G.R. No.

191752               June 10, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 

Admissibility of the out-of-court

Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and
in the killing of Rex in a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note
that Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for Mental Health, and
subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, we examine with greater scrutiny Lino’s
testimony regarding Zaldy’s alleged out-of-court identification.

People v. Algarme17 explains the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine its
admissibility, as follows:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention
at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. [italics and emphasis
supplied]

In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants
as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the
line-up took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with
the appellants (if there were indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the line-up
was confined to persons of the same height and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate
who accompanied Zaldy before and during the line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of
prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy regarding the appearance of the
appellants.

To our mind, Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring
omission that renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-ofcourt identification. No way exists for the courts to
evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications,
such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The
absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment
and assessment of Lino’s testimony.

The records also bear out that Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession18 at the NBI Main
Office, where he implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged. During trial, he
repudiated this confession, and claimed that he had been tortured by the NBI agents, and that he
was forced to copy a previously prepared statement.

After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession
is inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be
admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must
be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's
choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing."19

We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he
executed the alleged written confession. "A custodial investigation is understood x x x as x x x any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a particular
person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.20

In People v. Rapeza,21 we explained that the lawyer called to be present during custodial
investigations should, as far as reasonably possible, be the choice of the individual undergoing
questioning. If the lawyer is furnished by the police for the accused, it is important that the lawyer
should be competent, independent and prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights.

After a close reading of the records, we rule that Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who
acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI
itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to the agency’s investigators
that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan confirmed
this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas at the time his client made the
alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when
she was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession.
There was also nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas’
confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature and the consequence
of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights.

To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial investigation. "An
‘effective and vigilant counsel’ necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and be
able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by
the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession."22 In addition, the extrajudicial
confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the written
confession was made. We note in this regard that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the
witness stand despite hints made during the early stages of the trial that she would be presented.

At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in
view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding
only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered
as hearsay against them.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in
order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the
admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged
in carrying out the conspiracy.23

This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of
evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with
the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be
shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial
court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.