Kodak's digital imaging strategy during 1992-2012 aimed to provide an integrated system of digital photography products and services for consumers, professionals and businesses. However, the strategy ultimately failed due to intense competition, Kodak's poor financial performance, the rise of camera phones, consumers preferring to view photos digitally rather than printed, and Kodak's chemical capabilities becoming obsolete. Moving forward in 2012, the document recommends that Kodak focus on developing new digital capabilities, consider timing when adopting disruptive technologies, and evaluate how new technologies will impact industry structure and profit opportunities.
Kodak's digital imaging strategy during 1992-2012 aimed to provide an integrated system of digital photography products and services for consumers, professionals and businesses. However, the strategy ultimately failed due to intense competition, Kodak's poor financial performance, the rise of camera phones, consumers preferring to view photos digitally rather than printed, and Kodak's chemical capabilities becoming obsolete. Moving forward in 2012, the document recommends that Kodak focus on developing new digital capabilities, consider timing when adopting disruptive technologies, and evaluate how new technologies will impact industry structure and profit opportunities.
Kodak's digital imaging strategy during 1992-2012 aimed to provide an integrated system of digital photography products and services for consumers, professionals and businesses. However, the strategy ultimately failed due to intense competition, Kodak's poor financial performance, the rise of camera phones, consumers preferring to view photos digitally rather than printed, and Kodak's chemical capabilities becoming obsolete. Moving forward in 2012, the document recommends that Kodak focus on developing new digital capabilities, consider timing when adopting disruptive technologies, and evaluate how new technologies will impact industry structure and profit opportunities.
Kodak's digital imaging strategy during 1992-2012 aimed to provide an integrated system of digital photography products and services for consumers, professionals and businesses. However, the strategy ultimately failed due to intense competition, Kodak's poor financial performance, the rise of camera phones, consumers preferring to view photos digitally rather than printed, and Kodak's chemical capabilities becoming obsolete. Moving forward in 2012, the document recommends that Kodak focus on developing new digital capabilities, consider timing when adopting disruptive technologies, and evaluate how new technologies will impact industry structure and profit opportunities.
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“Eastman Kodak’s Quest for a Digital Future”
1. What was Kodak’s digital imaging strategy during 1992-2012?
2. Why did the strategy fail? 3. Was there a better alternative? 4. It is summer 2012, what advice would you give to the Kodak board about Kodak’s next steps?
ANSWER 1:
Confronted the approaching computerized imaging period giving the completely
incorporated arrangement of items and administrations required for advanced photography through:
o Different systems for the shopper, expert and business market.
o High interest in growing new items
o External sourcing of information through recruiting, coalitions and
securing
o Emphasizing printed pictures
o Keep mass-market giving effortlessness, quality and worth
Kodak has spearheaded its new advancements depending on technically
knowledgeable, cost uncaring clients to explore different avenues regarding new innovations while recovering a portion of its improvement costs.
Kodak's dedication reflects two variables:
• Its want to use its current qualities in the retail market, quite its image and its worldwide retail conveyance.
• Kodak's customary situating in the retail market as a mass-market provider of
tolerably valued cameras and film to the unsophisticated novice picture taker.
ANSWER 2:
1. Intense rivalry
2. Financial execution was lamentable
3. The telephone cameras moving
4. Consumers inclination to see photos on screen as opposed to in printed
structure
5. Chemical capacities turned futile in computerized imaging
ANSWER 3:
During the 1980s, the photography business was starting to move towards the computerized. With Kodak creating the computerized camera, one would feel that going to advanced would be the following coherent thing for Kodak. The organization got on board with the advanced pattern temporary fad - despite the fact that it was a late adopter - while as yet selling simple cameras and film. Kodak built up another business heading - printers. The organization zeroed in on the printing business building costly printers and modest ink while its rivals were bringing in cash from selling costly ink. ANSWER 4:
The troubles of improvement the new abilities required by the innovation. Set up firms can make new capacities and the Kodak approach offers sound direction on the best way to assemble ability in a fundamentally unique region of innovation: Challenges of timing. Ordinarily settled organizations are not early movers in the selection of troublesome advancements: Kodak was an exemption; it was a pioneer of computerized imaging. However, getting the circumstance right is as hard for built up firms for what it's worth for new ones. Evaluating the ramifications of a rising innovation for the structure of an industry and the benefit openings inside it. The interruption that new advances bring incorporates the structure of the businesses they sway. The benefit of keeping choices: Kodak submitted intensely to computerized imaging and stripped its synthetic and drug organizations.
