1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERSON DASMARINAS , October 4, 2017, G.R.

No. 203986
https://www.scribd.com/document/454044385/6-People-vs-Dasmarinas
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISENTE PEPAÑO NUÑEZ, OCTOBER 4, 2017,
G.R. No. 209342
FACTS:
On July 2, 2006, accused-appellant Nuñez was apprehended by the Philippine
National Police Regional Intelligence Office on the premise that he was the same ''Paul
Pobre" identified in the Information. Upon arraignment, Nuñez moved that the case
against him be dismissed as he was not the "Paul Pobre" charged in the Information.
However, prosecution witnesses identified him as one (1) of the alleged robbers and his
motion to dismiss was denied. The information was then amended to state Nuñez's
name in lieu of “Paul Pobre." During trial, the prosecution manifested that it would be
adopting the evidence already presented in the course of Marciales and Nabia's trial.
Apart from this, it also recalled prosecution witnesses Ronalyn Cruz (Cruz) and Relen
Perez (Perez). In their testimonies, they both positively identified Nuñez as among the
perpetrators of the crime.
Nuñez testified in his own defense and recalled the circumstances of his
apprehension. He stated that when he was apprehended on July 2, 2006, he was on
his way to his aunt's fish store where he was helping since 1999 when a man
approached him. He was then dragged and mauled. With his face covered, he was
boarded on a vehicle and brought to Camp Vicente Lim in Laguna. He further claimed
that on June 22, 2000, he was in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal with his aunt at her fish store
until about 5:00 p.m. before going home. At home, his aunt's son fetched him to get
pails from the store and bring them to his aunt's house.
On February 24, 2010, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision finding Nuñez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is the same person,
earlier identified as Paul Pobre?
RULING: NO. Contrary to the conclusions of the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
Court, this Court finds that it has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is thy same person identified as Paul Pobre.
The dangers of the misplaced primacy of eyewitness identification are two (2)-pronged:
on one level, eyewitness identifications are inherently prone to error; on another level,
the appreciation by observers, such as jurors, judges, and law enforcement officers of
how an eyewitness identifies supposed culprits is just as prone to error: The problem
of eyewitness reliability could not be more clearly documented. The painstaking work
of the Innocence Project, Brandon Garrett, and others who have documented wrongful
convictions, participated in the exonerations of the victims, and documented the role
of flawed evidence of all sorts has clearly and repeatedly revealed the two pronged
problem of unreliability for eyewitness evidence: (1) eyewitness identifications are
subject to substantial error, and (2) observer judgments of witness accuracy are
likewise subject to substantial error. The bifurcated difficulty of misplaced reliance on
eyewitness identification is borne not only by the intrinsic limitations of human
memory as the basic apparatus on which the entire exercise of identification operates.
It is as much the result of and is exacerbated by extrinsic factors such as
environmental factors, flawed procedures, or the mere passage of time. Domestic
jurisprudence recognizes that eyewitness identification is affected by “normal human
fallibilities and suggestive influences.”
People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995), introduced in this jurisdiction the
totality of circumstances test, which relies on factors already identified by the United
States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972): (1) the witness’
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of
the identification procedure. A witness’ credibility is ascertained by considering the
first two factors, i.e., the witness’ opportunity to view the malefactor at the time of the
crime and the witness’ degree of attention at that time, based on conditions of visibility
and the extent of time, little and fleeting as it may have been, for the witness to be
exposed to the perpetrators, peruse their features, and ascertain their identity. The
totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the length of time
between the crime and the identification made by the witness. “It is by now a well-
established fact that people are less accurate and complete in their eyewitness
accounts after a long retention interval than after a short one.” Ideally then, a
prosecution witness must identify the suspect immediately after the incident. This
Court has considered acceptable an identification made two (2) days after the
commission of a crime, not so one that had an interval of five and a half (5 1/2)
months. The passage of time is not the only factor that diminishes memory. Equally
jeopardizing is a witness’ interactions with other individuals involved in the event. As
noted by cognitive psychologist Elizabeth F. Loftus, “[p]ost[-]event information can not
only enhance existing memories but also change a witness’ memory and even cause
nonexistent details to become incorporated into a previously acquired memory.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO PINEDA, G.R. No. 141644, May 27,
2004
FACTS: Rolando Pineda together with several others allegedly staged a hold-upwhile
on board a bus. The police invited Camilo Ferrer, bus driver, to identify the
perpetratorsof the crime from photographs the police showed to him. Like Ferrer,
Ramosalso gave a statement regarding the incident. Unlike Ferrer, Ramos
candidlyadmitted that he could not identify any of the perpetrators.The police later
arrested appellant based on an out-of-court identificationby Ferrer. Ferrer first
identified appellant and Sison through mug shots thepolice presented to them.
Although he testified against Colet, SPO1 Carlito Alas("SPO1 Alas"), the investigating
police officer, admitted that there were only twophotographs presented to Ferrer.
The police showed Ferrer only thephotographs of appellant and his co-accused
Sison.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the prosecution
witnessespositively identified him as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
HELD:No. In resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of
suspects,courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider
thefollowing factors: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the perpetrator of thecrime;
(2) the witness’ degree of attention at the time; (3) the accuracy of anyprior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty shown by thewitness of his identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and theidentification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.Although showing mug shots of
suspects is one of the establishedmethods of identifying criminals,the
procedure used in this case isunacceptable. The first rule in proper
photographic identification procedure isthat a series of photographs must be shown,
and not merely that of thesuspect.The second rule directs that when a witness is
shown a group ofpictures, their arrangement and display should in no way suggest
which one ofthe pictures pertains to the suspect.In the present case, there was
impermissible suggestion because thephotographs were only of appellant and Sison,
focusing attention on the twoaccused.The police obviously suggested the identity of
the accused by showingonly appellant and Sison’s photographs to Ferrer and
Ramos.The testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos show that their identification ofappellant
fails the totality of circumstances test. The out-of-court identificationof appellant casts
doubt on the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos in court.
In its decision, the trial court relied on the testimonies of Ferrer andRamos to prove
that appellant is one of the perpetrators. On closerexamination, however, we
see that Ferrer and Ramos failed to establish thatwhat they saw of the perpetrators is
sufficient to produce an accurate memoryof the incident. During direct examination,
Ferrer testified that one of theperpetrators, who poked a gun at his nape, did not allow
him to turn back hishead. There was limited opportunity for Ferrer, while driving the
bus, to see theperpetrators.
4. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMAN MENESES, G.R. No. 111742
March 26, 1998n
https://www.scribd.com/document/449877837/4-PEOPLE-vs-MENESES-CASE-
DIGEST

5. PEOPLE vs. FRED JACOLO and NOEL CABILOGANG.R. No. 94470, December 16,
1992
https://www.scribd.com/document/458233597/FORENSICS-CASE-5-AND-7-docx

6. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO EVANGELISTA G.R. Nos. 84332-

7.
https://www.scribd.com/document/393754967/People-v-Timon

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