Malayang Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa v.
Ramos
326 Scra 428 (2000)
Facts:
Petitioner Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield
(MSMG) is a local union. Private respondent M. Greenfield is the employer of
petitioner's members. Members of petitioner conducted a strike, which was
marred by violence. Private respondent attempted to quell the same by hiring
persons for that purpose. Thereafter, petitioners were placed under preventive
suspension; only some of them were eventually allowed to return to work.
Petitioners thus filed a verified complaint with the Arbitration Branch
of the DOLE, charging private respondent of ULP, in the form of union-
busting, illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, interference in union activities,
discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion, violence, and oppression.
Private respondent's defense was that the strike was illegal for it was marred
by violence.
Issue:
Whether the strike should be declared illegal on account of violence
committed during the strike.
Ruling:
No, where both parties are responsible for the violence committed
during the strike, the strike cannot be declared illegal since the strike cannot
be attributed to the striking employees only. This is an exception to the
general rule that the strike shall be declared illegal where it is marred by
violence on the part of the employees.
In the case at bar, the allegation of violence committed in the course of
the strike, it must be remembered that the Labor Arbiter and the Commission
found that "the parties are agreed that there were violent incidents . . .
resulting to injuries to both sides, the union and management. The evidence
on record show that the violence cannot be attributed to the striking
employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the
strikers. With violence committed on both sides, the management and the
employees, such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as
illegal.
Manila Electric Co. V. Quisumbing
Facts:
The court directed the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the terms
among which are the following modifications: Wages: PhP 1,900 for 1995-
1996; Retroactivity: December 28, 1996-Dec. 1999, etc. Dissatisfied, some
members of the union filed a motion for intervention/reconsideration.
Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of Php2,000.00 per month as
ordered is allowed, it would pass the cost covering such increase to the
consumers through an increased rate of electricity. On the retroactivity of the
CBA arbitral award, the parties reckon the period as when retroaction shall
commence.
Issue:
Whether or not retroactivity of arbitral awards shall commence at such
time as granted by the Secretary.
Ruling:
In St. Luke’s Medical vs. Torres, a deadlock developed during CBA
negotiations between management unions. The Secretary assumed jurisdiction
and ordered the retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration of the
previous CBA. The Court ratiocinated thus: In the absence of a specific
provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary pursuant to article 263(g) of the Labor Code, public
respondent is deemed vested with the plenary and discretionary powers to
determine the effectivity thereof.
In general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of
the existing CBA retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if
agreed thereafter, the effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. On
the other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award
or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by
intervention of the government. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s
determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers
over arbitral awards shall control.
Wherefore, the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to
November 30, 1997; and the award of wage is increased from Php1,900 to
Php2,000.
PICOP RESOURCES INC., V. TANECA
GR 160828
Facts:
Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona
fide members of NAMAPRI-SPFL which is the collective bargaining agent for
the rank-and-file employees of petitioner PRI. PRI has a CBA with
NAMAPRI-SPFL. The CBA contained the following union security
provisions: All employees within the appropriate bargaining unit who are
members of the Union at the time of the signing of this Agreement shall, as a
condition of continued employment by the COMPANY, maintain their
membership in the UNION in good standing during the effectivity of this
Agreement. The Company shall give notice of termination of services of any
employee who shall fail to fulfill the condition provided.
Atty. Fuentes sent a letter to the management of PRI demanding the
termination of employees who allegedly supported the FFW during the
effectivity of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of campaigning
for and signing the petition for certification election of FFW as an act of
disloyalty and a valid basis for termination for a cause in accordance with its
Constitution and By-Laws specifically on Union Security Clause. PRI served
notices of termination for causes to employees on the ground of “acts of
disloyalty” committed against it when respondents allegedly supported and
signed the Petition for Certification Election of FFW before the “freedom
period” during the effectivity of the CBA. A Notice was also served on the
DOLE, Caraga Region. Respondents then accused PRI of ULP.
Issue:
Whether respondent employees were validly terminated.
Ruling:
No, Respondents were not validly terminated. The “Union security” is a
generic term, which is applied to and comprehends “closed shop,” “union
shop,” “maintenance of membership,” or any other form of agreement which
imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership
as a condition affecting employment.
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union
security clause, the employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union
security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of
the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to
support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. These
requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the
union security provision of the CBA. On third requisite, the Court find that
there is no sufficient evidence to support the decision of PRI to terminate the
employment of the respondents. The mere signing of the authorization in
support of the Petition for Certification Election of FFW or before the
“freedom period,” is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of
respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed during the
freedom period.
Manila Central Line Corp. V. Manila Central
Manila Free Workers Union
G.R. No. 109383. June 15, 1998
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Case arose out of a collective bargaining deadlock between petitioner
and private respondent Manila Central Line Free Workers Union-National
Federation of Labor. The parties’ CBA had expired on March 15, 1989. As
the parties failed to reach a new agreement, private respondent sought the aid
of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on October 30, 1989, but
the deadlock remained unresolved.
At the initial hearing before the Labor Arbiter, the parties declared that
conciliation efforts before the NCMB had terminated and it was their desire to
submit the case for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly, they were required
to submit their position papers and proposals, which they did, and in which
they indicated portions of their respective proposals to which they agree,
leaving the rest for arbitration.
The LA ordered the petitioner Union and the respondent Company to
execute and formalize their new five-year CBA retroactive to the date of
expiry of the 1986-1989 CBA within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
Decision. Petitioner appealed, but its appeal was denied by the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether the CBA entered into by the parties may be given retroactive
effect.
Ruling:
Yes, CBA entered into by the parties may be given retroactive effect.
Article 253-A refers to collective bargaining agreements entered into by the
parties as a result of their mutual agreement. The CBA in this case, on the
other hand, is part of an arbitral award. As such, it may be made retroactive to
the date of expiration of the previous agreement.
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting
retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of
Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved,
public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to
determine the effectivity thereof.
Sundowner Development Corporation V. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon
G.R. No. 82341 December 6, 1989
Gancayco, J.
Facts:
Private respondent Hotel Mabuhay, Inc. leased the premises belonging
to Syjuco. However, due to non-payment of rentals, a case for ejectment was
filed by Syjuco. Mabuhay offered to amicably settle the case by surrendering
the premises and to sell its assets and personal property to any interested
party.
Syjuco offered the said premises for lease to petitioner and formally
turned over the possession of the leased premises to petitioner. Meanwhile,
respondent National Union of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied
Services (NUWHRAIN) picketed the leased premises, barricaded the entrance
to the leased premises and denied petitioner’s officers, employees and guests
free access to and egress from said premises.
Public respondent Secretary of Labor, assuming jurisdiction over the
dispute, issued an order requiring all striking employees to return to work.
The parties were also directed to submit their respective position papers
within ten (10) days from receipt of the order. Public respondent then issued
an order requiring petitioner to absorb the members of the union and to pay
backwages from the time it started operations up to the date of the order.
Issue:
Whether petitioner should absorb employees of Mabuhay and pay them
their backwages.
Ruling:
No, petitioner should not absorb employees of Mabuhay and pay them
their backwages. Contrary to the claim of the public respondent that the
transaction between petitioner and Mabuhay was attended with bad faith, the
court finds no cogent basis for such contention.
Mabuhay had nothing to do with the negotiation and consummation of
the lease contract between petitioner and Syjuco. It was only when Mabuhay
offered to sell its assets and personal properties in the premises to petitioner
that they came to deal with each other. It appears that petitioner agreed to
purchase said assets of respondent Mabuhay to enable Mabuhay to pay its
obligations to its striking employees and to Syjuco. Thus, the absorption of
the employees of Mabuhay may not be imposed on petitioner.
Ronald Manlimos V. National Labor Relations Commissinon
G.R. No. 113337 March 2, 1995
Davide, Jr., J.
Facts:
The petitioners were among the regular employees of the Super
Mahogany Plywood Corporation, who had been hired as patchers, taper-
graders, and receivers-dryers. When a new owner acquired complete
ownership of the corporation, the petitioners continued to work and were
considered terminated, with their conformity when they received their
separation pay, 13th month pay, and all other benefits due them computed as
of the said month. Each of them then executed a Release and Waiver.
When the new owner caused the publication of a notice for the hiring of
workers, indicating therein who of the separated employees could be accepted
on probationary basis, the petitioners filed their applications for employment.
They were hired on a probationary basis. They were later on dismissed for
allegedly committing acts prejudicial to the interest of the new management
which consisted of their "including unrepaired veneers in their reported
productions on output as well as untaped corestock or whole sheets in their
supposed taped veneers/corestock.”
Issue:
Whether the dismissed workers have remained regular employees
regardless of the change of management.
Ruling:
No. Where such transfer of ownership is in good faith, the transferee is
under no legal duty to absorb the transferor employees as there is no law
compelling such absorption. The most that the transferee may do, for reasons
of public policy and social justice, is to give preference to the qualified
separated employees in the filling of vacancies in the facilities of the
purchaser.
The hiring of employees on a probationary basis is an exclusive
management prerogative. The employer has the right or privilege to choose
who will be hired and who will be denied employment. It is within the
exercise of this right that the employers may set or fix a probationary period
within which it may test and observe the employee's conduct before hiring
him permanently.
Master Iron Works Construction Corp. Vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 92009 February 17, 1993
Melo, J.
Facts:
Master Iron Labor Union (MILU) entered into a collective barganing
agreement with Master Iron Works Construction Corporation (Corporation for
brevity) for the three-year period. The CBA contains no-strike, no-lock out
provisions. After the signing of the CBA, the Corporation subcontracted
outside workers to do the usual jobs done by its regular workers including
those done outside of the company plant. As a result, the regular workers were
scheduled by the management to work on a rotation basis allegedly to prevent
financial losses thereby allowing the workers only ten (10) working days a
month. The Corporation insisted that the hiring of casual workers was a
management prerogative. The workers charged the Corporation with unfair
labor practice for subcontracting work that was normally done by its regular
workers thereby causing the reduction of the latter's workdays. Later, the
MILU staged a strike, maintaining picket lines on the road leading to the
Corporation's plant entrance and premises notwithstanding the no-strike no-
lockout provisions in the CBA. The workers contend that the strike is legal
because the reasons therefor are non-economic in nature.
Issue:
Whether the strike was legal.
Ruling:
Yes, the strike staged by the petitioners was a legal one even though it
may have been called to offset what the strikers believed in good faith to be
unfair labor practices on the part of the employer (Ferrer, et al. vs. CIR).
Verily, such presumption of legality prevails even if the allegations of
unfair labor practices are subsequently found out to be untrue. Article 263 of
the Labor Code which clearly states the policy of the State to encourage free
trade unionism and free collective bargaining. Paragraph b guarantees the
workers right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective
bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection and recognizes the right
of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to
lockout so long as these actions are consistent with the national interest and
the grounds therefor do not involve inter-union and intra-union disputes.
An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or other
concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant. The
hiring, firing, transfer, demotion, and promotion of employees are
traditionally identified as management prerogatives. However, they are not
absolute prerogatives. They are subject to limitations found in law, a
collective bargaining agreement, or general principles of fair play and justice
(University of Sto. Tomas vs. NLRC, citing Abbott Laboratories, Inc. vs.
NLRC).
Caltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) vs.
Hon. Jose S. Brillantes
G.R. No. 123782. September 16, 1997
Panganiban, J.
Facts:
Anticipating the expiration of their CBA on July 31, 1995, petitioner
and private respondent negotiated the terms and conditions of employment to
be contained in a new CBA. Because the parties failed to reach any significant
progress in these meetings, petitioner declared a deadlock. On July 24, 1995,
petitioner filed a notice of strike. Six conciliation meetings conducted by the
NCMB failed. Marathon meetings at the plant level, but this remedy proved
also unavailing. Secretary assumed jurisdiction and ordered “Accordingly,
any strike or lockout, whether actual or intended, is hereby enjoined.” But the
members of petitioner defied them and continued their mass action despite
repeated orders. Because of the strike, private respondent terminated the
employment of some officers of petitioner union. The legality of these
dismissals brought additional contentious issues. Again, the parties tried to
resolve their differences through conciliation. Failing to come to any
substantial agreement, the parties decided to refer the problem to the secretary
of labor and employment.
Issue: Whether or not the Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment
committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving the instant labor dispute.
Ruling:
No, Secretary of Labor did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The
disagreement between petitioner and private respondent on the union security
clause should have been definitively resolved by public respondent. The labor
secretary should take cognizance of an issue which is not merely incidental to
but essentially involved in the labor dispute itself, or which is otherwise
submitted to him for resolution.
The secretary of labor assumed jurisdiction over this labor dispute in an
industry indispensable to national interest, precisely to settle once and for all
the disputes over which he has jurisdiction at his level. Although the union
has every right to represent its members in the negotiation regarding the terms
and conditions of their employment, it cannot negate their wishes on matters
which are purely personal and individual to them. When parties agree to
submit unresolved issues to the secretary of labor for his resolution, they
should not expect their positions to be adopted in toto. It is understood that
they defer to his wisdom and objectivity in insuring industrial peace. And
unless they can clearly demonstrate bias, arbitrariness, capriciousness or
personal hostility on the part of such public officer, the Court will not
interfere or substitute the said officer’s judgment with its own.
Chung Fu Industries (Philippines) Inc., vs. Court Of Appeals
G.R. No. 96283 February 25, 1992
Romero, J
Facts:
Petitioner Chung Fu Industries and private respondents Roblecor
Philippines forged a construction agreement wherein Roblecor committed to
construct and finish on Dec. 31, 1989, Chung Fu’s industrial/factory complex
in Tanawan, Cavite in consideration of P42M.
It was stipulated also that in the event of disputes, the parties will be
subjected to an arbitration resolution, wherein the arbitrator will be chosen by
both parties-Apart from the construction agreement, the parties also entered
into ancillary contracts for the construction of a dormitory and support
facilities with a contract price of 3,875,285.00 to be completed on or before
October 31,1989 and the other dated Aug. 12,1989 for the installation of
electrical, water and hydrant systems at the plant site, priced at 12.1M and
requiring completion thereof one month after civil works have been finished.
Roblecor failed to complete the work despite the extension allowed by
Chung Fu. Chung Fu had to take over the construction when it had become
evident that Roblecor was not in a position to fulfill the obligation. Roblecor
filed a petition for Compulsory Arbitration with prayer for TRO before
respondent RTC. Pursuant to the arbitration clause in the construction
agreement Chung Fu moved to dismiss the petition and further prayed for the
quashing of the restraining order. RTC approved the arbitration agreement and
Asuncion was appointed as the sole arbitrator. Arbitrator ruled in favor of the
contractor Roblecor. Chung Fu moved to remand the case for further hearing
and asked for a reconsideration of the judgment award claiming that Asuncion
committed 12 instances of grave error by disregarding the provisions of the
parties’ contract. RTC denied Chung Fu’s Motion to Remand and approved
Roblecor’s Motion for Confirmation of Award.
Issue:
Whether the subject arbitration award is beyond the ambit of the court’s
power of judicial review.
Ruling:
No, It’s stated explicitly under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code that the
finality of the arbitrator’s award is not absolute and without exceptions.
Where the conditions described in Arts. 2038, 2039 and 2040 applicable to
both compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators’ award maybe
annulled or rescinded. Additionally, Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration
Law provide grounds for vacating, modifying or rescinding an arbitrator’s
award.
Del Monte Philippines, Inc Vs. Mariano Saldivar
G.R. No. 158620 October 11, 2006
Tinga, J.
Facts:
The Associated Labor Union (ALU) is the exclusive bargaining agent
of the plantation workers of petitoner. Respondent Timba, along with four
other employees were charged by ALU for disloyalty to the Union,
particularly for encouraging defections to rival Union, National Federation of
Labor (NFL). Timbal filed an answer before the Disloyalty Board, denying
the allegations in the complaint and the averments in Artajo's affidavit. She
noted that the allegations against her were purportedly committed nearly
2years earlier; and that Artajo's act was motivated by hate and revenge owing
to the filing of the aforementioned civil action. The Disloyalty Board
recommended the expulsion of Timbal from membership in ALU and
likewise dismissal from DMPI in accordance with the Union Security Clause
in the existing CBA between ALU and DMPI. The Labor Arbiter affirmed
that all five were illegally dismissed and ordered Del Monte to reinstate them
to their former position and to pay their full backwages and other
allowances..NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision. Court of Appeals
ruled that only Timbal was illegally dismissed and that DMPI failed to
observe procedural due process.
Issue:
Whether Timbal was illegally dismissed.
Held:
Yes, Timbal was illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter who is the
proximate trier of facts, and the Court of Appeals appreciated that the
testimony of Artajo against Timbal could not be given credence. This is due to
the prior animosity between the two engendered by the pending civil
complaint filed by Timbal's husband against Artajo.
Considering that the civil complaint was filed 6 days prior to the
execution of Artajo's affidavit, it would be plainly injudicious to presume that
Artajo possessed an unbiased state of mind. Such circumstance was
considered by the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals, as they rendered
favorably to Timbal. No credible disputation was offered by NLRC to the
claim that Artajo was biased against Timbal. Hence, the Supreme Court
adjudge the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the CA as more cogent on that
points. The dismissal for cause of employees must be justified by substantial
evidence, as appreciated by an impartial trier of facts. The petition is denied
and the decision the Court if Appeals is affirmed.
General Milling Corporation vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals
G.R. NO. 146728. February 11, 2004
Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
General Milling Corporation employed 190 workers. all the employees
were members of a union which is a duly certified bargaining agent. The
GMC and the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which
included the issue of representation that is effective for a term of three years
which will expire on November 30, 1991. On November 29, 1991, a day
before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with
a request that a counter proposal be submitted within ten days. On October
1991, GMC received collective and individual letters from the union members
stating that they have withdrawn from their union membership. The union
disclaimed any massive disaffiliation of its union members. On January 13,
1992, GMC dismissed an employee who is a union member. The union
protected the employee and requested GMC to submit to the grievance
procedure provided by the CBA, but GMC argued that there was no basis to
negotiate with a union which is no longer existing.
Issue:
Whether GMC is guilty of ULP for violating its duty to bargain
collectively and/or for interfering with the right of its employees to self-
organization.
Ruling:
Yes, GMC is guilty of ULP when it refused to negotiate with the union
upon its request for the renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA. The
union’s proposal was submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the
date of effectivity of the CBA. GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate
in good faith with the union. The refusal to send counter proposal to the union
and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA is tantamount to an
unfair labor practice under article 248 of the labor code. Under article 252,
both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it
presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within 3 years from the
effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under article 252.
What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the
union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears
stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the code is
mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting
industrial peace. The court of appeals found that the letters by 13 union
members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that
GMC exerted pressure on the employees. Court agree that the ill-timed letters
of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC interfered with the
right of its employee to self-organization.
PENTAGON STEEL CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 174141 June 26, 2009
Facts:
The petitioner, a corporation engaged in the manufacture of G.I. wire
and nails, employed respondent Perfecto Balogo, respondent, since September
1, 1979 in its wire drawing department. Respondent has been absent from
work on Aug 7 2002 without prior notice. Numerous number of letter were
sent to the address of the respondent requiring his explanation for his absence
however no respond therefore petitioner considered him AWOL.
A complaint was filed by respondent with the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC for underpayment/nonpayment of salaries and wages, overtime pay,
holiday pay, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay, and
ECOLA. He further explained that his absence from work was due to a flu and
diarrhea and when he was gonna go back to work petitioner refused to take
him back despite the medical certificate. (2x bumalik, ayaw pdn ni petitioner)
During the conciliation, petitioner required him, however, to submit
himself to the company physician to determine whether he was fit to return to
work in accordance with existing policies. Respondent presented a medical
certificate issued by the company physician; according to the petitioner, the
respondent refused to return to work and insisted that he be paid his separation
pay. The petitioner refused the respondents demand for separation pay for
lack of basis. Respondent formally amended his complaint to include his
claim of illegal dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not the statement used during the conciliation maybe used
as evidence.
Ruling:
Based on Art 233 of the Labor Code, “Information and statements made
at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged communication and
shall not be used as evidence in the Commission. Conciliators and similar
officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up
at conciliation proceedings conducted by them.” Also in the case of Nissan
v. Sec of Labor, the SC pointedly disallowed the award made by the public
respondent Secretary; the award was based on the information NCMB
Administrator Olalia secured from the confidential position given him by the
company during conciliation.
Therefore, it was said since the law favors the settlement of
controversies out of court, a person is entitled to buy his or her peace without
danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any
communication made toward that end will be regarded as privileged.
