People vs. Boholst-Caballero
People vs. Boholst-Caballero
People vs. Boholst-Caballero
Page 7 of 10
aroused her feelings to such a degree as to drive her to plan and day?
carry out the killing of her husband. A I was not able to wear that, Your Honor, because it was torn
On the other hand, it was Francisco Caballero who had a reason out.
for attacking his wife, Cunigunda. Meeting his wife unexpectedly at
Q You did not bring that to the police authorities?
past midnight on the road, Francisco reacted angrily, and suspecting
that she was out for some bad purpose he held her by the collar of her A I showed it to the police authorities, and they told me to keep it,
dress and said: “Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of but not to touch it.” (Tsn. p. 65, ibid)
a bitch.” This was followed by a slapping on the face until Cunigunda’s We do not see, therefore, the alleged contradiction in appellant’s
nose bled, pulling of her hair, pushing her down to the ground, and testimony which was singled out by His Honor as one of his reasons
strangling her—all of which constituted the unlawful aggression for discrediting her plea of self-defense.
against which appellant had to defend herself. That appellant made it clear to the police that she stabbed her
Next to appellant’s lack of motive for killing her husband, is her husband because he attacked her is confirmed by no less than the
conduct shortly after the occurrence. As soon as the sun was up that prosecution witness, Patrolman Restituto Mariveles, who was on duty
morning of January 3 (the stabbing occurred past midnight of January at the desk when appellant arrived at the police headquarters. This
2), Cunigunda went to the city and presented herself at the police witness on cross-examination declared:
headquarters where she reported that she stabbed her husband and “ And she also told you that on that night previous to the incident
surrendered the blood-stained dress she wore that night. On this Q her husband Francisco Caballero beat her up, is that right?
point, the trial judge stated that appellant made contradictory A She told me that she was met on the way by her husband
statements in her testimony concerning the report made by her to the immediately after carolling and she was manhandled by her
police authorities, for while at the start she declared that she did not
husband and when she was struggling to get loose from her
report the “choking by her husband”, she later changed her testimony
and stated that she did relate that fact. (p. 10, Decision) husband she happened to take hold of a knife that was placed
We have gone over the stenographic transcript of the testimony of under the belt of her husband and because she was already
appellant on direct examination and nowhere is half conscious she did not know that she was able to thrust
________________ said knife to the stomach of her husband.” (tsn. p. 23, witness
R. Mariveles)
105 Phil. 591; People vs. Macabenta, 106 Phil. 77. It is indeed regrettable that the statements made by appellant to the
193 police upon her surrender were not taken down in writing to serve as
a faithful and reliable account of her report, nevertheless, We are
VOL. 61, NOVEMBER 25, 1974 193
satisfied by the fact, which is not disputed, that of her own accord
People vs. Boholst-Caballero appellant went to the police authorities early in the morning of January
there a positive and direct statement of hers that she did not report 3, informed policeman Mariveles that she stabbed her husband
that she was choked by her husband. What the trial judge asked of because he manhandled her which rendered her “half-conscious”, and
appellant was whether or not she told the police about the fist mark on
her face and her answer was “No, sir, I forgot.” (tsn. p. 55, supra) And 194
on appellant’s cross-examination, there was no question propounded 194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and therefore there was no answer given on the subject-matter of People vs. Boholst-Caballero
appellant’s report to the police concerning the incident except for the brought and showed the dress she wore during the incident which
following: was torn by the collar and with blood stains due to the bleeding of her
“COURT: nose. Another policeman, Joventino de Leon, who at the time was
Q Did you show that dress to the police authorities the following property custodian of the Ormoc City police, corroborated appellant’s
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testimony concerning the dress marked Exhibit 1 for the defense. (tsn. recourse but to get hold of any weapon within her reach to save
p. 70 witness J. de Leon) If there was no clear and positive statement herself from impending death. Early jurisprudence of this Court has
in appellant’s testimony either on direct or cross examination that she followed the principle that the reasonable necessity of the means
informed the police that she was choked by her husband, it was employed in self-defense does not depend upon the harm done but
because, as We noted, no question was propounded to her on that rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. (U.S. vs. Paras,
point. 1907, 9 Phil. 367, citing Decision of Dec. 22, 1887) And so the fact
While We are on this subject of appellant’s surrender, mention is to that there was no visible injury caused on the body of the appellant
be made of the knife marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution. In her which necessitated medical attention, a circumstance noted by the
testimony, appellant stated that Exhibit C was not the knife actually trial court, is no ground for discrediting self-defense; what is vital is
used by her in stabbing her husband because the true weapon was that there was imminent peril to appellant’s life caused by the unlawful
her husband’s Moro hunting knife with a blade of around six inches aggression of her husband. The knife tucked in her husband’s belt
which she threw away immediately after the incident; that when she afforded appellant the only reasonable means with which she could
was asked by Pat. Mariveles to look for the weapon and she could not free and save herself from being strangled and choked to death. What
find it, she was advised by policeman Cabral who helped her in the this Court expressed in the case of People vs. Lara, 1925, 48 Phil.
search to get any knife and surrender it to the desk officer and so she 153, 160, is very true and applicable to the situation now before Us,
took the knife Exhibit C and presented it to Pat. Mariveles. (tsn. and We quote:
appellant pp. 56-57, 60) This testimony of appellant was taken against “It should be borne in mind that in emergencies of this kind human
her by the court aquo which held that her declaration could not have nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience
been true. We find however no strong reason for disbelieving the to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent, as in this
accused on this point. Appellant does not deny that she turned over case, that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the
Exhibit C to Pat. Mariveles as the knife with which she stabbed her duty of the courts to sanction the act and to hold the actor
husband but she claims that she did so upon advise of another irresponsible in law for the consequences.”16
policeman, Pat. Cabral, and it is quite significant that the latter was
not called upon by the prosecution to refute such declaration. There is Equally relevant is the time-honored principle: Necessitas Non habet
sincerity in appellant’s attempt to rectify a misstatement made by her legem. Necessity knows no law.
to Pat. Mariveles and We are inclined to believe and in fact We do The third element of self-defense is lack of sufficient provocation
believe that the fatal weapon must have had indeed a blade of around on the part of the person defending himself Provocation is sufficient
six inches as stated by appellant for it to penetrate through the left when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to
lumbar region to the victim’s large intestine and cause the discharge impel one to attack the person claiming self-defense.17 Undoubtedly
of fecal matter, (tsn. Dr. C. Samson, p. 6) appellant herein did not give sufficient provocation to warrant the
All the elements of self-defense are indeed present in the instant aggression or attack on her person by her husband, Francisco. While
case. it was
The element of unlawful aggression has been clearly established ________________
as pointed out above. 16
195 See also People vs. Encomienda, No. L-26750, August 18,
1972, 46 SCRA p. 522.
VOL. 61, NOVEMBER 25, 1974 195 17
Guevara’s supra p. 89, citing Decision of Supreme Court of
People vs. Boholst-Caballero Spain, February 20, 1893, 50 Jur. Crim. 166-168; Padilla’s Criminal
The second element, that is, reasonable necessity for the means Law, Book I, 1971 ed., p. 197.
employed is likewise present. Here we have a woman who being
strangled and choked by a furious aggressor and rendered almost 196
unconscious by the strong pressure on her throat had no other 196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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People vs. Boholst-Caballero unexplained nonpresentation of the bolo allegedly used by the
understandable for Francisco to be angry at his wife for finding her on deceased, the failure of the appellant concerned to report immediately
the road in the middle of the night, however, he was not justified in to the authorities the alleged attempt against him by the deceased
inflicting bodily punishment with an intent to kill by choking his wife’s and the lack of motive on the part of the deceased to assault the
throat. All that appellant did was to provoke an imaginary commission accused all belie and negative the plea of self-defense. (People vs.
of a wrong in the mind of her husband, which is not a sufficient Constantino, L-23558, August 10, 1967).
provocation under the law of self-defense. Upon being confronted by b) Unlawful aggression.—Real aggression presupposes an act
her husband for being out late at night, accused gave a valid excuse positively strong, showing the wrongful intent of the aggressor, not
that she went carolling with some friends to earn some money for their merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, but a material attack.
child. January 2 was indeed within the Christmas season during which (U.S. vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil. 565; U.S. vs. Santos, 17 Phil. 87.)
by tradition people carol from house to house and receive monetary (People vs. Yucierto, CA-G.R. No. 1905-R, Oct. 9, 1947).
gifts in a Christian spirit of goodwill. The deceased therefore should c) Reasonable necessity of means employed.—As to the
have given some consideration to his wife’s excuse before jumping to reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
conclusions and taking the extreme measure of attempting to kill his 197
wife.
VOL. 61, NOVEMBER 26, 1974 197
IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find that
accused-appellant acted in the legitimate defense of her person, and Maspil vs. Romero
We accordingly set aside the judgment of conviction and ACQUIT her aggression, it has been held that this does not imply a material
with costs de oficio. commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What
So Ordered. the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which
Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to
JJ., concur. which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the
Castro, J., On leave. reason, that moves or impels the defense, and, according to
jurisprudence of courts, the proportionateness thereof does not
Judgment set aside. depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of
Notes.—a) Circumstances which negate plea of self-defense.— such injury. (People vs. Canson, CA-G.R. No. 3357-R, Oct. 25, 1949).
The nature, number and location of the wounds of the deceased, the
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