1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7295 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.8343 OF 2019)

STATE OF ODISHA & ANOTHER …PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

ANUP KUMAR SENAPATI & ANOTHER …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7298 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.29313 OF 2018)

CIVIL APPEAL NO 7301 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.32409 OF 2018)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7296 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.16964 OF 2018)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7297 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.17416 OF 2018)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7304 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 22309 OF 2019 ARISING OUT OF
DIARY NO.31807 OF 2018)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  7299­7300 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NOS.31110­31111 OF 2018)
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
NARENDRA PRASAD
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7302 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.4261 OF 2019)
Date: 2019.12.19
12:57:09 IST
Reason:

AND 
 2

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7303 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.6708 OF 2019)

J U D G M E N T 

ARUN MISHRA, J.

1. The question involved in the appeals is whether the employees

are entitled to claim grant­in­aid as admissible under the Orissa (Non­

Government Colleges, Junior Colleges and Higher Secondary Schools)

Grant­in­aid Order, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘the order of

1994’),   after   its   repeal   in   the   year   2004   by   virtue   of   provisions

contained   in   Orissa   (Non­Government   Colleges,   Junior  Colleges   and

Higher   Secondary   Schools)   Grant­in­aid   Order,   2004   (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘the order of 2004’). The order of 2004 has also been

repealed by Orissa (Aided Colleges, Aided Junior Colleges, and Higher

Secondary Schools) Grant­in­aid Order, 2008.

2. Before   the   promulgation   of   the   Order   of   1994,   the   benefit   of

grant­in­aid   to   non­Government   educational   institutions   used   to   be

provided   under   instructions   issued   from   time   to   time   under   the

provisions   of   Orissa   Education   Act,   1969   (hereinafter   referred   to   as

‘the Act').  The same has been amended in the year 1994 by insertion

of the provisions contained in Section 7­C, extracted hereunder:
 3

“7­C.   Grant­in­aid   –  (1)     The   State   Government   shall   within   the

limits of its economic capacity, set apart a sum of money annually
for being given as grant­in­aid to private Educational Institution in
the State.

(2) No   order   according   permission   or   approval   or   recognition

under this Act, whether prior to or after the commencement of the
Odisha Education (Amendment) Act, 1994, shall entitle any private
educational institution to receive grant­in­aid.

(3) Save as otherwise provided, no private Educational Institution
which has not been recognized by the State Government under this
Act shall be entitled to receive any aid from the State Government.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, rule’ executive
order or any judgment, decree or order any Court, no grant­in­aid
shall   be   paid   and   no   payment   towards   salary   costs  or   any  other
expense shall be made to any private educational institution or for
any post or to any person employed in any such institution after the
commencement   of  the  Odisha  Education   (Amendment)  Act,  1994,
except  in  accordance  with an  order or  rule made under this Act.
Grant­in­aid where admissible under the said rule or order, as the
case may be, shall be payable from such date as may be specified in
that rule or order or from such date as may be determined by the
State Government:
Provided that pending framing of such rule or issue of order,
the State Government may, without prejudice to such rule or order,
direct   that   private   educational   institutions   which   were   receiving
grant­in­aid   and   the   posts   in   such   educational   institutions   in
respect of which grant­in­aid was being released shall continue to
be   paid   such   amount   as   grant­in­aid   as   was   being   paid   to   them
immediately   prior   to   commencement   of   the   Odisha   Education
(Amendment) Act, 1994.

(4­a) The   grant­in­aid   to   be   borne   by   the   State   Government   on

account   of   placement   of   a   teacher   in   an   aided   educational
institution   receiving   University   Grants   Commission   scales   of   Pay
under   the   Career   Advancement   Scheme,   shall   be   limited   to   the
extent   as   may   be   admissible   by   computing   the   period   of   service
rendered by him against an approved post with effect from the date
of completion of five years of service against such approved post:
Provided that nothing in this Sub­section shall be construed
as to affect the seniority or any other conditions of service of such a
teacher.

(4­b) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree
or   order   of   any   Court   to   the   contrary,   any   instructions   issued,
actions   taken   or   things   done   on   or   after   the   1 st  day   of   January,
1986   in   regard   to   matters   provided   in   Sub­section   (4­a)   shall   be
deemed to have been validly issued, taken  or done as if the said
Sub­section were in force at all material points of time.
 4

(5) Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any   law,   rule,

executive order or any judgment, decree or order of any Court the
following categories of private educational institutions shall only be
eligible for consideration for payment of grant­in­aid.

(a) Upper   Primary   Schools   imparting   instructions   or

courses   prescribed   by   the   State   Government   to
standards   or   classes   VI   and   VII   or   Sanskrit   Tolls
imparting equivalent courses and Madrasas imparting
equivalent courses in standards or classes from I to
VII or any one or more of such classes.
(b) High   Schools   imparting   instructions   or   course   for
High   Schools   Certificate   Examination   conducted   by
the   Board   of   Secondary   Education,   Odisha   or
institutions   imparting   Madhyama   Course   of   Sri
Jagannath   Sanskrit   University   and   Madrasas
imparting equivalent course.
(c) Higher   Secondary   Schools   or   junior   Colleges
imparting instructions or course for Higher Secondary
Examination   conducted   by   the   Council   of   Higher
Secondary   Education,   Odisha   or   institutions
imparting Upasastri course of Sri Jagannath Sanskrit
University and Madrasas imparting equivalent course.
(d) Colleges   imparting   course   for   B.A.   B.Sc.   or   B.Com.
degrees   of   the   Utkal,   Berhampur   and   Sambalpur
Universities   and   Shastri   of   Sri   Jagannath   Sanskrit
University.

(6) No educational institutions imparting any other courses of
studies   except   those   provided   in   Sub­section   (5)   shall   be
eligible   for   a   grant­in­aid   from   Government.     Educational
institutions   established   and/or   managed   by   Urban   Local
Bodies,   Zilla   Parishads,   Panchayat   Samitis,   and   Grama
Panchayats,   Public   Sector   Undertakings   or   Companies   or
statutory   bodies   shall   not   be   eligible   for   grant­in­aid   under
this Act. 

(7) A   Governing   Body   or   Managing   Committee  desirous   of

availing the facility of grant­in­aid shall make an application
for   the   purpose  within   such   period  and   shall   furnish   such
information   and   documents   including   audited   statement   of
accounts   of   the   institutions   as   may   be   prescribed.     It   shall
furnish  with the application an undertaking  to the effect that
grant­in­aid   sanctioned   for   the   purpose   or   meeting   part   or
whole   of   the   salary   costs   shall   be   disbursed   directly   to
employees  concerned  and  to   refund  any  excess   inadmissible
payment that may have been made.

(8) Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any   law,   rule,

executive order or any judgment, decree or order of any court,
the private Educational  Institutions covered under clauses (a)
and (b) of sub­section (5) recognized after the 31
      March, 2008
st
 5

shall   not   be   entitled   for   any   Grant­in­aid   from   the   State

Government save as provided in sub­section (9).

(9) The private Educational Institutions referred to in clause
(b)  of   sub­section   (5)   located  in   a   Grama   Panchayat   or   in   a
Municipality,   which   is   first   recognized   after   the   31st  March
2011 shall not be entitled for any Grant­in­Aid from the State
Government."                                          
(emphasis supplied) 

It   is   apparent   from   the   provisions   contained   in   Section   7­C(1)

that   the   aid   to   be   provided   by   the   Government   shall   be   within   the

limits of its economic capacity and for that purpose money had to be

set apart annually to be disbursed to private Educational Institution.

Mere fact that an institution has been recognised under the Act, shall

not entitle a private Educational Institution to receive grant­in­aid as

of right and no private educational institution, which is not recognised

by   the   State,   shall   be   entitled   to   claim   any   aid   from   the   State

Government.   Section 7­C(4) provides notwithstanding any law, rule,

executive   order   or   any   judgment,   decree   or   order   of   any   court,   the

private   educational   institution  shall  not  be   entitled   to   receive   aid

except under the order or rules under the Act after the commencement

of  Odisha Education (Amendment) Act, 1994.   The grant­in­aid to be

released under the provisions of the Order of 1994, shall be payable

from such date as may be determined by the State Government.  The

State   Government   has   the   right   to   determine   the   date   for   making

payment   of   grant­in­aid.     The   proviso   to   Section   7­C(4)   enables   the

State   Government   to   continue   grant­in­aid   to   institutions   already

 6

receiving it.  Section 7­C(5) specifies the categories of the educational

institutions eligible to be considered for payment of grant­in­aid.

3. In exercise of the powers under the provisions of Section 7­C of

the Act, the Order of 1994 was issued by the Government published in

the   Orissa   Gazette  on  21.11.1994.     It  provided   grant­in­aid   to   be

released with to the approved posts only.  Paragraph 3 of the Order of

1994   specified   the   categories   of   the   institutions   eligible   for   being

notified as Aided Educational Institutions.   Paragraph 4 of the Order

of   1994   deals   with   the   classification   of   the   Educational   Institutions

and   the   posts   in   such   Institutions.     Paragraph   4   is   extracted

hereunder:

  “4.   For the purposes of this Order, Non­Government Educational
Institutions   specified   in   Sub­Paras   (1)   and   (2)   of   Para   3   and   the
posts   in   such   institutions   shall   be   classified   into   the   following
categories namely: ­ 

A   –   Category   I  (i)  Non­Government   Educational   Institutions   and

approved posts in such institution which have received grant­in­aid
from   Government   or   in   respect   of   which   grant­in­aid   has   been
sanctioned   by   Government   prior   to   the   commencement   of   the
Amendment Act, 

(ii)    Other   posts  in   non­Government   Educational   Institutions

covered under Category­I (i) which were  admissible on the basis of
workload and prevalent yardstick  and had been  filled up prior to
commencement of the Amendment Act, but in respect of which no
grant­in­aid had been sanctioned.

Note – If a question arises whether a post was admissible on the
basis   of   workload   and   prevalent   yardstick,   the   decision   of   the
Director shall be final.

B – Category II (i) Colleges imparting instructions in and presenting
regular candidates for the B.A., B.Sc. or B.Com. Examinations with
or   without   Honours   of   any   of   the   Universities   which   have     been
functioning  regularly for  five years  or more by the 1 st  June 1994
 7

after   obtaining   Government   concurrence   or   recognition   and

affiliation   of   any   University   or   for   three   years   or   more   if   such
institution is located in an educationally backward district, which
has not been notified as an Aided Educational Institution and has
not received grant in aid from Government for any post.

(ii)   Higher   Secondary   Schools   and   Junior   Colleges   conducting

courses   in   Arts,   Science   and   Commerce   which   have   been
functioning regularly for five years or more by the 1 st  June, 1994
after   obtaining   Government   concurrence   or   recognition   and
affiliation   of   the   Council,   or   for   3   years   or   more   if   such   an
institution   is   located   in   any   educationally   backward   district,   but
which have not been notified as Aided Educational Institution and
have not received grant­in­aid from Government for any post.

C – Category III Non­Government Educational Institutions of the
categories specified in Sub­Paras. – (1) and (2) of Para.3 which have
already   been   established   and   have   received   recognition   of
Government   and   affiliation   prior   to   the   commencement   of   the
Amendment Act but do not come within Categories I or II of this
paragraph,   and   such   institutions   which   may   be   established   and
granted recognition by Government under the Act or the provisions
made thereunder and affiliation by the University or the Council, as
the case may be, after the commencement of this Order.”
                                                (emphasis supplied) 

The   Category   I   includes   approved   posts   in   Non­Government

Educational   Institutions   receiving   grant­in­aid   before   the

commencement   of   the  Amendment   Act,   shall   continue   to   receive   it.

Other   posts   in   Non­Government   Educational   Institutions   admissible

for releasing of grant­in­aid were such which had been filled up before

the commencement of  Amendment Act.   Category II consisted of the

colleges which had been functioning regularly for 5 years or more by

1.6.1994,   after   obtaining   Government   recognition/concurrence   and

affiliation of any University.  The period is reduced to 3 years for such

institutions   which   are   located   in   educationally   backward   districts.

 8

Category   III   deals   with   those  institutions  which   do   not   fall   in   the

Category I or Category II and which have already been established and

have received recognition of Government and affiliation of University

or   Council   before   the   commencement   of   the   Amendment   Act   or

thereafter.

Paragraph 5 of the Order of 1994 contains a provision that all

Educational   Institutions   in   Category   I(i)   of   Paragraph   4   shall   be

deemed to  be Aided Educational Institutions, however, in respect of

Categories II and III, as per provision contained in Paragraph 5(2) it is

necessary to fulfil the prescribed conditions. Firstly, an institution has

been   functioning   on   regular   basis   after   recognition   from   the

Government   and   affiliation   from   the   concerned   University   or   the

Council   for   5   years   or   in   the   educationally   backward   district   for   3

years.     It   is   provided   in   Paragraph   5(2)(A)(iii)(a)   that   the   number   of

institutions   to   receive   grant­in­aid   is   to   be   worked   out   as   per

prescribed population ratio.  Under the provisions of Paragraph 5(2)(A)

(v) in case number of eligible institutions to be considered for release

of grant­in­aid during an academic year are more, the Director had to

select   the   educational   institution/institutions   on   considerations   of

average enrolment during the three preceding years; performance of

the institution; availability of infrastructural facilities; maintenance of

discipline and academic standards; and availability of Government or
 9

Aided Educational Institution nearby.   It is not a matter of right that

the   institution   is   entitled   to   claim   grant­in­aid.     The   provision   for

grant­in­aid is made in budget academic year wise. 

Besides, there are other requirements as specified in Paragraph

5 of the Order of 1994, such as, the educational institution has run

continuously; maintained correct record of admissions and attendance

of   students;   accounts   of   receipts   and   expenditure   and   acquittance

rolls   of   salary;   and   other   allowances   paid   to   teaching   and   non­

teaching employees of the institution.  The educational institution has

a Governing Body duly constituted and approved under relevant rules.

The Governing Body of the educational institution has applied in the

prescribed form complete in all respects and in accordance with the

procedure laid down  in the said Order.   The educational institution

has   fulfilled   all   the   criteria   and   the   Director   has   recommended   for

notification of such an institution for grant­in­aid.   The provisions of

Paragraph 5 is extracted hereunder:

  “5. (1) All Non – Government Educational Institutions included in
Category   I  (i) of  Para   4 shall  be  deemed   to   be  Aided  Educational
Institutions for purposes of this Order.

(2)   No   Non­Government   Educational   Institution   falling   within

Category II or Category III or Para 4 shall be eligible to be notified as
an   Aided   Educational   Institution   under   this   Order   unless   it   has
fulfilled the following conditions, namely:­

(A)   (i)   An   institution   being   a   Non­Government   Educational

Institution falling within Category II has been functioning on a
regular basis  after receiving recognition from Government and
affiliation from the concerned University or the Council, as the
case may be, for 5 years or more, or for 3 years or more if such
 10

educational institution is located in an educationally backward
district, prior to 1st day of June 1994. 

(ii)   An   institution   being   a   Non­Government   Educational

Institution falling within Category II has been established and
has   been   functioning   on   regular   basis   after   receipt   of
recognition and affiliation for a qualifying period of five years:

Provided that the qualifying period shall mutatis mutandis be
three years if such an institution is located in an educationally
backward   district   or   is   a   women's   educational   institution
imparting education exclusively to women.

NOTE:   For   the   purposes   of   this   Order,   no   educational

institution   shall   be   deemed   to   be   a   women's   educational
institution unless it has received recognition and affiliation as
such   and   any   such   institution   shall   cease   to   be   a   women's
educational  institution   if  subsequently   it   is  converted  into  a
co­educational   institution.     In   the   event   of   such   conversion,
the   notification   declaring   it   to   be   an   Aided   Educational
Institution, if any, shall be modified.

(iii)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   this   Order,   no

Junior College or Higher Secondary School or college as the
case may be, falling under Category III shall be eligible to be
notified as an Aided Educational Institution if, ­ 

(a) in   the   case   of   a   Junior   College   or   a   Higher   Secondary

School,  there  are   already   two  aided   Junior   Colleges/   Higher
Secondary Schools in that Block or if the institution is located
within an urban area, there are more Aided Higher Secondary
Schools/ Junior Colleges than one for every 50,000 population
subject to a minimum of one.
(b) In   case   of   a   College,   there   is   already   one   aided   Degree
College in that Block or if the Institution is located in an urban
area, there is one Aided College for every one lakh population
subject to a minimum of one.

NOTE – An educational institution conducting B.A., B.Sc. or B.Com.
Degree   Courses   and  Junior   College   or  Higher   Secondary   Courses
shall,   for   the   purposes   of   this   Para,   be   treated   as   two   separate
institutions.”

4. As per the provisions contained in Paragraph 9(1) of the Order of

1994, a teaching or non­teaching post in Category I institution shall

be  deemed   to   be  an   approved   post  for  which   grant­in­aid   has   been
 11

sanctioned   at   any   time   before   insertion   of   Section   7­C.     The   post

which is not covered by Paragraph 9(1), shall be eligible for approval

inter alia subject to conditions that the post was admissible as per the

work­load and the prevalent yardstick before insertion of Section 7­C.

A   post   in   an   Educational   Institution   falling   in   Category   II   was   also

admissible  inter alia  as per work­load and yardstick prescribed vide

Annexure   III.     For  Category   III   post   in   the   institution,   more   or   less

similar riders have been made. 

5. Paragraph 9(2)(E) provides that post has to be filled up for the

qualifying period on a full­time basis, not on an honorary or part­time

basis,   as   per   the   procedure   laid   down   in   the   Act,   Rules,   and

instructions   and   persons   should   be   qualified   to   hold   such   a   post.

Paragraph   9(4)   provides   for   the   date   of   eligibility   of   a   post.     The

provisions contained in Paragraph 9(4) are extracted hereunder:

“9. (4) (i) The date of eligibility of a post in respect of which grant­in­
aid has been sanctioned prior to commencement of the Amendment
Act shall be the date on which the posts were admitted to the fold of
grant­in­aid for the first time.

(ii) The date of eligibility of a  post for which grant­in­aid has not
been sanctioned shall be the first day of the academic year following
the date on which an approved post completes the qualifying period
as applicable to the post:

Provided   that   the   date   of   eligibility   in   respect   of   a   post   in   an

educational institution coming within category II or III shall in no
case be a date prior to 1­6­1994.”
 12

6. As per Paragraph 10(3), a post in Category I institution for which

no grant­in­aid has been sanctioned before the commencement of the

Amendment Act shall be eligible to receive grant­in­aid at the rate to

be increased phase­wise manner.

7. As   per   provisions   in   Paragraph   16   of   the   Order   of   1994,   a

proposal   for   obtaining   grant­in­aid   has   to   be   submitted   by   the

Governing Body to the Director and unless a person is lawfully and

validly appointed and possesses qualification and experience shall be

not   eligible   for   receiving   grant­in­aid.     Paragraph   16   is   extracted

hereunder:

  “16. (1) On receipt of a proposal from the Governing Body under
Para 15, the Director shall examine each case and if he is satisfied
that   the   person   proposed   by   the   Governing   Body   is   eligible   to
receive   grant­in­aid   against   an   approved   post,   he   shall   make   an
order to that effect.   Where the Director is satisfied that a person
proposed by the Governing Body is not eligible to receive grant­in­
aid, his decision shall be communicated to the Governing Body.  For
the purpose of satisfying himself as to the eligibility of a person to
receive   grant­in­aid,   the   Director   may   call   for   any   information,
clarification   or   document   that   he   considers   necessary   for   the
purpose.

(2)   No   person   shall   be   eligible   to   receive   grant­in­aid   against   an

aided post unless – 

(i) he has been lawfully and validly appointed to that post by the
competent   authority   in   accordance   with   the   law,   rules,   and
instructions in force at the time of his appointment and has been
continuing to hold that post on and beyond the date of eligibility of
the post to receive grant­in­aid; and

(ii) he possessed educational qualifications and experience required
for holding that post at the time of his recruitment or on the date
the post was admissible to grant­in­aid, whichever is later.”
 13

8. It   is   apparent   from   the   provisions   that   grant­in­aid   cannot   be

claimed as a matter of right merely on completion of the prescribed

period.     It  is  dependent  upon   fulfilment  of   various  conditions.     The

Director is competent to examine the case concerning the post filled

up before 1.6.1994. Moreover, it is discretionary to avail the benefit of

grant in aid. There is no compulsion for the institution to apply for it.

9. The Government considering the financial constraint has decided

to repeal the Order of 1994 substituting it by Order of 2004 with effect

from   5.2.2004,   promulgated   in   exercise   of   powers   conferred   under

Section   7­C(4)   of   the   Act.     A   significant   departure   had   been   made

instead of salary cost to be given to the institution of the staff under

the   Order   of   1994,   the   concept   has   been   changed   to   block   grant,

which shall be a fixed sum of grant­in­aid determined by the taking

into account salary and allowance as on 1.1.2004.   The quantum of

block grant has been made dependent upon the economic capacity of

the Government as provided in Section 7­C(1) of the Act and it shall

not deal with the salary and allowance payable to any such employee

by the Governing Body from time to time.  Paragraph 3 is reproduced

hereunder:

  “3.   Admissibility   of   Grant­in­aid­   (1)   Every   private   educational

institution   being   a   Non­Government   college,   Junior   College   or
Higher Secondary School which has become eligible by the 1 st June
1994 to be notified as aided educational institution pursuant to the
Grant­in­aid  Order,   1994   shall  be   notified  by  the  Government   as
required under Clause (b) of Section 3 of the Act and the institution
 14

so notified shall be entitled to receive grant­in­aid, by way of block
grant, determined in the manner provided in the sub­para (2) : 

Provided that a college, in order to be eligible to be notified as an
aided   educational   institution,   must   not   have   more   than   two
ministerial staff and two peons.

(2) The block grant payable to the private educational institutions
under sub­para (1) shall be a fixed sum of grant­in­aid, which shall
be determined by taking into account the salaries and allowances,
as   on   the   1st  day   of   January,   2004,   of   the   teaching   and   non­
teaching employees of the educational institution which has become
eligible   to   receive   grant­in­aid   by   the   1st  day   of   June,   1994   in
accordance   with   the   Grant­in­aid   Order,   1994,   but   the
determination of the quantum of such block grant shall be within
the limits of economic capacity of Government as mentioned in Sub­
section (1) of Section 7­C of the Act and shall have no linkage with
the   salary   and   allowance   payable   to   any   such   employee   by   the
Governing Body from time to time :

Provided that no educational institution shall be notified to receive
such   block   grant   unless   it   satisfies   the   performance   criteria   as
envisaged in Clause (ii) and (vii) of Sub­section (1) of Section 7­D of
the Act.”

10. The provision as to repeal and saving contained in Paragraph 4

of the Order of 2004 is extracted hereunder:

 “4. Repeal and saving – (1) The Odisha (Non­Government Colleges,
Junior Colleges, and Higher Secondary Schools) Grant­in­aid Order,
1994 is hereby repealed, save for the purposes mentioned in sub­
para (1) of para 3. 

(2)   Notwithstanding   the   repeal   under   sub­para   (1),   the   private

educational   institutions   which   are   in   receipt   of   any   grant­in­aid
from Government under the Order so repealed immediately before
the date of commencement of this Order shall continue to receive
such grant­in­aid, as if the Grant­in­aid Order, 1994 had not been
repealed.”

The   Order   of   1994   has   been   repealed   save   for   the   purposes

mentioned   in   Paragraph   3(1).     Paragraph   4(2)  of   the   Order  of   2004

contains provisions concerning private educational institutions which
 15

are in receipt of any grant­in­aid under the Order so repealed, shall

continue to receive the same. 

11. Later   on,   the   State   Government   has   promulgated   grant­in­aid

Order of 2008 notified with effect from 7.1.2009.   The Order of 2004

has been repealed with certain savings. The eligibility of educational

institutions   is   dealt   with   in   Paragraph   3   of   the   Order   of   2004.   The

eligibility   criteria   for   consideration   of   Block   Grant   is   prescribed   in

Paragraph 4.  Paragraph 16 provides for components and admissibility

of   Block   Grant   and   Paragraph   20   deals   with   repeal   and   saving.

Paragraphs 3, 4, 16 and 20 are extracted hereunder:

  "3.   Eligible   Educational   Institutions—The   following   Non­

Government   Educational   Institutions   shall   only   be   eligible   for
consideration   for   Block   grant   for   being   notified   as   Aided
Educational Institutions under Clause (b) of Section 3 of the Act,
namely:­ 

(1) Higher Secondary Schools or Junior Colleges recognised by
Government   and   affiliated   to   the   Council   imparting
instructions   and   presenting   regular   candidates   for   Higher
Secondary Examination in Arts, Science or Commerce streams
conducted by the said Council.

(2) Colleges recognised by Government and affiliated to any of
the Universities imparting instruction and presenting regular
candidates   for   the   +3   Arts,   +3   Science   and   +3   Commerce
Degree   Examinations   of   the   Utkal,   Berhampur,   Sambalpur,
Fakir   Mohan,   North   Orissa   Universities   and   Ravenshaw
Unitary University with or without Honours.
*** *** ***

4.     Eligibility   criteria   for   consideration   for   Block   Grant—(1)   The

educational   institutions   described   in   Para   3   which   have   been
established   with   recognition   of   Government   and   affiliation   of   the
Council or the Universities as the case may be on or before the 1 st
June   1998   in   respect   of   Educationally   Advanced   Districts,   on   or
before   the   1st  June   2000   in   respect   of   Educationally   Backwards
 16

Districts   and   Women’s   Educational   Institutions   established   with

such recognition and affiliation on or before the 1 st  June 2000 in
both   Educationally   Advanced   Districts   and   Educationally
Backwards Districts are eligible for Block Grant to be determined in
the manner specified in Paragraph­16. 

(2) The educational institution to be considered for Block Grant in
accordance   with   this   order   shall   have   received   recognition   and
affiliation   for   each   course,   stream   and   subject   taught   in   that
institution   for   each   academic   year   for   a   continuous   period   of
minimum 5 years in respect of Educationally Advanced District and
3   years   in   respect   of   Educationally   Backward   District   and   a
Women’s Educational Institution without any break or discontinuity
from the date of establishment subject to the provisions of sub­Para
(1) :

Provided that in case of break or discontinuity, to acquire eligibility,
the   said   qualifying   period   shall   be   computed   from   the   date   of
revival.

*** *** ***

16.   Components and admissibility of Block Grant – (1) The Block
Grant   payable   to   the   Non­Government   Educational   Institution
under paragraph 9 shall be a fixed sum of Grant­in­aid, which shall
be determined at the rate of 40% of the emoluments calculated at
the   initial   of   the   existing   time   scale   of   pay   applicable   to   the
employees including existing. Dearness Pay and existing Dearness
Allowance as admissible prospectively from the date of Notification
of the Grant­in­Aid Order, 2008 in favour of the teaching and non­
teaching employees of the educational institution who have become
eligible to receive Grant­in­aid by 1st day of June 2003.  

(2)  The balance emoluments including Dearness Pay and Dearness
Allowance after payment under sub­Para. (1) shall be borne by the
concerned Governing Body of the Aided Education Institution.

*** *** ***

20.   Repeal and Saving—(1) The Orissa (Non­Government Colleges,
Junior Colleges and Higher Secondary Schools) Grant­in­aid Order,
2004   hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   Grant­in­aid   order   is   hereby
repealed,   save   for   the   purposes   of   such   private   educational
institution   being   a   non­Government   College,   Junior   College   or
Higher Secondary School which has become eligible under the said
order to be notified as Aided Educational Institution to be entitled to
receive   Grant­in­aid   by   way   of   Block   Grant   determined   in   the
manner provided in the sub­Para. (2) of Paragraph 3 of the Grant­
in­aid Order, 2004. 

(2)       Notwithstanding   the   repeal   under   sub­Para.   (1),   the   private

educational institutions which are in receipt of any Grant­in­aid or
 17

Block   Grant   from   Government   under   the   orders   so   repealed

immediately before the date of commencement of this Order, shall
continue to receive such Grant­in­aid or Block Grant as the case
may be as if the Orissa (Non­Government Colleges, Junior Colleges,
and Higher Secondary Schools) Grant­in­Aid Order, 1994 and the
Grant­in­Aid Order, 2004 had not been repealed."

It   is   provided   that   such   institutions   established   with

Government recognition and affiliation of Council or Universities, as

the case may be, on or before 1.6.1998 and in respect of Educationally

Backward Districts and Women's Educational Institutions on or before

1.6.2000 were eligible for Block Grant to be determined in the manner

specified in Paragraph 16.  The rate of Block Grant and management's

liability has been provided in Paragraph 9.   The institution shall be

eligible to grant­in­aid in the shape of Block Grant towards 40% of the

salary   cost   of   the   approved   teaching   and   non­teaching   posts.     The

balance   salary   cost   to   be   borne   by   the   Governing   Body   of   the

institutions.  The eligibility of posts for Block Grant is to be as per the

work­load and yardstick, as provided in Paragraph 10.  The work­load

shall   be   determined   regarding   the   actual   enrolment,   strength   of

students, number of candidates presented at the Higher Secondary or

Degree Examination, etc.   Paragraph 11 deals with the disbursement

of   Block   Grant.     As   per   Paragraph   12,   the   Governing   Body   has   to

apply   in   respect   of   eligible   persons   to   receive   Block   Grant   against

approved   posts.     Eligibility   is   conditioned,   inter   alia,   with   aforesaid

riders.   Paragraph 14 limits the liability of the State Government to
 18

provide   grant­in­aid   in   the   shape   of   Block   Grant   to   the   person

appointed lawfully and validly against one notified post at any time.

The   repealing   and   saving   clause   contained   in   Paragraph   20   of   the

Order of 2008.  There is saving to the institution receiving Block Grant

in   the   manner   provided   in   the   Orders   of   1994   and   2004,   shall

continue to receive the same.

12. Thereafter,   Order   of   2009   has   been   promulgated,   notified   and

implemented with effect from 6.6.2009, containing various provisions

in   Paragraph   3   concerning   eligible   educational   institutions,

admissibility of the Block Grant is contained in Paragraph 4 and rate

and   disbursement   of   Block   Grant   as   per   Paragraph   5.     Under   the

Order of 2009, the Block Grant payable shall be a fixed sum of grant­

in­aid,  which   shall be  determined  by taking  into   account  the  initial

basic pay at the pre­revised time scale of pay plus 7 increments plus

Dearness  Allowance at the rate of 41% as  on  1.1.2004 for teaching

and non­teaching employees of such institutions.   The determination

of   the   Block   Grant   shall   be   within   the   economic   capacity   of   the

Government.

It is apparent from the aforesaid Orders promulgated from time

to time under the provisions of Section 7­C of the Act that initially the

Government   made   the   provisions   of   full  cost   salary   in   the   Order   of

1994.     It   was   changed   to   Block   Grant   as   specified   in   the   Order   of

 19

2004.     The   Block   Grant   was   as   per   criteria   changed   and   specified

further in the Orders of 2008 and 2009, depending upon the financial

capacity of the State Government.

13. Shri Ashok Parija, Advocate General appearing for the State of

Odisha submitted that the High Court as well as the State Education

Tribunal   (for   short,   ‘the   Tribunal’)   erred   and   have   acted   in   gross

violation of law to entertain the claims made by the employees.   The

applications were filed in the Tribunal during 2011 and 2012, to claim

release   of   grant­in­aid   under   the   repealed   Order   of   1994.     The

applications   were   filed   belatedly   by   the   employees.   They   were   not

entitled   to   grant­in­aid   under   the   Order   of   1994.     The   grant­in­aid

cannot be claimed as a matter of right.  There are various factors to be

taken into consideration for releasing grant­in­aid.  No representation

was filed by the employees at the relevant time and they have filed the

representations,   writ   petitions,   and   original   applications   belatedly.

Divergent views have been taken in different cases by the High Court.

The High Court and the Tribunal have opined in some of impugned

judgments   and   orders   that   employees   are   entitled   to   grant­in­aid

under the Order of 1994, whereas in  Lokanath Behera v. the State of

Odisha, a Division Bench of the High Court has opined that grant­in­

aid cannot be claimed under the Order of 1994, after its repeal.   We
 20

have been taken through the scheme of the Act and the provisions of

the Orders issued thereunder.

14. Learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   employees   have

submitted   that   right   has   accrued   to   the   employees   to   receive   the

grant­in­aid under the Order of 1994 with respect to the posts which

were   in   existence   and   the   appointment   had   been   made   before

1.6.1994 on completion of 5 years or 3 years, as the case may be.  The

Tribunal   has   allowed   the   application   in   another   matter   in   the   year

2010.   Thereafter, writ petitions were filed on the ground of parity to

claim similar relief and the representation were filed under the order

of   the   High   Court,   which   was   illegally   rejected   by   the   State

Government.     Thereafter,   original   applications   were   filed   before   the

Tribunal,   and   the   same   rightly   has   been   allowed.     The   decision   in

Loknath Behera case does not lay down law correctly as once the right

has accrued and has vested to claim grant­in­aid it cannot be taken

away,   the   orders   passed   by   the   Tribunal   and   High   Court   granting

relief cannot be faulted.   The decision in  Loknath Behera  deserves to

be   set   aside.   The   employees   were   entitled   to   approval   of   their

appointment and payment of grant­in­aid in terms of Order of 1994.

The   Order   of   1994   contains   long­lasting   commitment   towards

extending   the   grant­in­aid   benefits   to   the   educational   institutions.

The communication of the Higher Education Department, Government
 21

of Odisha dated 7.10.2017 indicate that grant­in­aid can be claimed

and   there   is   continuing   eligibility   notwithstanding   the   repeal   of   the

provisions of the Order of 1994. There is no dispute concerning the

method of selection and qualification of the respondents to occupy the

respective posts.   Thus, after completion of the qualifying period, the

grant­in­aid has been rightly ordered to be released.   An office order

was   passed   on   5.7.2011,   informing   the   respondents   that   they   were

approved   for   payment   of   40%   of   Block   Grant   in   terms   of   Order   of

2008.  Thereafter, cases were filed before the Tribunal.  As some of the

colleges are located in educationally backward districts, it would not

be appropriate to deny the payment of a benefit under the Order of

1994.     Similar   benefits   have   been   granted   to   a   large   number   of

colleges by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court.  The employees

cannot be forced to obtain less favourable treatment under the Order

of 2008, which provides for 40% of Block Grant where grant­in­aid is

available   under   the   Order   of   1994   of   salary,   benefits   of   annual

increments,   dearness   allowance,   etc.   which   are   not   included   in   the

Order of 2008. 

15. It is apparent from the provisions contained in Section 5 of the

Act that permission for the establishment of an educational institution

is   imperative.     No   private   educational   institution   which   requires

recognition shall be established except following the provisions of the
 22

Act.   The permission to establish has to be granted on fulfilment of

certain conditions as specified in Section 5.  Section 6 deals with the

recognition of the educational institution.  The institutions in question

are recognised is not in dispute.

16. We   are   concerned   with   Section   7­C   of   the   Act,   which   was

incorporated by the Amendment Act of 1994.   Section 7­C makes it

apparent that Government has to provide grant­in­aid within the limit

of   its   economic   capacity   and   it   has   to   set   apart   a   sum   of   money

"annually"   for   disbursal   of   grant­in­aid   to   the   private   educational

institutions as may be found fit and the institutions/posts have to be

approved by the Director for grant­in­aid.  The grant­in­aid is optional

and an application has to be filed within the specified time limit by an

institution desirous of obtaining it. The release is not automatic, even

on   an   application   filed   to   the   State   Government.     If   the   Governing

Body   of   the   institution   has   not   received   any   grant­in­aid   from   the

State Government and opts to receive it, has to apply for that purpose

during the current session of the academic year concerned, for which

budgetary   provision   has   to   be   made   by   the   State   Government.     An

application   for   receiving   the   grant­in­aid   has   to   be   dealt   with

considering various factors as enumerated in the Order of 1994 i.e.,

the post has been filled up continuously for the qualifying period of 5

years/ 3 years, as the case may be, employees to have qualification
 23

and experience. It also depends on attendance in the institution, the

number   of   students,   work­load,   the   validity   of   the   appointment,

various other information has also to be furnished regarding date of

appointment   and   other   details   as   provided   in   Paragraph   15   of   the

Order of 1994.  As per Paragraph 16 of the Order of 1994, the Director

has to examine each case individually.   In terms of Paragraph 5(2)(v),

the   Director   has  to   ascertain   primary   conditions   i.e.,   number   of

institutions existing in the area.  The Director shall select educational

institution   within   the   permissible   economic   limits   considering   the

educational   needs   of   the   area,   average   enrolment   within   preceding

three   years,   average   number   of   students,   performance   of   the

institution in the examination, availability of infrastructural facilities,

maintenance of discipline and academic standards, ratio of population

vis­a­vis to number of institutions and availability of Government or

Aided   Educational   Institution   in   the   nearby   area.     The   educational

institution   must  have   been   imparting  instruction   regularly  following

the regulations of the University or the Council as the case may be;

the Educational Institution has not refused to conduct an examination

of the Council or University as the case may be, courses run are only

as per the recognition or affiliation. 

17. A   Non­Government   Educational   Institution   eligible   to   be   and

desirous of being notified as an Aided Educational Institution, has to
 24

apply in Form A.  The application shall be made within 3 months from

the   date   of   completion   of   the   qualifying   period   of   eligibility.     The

Director   may   extend   the   period   for   good   and   sufficient   reasons   as

provided in Paragraph 7(2) of the Order of 1994.  Further requirement

as   provided   in   Paragraph   9   is   that   of   work­load   and   the   other

yardsticks.   The work­load shall be determined regarding the actual

enrolment during the academic year in which post is admissible for

aid and should have completed the qualifying period.  The post has to

be filled up on a full­time basis, not on an honorary or part­time basis.

If any post admissible for aid based on work­load and yardstick has

not been filled up in the manner prescribed, that period shall not be

counted towards computation of the qualifying period.  As provided in

Paragraph 9(3), the Director, on his satisfaction that a post is eligible

for approval, shall issue an order to that effect with prior concurrence

of the State Government indicating therein the date from which the

post has been approved and the date of eligibility of post to receive the

grant­in­aid considering various other factors.

18. It   is   crystal   clear   from   the   scheme   of   the   Order   of   1994   that

grant­in­aid has to be claimed within the period prescribed and the

Director on good and sufficient cause shown may extend the period,

otherwise it cannot be claimed.  Even after completion of 5 years and

3 years period, as the case may be, there is no automatic accrual of
 25

right for receiving grant­in­aid.   It is dependent upon the opinion of

Director which educational institution/institutions shall be the best to

cater to the need of the area.

19. The   employees   have   filed   representations   to   claim   grant­in­aid

under Order of 1994 belatedly for the first time in the year 2011­12

that   too   according   to   the   directions   of   the   High   Court,   which   were

rejected.     Thereafter,   they   approached   the   Tribunal   by  way   of   filing

original applications, whereas on completion of the qualifying period,

the institution has to inform the Director to claim grant in aid. There

is no material on record that the institutions have duly applied in the

particular   academic   year   and   within   the   time   fixed   for   making

application   as   per   the   Order   of   1994   and   there   is   nothing   on   the

record   indicating   that   the   requisite   information   was   furnished.     No

such supporting documents have been placed on record.  Be that as it

may.   Fact remains that there is no order placed on record whether

such prayer if any made by the institution had been rejected as per

the Order of 1994.   The representations which have been placed on

record are of 2011­12, as the grant­in­aid is annual, dependent upon

economic limits and financial viability of the State Government, it was

too late in the day to file the original applications or writ petitions in

the year 2011­12, claiming the benefit of grant­in­aid under the Order
 26

of   1994.     In   case   employees/institutions   were   desirous   of   obtaining

grant­in­aid under the Order of 1994, they ought to have taken the

steps within the reasonable time in view of the fact that it cannot be

claimed as a matter of right, but it depends upon annual budget and

fulfilment   of   various   factors   as   contained   in   the   provisions   of   the

Order of 1994.  

20. In our opinion, the prayer made to release grant­in­aid under the

Order   of   1994   after   its   repeal   was   misconceived   and   would   not   be

possible for any Government within the economic capacity to release

the   grant­in­aid   retrospectively.    Delay   by   itself   defeats   the   right,   if

any, to claim the grant­in­aid which is dependent upon the option of

the institution to apply for it.   They may choose not to apply for the

grant­in­aid   as   it   comes   with   several   riders   as   imposed   by   the

Government.     Thus,   original   applications   filed   belatedly   after   the

repeal of the Order of 1994, could not have been entertained at all and

the   employees   filing   the   applications   after   repeal   of   Order   of   1994,

cannot be said to be entitled for any relief owing to laches having slept

over their right, if any, available under the Order of 1994.  

21. The   next   question   which   we   take   up   for   consideration   is

concerning the effect of the repeal of the Order of 1994, by the Order

of 2004.  The provisions contained in Paragraph 4 of the Order of 2004
 27

has repealed the Order of 1994 save for the purposes in Paragraph

3(1).     Paragraph   3(1)   provides   every   private   educational   institution

being a Non­Government College, Junior College or Higher Secondary

School which has become eligible by 1.6.1994 to be notified as aided

educational institution under the Order of 1994, shall be notified by

the Government as required under Section 3(b) of the Act and shall be

entitled to receive grant­in­aid by way of block grant in the manner

provided in Paragraph 3(2).  The proviso to Paragraph 3 makes it clear

that a college to be eligible as an aided educational institution must

not have more than two ministerial staff and two peons.  There is no

other  saving  of   the   Order  of   1994.     However,   Paragraph   4(2)  of   the

Order   of   2004   provides   notwithstanding   the   repeal   of   the   Order   of

1994, the private educational institutions which are in receipt of any

grant­in­aid from the Government under the Order so repealed shall

continue to receive the grant­in­aid as if the Grant­in­aid Order, 1994

had   not   been   repealed.     Thus,   it   is   clear   that   in   case   a   college   is

receiving grant­in­aid, with respect to a post, shall continue to receive

it under the Order of 1994, however, in case it was not receiving the

grant­in­aid as saving of the Order of 1994 is only entitled for block

grant under Paragraph 3(1), not eligible for receiving the grant­in­aid

under the Order of 1994. The saving of Order of 1994 is for a limited

purpose   that   the   institution   shall   continue   to   receive   grant­in­aid

 28

concerning the posts which had been sanctioned before the repeal of

the order of 1994. 

22. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 also deals with the

effect of repeal, which is extracted hereunder:

 “6. Effect   of   repeal.   Where   this   Act,   or   any   1   [Central   Act]   or

Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any
enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a
different intention appears, the repeal shall not

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the
repeal takes effect; or

(b) affect   the   previous   operation   of   any   enactment   so   repealed   or

anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued
or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect
of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of
any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or
punishment   as   aforesaid,   and   any   such   investigation,   legal
proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and
any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if
the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.”

The provisions contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act

stipulate   that   by   the   repeal   of   enactment,   the   benefit   given   to   the

person concerned shall not be affected.  However, the repeal shall not

revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal

takes place.   The previous operation of any enactment or anything is

duly done or suffered thereunder shall not be affected or any right,

privilege,   obligation   or   liability   acquired,   accrued   or   incurred   under

 29

any enactment so repealed.  However, the best guide is found in what

has been saved is by reference to the repealing provisions in the order

of 2004 which are clear and unambiguous.

23. In  Principles   of   Statutory   Interpretation,   14 th  Edition   by   Justice

G.P. Singh, following observation has been made:

  “The   distinction   between   what   is,   and   what   is   not   a   right

preserved   by   the   provisions   of   Section   6,   General   Clauses   Act   is
often one of great fineness 1.   What is unaffected by the repeal of a
statute is a right acquired or accrued under it and not a mere ‘hope
 or   expectation   of',   or   liberty   to   apply   for,   acquiring   a   right 2.    A
distinction is drawn between a legal proceeding for enforcing a right
acquired or accrued and a legal proceeding for acquisition of a right.
The   former   is   saved   whereas   the   latter   is   not.    In   construing
identical provisions of section 10 of the Hong Kong Interpretation
Ordinance, LORD MORRIS speaking for the Privy Council observed:
“It may be, therefore, that under some repealed enactment, a right
has been given, but that, in respect of it, some investigation or legal
proceeding   is   necessary.     The   right   is   then   unaffected   and
preserved.  It will be preserved even if a process of quantification is
necessary.     But   there   is   a   manifest   distinction   between   an
investigation in respect of a right and an investigation which is to
decide  whether  some  right  should or should  not  be given.   On  a
repeal, the former is preserved by the Interpretation Act.  The latter
is   not3.     The   LORD   CHANCELLOR’S   (LORD   HERSCHELL’S)
observations   in  an   earlier   Privy  Council  case,   that   “mere  right   to
take   advantage   of   an   enactment   without   any   act   done   by   an
individual towards availing himself of that right cannot property be

1 Free Lanka Insurance Co. v. Ranasinghe, (1964) 1 All ER 457, p.462 : 1964 AC 541 (PC);
Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1989 SC 1614, p. 1621 : 1989 (2) SCC 557.
2 Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang, (1961) 2 All ER 721, p. 731 : (1963) 3 WLR 39 (PC);
Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan, supra; Gajraj Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal,
AIR 1997 SC 412, p. 426 : (1997) 1 SCC 650.
3 Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang, (1961) 2 All ER 721, p. 731 : (1963) 3 WLR 39 (PC).
Also referred  to in  Free Lanka Insurance Co. v. Ranasinghe,  (1964) 1 All ER 457, p.462 :
1964 AC 541 (PC) [Interpretation of section 6(3). Ceylon Interpretation Ordinance, 1900];
Isha Valimohamad v. Haji Gulam Mohamad, AIR 1974 SC 2061, p. 2065 : (1974) 2 SCC 484;
M.S. Shivananda v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation,  AIR 1980 SC 77, p. 81 :
(1980) 1 SCC 149; Kanaya Ram v. Rajinder Kumar, (1985) 1 SCC 436, p. 441 : AIR 1985 SC
371 ;  Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan,  AIR 1989 SC 1614, p. 1623 : 1989 (2) SCC 557;
Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 2156, p. 2159 : (1991) 4
SCC   333;  P.V.   Mohammad   Barmay   Sons   v.   Director   of   Enforcement,  AIR   1993   SC   1188,
p.1192 : (1992) 4 JT 565; Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH v. Steel Authority of India, JT 1999 (8)
66, pp.98, 108 : AIR 1999 SC 3923, p. 3942; Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amrit Lal
& Co., AIR 2001 SC 3580, p.3589 : (2001) 8 SCC 397.
 30

deemed a right accrued4”, are not to be understood as supporting
the view that if steps are taken under a statute for acquiring a right,
the   right   accrues   even   if   the   steps   taken   do   not   reach   the   stage
when the right is given5, nor do the said observations support the
view that if no steps are taken for enforcement of a right come into
existence,   the   right   is   not   an   accrued   right 6.     As   explained   by
SINHA,   C.J.   the   observations   of   LORD   HERSCHLL   are   only
authority  for  the  proposition   that  “the  mere  right,  existing  at   the
date of a repealing statute to  take advantage of  provisions of  the
 statute   repealed   is   not   a   right   accrued 7.     Inchoate   or   contingent
rights and liabilities, i.e., rights and liabilities which have accrued
but   which   are   in   the   process   of   being   enforced   or   are   yet   to   be
enforced are unaffected for clause (c) clearly contemplates that there
will be situations when an investigation, legal proceeding or remedy
may have to be continued or resorted to before the right or liability
can  be enforced8.   Such a right  or liability is not  merely a  ‘hope’
which is destroyed by the repeal9.
*** *** ***
It is submitted that as pointed out by SIMON BROWN, L.J.,
the   two   expressions   are   generally   used   in   saving   legislations   to
convey   the   same   idea   and   are   not   mutually   exclusive.     Yet   a
possible distinction may be made between cases where some step,
after the Act comes into force, is needed to be taken by the claimant
for   getting   the   right   and   cases   where   the   Act,   without   anything
being further done by the claimant confers the right.  In the former
class of cases, it would be a right acquired after the necessary step
is   taken   whereas   in   the   latter   class   of   cases   it   would   be   a   right
accrued by mere force of the Act.
*** *** ***
The right of a tenant, who has the land for a certain number of
years and who has personally cultivated the same for that period ‘to
be deemed to be protected tenant’ under the provisions of a statute
has been held to be an accrued right which will survive the repeal of
the statute10 .  Similarly, a right conferred by an Act that every lease
shall be deemed to be for a period of ten years is a right acquired
and will be unaffected by repeal of the Act 11.  But the so­called right
4 Abbot v. Minister of Land, (1895) AC 425, 431: 72 LT 113 (PC).
5 Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang, (1961) 2 All ER 721, p. 732, 733 (PC).
6 Sakharam   v.   Manikchand,  AIR   1963   SC   354,   pp.   356,   357.  See   further  Hungerford
Investment Trust v. Haridas Mundhra, AIR 1972 SC 1826, p. 1832: (1972) 3 SCC 684; Lalji
Raja & Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram, AIR 1971 SC 974, p. 979 : (1971) 1 SCC 721; Zoharabi v.
Arjuna,  AIR 1980 SC 101, p. 102 : (1980) 2 SCC 203 ;  Kanaya Ram v. Rajinder Kumar,
(1985) 1 SCC 436, p. 441 : AIR 1985 SC 371 ; Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1989 SC
1614, pp.1621, 1622; Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH v. Steel Authority of India, JT 1999 (8) 66,
p. 107, 108 : AIR 1999 SC 3923, pp.3947, 3948 : (1999) 9 SCC 334.
7 Sakharam v. Manikchand, supra.
8 Plewa v. Chief Adjudication Officer, (1994) 3 All ER 323, p.331 : (1995) 1 AC 249 : (1994) 3
WLR 317 (HL) (For this case see also text and note 74, p.588).
9  Aitken v. South Hams District Council,  (1994) 3 All ER 400, p. 405 : (1995) 1 AC 262 :
(1994) 3 WLR 33 (HL).
10 Sakharam v. Manikchand, AIR 1963 SC 354 : 1962 (2) SCR 59.
11 Hiralal v. Nagindas, AIR 1966 SC 367 : 1964 (6) SCR 773.  For other vested rights in the
context of landlord and tenant, see Ishverlal v. Motibhai, AIR 1966 SC 459 : 1966 (1) SCR
 31

of a statutory tenant to protection against eviction under a Control
of Eviction Act is mere advantage and not a right in the real sense
 and   does   not   continue  after  repeal  of  the  Act. 12.  Similarly   on  the
reasoning that the right of a tenant to get standard rent fixed and
not to pay contractual rent in excess of standard rent under a Rent
Control Act is only a protective right and not a vested right, it has
been   held   that   when   during   the   pendency   of   an   application   for
fixation of standard rent, the Act is amended and it ceases to apply
to the premises in question, the application is rendered incompetent
and has to be dismissed as infructuous.13
*** *** ***
The option given to a grantee to make additional purchases of
Crown land on fulfilment of certain conditions under the provisions
of the statute was held to be not an accrued right when the statute
was repealed before the exercise of the option.14
A privilege to get an extension of a licence under an enactment
is  not  an   accrued   right  and  no  application   can  be   filed   after   the
repeal of the enactment for renewal of the licence.15
***  *** ***
The right or privilege to claim benefit of condonation of delay is
not an accrued right under a repealed provision when the delay had
not occurred before the repeal of the said provision.16
The   right   of   pre­emption   conferred   by   an   Act   it   is   remedial
right or in other words a right to take advantage of an enactment for
acquiring a right to land or other property and cannot be said to
have been acquired or accrued until a decree is passed and does not
survive if the Act is repealed before passing of the final decree. 17
The   right   of   a   Government   servant   to   be   considered   for
promotion   in   accordance  with   existing  rules  is  not   a  vested   right
and does not survive if the Government takes a policy decision not
to fill up the vacancy pending revision of the rules and the revised
rules   with   repeal   the   existing   rules   do   not   make   him   eligible   for
 promotion. 18.

367. 
12  Qudrat Ullah v. Bareilly Municipality, AIR 1974 SC 396 : (1974) 1 SCC 202. The same
result will follow if the Act ceases to apply to certain tenancies by an amendment made by
the   Legislature   or   by   a   notification   issued   by   the   Government   in   exercise   of   a   power
conferred by the Act: D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India, 1995 (1) SCC 104: 1994 AIR SCW 5011;
Parripati Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Alapati Jalaiah, 1995 (3) Scale 197: AIR 1995 SC 1781 :
(1995)   3   SCC   709.   (Even   pending   proceedings   will   be   affected);  Ambalal   Sarabhai
Enterprises   Ltd.   v.   Amrit   Lal   &   Co.,   AIR   2001   SC   3580   :   (2001)   8   SCC   397   (pending
proceedings will be affected).
13 Vishwant Kumar v. Madanlal Sharma, AIR 2004 SC 1887, pp.1888, 1889 : (2004) 4 SCC
1.
14 Abbot v. Minister of Lands, (1895) AC 425, 431 (PC).
15  Reynolds v. A.G. for Nova Scotia,  (1896) AC 240 : 65 LJ PC 16 : 74 LT 108 (PC).  See
further Gajraj Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1997 SC 412, p.422 : (1997)
1 SCC 650 (The text in this book from 6th Edition, p.418 is quoted).
16 Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 2156, p. 2160: 1991
(4) SCC 333.
17  Nirmala   Devi   v.   Renuka,   AIR   1973   MP   120  approved  in  Krishna   Dass   Agarwal   v.
Kanhaiyalal, AIR 1996 SC 3464: 1996 (9) SCC 488.
18 Ramulu (Dr.) v. S. Suryaprakash Rao (Dr.), AIR 1997 SC 1803, p.1808: 1997 (3) SCC 59.
 32

General   savings   of   rights   accrued,   and   liabilities   incurred

under a repealed Act by force of section 6, General Clauses Act, are
subject   to   a   contrary   intention   evinced   by   the   repealing   Act. 19  In
case   of   a   bare   repeal,   there   is   hardly   any   room   for   a   contrary
intention;20 but when the repeal is accompanied by fresh legislation
on the same subject, the provisions of the new Act will have to be
looked into to determine whether and how far the new Act evinces a
contrary   intention   affecting   the   operation   of   section   6,   General
Clauses   Act.21  …..When   a   saving   clause   in   a   new   Act   is
comprehensively worded and is detailed, it may be possible to infer
that it is exhaustive and expresses an intention not to call for the
application of section 6, General Clauses Act.22”

24. It   is   apparent   from   the   aforesaid   discussion   that   what   is

unaffected by the repeal of a statute is a right acquired or accrued and

not   mere   hope   or   expectation   of   or   liberty   to   apply   for   acquiring   a

right.  There is a distinction in making an application for acquiring a
19 Karam Singh v. Pratap Chand, AIR 1964 SC 1305, p. 1309 (para 10) : (1964) 5 SCR 647 ;
Ishverlal v. Motibhai, AIR 1966 SC 459, p.466 : 1966 (1) SCR 367.
20 By a subsequent statute a penal section in an earlier statute ceased to have effect and
was also repealed.   It was held that even such a double repeal did not show a contrary
intention and prevent prosecution for an offence committed before the repeal; Commissioner
of Police v. Simeon, (1982) 2 All ER 813 : (1983) 1 AC 234 : (1982) 3 WLR 289 (HL).
21  State  of   Punjab  v.   Mohar  Singh,  AIR   1955  SC   84,  p.88   :  (1955)   1  SCR   833  ;  Indira
Sohanlal   v.   Custodian   of   E.P.,  AIR   1956   SC   77,   p.   83   :   (1955)   2   SCR   1117   ;  Brihan
Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate v. Janardan,  AIR 1960 SC 794, p. 795 : (1960) 3 SCR 85;
Mahadeolal v. Administrator General of WB, AIR 1960 SC 936, pp.938, 939 (para 7) : (1960)
3 SCR 578; State of Kerala v. N. Sami Iyer, AIR 1966 SC 1415, pp.1417, 1418; Jayantilal v.
Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 1193, p.1196 : (1972) 4 SCC 174;  T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe,
AIR 1983 SC 150, p.156 : (1983) 1 SCC 177; Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1989 SC
1614, p.1619 : (1989) 2 SCC 557; Manphul Singh Sharma v. Ahmedi Begum, JT 1994 (5) SC
49,   p.53   :   (1994)   5   SCC   465;  D.   Srinivasan   v.   The   Commissioner,  AIR   2000   SC   1250,
p.1255 : (2000) 3 SCC 548. For the construction of a Saving Clause which opens with the
words ‘Save as expressly provided in this Act', see S.N. Kamble v. Sholapur Municipality, AIR
1966 SC 538 : (1966) 1 SCR 618. For a saving clause which preserves old rights but applies
new procedure, see Ramachandra v. Tukaram, AIR 1966 SC 557: 1966 (1) SCR 594.
22  Kalawati Devi v. CIT, AIR 1968 SC 162, p.168 : (1967) 3 SCR 833;  ITO, Mangalore v.
Damodar,  AIR 1969 SC 408, p.412 : (1969) 2 SCR 29;  Mahmadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota
Shaikh v. Union of India, (2009) 2 SCC 1 para 34 (f) : (2008) 13 Scale 398. But see Tiwari
Kanhaiyalal v. Commissioner of Income­tax, AIR 1975 SC 902 : (1975) 4 SCC 401, which
holds that the detailed savings contained in section 297, of the Income­tax Act, 1961 are
not exhaustive.   Recourse, in this case, was taken to section 6, General Clauses Act for
holding that a person's liability for an offence under section 52 of the Income­tax Act, 1922
continued even after its repeal.   In  Commissioner of Income­tax, U.P. v. Shah Sadiq and
Sons,  (1987) 3 SCC 516, p.524: AIR 1986 SC 1217. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act
was again applied to continue the right of set­off accrued under section 24(2) of the 1922
Act after its repeal by the 1961 Act.
[Note: For convenience, the cases/citations in the extracts has been renumbered.]  
 33

right.  If under some repealed enactment, a right has been given, but

on investigation in respect of a right is necessary whether such right

should be or should not be given, no such right is saved.  Right to take

advantage   of   a   provision   is   not   saved.   After   repeal,   an   advantage

available   under  the  repealed   Act  to  apply  and  obtain   relief  is  not  a

right which is saved when the application was necessary and it was

discretionary   to   grant   the   relief   and   investigation   was   required

whether relief should be granted or not.  The repeal would not save the

right   to   obtain   such   a   relief.     The   right   of   pre­emption   is   not   an

accrued   right.     It   is   a   remedial   right   to   take   advantage   of   an

enactment.   The   right   of   a   Government   servant   to   be   considered   for

promotion   under   repealed   rules   is   not   a   vested   right   unless   repeal

provision contains some saving and right has been violated earlier.

25. In general savings of the rights accrued under Section 6 of the

General Clauses Act are subject to a contrary intention evinced by the

repealing Act.  It depends upon the repealing provisions what it keeps

alive and what it intends to destroy when repeal and saving clause is

comprehensively   worded,   then   the   provisions   of   Section   6   of   the

General Clauses Act are not applicable.  

26. In the present case, it is apparent that there is no absolute right

conferred under the Order of 1994.   The investigation was necessary
 34

for whether grant­in­aid to be released or not.  It was merely hope and

expectation to obtain the release of grant in aid which does not survive

after the repeal of the provisions of the Order of 1994.  Given the clear

provisions contained in Paragraph 4 of the Order of 2004, repealing

and saving of Order of 1994, it is apparent that no such right is saved

in case grant­in­aid was not being received at the time of repeal.  The

provisions   of   the   Order   of   1994   of   applying   and/or   pending

applications are not saved nor it is provided that by applying under

the repeal of the order of 1994, its benefits can be claimed.  Grant was

annual based on budgetary provisions. Application to be filed timely.

As several factors prevailing at the relevant time were to be seen in no

case provisions can be invoked after the repeal of the order of 1994.

Only the block grant can be claimed.

27. The High Court in Loknath Behera has rightly opined that due to

repeal, the provisions of the Order of 1994 cannot be invoked to obtain

grant­in­aid.   The High Court has rightly referred to the observations

of   this   Court   in  State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   and   others   v.   Hirendra   Pal

Singh, and others, (2011) 5 SCC 305, wherein it was observed:

“22.   It   is   a   settled   legal   proposition   that   whenever   an   Act   is

repealed, it must be considered as if it had never existed. The object
of repeal is to obliterate the Act from the statutory books, except for
certain   purposes   as   provided   under   Section   6   of   the   General
Clauses Act, 1897. Repeal is not a matter of mere form but is of
substance.   Therefore,   on   repeal,   the   earlier   provisions   stand
obliterated/abrogated/wiped   out   wholly   i.e.   pro   tanto   repeal   (vide
Dagi Ram Pindi Lall  v.  Trilok Chand Jain, (1992) 2 SCC 13;  Gajraj
 35

Singh v. STAT, (1997) 1 SCC 650; Property Owners’ Assn. v. State of
Maharashtra,   (2001)   4   SCC   455   and  Mohan   Raj  v.  Dimbeswari
Saikia, (2007) 15 SCC 115).

24. Thus, there is a clear distinction between repeal and suspension
of the statutory provisions and the material difference between both
is   that   repeal   removes   the   law   entirely;   when   suspended,   it   still
exists   and   has   operation   in   other   respects   except   wherein   it   has
been   suspended.   Thus,   a   repeal   puts   an   end   to   the   law.   A
suspension holds it in abeyance.”

28. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of Board of Control

of Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Private Limited,  (2018) 6 SCC 287,

wherein decision rendered in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955

SC  84,  has   been   relied  upon   while   holding  that  when   the  repeal  is

followed by fresh legislation on the same subject, the provisions of the

new Act have to be looked into so as to ascertain whether it manifests

an intention to destroy the rights or keep them alive.

29. Considering the various provisions of Section 7­C of the Act and

the   Order   of   1994,   it   is   apparent   that   institutions   which   received

grant­in­aid   and   post   with   respect   of   which   grant­in­aid   was   being

released, have been saved.  The reference of the institution means and

includes the posts.   They cannot be read in isolation.   It cannot be

said that right to claim grant­in­aid has been fixed, accrued, settled,

absolute or complete at the time of the repeal of the order of 2004.  As

per the meaning in  Black’s Law Dictionary,  vesting has been defined

thus:
 36

“vest, vb. (15c) 1.  To confer ownership (of property) upon a person.
2.  To invest (a person) with the full title to property. 3.   To give (a
person) an immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment. 4.
Hist.   To put (a person) into possession of land by the ceremony of
investiture. – vesting, n.”

Thus,  there  was   no  vested,  accrued  or  absolute  right to   claim

grant­in­aid under the Act or the Order of 1994.  Merely fulfilment of

the   educational   criteria   and   due   appointment   were   not   sufficient   to

claim grant in aid.  There are various other relevant aspects fulfilment

thereof and investigation into that was necessary. Merely by fulfilment

of the one or two conditions, no right can be said to have accrued to

obtain   the   grant­in­aid   by   the   institution   concerning   the   post   or

individual.  No right has been created in favour of colleges/individual

to claim the grant­in­aid under the Order of 1994, after its repeal. No

claim for investigation of right could have been resorted to after repeal

of Order of 1994.

30. It was lastly submitted that concerning other persons, the orders

have been passed by the Tribunal, which  was  affirmed by  the  High

Court and grants­in­aid has been released under the Order of 1994 as

such   on   the   ground   of   parity   this   Court   should   not   interfere.     No

doubt, there had been a divergence of opinion on the aforesaid issue.

Be   that   as   it   may.     In   our   opinion,   there   is   no   concept   of   negative

equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.  In case the person has a

right, he has to be treated equally, but where right is not available a
 37

person cannot claim rights to be treated equally as the right does not

exist,   negative   equality   when   the   right   does   not   exist,   cannot   be

claimed.  In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer,

(2013) 14 SCC 81, it was held thus:

“8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution
is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the
wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not
envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if
some   other   similarly   situated   persons   have   been   granted   some
relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not
confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a
wrong   is   committed   in   an   earlier   case,   it   cannot   be   perpetuated.
Equality   is   a   trite,   which   cannot   be   claimed   in   illegality   and
therefore,   cannot   be   enforced   by   a   citizen   or   court   in   a   negative
manner.   If   an   illegality   and   irregularity   has   been   committed   in
favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order
has   been   passed   by   a   judicial   forum,   others   cannot   invoke   the
jurisdiction   of   the   higher   or   superior   court   for   repeating   or
multiplying   the   same   irregularity   or   illegality   or   for   passing   a
similarly   wrong   order.   A   wrong   order/decision   in   favour   of   any
particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on
the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot
be   stretched   too   far   for   otherwise   it   would   make   functioning   of
administration impossible. (Vide  Chandigarh Admn.  v.  Jagjit Singh,
(1995) 1 SCC 745, Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9
SCC 164,  K.K. Bhalla  v.  State of M.P,  (2006) 3 SCC 581 and  Fuljit
Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2010) 11 SCC 455.)”

In Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab and others, (2014) 15 SCC 715,

it was observed as under:

“16. More so, it is also settled legal proposition that Article 14 does
not envisage for negative equality. In case a wrong benefit has been
conferred upon someone inadvertently or otherwise, it may not be a
ground to grant similar relief to others. This Court in Basawaraj v.
Land   Acquisition   Officer,   (2013)   14   SCC   81   considered   this   issue
and held as under: (SCC p. 85, para 8)
“8.   It   is   a   settled   legal   proposition   that   Article   14   of   the
Constitution   is   not   meant   to   perpetuate   illegality   or   fraud,
even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases.
The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has
only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated
persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or
by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on
 38

others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in
an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite,
which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be
enforced   by   a   citizen   or   court   in   a   negative   manner.   If   an
illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an
individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been
passed   by   a   judicial   forum,   others   cannot   invoke   the
jurisdiction   of   the   higher   or   superior   court   for   repeating   or
multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a
similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any
particular   party   does   not   entitle   any   other   party   to   claim
benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even  otherwise,
Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would
make   functioning   of   administration   impossible.   (Vide
Chandigarh Admn.  v.  Jagjit Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 745,  Anand
Buttons   Ltd.  v.  State   of   Haryana,   (2005)   9   SCC   164,  K.K.
Bhalla  v.  State   of   M.P,  (2006)   3  SCC   581   and  Fuljit   Kaur  v.
State of Punjab, (2010) 11 SCC 455.)””

In Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab and others, (2010) 11 SCC 455, it

was observed thus:

“11. The respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Laungia v. State
of Punjab, AIR 1993 P&H 54, in view of the settled legal proposition
that   Article   14   of   the   Constitution   of   India   does   not   envisage
negative equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or
fraud. Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept. Equality
is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot
be   enforced   by   a   citizen   or   court   in   a   negative   manner.   If   an
illegality   and   irregularity   has   been   committed   in   favour   of   an
individual   or   a   group   of   individuals   or   a   wrong   order   has   been
passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same
irregularity   or   illegality   or   for   passing   a   wrong   order.   A   wrong
order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any
other party to claim the benefits on the basis of the wrong decision.
Even otherwise Article 14 cannot be stretched too far otherwise it
would   make   function   of   the   administration   impossible.   (Vide
Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd.  v.  Union of India, 1984 Supp SCC 457,
Panchi   Devi  v.  State   of   Rajasthan,   (2009)   2   SCC   589   and  Shanti
Sports Club v. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC 705)”

In   Doiwala   Sehkari   Shram   Samvida   Samiti   Ltd.   v.   State   of

Uttaranchal and others, (2007) 11 SCC 641, this Court in the context

of negative equality observed thus: 
 39

“28. This Court  in  Union of India  v.  International  Trading Co.  has

held that two wrongs do not make one right. The appellant cannot
claim that since something wrong has been done in another case,
directions should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be
setting a wrong right but could be perpetuating another wrong and
in such matters, there is no discrimination involved. The concept of
equal treatment on  the logic of Article 14 cannot be pressed into
service   in   such   cases.   But   the   concept   of   equal   treatment
presupposes   existence   of   similar   legal   foothold.   It   does   not
countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring wrongs on a par.
The affected parties have to establish strength of their case on some
other basis and not by claiming negative quality. In view of the law
laid down by this Court in the above matter, the submission of the
appellant   has   no   force.   In   case,   some   of   the   persons   have   been
granted permits wrongly, the appellant cannot claim the benefit of
the wrong done by the Government.”

In   Bondu   Ramaswamy   and   others   v.   Bangalore   Development

Authority and others, (2010) 7 SCC 129, this Court observed thus:

“146.   If   the   rules/scheme/policy   provides   for   deletion   of   certain

categories of land and if the petitioner falls under those categories,
he   will   be   entitled   to   relief.   But   if   under   the   rules   or   scheme   or
policy   for   deletion,   his   land   is   not   eligible   for   deletion,   his   land
cannot   be   deleted   merely   on   the   ground   that   some   other   land
similarly situated had been deleted (even though that land also did
not   fall   under   any   category   eligible   to   be   deleted),   as   that   would
amount to enforcing negative equality. But where large extents of
land of others are indiscriminately and arbitrarily deleted, then the
court   may   grant   relief,   if,   on   account   of   such   deletions,   the
development scheme for that area has become inexecutable or has
resulted in abandonment of the scheme.”

In Kulwinder Pal Singh and another v. State of Punjab and others,

(2016)   6   SCC   532,   this   Court   while   relying   upon  State   of  U.P.   v.

Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330, observed as under:

16. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that when the
other   candidates   were   appointed   in   the   post   against   dereserved
category,   the   same   benefit   should   also   be   extended   to   the
appellants.   Article   14   of   the   Constitution   of   India   is   not   to
perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equalities. In­
State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 it was held as
under (SCC p. 337, para 15) 
 40

“15.  Even if in some cases appointments have been made by
mistake or wrongly, that does not confer any right on another
person.   Article   14   of   the   Constitution   does   not   envisage
negative   equality,   and   if   the   State   committed   the   mistake   it
cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. (See  Sneh
Prabha v. State of U.P, (1996) 7 SCC 426; Jaipur Development
Authority  v.  Daulat   Mal   Jain,  (1997)   1   SCC   35;  State   of
Haryana  v.  Ram Kumar Mann,  (1997) 3 SCC 321;  Faridabad
CT   Scan   Centre  v.  DG,   Health   Services,  (1997)   7   SCC   752;
Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh, (1999) 3 SCC
494;  State   of   Punjab  v.  Rajeev   Sarwal,  (1999)   9   SCC   240;
Yogesh Kumar v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 3 SCC 548; Union
of   India  v.  International   Trading   Co.,  (2003)   5   SCC   437   and
Kastha   Niwarak   Grahnirman   Sahakari   Sanstha   Maryadit  v.
Indore Development Authority, (2006) 2 SCC 604.)”

Merely because some persons have been granted benefit illegally
or by mistake, it does not confer right upon the appellants to claim
equality.”

In  Rajasthan   State   Industrial   Development   &   Investment

Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur and

others, (2013) 5 SCC 427, this Court held as under: 

“19. Even if the lands of other similarly situated persons have been
released,   the   Society   must   satisfy   the   Court   that   it   is   similarly
situated   in   all   respects,   and  has   an  independent   right  to   get   the
land   released.   Article   14   of   the   Constitution   does   not   envisage
negative equality, and it cannot be used to perpetuate any illegality.
The   doctrine   of   discrimination   based   upon   the   existence   of   an
enforceable   right,   and   Article   14   would   hence   apply,   only   when
invidious   discrimination   is   meted   out   to   equals,   similarly
circumstanced   without   any   rational   basis,   or   to   relationship   that
would warrant such discrimination. [Vide  Sneh Prabha  v.  State of
U.P., (1996) 7 SCC 426, Yogesh Kumar v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (2003)
3 SCC 548, State of W.B. v. Debasish Mukherjee, (2011) 14 SCC 187
and Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 7 SCC 433.]”

In  Arup Das and others v. State of Assam and others,  (2012) 5

SCC 559, this Court observed as under

“19. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in  State of U.P.  v.
Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330, this Court once again had to
consider the question of filling up of vacancies over and above the
 41

number of vacancies advertised. Referring to the various decisions
rendered on this issue, this Court held that filling up of vacancies
over   and   above   the   number   of   vacancies   advertised   would   be
violative   of   the   fundamental   rights   guaranteed   under   Articles   14
and   16   of   the   Constitution   and   that   selectees   could   not   claim
appointments   as   a   matter   of   right.   It   was   reiterated   that   mere
inclusion of candidates in the select list does not confer any right to
be selected, even if some of the vacancies remained unfilled. This
Court   went   on   to   observe   further   that   even   if   in   some   cases
appointments had been made by mistake or wrongly, that did not
confer any right of appointment to another person, as Article 14 of
the Constitution does not envisage negative equality and if the State
had committed a mistake, it cannot be forced to perpetuate the said
mistake.”

In State of Orissa and another v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC

436, it was observed: 

“56. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to
perpetuate   illegality   and   it   does   not   envisage   negative   equality.
Thus,   even   if   some   other   similarly   situated   persons   have   been
granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does
not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the same relief.
(Vide Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 745, Yogesh
Kumar  v.  Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2003) 3 SCC 548,  Anand Buttons
Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 164, K.K. Bhalla v. State of
M.P., (2006) 3 SCC 581, Krishan Bhatt v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC
24, State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh, (2009) 5 SCC 65 and
Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal, (2010) 2 SCC 422)”

31. It is apparent on consideration of Paragraph 4 of order of 2004

that only saving of the right is to receive the block grant and only in

case   grant   in   aid   had   been   received   on   or   before   the   repeal   of   the

Order of 2004,  it shall not be  affected  and  the Order  of  1994 shall

continue only for that purpose and no other rights are saved.    Thus,

we approve the decision of the High Court in Lok Nath Behera (supra)

on the aforesaid aspect for the aforesaid reasons mentioned by us.
 42

32. Thus, we find that the orders passed by the Tribunal  and the

High Court in favour of employees are not sustainable.  The judgment

and order of the High Court in Loknath Behera and Manas Purohit are

upheld for the reasons mentioned in the order.   The appeals filed by

the   State   of   Orissa   are   allowed   and   that   of   employees   are   hereby

dismissed.  Parties to bear their own costs as incurred.

…………………………….J.
  (Arun Mishra)

…………………………….J.
      (S. Abdul Nazeer)

New Delhi: …………………………….J.
September 16, 2019 (M.R. Shah)