EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-27786. January 30, 1971.]
NATALIA FERNANDO, PEDRO ANDRES, PONCIANO ANDRES, ADOLFO
ANDRES, FLAVIANA ANDRES, TELESFORO ANDRES and ESTEBAN
ANDRES, JR., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ANASTACIO FRANCO, defendant-
appellant.
Rafael B. Ruiz for plaintiffs-appellees.
Albano, Gonzales & Associates for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J : p
It is beyond dispute that a judgment of conviction in the case of a driver accused
of homicide through reckless imprudence, there being no collusion between the
accused and the offended party, conclusively binds the employer to answer subsidiarily
for the damages awarded. So it has been since the leading case of Martinez v. Barredo.
1 Necessarily then, in this appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte holding defendant-appellant Anastacio Franco, as employer, liable for the
indemnity awarded, the plaintiffs-appellees, 2 the heirs of the deceased who met his
death as a result of being run over by a driver of a passenger truck owned by
defendant-appellant and thereafter prosecuted and convicted for the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence, the only way responsibility may be avoided by defendant-
appellant for the amount in question is for a legal defense su cient in law to defeat
such a claim. He would invoke prescription, basing his defense on the fact that it took
plaintiffs-appellees ve years and eleven months after the accident, but hardly over a
year after the nality of the judgment of conviction for such crime by the Court of
Appeals. On its face, such a defense is without merit. So the lower court held. It is the
only legal issue raised in this appeal before us. The lower court must be sustained.
From the stipulation of facts, it was shown that defendant was authorized to
operate units, trucks or buses for public convenience within the province of Ilocos
Norte; that one of his buses driven by his employee, the driver, Leonardo Cabaron, ran
over a child, Nonito Andres, on January 11, 1958 resulting in his death. Thereafter, May
23, 1958, Leonardo Cabaron was accused in a criminal case for homicide through
reckless imprudence convicted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte which
judgment was a rmed on appeal in September 1962 by the Court of Appeals. Then
came the complaint led on December 12, 1963 where, in addition to the amount of
P6,000.00 given as indemnity, moral damages, attorney's fees and exemplary damages
were sought by plaintiffs-appellees. Even in the lower court the defense raised was that
of prescription. A judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
on October 5, 1965, ordering that the amount of P6,000.00, the indemni cation
awarded the plaintiffs-appellees as heirs in the criminal case against the driver,
Leonardo Cabaron, be paid by defendant to such plaintiffs-appellees.
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Hence this appeal on a question of law, with defendant-appellant expressly
submitting "that the one and only legal issue to be resolved" by this Court "is [whether
or not the instant case has already prescribed]." As was made clear at the outset, the
answer cannot be in doubt. No case for prescription has been made out. The nality of
the judgment of the Court of Appeals a rming the conviction of the driver must have
come at the earliest in October 1962 in a decision having been promulgated in
September of that year. It was only then that there is a legal basis for the claim against
defendant-appellant as employer. As of that time there was no more question as to his
subsidiary liability. The judgment against him had become nal and conclusive. The
assertion therefore that the civil action led on December 12, 1963, scarcely a year
after the right against the employer had accrued, cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
be considered as having prescribed. The defense of prescription is devoid of any
support in law. 3
While there is no such pronouncement to this effect, Manalo v. Robles
Transportation Company, Inc. 4 necessarily points to the conclusion that where a
criminal action has been led for homicide through reckless imprudence against the
driver of the vehicle responsible for such mishap, the codal provision requiring that the
action based on quasi-delict be instituted within four years is not applicable. 5 In this
case, the accident happened on August 9, 1947 and it was not until February 17, 1953,
or after a period of more than ve years, that the parents of the deceased led the
action against the defendant-owner and operator of a taxicab for his subsidiary liability
after the driver had been prosecuted and convicted for homicide through reckless
imprudence. There is no allegation nor can it be shown that the criminal action was not
led within the prescriptive period. The conclusion that prescription can not be relied
upon as a defense is unavailing and is solidly buttressed in law. It may be stated further
that since it was not only in the latter part of October 1962 that the decision against the
driver attained nality and became executory, had plaintiffs relied on suing out a writ of
execution against the employer, it could have had until October 1967 at the latest to
take such a step. Since clearly the case was led on December 12, 1963, there is thus
added reinforcement to the decision of the lower court that there is no legal bar to
holding defendant-appellant subsidiarily liable to plaintiff in this case.
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of October 6, 1965 is a rmed. With costs
against defendant-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. 81 Phil. 1 (1948).
2. The plaintiffs-appellees are: Natalia Fernando, Pedro Andres, Ponciano Andres, Adolfo
Andres, Flaviana Andres. Telesforo Andres and Esteban Andres, Jr.
3. Martinez v. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1 (1948). Cited with approval in Nagrampa v. Mulvaney
McMillan & Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 724 (1955); Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., 99
Phil. 670 (1956); Manalo v. Robles Transportation Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729 (1956); Bantoto
v. Bobis, L-18966, Nov. 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 690; Jocson v. Glorioso, L-22686, Jan. 30,
1968, 22 SCRA 316 M.D. Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, L-23882, Feb. 17,
1968, 22 SCRA 559.
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4. 99 Phil. 729 (1956).
5. Article 1146 of the Civil Code provides: "The following actions must be instituted within
four years: (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff; (2) Upon a quasi-delict."
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