Case Name GIOVANI SERRANO y CERVANTES , petitioner, vs .
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent
Case No. | Date G.R. No. 175023 | July 5, 2010
Ponente BRION., J
TOPIC: Stages of Commission; Specific felonies; homicide
SUMMARY: The case stemmed from a brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two rival groups that occurred at the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City on the evening of March 8, 1999. The incident resulted in the
stabbing of Anthony Galang (victim). Pinpointed as the victim's assailant, the petitioner (Serrano) was charged with
frustrated homicide. The RTC found him guilty of frustrated homicide. Upon appeal, the CA modified the crime
committed to attempted homicide. In this petition, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the CA’s decision with modifications
on the civil liability.
RELEVANT RULE: Article 6 of the RPC1
DOCTRINES:
1. In Palaganas v. People, the Court establishes that:
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a
consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will
of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a
cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.
The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof
showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim's death without timely medical intervention.
When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the crime
committed should be attempted.
2. The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a
deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is present.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
According to the prosecution, the facts are as follows:
At around 9:30 p.m. of March 8, 1999, the victim and his two friends, Arceo and Richard Tan, were on their way to
Fatima II in Pook Dagohoy, UP Campus when they came across Gener Serrano, the petitioner's brother, who was
with his group of friends. The victim, Arceo and Tan approached Gener and his friends to settle a previous quarrel
between Gener and Roberto Comia. While the victim and Gener were talking, Comia suddenly appeared and
hurled invectives at Gener. Irked, Gener challenged Comia to a fistfight, which commenced.
The petitioner appeared with other members of his group and watched the two fight. When Gener lost the fight,
the petitioner sought to get back at the victim and his friends. Thus, the one-on-one escalated into a rumble
between the members of the two groups. During the rumble, and with the aid of the light emanating from two
Meralco posts, the victim and Arceo saw that the petitioner had a knife and used it to chase away the members of
their group. The petitioner also chased Arceo away, leaving the victim alone; the petitioner's group ganged up on
him.
Then, the petitioner went to where the victim was being beaten by Gener and one Orieta. It was then that the
victim was stabbed. The petitioner stabbed the left side of his stomach while he was standing, with Gener and
Orieta holding his arms. The petitioner, Gener and Orieta then continued to beat and stone the victim until he fell
into a nearby creek. The petitioner and his group left him there.
From his fallen position, the victim inspected his stab wound and saw that a portion of his intestines showed. On
foot, he went to find help, was taken to the UP Infirmary and then referred to the East Avenue Medical Center
where he underwent surgery.
In the investigation and in court, the victim positively identified the petitioner as his assailant.
The defense denies this. While petitioner admitted that he was present during the fistfight, he claimed that he and
Gener left as soon as the rumble started. A defense witness, Hipolito, a participant in the rumble, also testified that
he did not see the petitioner and Gener during the fight. He also testified that the place where the rumble took
place was near a steel manufacturing shop which provided some light to the area.
Regarding the victim’s injury, the victim's attending physician did not testify on the gravity of the wound inflicted
on the victim. The medical certifications issued by the East Avenue Medical Center also merely stated the location
of the wound.
ISSUE: [TOPIC]
1. If petitioner is guilty of homicide, whether the stage of execution of the crime reached the frustrated stage. – NO.
The crime only reached the attempted stage.
HELD:
1. The Court recites Article 6 of the RPC. Also, in Palaganas v. People, the Court made the following distinctions
between frustrated and attempted felony as follows:
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as
a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the
will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is
a cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.
The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof
showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim's death without timely medical intervention.
When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of
the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be
resolved in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated, homicide. Hence,
ITCAB, although the stab wound could have been fatal since the victim testified that he saw his intestines showed, no
exact evidence exists to prove the gravity of the wound which can consider the stab wound as sufficient to cause
death. There was also no proof that without timely medical intervention, the victim would have died. This paucity of
proof must necessarily favor the petitioner.
The view from the “frustrated” stage of the crime gives the same results. The elements of frustrated homicide are:
(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. Since the prosecution
failed to prove the second element, we cannot hold the petitioner liable for frustrated homicide.
Other main issues:
2. Whether the petitioner was positively identified by a credible testimony – YES
3. Whether the petitioner can only be convicted of serious physical injuries as the intent to kill the victim was
not sufficiently proven. -NO.
HELD:
2. YES. The RTC's and CA's conclusions on the petitioner's positive identification are supported by ample
evidence. The Court considered the following pieces of evidence: (1) the manner of attack which was done
frontally and at close range; (2) the lighting conditions at the scene of the stabbing; and (3) that the victim
and the petitioner knew each other also allowed the victim to readily identify the petitioner as his assailant.
The Court also considers the victim’s lack of improper motive to falsely accuse the petitioner as well as the
circumstantial evidence that the petitioner was the only one seen in possession of a knife during the rumble.
3. NO. In Rivera v. People, the Court considered the following factors to determine the presence of an intent to
kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim;
and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. Additional
determinative factors include motive and words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted the injuries.
Under the circumstances of the case, the Court is convinced that the petitioner, in stabbing, beating and
stoning the victim, intended to kill him.
1
ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when
the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
