• Pangasinan Transportation vs. PSC, G.R. No.

47065, June 26, 1940

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R.
No. 47065 June 26, 1940
FACTS: Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been engaged for 20 years in the
business of transporting passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by
the Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission). The company applied
for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were
needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the
application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization, but with two
conditions as provided for by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454: First, that the certificates
of authorization issued to it would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of
promulgation; and second, that the company may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth
with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into account reasonable
depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it acquisition. PTI did not agree with
the conditions, and instead asked the Supreme Court to declare Commonwealth Act No. 454.
ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional for being undue
delegation of legislative power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule except the
unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total
abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so
far as those powers are concerned.
HELD: No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made subject to a sufficient standard that
the PSC must strictly follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under
section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the
Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the
public interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of
time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being
that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146;
Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) The Supreme Court had earlier ruled that "public interest"
furnishes a sufficient standard.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R.
No. 47065 June 26, 1940
FACTS: Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been engaged for 20 years in the
business of transporting passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by
the Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission). The company applied
for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were
needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the
application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization, but with two
conditions as provided for by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454: First, that the certificates
of authorization issued to it would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of
promulgation; and second, that the company may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth
with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into account reasonable
depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it acquisition. PTI did not agree with
the conditions, and instead asked the Supreme Court to declare Commonwealth Act No. 454.
ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional for being undue
delegation of legislative power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule except the
unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total
abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so
far as those powers are concerned.
HELD: No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made subject to a sufficient standard that
the PSC must strictly follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under
section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the
Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the
public interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of
time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being
that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146;
Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) The Supreme Court had earlier ruled that "public interest"
furnishes a sufficient standard.

• US vs. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122, February 27, 1922

Facts:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled “An Act penalizing the
monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating
the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State,
to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose”.
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this
Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Then,
on August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at
an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that
the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on
the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
Issue:
WON the delegation of legislative power to the Governor General was valid.
Held: No.
By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature
to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate the
legislative power to enact any law.
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly
defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the
government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall
become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per “ganta,” and
that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any
price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any
price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued
the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the
proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes
the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it
to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause” for enforcing the
act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under certain
undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say
whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it
should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was
“any cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it specify or define
the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was
committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is
charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that
fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-
General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of
the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

• Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, G.R. No. L-11216 , March
6, 1916

FACTS

In 1965, Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and
engaged in business in the Philippines as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water, received a
show-cause order from the Board of Public Utility Commissioners. The order asked Compania General why it
should not be required to present detailed annual reports on its operations and finances.

The Board was invoking Sec. 16(e) of Act No. 2307, which states that the Board shall have the power to require
every public utility to submit an annual report of finances and operations, "in such form and containing such
matters as the Board may from time to time by order prescribe."

In its return to the show-cause order, Compania General refused to provide annual reports of its finances and
operations, saying that the power being invoked by the Board constituted an invalid delegation of authority by
Congress.

The Board eventually decided to require Compania General to submit a report of its finances and operations.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is constitutional to require COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a detailed
report to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine Islands?

Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the
execution of the law?

HELD:

The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is returned to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with
instructions to dismiss the proceeding.

RULING:

The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as
pertinent to the case at hand, reads as follows: Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by
order in writing, to require every public utility as herein defined: (e) To furnish annually a detailed report of
finances and operations, in such form and containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by order
prescribe. The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from
public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the
principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the
board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.

Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to
it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State
must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to require them to deal justly and
equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision
in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in
a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to
be directed, guided or applied. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made. The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power, it said: The Congress may not
delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under
which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular
situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid
down by the Congress. In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congress has authorized the commission to require
annual reports. The act itself prescribes in detail what those reports shall contain. In other words, Congress has laid
down general rules for the guidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the
exercise of the power so conferred. This, we think, is not a delegation of legislative authority. In the case at bar the
provision complained of does not law "down the general rules of action under which the commission shall
proceed." nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the
judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act,
why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon. The Legislature, by the
provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902. The Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information which the State wants but
has authorized and board to obtain the information which the board wants.

• Asuncion vs. de Yriarte, 28 Phil. 67

FACTS: The proposed incorporators began an action in the CFI to compel the chief of the division of archives to
receive and register said articles of incorporation and to do any and all acts necessary for the complete
incorporation of the persons named in the articles. The court below found in favor of the defendant and refused to
order the registration of the articles mentioned, maintaining and holding that the defendant, under the
Corporation Law, had authority to determine both the sufficiency of the form of the articles and the legality of the
object of the proposed corporation. This appeal is taken from that judgment
The chief of the division of archives, the respondent, refused to file the articles of incorporation, upon the ground
that the object of the corporation, as stated in the articles, was not lawful and that, in pursuance of section 6 of
Act No. 1459, they were not registerable.
Hence, this action to obtain a writ of mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the chief of the division of archives has authority, under the Corporation Law, on being
presented with articles of incorporation for registration, to decide not only as to the sufficiency of the form of the
articles, but also as to the lawfulness of the purposes of the proposed corporation.
HELD: YES.
CORPORATION LAW; POWERS AND DUTIES OF CHIEF OF DIVISION OF ARCHIVES, EXECUTIVE BUREAU. — The chief
of the division of archives, for and on behalf of the division, has authority under the Corporation Law (Act No.
1459) to determine the sufficiency of the form of articles of incorporation offered for registration with the division.
Section 6 of the Corporation Law reads in part as follows:
“Five or more persons, not exceeding fifteen, a majority of whom are residents of the Philippine Islands, may form a
private corporation for any lawful purpose by filing with the division of archives, patents, copyrights, and
trademarks of the Executive Bureau articles of incorporation duly executed and acknowledged before a notary
public, . . .”
Simply because the duties of an official happen to be ministerial, it does not necessarily follow that he may not,
in the administration of his office, determine questions of law. We are of the opinion that it is the duty of the
division of archives, when articles of incorporation are presented for registration, to determine whether the
objects of the corporation as expressed in the articles are lawful. We do not believe that, simply because articles of
incorporation presented for registration are perfect in form, the division of archives must accept and register them
and issue the corresponding certificate of incorporation no matter what the purpose of the corporation may be as
expressed in the articles. The chief of the division of archives, on behalf of the division, has also the power and
duty to determine from the articles of incorporation presented for registration the lawfulness of the purposes of
the proposed corporation and whether or not those purposes bring the proposed corporation within the purview
of the law authorizing corporations for given purposes.
MANDAMUS TO COMPEL HIM TO PERFORM DUTIES. — The duties of the chief of the division of archives, so far as
relates to the registration of articles of incorporation, are purely ministerial and not discretional; and mandamus
will lie to compel him to perform his duties under the Corporation Law if, in violation of law, he refuse to perform
them
On the contrary, there is no incompatibility in holding, as we do hold, that his duties are ministerial and that he has
no authority to exercise discretion in receiving and registering articles of incorporation. He may exercise judgment
— that is, the judicial function — in the determination of the question of law referred to, but he may not use
discretion. The question whether or not the objects of a proposed corporation are lawful is one that can be
decided one way only. If he err in the determination of that question and refuse to file articles which should be
filed under the law, that decision is subject to review and correction and, upon proper showing, he will be ordered
to file the articles.
Discretion, it may be said generally, is a faculty conferred upon a court or other official by which he may decide a
question either way and still be right. The power conferred upon the division of archives with respect to the
registration of articles of incorporation is not of that character. It is of the same character as the determination
of a lawsuit by a court upon the merits. It can be decided only one way correctly.

• Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 134

• PSPCA v. COA (G.R. No. 169752, September 25, 2007)

• Buklod vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 142801-802. July 10, 2001

• Bagaoisan vs. National Tobacco Administration, G.R. No. 152845. August 5, 2003

• Domingo vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283. February 6, 2003

• Liban et al. vs. Gordon, PNRC (G. R. No. 175352, Jan. 18, 2011)

• Biraogo vs. PTC, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010

• EO 366

• RA 6656