical and political
currents many of which they do not themselves control. A theory
about the authority of a state may serve as a way of justifying a
political system, but that does not mean that it reflects the basis on
which that authority is actually accepted – that may be a far more
mundane matter of what people have grown accustomed to, and
what seems to work well for them.

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 HYPOTHETICAL CONTRACTS

Ronald Dworkin and others have argued that a hypothetical

contract is actually no contract at all. It says only what might have
been agreed, not what has actually been agreed. Hence it may
indeed offer a basis for ethical arguments (in other words, it can
show what would be fair) but it does not reflect the real situation.
In reality, people are born into a political system and are not in a
position to opt in or out of any theoretical contract upon which it
claims to be based.

As Hume and others pointed out, in considering the earlier

tradition of social contracts, people are born into a particular
nation; they do not choose to join it. What may feel like justice to
someone who actually sits down and negotiates may feel like an
imposition to those who subsequently find themselves living under
that political or legal regime.

Therefore we should be very cautious about hypothetical contracts

or ‘thought experiments’; they are wonderful for sorting out the
logic of an argument, or for clarifying basic values, but they do not
and cannot reflect what really happens in the ongoing historical
process.

Legislation

What is the nature of law? How far can the law accurately put into
effect the wishes of a ruler or government? The philosophy of law
is a whole subject in itself, as is jurisprudence, and so we cannot
start to examine exactly how the law operates. What we do need
to do, however, is see how the operation of the law fits into the
general requirement that a political system should promote justice,
fairness, equality and freedom.

Plato wrote Statesman and Laws towards the end of his life, and in
them he seems to have grown rather more pragmatic in his political

7. Rights, justice and the law 175

 thought, compared with the earlier The Republic. On the one hand,
he wants to restrict citizenship in order to exclude those who are
incapable of making progress in knowledge and virtue (and thus
less able to participate in government), but on the other hand he
recognizes that those who are less than philosophers may achieve
positions of power. He therefore recognizes that no system is perfect.

Although in Statesman Plato approves of the process of making

and implementing laws, he sees them as blunt instruments
compared with the sensitivity of a skilled philosophical ruler. This
is because laws are inherently unable to see the subtleties and
differences that distinguish one situation from another.

In other words, law is a matter of compromise. It cannot express,

in each and every case, what a wise person would want to see as
the outcome.

Example

There are occasions when, in order to end intolerable suffering, a

person may – out of love – help another to die. Strictly speaking, this
is either assisted suicide or murder, since ‘murder’ is the term used
for the deliberate taking of innocent human life. On the other hand
any law dealing with this will need to be applied very sensitively,
since the intention is quite different from that of someone who kills
a bank clerk in the course of a robbery. Every situation may have its
mitigating circumstances.

The crucial issue, if the law is going to be seen as just, is

the sensitivity and flexibility with which it is applied. But even
in case law, where the record of judicial decisions helps to
guide the application of the law, it is never possible to take all
the particularities of the present situation into account.

In Laws, Plato contrasts people’s desires (which pull them one way
and then another) with reason, and it is the latter which should
provide the common law of the state. He recognizes that every
society will develop customs, some of which can be applied to
everyone and may therefore become laws, and that reason

176
(as embodied in the wise ruler) has the role of evaluating
different customs and promoting some to the status of law,
with the intention that they should then be applied to everyone.

This, of course, leaves open the question of how laws may be

framed in a multicultural society. If there is a range of cultural
customs, their assessment by reason might not be straightforward,
for some will be more important to one particular social group
than to others. The task of reason, then, is to act as a universal
adjudicator between conflicting social customs.

Insight
How far should you accept social customs? There are some
things – female circumcision, or human sacrifice, or racism, –
which have been accepted by societies but which some people
would declare to be always wrong. Can the law take such
absolutes into account?

The French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 described

law as ‘the expression of the general will’ (a term that is found in
Rousseau – see page 65) and goes on to say that every citizen has a
right, through his representative, to have a say in its foundation.

But it is important that the judiciary should be properly established

and independent of external pressure. In the American Declaration
of Independence, the complaint against the King was that ‘He has
obstructed the Administration of Justice by refusing his Assent to
Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers’ and ‘He has made Judges
dependent on his Will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the
amount and payment of their salaries’.

Honesty in court?
In his day, as Mill observed in On Liberty, atheists were not
permitted to give evidence in a court of law – an argument that
suggested that unless you believed in a future life (and therefore
(Contd)

7. Rights, justice and the law 177

 punishment) you could not be trusted to tell the truth under oath.
But he points out that this argument is ‘suicidal’:

Under pretence that atheists must be liars, it admits the

testimony of all atheists who are willing to lie, and rejects
only those who brave the obloquy of publicly confessing a
detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood.

An oath in court does not guarantee the truth. It simply

demonstrates that a liar is aware of the legal consequences of
doing so.

Hence, the importance of separating out the three different

functions of the state:

 The legislative body or parliament, which frames the laws and

establishes the principles upon which the country is to be run.
 The executive, which puts those principles into action, taking
as its authority the decisions of the legislature.
 The judiciary, which puts into practice the laws that have been
put forward and agreed by the government.

The important principle is that, if the law is to be applied fairly, it

must be independent of the power of the executive, and must not
be influenced by any other authority or money.

Branson gives £100,000 to help

defend the McCanns
Following the disappearance of four-year-old Madeleine McCann
while on holiday in Portugal in May 2007, suspicion eventually fell
on her parents, Gerry and Kate, when no convincing leads in the
investigation were forthcoming.

178
 In September, Sir Richard Branson announced that he would be
giving £100,000 to launch a fighting fund to help in their defence.
Convinced of their innocence, he wanted to provide the means for
them to get access to the best legal help in preparing their case.

 What does this say about the law?

 Should innocence be more easily proved for those able to fund
the best legal advice?
 Is it right to provide funds for a defence in a case that could
lead to a criminal prosecution? If so, might those not so
fortunate as to have the cash claim that the outcome of their
own cases were adversely affected?

At the same time, a YouGov poll for The Sunday Times showed
that 48 per cent of those interviewed thought the McCanns could
have been involved with their daughter’s death (although this
included the possibility that the death was an accident).

 Is it right that opinion polls of this sort should be taken and

published?
 Is it possible for someone to receive a fair trial if public opinion,
based on whatever information is given in the media, is
strongly for or against the innocence of the accused?

HOW MUCH LAW DO WE NEED?

Both Plato and Aristotle thought that the purpose of law was to help
people live better, offering summary guidance based on the wisdom
of the rulers. But does more legislation automatically lead to a better
quality of life, by giving additional guidance, or does it unfairly
constrain the individual? What areas of life should be free of law?

In On Liberty, Mill says:

No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a

soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty.

7. Rights, justice and the law 179

 Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of
damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken
out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law.

Clearly, this follows his general, utilitarian approach to freedom

and morality. Private matters should not require legislation. He is
also against the sensitivities of any religious or cultural group being
legally imposed on others. He gives two examples of this:

 Since Muslims, through the tradition of their religion, do not

eat pork, he argued that within Muslim countries eating pork
can be made illegal. But if it were made universally illegal, that
would be wrong.
 The Puritans in New England – or in England during the time
of the Commonwealth – forbade most forms of entertainment.
This, he thinks, is wrong because it is the imposition on the
whole of society of the sensitivities of a minority. He was
therefore against the imposition of Sabbath restrictions on
entertainment and work.

The two maxims Mill applies are:

 that an individual is not accountable to society for his actions,

in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself.
 that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of
others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected
either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of the
opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.

Hence, for Mill, the justification for punishment is essentially

a matter of social protection. There are at least five reasons for
punishment:

 retribution
 deterrence
 protection of the public
 rehabilitation and reform of the law-breaker
 vindication of the law.

180
All but the first of these is in the general interests of society, and may
be justified on a utilitarian basis. From the perspective of political
philosophy, the last is important, because it suggests that if the
law is seen to be broken with impunity it will no longer command
respect, and will therefore fail to perform its basic social function.
The first, retribution, is very different, in that it assumes that some
actions are such that they deserve to be punished, quite apart from
any subsequent benefit that the punishment might achieve.

One might want to ask whether retribution, taken in isolation

from the other four, is ever sufficient reason for punishment, but
that takes us into a whole range of questions of a broadly ethical
character, rather than being specific to political philosophy.

In terms of rights and justice, the main thing to recognize here is

that the law is an expression of the authority of the government.
To ask whether it is ever right to protest against or break a law,
is therefore equivalent to asking when it might be right to protest
against or seek to change a government. Locke held that the
government was accountable to the people. Logically, the law,
too, must be so accountable. A law that does not have the broad
consent of the people may be enforced, but without consent it is
difficult to see how it could be described as just.

THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING …

David Hume was a philosopher who can generally be relied

upon for sharp observation and common sense. He argues
(in ‘Of Civil Liberty’, one of his Essays Moral and Political, 1741)
that monarchies had improved recently, since they were:

found susceptible of order, method, and constancy, to a

surprising degree. Property is there secure, industry encouraged,
the arts flourish, and the prince lives secure among his subjects,
like a father among his children.

This is his straightforward way of judging the effectiveness of a

political regime – that it leads to security and human flourishing.

7. Rights, justice and the law 181

 That seems to be a fair way to assess whether or not rights, justice
and the law are well applied.

That remains true in the twenty-first century. To say that a country

is democratic simply means that its leaders are elected; it does not
imply that its people are free or that life is stable and civilized. Both
Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, have elected governments, but that
does not stop chaos and bloodshed. President Mugabe is an elected
head of state in Zimbabwe, but that does not guarantee fairness or
equality for its people. The key to a stable and civilized life for any
nation is the application of a benign rule of law; ‘benign’ because
the imposition of draconian legal restrictions by a military junta, for
example, does little to secure the long-term co-operation of its people.
Where the law is perceived to be fair, it is most likely to be obeyed.
That in turn leads to respect for government and political stability.

Of course, the more cynical may follow the observations of

Nietzsche in Part 2 of On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), who
argued that people rationalize their obedience to the law, and think
that they are being moral, but in fact they obey first and foremost
because they have no alternative. Politics, however much ‘social
contract’ theorists might like to think that it is based on reason
and consent, is actually based on power – an argument that goes
right back again to Thrasymachus in Plato’s The Republic, and the
argument that justice is whatever is in the interest of the strongest.

182
 10 THINGS TO REMEMBER
1 There is an issue about who is best suited to take political
decisions.

2 There is a distinction between natural rights and civil rights.

3 There are no rights in nature (e.g. animals naturally kill and

are killed).

4 The social and historical context is important for ascertaining

property rights.

5 Rights are enforced mainly when they are not in the interests
of the majority.

6 Political authority depends on representation, and may be

rejected by the people.

7 There is a strong case to be made for anarchy in personal

matters.

8 The law needs to be flexible in its application, to account for

individual circumstances.

9 Mill gives five reasons for punishment: retribution, deterrence,

protection of the public, rehabilitation and vindication of
the law.

10 Hume and others have generally judged political authority on

a pragmatic basis.

7. Rights, justice and the law 183

 8
Gender and culture
In this chapter you will learn:
• about the battle for gender equality and representation
• to consider whether there should be positive gender
discrimination
• about the issues raised by multiculturalism
• about the role of religion in society.

We have already seen that the broadly liberal agenda in political

philosophy focuses on freedom, equality and the autonomy of
individuals. But at the same time, there has been criticism of the
central place given to the individual in this agenda. Conservatives
like Burke (see page 82) or Oakeshott (1901–90) argue that
more attention should be paid to the social traditions and
views that, passing from generation to generation, build up an
accumulation of wisdom. Communitarians point out that people
do not act as isolated individuals, but what they do is related
closely to their place within society. Oakeshott himself argues that
people are not abstract rational selves (in the way Kant conceived
them to be, in his ideal ‘kingdom of ends’ where everyone is an
autonomous individual), but are real and embedded in particular
circumstances. Hence, politics cannot simply be a matter of
applying abstract rules, but rather ‘attending to the arrangements
of a society’.

In terms of ethics, F.H. Bradley (1846–1924) argues that, in

deciding what was right, one should take into account the various

184
responsibilities one has within family and society – in other words,
that one’s place in society brings with it certain duties, and moral
dilemmas occur when different social duties conflict with one
another.

That division of emphasis between the individual and society runs

deep within philosophy:

 On the one side you have the rationalist and idealist tradition
of philosophers such as Descartes or Kant, along with
utilitarians such as Bentham and Mill, and in more recent
times, existentialists like Sartre, who all look at the individual
with his or her choices and dilemmas, and then explore their
social implications.
 On the other you have Hegel and Marx on the socialist side,
along with conservatives like Burke, who start with society
with its traditions and its ongoing process of change. This
tradition sees people as being who they are because of the
place they have in society; it makes no sense to abstract them
from their community.

And that divide lay behind the discussions in the 1970s initiated
by Rawls’s idea of the ‘original position’, where he considered
what people would choose to do if they were behind a thick veil
of ignorance about their place in society. His critics pointed out
the impossibility of such ignorance – we know who we are, because
we know the place we have within our family, society, nation and
so on.

So how does this impact on gender and culture?

From the liberal side, a good starting point might be the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Article 2 states:

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.

8. Gender and culture 185

 On the other hand, surely your experience of life, your social
needs, opportunities and aspirations will differ greatly from other
people’s, depending on all these factors; your gender, race, social
origin and religion may do more than anything else to define who
you are. Is it realistic that politics and law should take none of
them into account?

We shall therefore look at issues of gender, and then at the

particular problems posed by multiculturalism.

The essence of womankind

For the most part, until the twentieth century, philosophy

was dominated by men, and represented a particularly male
view of the world. Feminists have sought to counter this by
arguing that:

 women should be treated on an equal basis with men

 the distinctive role of women in society should be recognized
and appreciated.

The first of these is aligned with the liberal tradition, the second
with a more communitarian approach.

But first we need to ask whether womankind has a distinctive

essence, different from that of the males of the species. If that
is the case, then it might provide an objective starting point
from which to argue for a particular relationship between the
sexes.

Plato considered that women were capable of becoming Guardians,

and therefore that they were capable of becoming educated in the
same way as men (The Republic, Book 5). He thought that natural
abilities were equally distributed between men and women, but
that women remained the weaker sex and should therefore be given
duties lighter than those for men.

186
However, equal opportunities for men and women came at a price,
for he wanted selective breeding – pretending that the right to have
children was allocated by lot, but actually selecting only the most
athletic men and women – and he removed his potential Guardians
from family life, intending that those who did not know their own
parents would treat all those of an appropriate age with equal
parental respect. Men and women are seen as equal, but only by
isolating them from the normal influences and role models that
might produce gender differences.

Aristotle, however, held that women were unable to reason well

(or effectively), and that they were therefore better suited to be
ruled. He did not see this as in any way against the interests
of women, but argued that since they could not rule themselves
they should welcome the help given them by men. He saw
women as too much ruled by their emotions, and therefore
needing the rational guidance of men, who were better suited
to command.

Notice that Aristotle argues on the basis of his view of the

natural essence of women, to justify a system in which men took
responsibility for political decision-making. He was not the
only one.

Kant claimed that ‘the philosophy of women is not to reason but

to feel’ and that, in a marriage, the couple would be guided by the
knowledge of the man and the taste of the woman. In other words,
while accepting that the sexes could work well together, he sees
their essences as quite different.

Rousseau made a virtue out of Kant’s necessity, and considered

that women should not be taught to reason. He argued that women
were already well able to use their emotions to manipulate men,
and feared that, if they were also taught to reason, they would have
undue power over them.

In one of his clearest statements, in his book Emile, he declared

that the role of a woman was to make herself attractive and

8. Gender and culture 187

 to be subject to man, with her strength chiefly in her charms, by
which she is able to arouse men to action. Although endowed
with boundless passions, a woman is given modesty to restrain
them. She shows her power through the profession of weakness.
Men find that their pleasures depend on the goodwill of the
female sex, and are therefore taught to offer them their attentions,
in the hope of reward. In the end, the man is enslaved by the
woman.

Rousseau’s comments are frequently of a covert sexual nature

and should not always qualify as rational philosophy – as when
he claims that, in their moral relations, a man needs power and
will, while the woman’s need is merely to offer little resistance!
But his general argument is clear: he wants women to be educated
to accept, willingly and cheerfully, a position subordinate to that
of men.

Nietzsche, in comparing what he saw as the ‘slave morality’ and

‘master morality’ (see page 96), feared that women would be more
prone to accept the slave moralities of the weak, and Sartre, in
Being and Nothingness, saw women as more open to anxiety and
despair and therefore more likely to fall into what he termed ‘bad
faith’.

Are women essentially different from men? That is the question

that lies behind all these views. If they are different, is that
difference such as to alter their place in society or their political
rights or duties? And given the way in which – from both
social contract and utilitarian standpoints – people agree together
on the basis of their needs and wishes, the key question becomes:
Are men and women equally capable of directing themselves,
thinking effectively and developing their own life-plans and
values?

If that is the case, then the logic of the social contract, and all the
arguments in favour of equality and justice, should require the
elimination of any sexual discrimination.

188
However, that is only one aspect of the gender issue. It might
be the case that women and men are equal when it comes to
participation in the political processes that men have established.
But do those political processes recognize the distinctive nature of
women’s contribution and insight? In other words, it is one thing
to establish parity with men, another to make sure that the political
agenda is balanced between the concerns and values of men and of
women.

Insight
These male, philosophical views of the place of women
illustrate the way in which the criteria by which those
thinkers judged women’s place in society were themselves
influenced by the male perspective. It is difficult to show that
Kant, Rousseau, Nietzsche or Sartre were objective in their
assessment.

Women and freedom

Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–97), whose A Vindication of the
Rights of Women, 1792, was published the same year as Thomas
Paine’s Rights of Man, argues that men and women were equal
on the basis of intellect, and is angry that men had assumed that
they should be controlled by propriety, and restricted by prejudices.
She is concerned particularly with education, believing that to be
a major factor in preventing women from fulfilling themselves in
society and working alongside men as equals. She boldly attacks
and undermines the view of women presented by Rousseau:

Women are … made slaves to their persons, and must render

them alluring that man may lend them his reason to guide their
tottering steps aright. Or should they be ambitious, they must
govern their tyrants by sinister tricks, for without rights there
cannot be any incumbent duties.
(From A Vindication of the Rights of Women)

8. Gender and culture 189

 In other words she acknowledges and mocks what Rousseau
saw as natural. She argues that a woman’s first duty is to
herself as a rational creature and as a mother. She makes the
point that women are held back even from developing their own
personal qualities, asking ‘how can a being be generous who has
nothing of its own? or virtuous, who is not free?’ Wollstonecraft
herself found intellectual stimulus by being a member of a
group of thinkers which included Thomas Paine and, later,
William Wordsworth. Her book should be seen against the
background of radical political debate triggered by the revolution
in France – ensuring that the rights of women, and their particular
needs, were not neglected in the broader campaign for political
rights.

Probably the best-known work to argue for women’s equality,

before the twentieth century, was John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection
of Women, 1869. Mill was of the opinion:

…that the principle which regulates the existing social relations

between the two sexes – the legal subordination of one sex to
the other – is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances
to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a
principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege to
the one side, nor disability to the other.

His campaign had an ideal precedent – the recent abolition of

slavery in the USA. He says that, before its abolition, many people
had argued that black people could not govern themselves, and
therefore that slavery was entirely natural for them. The same
argument had been used against women, and he now set out to
refute it, and to argue that men and women should be treated
equally.

Insight
Notice that we have here a movement away from the
Aristotelian view of different essences towards the liberal,
Enlightenment view of people as equal, rational and
autonomous.

190
He did not argue that women should be given any special
treatment, simply that prejudices should be removed, and the
law of supply and demand should determine their work and
contribution.

What women by nature cannot do, it is quite superfluous to

forbid them from doing. What they can do, but not so well as the
men who are their competitors, competition suffices to exclude
them from; since nobody asks for protective duties and bounties
in favour of women; it is only asked that the present bounties
and protective duties in favour of men should be recalled. If
women have a greater natural inclination for some things than
for others, there is no need of laws or social inculcation to make
the majority of them do the former in preference to the latter.
Whatever women’s services are most wanted for, the free play of
competition will hold out the strongest inducements to them to
undertake.

Here we have the voice of a utilitarian and free-market economist.

Indeed, he argues that until women have been given a chance
to explore the range of their natural abilities, society will not
know the benefits they have to offer. To the accusation that
women have more nervous energy and emotion than men, he
points out that if their energy were more channelled in business,
for example, it would be less likely to show itself in changes
of mood.

He claims that there is a great waste of mental talent by not

allowing women the freedom to do all that men are able to do –
not totally wasted, since domestic arrangements etc. are of value,
but limited in a way that then sets them apart from men. Hence,
if men and women were allowed equal access to work, the pool of
talent available in any sphere would increase.

In the end, it comes down to prejudice. Mill argues that:

… the generality of the male sex cannot yet tolerate the idea
of living with an equal. Were it not for that, I think that almost

8. Gender and culture 191

 every one, in the existing state of opinion in politics and political
economy, would admit that injustice of excluding half the human
race from the greater number of lucrative occupations, and
from almost all high social functions; ordaining from their birth
either that they are not, and cannot by any possibility become,
fit for employments which are legally open to the stupidest and
basest of the other sex, or else that however fit they may be,
those employments shall be interdicted to them, in order to be
preserved for the inclusive benefit of males.

NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE FREEDOM FOR WOMEN

In Chapter 6 we noted the distinction between positive and

negative freedom. Notice that with Mill you have a natural
progression from the one to the other. It is not simply a matter
of removing restrictions that society places on women, for example,
the gaining of the vote or passing of legislation that requires
equal treatment in the workplace, but of looking at the positive
freedom that women now expect to shape their lives as they wish.
In other words, it is not enough to claim that women are free to
do things on an equal par with men, unless society offers such
possibilities equally. It is one thing to be free to do something,
another to be able to do it. Freedom from prejudice allows freedom
to develop.

Moving forward to the mid-twentieth century, another major

work about the place of women in society is The Second Sex,
1949, by Simone de Beauvoir (1908–96). Her book explores the
various myths about women and the roles they are expected to
perform for the benefit of men – that of wife, lover, mother.
In particular, she argues that women are not born to the roles
that they end up adopting, but they accept them because that is
what society expects.

She sums this up in her famous line ‘One is not born, but
rather becomes a woman’. Clearly, there is nothing natural
about the position of women in society; it is (rather literally)
man-made.

192
And here we touch on a feature that will come up again when we
look at multiculturalism and postmodernism – that the political
agenda is not based on some absolute or ‘natural law’ approach,
but is simply the product of a choice to follow one or more social
constructs. Society is as it is because that is what we choose it to
be; it could be quite different. There is nothing inevitable about
the place of women; they are not born to particular roles. There
is nothing in the essence of womankind that holds her back from
exploring her positive freedom.

Insight
There is a danger in arguing that women should be equally
able to do what men do – namely that male criteria of success
will be adopted in assessing women’s contributions. It could
equally be argued that women may be most successful at
being exactly what men are not.

WOMEN AND REPRESENTATION

Today, we take it for granted that a key feature of a successful

democracy is adequate representation. In other words, if the
political process is to reflect the wishes of the people, then the
interests of all should be taken into account, both in terms of
access to those who are elected to represent them, and in the
selection of representatives in the first place.

It is worth pausing, therefore, to remember that women only

received the right to vote in Britain in 1918, and even then it was
restricted to women over the age of 30, who ‘occupied premises of
a yearly value of not less than £5’. It was not until 1928 that the
voting age for women was brought into line with that of men.

The question now is not whether women have the right to vote,
but whether the present system of elections provides sufficient
representation for them within Parliament and government. Is the
fact that there are more men than women in the British House of
Commons simply a feature of social assumptions and opportunities
which favour men?

8. Gender and culture 193

 POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION

In an ideal representative democracy, every group would be fairly

represented in the decision-making process. The result would be
that the general views of society and law would reflect the interests
of all alike.

However, that is not always the case, and there are situations, for
example, in employment law or the selection of candidates for
election, where particular social groups feel that they are unjustly
excluded or face particular obstacles in achieving parity with
others.

In such cases, it may be argued that the balance should be restored

by introducing positive discrimination. In other words, if all
other things are equal, a decision should be made in favour of a
representative of a group that feels it is unfairly treated. This can
apply to women applying for work, for example, or members of a
racial or religious group.

However, there may be problems with positive discrimination:

 The person appointed may not be accepted by his or her

peers as having gained the position on the basis of his or her
merits.
 There may be resentment on behalf of those who believe that
they are better qualified but are now being discriminated
against in favour of those who receive positive discrimination!

In an ideal situation, no discrimination of any sort would

be practised, and therefore no positive discrimination would be
needed. In such a situation, Mill’s market-forces argument
might work – that people would only do what they are best
qualified to do. But even if that were put into practice fairly, it
might still result in women not receiving the same treatment as
men. Issues today include equal pay, or the ‘glass ceiling’ beyond
which women do not seem to go in terms of promotion within a
company.

194
The dilemma is whether market forces or positive discrimination
are the best, long-term answer to remaining grievances. Those
feminists who take a Marxist analysis argue that capitalism is
inherently unfair on women and that men and women can only
be treated equally when other social distinctions are also set aside.
Today, with the dominance of capitalism and liberal democracy
globally, the free-market approach (with minor social adjustments
to promote equality) seems to be the most favoured.

Gender and distinctiveness

Even if women and men are treated by law as equal, it can be

argued that their contribution to society is different from that of
men. Particular qualities (for example, sensitivity, compassion,
nurturing, skill in the bringing up of the young), may be displayed
by both men and women, but are traditionally thought of as
feminine. Clearly, society as a whole benefits from a balance of
‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ qualities, by whichever gender they are
displayed, but how is that best achieved? Should gender differences
be celebrated or minimized?

Carol Gilligan (In a Different Voice, 1982) showed that 11-year-old

boys and girls think quite differently about moral issues. Presented
with the same dilemma, the girl considered mainly the relationships
involved, while the boy treated it rather more like a mathematical
problem, weighing up the options.

And today it remains broadly true that there is sexual stereotyping

in the toys children are given and the style in which they are
dressed. For all that gender equality is accepted in terms of the
law, the right to own property, the political process and the
workplace, gender distinctiveness is proclaimed from every
advertisement.

In the western media and advertising world, sex is still used to sell
products, whether they are designed to appeal to men or women.

8. Gender and culture 195

 This contrasts with the rather coy approach, and blatantly sexist
rules of 50 years ago.

Oxford hoax girl named

The name of the girl undergraduate of St Hilda’s College,
Oxford, who disguised herself as a man and dined in hall
at Lincoln College on Saturday, was revealed to the college
authorities yesterday.

Thus began an article in The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post,

2 December 1953. Both she and the male student who had invited
her as a guest into the hall were ‘rusticated’ – sent home for the
remainder of the term. The article described how she returned to
her home near Aylesbury ‘wearing a corsage of carnations given
to her by an undergraduate before she left’.

Her mother commented ‘I don’t wonder Felicity was taken for a

boy. I saw her on the river last term. She was wearing slacks, and
from a distance I could not tell the difference’.

 Notice the assumptions of 50 years ago. There was no hint that

it was wrong of the college to allow only male guests. Nor is
the idea of dressing as a boy in order to go against that rule
seen as anything other than a foolish prank. But the reporter
could not help but insert the comment about the corsage – a
nice feminine touch.
 Whatever rules and restrictions may have applied in the past,
they need to be seen against the background of the general
views and assumptions of the day.

196
One reason why feminism has a rather different angle on politics,
is that it recognizes the importance of family life and interpersonal
relationships. Earlier political philosophy tended to focus on the
ordering of society and public life, rather than on the more intimate
arrangements of marriage and family. However, issues such as
the right of a man, on marriage, to take over his wife’s property,
brought the public and the private together in a way that reduced
the freedom of women. Today, it is more difficult to pretend that
domestic life is not closely bound up with the social and political –
tax, benefits, education, health provision, are all political issues
that impact directly on domestic life.

Example

The provision of social welfare, support for single parents and so

on, is made on the basis of an evaluation about the relative value of
family life and employment. For example, a government may try to
encourage mothers to return to the workplace, rather than remain
at home with their children. This, whether right or wrong, suggests
that becoming part of the conventional workforce is more important
that childrearing, and that it will therefore be more rewarding
economically to return to work. If the values were different, it might
be argued that women should be paid to remain home with children,
rather than find work outside the home.

At the same time, there are the issues of whether men and women
are being treated equally when it comes to home and family
responsibilities, and whether men and women are treated equally in
employment, if they are of an age when they might be expected to
have a family.

Insight
It is widely recognized today that one cannot separate the
political from the domestic – the one automatically impacts
on the other.

8. Gender and culture 197

 The enlightenment view, reflected in liberal politics and
utilitarianism, sees people as individual, autonomous human
beings, of equal status and requiring equal freedoms and rights.
Clearly, at the time when these principles were first established,
women were not given equal rights, and have therefore had to fight
for their equality.

But that is only half the story. In the great sweep of political
philosophy, there have been two very different strands of thinking.
One of these, typified by Kant, tries to establish rational and
universal principles that can then be applied to everyday situations.
The other, typified by Hegel, sees people as always embedded in an
historical process – in real, physical communities, and thus open to
all the influences of their particular time and place.

The enlightenment project represents the first of these – but it tends

to abstract individuals from their particular setting, considering
what rights and freedoms I should have in general, rather than
what rights and freedoms I need in the particular circumstances
in which I live. Communitarians counter this by arguing that we
are embedded individuals. We are shaped by our families, our
communities, our religious or social traditions, our economic
circumstances, and by the place where we live.

This applies equally to men and women. Women, for example,

have a special role in producing and nurturing children; they have
a natural ability to form supportive friendships and they may be
members of a religion that has a long tradition of seeing women in
particular roles and not in others.

There are, for example, communities in Holland where men and

women choose to dress in traditional dress, reflecting their Calvinist
religious background. Muslim women may prefer to wear the
traditional dress of that tradition. To the enlightenment mind, both
appear to be restrictive and indicative of an attitude of repression.
The French education system does not permit Muslim girls to
wear even a headscarf in school, since they want to emphasize the
enlightenment ideal of equality rather than cultural distinctiveness.

198
It may therefore be argued that women need to be cautious
in accepting equality too readily on the basis of the male
enlightenment stereotype – of which the power-dressed female
executive is perhaps the icon – simply because that may do
less than justice to the distinctive social experience of women.
Those who are not convinced of the value of this liberal
individualism and autonomy may see such women as repeating
the mistakes of men.

So the feminist perspective has contributed both a critique of

the male-dominated nature of politics (with the demand for
equality and for proper representation) and also a demand for a
proper recognition of the nature and contribution of women
in society, and a consequent shifting of the political agenda to
reflect it.

Insight
The key question here, and one deserving some careful
reflection, is this: What would political life and society be
like if it genuinely reflected the more distinctively feminine
qualities?

Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is the view that people should respect and
celebrate different cultures. It does not require the removal of
cultural differences, but encourages mutual understanding. It tends
to go hand in hand with the general view that there is, in any
case, no single ‘correct’ answer to any political, philosophical or
religious question.

The alternatives to a multicultural society are:

 A society where only one culture is accepted and allowed.

Foreigners are tolerated, but are required to conform to the
social and cultural norms when in public.

8. Gender and culture 199

  A society where there is either hidden or open conflict between
different racial and cultural groups, or where these groups
separate themselves off into ghettos.

Iranian police give barbers the chop

to enforce Islamic dress code
Under this heading, an article in The Guardian (25 August 2007)
described the way in which some barbers were closed down after
being accused of being ‘purveyors of decadent “Western” culture.’
Some women’s salons had been closed for offering tattoos and
some men’s barbers closed for providing eye-catching haircuts.
This was done as part of a campaign to enforce Iran’s Islamic dress
code, especially amongst the young. Young men were ordered to
have another haircut and then report to a police station to see if
the new style was acceptable.

Things like this can happen because Iran follows a single cultural
norm; it is an Islamic state. From a Western perspective, where
multiculturalism is the norm and religious rules are not legally
enforced, such actions seem an infringement of the rights of
individuals. But from the perspective of Islamic law, a government
has a duty to maintain order and respect – and that applies to
things that, in the West, would never be considered open to
political determination.

 Should the laws of a nation be determined by religious views?

Insight
Even if there is a separation of religion and state – as is the
case in the USA – religious views can still be important in
shaping the political agenda, as we see with issues such as
abortion and embryo research.

200
Multiculturalism tends to create problems for some of the basic
arguments and approaches in political philosophy:

 A utilitarian approach tends to favour majorities rather than

minorities. Should a racial or cultural group be required to
conform to a norm set by the majority, if that is deemed to be
in the best interest of the greatest number?
 Rights are assumed to apply to all citizens alike. How do you
adjudicate between a right that is given to all citizens and the
pressure to conform to the values of a minority group? For
example, drinking alcohol or having an abortion (if certain
criteria are met) might be legally and socially acceptable
within a secular society. But some religious groups would
consider both to be immoral. How do you enforce those
rights, without at the same time acting against the values
of that cultural or religious minority?

Honour killings
The most stark example of this clash between a secular ‘right’
and a religious and cultural minority is the so-called ‘honour
killings’ of girls who are thought to have brought shame on their
families by dating men who do not belong to their religion or
culture.

Clearly, by law, such killing is murder, and is punished as such.

Within the family or cultural group, however, it may be seen as an
obligation to preserve the honour of the family.

In the earlier social contract approach to legitimizing government,

it was assumed that all citizens would be roughly alike in terms of
their perceptions of what life was for, and that they could therefore
agree on common rights and values to be promoted by their chosen
form of government.

8. Gender and culture 201

 The challenge to Rawls’s idea of fairness is that people cannot
decide how society is to share out its goods from behind their veil of
ignorance, because in the real world people always know their place in
society. We have now seen that this applies also to gender and cultural
differences. Individuals do not exist as abstract citizens, their political
views and needs reflect their family, locality and cultural roots.

Within a multicultural society, one way of dealing with differences

is by a utilitarian weighing of preferences. But this will always
penalize those who are in a minority. The logical alternative is to
ensure that individual rights are respected, whether they are of
those in the majority or a minority. But in that case, how do you
cope with any conflict that arises between those rights and the
established traditions of the minority group?

Multiculturalism tends to imply relativism of values, and this

moves politics in the direction of postmodernism.

POSTMODERN POLITICS

Postmodernism is a difficult thing to define. In general it is the

view that there is no one essential truth or perception, but that
everything we think or say is the product of a whole range of
images and concepts that we find around us. Postmodern politics
suggests that political ideas are not based on any essential quality
of humankind or society, but are the product of individual
perceptions and images, always relative to a particular situation.
A postmodern politician is likely to be more concerned with
creating and selling an image to people, rather than working
rationally from first principles to decide what is right.

Postmodernism is relativist – everyone uses and combines ideas

in their own way, and it is impossible to say that one is right and
another wrong, or that one theory is inherently better than another.
It is therefore sceptical about any claims to universal truth.

Postmodernism also tends to be anti-rationalist, breaking down

the difference between reality and fiction, so that postmodern

202
politicians may use the media and create images and give a
particular ‘spin’ to every piece of news. Postmodern politics is
therefore dominated by a global media culture in which opinions
are formed and changed.

Postmodernism negates all ‘metanarratives’; in other words, it

claims that there is no single ‘story’ that can be told to make sense
of the world, no single theory that can explain it (of the sort that
Hegel or Marx expounded); there are only optional images to play
with and manipulate.

To follow up on this
Philosophers who take this approach include Jacques Derrida,
Jean-Francois Lyotard and Michel Foucault. For those who want
to explore this branch of philosophy in more detail, there is
Understand Postmodernism in this series.

The fundamental issue here is between essentialist ideologies

(i.e. those political theories that claim to be based on a rational
assessment of human society and its needs) and postmodern
relativism. In a postmodern world, images and lifestyles are
traded, but without any relationship to fundamental structures. A
government is there to present images for the people to buy, others
bid with better images. What is lacking is the sense of any absolute
good or an ideal on which the political process could be built.

Apart from anything else, one effect of postmodernism is to

allow politics to dissolve into economics. In the absence of
strong ideologies or absolute principles, the perceived value of a
government may be based almost entirely on whether it delivers
economic benefits for its citizens. There is no single direction for
society or source of wisdom; rather, a wide variety of political
ideas and value systems are commodified and placed on the open
market – not one of which can claim any exclusive justification.

8. Gender and culture 203

 Insight
I believe the postmodern tendency is very damaging to
political debate. To justify political action on the basis
of reason, we need to relate our beliefs to fundamental
convictions about the world. But we can’t do that if we see
ourselves as merely picking from a range of equally valid
ways of looking at the world and society.

RELATIVISM AND RELIGION

Back in 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union, André Gorz wrote:

Can a society perpetuate itself without direction or orientation,

without any aim or hope? Can it perpetuate itself when the
economic performance and efficiency which are its permanent
obsession have as their supreme goal an excess of comfort? Will
not a growing number of men and women be tempted, then,
to seek refuge from this absence of hope and orientation in
abstractly religious – if not, indeed, fundamentalist – systems of
thought?
Capitalism, Socialism, Ecology (translated by Chris Turner, Verso, 1994), p. 1.

This issue, then only becoming visible on the global horizon, is

exactly the one that faces us today. However loudly the liberal–
democratic tradition and capitalism proclaims their success in
delivering the goods and freedoms that people desire, there is still
a void that consumerism itself does not seem to satisfy.

That void may be expressed religiously or philosophically, but

also in terms of belonging – the desire for a society within which
the individual is respected and feels that he or she is able to
contribute to some overall goal, and to matter. This is seen in the
rise of the fundamentalist and politically radical form of Islam.
The basic tenets of Islam – of submission to the fundamental and
essential reality called Allah, and the recognition of Muhammad
as his prophet – sets up values that are in stark contrast to those

204
of postmodern economics and politics. If that religious absolute is
subverted into political radicalism, it provides a motivation for a
crusade against what are seen as the intrusive values of capitalism
and the individualist ideology embedded in liberal democracy.

The gesture of suicide to demonstrate a cause is one that

acknowledges a value that, for the individual, is beyond that of life
itself – sweeping away all the ‘goods’ offered by liberal democracy.

This sense that there are some absolute truths worth dying for – which
is there in most world religions in one form or another – presents an
unstoppable opposition to liberal politics, because it rejects the promise
of individual benefits that is the latter’s raison d’être.

Oil and control

In debating the underlying reasons for the 2003 Iraq war, some
have suggested that the motivation was the control of oil supplies.
Others have pointed to the desire of the USA to steer the Middle
East towards democracy, and encourage that part of the world into
a free-market capitalist economy. As we shall see later (page 267)
this was part of the overall neo-conservative agenda in the USA.

The implication is that the struggle for influence in the Middle

East is fundamentally on behalf of the liberal–democratic agenda.
Far from being the political option of choice for all who are free
to choose, it is now opposed by various groups who express
fundamentalist religious and political views. Faced with the offer of
western relativism, there is a backlash in favour of fundamentalism.

And this, of course, only reflects a similar rise of Christian

fundamentalism and moral absolutism in the USA itself (seen
particularly in connection with abortion and gay rights) in the
face of the perceived threat to traditional values posed by liberal
individualism.

8. Gender and culture 205

 Religion is about a rejection of superficial images and lifestyle
options, in favour of a quest for what is enduring and essential in
life – exactly those things that a postmodern culture rejects.

The danger is that the absolutism of religion can too easily become
wedded to the absolutism of a political ideology. Where that
happens, liberalism, relativism, individualism and democracy itself
may be seen as enemies to be opposed.

Headscarves and bikinis in Turkey

An article for The Observer (6 May 2007) by Peter Beaumont
highlighted the clash of symbols that confronts modern Turkey,
illustrated by a photograph of women wearing headscarves
in front of a huge poster advertising a bikini. There had been
demonstrations in Ankara against the perceived threat to the
secular state from those who would promote a stricter Islamic
lifestyle.

His analysis suggested that an underlying problem is that a

wealthy, educated, secular and westernized elite, which has held
power, is now feeling threatened by the growing influence of the
middle class and urban poor, who are generally more conservative
and religiously observant.

Turkey was established as a republic in 1932, and its constitution

prevents religious laws from dominating society and separates
religion from the state, even though 99 per cent of the population
is Muslim.

This may partly account for the resentment of the USA in some
quarters, for it has come to represent a state where any form of
traditional order has given way to mobility and market forces,
where individuals have to make their own way, and in which
all previous cultural and ethnic roots are melting into a single,

206
materialist society that is devoid of higher values. Now this, of
course, is not a serious assessment of the USA, but it is an image
that has been festering away in the minds of many of those who
fear its economic dominance and military power to coerce. It was
true for Gorz, writing in 1991, and it remains true today.

RELIGION IN A FREE SOCIETY

Put in an historical perspective, freedom to practise religion is a

recent phenomenon. Following the Reformation in Europe, nations
divided between Protestant and Catholic, frequently persecuting
those who did not conform. Before that, the clash between the
expanding Islamic empire and old Christendom led to bloodshed.
And before that, Christians were intermittently persecuted within
the Roman Empire. Forced conversions and intolerance are not the
preserve of any one religion.

So a first question might be: Should religion be excluded from the

political arena?

In the USA, there is freedom of worship but religion is officially

excluded from the state political and educational apparatus.
However, that does not prevent issues from arising where state
provision seems to cut across religious views. Should creationism be
taught alongside natural selection in schools? From a secular point of
view, it is clear that the responsibility of the state is to teach whatever
is regarded as the established science. However, for those who accept
a literal interpretation of the Bible, that secular perspective is taken to
be one-sided, and they seek a balance. If fairness is established, either
on a utilitarian basis or one of preserving basic human rights, it could
be argued that a government should provide what a majority, or even
a significant minority want, provided it does not offend others.

Britain has an established religion, while accepting freedom of

worship. The issue in this situation is whether other religions
should be treated on an equal basis with the established church.
Should denominational schools be funded by the state? Should
they be required to teach all religions in an objective way? Should

8. Gender and culture 207

 funding for denominational schools be allocated in a way that is
proportionate to the membership of each religion?

In any case, if religious observance is measured by those who

attend a place of worship on a regular basis, the majority of the
British are not religious – which would suggest that state funding
of religious schools is inappropriate, were it not for the fact that
many non-religious parents opt for their children to go to faith-
based schools, on the basis that they may receive education in a
more morally sensitive context.

A recent issue in France was the wearing of the Muslim headscarf

by girls at state schools. The French approach to religion and
culture is that minority groups should comply with the norm of
French society and should not be allowed to stand out from others
on the basis of cultural or religious identity. Then, as we saw
above, in Turkey the issue is whether a secular state is threatened
by the strict adherence to a religion of which the vast majority of
the population are members.

These different situations suggest that there is no simple political

formula for ensuring that religious groups, whether a minority
or majority of the population, will be entirely satisfied with the
secular arrangements of the state. On the other hand, states that
officially base themselves on religion – as for example, those that
practise Islamic Shari’a law – are then challenged on the grounds
that the secular concepts of human rights and freedoms are
curtailed in favour of religious traditions.

Mill on religious toleration

Having argued for freedom of conscience and that nobody should
be accountable to anyone else for his or her religious beliefs, he
notes:

Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really

care about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been

208
 practically realised, except where religious indifference,
which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological
quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the minds
of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant
countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit
reserves.
On Liberty

The problem in any multicultural, multi-faith society is how you

square the democratic right to practise any religion or none, with
the exclusive claims of individual religions. To prevent someone
from making exclusivist claims is to apply exactly the form of rigid,
exclusive rules that the multiculturalist wants to avoid. So, in the
name of being liberal and fair, one might have to accept the right
of others to argue against being liberal and fair!

8. Gender and culture 209

 10 THINGS TO REMEMBER
1 It is difficult to consider people’s rights and freedoms without
taking into account their positions in society.

2 It is important to come to a view about whether or not women

have an essence, and possibly therefore a role, that is distinct
from that of men.

3 Wollstonecraft saw education as an important first step

towards the emancipation of women.

4 Mill considered that, if women were treated on an equal basis

with men, no further legislation would be needed to sort out
gender roles in society.

5 There is a difference between positive freedom (freedom to)

and negative freedom (freedom from).

6 Simple equality (especially if on male terms) may not do justice

to the distinctive contribution of women.

7 It is difficult for democracy to deal fairly with minorities in a

multicultural society.

8 Postmodernism argues that it is not possible to give an overall

rationale and story (metanarrative) to explain society.

9 There is a human void that is not filled by consumerism, and

which may explain the continuing influence of religion and
fundamentalism.

10 There is a debate about the extent (if any) to which religion

should be involved in political life.

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 9
Nations, war and terrorism
In this chapter you will learn:
• to consider the role of the nation state
• about what constitutes a just war
• about the political challenge posed by terrorism.

In discussing freedom or fairness, we have tended to think in terms

of a single political framework – the sovereign state – within which
people can decide how they should be governed. But not everything
happens at this level. War and terrorism go beyond its boundaries,
minority groups may seek autonomy within a state, and the state
itself, as we think of it today, is a fairly recent phenomenon.

States

At the time of writing, there are 193 universally recognised

sovereign states, of which 192 are members of the UN. (The
exception is Vatican City, which is independent 10 other states
claim to be sovereign, but are not universally recognised as such.
States range in size from the huge Russian Federation to the
compact Vatican City, but they have one thing in common – that
they are recognized as autonomous political entities, each with its
own government and legal system, and internationally accepted

9. Nations, war and terrorism 211

 boundaries. Within their boundaries, they are ‘sovereign’ – in other
words, they are self-governing, and may rightly object if other
states try to interfere, or to invade their physical borders.

Insight
From the definition given above, you will see that England,
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are not states. The
state is Great Britain, and the nationality of its citizens is
British. They may be considered ‘nations’, but that’s another
matter, as we shall see below.

But autonomous nation-states, as we know them today, have

emerged only during the last 300 years or so. When you go back to
the time of the ancient Greeks, the political unit under discussion
was the polis, or city-state; then there were kingdoms, empires,
local self-governing republics, and areas where there was no single
political structure at all. Until the eighteenth century, most of the
world outside Europe was controlled by merchant companies,
whose trading areas became colonies of whichever European
power sponsored them. Australia was a wide open space waiting
to be colonized, into which Britain sent convicts. Africa and South
America were carved up by European powers – bringing some form
of political control into areas being explored for commercial gain.
The American colonies were ruled by Britain until 1783.

And even with the emerging of nationalism in the nineteenth

century, there was still great flexibility in the shape of states. Both
Germany and Italy were formed out of federations of smaller
states. In the Middle East, the former Ottoman Empire was
divided up into protectorates and newly formed states (with the
later addition of Israel) whose boundaries were negotiated or
imposed and therefore inherently unstable. Until the latter part
of the twentieth century, even in Europe, there were changes in
the borders and names of states – as happened particularly in the
Balkans, with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The failure
of Soviet communism in the 1980s profoundly affected the
status of the previously satellite soviet states, as they gained
independence.

212
Warfare has always been a feature of competition between
kingdoms and empires within Europe, but the rise of nationalism
only encouraged inter-state rivalry, and competitive pressure for
dominance within Europe contributed to two World Wars.

The League of Nations, set up in 1920 after the trauma of World

War I, attempted to stabilize Europe, but failed because of the
expansionist actions of Germany and Italy – in other words, it
lacked the power to authorize compliance with its desired aims.
The UN was set up in 1945. One of the key issues for political
philosophy is the extent to which it (or any other) international
body can have authority over individual states.

Not our subject!

All this is a matter of political geography, rather than political
philosophy, but some study of the way in which nations have
changed provides a useful corrective to the over-abstract analysis
of some philosophical texts. Thus there is little point in using
the term ‘state’ without some idea of the range of states today
and how they are run. So dipping into political geography gives a
valuable backdrop to philosophical arguments.

NATIONS AND STATES

So far we have used the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ rather loosely.
They now need to be clarified, and for our purposes they may be
simply defined as:

 Nation – a physical area, whose inhabitants have a sense

of shared history, common territory, language and culture.
A nation can become a state, or a state can give rise to a
nation.
 State – a sovereign political authority. It may or may not
correspond to a nation.

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 A state may be created that spans different language and cultural
groups, as with Belgium, or a state may be split, as happened
when the former Czechoslovakia became the Czech and Slovak
Republics. Patriotism, based on national pride and a sense of
history, may be a motive to reform the state. But equally, when
smaller political units come together to form a single state, this
may give rise to a sense of shared identity and nationhood – as for
example with Germany or Italy.

A state has its own form of government and legal system. Once
you walk over a border between your state and another, although
there may be no physical boundary, your status changes. You
are now a foreign national, a visitor, an immigrant, perhaps an
asylum seeker. You may have crossed that border for economic
reasons or political ones, or perhaps simply because you are on
holiday.

The key feature of today’s world is mobility. People cross the

world for many different purposes. One person may escape from
state A to state B because they fear persecution, while another
may travel from state B to state A on holiday! At the same time,
workers move from one country to another, and companies extend
globally.

Nationalism tends to celebrate its roots of language, land and

culture. In doing so, it is tempting for it to regard those who share
those national roots as deserving of a privileged status within the
state, compared with immigrants. This tendency has a long and
sad history, with the persecution of minorities who, for whatever
reason, have found themselves displaced.

The other side of this issue, however, concerns identity. With

mobility, there is a breaking down of old connections with a
particular place and way of life. Some may sense themselves to
be truly cosmopolitan, without any strong link to their national
roots. Others, simply because they are removed from their original
homeland, may emphasize that national identity and endeavour to
preserve their customs and language.

214
Within a multicultural environment, you may therefore have at
least three distinct groups:

 Those whose background links them to the national culture

and language.
 Those who have come from elsewhere, but who regard
themselves as fully integrated into a cosmopolitan culture,
or their adopted national culture.
 Those who have come from elsewhere, but who cherish their
original cultural heritage and preserve its language. The
problem here is that integration with the rest of those who live
in the state may be restricted, and hence they may choose to
live in what become cultural ghettos.

Insight
These issues are highlighted by political parties that
emphasize national identity and are therefore critical of the
increasingly multicultural society brought about through
immigration. In Britain there is the British National Party,
and in The Netherlands the far-right Freedom Party, both of
which made gains in the 2009 European elections.

The problem, in terms of political philosophy, is how you reconcile

the considerable differences that exist between people living within
its borders with the concepts of equality and rights that are implied
by the theory of the state. Can everyone be treated alike, and
should they be? Political theory may suggest that this is the case,
but historical differences may suggest otherwise.

Examples
Within a sovereign state, there may be minorities who feel that
their particular interests are not properly recognized. They may
also seek a measure of autonomy for their own communities. The
Basques within northern Spain, the Kurds within Turkey, Iraq and
Iran, and the Tibetans within China are examples. In all these cases,
national and cultural roots have given way to the imposition of
(Contd)

9. Nations, war and terrorism 215

 the boundaries of sovereign states, to the frustration of those who
want to preserve their distinctiveness. In the case of China’s claim
on Tibet, of course, this situation is made more difficult because
of Tibet’s strong Buddhist religious tradition, conflicting with the
secularism of the Chinese rulers.

In 1995, the Dayton Peace Accord ended the civil war between
Muslims, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia. The country was divided into
two mini-states: the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Each had its own parliament, legal
system and police, but a presidency was established at the top
level, in order to unite the two into a single state. But there remain
rivalries between the ethnic groups, illustrated by divisions within
the education system and the languages used in schools. Whereas
before the war the different groups had lived alongside one another,
now they have generally moved into their respective parts of the
country, but resentments remain and full integration is opposed,
particularly by the Serbs.

 Is it realistic to expect political structures to overcome ethnic,

cultural and religious differences?

At its worst, this problem manifests itself as ethnic cleansing, where

whole groups of people are expelled in order to create a society
where the national heritage appears to match the sovereign state.

THE INVISIBILITY OF THE STATE

Nations are visible. A nation comprises a geographical area, with

its people, language, traditions and so on, in so far as they form an
identifiable entity. Nations have a long history and may have gone
through many political upheavals.

By contrast, states are relatively invisible. A state is a political entity,

comprising – in the case of a democracy – a parliament for deciding
upon national strategies and laws, an executive for carrying out the
business of government, and a judiciary for putting into effect the
laws that a parliament has approved. It also comprises those bodies
that control security – the police, in terms of internal security, and

216
the armed forces for external security. In some states, of course, the
military may take over the functions of parliament and government.

The state is therefore a set of political structures and power

relations, agreed (or imposed) on the people of a nation, in order to
provide the benefits of government and law. States can be changed –
both in terms of their status and their boundaries – because they are
artificial constructions, not chunks of land.

Example
With the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the state of
Czechoslovakia was created in 1918. This was invaded by Germany
during World War II and then occupied by the Red Army. In 1946,
the Communist party came to power, and Czechoslovakia was a
communist state until 1989 when a peaceful protest resulted in
the communist party relinquishing power. In 1993, the country
was divided into two states – the Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic.

The details of all this, although fascinating, need not detain us. The
point here is that a single country or nation can go through political
changes (some peaceful, some due to war) that fundamentally alter
the nature of the state.

Hence the major divide between the conservative and liberal

points of view. A liberal, recognizing the essential artificial nature
of the state, wants to emphasize the right of individuals to shape
their own destiny and to enter into social contracts and so on. A
conservative, conscious of long-established traditions and customs,
wants to emphasize continuity.

What should the state do?

Government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its

worst state, an intolerable one.
Thomas Paine, Common Sense, 1776

9. Nations, war and terrorism 217

 Aristotle’s aspiration was that the state could and should
encourage people to live well. At the other extreme, Paine saw
it as a ‘necessary evil’ – a view taken up by political anarchists.
Part of the task of political philosophy is to try to arrive at a
view of exactly how much government can and should do.
Some see it as crucial in protecting human rights and controlling
the negative aspects of human behaviour. Others see society as
well able to take care of itself, and wish government simply to
provide the minimum political structure within which freedom
can operate.

Whatever the state does, it does with money raised through taxes.
In 2004, the utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer wrote about the
ethics of President George W. Bush (in The President of Good and
Evil: Taking George W. Bush Seriously), and commented on one
of his comments on taxation, that ‘It’s your money!’ which Singer
calls ‘folk libertarianism’. Bush, of course, takes the view that what
a person earns is his or her own money, and taxes should therefore
be kept to a minimum.

The problem with this, as Singer is quick to point out, is that we

only earn money because we are part of a social and economic
structure. Without society, money has no value: What can you
do with banknotes, if nobody recognizes their value? Hence, the
paying of tax may be seen as contributing to the maintenance of
the society that enables you to earn money in the first place.

But the fundamental issue raised here is really about the amount
that the state should do – since the more it gathers in tax the more
it is able to do by way of social provision and so on.

Thomas Hobbes argued that the sovereign had four duties:

 to defend the nation against foreign enemies

 to preserve peace and internal security
 to allow subjects to enrich themselves
 to allow ‘harmless liberty’ (i.e. freedom that does not threaten
security).

218
The assumption here is that people do not want to be involved
politically. What they really care about is their economic welfare,
and once they are secure from threats both external and internal,
what they want is the freedom to increase their wealth. Provided
their actions do not endanger security, they are free to do them.
This is the starting point for what might be described as a
‘minimalist’ view of the work of the state.

Insight
The crucial question is this: Can you trust people to behave
fairly towards one another, given that they are secure and
have their basic needs met? If you can, then minimalist
government is all that is needed; if not, then government will
need to intervene more in order to establish social justice.

GO FOR THE MINIMUM

In ‘On Anarchy’, a section from the second part of his Rights of

Man, Thomas Paine says:

The more perfect civilization is, the less occasion has it for
government, because the more does it regulate its own
affairs, and govern itself; but so contrary is the practice of old
government to the reason of the case, that the expenses of
them increase in the proportion they ought to diminish. It is but
few general laws that civilized life requires, and those of such
common usefulness, that whether they are enforced by the forms
of government or not, the effect will be nearly the same.

This view, although generally modified to recognize a greater

degree of control than the early anarchists would have wished, is
still popular. Some philosophers, including Robert Nozick, opt for
a fairly minimal role for the state – providing external defence and
internal law and order, and beyond that leaving its citizens as free
as possible to see to their own affairs.

This approach, which is broadly liberal, is concerned to allow

individuals maximum control of their own lives. Health and

9. Nations, war and terrorism 219

 education should be the responsibility of individuals, banding
together to organize health insurance and to pay for schools. By
way of concession, a minimum is provided to ensure that the
poorest receive some help, but as an ideal, the poor should be
encouraged to work to improve their situation and no longer have
to rely on state aid.

This is the opposite of the broadly socialist approach, where the

state takes responsibility for the welfare of its citizens, and taxes
everyone to a level sufficient to cover the costs. The argument here
is that provision of planned services is fairer and more effective than
leaving everything to the open market, with the minimum of safety
nets. On the other hand, the problem with such a view is that – as
with the totally planned economy of the communist state – universal
provision too often leads to inefficiency, bureaucracy and lack of
accountability. By and large, enterprises motivated by profit and
directly accountable to and paid for by customers tend to be more
efficient than those that are centrally managed.

THE ECONOMY

The amount that the state does determines its level of taxation,
and therefore also its intimate relationship to the economy. In
a political system where individuals expect the government to
facilitate their wishes in terms of life opportunities and provisions,
governments are judged by whether or not they deliver the goods.
This leads to questions about whether a government should
become involved with economic and banking decisions, or whether
they should be left entirely to market forces, whatever the potential
social outcome.

Bank alarm for Labour

In the light of the intervention of the Bank of England to support
the troubled Northern Rock building society, adversely affected
by the crisis in global inter-bank lending, The Sunday Times
commented on 16 Sept 2007:

220
 The criticism of Mr Brown will be that he presided over the
excesses that are now unwinding in the money markets
and the economy. New Labour was so keen to establish its
pro-enterprise credentials that even obvious excesses and
injustices went uncriticized … He and his ministers have also
failed to distinguish between encouraging free markets, which
is good, and irresponsible market behaviour, which is not. Old
Labour used to prop up coalmines, steel mills and shipyards.
Under New Labour, a mortgage bank that offered 125 per
cent loans and increased its lending by 55 per cent this year is
propped up by a taxpayers’ loan. Truly a story for our times.

In the year of so following that comment, the full extent of the

problem was revealed, with a global banking crisis and economic
downturn.

 How is a balance to be struck between free-market economics

and a utilitarian concern that the welfare of the whole of
society should not be threatened by it?

Insight
The key question here is the degree to which it is right
for governments to intervene in the economic decisions
of banks and companies, or to take a controlling stake in
them.

INTERNAL SECURITY

Few would disagree with Hobbes that the state has a duty to
defend itself from both external threats and internal disorder.
However, a crucial question here is the degree of control and
surveillance that is required to maintain that security, and whether
there is a point at which the rights and freedoms of individuals are
put at risk. To what extent, for example, are people prepared to
have their activities monitored?

9. Nations, war and terrorism 221

 Surveillance facts about Britain
There are 4.2 million CCTV cameras (one for every 16 people),
making Britain the most-watched nation.

About 3.6 million DNA samples are held, including those of

140,000 innocent people.

In the 15 months to March 2006, there were 439,000 requests for

communications traffic data (i.e. requests for legal bugging) of
which 2,243 were approved.

(Source: The Independent, 21 August 2007)

GUARDIAN OF LIFESTYLE AND MORALS

How far should governments be involved in determining the

lifestyle and environmental concerns of their citizens?

Guzzling less gas…

In Britain, the cost of a road fund licence for a vehicle is based
on the degree to which that vehicle pollutes the atmosphere.
Setting a differential here was a political and economic decision
to encourage (but not compel) people to move away from ‘gas
guzzling’ four-wheel drive and sports utility vehicles to more
environmentally friendly motoring options.

In this situation, freedom remains (you can still pay up and do

what you want) but the government attempts, through its financial
management of the economy, to influence personal decisions. The
same applies, of course, to taxes on tobacco products and so on.

222
Should governments take this line, and on what basis? Clearly, if it
is in the interest of the majority that there is less pollution, then such
a move can be justified on utilitarian grounds (the greatest benefit
for the greatest number) – with individuals given incentives to do
that which is to the general benefit. This suggests that governments
have a moral role to play – just as parents or guardians might
encourage children into good habits by the use of incentives.

Similarly, governments can provide safety nets for those who

are foolish and get themselves into economic difficulties, or who
deliberately act in ways that cause them physical harm. Drug addicts
are given medical treatment, even though their abuse of substances
was their own choice. Equally, financial help is available for those
who either cannot work or are out of work for a period of time.
Unemployment pay and social security payments are a safety net.

But is it right for government to act in this way? If its sole task is
to organize the economy and defence of the state, both internal and
external, then there is a case to be made for absolutely minimal
involvement in the personal lives of its citizens. A minimalist state
would leave individuals either to their fate, or to enjoy their profits.
This might be the conclusion of the approach taken by Nietzsche –
who did not want the healthy to be restrained on behalf of the sick,
and therefore criticized both Christianity and democracy.

But such an approach cannot be morally or socially neutral. Those

who think they are likely to do well if left to their own devices
tend to opt for less regulation; those who struggle to maintain
themselves tend to opt for more intervention and help. As we saw
above (page 116), this problem was addressed by Rawls’s, thought
experiment, where people had no idea of their position in society,
and therefore whether they were likely to be in need of help.

In the end, there is a fundamental decision to be made about the

nature and function of government: Do you want a minimalist
government, and to be free and responsible for sorting out your
own life (provided that basic security is provided), or do you
prefer to live in a society where everyone contributes towards the

9. Nations, war and terrorism 223

 universal provision of services, and you have the confidence of
knowing that, whatever happens, you will be provided for?

MEDIA CENSORSHIP

By what standards do and should the media operate? Can they

ever be totally objective in their reporting? Most papers tend to
favour one or other of the main political groups – should that be
permitted?

Google China
Ever since the establishment of Google in China in 2006, there has
been controversy about the degree of censorship imposed on the
search engine by the Chinese Government. It is generally assumed
that whatever is available on the internet is freely searchable, but
there are many subjects that the Chinese government consider
too sensitive to allow its citizens completely free access. Hence,
Google China emerged as, to some extent, self-censoring.
However, any government that is concerned to censor, is also
concerned with its image. In the run-up to the Olympic Games in
2008, with the influx of foreign journalists and other visitors, there
was the expectation that the restrictions on internet access would
be lifted, and that proved to be the case – so political pressure
can influence the degree of censorship. However, Google always
claimed that its purpose is to make information available. Should
it then be involved in any form of self-censorship? Although
it has argued, quite reasonably, that any information is better
than none, and that if accepting a measure of censorship is the
only way to become established in a country, then it should do
so, it continues to object to censorship and its future in China
is uncertain. Censorship is simply a tool of control; to have
information is to have power, and many governments would
prefer to determine what is ‘good’ for its people, than allow them
the freedom and power to know whatever they wish.

224
What is more, control of the media is in the hands of a small group
of people. They are therefore able to exercise a disproportionate
influence over the rest of the people. Is that right, or should a
government – chosen, in a democracy, by a majority of the voting
public – have authority to make sure that the minority of media
controllers are not permitted to exercise an authority above that of
the government.

But, of course, without the media, many people do not know

what is happening and are therefore unable to make any serious
political evaluation – hence a free media would seem a necessary
requirement of any democratic society.

TRUSTING POLITICIANS

The issues raised in this section concern the extent to which

people should authorize their government to act on their behalf.
But embedded within this is another issue – trust. Can you trust
politicians to run a state?

Clearly, dictators are generally regarded as a bad thing on the

grounds that they act in their own interest, rather than that of the
nation as a whole. That is frequently, but not necessarily the case.
Although power may tend to corrupt, that remains an observation
rather than a logical argument.

But what of elected representatives? Is the operation of government

something that should follow the normal moral principles that
would guide the relationship between individuals, or is it necessary
for a politician to follow an alternative set of values?

Moral politician or political

moralist …
Kant argued (in his essay ‘Perpetual Peace’) that morality,
following pure practical reason, guides action. It is practical.
(Contd)

9. Nations, war and terrorism 225

 It leads us to frame a set of laws by which a nation of reasonable,
autonomous individuals should be governed (the third of his
categorical imperatives). Hence morality is bound up with
politics, which determines how the laws that govern a country
are framed.

He argues that force is not enough to ensure that all will work
together for this common and rational good. Hence we need
a moral politician, ‘someone who conceives of the principles of
political expediency in such a way that they can co-exist with his
morality’. This contrasts with the political moralist who is: ‘one
who fashions his morality to suit his own advantage as a statesman’.

And here is a fundamental problem when listening to political

arguments that appeal to one’s sense of morality. Are the
arguments framed in a moral way in order to give strength to
an argument that is in fact put forward in order to gain some
political advantage? Or are they genuinely moral, and do they
therefore determine the goals of the politician who presents
them?

 In other words, do you trust politicians when they present

moral arguments?

Machiavelli would argue that the security and defence of the

state take priority and may require decisive action, irrespective
of the moral sensibilities of the ruler. Kant clearly assumes
that his universal moral principles are capable of guiding the
politician.

These are the key questions:

 Do you start with agreed principles of fairness, freedom and

rights, and then seek politicians who will consider those

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 principles fundamental and shape the governance of the state
accordingly?
 Or do you start with the need to maintain a strong and
autonomous state, and (if necessary) modify moral principles
to fit that situation?
 Plato argued that, for the sake of the stability of the state,
people should be told a ‘noble lie’ about their origins and
fixed place in society. Is a government always justified in
manipulating the media, if it deems it to be in the nation’s
best interest?

Sovereignty, identity and representation

Should every nation automatically have the right of self-

determination? In other words, should you apply to nations
the principles that Mill applied to individuals – that they should
be free to do whatever they like so long as no harm is done to
others?

Discussions about international relations assume that nations are

sovereign – that they should be free from external interference in
the way they are governed. This is particularly true of the security
of borders.

Turkey and the PKK

The PKK is a Kurdish separatist group, operating within Turkey but
with support from within Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. Should
the Turkish armed forces be entitled to cross the border into Iraqi
territory in pursuit of the PKK fighters or in order to attack their
camps?

Both Iraq and the USA argue that Turkey should not do so, but
should leave it to the Iraqi forces to deal with them. But what if
(Contd)

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 they cannot do so? The dilemma, of course, is that Turkey does
not want to undermine the government of Iraq, and therefore
would not – under the normal rules that apply to international
disputes – want to cross the border. On the other hand, it
perceives the need to deal with the terrorist groups, who are able
to inflict casualties on Turkish forces.

On the other hand, if states are always sovereign, does that mean
that it is always wrong to violate that sovereignty, if there is reason
to believe that a state is likely to become a threat to its neighbours,
or is deliberately acting against the welfare of its citizens.

Examples
Although widely condemned, no military action has been taken
against the regime in Burma, following its repression of those
seeking democracy. Nor has military action been taken against,
for example, Zimbabwe, in spite of a growing humanitarian crisis in
that country.

On the other hand, the USA, UK and others in the ‘coalition of the
willing’ took military action against Iraq on the basis of a belief
that it possessed weapons of mass destruction and was therefore a
threat. A subsequent justification offered for war was that regime
change was in the interests of the Iraqi people.

Does Iran have a sovereign right to develop its own nuclear

industry? Does the international community require proof that
nuclear material will be used to create weapons to threaten other
states, before any military action can be taken to eliminate
that threat?

Should North Korea be allowed to develop and test nuclear

weapons and missiles, as it did – in the face of international
condemnation – in 2009? Which is more dangerous, to allow it to
continue, or to intervene?

228
Insight
In such situations, the decision about whether to take
military action is generally taken on a pragmatic basis,
rather than on principle. It seems right that military
intervention should be used if a nation poses a direct threat.
But how is that threat to be determined and quantified?
Remember Iraq.

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND REPRESENTATION

Democracy involves compromise. If one political party has an

overall majority, it can form a government, based on the manifesto
that it put to the people at the election. Naturally, those who
voted for other parties find themselves ruled by a government
other than the one they wanted, but there may also be a variety
of views among members of the ruling party, not all of whom
will be satisfied with the result. Where parties are more equally
divided, a coalition may be formed, or a minority party may
attempt to form a government, relying on the support of other
parties. In such circumstances, the views of more people are
taken into account, but almost nobody is completely satisfied,
and such governments can appear weak and their legislation
generally uncontroversial. The obvious exception to this is in
wartime, when an external threat dominates any party differences,
and a coalition government can act with the support of the whole
nation.

Hence, within a democracy, a strong and decisive government is likely

to represent the views of only a minority of the electorate – simply
because, in order to be decisive, it has to pick and choose between
the variety of opinions within its own political party, and will
probably more or less ignore those of the electorate as a whole.
Equally, significant minorities will feel themselves completely
excluded, if they fail to win seats and therefore have no way of
influencing the legislative process.

9. Nations, war and terrorism 229

 Insight
Without party politics, there would be a chaos of views and
it would be practically impossible to form a government;
with party politics, the variety of views becomes more
manageable, but there will still be those who feel excluded.
The key question for democracy is how you achieve adequate
representation.

But the issue of representation goes beyond that of political parties.

We have already seen that a state is not the same thing as a country
or people – it is a political construct. The borders of a state may
therefore fail to take into account the various groups which dwell
within them.

Some nations are put together from different parts of others. Thus,
for example, Belgium is the result of fusing together parts of The
Netherlands with parts of France. As a result, it is a nation with
different languages and cultures; in the north it imperceptibly
blends into Holland, as it does into France in the south. There
are many other examples of this: in the Balkans, for example,
the former Yugoslavia contained within itself many national and
cultural differences, which eventually led to warfare and division.
Today, the religious and cultural differences between the Sunni,
Shia and Kurd populations of Iraq have exacerbated the troubles
that have resulted from the American- and British-led invasion of
2003. Nigeria is divided between Muslims and Christians. The
partition of India, following its independence, led to huge loss of
life when Hindus and Muslims were forced to move one side or
other of the borders between India and the newly created Pakistan.

The fundamental question for political philosophy, as we think

about these countries, is about loyalty, identity and representation.
In a country with a single cultural and religious make-up, the
citizen may be more or less satisfied with his or her nation, but at
least the loyalty is clear. But is one first of all a Kurd or an Iraqi?
Scottish or British? Even if the loyalties are compatible, how will
they affect the political process? Should I always vote for someone
from my own particular sub-group within the nation?

230
The same is true of religious identity. Is one first of all a Muslim,
or a Christian, and only secondarily a British or American
national? Does a Sikh have a prime loyalty to the Punjab, home of
his or her religion, or to the nation where he or she resides? What
is the relationship between the Jewish community and the State of
Israel?

In today’s multi-faith, multicultural, interlocking world, a religion

will comprise people of many different cultures and political
persuasions. Equally, any one nation will comprise a whole range
of people who have loyalties to cultures and religions that extend
beyond its borders. There was a time, following the Reformation
in Europe, when each nation tended to determine its own religion,
and its citizens were required to follow it. That sort of neat division
is no longer a practicable option for any country that retains a
democratic constitution. You cannot, in practice, achieve a nation
with a single religion and culture, without a centralized and
authoritarian government which is prepared to impose a religious
norm – as, for example, in Saudi Arabia.

So it is even more crucial, in order to achieve political stability,

that the democratic process – where it exists – should endeavour
to represent each religious or cultural group fairly. But here, of
course, we return to one of our fundamental questions. Can that be
done fairly on the basis of some utilitarian assessment of benefits?
In any utilitarian democracy, the wishes of majorities prevail. In
extreme situations, minorities rebel.

MINORITY VIEWS AND PUBLIC OPINION

It is one thing to think about politics, quite another to be involved

with implementing a political agenda. The question is whether or
not people tend to take a pragmatic line, rather than one based on
principle, when it comes to the practicalities of ruling a country.
Those in power are regularly challenged to explain why they have
proposed some piece of legislation, or have balanced out the needs
of different groups of people in a particular way. Does this favour
the working people, or the owners of business? Does a particular

9. Nations, war and terrorism 231

 education system favour people of a particular class, or alienate
those of a particular ethnic background?

In answering these questions, a politician is expected to appeal

to fundamental values that he or she shares with those asking
the questions. Without some shared values, there would be no
meaningful dialogue at all. The politician needs to appeal to basic
principles about how those values can be put into effect in society,
and it is the strategy for doing exactly that which underpins the
manifesto of a political party.

However, public opinion can shift and, if a government is not

to become out-of-step with the wishes of the voters, it needs to
take even minority views into account, since vocal minorities can
undermine the credibility of a particular policy. A broad example
of this might be the challenging of the assumption that people
always and automatically want what will deliver the greatest
economic benefit.

The tyranny of money

It is often assumed that the success of a government depends
on the ever-increasing living standards of the citizens – and such
standards are generally measured in terms of the amount of
money and goods that are available to them.

It is therefore assumed that, in terms of political theories, there is

no choice but to accept capitalism and a free-market economy,
on the grounds that these will provide the best environment for
increasing wealth. If everyone is free to make money, untroubled
by regulations, then everyone will maximize his or her abilities –
and any failure will be down to the individual and not the state.

In such an environment, those who campaign for non-financial

benefits may too easily be seen as eccentrics. The economy
demands fast and cheap transport; that requires new and bigger
roads. To protest about a new motorway scheme in favour

232
 of preserving a traditional habitat of a threatened species of
butterfly is regarded as romantic naivety, and it is assumed that
the vast majority of the population would prefer the road.

Recently, that has started to change. With the recognition of the

threat of global warming, a majority are now coming to the view
that it is in the interests of all that the environment in which we
live is considered as important a factor in determining happiness
as the amount of money we have in our pockets. This is seen, for
example, in the willingness of some people to take lower salaried
jobs that happen to be located in a more attractive ‘healthy’ part
of the country.

If money is all, political philosophy becomes but a branch of

economics, and political action is determined by the economy.
If not, then we are free to re-open all the fundamental questions
about how we choose to live and organize our society.

Insight
By 2009, in the wake of the global financial crisis and
resulting recession, people were contemplating the prospect
of an extended period of austerity. In these circumstances,
should you try to return to increased consumption and
growth, or should you revise your values, and hence the
political and economic agenda?

CHANGING GOVERNMENTS

There is a fundamental question that hangs over all political

structures. What if they go wrong? What if they fail to meet the
aspirations of the people over whom they rule? What if they repress
minorities? What if they are seen to be corrupt or self-serving?

In a democracy, voters are able to express their dissatisfaction

at the polls, although that, of course, is not guaranteed to bring

9. Nations, war and terrorism 233

 about the required change. Unless there is an overall majority for
one particular party in a majority of constituencies, there will be a
process of negotiation before a government can be appointed that
commands a majority of the elected representatives.

But what if that democratic process is not available? What if a

government forbids democratic elections for whatever reason?
At what point would it then be right to use direct action – or, if
necessary, violence – to bring about a change?

History is littered with revolutions of various sorts. Some, like

the one that brought about the end of communist rule in the
Czech Republic, are achieved through the sheer weight of public
opinion and the size of anti-government demonstrations. Others
are achieved only by bloodshed, and many on-going civil wars are
simply long-drawn-out attempts at regime change.

The fundamental question here for political philosophy concerns the

justification for taking direct or violent action against a government.
Most would argue that this is only justified if all peaceful means
have been exhausted. But even then, what right do individuals or
groups have to rebel against an established political authority?

One way of evaluating this would be by a utilitarian assessment.

How do you assess the benefits to be gained by regime change,
against the potential loss of life that might come from the attempt at
revolution? And how do you estimate that cost against the cost of the
continuation of the current government? Thus, for example, one of
the debates following the 2003 Iraq war, once the issue of weapons of
mass destruction was no longer viable as justification, was the harm
done to the Iraqi people by allowing Saddam Hussein to continue in
power. The problem with the present violence in that country is that,
on a utilitarian assessment, it is less obvious that overall people are
better off than they were before. That matter is debatable, but the
principle on which the judgement was made is utilitarian.

The other option is to say that, even if the overthrow of the

government might cause more suffering than it prevents, it is
still worthwhile to change a government that does not respect

234
certain human rights. In other words, as a matter of principle,
certain governments should be opposed, no matter what the cost.

The extreme version of that argument is that of the terrorist who

claims that the loss of innocent human life is a necessary and
worthwhile price to pay for the possibility of regime change. But
that view is generally only taken by those whose views are absolute
and fundamental – in other words, it is not the result of some
balancing of possibilities, but a campaign in which self-sacrifice
is made worthwhile in the greater scheme of things.

The just war theory

It can be argued that warfare and other violent confrontations

are not an inevitable feature of international politics, but happen
because there is no effective alternative. Here is the view of
Hannah Arendt:

The chief reason warfare is still with us is neither a secret death

wish of the human species, nor an irrepressible instinct to
aggression, nor, finally and more plausibly, the serious economic
and social changes inherent in disarmament, but the simple fact
that no substitute for this final arbiter in international affairs has
yet appeared on the political scene. Was not Hobbes right when
he said: ‘Covenants, without the sword, are but words’?
On Violence, Harcourt Brace (1969)

So the first and crucial thing to acknowledge is that war represents

failure to secure a rational way of resolving disputes, and can only
be justified (if at all) if all possible avenues for peaceful resolution
have been explored and are found blocked.

There are two questions to be considered:

 When is it right to go to war? (jus ad bellum)

 What rules should apply to the conduct of a war? (jus in bello)

9. Nations, war and terrorism 235

 The principles of the just war, set out by Thomas Aquinas in the
thirteenth century and subsequently developed, are broadly that it
may be just to go to war if:

 it is conducted by proper authority (this is generally taken

to imply that war should be carried out by a state, not by an
individual or group).
 there is a valid reason to go to war (for example, in self-
defence if threatened by another state).
 warfare is a proportional response to whatever has happened,
and there is a reasonable chance of success. (In other
words, massive retaliation as a result of a minor border
infringement would be ruled out, as would launching a
war when it was clear that little could be achieved by the
resulting slaughter.)
 the intention of going to war is to establish peace and justice.
(War is not valid as an end in itself.)

Motives for war

I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge
what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil.
Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the
US Federal Reserve

The key word here is ‘largely’. There were other ‘reasons’ for
the war: the belief that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass
destruction, the need to show strength on the world stage after
9/11. The question must remain whether the economic significance
of the Middle East (including, of course, its oil) was a factor in
deciding that there should be enforced regime change in Iraq.

 But are motives for war ever pure?

 Are motives, reasons and subsequent justifications necessarily
the same?

236
The conduct of war is considered right only if:

 it is waged against military personnel, not against civilians (in

other words the loss of civilian life should minimized).
 the force used is proportional (so, for example, a minor border
dispute should not be used as an excuse for an all-out military
assault).
 minimum force is used in order to achieve the war’s aim
(this would preclude using weapons of mass destruction, or
excessive carpet bombing, if less force could achieve the same
military objectives).

Weapons left by US troops ‘used as

bait to kill Iraqis’
At a court martial (as reported in The Independent on 25
September 2007) the officer in charge of a sniper platoon said:

Basically we would put an item out there and watch it. If

someone found the item, picked it up and attempted to leave
with the item, we would engage [shoot] the individual as I saw
this as a sign they would use the item against the US forces.

This is a clear example of actions that are against the ‘just war’
and other moral principles. Reasons include:

 Killing someone for picking up a weapon, as opposed to

directly threatening to use it, seems disproportionate.
 The person picking it up is a civilian, not a member of the
military.
 If that were to have taken place in the USA rather than in Iraq, it
would clearly have been murder, for the possession of a firearm
in that country is seen as a right. In Iraq, the possession of a
weapon is assumed to be for aggression rather than self-defence.
(Contd)

9. Nations, war and terrorism 237

  Like the invasion of Iraq itself, this is an example of proactive
military intervention – not reacting to what has been done, but
taking action to avoid what one might reasonably assume will
be done.

The two examples given here both concern the Iraq war, but
looking back through history, similar examples could be found in
almost all military confrontations. Warfare seldom lives up to the
high ideals of the ‘just war’ theory – but that does not invalidate
the attempt to set down principles that should guide the conduct
of war. Those who flout them may find themselves on trial as war
criminals.

The other responsibility, considered under the ‘just war’ heading,

may be termed jus post bellum. This is the responsibility of a victor
to ensure that the vanquished state is made stable and viable. In
other words, it would be considered wrong to invade a state, destroy
its military and political structures, and then withdraw to leave its
people in chaos. Forced regime change implies a responsibility to
establish a viable alternative.

In terms of political philosophy, the fundamental questions are:

 Is it possible to construct a world order in which the danger of

war between states is reduced?
 Is it possible to do so without at the same time having an
international military capability sufficient to ensure that all
states comply?
 At what point are individual states likely to abandon their
own military control in favour of an international body?

It is clear, for example in the debate leading up to the 2003 Iraq

war, that individual states cannot be forced to comply with the
wishes of the UN. But does that suggest that the UN itself, as a
body, should be able to adjudicate between states and enforce its
rules through military action?

238
The provision and supply of arms is a major worldwide trade, and
the supply of arms worldwide ensures that local conflicts are able to
continue. In many cases the local combatants act with the implicit
approval of those who supply arms. Political regimes therefore
depend on those who can supply them with the arms they need for
internal or external defence. Thus, for example, the state of Israel is
linked closely with that of the USA and the military junta in Burma
depends on support from China for much of its trade.

The arms budgets

On 25 August 2007, an article in The Guardian (page 21) outlined
the defence budgets of Russia, the UK and the USA, in the context
of a determination on the part of Russia to revamp its armed
forces. The figures quoted in dollars were: Russia: 32 billion; UK:
29.9 billion and USA: 582 billion.

Once those figures are presented, there is almost nothing else

that needs to be said in terms of the global balance of power. The
USA spends hugely more on military equipment and personnel
than any other nation. But it is also worth noting that the figures
are considerably lower than at the height of the Cold War, and the
reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles, agreed between Russia
and the USA in 2010, will further reduce costs.

In the end, there is a limit to what military force can do in the

political arena. It can impose a settlement where there is a dispute,
but it cannot guarantee the agreement of all parties to the dispute,
nor persuade of the fairness of the result. As David Milliband, the
British Foreign Secretary said at the Labour Party conference in
September 2007: ‘While there are military victories there never is a
military solution’.

And, of course, where people feel that they have been unfairly
treated, whether as a result of military intervention or exploitation

9. Nations, war and terrorism 239

 by a dominant trading partner, they may feel powerless to change
the existing political or economic structures by legal democratic
means, and be driven to take some form of direct action. A sense of
injustice lies behind the phenomenon which, while not new, now
commands global attention: terrorism.

Terrorism

The attack on New York and The Pentagon, Washington,

on 11 September 2001 was, without doubt, instrumental in a
major re-think of security ways in which states can counter the
threat of terrorism. There were terrorist attacks before that,
including extended campaigns like that of the IRA in Northern
Ireland and the Basque separatist movement (ETA) in Spain,
but it was the sheer scale and location of 9/11 that made it so
significant.

The literature is already extensive, and cannot realistically be

reviewed here, but some recent books (for example, Francis
Fukuyama’s America at the Crossroads) have explored and
attempted to evaluate the political significance of that event
and the resulting ‘war on terror’.

With the rise of the modern nation state, warfare and threats
came to be seen as a state-against-state phenomenon. The scale
of the power and weaponry held by states, as opposed to private
individuals and groups, made it seem inconceivable that a serious
threat could come other than from another state. That is no longer
the case. The attacks on 11 September 2001 were carried out by
an organization that is trans-national. Just as a multinational
company can have branches throughout the world, so it seems an
organization that has political or violent ends can be global. This
creates a very special problem, for states are equipped to fight other
states; they are not equipped to fight networks of individuals or
small groups.

240
That was the problem that faced the USA after the attack on
New York. It would have been easy if one particular state could
be shown to be responsible – a quick and decisive war might have
eliminated the problem. It was not to be so easy, as the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq have shown.

The ‘just war’ theory is designed to apply to state-on-state violence,

but it can equally be used to highlight the nature of terrorism:
terrorists do not represent any accepted ‘authority’, nor do they
generally, although there are exceptions, respect civilian loss of life,
nor can their actions be deemed proportionate, since it is often unclear
what the aim of the terrorist attack is, other than to do damage.

The only principle that might be used to justify terrorism would be

the argument that, if one’s life and property is threatened, one has
the right to defend oneself – a principle set out by both Hobbes and
Locke. Terrorism might then be seen as a form of self-defence, where
the imbalance of weapons and power would make it impossible to
secure a just outcome through direct military confrontation. But such
an argument would also need to show that all peaceful means of
achieving the terrorists’ stated goals had been exhausted. The problem
is that, since a terrorist group is not a nation-state, it is difficult for it to
enter into bilateral talks in the first place, since governments frequently
declare that they will not talk to or negotiate with terrorists.

The principles by which a war can be deemed just can also be

applied to the military response to terrorism, but here there are
considerable problems. A key question is: Is a nation to be held
responsible for a terrorist group that may operate from within its
geographical boundaries?

Afghanistan was very clearly a base for al-Qaeda operations, and

it was on that basis that the USA went on the offensive in that
country, deposing the Taliban regime that had supported the
terrorists. But what of Pakistan, which opposes and takes military
action against such terrorist groups, but acknowledges that they
operate within its territory? What of Britain and other western-
European countries? If a terrorist cell based in Britain had carried

9. Nations, war and terrorism 241

 out at attack in another country, would that justify direct action by
the forces of that country on British soil?

The next question concerns the effectiveness of military action:

Is it possible to defeat terrorist groups through conventional
military means?

Simon Jenkins, writing in The Sunday Times on 29 April 2007

said:

Tony Blair claims that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are
intrinsic to his crusade against terrorism and have made Britain
a safer place. Yet both have become confused and bloody
occupations of nations whose threat to British national security
has been wildly overrated.

The wars have clearly strengthened, not weakened, al-Qaeda

and, as far as Britain is concerned, offered a glamorous focus for
impressionable young Asians and a training ground for misfits
eager for a cause.

And he goes on to suggest that the politics of fear only make

the situation worse among Asian Muslims in Britain, whom
he describes as ‘among Britain’s most loyal and motivated
immigrants’.

The basis upon which the USA launched the war on terror was that
of pre-emptive action. Americans no longer considered that they
should wait to be attacked and then retaliate; they were prepared
to take the fight to the enemy. The idea of preventative war was
born: where a threat, or potential threat, could be identified, it
was deemed appropriate to take whatever action was necessary,
including the use of force.

That principle, coupled with evidence (later shown to be incorrect)

that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction that were capable of
threatening international security, led to the Iraq war of 2003. It was
argued that, if Iraq (or any other nation) were to provide weapons of
mass destruction to a terrorist group, the results could be catastrophic.

242
There were two major problems with this:

 A state, going to war against another state, can occupy that

state and replace its government. However, military action
cannot subdue a religious or political ideology. If anything,
as has been demonstrated in Iraq, an ideology is strengthened
when it faces a visible enemy, since it feeds on all the
resentment caused by the inevitable casualties of war.
 Because an international terrorist group is based ideologically
and not geographically, it cannot be subdued through
conventional military conquest. In other words, whatever
national target is selected, it is bound to be wrong, and hitting
a wrong target always helps the enemy.

There is, of course, another approach. Terrorism thrives on

perceived injustice. People join terrorist organizations because they
believe there is a cause to be fought for, an injustice deserving a
terrorist response. If the causes of that injustice are removed, then
there is less reason for people to resort to terror, and less reason for
others to give them shelter or tacit support.

To parody Tony Blair on crime, a balanced moral and

philosophical approach to terror might be: ‘Tough on terror;
tough on the causes of terror’.

RELIGION AND TERROR

Today it is radicalized Islamic fundamentalists who are seen as

the principal terrorist threat. Those who carry out terrorist acts
may claim to do so in the name of Islam, but is that correct? The
vast majority of Muslims would argue that their faith is one of
peace and submission to Allah, and they condemn extremism. On
the other hand, Islam does not make a distinction between beliefs
and the way of life that expresses them – so Islam is a social and
political phenomenon as well as a religious one.

The debate about the relationship between a religion and acts of

terror carried out by its adherents is complex, and beyond the scope
of this book. The key feature is that religion and ethnic or social

9. Nations, war and terrorism 243

 identity are closely related. Whether it is Christians and Muslims in
the Balkans or Nigeria, Hindus and Muslims in India, or Protestant
and Catholic Christians in Europe, people have all too often been
divided along religious lines, and religious labels have therefore
been used to distinguish the sides in the resulting disputes.

The Mountain Meadow massacre

The 9/11 attack was not the first massacre in the USA to be
linked with religion. On 8 September 1857, a party of settlers
from Arkansas, travelling by wagon train, were attacked, either
by Mormons (who were then a persecuted minority sect, led
by Brigham Young, who had settled in Utah ten years earlier) or
Paiute Indians who had been mobilized by the Mormons. The
settlers, short of ammunition and recognizing that their situation
was hopeless, sued for peace, and a Mormon representative
offered them their safety in exchange for their possessions. After
they surrendered, both men and women were slaughtered, 140
in all. Only children under the age of ten were spared and sent to
live with Mormon families until eventually being repatriated to
Arkansas. John Lee, Brigham Young’s adopted son, was executed
for the crime in 1877. He confessed, but claimed that he was being
made a scapegoat.

 Should this historical event colour one’s present understanding

of the Mormon religion?
 If not, then presumably it is equally right that one’s
understanding of Islam should not be coloured by the actions
of terrorists even if they claim to be acting in its name.

TERRORISM AND LIBERTY

There is an additional problem with any attempt to counter

terrorism. Terrorists, by their very nature, do not abide by just
war principles or established conventions (for example, the Geneva

244
Convention on the treatment of prisoners). The temptation,
therefore, is to counter terrorists by using methods that equally
flout those principles and conventions (for example, illegal
detention of suspects without trial; torture and inhumane treatment
of prisoners; ‘special rendition’ of prisoners from one country to
another for the purposes of torture or imprisonment).

However, a nation retains its credibility and its standing within the
international community to the extent that it maintains the highest
standards of integrity in both its domestic and foreign policy. The
danger is that by attempting to fight terrorism on its own terms,
a nation state is liable, not only to lose the battle on the ground,
but also to lose its international standing. This point was made
succinctly by Michael Ignatieff in his Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh
in 2003. Recognizing that defeating terrorism requires violence,
he asked: ‘How can democracies resort to these means without
destroying the values for which they stand?’

In the 1790s, Charles James Fox sought to defend individual

liberty. He argued that the terror in France did not pose a threat
to the situation in England and that the Prime Minister (Pitt the
Younger) was wrong to introduce emergency measures. He claimed
that the real danger in such measures was that they give the
government power over the individual’s thoughts and views.

The situation has not changed greatly since the end of the
eighteenth century. Given a threat from global terrorism, the
reaction of a government is to place restrictions on people, aimed
at those groups thought most likely to be involved in terror
networks, particularly in terms of surveillance over their actions.

The old argument remains – do you take emergency measures to

make sure that the country is kept safe (if that were possible), as
argued in Britain by Pitt the Younger and by Tony Blair, or do you
maintain individual liberty, and take the risk that such liberty will
be exploited by terrorists? It is difficult to see how civil liberties
can be defended by suspending civil liberties – that is a constant
political problem in dealing with terrorism – on the other hand a
pragmatic or utilitarian approach may suggest just that.

9. Nations, war and terrorism 245

 The problem of the nation state, equipped with a military trained
in conventional warfare but confronted by the international
terrorist network, is perfectly summed up in a conventional saying,
quoted by Fukuyama, to the effect that: When your only tool is a
hammer, every problem tends to look like a nail! That is precisely
the problem with seeing a terrorist threat as though it were
something that could be sorted by conventional military means.

Terrorists and human rights

Two terror suspects held in Britain but due to be deported to Libya
in April 2007, following 18 months’ detention, were freed on bail,
subject to a 12-hour curfew and a ban on using mobile phones
and laptops. This was because two judges ruled that, although it
was accepted that people could be sent back to Libya (following
an agreement with Libya that torture would not be used on those
so returned) the men could be in danger of having their human
rights violated if they went back. The Home Secretary had argued
that they posed a real threat to security, and that they were
members of a terrorist group.

 Which side do you take on this – national security with loss

of rights for the suspects, or the maintenance of fundamental
human rights, at the risk of further terrorist activity?

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

Some actions, carried out within a particular jurisdiction and perhaps

with the full knowledge and implicit approval of the government,
are so horrendous in terms of human life, that they are considered
‘crimes against humanity’. The large-scale killing of innocent people
or prisoners, for example, would constitute such a crime.

Such acts are prohibited by international conventions, for example,

the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva

246
conventions. These set out how prisoners should be treated and so
on. The UN Security Council has also been responsible for setting
up various tribunals for dealing with these crimes, and in 2002 the
International Criminal Court was set up in The Hague.

But the problem with any such international body is to know

whether a prosecution brought in that court is a valid one, or is
politically motivated. The USA, for example, will not allow any
case to be brought against American military personnel. The
argument used is that a prosecution against an American soldier
could be brought for malicious or publicity purposes.

This implies that a state is in a position to judge the validity of a

case that an international body may wish to take up – and hence
the international body is placed beneath the nation-state on the
scale of authority. Once again, we are up against the issue of the
conflict between national and international law. International law
is set up by bodies created by the mutual agreement of nation-
states. Hence, it would appear that the nation-states, having
established that higher body (for example, the UN) must, in the
very act of doing so, agree to accept its authority. It is difficult
to see how any international body can continue if its authority is
open to challenge on a case-by-case basis – whether in the case of
criminal prosecutions, or the implementation of resolutions taken
by the UN Security Council.

9. Nations, war and terrorism 247

 10 THINGS TO REMEMBER
1 There is a difference between a state and a nation.

2 States that do not align with national, cultural or ethnic

boundaries tend to be unstable.

3 States are invisible and artificial constructs, and are therefore

liable to change.

4 There is a fundamental debate about how much the state

should do, and how much it should leave to individuals.

5 Economic performance is often uncritically assumed to be the

primary way of judging successful government.

6 Democracy is always a matter of compromise when it comes

to representing the people.

7 In a multicultural world, areas of national and cultural

identity may not correspond to the borders of a state.

8 The just war theory sets out some basic conditions upon which
it argues that war may be morally justified.

9 There is a problem in using military force to confront

terrorism, since it is ideologically and not geographically
based.

10 There is always a danger that national security will come at

the cost of the rights and freedoms of individuals.

248
 10
The global perspective
In this chapter you will learn:
• about international relations
• about globalization
• to consider the moral, religious and environmental aspects of
global political issues.

Few nations have ever sought to isolate themselves from the rest of
the world and even fewer have succeeded in doing so. Trade and
conquest have linked nations, formed and destroyed empires, and
brought together people from different parts of the world.

It is tempting to think that the global economy is a recent

phenomenon, but that is far from the case. In 1848, Marx and
Engels published their Manifesto of the Communist Party,
the opening section of which sets out the impact of the rise of
manufacture, trade and the bourgeoisie, and gives the context in
which they explain the confrontation between the workers and the
owners of capital. Here they describe a phenomenon which is as
relevant now as it was in the mid-nineteenth century:

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market

given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption
in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn
from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it
stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed

10. The global perspective 249

 or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries,
whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all
civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous
raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones;
industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in
every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by
the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for
their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place
of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we
have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence
of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production.
The intellectual creations of individual nations become common
property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness
become more and more impossible, and from the numerous
national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.

Add to this some reference to the impact on global warming of all

that shifting of material and goods around the planet, and a hint at
the impact of the web on intellectual property issues, and you have
an essentially up-to-date comment on globalization!

Perhaps significant differences today are that neo-liberalism has

given birth to the global market, economics is now beyond the
control of any single nation, and instant communication means
that a crisis in one market has an immediate impact around the
world. Most importantly, information now flows as never before –
particularly since the arrival of the internet – cutting across
political barriers and allowing individual people to communicate
and trade with one another globally. But the trans-national flows
of trade, finance and manpower, whereby global trends and
forces have become realities alongside individual nation-states, are
phenomena that go back at least as far as the nineteenth century.

The other aspect of globalization is multiculturalism. A global

community means that any one nation-state is likely to become
home to people from other continents and cultures. But this is
hardly new. People have always travelled for trade or conquest, and
found themselves engaging in cultures different from their own – just

250
contemplate the sense of distance from his homeland for Alexander
the Great on arriving in India, or a Roman centurion maintaining
a distant outpost in what is now Germany or the north of England.
Similarly, the problems of holding together a political structure
spanning different cultures is certainly as old as the Babylonian
empire of the sixth century BCE, whose policy of cultural
integration caused the leaders of the conquered Jewish people to find
themselves living in Babylon, and struggling to maintain their own
identity in the face of the easy option of cultural assimilation with
their neighbours. Ancient Babylon was clearly an early example of
enforced multiculturalism.

But the crucial difference today is the complexity and scale of

globalization. This chapter simply tries to map out some of the
main issues that emerge in a global environment.

The international dimension

Global phenomena and issues are those that arise at a level above
that of the nation-state – global trade, environment, finance and
so on. They impact on individual states, but are not simply the
product of how states deal with one another.

By contrast, the ‘international dimension’ of politics is concerned

with the ways in which individual nation-states relate to one
another and with such bodies that are set up to represent them at a
global level. A fundamental question is whether the principles that
determine how states interact with one another are adequate to
form the basis of a global politics. In other words, are international
organizations, such as the UN, the European Union (EU), NATO
and so on, which bring states together, able to deal effectively with
the growth of trans-national, global phenomena – like the internet
or global money markets?

The other significant thing to keep in mind is that the success of

a political system at home is no guarantee that it will succeed

10. The global perspective 251

 in international relations. Ancient Athens may be held up as
an example of early democracy in action, but it was constantly
involved with disputes with other city-states and with larger
confederations of states. By the time of Plato and Aristotle, the real
complaint about Athens was that it had failed to keep its empire,
and had expended all its strength in its wars with Sparta (the
Peloponnesian Wars). So good governance at home is no guarantee
of a successful foreign policy.

Insight
Nation-states tend to be at their strongest internally when
dealing with an external enemy – and therefore governments
may deliberately present to their people the impression that
they are threatened by foreign powers in order to bolster
their own position. Current examples of this include Iran and
North Korea.

When looking at the government of an individual state, political

philosophers examine various ways by which its authority could
be established and justified – the social contract, or a utilitarian
assessment of benefits, or the protection of basic human rights,
would all count as justification. But how do you establish and justify
authority on the international level? And how much authority are
individual sovereign states likely to cede to an international body?

THE DILEMMA OF AUTHORITY

Imagine a democracy ruled by a parliament of 192 representatives,

who gather to debate and vote on what laws should be applied
throughout the state and the principles upon which it should be
run. In most democracies, once the laws have been approved, a
government and civil service have the task of putting those laws
into effect, and the government raises taxes in order to do so. Of
course, since the state is a democracy, the laws it make are always
something of a compromise. The representatives express the views
of their own constituencies, but do not always get everything they
want – it is a matter of give and take, to achieve the best overall
result for the state as a whole.

252
But in this democracy, things are done differently. Once the laws
are decided on, the representatives are sent back home and each
has responsibility for implementing the law in his or her own
constituency, and to raise funds in that constituency in order to
do so. But of course, some will have to return and admit that their
own particular view did not prevail in the parliament, and they will
therefore have difficulty in persuading their constituents to do what
is required.

The situation then gets more complicated, because each of those

representatives will want to serve his or her constituents, and will
need their support in order to stay in office. Local needs will now
compete with the state-wide law and, since each constituency
is self-governing in practical terms, there will always be the
opportunity to ignore what has been agreed in parliament,
or to attempt to delay its implementation.

What is more, the constituencies vary hugely in size. Some feel that
they are big enough to ignore the wishes of parliament without
any serious consequences. Smaller ones feel that they should not
be required to carry the burden of national law, since they have
enough trouble running their own constituency.

But since the finance and power is in the hands of the constituencies,
it is quite impossible for the central government to overrule their
wishes. It can only get compliance by persuading the individual
constituencies to accept the agreed laws.

Clearly, such a democracy would have little chance of pushing

through any radical legislation. In practice, it would always be at
the mercy of the larger constituencies, and would have authority
only in name.

This is the dilemma that faces the UN and any similar international
organization. While power remains in the hands of individual
members, it does not have the power to enforce its resolutions.
States can defy it, and it has to negotiate with members to
contribute troops in order to take any action to defuse a crisis.

10. The global perspective 253

 On the other hand, individual states are reluctant to give up
their sovereign status and military power and hand it over to an
international body. Apart from anything else, once an international
body has power, it is difficult to see how it could be adequately
controlled or replaced if it started to act against the interests of
members.

Centralized power is therefore unlikely to be achieved. But a

central parliament without adequate power cannot compel, but
only persuade, states to follow its resolutions – and where national
interests are at stake, that persuasion may be resisted and the
determination to maintain national interests hardened.

Rawls’s problem again

A criticism of Rawls’s ‘original position’ thought experiment is
that, in the real world, people always know who they are and
where they stand on the social ladder and therefore they cannot
decide on principles of fairness in a disinterested way. The same
is true of the representation of sovereign states on international
bodies. Debates and negotiations at the General Assembly
or Security Council of the UN inevitably reflect the particular
interests and alliances of members.

KANT ’ S IDEA FOR PEACE

In 1796, Kant wrote Perpetual Peace, in which he tackled the

idea of how states could work together. He saw that the idea of
a single global state would not work, not least because of the
natural divisions between the people who would comprise it, and
the lack of any external body to which to appeal in the event of
such a global state becoming tyrannical. Rather, he argued for a
federation of states, bound together by agreements to resolve any
differences by negotiation rather than by war.

254
He argued that all the nations who joined such a body should be
republican, and that armies should be abolished, so that it would
be impossible for one state to attack another. In fact, he wanted
an agreement that no state should be able to take over another, or
interfere in its internal affairs.

Kant thought that republicanism would be the right form of

government if one wanted to achieve perpetual peace, on the
grounds that a republic was governed by the people, and they
would have most to lose in the case of war breaking out. A
republican government would therefore always be less likely to
agree to go to war, compared with a monarchy, in which the
benefit of the monarch could be seen to override that of the people.

Kant saw clearly that ordinary people had much to gain from
perpetual peace, and therefore had a genuine interest in the
international situation, but that this did not imply that they could
forget their commitment to their own nation. Indeed, Kant held
that there could be no justification for the overthrow of a state, and
that those who attempted to do so should be eliminated as outlaws.

He recognized that an alliance of states would not be easy to

achieve, but he thought that international commerce would help
it to become a more realistic possibility. In other words, the more
reasons there are to bind states together for their mutual benefit,
the more likely that they will also see it as in their interest to set up
an alliance for mutual security.

There are two approaches to the prospect of international peace of

the sort that Kant aspired to:

 One is that there should be some overall global organization

with authority over the individual nation-states that make it
up. That is the ‘cosmopolitan’ approach.
 The other is the formulation of sets of rules governing the
relationship between nation-states. In other words, the
primary political agency remains with the states, but they

10. The global perspective 255

 agree (on the basis of enlightened self-interest) to treat each
other fairly and in an agreed manner.

An inherent problem with the first of these is that the wide variety of
people belonging to such an organization would display such different
characteristics and aspirations that it would be very difficult to agree
on anything – local interests would constantly threaten its stability.

An inherent problem with the second is that it cannot easily

become immune from the tendency of more powerful states to opt
out of their obligations when it suits them and to try to impose
their will on other states.

Sixty per cent of the world’s population live within states that are at
least nominally democratic. Politicians are voted in by the electors of
their own country, and when it comes to the crunch will therefore act
in their nation’s own self-interest Where that self-interest coincides
with that of the international community, fine; where it conflicts,
tensions arise, and the temptation of any elected politician will be to
go with the national rather than with the international interest.

Insight
Recent European elections in Britain have seen a substantial
vote for the United Kingdom Independence Party, and two
members elected to the European Parliament from the British
National Party. Although very different from one another,
both parties appeal to a sense of national self-interest. In the
case of UKIP, the concern is to defend national sovereignty
within Europe, for the BNP the concern is primarily about
immigration and national identity.

But in an international environment, effective and speedy action

would seem to require powers that are already established and
agreed. Long-term discussions and resolutions are ineffective in
dealing with immediate crises. Hence, the fundamental dilemma at
the heart of all international bodies is the conflict between the need
for fast and efficient action, and the process of legitimization by
consent. Both are needed, but each constrains the other.

256
Sovereign states

When, if ever, is it right for one sovereign state to interfere in the

politics of another?

The theory is that nation-states are sovereign. They control their own
destiny, and a key requirement of the state is that it maintains both
internal and external security. It has fixed borders and can establish
rules about who enters and leaves and it fixes its own taxes and laws.

But states have always interfered with one another, whether by the
stick of warfare or economic sanctions or the carrot of preferential
trade, the supply of arms, or the provision of personnel to train the
military, advise on development and so on.

In general, states claim their sovereignty only when threatened by

an unwelcome influence. Thus, for example, whilst recognizing
that Turkey had no intention of violating Iraq itself, but only of
pursuing the Kurdish PKK fighters who had launched attacks over
its border, Iraq still considered that any attempt to cross the border
by Turkish troops would constitute a violation of its sovereignty.

Two things need to be considered in terms of when it might be

right to violate the sovereignty of a state:

 On what grounds might it be justified?

 On what authority should it be carried out?

The first of these might include the reasons given for a just war,
in particular self-defence, if threatened by that state. On the other
hand, it is then debatable whether a state should be proactive in
anticipating and countering a threat, or whether it should only
respond once the threat become a reality.

If one state is directly threatening another, the case might seem

clear. But would it be justified to invade a sovereign state for the
purposes of defending its population against the actions of its

10. The global perspective 257

 government? One could argue, for example, that the rise of the
Nazi party and its treatment of the Jews and others, would suggest
that the world might have been spared World War II if proactive
military action had been taken against Germany earlier. But would
that have been justified given the circumstances at the time? Is it
seen as justified only with hindsight?

And how do you decide, of all the states that treat their people
brutally, which deserve to be invaded in order to spare their own
people’s suffering?

The second of these two fundamental questions touches on the

issue of the authority of international organizations. Is the UN the
only appropriate body to take sanctions against a sovereign state,
or it is equally appropriate for that action to be taken by one or
more states acting on their own authority?

‘Sons of Buddha’ on the march

On 24 September 2007, 100,000 people took to the streets
of Rangoon, Burma, protesting against the military regime.
Sparked off by a rise in the cost of fuel, but mainly appealing for
democracy, the march was led by many thousands of Buddhist
monks – thereby giving moral authority to the protests in a
country that is mainly Buddhist.

After many days of protests, ever-increasing numbers of troops broke

up the demonstrations. Monks were beaten up and many imprisoned
and a number of demonstrators were shot. The democracy leader,
Aung San Suu Kyi, remains under house arrest (as she has been for
14 of the last 19 years), severely restricted in what she can do. Her
Democratic League for Democracy party, with its allies, won Burma’s
1990 parliamentary elections, but she was never able to take up her
rightful position. Those elections were held just two years after the
last major democracy protests, which were brutally repressed.

258
 In 2007, the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, said: ‘… there
is a golden thread of common humanity that across nations and
faiths binds us together and it can light the darkest corners of the
world. The message should go out to anyone facing persecution
anywhere from Burma to Zimbabwe – human rights are universal
and no injustice can last for ever’.

The questions are:

 How can or should the world community respond to the

repression of people in a sovereign state?
 Should common humanity provide a basis for military
intervention?
 Is the rise of democracy inevitable, and can that justify
non-intervention where there is repression?
 What is the difference between this situation and the later
justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq (initially on the basis
of a false assessment that Iraq possessed weapons of mass
destruction), namely the treatment of the people by the regime
of Saddam Hussein?

Global networks
Back in the eighteenth century, Adam Smith (1723–90) argued
for free-market economics, on the grounds that international
trade would benefit everyone. Over 200 years later, international
trade and banking and the triumph of free-market economics, as
opposed to the directed economies of the old socialist states, are
the driving force in globalization. Trade is not the only global
network, but it is the one that illustrates most clearly the way in
which global influences have come to dominate those of
nation-states.

10. The global perspective 259

 Insight
This is seen most starkly when there is a banking crisis –
no one nation or institution is able to isolate itself from
global problems, for exactly the reason that each financial
institution has sought to generate money by investing
(directly or indirectly) in funds that are globally based.

THE POST-COLONIAL WORLD

Since the 1940s, the old European colonial empires have been in
decline, as one by one the major colonies achieved independence.
The effect of this was, amongst other things, to open the
developing world up to competitive trading agreements, and
by the 1980s the dominant view was that the nations of the
developing world would be served best by having free markets
within a global economy.

The assumption was that market economics would secure increased

standards of living and ensure the former colonies of a place within
the world trade system. However, trade is seldom conducted on
absolutely equal terms, and the effect of a free market is that
fluctuations in the value of commodities – which can be tolerated
within a developed economy – have very serious consequences
within the developing world, especially where a very large
percentage of income comes from a small number of products.

So, in such a world, a fundamental question is whether it is in the

interests of developing countries to tie themselves into a global
free market, moving from subsistence farming to cash crops, for
example, or to accept a lower trade profile and concentrate on
subsistence production and self-sufficiency.

Insight
Once you are entirely dependent on a particular cash crop
for your income, you are vulnerable to market fluctuations;
if you can’t sell your crop, you have nothing. Self sufficiency
promises independence, but also means that you have to
accept a lower standard of living.

260
Clearly, even where a global free market is the ideal, some regulation
and assistance is necessary – hence the setting up of the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, the OECD (Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development) and the World Trade
Organization. These international bodies both regulate and promote
global trade, often by requiring individual states to take action to
control their economies, in exchange for support.

But there are key questions here for political philosophy. The
world of global free markets is one dominated by economics,
rather than politics. But economics is a science, neutral in itself,
but relying on political or moral principles in order to express
its purpose. It works on Adam Smith’s assumption that trade
benefits all.

 Is that assumption necessarily correct?

 Is it sufficient as a guide for this new global phenomenon?
 Are there political principles that should dominate economic
ones?

GLOBALIZATION

Globalization refers to the emergence of processes and networks

of trade that are not constrained by territorial boundaries. So,
for example, the global money markets exist independently of the
banks in any one state, and no one state can control them.

Sub-prime chaos!
In 2007, banks in the USA sustained losses in the ‘sub-prime’
market – the granting of mortgages to people with poor credit
records. But those mortgage debts had already been packaged up
and sold off to other banks, who thereby shared the risk and the
potential benefits. Consequently, as house prices fell and people
in the USA defaulted on their loans, the effect was felt worldwide,
and banks became more cautious about lending to one another.
(Contd)

10. The global perspective 261

 In Britain, the first casualty of this was the Northern Rock building
society, which had been borrowing on the international money
markets in order to fund its mortgage lending, and then found
that its source of money had become restricted. As a result it
had to apply to the Bank of England for special loans in order to
meet its commitments. But people, anxious that they might lose
their money, queued outside branches of the bank in order to
get their cash. That was just the start of what rapidly became an
international banking crisis, which then (by restricting the flow of
funds to businesses) triggered global recession.

The initial crisis linked home ownership in the USA, via a global
banking system, to people queuing to secure their cash in Britain.
As it developed, national governments found themselves spending
billions of dollars in order to maintain and stabilize financial
institutions and markets; it became a truly global problem.

There was panic, but who was to blame? The sub-prime borrowers
who overstretched themselves? The banks in the USA who lent to
them? The international system of sharing out packages of debt?
Northern Rock for lending more than it received from savers, and
needing to go to the international money market to finance its
operation? The Bank of England and others for not stepping in
earlier to stabilize the situation? The media for making a great
issue of the problem, and therefore causing people to panic?

Welcome to the globalized world of finance!

The global market means that falls on stock markets in the Far
East (reacting to falls on Wall Street at the end of the previous
day’s trading there) hit the European markets when they open and,
as the sun tracks westwards, influence what happens when Wall
Street opens for the next day’s trading.

Multinational corporations span national boundaries, and operate

under different laws in different parts of the world. Employment
law and higher standards of living and pay in one place may lead

262
them to shift production to a country where cheap labour will
reduce overheads. Products for the market in one part of the world
are produced in another.

The global economy also extends to the workforce: jobs are

outsourced to countries (for example, India) where there is a large,
educated workforce that will accept lower wages, compared with
the EU or the USA; manufacturing is switched to China, where
goods can be produced for less; practical skills shortages in Western
Europe are met by migrants from the countries of Eastern Europe.

Globalization creates a whole new set of issues for political philosophy:

 Governments raise taxes in order to provide benefits for their

citizens, but with globalization, people may well officially reside
in ‘tax havens’ where their taxation is lower, even if their income
is generated elsewhere. Companies, similarly, make profits for
shareholders who reside far from the employees whose work
generates them in the first place. Hence we need to consider
whether existing concepts of ‘fairness’ – based on the idea of a
social contract within a single state – are adequate. And what
does ‘fairness’ mean for a worker in India who receives a lower
wage for the same work as his or her European counterpart?
 If a state finds that its industry is dominated by foreign capital,
it is vulnerable to capital outflows in any time of uncertainty.
The only way to avoid this is to ensure that its economy is in
line with what international capital expects. But once linked into
that global network, it is practically impossible for a country
to avoid following the principles of the free market. Hence the
global economy tends to limit a nation’s political choices, and
the success of a national economy is now measured in terms of
its ability to compete within a global capitalist system.
 Globalization can be seen as a political agent for peace, for if
nations are locked together by economic ties, it is unlikely that
they would consider themselves sufficiently independent of one
another to go to war (as argued by Kant).

Neo-liberalism is the general term used for an approach to

economic and political thought that includes the lowering of

10. The global perspective 263

 taxation and economic deregulation. And, of course, with the
failure of socialism and rigidly regulated economies, liberal
democracy and capitalism became the dominant political and
economic options of choice for individual states. Now, however,
they have also become the necessary passport to integration into
the global economy. Does that inhibit political freedom?

Globalization and the law

Trade moves between countries, but law does not. Therefore there
needs to be a complex set of regulations to control international
trade, otherwise what is acceptable in one place will fall foul of the
law in another.

 Under which legal system should multinational companies

operate?
 Are multinationals sufficiently accountable to the
governments and within the legal systems of any one state?

On an individual level, to what extent should a state be responsible

for acts committed by its citizens when they are outside its
geographical territory? If someone from Britain commits a crime
abroad, should they have a right to be repatriated to serve their
sentence, or should they remain in custody within the country
in which the crime was committed? Of course, the severity of
punishments varies considerably from one state to another.

 Is this fair? If not, would an internationally agreed system

be better, or would that simply undermine the autonomy of
individual legal systems?

The ability to trade internationally is important for individual

states and becomes a measure of the success of their governments.
Hence trade is used as a method of furthering political ends, or
even to encourage regime change. Imposing economic sanctions

264
is regarded as a more acceptable way of putting pressure on a
government than threatening to invade. The more locked into
the global market a country becomes, the more it is vulnerable to
economic pressures not of its own making.

Oil deal with Libya?

In August 2009, Abdelbasset Al-Megrahi, convicted of the bombing
of a Pan Am airliner over the Scottish village of Lockerbie but
terminally ill with cancer, was released from prison on compassionate
grounds to return home to Libya to die, rather than serving out his
full life sentence. In the debate that followed that decision, it became
clear that – two years earlier – the British government had dropped a
plan to exclude Al-Megrahi from a prisoner transfer agreement with
Libya, and that one factor in that decision had been to facilitate a
profitable oil deal with Libya. The argument was made that Libya had
been a rogue state, and that the attempt to bring it back into normal
international relations involved trade.

Sometimes sanctions (involving the cutting off of trade) are

imposed against states to attempt to bring them in line; in this
case trade was used as a carrot rather than a stick. Trade assists
with the normalizing of relations between states, which is deemed
to be in the interest of all parties.

But recognition and status are equally important. Hence states

use international events to promote themselves within the global
community, and thereby gain implicit acceptance for their political
position. Thus, in discussing countries with a poor record on
human rights, for example, one question generally asked is: Should
we be trading with them? Here there are two options:

 By continuing to trade, state A hopes to influence state B, by

having its views – as a trading ally – taken more seriously than
would be the case if it cut off such links.

10. The global perspective 265

  By refusing to trade, state A hopes to pressure state B
by taking away any potential benefits of that trade and
highlighting the unacceptability of state B’s policies within
the international community.

GAMES, POLITICS AND VALUE-FOR-MONEY

International sporting events have always been an opportunity

to showcase what the host national can achieve. That was
seen spectacularly in China’s hosting of the Olympic Games in
2008, and it was noted at the time that the amount spent on the
games would have been unacceptable in a democratic country.
On the other hand, with the world’s media assembled for each
event, it seems inevitable that the Games have taken on political
importance. An important factor in justifying the cost of the next
Olympic Games, in London in 2012, is its ‘legacy’ – in other
words, the amount of capital investment that will bring long-
term benefit that local people will be able to derive from the new
facilities and transport infrastructure.

Moral and religious perspectives

Aristotle saw it as the responsibility of rulers to enable people

to live the good life, and that implied that they should take a
moral view of what they were doing. Equally, the social contract
approach and utilitarianism both seek to justify forms of
government in terms of fairness and protection, which imply a
moral view of the nature and purpose of political life.

By contrast, capitalism in itself is amoral – it is about investment

and profits. Whether capitalism should be aligned to specific views
about the good life, or fairness, or the way people should be treated,
is a secondary but important issue. Capitalism does not provide its
own moral structure, unless you are prepared to argue that economic
success and profits are themselves a final good to be sought in life.
And if you argue that, you also need to take into account the fact

266
that within any competitive environment, one person’s success
means another person’s failure; all cannot win in this race.

Globalization is a phenomenon of markets, information and

communication, powered by multinational corporations, and based
on capitalism. Does that imply that it cannot, or should not, have a
moral dimension?

If you think it should then it is equally important to recognize

that many people are guided in their morality, and establish their
personal values, through the influence of religion. Given the global
nature of religions, it is therefore important to ask to what extent
religion is a factor in the global political equation.

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

In the 1990s, following the fall of communism, the USA found

itself in a curious position of being the only remaining superpower.
Convinced that right was on its side, the neo-conservative view
(seen particularly during the presidency of George W. Bush) is
that the USA has a moral responsibility to use its military and
economic weight to influence (and if necessary, change) regimes,
where that is considered to be in the best interest of global stability
or of the people of the country concerned. While it does not
conceive of its efforts as in any way empire-building, it considers
itself a force for good on the international scene, given its unique
and privileged position in the world. Others do not necessarily see
it that way!

Thus, for example, it set about encouraging democracy in the

Middle East, although the prevailing Islamic culture in that part of
the world has a very different view of society from that prevailing
in liberal democracies. The problem, however, is to know to what
extent any moral claim remains untainted by self-interest. Was
that a genuinely altruistic and moral decision, or was it equally
motivated by support for Israel or the need to secure oil supplies?
That question is beyond our present purpose. The key question for
political philosophy is whether it is ever right to use military

10. The global perspective 267

 or economic power for a specifically moral purpose and, if it is,
how that purpose should be decided and subsequently justified.

Insight
It is interesting to compare this position with that of
President Barack Obama, who seems more willing to listen to
the views of others, although equally prepared to use military
force, where necessary, in order to establish security – as, for
example, in Afghanistan.

But if politics is used for a moral purpose, should that be made

public, or should it remain hidden from public scrutiny, and
another reason for the political action given instead?

This approach has a long pedigree and goes back to Plato’s The
Republic, where he considers it right to put out a ‘noble lie’ that
people are, from birth, destined to be in one or other of the classes
within his republic, and that they are therefore unable to change
their fate and place within the hierarchy of the state. Deception,
for Plato, is justified in order to maintain order. But if deception
is practised, can people ever know whether the reason for which
political action is being taken – and on which they might vote in a
referendum or election – is the one they have actually been given?
And if they do not have that assurance, what is the value of the
democratic process to which they subscribe?

This might well lead to the cynical view that political realities are
known only to the few, and that the people are fed with only such
information as they need in order to endorse policies that are taken
for far more complex reasons than those presented.

Insight
This applies to all levels of government. In 2009, as part
of discussions about reforming the British politics, it was
argued that there should be greater transparency of Cabinet
discussions. All such discussions were confidential, and only
the collective decisions were presented to Parliament, with
the requirement that every Cabinet member endorse them.

268
  Is the reality of politics different from the issues debated in
political philosophy?

I suspect that there are many who have subscribed to this rather
sceptical view over the years, including of course Machiavelli,
Bentham and Hume, all of whom were determined to reflect on the
real political situation rather than an idealized one.

There are other important moral issues raised by global networks:

Is ‘development’ a good thing? Is it just colonialism under another

guise? On the one hand, it seems right that people should be helped
to escape poverty, but on the other there is the danger of poorer
nations becoming too dependent on producing cash crops for
richer ones, rather than concentrating on subsistence farming and
autonomy. Is it necessarily moral to assist a nation to link itself
into the globalized market?

What about the movement of people and work? People are less
mobile than the economic structures that need them – so it is
understandable for businesses to out-source their work to India,
rather than employing labour in Britain or the USA. But to what
extent does this penalize the opportunities of those in Europe and
North America to find suitable work? A huge area for consideration
here is the movement of manufacturing jobs to China, India and
elsewhere, where overheads and labour costs are less.

 Is that fair to people whose jobs are lost, because they

are too expensive?
 Is it fair that, in another part of the world, people work
for much less so that the businesses can lower the price
consumers have to pay for what they produce?

The other side of this issue, of course, is the provision of ‘fair trade’
goods – where there is the specific intention of trading in a way
that avoids exploiting producers in developing countries. Here the
market is shaped by a prior moral commitment.

10. The global perspective 269

 There are also moral issues raised by immigration. Some sectors
of the economy of the USA, for example, depend on immigrant
labour, but many of the immigrants entered illegally and remain
illegally. They become trapped by a concept of citizenship that is
nationally based, while working in a supply-and-demand global
economy that is not.

GLOBAL INEQUALITY

In Chapter 5 we looked at the issue of fairness. As set out by Rawls

and others, the arguments about what constitutes fairness and how
it might be realized in society, were mainly set in the context of
a single nation. When we consider the global situation, the issues
become far more stark, even if the philosophical arguments remain
the same. Without doubt, even if global warming and the terrorist
threat are more often in the headlines, the huge disparity in living
standards between the developed and the developing nations
present the most pressing moral issue.

 Is it enough to assume that free-market capitalism will eventually

spread its benefits to all, thereby eliminating poverty?
 If not, what action, by whom and on what authority, is
needed to combat poverty in the developing world?

This is a huge issue, and not one that can be examined adequately
here. For those wanting to go further into it, Peter Singer has
long campaigned on behalf of a radically more generous attitude
towards addressing the issue of world poverty, arguing that, where
it is possible to help those in need, especially where that involves
relatively small consequences for oneself, then one should do so.
His latest book on this is The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to
End World Poverty, Picador 2009.

THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION

In the wars of religion that followed the Reformation in Europe,

the general principle was that each state, following its ruler, opted
to be either Protestant or Catholic. This is an oversimplification,

270
of course, but it makes the point that religion has generally been
a trans-national phenomenon, even where individual states have
regulated religious practices within their borders.

The ‘world religions’ are exactly that – belief and value systems
that may be followed by people anywhere. They therefore provide
people with an alternative way of understanding themselves from
that given by the nation-state. In other words, two Buddhists may
feel that they have much in common, in terms of their views of life
and moral perspectives, even if one lives in Europe and is a British
citizen while the other lives in Burma, Sri Lanka or Japan.

The spread of the world religions was a global phenomenon that

pre-dated capitalist globalization. They form a layer of self-
understanding for people all over the globe that sits over the
political or economic.

Where religion and politics are regarded as quite separate – so that

religion is regarded as something personal, and as compatible with
almost any political allegiance, economic status, or lifestyle – then
the religious dimension, however important it may be as a global
phenomenon, does not pose a problem for our understanding of
global politics.

However, religion is as much a way of life as it is a set of beliefs,

and it is therefore liable to clash with any political structures that
appear to promote an incompatible set of values. Religions, by and
large, hold that certain beliefs and values are absolute, whereas in a
postmodern, globalized world, relativism is the order of the day.

Hence, the spread of an amoral capitalism, combined with a

liberal–democratic view that is generally permissive and relativist,
may be seen by some traditional religious groups as threatening
to their way of life. This is seen particularly within Islam, where
submission to Allah, following traditional Shari’a Law and
solidarity with the whole community of Muslims (the Ummah)
takes priority over any allegiance to political or social systems. For
a Muslim, the ideal is to live in a Muslim state and under Shari’a

10. The global perspective 271

 law. That implies a political agenda that is fundamentally at odds
with the secular ideals of liberal democracy.

It is therefore not difficult to see how this sense of religious

commitment and loyalty, in the face of the apparently unstoppable
rise of consumerism, globalization and the relativist values of a free-
market view of life, lead some towards radicalized opposition to all
these features of the liberal-democratic, globalized world view.

This is not in any way to condone the atrocities carried out by, for
example, Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, but to recognize
that the appeal of such radical Islamicist groups stems from deeply
felt religious opposition to what they see as attacks on Muslims
and the Muslim way of life.

The difficulty faced by moderates, whether within Islam or any other

religion, is how to present the moral challenge and the distinctive
way of life that their religion teaches, without appearing (to the
more fundamentalist and extremist elements) to be compromising
with the broadly secular global agenda which threatens those values.

Insight
This is nothing new. From time to time, Christians were
persecuted within the Roman Empire for refusing to
acknowledge prior loyalty to the Emperor. Before that
Socrates was condemned to death for undermining politically
important religious ideas.

Politics and climate change

However much individuals and individual nation-states can
achieve, there are some issues that need to be tackled globally. The
threat of climate change is the clearest example of this. In the face
of increasing evidence that the accelerating pace of change is in
part caused by human action in burning fossil fuels and releasing
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, politicians are faced with

272
an issue which demands that they ask people to change their
lifestyle or aspirations in order to achieve something of long-term
and universal benefit. Since many political systems are maintained
on the basis of enlightened self-interest, this sounds challengingly
altruistic.

Eco-war between parties?

If everyone agreed that cutting carbon emissions and protecting
the environment were absolute priorities, how to do it would be a
matter for scientists and economists. It would happen, whatever
the cost. However, in a democracy, politicians generally need
to persuade people that their policies will bring about a better
future with minimum effort or taxation – since it is generally
accepted that a party is unlikely to retain power at a general
election on a manifesto of austerity and higher taxation. The task
politicians tend to set themselves is to present proposals that
offer maximum gain for minimum pain.

But how can the harmful changes in the global environment be

halted and then reversed without fundamentally challenging the
ever-increasing expectations of consumer-voters? And which
party, in a democracy, is going to have the courage to tell it like it
will need to be?

Without doubt, the answer to the crisis of global warming and

other related ecological issues lies within the political sphere.
Economics alone cannot solve the problem, because economics is
not normative – in other words, it does not decide what should be
done. But it is equally clear that efforts on the part of individual
nations will not be sufficient, since the environmental impact of
human life respects no national boundaries, and no one nation
is likely to want to take action if others do not, since that might
imply a risk to its ‘competitiveness’ in a global market. Hence,
global forums need to decide what to do and (more difficult) we

10. The global perspective 273

 need to find a way to give such forums the authority to enforce the
changes that are needed.

Following on from Kyoto

The Kyoto Protocol, agreed in 1997, obliged the industrialized
nations to cut their greenhouse gas emissions to five per cent
below the 1990 levels by 2012. By 2009, 183 nations had
signed up to the agreement, but some – notably the USA –
were reluctant to ratify it, and thus accept it as binding. In
September 2009, the President of China (the world’s biggest
emitter of greenhouse gasses), attending a meeting of the
UN General Assembly said: ‘Out of a sense of responsibility to
its own people and people across the world, China fully
appreciates the importance and urgency of addressing
climate change’.

That sounds encouraging, but it has to be related to the need for

social and economic development. In terms of pollution per head
of population, China is quite modest in its output of greenhouse
gases. Should developing countries, and those – like China –
which are going through a period of rapid industrialisation, do
proportionately more or less than countries that have already
achieved a higher level of per-capita income? These issues were
debated at a Climate Change Summit meeting in Copenhagen in
December 2009. While it was agreed that action was needed, the
summit failed to agree binding commitments or the necessary
finance.

The fundamental problem is that, for substantial cuts to be

possible, it is necessary to change the lifestyle of people in
wealthier nations and the expectations of those living in the
developing ones. Nations such as China and India, on a trajectory
for growth, find it more difficult to slow the increase in pollution, let
alone implement cuts. Technology can generally provide answers
to practical problems of this sort – but technology comes at a
price, and it is a price that some will not and others cannot pay.

274
 There are many questions here, including:

 Which is more effective? Top-down imposition of agreements

on the part of international bodies, or bottom-up changes in
attitude on the part of individual citizens?
 If the latter, how can this be encouraged without restricting
individual freedom?
 Is restraint on emissions compatible with a global
free market?

International agreements are of key importance, but what level of

compulsion can be expected of any such agreement? If a nation does
not perceive compliance to be in its own interest, is it likely to accept
its recommendations? Clearly, while individual nations can opt out
of agreements to reduce carbon emissions, for example, there is little
chance that changes that require serious challenges to a way of life or
standard of living stand much chance. In democracies, governments
stand or fall by their ability to satisfy the people who vote them into
power. Only if ecology gets high on the personal agenda of the voters
is a government likely to be given the mandate for drastic action.

Insight
Is democracy (both within and between nations) the best
political system for delivering on global issues of this sort?
Might benign dictatorship be more effective? Would that be a
price worth paying?

Establishing the human contribution to climate change was always

a key issue in persuading politicians that action needed to be taken.
Today there is a general consensus on that point. Whether remedial
action will go ahead if it appears to conflict with the needs of business
and the drive for higher standards of living, is another matter.

And superimposed on this is the fact that a minority of the world’s

population consumes the majority of its resources and emits the
most carbon.

10. The global perspective 275

 Fairness with eyes open
If all were required to cut carbon emissions by the same amount
(or even keep them at present levels) it is the poorer nations who
would suffer most, simply because the energy required to bring
them up to the standard of life enjoyed by the developed nations
would inevitably produce more carbon emissions. How then do you
establish a fair way of cutting emissions? In a re-run of John Rawls’s
‘original position’ debate, we might agree that, in the distribution
of cuts, the poor should be protected most. The problem with
Rawls’s argument is that people are always aware of where
they are in the economic pecking order. It is far more difficult to
negotiate cuts fairly when everyone has their eyes open and is able
to compare standards of living against levels of pollution.

The problem is that we now have globalization of information

and trade. People in developing nations can see and aspire to
the level of consumption (and resulting pollution) enjoyed in the
wealthiest countries. That sets an aspirational benchmark, and it
is difficult to argue that someone who pollutes little should enjoy
less by way of goods and services simply to compensate for the
additional pollution pumped into the atmosphere by those who are
accustomed to enjoy more.

Hence climate change is perhaps the ultimate challenge to political

systems. It demands a set of values, power relations, and economic
systems that are integrated for universal benefit, rather than the
more limited scope of national or personal interests.

It has not been possible, especially in this last chapter, to give any
systematic exposition of what philosophers have said on each of
these issues – a book could be written on each of them, and many
have! All that is attempted here is to give some overview of the
crucial questions that need to be addressed.

276
 10 THINGS TO REMEMBER
1 International trade, finance and multiculturalism require us to
think beyond the politics of the nation-state.

2 International organizations only have the collective authority

of the nations that support them, making enforced compliance
difficult.

3 Kant thought peace could only be achieved by international

commerce and the abolition of national armies.

4 In general, each state is sovereign within its borders, and

any interference in that state by external forces may only be
justified by reference to the just war principles.

5 Globalization creates legal problems, since laws are related to

states, whereas global organizations span different states and
thus come within different legal systems.

6 There is debate about the degree to which moral considerations

can, or should, influence a state’s foreign policy.

7 The debate about fairness, following the work of Rawls,

can be applied globally.

8 Global issues generally require a balance between long-term

goals that depend on altruism and national self-interest.

9 Religion is about lifestyle and moral values as well as beliefs,

and cannot therefore be separated from the political agenda.

10 The climate change agenda is likely to require a radical

re-thinking of personal and political values, which will
entail a new level of transparency and honesty on the part
of governments.

10. The global perspective 277

 Postscript: what hope humankind?
In October 2007 Al Gore, former Vice-President of the USA, along
with The Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their work on researching
and campaigning to make the world more aware of the threats of
global warming and the part that human activity contributes to
it. Why the Peace prize? Because you cannot separate out issues
of peace and conflict from those of sustainable development and
ecology. All the issues are now interrelated.

That being the case, we are likely to see an increasingly varied

agenda for political philosophy in the future. The days when it
was relevant to determine how best an independent sovereign state
should conduct its political and economic life are fast diminishing.
Business, communication, the threat of terrorism, the threat to the
environment and the banking system are all global. Isolationism
is a diminishing possibility. States that would like to hide their
activities from the outside world are now frustrated by the ability
of individuals to use the web and mobile phones to communicate
beyond their borders. Nations may maintain their identity – and
so they should, for they carry with them a huge wealth of history
and culture. But just as Aristotle recognized that man was basically
a political animal, and therefore participation in the life of the
polis was integral to personal fulfilment, so nations now find their
fulfilment by engaging in the global political process.

The debates of 50 years ago are well behind us. No longer do we

find capitalist and socialist blocs facing one another. Certainly, in
terms of the aspirations of nations globally, liberal democracy and
free-market capitalism are the political systems of choice. But, as
has been shown so clearly by the problems of the ‘war on terror’ or
the assumption that people, once freed from their existing regimes,
will automatically opt for liberal democracy, the future is far from
certain.

278
Whether we like it or not, the future of humankind, as a species,
depends on finding solutions to political issues. Today our main
threat is from global warming and, in addition, there are the
on-going clashes of ideology and the inequalities of military
and economic power that contribute to social unrest and, at its
most extreme, to terrorism. Alongside those, there is the huge
disparity in terms of quality of life between the developed and
developing nations – an injustice which has not been solved by a
global market, and which always has the potential to encourage
resentment and with it political instability.

Economics alone cannot solve such problems, nor can science –

for both can be used for good or ill, depending on the motives
of those who control them. Nor is religion a likely candidate for
global harmony, even if each of the major religions may claim to
offer that prospect, if only everyone were to follow its path. Each
religion comes with cultural and historical baggage which may
divide people as easily as unite them. So, in all probability, the
future of humankind will depend in large measure on a deepening
awareness of the normative – of the principles and values which
make for the good life, expressed through ethics and thus also
through political philosophy.

But that, in turn may well spring from the establishment of a

‘normative anthropology’. Unless we establish some common
ground for understanding what life is for, some vision of the good
life that Aristotle might have recognized, then all politics can
do is negotiate between an infinite number of individual human
preferences.

Sometimes there can be agreement on common projects, when the

threat to all is clearly defined. On other occasions, one can but
stand back in frustration as egos and interests compete. Nowhere is
that clearer than in the political arena. Hence the need for political
philosophy to stand back from the practicalities of the political
process, the power struggles and the ideological battles, and
constantly re-examine the fundamental ideas and principles that
guide the political sphere of life.

Postscript: what hope humankind? 279

 Glossary
The following is a selection of terms used in this book, gathered
here for quick reference. For more information on each of them,
please refer to the relevant index entry.

absolutist Used of moral arguments that suggest that it is

possible, in theory, to find moral principles that can
be applied universally.

altruism The unselfish consideration of others.

amoral An action that, with respect to the person who

performs it, is done without reference to any moral system.

anarchy The view that society would benefit from an absence

of law, allowing each individual to be self-regulating.

capitalism The economic system under which goods and services

may be traded for profit in a generally competitive environment,
and individuals or organizations own the means of production.

categorical imperative An absolute obligation, independent of

anticipated results, that forms the basis of moral action. In
Kant’s philosophy, it denotes that an action is right only if
one could wish the principle upon which one acts to become
a universal law, and that persons should be treated as ends,
never simply as means.

communism The political view that property and the means of

production should be under common ownership, with each
giving as able and receiving according to need.

communitarian Describes the view that political reality is

always embedded within a community, rather than a theory
applying to individuals.

280
conservatism The political view that places emphasis on
established traditions and values.

contractualism The view that social and political entities

originate in, or are justified with reference to, contractual
agreements between the parties involved.

deep ecology The view that nature should be protected for its
own sake, not just for the benefit of human kind.

democracy Used of a political system in which political

authority is established by the people, using a voting
system, either directly (in small organizations, or in ancient
city-states) or through elected representatives (in modern
representative democracies).

determinism Philosophical view to the effect that every

act is totally conditional and therefore that agents are
not free.

emotivism The ethical theory that moral assertions are in fact

the expression of emotions (i.e. to say something is wrong
means that you dislike it).

empiricism The theory that all knowledge is based on sense

experience.

epistemology The theory of knowledge.

eudaimonia Greek term for ‘living well’ in a broad sense

of both comfortable living and living in accordance with
moral principles. It is sometimes loosely translated as
‘happiness’.

existentialism A philosophy concerned with individual self-

understanding and the problems and finite nature of human
existence.

Glossary 281
 fascism A political philosophy that gives the interests of the
state priority over those of individual citizens. Fascism thus
tends to be both authoritarian and nationalistic, and the
term ‘fascist’ is loosely used to describe either tendency.

forms, theory of Used of Plato’s view of the existence of

universals, in which particular instances participate.

hedonism The moral view that the quest for happiness is the
goal of human life.

humanism A cultural movement, emphasizing the dignity of

humankind and the centrality of human reason as opposed
to the unquestioning acceptance of tradition.

ideology The structure of ideas that forms the basis for a

political or economic system.

justice Used of the ordering of society in a way that reflects

established moral principles.

liberalism The political view that emphasizes the freedom of

the individual within society.

libertarianism The view that the individual should be free

from social and political restraints (as opposed to the more
moderate liberal view that allows freedom only in so far as it
does not prevent others from enjoying it also, and thus takes
the overall freedom and benefit of society into account).

logos The Greek term for ‘word’, used by the Stoics for the
fundamental rationality in the universe and therefore
the basis of a ‘natural law’ approach to ethics and politics.

metanarrative An overall framework of thought or narrative

used to interpret the past (used within the philosophy of
history and challenged by postmodernism).

282
modernism A general term for the self-conscious approach to
philosophy and the arts, developed particularly in the first
half of the twentieth century.

nationalism A view that gives priority to the interests of one’s

own nation.

natural law The view that a rational interpretation of the

structures of existence can serve as a guide to moral and
political thought.

neo-conservatism A view, sceptical about the value of social

planning and international agreements, that seeks to base
policy on the imposition of conservative values.

normative Used of an ethical or political argument concerning

‘norms’ or values (i.e. an argument about what should
happen, rather than what does happen).

normative anthropology A view about the meaning and purpose

of human life, expressed in terms of values or ‘norms’.

polis Greek term for a city-state (e.g. ancient Athens).

political ecology The consideration of politics in the light of

the environment and its needs.

positive discrimination The deliberate enhancement of the

opportunities available to those groups who might otherwise
be deemed to be discriminated against and therefore treated
unfairly.

postmodernism A movement in philosophy and the arts which

rejects the ‘modernist’ concept of a self-conscious, authentic,
creative self, along with any absolute or global truths, and
accepts a relativist view of the variety of cultural and social
phenomena.

Glossary 283
 pragmatism The idea that a theory should be assessed
according to its practical use, its implications for other
areas of knowledge and its coherence with other beliefs.

preference utilitarianism The utilitarian theory based on the

satisfaction of the preferences of the individuals concerned.

prescriptivism The view that, in saying that something is

‘right’ one is not describing a quality, but ‘prescribing’ or
recommending a course of action.

rationalism The theory that all knowledge is based on reason

rather than experience.

relativism The view that there are no absolute truths, but

that what is deemed to be true depends on the views of
individuals or societies.

scepticism A philosophical view that doubts any claims to

knowledge and certainty.

socialism The political view that emphasizes social justice

and a concern for the poorer sections of society, and the
responsibility of a government to regulate society
accordingly.

utilitarianism An ethical theory according to which actions are

justified in terms of the anticipated benefit they offer; often
summed up as seeking ‘the greatest good for the greatest
number’.

utopian Used of a description of an ideal state, following the

tradition of Thomas Moore’s book Utopia, describing the
political arrangements on a fictional island of that name.

virtue ethics A moral theory based on the development and

promotion of qualities and virtues that embody the good life.

284
Taking it further
The following is a short selection of titles that might prove useful
for those wanting to further their studies in political philosophy.

Balot, Ryan, K. (2006) Greek Political Thought, Blackwell.

Blacksell, M. (2006) Political Geography, Routledge.

Daniels, N. (1975, 1989) Reading Rawls, Stamford University Press.

Fukuyama, F. (2006) America at the Crossroads: Democracy,

Power and the Neoconservative Legacy, Yale University Press.

Gorz, A. (1994) Capitalism, Socialism, Ecology, trans.

Chris Turner, Verso.

Hampton, J. (1997) Political Philosophy, Westview Press.

Ignatieff, M. (2005) The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of

Terror, Princeton University Press.

Kymlicka, Will. (2002) Contemporary Political Philosophy

(2nd ed.), Oxford University Press.

Miller, D. (2003) Political Philosophy: a very short introduction,

Oxford University Press.

Quill, L. (2006) Liberty after Liberalism, Palgrave Macmillan.

Roberts, Peri and Sutch, Peter. (2004) An Introduction to

Political Thought: a conceptual toolkit, Edinburgh University Press.

Rosen, M. and Wolff, J. (eds) (1999) Political Thought, Oxford

University Press.

Taking it further 285

 Scanlon, T.M. (2003) The Difficulty of Tolerance, Cambridge
University Press.

Singer, P. (2004) The President of Good and Evil: Taking

George W. Bush Seriously, Granta Books.

Singer, P. (2009) The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End
World Poverty, Picador.

Swift, A. (2006) Political Philosophy: A Beginners’ Guide for

Students and Politicians (second edition), Polity Press.

White, M.J. (2003) Political Philosophy: An Historical

Introduction, Oneworld Publications.

Wolff, J. (2006) An Introduction to Political Philosophy

(revised edition), Oxford University Press.

In addition to these, the following classic texts are available in

various printed editions, and some are available to be downloaded
from the web:
Aristotle Politics
Augustine The City of God
Bentham Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
Berlin Four Essays on Liberty
Burke Reflections on the Revolution in France
Hobbes Leviathan
Locke Two Treatises on Government
Machiavelli The Prince
Marx The Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital
Mill On Liberty and The Subjection of Women
Paine Rights of Man
Plato The Republic
Rawls A Theory of Justice
Rousseau The Social Contract
Wollstonecraft A Vindication of the Rights of Women

286
 Philosophy and Ethics website
The Philosophy and Ethics website, hosted by the author, has
a section on political philosophy, providing further suggestions
for study, including lists of relevant books and websites on this
and related topics. The author also welcomes comments and
questions through the site www.philosophyandethics.com

Credits

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Taking it further 287

 Index
absolutist, 5, 281 deep ecology, 102, 282
altruism, 281 democracy, x–xi, 2, 6, 7, 12, 20, 24,
amoral, 281 27, 33–4, 36, 52, 59, 60–70, 76–7,
anarchism/anarchy, 75, 81–2, 80, 103, 112, 125–30, 159–60,
171–3, 219, 281 165, 168, 193, 210, 229, 233–4,
Arendt, Hannah, 8, 80–1, 124, 252–3, 275, 282
235 Derrida, Jacques, 203
Aristotle, xii, 5–6, 22–4, 35–9, 42, Descartes, 185
47, 85, 108, 122, 126, 155–6, 179, despotism/dictatorships, 2,
187, 252, 266, 279 98–9, 134, 143, 171, 225, 275
determinism, 132, 282
Beauvoir, Simone de, 192 Diogenes, 40, 47, 81
Bentham, Jeremy, 86, 107, 126, Dworkin, Ronald, 8, 125, 166, 175
162–4, 185, 269
Berlin, Isaiah, 7, 133–4, 143, 147, emotivism, 10, 282
166 empiricism, 282
Burke, Edmund, 6, 82–3, 160, 184, environmentalism, 75, 100–2,
185 105, 232–3
epistemology, 282
capitalism, 91, 109–13, 130, equality, 13, 76, 85, 106–29,
266, 281 184–209, 210
categorical imperatives, 6, 148, existentialism, 147, 185, 282
281
communism, xi, 7, 75, 85, 88–90, fairness, xiv–xv, 2, 13, 85, 106–30,
103, 249, 281 226, 277
communitarianism, 119, 172, 184, fascism, 7, 75, 97, 283
198, 282 Finnis, John, 163–4, 166
conservatism, 75, 82–4, 105, 111, forms, theory of, 283
115, 282 Foucault, Michel, 8, 203
Constant, Benjamin, 141–2 Fox, Charles James, 245
contractarianism, 52 freedom, 13–15, 76–7, 107, 131–53,
contractualism, 73, 117, 282 192–3, 210, 226–7, 248

288
Fukuyama, Francis, 15–16, 83–4, libertanianism, 77, 165, 283
103, 240, 246 Locke, John, xiii, 6, 9, 12, 41, 55–9,
72–3, 101, 161, 167–8, 170, 181, 241
Gentile, Giovanni, 97–8 logos, 283
Gilligan, Carol, 195 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 203
globalization, 16, 19, 104, 105,
114, 249–77 MacCallum, Gerald, 147
Godwin, William, 81 Machiavelli, Niccolò, xiii, 5–6, 9,
Gorz, André, 8, 93–5, 100, 144, 204 17, 43–5, 47, 98, 126, 226, 269
Marx, Karl, xiii, 6–7, 12, 74–5,
Habermas, Jürgen, 8, 81 87–91, 98, 105, 113, 115, 130, 133,
Hayek, Friedrich von, 7, 90 185, 203, 249
hedonism, 283 metanarratives, 203, 210, 283
Hegel, Georg, 6–7, 74–5, 88, 98, Mill, John Stuart, xv, 6–7, 62,
133, 185, 198, 203 78, 84, 86–7, 107, 123, 134–7,
Heidegger, Martin, 97, 147 139, 141, 144, 150, 153, 171, 177,
Hobbes, Thomas, xii, 6, 41, 48, 52–6, 179–80, 183, 185, 190–2, 194,
68, 72–3, 167, 170–1, 218, 221, 241 208–10, 227
humanism, 283 modernism, 284
Hume, David, 6, 64–5, 71, 146, multiculturalism, 10, 20, 186,
174–5, 181, 183, 269 199–202, 210, 248, 250

ideology, 75–7, 283 nationalism, 75, 97, 105, 284

natural subordination, 38–9,
Jenkins, Simon, 242 156
justice, xiv–xv, 2, 13, 25, 76, neo-conservatism, 16, 83–4,
114–15, 154–83, 283 284
neo-liberalism, 78–9, 111, 113,
Kant, Immanuel, 6–7, 74, 116, 126, 250, 263–4
143, 148, 164, 184–5, 187, 189, Nietzsche, Friedrich, 6–7, 12,
198, 225–6, 254–6, 277 96–7, 120, 126, 182, 188–9
Kropotkin, Peter, 81 normative anthropology, 11, 279,
284
law, 26, 36–7, 43, 149–83, 162, normative philosophy, 3, 9, 20,
246–7, 264, 284 26, 284
liberalism, xi, 7–8, 17, 70, 75, Nozick, Robert, 8, 119–20, 164–6,
78–80, 83, 103, 105, 159, 219, 283 219

Index 289
 Owen, Robert, 85–6 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, xv, 6, 12,
48, 65–9, 72–3, 81, 143, 148, 153,
Paine, Thomas, 6, 82–3, 160–1, 177, 187–90
189–90, 218 Russell, Bertrand, xv, 85
Plato, xii, 5–6, 9, 22–3, 25, 27–36,
47, 51, 67, 85, 108, 120, 126, 129, Sartre, Jean-Paul, xv, 8, 147, 185,
135, 155, 171, 175–7, 182, 186, 188, 189
227, 252, 268 scepticism, 285
polis, 22–5, 29, 31, 34, 36, 40, 47, Singer, Peter, 218, 270
124, 144, 155, 284 Smith, Adam, xiii, 79, 259
political authority, 13, 167–71, socialism, 75, 85–7, 91–2, 103, 110,
174, 183 115, 220, 285
political ecology, 16, 101–2, 105, Socrates, xv, 23, 25, 26, 28, 51
284 states and nations, xiii, 38, 59,
political integrity, 59–60, 178, 211–31, 248, 252–8, 277
68–9
Popper, Karl, 7, 90 terrorism, 13, 16, 43, 211, 240–6,
positive discrimination, 194–5, 248
284 thought experiments, 11, 69, 116,
postmodernism, 10, 31, 202–4, 118, 130, 175
210, 284 tyranny, 33, 48
pragmatism, 285
prescriptivism, 10, 285 utilitarianism, 2, 6, 11, 20, 86,
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 81 107–12, 117–18, 130, 165, 180,
185, 191, 201, 231, 245, 285
rationalism, 285 utopian, 285
Rawls, John, xiv–xv, 8, 11, 69,
115–20, 130, 146, 164, 166, 185, virtue ethics, 26, 285
202, 254, 270, 277
relativism, 31, 202, 204–7, 285 war, 211, 235–41, 248
religion, 16, 41–3, 159, 198, White, Michael, 11, 279
204–10, 243–4, 270–2, 277 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 189–90,
rights, 2, 13, 16, 154–83, 210, 226, 210
245 women’s rights, xv, 8, 16, 184–209

290