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G.R. No. 166282.      February 13, 2013.*
                        HEIRS OF FE TAN UY (Represented by her heir, Manling Uy
                        Lim), petitioners, vs. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK,
                        respondent.
                                                   G.R. No. 166283.      February 13, 2013.*
                        GOLDKEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
                        INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK, respondent.
                              Mercantile Law; Corporation Law; Obligations incurred by the
                        corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole
                        liabilities. A director, officer or employee of a corporation is generally not
                        held personally liable for obligations incurred by the corporation.―Basic is
                        the rule in corporation law that a corporation is a juridical entity which is
                        vested with a legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for
                        and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. Following
                        this principle, obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its
                        directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. A director, officer
                        or employee of a corporation is generally not held personally liable for
                        obligations incurred by the corporation. Nevertheless, this legal fiction may
                        be disregarded if it is used as a means to perpetrate fraud or an illegal act, or
                        as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of
                        statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues.
                             Same; Same; Requisites Before a Director or Officer of a Corporation
                        Can be Held Personally Liable for Corporate Obligations.―Before a
                        director or officer of a corporation can be held personally liable for
                        corporate obligations, however, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
                        complainant must allege in the complaint that the director or officer assented
                        to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the officer was guilty of
                        gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) the complainant must clearly and
                        convincingly prove such unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith.
                              _______________
                              * THIRD DIVISION.
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                                      Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                             Same; Same; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; The piercing of
                        the veil of corporate fiction is frowned upon and can only be done if it has
                        been clearly established that the separate and distinct personality of the
                        corporation is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or perpetrate a
                        deception.―It behooves this Court to emphasize that the piercing of the veil
                        of corporate fiction is frowned upon and can only be done if it has been
                        clearly established that the separate and distinct personality of the
                        corporation is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or perpetrate a
                        deception. As aptly explained in Philippine National Bank v. Andrada
                        Electric & Engineering Company, 381 SCRA 244 (2002): Hence, any
                        application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil should be done
                        with caution. A court should be mindful of the milieu where it is to be
                        applied. It must be certain that the corporate fiction was misused to such an
                        extent that injustice, fraud, or crime was committed against another, in
                        disregard of its rights. The wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly
                        established; it cannot be presumed. Otherwise, an injustice that was never
                        unintended may result from an erroneous application. Indeed, there is no
                        showing that Uy committed gross negligence. And in the absence of any of
                        the aforementioned requisites for making a corporate officer, director or
                        stockholder personally liable for the obligations of a corporation, Uy, as a
                        treasurer and stockholder of Hammer, cannot be made to answer for the
                        unpaid debts of the corporation.
                             Same; Same; Same; Under a variation of the doctrine of piercing the
                        veil of corporate fiction, when two business enterprises are owned,
                        conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will,
                        when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal
                        fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical
                        or one and the same.―Under a variation of the doctrine of piercing the veil
                        of corporate fiction, when two business enterprises are owned, conducted
                        and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when
                        necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that
                        two corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or one and
                        the same. While the conditions for the disregard of the juridical entity may
                        vary, the following are some probative factors of identity that will justify the
                        application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, as laid down in
                        Concept Builders, Inc. v NLRC, 257 SCRA 149 (1996): (1) Stock ownership
                        by one or common ownership of both
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                        corporations; (2) Identity of directors and officers; (3) The manner of
                        keeping corporate books and records, and (4) Methods of conducting the
                        business.
                        PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
                            of the Court of Appeals.
                           The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
                              Mario E. Valderama for petitioners in both cases.
                              Macalino and Associates for respondent Bank.
                        MENDOZA, J.:
                           Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on
                        certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
                        Procedure, assailing the August 16, 2004 Decision1 and the
                        December 2, 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
                        G.R. CV No. 69817 entitled “International Exchange Bank v.
                        Hammer Garments Corp., et al.”
                                                      The Facts
                           On several occasions, from June 23, 1997 to September 3, 1997,
                        respondent International Exchange Bank (iBank), granted loans to
                        Hammer Garments Corporation (Hammer), covered by promissory
                        notes and deeds of assignment, in the following amounts:3
                            _______________
                            1  Rollo (G.R. No. 166283), pp. 41-54; penned by Associate Justice Josefina
                        Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and
                        Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta of the Seventh Division.
                            2 Id., at pp. 56-57.
                            3 Id., at pp. 62, 325, 414-431.
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                                   Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                                     Date of Promissory Note                               Amount
                                          June 23, 1997                                      P 5,599,471.33
                                          July 24, 1997                                        2,700,000.00
                                          July 25, 1997                                        2,300,000.00
                                         August 1, 1997                                        2,938,505.04
                                         August 1, 1997                                        3,361,494.96
                                        August 14, 1997                                          980,000.00
                                        August 21, 1997                                        2,527,200.00
                                        August 21, 1997                                        3,146,715.00
                                       September 3, 1997                                    __1,385,511.75
                                               Total                                        P24,938,898.08
                          These were made pursuant to the Letter-Agreement,4 dated
                        March 23, 1996, between iBank and Hammer, represented by its
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                        President and General Manager, Manuel Chua (Chua) a.k.a. Manuel
                        Chua Uy Po Tiong, granting Hammer a P 25 Million-Peso Omnibus
                        Line.5 The loans were secured by a P 9 Million-Peso Real Estate
                        Mortgage6 executed on July 1, 1997 by Goldkey Development
                        Corporation (Goldkey) over several of its properties and a P 25
                        Million-Peso Surety Agreement7 signed by Chua and his wife, Fe
                        Tan Uy (Uy), on April 15, 1996.
                            As of October 28, 1997, Hammer had an outstanding obligation
                        of P25,420,177.62 to iBank.8 Hammer defaulted in the payment of
                        its loans, prompting iBank to foreclose on Goldkey’s third-party
                        Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgaged properties were sold for P 12
                        million during the foreclosure sale, leaving an unpaid balance of P
                        13,420,177.62.9 For failure of
                            _______________
                            4 Id., at pp. 106-107.
                            5 Id., at pp. 60.
                            6 Id., at pp. 432-433.
                            7 Id., at pp. 434-435.
                            8 Id., at pp. 42, 60 and 350.
                            9 Id., at pp. 60-61.
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                                   Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                        Hammer to pay the deficiency, iBank filed a Complaint10 for sum of
                        money on December 16, 1997 against Hammer, Chua, Uy, and
                        Goldkey before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City (RTC).11
                            Despite service of summons, Chua and Hammer did not file their
                        respective answers and were declared in default. In her separate
                        answer, Uy claimed that she was not liable to iBank because she
                        never executed a surety agreement in favor of iBank. Goldkey, on
                        the other hand, also denies liability, averring that it acted only as a
                        third-party mortgagor and that it was a corporation separate and
                        distinct from Hammer.12
                            Meanwhile, iBank applied for the issuance of a writ of
                        preliminary attachment which was granted by the RTC in its
                        December 17, 1997 Order.13 The Notice of Levy on Attachment of
                        Real Properties, dated July 15, 1998, covering the properties under
                        the name of Goldkey, was sent by the sheriff to the Registry of
                        Deeds of Quezon City.14
                            The RTC, in its Decision,15 dated December 27, 2000, ruled in
                        favor of iBank. While it made the pronouncement that the signature
                        of Uy on the Surety Agreement was a forgery, it nevertheless held
                        her liable for the outstanding obligation of Hammer because she was
                        an officer and stockholder of the said corporation. The RTC agreed
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                        with Goldkey that as a third-party mortgagor, its liability was limited
                        to the properties mortgaged. It came to the conclusion, however, that
                        Goldkey and Hammer were one and the same entity for the
                        following reasons: (1) both were family corporations of Chua and
                        Uy, with Chua as the President and Chief Operating Officer; (2) both
                        corporations shared the same office and
                            _______________
                            10 Id., at pp. 349-357.
                            11 Id., at p. 321.
                            12 Id., at pp. 61-62.
                            13 Id., at p. 43.
                            14 Id., at pp. 323 and 385.
                            15 Id., at pp. 60-69.
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                                   Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                        transacted business from the same place, (3) the assets of Hammer
                        and Goldkey were co-mingled; and (4) when Chua absconded, both
                        Hammer and Goldkey ceased to operate. As such, the piercing of the
                        veil of corporate fiction was warranted. Uy, as an officer and
                        stockholder of Hammer and Goldkey, was found liable to iBank
                        together with Chua, Hammer and Goldkey for the deficiency of
                        P13,420,177.62.
                            Aggrieved, the heirs of Uy and Goldkey (petitioners) elevated the
                        case to the CA. On August 16, 2004, it promulgated its decision
                        affirming the findings of the RTC. The CA found that iBank was not
                        negligent in evaluating the financial stability of Hammer. According
                        to the appellate court, iBank was induced to grant the loan because
                        petitioners, with intent to defraud the bank, submitted a falsified
                        Financial Report for 1996 which incorrectly declared the assets and
                        cashflow of Hammer.16 Because petitioners acted maliciously and in
                        bad faith and used the corporate fiction to defraud iBank, they
                        should be treated as one and the same as Hammer.17
                            Hence, these petitions filed separately by the heirs of Uy and
                        Goldkey. On February 9, 2005, this Court ordered the consolidation
                        of the two cases.18
                                                         The Issues
                            Petitioners raise the following issues:
                            Whether or not a trial court, under the facts of this case, can
                        go out of the issues raised by the pleadings;19
                            Whether or not there is guilt by association in those cases
                        where the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced;20 and
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                            _______________
                            16 Id., at pp. 46-47.
                            17 Id., at p. 50.
                            18 Rollo (G.R. No. 166282), p. 8a.
                            19 Id., at p. 22.
                            20 Id., at p. 22.
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                                          VOL. 690, FEBRUARY 13, 2013                            525
                                   Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                        Whether or not the “alter ego” theory in disregarding the
                        corporate personality of a corporation is applicable to
                        Goldkey.21
                            Simplifying the issues in this case, the Court must resolve the
                        following: (1) whether Uy can be held liable to iBank for the loan
                        obligation of Hammer as an officer and stockholder of the said
                        corporation; and (2) whether Goldkey can be held liable for the
                        obligation of Hammer for being a mere alter ego of the latter.
                                                    The Court’s Ruling
                            The petitions are partly meritorious.
                        Uy is not liable; The piercing of the
                        veil of corporate fiction is not justified
                            The heirs of Uy argue that the latter could not be held liable for
                        being merely an officer of Hammer and Goldkey because it was not
                        shown that she had committed any actionable wrong22 or that she
                        had participated in the transaction between Hammer and iBank.
                        They further claim that she had cut all ties with Hammer and her
                        husband long before the execution of the loan.23
                            The Court finds in favor of Uy.
                            Basic is the rule in corporation law that a corporation is a
                        juridical entity which is vested with a legal personality separate and
                        distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from
                        the people comprising it. Following this principle, obligations
                        incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and
                        employees, are its sole liabilities. A director, officer or employee of
                        a corporation is generally not
                            _______________
                            21 Rollo (G.R. No. 166283), p. 20.
                            22 Id., at p. 253.
                            23 Id., at pp. 245-246.
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                                   Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                        held personally liable for obligations incurred by the corporation.24
                        Nevertheless, this legal fiction may be disregarded if it is used as a
                        means to perpetrate fraud or an illegal act, or as a vehicle for the
                        evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to
                        confuse legitimate issues.25 This is consistent with the provisions of
                        the Corporation Code of the Philippines, which states:
                        Sec. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers.―Directors or trustees
                        who wilfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of
                        the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in
                        directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary
                        interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable
                        jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
                        corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.
                          Solidary liability will then attach to the directors, officers or
                        employees of the corporation in certain circumstances, such as:
                        1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a
                        corporation: (a) vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
                        corporation; (b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the
                        corporate affairs; and (c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of
                        the corporation, its stockholders or members, and other persons;
                        2. When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered
                        stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the
                        corporate secretary his written objection thereto;
                        3. When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated
                        to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or
                           _______________
                           24 Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, G.R. No. 170735, December
                        17, 2007, 540 SCRA 456, 473-474.
                           25  Aratea v. Suico, G.R. No. 170284, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 501, 507 citing
                        Prudential Bank v. Alviar, 502 Phil. 595; 464 SCRA 353 (2005).
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                                      Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                        4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law,
                        personally liable for his corporate action.26
                           Before a director or officer of a corporation can be held
                        personally liable for corporate obligations, however, the following
                        requisites must concur: (1) the complainant must allege in the
                        complaint that the director or officer assented to patently unlawful
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                        acts of the corporation, or that the officer was guilty of gross
                        negligence or bad faith; and (2) the complainant must clearly and
                        convincingly prove such unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith.27
                            While it is true that the determination of the existence of any of
                        the circumstances that would warrant the piercing of the veil of
                        corporate fiction is a question of fact which cannot be the subject of
                        a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court can take
                        cognizance of factual issues if the findings of the lower court are not
                        supported by the evidence on record or are based on a
                        misapprehension of facts.28
                            In this case, petitioners are correct to argue that it was not
                        alleged, much less proven, that Uy committed an act as an officer of
                        Hammer that would permit the piercing of the corporate veil. A
                        reading of the complaint reveals that with regard to Uy, iBank did
                        not demand that she be held liable for the obligations of Hammer
                        because she was a corporate officer who committed bad faith or
                        gross negligence in the performance of her duties such that the
                        lifting of the corporate mask would be merited. What the complaint
                        simply stated is that she, together with her errant husband Chua,
                        acted as surety of Hammer, as evidenced by her signature on the
                            _______________
                            26  Uichico v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 242, 252; 273
                        SCRA 35, 45-46 (1997).
                            27 Francisco v. Mallen, Jr., G.R. No. 173169, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA
                        118, 123.
                            28 Sarona v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 185280, January 18,
                        2012, 663 SCRA 394, 415.
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                                    Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                        Surety Agreement which was later found by the RTC to have been
                        forged.29
                           Considering that the only basis for holding Uy liable for the
                        payment of the loan was proven to be a falsified document, there
                        was no sufficient justification for the RTC to have ruled that Uy
                        should be held jointly and severally liable to iBank for the unpaid
                        loan of Hammer. Neither did the CA explain its affirmation of the
                        RTC’s ruling against Uy. The Court cannot give credence to the
                        simplistic declaration of the RTC that liability would attach directly
                        to Uy for the sole reason that she was an officer and stockholder of
                        Hammer.
                           At most, Uy could have been charged with negligence in the
                        performance of her duties as treasurer of Hammer by allowing the
                        company to contract a loan despite its precarious financial position.
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                        Furthermore, if it was true, as petitioners claim, that she no longer
                        performed the functions of a treasurer, then she should have
                        formally resigned as treasurer to isolate herself from any liability
                        that could result from her being an officer of the corporation.
                        Nonetheless, these shortcomings of Uy are not sufficient to justify
                        the piercing of the corporate veil which requires that the negligence
                        of the officer must be so gross that it could amount to bad faith and
                        must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Gross
                        negligence is one that is characterized by the lack of the slightest
                        care, acting or failing to act in a situation where there is a duty to
                        act, wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to the
                        consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.30
                            It behooves this Court to emphasize that the piercing of the veil
                        of corporate fiction is frowned upon and can only be done if it has
                        been clearly established that the separate and distinct personality of
                        the corporation is used to justify a wrong,
                            _______________
                            29 Rollo (G.R. No. 166283), pp. 64 and 351.
                            30 Magaling v. Ong, G.R. No. 173333, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 152, 169-170.
                                                                                                   529
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                                   Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                        protect fraud, or perpetrate a deception.31 As aptly explained in
                        Philippine National Bank v. Andrada Electric & Engineering
                        Company:32
                            Hence, any application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
                        should be done with caution. A court should be mindful of the milieu where
                        it is to be applied. It must be certain that the corporate fiction was misused
                        to such an extent that injustice, fraud, or crime was committed against
                        another, in disregard of its rights. The wrongdoing must be clearly and
                        convincingly established; it cannot be presumed. Otherwise, an injustice that
                        was never unintended may result from an erroneous application.33
                           Indeed, there is no showing that Uy committed gross negligence.
                        And in the absence of any of the aforementioned requisites for
                        making a corporate officer, director or stockholder personally liable
                        for the obligations of a corporation, Uy, as a treasurer and
                        stockholder of Hammer, cannot be made to answer for the unpaid
                        debts of the corporation.
                        Goldkey is a mere alter ego of Hammer
                           Goldkey contends that it cannot be held responsible for the
                        obligations of its stockholder, Chua.34 Moreover, it theorizes that
                        iBank is estopped from expanding Goldkey’s liability beyond the
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                                                    35
                        real estate mortgage. It adds that it did not authorize the execution
                        of the said mortgage.36 Finally, it passes the blame on to iBank for
                        failing to exercise the requisite due diligence in properly evaluating
                        Hammer’s creditworthiness before it was extended an omnibus
                        line.37
                            _______________
                            31 Kukan International Corporation v. Reyes, G.R. No. 182729, September 29,
                        2010, 631 SCRA 596, 628.
                            32 430 Phil. 882; 381 SCRA 244 (2002).
                            33 Philippine National Bank v. Andrada Electric & Engineering Company, 430
                        Phil. 882, 894; 381 SCRA 244, 254 (2002).
                            34 Rollo (G.R. No. 166283), p. 257.
                            35 Id., at p. 260.
                            36 Id., at p. 262.
                            37 Id., at p. 234.
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                                   Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                            The Court disagrees with Goldkey.
                            There is no reason to discount the findings of the CA that iBank
                        duly inspected the viability of Hammer and satisfied itself that the
                        latter was a good credit risk based on the Financial Statement
                        submitted. In addition, iBank required that the loan be secured by
                        Goldkey’s Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement with
                        Chua and Uy. The records support the factual conclusions made by
                        the RTC and the CA.
                            To the Court’s mind, Goldkey’s argument, that iBank is barred
                        from pursuing Goldkey for the satisfaction of the unpaid obligation
                        of Hammer because it had already limited its liability to the real
                        estate mortgage, is completely absurd. Goldkey needs to be
                        reminded that it is being sued not as a consequence of the real estate
                        mortgage, but rather, because it acted as an alter ego of Hammer.
                        Accordingly, they must be treated as one and the same entity,
                        making Goldkey accountable for the debts of Hammer.
                            In fact, it is Goldkey who is now precluded from denying the
                        validity of the Real Estate Mortgage. In its Answer with Affirmative
                        Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim, dated January 5, 1998, it
                        already admitted that it acted as a third-party mortgagor to secure
                        the obligation of Hammer to iBank.38 Thus, it cannot, at this late
                        stage, question the due execution of the third-party mortgage.
                            Similarly, Goldkey is undoubtedly mistaken in claiming that
                        iBank is seeking to enforce an obligation of Chua. The records
                        clearly show that it was Hammer, of which Chua was the president
                        and a stockholder, which contracted a loan from iBank. What iBank
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                        sought was redress from Goldkey by demanding that the veil of
                        corporate fiction be lifted so that it could not raise the defense of
                        having a separate juridical personality to evade liability for the
                        obligations of Hammer.
                            _______________
                            38 Id., at pp. 367-368.
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                                   Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                           Under a variation of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
                        fiction, when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and
                        controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when
                        necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal
                        fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and treat them as
                        identical or one and the same.39While the conditions for the
                        disregard of the juridical entity may vary, the following are some
                        probative factors of identity that will justify the application of the
                        doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, as laid down in Concept
                        Builders, Inc. v. NLRC:40
                                (1)   Stock ownership by one or common ownership of both corporations;
                                (2)   Identity of directors and officers;
                                (3) The manner of keeping corporate books and records, and
                                (4)   Methods of conducting the business.41
                           These factors are unquestionably present in the case of Goldkey
                        and Hammer, as observed by the RTC, as follows:
                        1. Both corporations are family corporations of defendants Manuel Chua
                        and his wife Fe Tan Uy. The other incorporators and shareholders of the two
                        corporations are the brother and sister of Manuel Chua (Benito Ng Po Hing
                        and Nenita Chua Tan) and the sister of Fe Tan Uy, Milagros Revilla. The
                        other incorporator/share holder is Manling Uy, the daughter of Manuel Chua
                        Uy Po Tiong and Fe Tan Uy.
                           The stockholders of Hammer Garments as of March 23, 1987, aside from
                        spouses Manuel and Fe Tan Uy are: Benito Chua, brother Manuel Chua,
                        Nenita Chua Tan, sister of Manuel Chua and Tessie
                           _______________
                           39 General Credit Corporation v. Alsons Development and Investment Corporation, 542
                        Phil. 219, 231; 513 SCRA 225, 238 (2007).
                           40 326 Phil. 955; 257 SCRA 149 (1996).
                           41 Concept Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 326 Phil. 955, 965; 257 SCRA 149, 158 (1996).
                                                                                                              532
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                                      Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
                        See Chua Tan. On March 8, 1988, the shares of Tessie See Chua Uy were
                        assigned to Milagros T. Revilla, thereby consolidating the shares in the
                        family of Manuel Chua and Fe Tan Uy.
                        2. Hammer Garments and Goldkey share the same office and practically
                        transact their business from the same place.
                        3. Defendant Manuel Chua is the President and Chief Operating Officer of
                        both corporations. All business transactions of Goldkey and Hammer are
                        done at the instance of defendant Manuel Chua who is authorized to do so
                        by the corporations.
                            The promissory notes subject of this complaint are signed by him as
                        Hammer’s President and General Manager. The third-party real estate
                        mortgage of defendant Goldkey is signed by him for Goldkey to secure the
                        loan obligation of Hammer Garments with plaintiff “iBank. The other third-
                        party real estate mortgages which Goldkey executed in favor of the other
                        creditor banks of Hammer are also signed Manuel Chua.
                        4. The assets of Goldkey and Hammer are co-mingled. The real properties
                        of Goldkey are mortgaged to secure Hammer’s obligation with creditor
                        banks.
                            The proceeds of at least two loans which Hammer obtained from plaintiff
                        “iBank”, purportedly to finance its export to Wal-Mart are instead used to
                        finance the purchase of a manager’s check payable to Goldkey. The
                        defendants’ claim that Goldkey is a creditor of Hammer to justify its receipt
                        of the Manager’s check is not substantiated by evidence. Despite subpoenas
                        issued by this Court, Goldkey thru its treasurer, defendant Fe Tan Uy and or
                        its corporate secretary Manling failed to produce the Financial Statement of
                        Goldkey.
                        5. When defendant Manuel Chua “disappeared”, the defendant Goldkey
                        ceased to operate despite the claim that the other “officers” and stockholders
                        like Benito Chua, Nenita Chua Tan, Fe Tan Uy, Manling Uy and Milagros T.
                        Revilla are still around and may be able to continue the business of
                        Goldkey, if it were different or distinct from Hammer, which suffered
                        financial set back.42
                          Based on the foregoing findings of the RTC, it was apparent that
                        Goldkey was merely an adjunct of Hammer and, as
                            _______________
                            42 Rollo (G.R. No. 166283), pp. 66-67.
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                                         VOL. 690, FEBRUARY 13, 2013                             533
                                   Heirs of Fe Tan Uy vs. International Exchange Bank
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2/22/2021                                                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 690
                        such, the legal fiction that it has a separate personality from that of
                        Hammer should be brushed aside as they are, undeniably, one and
                        the same.
                           WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The
                        August 16, 2004 Decision and the December 2, 2004 Resolution of
                        the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69817, are hereby
                        MODIFIED. Fe Tan Uy is released from any liability arising from
                        the debts incurred by Hammer from iBank. Hammer Garments
                        Corporation, Manuel Chua Uy Po Tiong and Goldkey Development
                        Corporation are jointly and severally liable to pay International
                        Exchange Bank the sum of
                        P 13,420,177.62 representing the unpaid loan obligation of Hammer
                        as of December 12, 1997 plus interest. No costs.
                           SO ORDERED.
                              Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Abad, Villarama, Jr.** and Leonen,
                        JJ., concur.
                            Petitions partly granted, judgment and resolution modified.
                            Notes.―Under the doctrine of “piercing the veil of corporate
                        fiction,” the court looks at the corporation as a mere collection of
                        individuals or an aggregation of persons undertaking business as a
                        group, disregarding the separate juridical personality of the
                        corporation unifying the group. (Kukan International Corporation
                        vs. Reyes, 631 SCRA 596 [2010])
                            A corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the
                        court’s process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction—in that
                        situation, the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the corporation
                        and, hence, any proceedings taken against that corporation and its
                        property would infringe on its right to due process. (Ibid.)
                                                      ――o0o―― 
                            _______________
                            ** Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M.
                        Peralta, per raffle, dated July 20, 2011.
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