CASE SUMMARY

REEMA AGGARWAL …..PETITIONER

V.

ANUPAM ….RESPONDENT

Citation of the case: 2004 CR LJ 892 (SC)

Nature of the case: Criminal

Quorum of the Court: 2

Name of the Judge:A Pasayat(Author)

SUBMITTED BY:
RUPALI LEKHI
INTERN
PROBONO INDIA

APRIL 26, 2020

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BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act of 1983 was made bearing in mind the number
of dowry deaths that were on the rise in India. The cruelty caused by her husband and in-laws
in the matrimonial home of the woman for more demand of dowry resulted in the suicides
and dowry deaths in India. To eradicate this evil from the society, sections 498A and 304B in
the Indian Penal Code, 1908 along with section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 were added
through this amendment. However, even after three decades of the aforementioned
amendment, the menace of dowry system in India prevails in large numbers. Time and again
several cases of dowry death and cruelty have been reported and one such case is the present
case at hand, Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam1. This is a landmark case with respect to the
interpretation of the word “husband” within the meaning of sections 498A and 304B, Indian
Penal Code, 1908.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner and the respondent tied the knot on 25.01.1998. On 03.07.1998 the petitioner
was admitted to the Tagore Hospital in Jalandhar for having forcibly consumed poisonous
substance. The appellant was examined by the I.O to record her statement as follows:
 That she was harassed by her husband, mother-in-law, father-in-law and brother-in-
law (respondent no.1,2,3 & 4 respectively) subsequent to her marriage to respondent
no 1 for having brought insufficient dowry. She also disclosed that it was the second
marriage of both the petitioner and the respondent.
 That they forced her to consume a poisonous acidic substance to end her life as a
result of which she started vomiting and fell unconscious.

The FIR and chargesheet was filed by the police after which charges were framed under
section 307 and 498A of Indian Penal Code (IPC).The matter was heard by the Hon’ble trial
court. The learned trial court ruled in favour of the accused persons and did not find them
guilty. Subsequently a leave to appeal was filed by the state of Punjab before the division
bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court against the acquittal of the accused. However,
the leave to appeal was declined and dismissed. In view of such dismissal, criminal revision
petition was filed by the appellant which was also dismissed. Hence the present application
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

1
Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, 2004 Cr LJ 892 (SC).

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ISSUES OF THE CASE
1. Where the validity of marriage is in question how can the expression “husband” be
interpreted in regards to section 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860?
2. Whether the High Court was justified in dismissal of leave of application as well as
criminal revision petition?

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
1. That the High court erred in dismissing the appeal and the criminal revision petition
through unjustified orders as important questions of law were involved in the present
case.
2. That emphasis should be laid on different views of various high courts that ran
contrary to the decision of the M.P High Court in the case of Ramnarayan & Ors v.
State of M.P2on which reliance was placed by the learned trial court.
3. That the words “husband” and woman” appearing in section 498A and 304B, IPC
need to interpreted in a way that would serve the purpose of the creation of this
section.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
1. That it is essential to establish a valid marriage in order constitute a marriage within
the eyes of the law. Section 498A doesn’t extend to a woman whose marriage is void
and not valid in the eyes of law.
2. That the presumption of a valid marriage between the victim woman and the offender
husband was a requisite to attract the provision of dowry death and cruelty under
sections 304B and 498A, IPC respectively. Hence arguing that harassment and cruelty
could only be caused between a husband and wife tied by a valid nuptial knot.
3. That the prosecution failed to provide any conclusive evidence of a valid marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent since the appellant had stated upon
examination that they had been married to each other during the lifetime of the first
wife of the respondent.
4. That section 498A, IPC had no applicability in the present case as the prosecution did
not succeed in proving that the petitioner was the legally wedded wife of the
respondent and that the first marriage of respondent was dissolved.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE
2
Ramnarayan & Ors v. State of M.P, 1998(3)Crimes 147 M.P.

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Section 498A, IPC
This case has been a turning point in the many cases that have evolved 498A, IPC as a
section to curb the very purpose it was enacted for. The offence under this section is a
cognizable and non bailable offence, which means that a person accused of the offence of
cruelty can be arrested without warrant upon a complaint received against him. This section
was specifically enacted for the protection of women against any kind of cruelty caused by
her husband or any relative of her husband. The objective of this section was to reduce crimes
against women including harassment by in-laws of the woman in connection with dowry or
otherwise.

Section 498A explains cruelty under two sub clauses. Sub clause (a) of this section explains
cruelty as mental or physical harassment. It enumerates cruelty as a ‘wilful conduct’ by the
husband or the relative of the husband that is likely to cause or causes injury or danger to the
life limb or health of the woman. Sub clause (b) explains cruelty as harassment to coerce the
woman or her relative for meeting any ‘unlawful demand’ of property or valuable security.
The legislature has taken into consideration the complete view of the present and future
scenario of the domestic evil against women that takes place behind the four walls of her
matrimonial home. The definition of cruelty under this section is broad and expansive and
shows the intent of the legislature to curb the demand of dowry and harassment for
insufficient or more dowry.

Section 304B, IPC

The Supreme Court has discussed at length the menace of dowry which is a result of the
enactment of provisions like section 304B and 498A of IPC. For the longest time the practice
of taking and giving dowry by the parents or guardian of the bride or the bridegroom has
been an embedded and essential tradition of the Hindus, in other words dowry acts as a
consideration for marriage without which the marriage of the bride was impossible. The
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was specifically enacted to curb the ever increasing tradition of
dowry cut across all religions and regions in India.

The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 defines dowry under section 2 of the Act as ‘any property
or valuable security’ given or agreed to be given ‘at, before or after’ the marriage, as a
consideration of marriage. Section 4 prohibits demand of dowry by the bride or bridegroom
as a consideration of marriage. If these two sections are read together, it penalises the demand

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of any property valuable security or money as a consideration of marriage. The intent of the
legislature is clear to make not only the giving of dowry a punishable offence but the very
demand of dowry as a punishable offence as a separate provision. The inclusion of the
expression “as consideration of marriage” in the definition of dowry under Section 2
indicated that the aim of this legislation is to prohibit this social evil to be used as a ‘quid pro
quo’ for marriage. Marriage is not a contract between two parties but a holy sacrament. It
cannot be compared to and equivalent to the value of any property or money.The legislative
intent behind enactment of this act is absolutely clear. This Act is a piece of social legislation
to curb and reduce the threat of dowry encompassed on the livelihood of the lives of the
families and society at large.

Section 304B was introduced through the 1986 amendment of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
The legislature rightly decided to create a presumption of dowry death where the death of a
woman is caused within seven years of marriage and if there exists evidence that soon before
her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives in
connection with demand for dowry. The liability of the accused under this section is extended
to cases where repeated demand for dowry by the husband or his family members puts an
inadvertent pressure on the victim, leaving the woman with no choice but to commit suicide.
This mental agony and frustration has been the result of the death of many women in India
who succumb to the demands of her matrimonial home compelling her to end her life. The
presumption under section 304B IPC is corroborated by Section 113B of the Evidence Act.
These two section are read together in order to shift the burden on the accused to prove that
the victim was not subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death in relation to
demand for dowry.

There is a long list of cases where the kin of the deceased have been brought to justice under
section 304B. One such case is that of the State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Raj Gopal Asawa
and Anr3, where the accused was proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt under section
304B, IPC for driving the victim to commit suicide by subjecting her to cruelty and
harassment in relation to demand of dowry soon before her death.
It was observed in the case of Raja Lai Singh v. State of Jharkhand 4, that the expression
‘soon before death’ appearing in the Section 304B, IPC is an elastic term. It can be referred

3
State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Raj Gopal Asawa andAnr, 2004 4 SCC 470.
4
Raja Lai Singh v. State of Jharkhand,2007 III Cr. L.J. 3262 (SC).

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as a period either immediately before death of deceased or within a few days or few weeks
before death of the victim. The relevance of this term is that there must be a nexus between
death of the deceased and harassment or cruelty inflicted upon the victim in relation to
demand for dowry.

Cruelty, dowry death and Section113B of Evidence Act, 1872

The tradition of dowry poses a continuous threat to the gender inequality in the country
where the parents and family of the woman feel burdened with the huge demands made in
order to marry. The man considers the woman as his property who he can mold and harass in
order to fulfill his never ending greed. Section 304B, 498A, IPC read with section 113B,
Evidence Act, 1872 are allied provisions dealing revolving around dowry death, cruelty and
its presumption.

Section 113B of the Indian Penal code, 1860 lays down a presumption to be made against the
accused in cases connected with dowry death where cruelty or harassment was committed
bythe accused soon before the death of the victim. This section is significant in terms of its
limited scope for the accused to escape causing dowry death. However, in order to constitute
an offence under this section, it is important that cruelty or harassment in relation to demand
of dowry is established, the death of the victim has been the result of such cruelty and such
cruelty must be caused soon before the death of the victim.

Validity of marriage
Marriage in India is considered to be a holy sacrament, union of two souls who come together
for mutual companionship and procreation. The Indian Penal Code 1860, and the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955(HMA)prohibits bigamy under section 494 IPC and Section 17 of HMA
respectively. These provisions make the second marriage voidif it takes place during the
lifetime of the wife or husband. The whole premises of the respondent in the present case was
that the marriage of the appellant and the respondent was invalid and hence the
aforementioned sections wont be applicable. The prosecution had failed to establish that the
respondent’s first marriage had been dissolved. The Supreme court placed reliance on many
precedents to explain the presumption of a validity of marriage. It stated that when there is a
celebration of marriage and all necessary rites and ceremonies have been carried out, it is a
marriage in fact, therefore in the absence of a proof of such marriage a presumption arises as
to marriage in law. In the case of Inderun Valungypooly v. Ramaswamy5, the court stated
5
Inderun Valungypooly v. Ramaswamy,1869 (13) MIA 141.

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that once marriage in fact has been established, there would be a favourable presumption of
marriage in law. In the case of Sastry Velaider v. Sembicutty6where there is evidence that a
man and woman have lived together as husband and wife, until otherwise proved as contrary,
the law will presume that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage and
not in a state of concubinage.

Interpretation of statute:
There are 4 main rules of interpretation that the courts rely on. These include the literal rule,
mischief rule, golden rule and the harmonious rule interpretation. Through these rules the
courts have been able to deliver fruitful judgments which make them landmark in the true
spirit of law. It becomes imperative for the judiciary to interpret the law to understand the
true object of the legislation in situations where injustice is caused. The judiciary has
successfully tried to interpret the provisions in a way that is favourable to the parties to the
matter and the society at large.

In the present case the court felt the need to interpret the expression “husband” beyond its
literal meaning to attain the object of curbing the social evil of dowry in the society. The
Court laid emphasis on the purpose of enactment of the legislation. It was made to protect the
women cruelty and dowry death and not to shelter the vey perpetrators that were responsible
for this offence. It stated that is the language of a legislation is vague or imprecise then they
cannot confine the meaning of the words or phrases to its literal interpretation. The Supreme
Court placed reliance in several cases to emphasize on the need of interpretation of statute.

In the case of Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)7the Court stated that it is the paramount
duty of the legislature to give a rational meaning to the words, sections and provisions where
such words, sections or provisions are ambiguous, uncertain and dubious in nature. The court
attempts to examine the act as a whole and the necessity behind the construction of the Act
without separating any provisions from its legislative framework. Further, the provisions are
read in such a manner so as to decipher the motive behind the Act so as to make a coherent
and consistent interpretation of the provisions in question and to avoid any undesirable
consequences.

6
Sastry Velaider v. Sembicutty,1881 (6) AC 686.
7
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1988 SC 1883

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In the case of District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron & Steel Co, 8this Court stated that the
construction of an Act incorporates both literal and purposive approach. The court is mindful
of deriving at the nexus between the meaning of the word and the purpose or object of the
Act. This is important to understand the true and legal meaning of the words and provisions.

In the case of Reserve Bank of India etc. v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co.
Ltd. and others9the court dealtwith the question of interpretation of a statute and observed
that the basis of interpretation of any statute should be its ‘text’ and ‘context’. Theses are
mutually dependent on each other for a rationale comprehension of the text as a whole and
with respect to the context. When text is read in the light of the context from the eyes of the
legislature we can understand why the legislation was enacted in the first place and can relate
it to the context. However, when we read the text is read solely without involving the context
a different meaning and view may appear. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be
construed in isolation.

In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher10, Lord Denning, advised to adopt a purposive
approach to the interpretation of a word used in a statute and observed The English language
is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Legislations are not defined with exact
precision therefore judges cannot be expected to make decisions merely by literal
interpretation of the language of the Act. So when any ambiguity or defect arises, the judges
have to consider the social conditions which gave rise to it, the mischief which it was passed
to remedy it, alongside the language of the legislation and thereafter supplement the written
word. The judge must not remove or replace the material ingredients of which the Act is
comprised of but should only “iron out the creases”.

JUDGMENT AT A GLANCE

The position of the Supreme court in the present case stood as under:

1. The liberal approach of interpretation to be adopted for determining the relationship

of a husband and wife in cases where question of curbing social evil is involved. On
the other hand, strict interpretation should be applied where civil rights between them
is to be decided.

8
District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron & Steel Co,JT 2001 (6) SC 183.
9
Reserve Bank of India etc. v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others,1987 (1) SCC 424.
10
Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher,(1949) 2 All ER 155 (CA).

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 2. It is significant to interpret the law with certain realism and not merely pedantically.
The objective of the legislation is important to be understood to interpret the text with
the context.
3. The expression “husband” under section 498A or 304B of IPC includes any person
who under the status of proclaimed husband subjects the woman to cruelty in relation
to dowry under these sections.
4. The Supreme Court remitted the case back to the High Court for hearing the matter on
merits and stated that the High Court was unjustified to dismiss the grant of leave and
criminal revision petition.

The Court further explained that it is essential to decipher the thrust of any legislation. For
example, to constitute the offence of Bigamy under section 494, IPC the key ingredient is
"marrying" again during the lifetime of husband or wife in contrast to the key ingredient of
Section 498A is subjecting the woman concerned to cruelty. The thrust is mainly "marrying"
in Section 494 IPC as against subjecting of the woman to cruelty in Section 498A. Likewise,
the thrust of the offence under Section 304B is "Dowry Death". The thrust or the key
ingredient of each section different from the persons committing the offence. The words in
these section can be used in such a way so as to include not only those who are tied by a valid
marriage but also those that have undergone some form of marriage and thereby feigns
himself to be the husband. The court referred to the case of Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande &
Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr11, to deal with the contention relating to presumption.
The court stated that the presumption of long cohabitation could not be invoked merely
because the parties were unable to prove the necessary ceremonies performed by them to
constitute a valid marriage.

CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF THE JUDGMENT

The court has discussed the tradition of dowry as a social evil and how the intent of the
legislature is to eradicate such social evils from our society. The court has mentioned several
cases to indicate the need to interpret the legislation in relation to the context in question. The
court applied the liberal rule of interpretation in order to fulfill the purpose for which the
statue was enacted in the first place. The court stated that to understand the relationship
between the husband and wife in a marriage ‘strict interpretation’ is applicable where claims
of civil rights such as right to property etc. is involved and liberal approach must be adopted

11
Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr,1965 AIR 1564.

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where is the eradicating social evil is in question. The court explained this through the case of
Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and Anr,12where the
marriage of the woman was proved to be null and void under section 5 of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955. Sheclaimed right to maintenance, a civil right of the wife under section 125 of
CRPC, 1973. However, it was rejected on the ground of not fulfillment of necessary
conditions under section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955.

The supreme court stated that the provisions and legislations that are specifically enacted to
effectuate a public purpose must be read with realism and not merely on technical lines. A
person cannot enter into a marital relationship or arrangement with the woman, harass her for
dowry to fulfill his greed and then escape punishment under the pretext of calling the
marriage as invalid in law. Such interpretation and approach towards these specific
legislations would encourage harassment and destroy the purpose of their enactment. The
court ruled and stated; “The expression “husband” covers a person who enters into a marital
relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects
the woman concerned to cruelty in the manner provided under Section 498-A, whatever be
the legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of Section 498-A.”.
The court further explained that even though the expression ‘husband’ would include those
who cohabit with the woman and perform the role and status of the husband. Thus there
exists no ground to exclude them from being covered under the purview of sections 498A,
304B of IPC. Including them would serve the legislative intent.

SUGGESTIONS
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the word “husband” has succeeded in giving a new
dimension to the section 498A and 304B of the IPC. This has helped to further women safety
and left little scope for the perpetrators to escape. The impact of this judgment has broadened
the scope of applicability of this section by making the husband liable irrespective the
legitimacy of the marriage which is termed to be irrelevant.

The Apex court has put a great deal of confidence in the applicability of this provision to
further the protection of women in the society. However, the supreme court’s interpretation
of the word “husband” within the meaning of Section 498A and 304B of IPC was applied
ineffectivelyn a recent judgment of the Kerala High Court.
12
Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and Anr,AIR 1988 SC 644.

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In the case of Unnikrishnan v. State of Kerala13the married persons did not perform certain
rites and ceremonies in order to be legally married and started living together as husband and
wife. The court ruled that the parties were not married to each other in the eyes of law and
were in a live in relationship. Thus an unfavourable judgement was passed, stating that a
woman in a live-in relationship was not entitled to file a complaint under section 498A, IPC.

This view of the high court subdues the importance of this judgment in the light of sections
498A and 304B IPC. The court suggested to include within the meaning of the word husband
any person who proclaims or feigns himself to be the husband of the victim, perform the roles
and duties of a husband, cohabits with the woman and harasses her so as to broaden the
definition of husband and leave very little or no scope for the perpetrators of this crime.
However, the Kerala High Court’s judgment defeats the very purpose of this liberal
interpretation. Live in relationships are very much a marital arrangement that two people
share. They share the same right and responsibilities as that of a husband and wife. Woman
cohabiting in a live in relationship should have an equivalent protection under sections 498A
and 304B as that given to a woman tied by a valid marriage.

REFERENCES
1. Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, 2004 Cr LJ 892 (SC).
2. Ramnarayan & Ors v. State of M.P, 1998(3)Crimes 147 M.P
3. The State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Raj Gopal Asawa and Anr, 2004 4 SCC 470
4. Raja Lai Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2007 III Cr. L.J. 3262 (SC).
5. Inderun Valungypooly v. Ramaswamy, 1869 (13) MIA 141.
6. Sastry Velaider v. Sembicutty, 1881 (6) AC 686.
7. Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1988 SC 1883
8. District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron & Steel Co, JT 2001 (6) SC 183
9. Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and
others, 1987 (1) SCC 424
10. Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, (1949) 2 All ER 155 (CA)
11. Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr, 1965 AIR 1564
12. Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and Anr, AIR 1988 SC
644
13
Unnikrishnan v. State of Kerala,2017 SCC 12064.

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 13. Unnikrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2017 SCC 1206

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

I am a final year law student at Amity Law School, Noida. I have a good academic record and
have been an active participant in moot court competitions and paper presentation. I have also
maintained a good academic record throughout my law school journey. I have profound
interest in the field of Arbitration Law and Intellectual Property Law. I aim to pursue my
career in Litigation.

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