EN BANC

[G.R. No. 180088. January 19, 2009.]

MANUEL B. JAPZON , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

JAIME S. TY , respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rules 64 1 and 65 2 of the

Revised Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution 3 dated 31 July
2007 of the First Division of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
and the Resolution 4 dated 28 September 2007 of COMELEC en banc, in SPA No. 07-
568, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. SAHIaD

Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty

(Ty) were candidates for the O ce of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by ling before the
COMELEC a Petition 5 to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certi cate of Candidacy on the
ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a
former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then
Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a
Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a
citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty led his
Certi cate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a
resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year
before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign
country. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he
never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a
period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991. In fact, even after ling his application for reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31
October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover, although Ty already took his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself
as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce
his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws. Hence, Japzon
prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disquali cation of Ty from
running for public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
In his Answer 6 to Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568, Ty admitted that he was a
natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a
naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to ling his Certi cate of
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 Candidacy for the O ce of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos,
Ty led with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an
application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty
executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz,
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty
applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the
Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a
Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his
Community Tax Certi cate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which
he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC
dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) nally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly
notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. Given the aforementioned facts, Ty
argued that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American
citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore,
Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568. STcADa

Pending the submission by the parties of their respective Position Papers in SPA
No. 07-568, the 14 May 2007 elections were already held. Ty acquired the highest
number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007. 7
Following the submission of the Position Papers of both parties, the COMELEC
First Division rendered its Resolution 8 dated 31 July 2007 in favor of Ty.
The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of
Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to
wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective public o ce, and the purpose of the citizenship quali cation is none
other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Evidences revealed that [Ty] executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T.
Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover,
neither is [Ty] a candidate for or occupying public o ce nor is in active service as
commissioned or non-commissioned o cer in the armed forces in the country of
which he was naturalized citizen. 9

The COMELEC First Division also held that Ty did not commit material
misrepresentation in stating in his Certi cate of Candidacy that he was a resident of
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before
the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that:
Although [Ty] has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was
naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship
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 and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the
elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy[.]

As held in Coquilla vs. Comelec:

"The term 'residence' is to be understood not in its common

acceptation as referring to 'dwelling' or 'habitation', but rather to 'domicile'
or legal residence, that is, 'the place where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).'
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the
place where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). DCaEAS

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in

Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in
1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without
any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration
laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident
alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for
naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, §1427(a) of the United States Code
provides:

Requirements of naturalization: Residence

(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter,
shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) year immediately preceding
the date of ling his application for naturalization has resided
continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within
the United States for at least ve years and during the ve years
immediately preceding the date of ling his petition has been physically
present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has
resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the United
States in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months,
(2) has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the
application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all
period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good
moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United
States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States. (Emphasis added)
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to
the United States by virtue of a 'greencard', which entitles one to
reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does
naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines.

Records showed that after taking an Oath of Allegiance before the Vice
Consul of the Philippine Consulate General on October 2, 2005, [Ty] applied and
was issued a Philippine passport on October 26, 2005; and secured a community
tax certi cate from the Municipality of General Macarthur on March 8, 2006.
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 Evidently, [Ty] was already a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar for more than one (1) year before the elections on May
14, 2007. 1 0 (Emphasis ours.)

The dispositive portion of the 31 July 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. 1 1 cDEHIC

Japzon led a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution of the

COMELEC First Division. On 28 September 2007, the COMELEC en banc issued its
Resolution 1 2 denying Japzon's Motion for Reconsideration and a rming the assailed
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, on the basis of the following ratiocination:
We have held that a Natural born Filipino who obtains foreign citizenship,
and subsequently spurns the same, is by clear acts of repatriation a Filipino
Citizen and hence qualified to run as a candidate for any local post.

xxx xxx xxx

It must be noted that absent any showing of irregularity that overturns the
prevailing status of a citizen, the presumption of regularity remains. Citizenship is
an important aspect of every individual's constitutionally granted rights and
privileges. This is essential in determining whether one has the right to exercise
pre-determined political rights such as the right to vote or the right to be elected to
office and as such rights spring from citizenship.

Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus presumed that every person is

a citizen of the country in which he resides; that citizenship once granted is
presumably retained unless voluntarily relinquished; and that the burden rests
upon who alleges a change in citizenship and allegiance to establish the fact.

Our review of the Motion for Reconsideration shows that it does not raise
any new or novel issues. The arguments made therein have already been
dissected and expounded upon extensively by the rst Division of the
Commission, and there appears to be no reason to depart from the wisdom of the
earlier resolution. We thus a rm that [Ty] did not commit any material
misrepresentation when he accomplished his Certi cate of Candidacy. The only
ground for denial of a Certi cate of Candidacy would be when there was material
misrepresentation meant to mislead the electorate as to the quali cations of the
candidate. There was none in this case, thus there is not enough reason to deny
due course to the Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent James S. Ty. 1 3

Failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to

file the instant Petition for Certiorari, relying on the following grounds:
A. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY DISREGARDED THE
PARAMETERS SET BY LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE ACQUISITION
OF A NEW DOMICILE OF CHOICE AND RESIDENCE. 1 4 DCcIaE

B. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY REFUSED TO CANCEL
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 [TY'S] CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, AND CONSEQUENTLY DECLARE
[JAPZON] AS THE DULY ELECTED MAYOR OF GEN. MACARTHUR,
EASTERN SAMAR. 1 5

Japzon argues that when Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his
domicile of origin. Ty did not establish his residence in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, just because he reacquired his Philippine
citizenship. The burden falls upon Ty to prove that he established a new domicile of
choice in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, a burden which he failed to discharge. Ty
did not become a resident of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by merely executing
the Oath of Allegiance under Republic Act No. 9225.
Therefore, Japzon asserts that Ty did not meet the one-year residency
requirement for running as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.
The one-year residency requirement for those running for public o ce cannot be
waived or liberally applied in favor of dual citizens. Consequently, Japzon believes he
was the only remaining candidate for the O ce of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, and is the only placer in the 14 May 2007 local elections.
Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July
2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively;
to issue a new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certi cate of
Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
As expected, Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty,
the COMELEC already found su cient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007
local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence
without violating the well-entrenched rule that ndings of fact of the COMELEC are
binding on the Court. Ty disputes Japzon's assertion that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed Resolutions, and avers that the said
Resolutions were based on the evidence presented by the parties and consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. Even assuming that Ty, the winning candidate
for the O ce of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, is
indeed disquali ed from running in the local elections, Japzon as the second placer in
the same elections cannot take his place. CTHDcE

The O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty

failed to meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a
mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. The OSG opines that Ty was
unable to prove that he intended to remain in the Philippines for good and ultimately
make it his new domicile. Nonetheless, the OSG still prays for the dismissal of the
instant Petition considering that Japzon, gathering only the second highest number of
votes in the local elections, cannot be declared the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, even if Ty is found to be disquali ed
from running for the said position. And since it took a position adverse to that of the
COMELEC, the OSG prays from this Court to allow the COMELEC to le its own
Comment on Japzon's Petition. The Court, however, no longer acted on this particular
prayer of the COMELEC, and with the submission of the Memoranda by Japzon, Ty, and
the OSG, it already submitted the case for decision.
The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised in
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 the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to
work in the USA and eventually became an American citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty
reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in
Los Angeles, California, USA, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225. 1 6 At this point, Ty still held dual citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was
only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary
public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a
natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain 1 7 his Philippine citizenship despite
acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such
circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch
on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its
provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of
such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of
the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same
time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino
with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.
Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: TAacCE

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Those seeking elective public o ce in the Philippines shall meet
the quali cations for holding such public o ce as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the ling of the certi cate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who
reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for
public o ce, he must: (1) meet the quali cations for holding such public o ce as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public o cer authorized to
administer an oath.
That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March
2007 , he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary
public. By the time he led his Certi cate of Candidacy for the O ce of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007 , he had already
effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.
The other requirement of Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225 pertains to the
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 qualifications required by the Constitution and existing laws.
Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution left it to Congress to enact a local
government code which shall provide, among other things, for the qualifications ,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of
local o cials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.
Pursuant to the foregoing mandate, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160,
the Local Government Code of 1991, Section 39 of which lays down the following
qualifications for local elective officials:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local o cial must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to
be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language
or dialect.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent
component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one
(21) years of age on election day. TaSEHD

The challenge against Ty's quali cation to run as a candidate for the O ce of
Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, centers on his
purported failure to meet the one-year residency requirement in the said municipality.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to "dwelling" or "habitation", but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is,
"the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi)." 1 8
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, 1 9 the Court already
acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish
residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American
citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the
USA, as his domicile of choice.
As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Ty's reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or
effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did
not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his
new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from
the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his
birth.
How then could it be established that Ty indeed established a new domicile in the
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 Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines?
In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 2 0 the Court provided a
summation of the different principles and concepts in jurisprudence relating to the
residency quali cation for elective local o cials. Pertinent portions of the ratio in
Papandayan are reproduced below:
Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the
issue of whether or not a candidate has complied with the residency requirement
for elective positions. The principle of animus revertendi has been used to
determine whether a candidate has an "intention to return" to the place where he
seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an
"abandonment" of his former residence which signi es an intention to depart
therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of
the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the
respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that
respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card
holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he
ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disquali ed
under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881). TcCDIS

I n Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, respondent

Jose Ong, Jr. was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd District of
Northern Samar. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld
his election against claims that he was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this
Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino, applied the concept of animus revertendi or "intent
to return", stating that his absence from his residence in order to pursue studies or
practice his profession as a certi ed public accountant in Manila or his
registration as a voter other than in the place where he was elected did not
constitute loss of residence. The fact that respondent made periodical journeys to
his home province in Laoag revealed that he always had animus revertendi.
In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on
Elections, it was explained that the determination of a person's legal residence or
domicile largely depends upon the intention that may be inferred from his acts,
activities, and utterances. In that case, petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had
obtained the highest number of votes in the local elections of February 1, 1988
and who had thus been proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was disquali ed
by the COMELEC for lack of residence and registration quali cations, not being a
resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC ruled that the
attempt of petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence one year before the
election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of
governor of the province of Leyte was proof that she considered herself a resident
of Ormoc City. This Court a rmed the ruling of the COMELEC and held that
petitioner Larrazabal had established her residence in Ormoc City, not in Kananga,
Leyte, from 1975 up to the time that she ran for the position of Provincial
Governor of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to show that she
and her husband maintained separate residences, i.e., she at Kananga, Leyte and
her husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte
through the years did not signify an intention to continue her residence after
leaving that place.
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 In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile"
and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence", as used in the election
law, imports not only an intention to reside in a xed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
"Domicile" denotes a xed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case,
petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980's in
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure from the
country of petitioner, because of the EDSA People's Power Revolution of 1986, to
go into self-exile in the United States until favorable conditions had been
established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an abandonment of residence.
The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an inde nite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.

Ultimately, the Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that it is the fact of

residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the residency qualification requirement. IcTaAH

As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with the one-year residency
requirement for running for public office is a question of fact. Its determination requires
the Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties before the COMELEC.
The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence
presently before this Court, found that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. It is
axiomatic that factual ndings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which
have acquired expertise in their eld are binding and conclusive on the Court. An
application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is con ned to instances of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process,
considering that the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling
within its domain. 2 1
The Court even went further to say that the rule that factual ndings of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is
absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such ndings, should
be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself — on a level higher than statutory administrative
organs. The factual nding of the COMELEC en banc is therefore binding on the Court.
22

The ndings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in

the speci c matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only
respect but even nality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial,
not preponderance, of evidence is necessary. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides that in cases led before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. 2 3
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 The assailed Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the
COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively, were both supported by substantial
evidence and are, thus, binding and conclusive upon this Court.
Ty's intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine
passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A.
Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years
2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and
securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini St.,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for
and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, since his arrival on 4 May 2006 , inarguably, just
a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. Japzon maintains that Ty's
trips abroad during said period, i.e., to Bangkok, Thailand (from 14 to 18 July 2006),
and to the USA (from 31 October 2006 to 19 January 2007), indicate that Ty had no
intention to permanently reside in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines. The COMELEC First Division and en banc, as well as this Court, however,
view these trips differently. The fact that Ty did come back to the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, after said trips, is a further
manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to
the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To
the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where
one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. 2 4 The Court also notes, that even
with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the
14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily
determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only
consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile
in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. CSTDEH

Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with
the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14
May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC, 2 5 the Court did not nd anything wrong in
an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he
is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence
for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found in
the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had established
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May
2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a
candidate for the O ce of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of
votes.
Finally, when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence quali cation of a
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 candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the
purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor's right to the o ce,
the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to
give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. 2 6 To successfully challenge
Ty's disquali cation, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately
create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that
our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed
to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
1.Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and
the Commission on Audit. AaCcST

2.Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.

3.Penned by Commissioner Romeo A. Brawner with Presiding Commissioner Resurreccion Z.

Borra, concurring; rollo, pp. 29-36.

4.Penned by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer with Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and
Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner, and
Rene V. Sarmiento, concurring; id. at 37-40.
5.Records, pp. 1-3.

6.Id. at 28-34.

7.Id. at 51.
8.Rollo, pp. 29-36.

9.Id. at 33.
10.Id. at 34-35.

11.Id. at 35.

12.Id. at 37-40.
13.Id. at 38-39.

14.Id. at 10.
15.Id. at 18.

16.According to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
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 have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

17.Depending on when the concerned natural-born Filipino acquired foreign citizenship: if

before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 on 17 September 2003, he may
reacquire his Philippine citizenship; and if after the effectivity of the said statute, he
may retain his Philippine citizenship.

18.Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, 434 Phil. 861, 871-872 (2002).

19.Id. ISTCHE

20.430 Phil. 754, 768-770 (2002).

21.Matalam v. Commission on Elections, 338 Phil. 447, 470 (1997).

22.Dagloc v. Commission on Elections, 463 Phil. 263, 288 (2003); Mastura v. Commission on
Elections, 349 Phil. 423, 429 (1998).
23.Hagonoy Rural Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, 349 Phil. 220, 232 (1998).
24.Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 30 July 1991,
199 SCRA 692, 715-716.

25.G.R. No. 120265, 18 September 1995, 248 SCRA 400.

26.Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra note 20 at 773-774.

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