• PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

• DEAN GENEVIEVE MARIE D.B. PAULINO

• WHEN DO LAWS TAKE EFFECT?

GENERAL RULE:

Art. 2.  Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of General Circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.  This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication. 

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE:

A law was passed. It was completely published on April 1, 2020. It shall take effect on April 16,
2020.

• EXCEPTION:

• UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW.

Note that the clause “UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED” solely refers to the 15-day period and
not to the requirement of publication. The clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication, which in any event can not be omitted.

Publication is an indispensable requirement, the absence of which will violate due process as it
would deny the public, the knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. (Nagkakaisang
Maralita ng Sitio Masigasis Inc. vs. Military Shrine Services, G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013).

CASE DIGESTS:

Tanada versus Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27

FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise
provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon approval.

The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees.
The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential
Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means
complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required
by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code
meant that the publication  required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when
necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

RULING:

(1)    The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.

The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is

mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise, impose a burden for the people, such as TAX and revenue measures, fall within
this category.

Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.

(2)    The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the laws.

• Acaac v. Azcuna, G.R. No. 187378

FACTS: PETAL Foundation is a non-governmental organization, which is engaged in the protection and
conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental. PETAL built some
cottages on Capayas Island which it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its
beneficiaries, among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.

Respondents Mayor Azcuna and Building Official Bonalos issued Notices of Illegal Construction
against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in
violation of the Building Code ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. On July 8,
2002 the Sangguniang Bayan of Jaena Lopez adopted a Municipal Ordinance which prohibited, among
others : (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries;and
(b) the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized
by the local government.

On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the
matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the
premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto. A Notice of Voluntary
Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island.

Petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a TRO, injunction and damages against
respondents alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. Moreover,
PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds : (a) it was adopted
without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province as required by the Local Government Code (LGC); and (c) it was not approved by the SP.
Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.

Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they are not
the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and property
belonging to the public domain.

The RTC declared the ordinance as invalid/void. On appeal, the CA held that the subject
ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days after
its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. Having enacted the subject ordinance within its
powers as a municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced
that the subject ordinance is valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners.

RULING: YES. The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.

Section 56 (d) of the LGC provides: If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within
thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed
consistent with law and therefore valid.

It is noteworthy that petitioner's own evidence reveals that a public hearing was conducted prior

to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners
failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was
made.

While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with
the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld
in the absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed
in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they,
however, failed to do.

In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA, 364 Phil. 683(1999) citing United States v. Cristobal, 34 Phil. 825
(1916), the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of
controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that public hearings were
conducted in light of: (a) the oppositors equal lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local
governments non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local governments
non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositors cause of action. Hence, as
petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that
no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their
constitutionality or legality.

• SUMMARY OF THE RULES ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE LAW:

1. LAW TAKES EFFECT ON THE DATE PROVIDED FOR BY THE LAW ITSELF.

2. IF THE LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE DATE OF ITS EFFECTIVITY, THEN APPLY ARTICLE 2 OF
THE NCC. IT SHALL TAKE EFFECT after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of General Circulation.

3. IF THE LAW STATES THAT IT SHALL TAKE EFFECT, IMMEDIATELY, THEN APPLY THE DOCTRINE IN
LA-BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION. (There are 2 views but the second view is the more
correct view.

LA-BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION VERSUS RAMOS ,G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004

When the law states that it shall take effect immediately, IT BECOMES EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY
UPON ITS PUBLICATION.

Art. 3.  Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. 

AS LONG AS THE REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICATION HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH THERE IS A

CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION THAT ALL CITIZENS NOW ABOUT THE LAW.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to

know the law and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what
he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However,
the moment he realized that what he had signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer
claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should have known that he was
not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would have
made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law. (In Re: Petition to Sign the Roll of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540,
September 24, 2013.)
 • CASE DIGEST:
Elegado vs. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-68385, May 12, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner is designated executor of the decedents will (Warren Taylor Graham) who is an
American national who formerly resides in the Philippines, but died in Oregon, USA. He left certain
stocks in the Philippines. His son Ward Graham, filed an estate tax return with the Philippine Revenue
Representative in USA. CIR assessed the estate in the amount of Php 96, 509.00. The assessment was
protested by the American law firm but denied by the Commissioner. No further action was taken.
Petitioner filed a second estate tax return and was assessed in the amount of Php 72, 948.00 but was
cancelled by the Commissioner with the contention of that the first assessment is final executor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the first assessment is not valid because it was based on a return filed by foreign
lawyer who had no knowledge of our tax laws.

RULING: The first assessment even filed by a foreign lawyers is already final and executory. Thus, it is
valid.

• PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS

GENERAL RULE:

Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. 

EXCEPTIONS:

1) Procedural or Remedial Laws

2) Penal Laws favorable to the accused; provided, that the accused is not a habitual delinquent

3) Unless the law otherwise provides;

4) Tax Laws when expressly declared or is clearly the legislative intent

5) Laws creating New rights

6) Interpretative Statutes

7) Curative or Remedial Statutes

8) Emergency Laws

• EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCEPTIONS: Even if the law provides for its retroactivity, but still it can
not be given retroactive effect if:

1) Ex Post Facto Laws

2) Laws that impair the obligation of contracts

 • J. AMADO ARANETA, Petitioner, vs. ALFONSO DORONILA, A. DORONILA RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents., G.R. No. L-35643 August 24,
1976;

FACTS: Amado Araneta, filed before us a motion to dismiss appeal of defendants-appellants on the
ground that the record on appeal does not show on its face that the appeal was perfected on time. An
examination of the record shows that on April 28, 1971, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a
decision in favor of Araneta, copy of which was received by the defendants-appellants on May 14, 1971. 
As a consequence, defendants-appellants immediately filed on May 31, 1971, a notice of appeal and an
appeal bond in the amount of P120.00.  However, due to some deficiencies, the original record on
appeal was ordered amended.  So that it was only on June 22, 1971, that the amended record on appeal
was filed by the defendants-appellants.

Respondent Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal of the Doronilas, there being no
showing on the face of their amended record on appeal as to when their original record on appeal was
filed, hence said amended record "fails to show on its face that their appeal was perfected within the
period fixed by the rules”. Under date of July 29, 1976, however, with commendable candidness, Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales, counsel for Araneta, filed a manifestation taking note not only of the later more
liberal rulings of this Court in Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 228, Pimentel vs. Court of
Appeals, 64 SCRA 475 "As may be seen, Berkenkotter and Pimentel and subsequent cases have
overruled Valera vs. Court of Appeals, Reyes vs. Carrascoso, and other cases adhering to the strict
construction of the material data rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in Berkenkotter vs. CA can be applied in this case.

RULING: NO. Berkenkotter and Pimentel were promulgated only on September 28, 1973 and
June 25, 1975 respectively, hence, it can only operate prospectively and will not affect previous cases
appealed before that date, relying on the old doctrine. 

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system.  These decisions,
although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean.  The application or
interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the
said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that construed law purports to carry into effect.

Therefore, Berkenkotter and Pimentel cannot retroactively affect the present case, whose
appeal was perfected on June 21, 1971."
 • PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES vs. ROBERTO QUIACHON,
G.R.  No.  170236  August  31,  2006;

FACTS: Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape committed against
her eight-year-old deaf-mute daughter in 2001. Key witnesses for the prosecution were the victim and
her 11-year-old brother; for the defense, it was appellant’s mere bare denial. The victim’s testimony was
supported by medico-legal findings indicating rape. The trial court found the appellant guilty and
sentenced him to death plus payment of damages. On automatic appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision and also imposed civil indemnity. Notably, Republic Act 9346 was enacted on June 24, 2006
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not death was still the proper penalty imposed in view of RA 9346, considering that
the crime was committed before the law’s enactment?

RULING: NO, Reclusion perpetua, not death penalty, is the proper penalty in this case in view of
RA 9346. Although the crime was committed before the law was enacted, favorabilia sunt amplianda
adiosa restrigenda, or penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. (Article 22,
Revised Penal Code)

But appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of RA 9346 provides that "persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."

Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity. 

MANDATORY- that which is required

An example of a mandatory law is one which prescribes some element as a requirement:

ARTICLE 804 of the New Civil Code:

Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the
testator. (n)

Article 749 of the New Civil Code:

Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
 If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. 
  

• Mandatory Laws:

ARTICLE 2 of the FAMILY CODE:

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)

A prohibitory law is one which forbids something.

EXAMPLES:

Art. 818 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE:

Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. 

Art. 87 OF THE FAMILY CODE:

Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion
of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage.

Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory

laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

General Rule: Acts which are contrary to mandatory or prohibited laws are void.

Exceptions:

1. When the law itself authorized its validity (i.e., lotto, sweepstakes)

2. When the law makes the act only voidable and not void (i.e., if consent is vitiated, the contract is
voidable and not void).

3. When the law makes the act valid but punishes the violator.
EXAMPLES:

A) If the marriage is celebrated by someone without legal authority but the parties are in good
faith, the marriage is valid but the person who married the parties is liable.

B) If the marriage license was issued irregularly, the irregularity does not affect the validity of the
marriage but the person responsible for the irregularity may be subjected to administrative, civil
and criminal liability.

4. When the law makes the act void but recognizes legal effects flowing therefrom.

Example. Children born out of the subsequent marriage which is terminated by the execution of
the affidavit of reappearance by the spouse who was declared presumptively dead. (Article 41 in relation
to Article 43 of the FC.) Children born out of marriages that are declared null and void under ARTICLE 36
and 54 of the FAMILY CODE.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE:

Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under

Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

 GENERAL RULE:

Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.  

WAIVER- it is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or such conduct as warrants an inference
of relinquishment of such right. (Castro vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. L-171915)

REQUISITES FOR A VALID WAIVER RIGHT: CUE-CPF

1) Full Capacity to make the waiver;

2) Waiver must be Unequivocal;

3) Right must Exist at the time of the waiver;

4) It must not be Contrary to law, public Policy, morals or good customs;

5) It must not be Prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law; and

6) When Formalities are required, the same must be complied with.

EXAMPLE OF A VALID WAIVER OF RIGHTS:

* If A owes B P10M, B can waive the right to collect the payment to the loan. However, B cannot
waive the said loan if B owes C and B has no other assets to pay C.

• Famanila v. Court of Appeals 500 SCRA 76

FACTS: In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the services of petitioner
Roberto G. Famanila as Messman for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and owned by its principal and co-
respondent, Barbership Management Limited. On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the
port of Eureka, California, U.S.A. and while petitioner was assisting in the loading operations, the latter
complained of a headache. Petitioner experienced dizziness and he subsequently collapsed. Upon
examination, it was determined that he had a sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a
ruptured cerebral aneurysm. Petitioner underwent a brain operation and he was confined at the
Emmanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. On July 19, 1990, he underwent a second brain
operation.

Owing to petitioner’s physical and mental condition, he was repatriated to the Philippines. On
August 21, 1990, he was examined at the American Hospital in Intramuros, Manila where the examining
physician, Dr. Patricia Abesamis declared that he "cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed for
120 days, he is being declared permanently, totally disabled.” Thereafter, authorized representatives of
the respondents convinced him to settle his claim amicably by accepting the amount of
US$13,200. Petitioner accepted the offer as evidenced by his signature in the Receipt and Release dated
February 28, 1991. His wife, Gloria Famanila and one Richard Famanila, acted as witnesses in the signing
of the release.

On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint praying for an award of disability benefits, share
in the insurance proceeds, moral damages and attorney’s fees. Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A.
Balitaan dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner's claims that he did not sign the Receipt and Release voluntarily or
freely because he was permanently disabled and in financial constraints is valid.

RULING: Petition Denied.  Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his
consent to the Receipt and Release thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability is
not among the factors that may vitiate consent. Besides, save for petitioner’s self-serving allegations,
there is no proof on record that his consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the absence of
such proof of vitiated consent, the validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld

• Herrera v. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-41171, July 23, 1987

FACTS: Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an illegitimate son of the deceased, by
incorporating a Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the rest of the Borromeo’s. In the
waiver, the 9 heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The petitioners
opposed this Waiver for reason that this is without force and effect because there can be no effective
waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance from the heirs
who intend to transfer the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be executed without a valid acceptance from
the heirs in question.

RULING: YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that “the properties included
in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs,
who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. The heirs succeed the deceased by the
mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until
the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to
the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although
conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion.

Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation;

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future legitime. (1814a)

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not
be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. 

Art. 8.  Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines. 

Art. 9.  No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws. 

Art. 10.  In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.  

IN CASE OF DOUBT OR VAGUENESS IN THE LAW, APPLY STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

SPIRIT OF THE LAW:

This is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or
obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the court to avoid an injustice which may apparently be
authorized by someway of interpreting the law.

Art. 13.  When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights
from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which
they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.  (FELI)

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE:

In counting the effectivity of a law or an ordinance which was completely published on April 1,
2020, the fifteen day period must be counted from April 2, 2020 until the end of the 15 day period which
is April 16, 2020.

GENERAL RULE:

Art. 14.  Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations. 

(RINCIPLE OF TERRITORIALITY)

PRINCIPLE OF GENERALITY)

What are penal laws?

Penal laws are laws prescribing a penalty (as a fine or imprisonment) for one who violates it.

Art. 2, Revised Penal Code

ARTICLE 2. Application of Its Provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago,
including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction,
against those who:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;

2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations
and securities mentioned in the preceding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their
functions; or

5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE ON TERRITORIALITY OF PENAL LAWS:

1) Treaty Stipulations (e.g. Visiting Forces Agreement)

2) Laws of Preferential Application (e.g. prohibition of issuance of warrant of arrest against

Ambassadors) and,

3) Principles of Public International Law (e.g. Universality Principle)

• EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF GENERALITY

• Following the principles of Public International Law, the following are not covered by Philippine
Penal Laws:

• A) HEADS OF STATE;

• B) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES SUCH AS AMBASSADORS, PUBLIC MINISTERS AND THEIR

OFFICIAL RETINUE;

• THE DIPLOMATIC RESPRESENTATIVES ARE ALTER-EGO OF THE HEADS OF STATE;

*CONSULS ARE NOT COVERED BY DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Art. 15.  Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. 

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE:

A and B, both Filipinos are residing in Germany where the marrying age is 16 years old. If A and
B, who are both 16 years of age, get married in Germany, the marriage is void. Because our laws, which
in this case are the provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines provide that the legal age is 18 years
of age. That is an example of a law or a legal provision regarding “legal capacity.

• NATIONALITY THEORY covers laws relating to:

A) FAMILY RIGHTS AND DUTIES (for example, ARTICLES 194 and 195 of the FAMILY CODE of the
Philippines;
 B) STATUS (for example, whether legitimate or illegitimate child. provisions of the family Code
on Paternity and Filiation);

C) CONDITIONS;

D) LEGAL CAPACITY (for example: ARTICLE 2 of the Family Code on the legal capacity of the
contracting parties to a marriage);

Art. 16.  Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. 

• Tayag v Benguet Consolidated, GR L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968 

FACTS: County Trust Company of New York, United States of America is the domiciliary administration
of the decedent, Idonah Slade Perkins who owned 33,002 shares of stocks in the appellant, domestic
corporation, Benguet Consolidated Inc. located in the Philippines. A dispute arose between the appellee,
Tayag who is the appointed ancillary of Perkins in the Philippines and the domiciliary administration as
to who is entitled to the possession of the certificate of shares, however, County Trust Company refuses
to transfer the said certificate to Tayag despite the order of the court. Hence, the appellee was
compelled to petition the court for the appellant to declare the subject certificates as lost to which
appellant alleged that no new certificate can be issued and the same cannot be rendered as lost in
accordance with their by-laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the certificate of shares of stock can be declared lost.

RULING: Yes. Administration whether principal or ancillary certainly extends to the assets of a
decedent found within the state or country where it was granted.

It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies
intestate owning property located in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent’s last
domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary
administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio
vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administration
appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the Philippines. The ancillary administration is proper,
whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be
administered in the nature of the deceased’s liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among
his heirs.
 Since there is refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administration in New York,
to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary
administration in the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them
lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby the task incumbent
under the law on the ancillary administration could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.

Assuming that a contrariety exist between the provision of the laws and the command of a court
decree, the latter is to be followed. 

A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it

has received the imprimatur of state according to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore it will have
rights and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator, more than that, it cannot legitimately
refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever
called upon to do so.

• Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177,

November 23, 2007

FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The
agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon
assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project.
When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this
time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement
(BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract.

Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the
company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by
the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project. Kitamaru demanded that he be
assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had
expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a
MTD.

Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese
nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of
Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of
lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis
was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written
agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: YES. The only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice-of-law rules as raised by the
petitioner is inapplicable and not yet called for (reference to  lex loci, lex contractus, or state of most
significant rule). The petitioner prematurely invoked the said rules before pointing out any conflict
between the laws of Japan and the Philippines.

The doctrine on forum non conveniens  cannot be invoked to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction.
Dismissing the case on this ground requires a factual determination hence the principle is considered to
be more a matter of defense.

• Raytheon v Rouzie, GR 162894, February 26, 2008 

FACTS: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized & existing under the laws of
Connecticut, &Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract. BMSI hired Rouzie as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in thePhilippines for an
agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of Phil.
on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption & mudflows.

Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International (Rust) for alleged
nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination, & breach of employment contract. The Labor Arbiter
ordered BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s money claims. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed
Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Rouzie filed an action for damages before the
RTC of La Union (where he was a resident) against Raytheon International. He reiterated that he was not
paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI.

RAYTHEON SOUGHT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO

STATE ACAUSE OF ACTION & FORUM NON CONVENIENS & PRAYED FOR DAMAGES BY WAY OF
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM.

Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice of
law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also
mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, namely that the parties & witnesses involved
are American corporations & citizens & the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines,
that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. The foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the
immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

• ISSUES: (a) Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction.

(b) Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens.

RULING: (a) YES. On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is
filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and
the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of
the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where
the case is filed.
 That THE SUBJECT CONTRACT INCLUDED A STIPULATION THAT THE SAME SHALL BE GOVERNED
BYTHE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE PHILIPPINE
COURTS,OR ANY OTHER FOREIGN TRIBUNAL FOR THAT MATTER, ARE PRECLUDED FROM HEARING THE C
IVIL ACTION.

NOTE: JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW ARE 2 DISTINCT CONCEPTS. Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The choice of law stipulation will be come relevant only when the substantive issues of the
instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

(b) NO. UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A COURT, IN CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS
CASES, MAY REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS NOT THE MOST “CONVENIENT” OR
AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE.

Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the RTC of its
jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved. Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based
on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly
considered as a matter of defense. While it is w/c the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine
whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.

Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678  June 6, 1967

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-
deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman. By his second wife,
Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and
Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis. On August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his
estate as follows:

1.    $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen

2.    P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis 

3.    remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives

On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A. On September 15, 1958, his will
was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila. People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will
did based on what the will directed. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. The
Probate Court, on the other hand, relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUE: Whether or not Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of
the will.

RULING: YES. The order of the probate court is hereby affirmed. According to the Doctrine of
Processual Presumption:

The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise,
such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum. In the absence of proof as to
the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.  Apply Philippine laws.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will;
and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

As provided for in ART. 1039, capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Art. 17.  The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their
object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 

THE PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where a
contract is made. 

• EFFECT OF FOREIGN LAWS, JUDGMENTS AND CONVENTIONS UPON PROHIBITORY LAWS :

CONSEQUENCES:

1. A DIVORCE OBTAINED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN WHO IS MARRIED TO ANOTHER FILIPINO CITIZEN,

WHILE VALID IN THE COUNTRY WHERE THE DIVORCE IS OBTAINED, IS VOID HERE IN THE
PHILIPPINES;

2. MARRIAGES THAT ARE VOID UNDER ARTICLES 35 (1); 35 (2); 35 (4); 35 (5); 35 (6); ARTICLES 36,
37 AND 38 EVEN IF CELEBRATED ABROAD AND VALID THERE AS SUCH SHALL BE VOID HERE IN
THE PHILIPPINES.

3. Take note of the case of del Socorro versus Van Wilsem.

DEL SOCORRO VS. WILSEM                                                 

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

FACTS: Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son
came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support
to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave
support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines particularly
in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed
the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien.

• ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
the Philippine law?

RULING: YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the

Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as
to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law.

In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the
laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice
is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-
compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be
of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

MARRIAGES THAT ARE VOID IN THE PHILIPPINES EVEN IF CELEBRATED ABROAD AND VALID THERE AS
SUCH:

1). ARTICLE 35 (1)Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of
parents or guardians; 

Example: In Texas, the legal age is 16 years of age. If A and B both Filipinos, marry in Texas , the marriage
is void.

• More consequences of Article 17 pa

2) ARTICLE 35 (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; 

3) ARTICLE 35 (5) (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the
identity of the other; and

4) ARTICLE 35 (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

5) ARTICLE 36 - MARRIAGE THAT IS VOID ON THE GROUND OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;

6) ARTICLE 37 - INCESTUOUS MARRIAGES

7) ARTICLE 38 - MARRIAGE THAT ARE VOID BY REASON OF PUBLIC POLICY

Note:

A) Marriage between a stepsister and a stepbrother is valid.

B) Marriage between the adopted child and the illegitimate child of the adopter is valid.

 Tamano v Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998

FACTS: Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites. Before Sen. Tamano died, he married
Estrellita in civil rites too. A year after Sen. Tamano’s death, Zorayda and her son filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage of her husband and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous.
Zorayda further claimed that her husband claimed to be divorces and Estrellita as single, hence, their
marriage was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that QC RTC has no jurisdiction
because only a party to a marriage could file an action for annulment against the other spouse. Estrellita
also contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the
jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested in Sharia courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of Muslim.
RTC denied the petition and ruled it has jurisdiction since Estrellita and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code. Motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner referred to SC
which ruled that it should be referred to CA first. The CA ruled that the case would fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in
places where there are no sharia courts, the instant petition could be at RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sharia courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case and the
nature of action.

RULING: SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and
marital relations. In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were married through a civil wedding.
And whether or not they were likewise married in a Muslim wedding, sharia courts are still not vested
with original jurisdiction over marriages married under civil and Muslim law.

• Zamoranos v People, G.R. No. 193902, June 1, 2011

FACTS: Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos
was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed again, this time, in civil
rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City. A little after a year, Zamoranos and
De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Shari’a
Circuit District Court, which issued a Decree of Divorce.

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in her first
nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau
of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to
strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil
ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first
marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely:
Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and
the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a
bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a
compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter
retaining visitorial rights thereto.

As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal and
disbarment from the civil service.
 Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor
Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.
Consequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC.

On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a
decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC,
Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of
their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous.

RULING: NO. First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness
of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In
that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the
regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Shari'a Circuit Court which had
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. 

Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken
cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim,
whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In
fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman validly severed their
marriage ties.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of
the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under
Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by
P.D. No. 1083.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on
Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil
law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim status should have been
apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.

The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of
Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit Court and had successfully shown that
it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.

In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective participation of the
National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and
interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies."

Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over
the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal
recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.

Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable
talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to
remarry.

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz
and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus,
entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without
jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy. GRANTED.

• HUMAN RELATIONS

• Dean Genevieve Marie D.B. Paulino

• ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE

ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

• PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

RULE ON ABUSE OF RIGHTS: (Art. 19, NCC)

- this principle departs from the Classical Theory that “he who uses a right injures no one.”

ELEMENTS OF ABUSE RIGHTS: LEP

1) Existence of a Legal right or duty;

2) Which is Exercised in bad faith;

3) For the sole intent of Prejudicing or injuring another (Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No.
88694, January 11, 1993).

• ABUSE OF RIGHTS

Article 19, also known as the “principle of abuse of right”, prescribes that a person should not
use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability.
(HSBC v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159590-91, October 18, 2004; 440 SCRA 498). It seeks to preclude the use of,
or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise
of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages
to the injured party will attach.

ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

In Article 20, there must be law that is violated. In Article 21, there is no law violated because the act
is lawful but it is contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

INJURY- AN ILLEGAL INVASION OF A KNOWN LEGAL RIGHT.

AN UNLAWFUL ACT RESULTS TO AN ILLEGAL INVASION OF A KNOWN RIGHT OR INJURY.

ARTICLE 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 21, does not require a violation of the law. All that the law requires is that there must be a
legal act but the legal act must be against morals, good customs and public policy. This is why an
action under ARTICLE 21 is a also called an action CONTRA BONUS MORES ( contrary to good morals.)

• DAMNUM ET INJURIA

UNDER ARTICLES 20 AND 21, FOR AN ACTION TO PROSPER THERE MUST BE BOTH INJURY AND
DAMAGE. ( DAMNUM ET INJURIA).

Note: Be able to distinguish INJURY, DAMAGE and DAMAGES.

Damnum absque injuria – There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can
be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation
of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

• DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

• PRINCIPLE OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA (Damage without Injury)

A person who exercises his legal right does no injury. However, it cannot be said that a person
exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudice another or offends morals or good customs.
When damages result from a person’s exercise of rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
DOCTRINE:

• The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages.
To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

Article 21 – Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides the basis for the principle of abuse of rights. For
there to be an abuse of rights, the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There was
damage or injury to the plaintiff.

• VOLENTI NO FIT INJURIA

• VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA- This phrase means, to which a person assents, is not esteemed in
law as injury. This means, self-inflicted injury or consent.

• ANY PERSON WHO VOLUNTARILY EXPOSES HIMSELF TO INJURY, EVEN IF HE IS NEGLIGENT IN

DOING SO, CAN NOT RECOVER DAMAGES.

•  Remember the case of AMAY BISAYA. (Nikko Hotel Manila v. Reyes G.R. No. 154259, 28
February 2005.)

• CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996

FACTS: Private Respondent Mabasa wanted to establish an easement of right of way going into
their property against petitioners who built an adobe wall in their properties which thereby
restricted access to the Mabasa property. Petitioners claim that they built the wall in order to protect
their persons and their property from their intrusive neighbors. The Trial Court nonetheless ordered that
an easement be created. 

Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial
court by awarding actual damages (P65,000.00), moral damages (P30,000.00) and exemplary damages
(P10,000.00). Hence this petition. Damages were based on the fact of loss in the form of unrealized
rentals on the property due to the adobe wall restricting access.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding damages.

RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred, the award for damages has no legal basis. The mere
fact of loss does not give rise to a right to recover damages. There must be both a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by defendant and a damage to the plaintiff resulting therefrom.  Damages are
merely a part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. 
 An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting from the injury is
damage. Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. In this case,
the petitioners merely constructed an adobe wall which was in keeping with and is a valid exercise of
their rights as the owner of their respective properties—i.e. there was no abuse of right as provided for
in Article 21 of the New Civil Code and where the following requisites must concur: 

(1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy;

(2) The acts should be willful and;

(3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. None of these requisites was present in this
case.

The loss was therefore not a result of a violation of a legal duty. Instances where the damage
was not a result of an injury is called damnum absque injuria  and the plaintiff is not normally given an
award for damages. In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage,
that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.

• California Clothing v. Quinones

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. v. QUINONES
G.R. No. 175822  October 23, 2013

FACTS: Respondent went inside the Guess USA Boutique in Robinson’s Department Store in
Cebu City and decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2098. While she was walking, she was
confronted by a Guess employee and told her that she failed to pay for the item she got to which
respondent replied that she did and showed the receipt.  Respondent then suggested they talk about it
in the office at the mall. While there, she was allegedly embarrassed and humiliated by the Guess
employees in front of their clients. The next day, Guess employees event sent a demand letter to
respondents employers.  While the RTC ruled for them, CA reversed the decision saying that the acts
done by the employees were not in good faith. Petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Guess employees violate Articles 20 and 21 of Civil Code of the
Philippines?

RULING: YES. The Court affirmed CA’s decision and held that the employees abused their rights and did
not have good faith in their actions against respondent where there was no clear evidence that she was
evading to pay for the merchandise. The petition is thus denied for lack of merit.
 • PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. JOSEPHINE D. GOMEZ, GR No. 199601,
2015-11-23

FACTS: Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a
certain Colin R. Harrington opened Savings Account No. 373-28010-6 with said branch in January 1985.

The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts dated January 3, 1985,
issued by the Bank of New Zealand. The first draft was in the sum of US$724.57 payable to "C.R.
Harrington," while the second draft was in the sum of US$2,004.76 payable to "Servants

Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores,
whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the savings
account of Harrington. When Flores answered in the affirmative, and after receiving... from the bank's
foreign exchange supervision a Philippine Currency conversion of the amounts reflected in the drafts,
Josephine received the deposit slip.

On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington withdrew the
sums of P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made the
withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington P50,600.00 representing the
amounts of the bank drafts in his name.

The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action should
be taken against her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned that being a
new teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various aspects of the job. She further alleged that she
had asked the approval of her immediate supervisor prior to receiving the deposits.

On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of P-423.38 from Josephine's salary.
Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask why the deduction was made. After due investigation on the matter,
the PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and liable for performing acts
in violation of established operating procedures. Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its
findings that she was grossly negligent and liable to pay the amount of P50,600.00. During trial, the RTC
found that the PCIB did not even respond to this letter. PCIB, however, alleged that it had replied to
Josephine's letter and explained that she was afforded due process and the deductions made prior to
January 15, 1986, were merely a withholding pending the investigation.

On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Makati City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by gradually
deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington. In its May 25, 1999 decision,
the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Josephine and ordered the PCIB to pay her actual damages. The
RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the salary and allowance of Josephine as having
been rendered in bad faith and contrary to morals, good custom, and public policy. In its May 23, 2011
decision, the CA affirmed the May 25, 1999 RTC decision.
 • ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in ruling that PCIB’s actions were in total and
wanton disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily
imputed bad faith on how it had treated Josephine.

RULING: YES. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the "abuse of right
principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in Articles 20 and 21
of the Civil Code.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human' relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy
for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either

Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB
were in clear violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the
PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly
and illegally. In the instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary even if the
investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine grossly
negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid to Harrington's
impostor.

When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of negligence, the PCIB refused
to give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary, allowances, and
bonuses.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED

• Albenson Enterprises Corp. Vs. CA,

G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993

FACTS: Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. at Baltao
Building mild steel plates which the latter ordered and as part of the payment, a bouncing check was
issued by one “Eugenio Baltao”.
 Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of money due them, filed a criminal complaint
against private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter refused to make good the amount of the
bouncing check despite demand. However, there was a mistake of identity as there were two “Eugenio
Baltaos” conducting business in the same building – Eugenio S. Baltao and his son, Eugenio Baltao III. It
was found that the signature of the check was not of Eugenio S. Baltao and because of the alleged unjust
filing of a criminal case against him, respondent Baltao filed a complaint for damages anchored on
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code against petitioners.

• ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been violated,
resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law.

RULING: No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of rights. What
prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private
respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they
honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries
regarding the origin of the check. Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of
mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced
on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages.

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article
20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their
own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or
duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21
deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2)
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent
to injure.

There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the
case against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith
committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages.

• BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

• GENERAL RULE: BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG:

EXCEPT:

a) When there is seduction or the man employs deceit, enticement, superior of power or abuse
of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded;

b) When the promise of marriage is the PROXIMATE CAUSE of why a woman had sex with the
man who has clearly no intention to fulfill this promise;
 c) When there have been extensive preparations for the wedding and one of the parties walks
out of the marriage when the marriage is about to be solemnized;

• BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

TANJANCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-18630 Dec. 17, 1966

• Facts:

• From December, 1957, petitioner APOLONIO TANJANCO courted the respondent, ARACELI
SANTOS, both being of legal age. Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying love and
affection for Santos who eventually reciprocated such feelings. With Tanjanco’s promise of
marriage in mind, Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge sometime in July, 1958. For
one year, Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos which eventually led to Santos getting pregnant.
As a result of her pregnancy, Santos had to resign from her job as secretary in IBM Philippines,
Inc. In her state of unemployment Santos became unable to support herself and her baby, and
because Tanjanco did not fulfill his promise of marriage she suffered mental anguish, a
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos prayed to
the court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the unborn child she was bearing, and pay
her for support and damages.

• Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for failure to state cause of action.
Santos appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the latter decided the case, stating that no
cause of action was shown to compel recognition of the unborn child nor for its support, but a
cause of action was present for damages, under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Tanjanco appealed
such decision pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this
jurisdiction.

• ISSUE: Whether or not Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of his
promise to marry her.

RULING: No case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with appellant with repeated acts of intercourse. Such is not compatible to the
idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived she would not have again yielded to his embraces much less for one year without exacting
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage and she would have cut all relationship upon finding that
the defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. One cannot be held liable for a breach of promise to
marry.

In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the memorandum submitted by the Code
Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. In the example set
forth by the memorandum, Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it refers to a tort upon a minor who
has been seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. That definition of seduction is
not consistent with the position of Santos, who was of legal age, and granted carnal access to Tanjanco
and had sexual relations with him for one whole year. Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited
mutual passion to Tanjanco which is incompatible with the premise behind the idea of seduction.

• BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY:

GENERAL RULE: As a general rule, “a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong”
(Baksh v. Court of Appeals; G. R. No. 9733 6; February 19, 1993)

EXCEPTION: Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, however, also provides that “any person
who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

Thus, to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.”

From the above case, it is clear that calling off wedding plans when preparations have already
been made is contrary to good customs that is proscribed in Article 21 of the Civil Code. Corollary,
Article 2219 (10) of the law also provides that “moral damages may be recovered in–acts and actions
referred to in Article 21.”

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY:

Wassmer v. Velez 12 SCRA 648

FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get
married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-
be that day to postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear
and was not heard from again. Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was
declared in default. Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff  P2.000 as actual
damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.

Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed, thereby
rendered judgment hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

RULING:  Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally
set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it
when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and unjustifiable to good
customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.
 When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary
damages may not be awarded when it is proven that the defendant clearly  acted in wanton, reckless
and oppressive manner.

Baksh v. CA, 219 SCRA 115

FACTS: Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was
an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a
luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the respondent, and was said
to promise marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It was
even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to inform her family about
the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the marriage did not materialize, with several
beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the petitioner.

The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the
respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims
of the respondent are not true, and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts
were in accordance of his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the  Court of Appeals.
Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

• ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the
petitioner

RULING: Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was
proved to have a good moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the
petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages.

Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since she  believed that his
promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims against the
petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs and chicken for
the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were caused by the
petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent against the petitioner.

• THE SUPREME COURT SAID IN BAKSH:

In the light of the above, the laudable purpose of ARTICLE 21, WE are of the opinion and so hold, that
where a man’s promise to marry is in fact, the PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF HIS LOVE, by
a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the PROXIMATE CAUSE of the
giving of herself to him in a sexual congress, proof that he had in reality, no intention of marrying her
and promise was merely a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and
to obtain her sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to ARTICLE 21 not because of the
breach of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation that followed thereafter.
 • Continuation…

• It is essential however, that such injury should be committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy

• These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by
good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even
remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty
words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was
nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of
ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly
defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code
which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

• No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

• Hermosisima v. CA, 109 Phil. 629

FACTS: Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was then a teacher in the in Cebu, and petitioner, who was
almost 10 years younger than her used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although
he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the
movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached
as apprentice pilot. In February, 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way,
whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a
private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one
Romanita Perez. 

On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court of first instance a complaint for the
acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner, as well as for
support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the
paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the later, but denied having ever promised to
marry the complainant. The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony
pendente lite, P50 a month, which was, on February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of
P5,000 as moral damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's fees

CA affirmed this decision.

ISSUE: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.

RULING: NO. The Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced upon the faith of such promise".

The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in many of the
American States.

• Constantino vs. Mendez

209 SCRA 18

FACTS: Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought
monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia’s complaint on damages.  The latter and Amelita
met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress.  Ivan invited him at his hotel and
through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he
admitted being a married man.  In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact.  Subsequently, she
became pregnant and had to resign from work.

The Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging
Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA.     

• THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES IS NOT ONLY AVAILABLE TO THE WOMAN BUT TO THE FAMILY
WHO SUFFERS EMBARASSMENT AS A RESULT OF THE WILFULL ACT THAT IS CONTRARY TO
MORALS , GOOD CUSTOMS AND PUBLIC POLICY.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

RULING: Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that
Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino.  Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first
or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct
examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of
September, October and November, 1974.  More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan
and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was
the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him.

•
Unjust enrichment exists when a person unfairly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity, and good conscience.

• There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when

(1) a person is unjustly benefited, and

(2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.

(GEORGIA OSMEÑA-JALANDONI, Petitioner vs CARMEN A. ENCOMIENDA, Respondent, G.R. No.

205578, March 1, 2017.)

• Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr.,

G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013

FACTS: Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s)
filed a case for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining
Order against the Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed a fence without a valid permit
and that it would destroy the walls of their building.

The court denied the application for lack of evidence.  So in order to get evidences for the case,
on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two video surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s property. Their
employees even took pictures of the said construction of the fence. The Hing’s then filed a case against
the Choachuy’s for violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC issued a order granting the
application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to remove the two video surveillance
cameras they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and  the RTC’s
decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s violated the
Hing’s right to privacy.

RULING: Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the Hing’s under Article 26(1)
prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” Although it is a business office and not a
residence, the owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other
relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
 This is about a Public official’s failure to perform their official duty. As a representation of the
government, their work reflects the government itself as such people expect a lot from public officials.
Article 27 focuses on the public servants who fail to perform their official duty.

The performance of one’s duty varies from one public servant to another, because the
interpretation of a person on their duty depends on their own discretion and interpretation. If a public
employee official, servant of employee failed to perform its sacred duty due to refusal or neglect, and
causes material and moral loss. The person affected may file an action for damages or other relief
against the public officer.

1. Refusal and Neglect in the Performance of Official Duty 

a. The article refer to a public servant or employee. Taken from Art. 839 of the German Civil Code, the
purpose of Art. 27 is to end the "pabagsak” or bribery system, where the public official for some flimsy,
delays or refuses the performance of his duty until he gets some kind of pabagsak.”

In a sense, it maybe said that there are three kinds of bribes:

1. The pabagsak- the gift given so that an illegal thing may be done.

2. The pampadulas- the gift given to facilitate or expedite the doing of a legal thing.

3. The pampasalamat- the gift given in appreciation of a thing already done.

EXAMPLES:

a. A goes to a government office where B an administrative clerk, instead of attending to A (upon A's
request) just reads the newspaper. If A suffers material of moral loss, B will be liable. Also, if B refuses to
perform his duty unless given a bribe, damages may be asked of him in addition to the proper criminal
and administrative liabilities.

b. A Chief of Police who instead of giving legal assistance to the victim of an assault, intimidates and
harasses said victim, his father, and his witnesses is liable for damages under Art. 27. This is so even if
other remedies (such as an administrative charge against the Chief and the filing of a criminal complaint
with the office of the city attorney for such assault) are also available to the victim.

c. Similarly, a town mayor (and other officials) who consistently absents himself from town council
sessions, and refuses to act upon the minutes of sessions conducted by the present councilors, and to
sign the payrolls for the councilors' per diems at such sessions, can be liable under this Article for refusal
to do his duty.

• Ledesma Vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: The late Ms. Delmo became the Treasurer of the student organization. As the organization
treasurer, she had the power to disburse the organization fund for financial-aid of the students. The said
act violated school rules and regulations and then later penalized by being dropped from the
membership of the club and that she was not a candidate for any award or citation from the school.

Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus,
appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools. Preliminary investigation revealed
that Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club, an exclusive student organization;
that pursuant to Article IX of the of the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it passed Resolution No. 2,
authorizing the treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to student for financial aid and other
humanitarian purposes.

There were several instances that Director Bernardino directed the petitioner not to deprive
Miss Delmo the honors due her. But the petitioner made his efforts not to follow his directives and
made her graduate as a regular student. But eventually the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of
the school to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, “Magna Cum Laude.”

• ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.

RULING: YES. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was
brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.
As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448): 

There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984). 

The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo
by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision.
Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could
have done so considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it
back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three
pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father,
and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. 

• ARTICLE 29 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE

• Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.  Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
 • If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall
so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

• Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.

Civil liability ex delicto  —  While an act considered criminal is a breach of law against the State, our legal
system allows for the recovery of civil damages where there is a private person injured by a criminal act;
it is in recognition of this dual nature of a criminal act that our Revised Penal Code provides that every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable; this is the concept of civil liability ex delicto. 

• THE EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY

The  general  rule  is  that  the  civil  action  is  not  necessarily extinguished by the acquittal of
the accused.  Even if the accused is acquitted, the court can still award civil liability in the following
cases: 

1. When  the  acquittal  is  based  on  reasonable  doubt  and there was no negligence;

2. When  there  is  a  declaration  in  the  decision  that  the liability of the accused is only civil;

3. When the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal    act   of   which   the   accused   is  
acquitted (independent civil actions.) 

However, if the decision contains a finding that the act from which the  civil  liability  may  arise 
doesn’t  exist,  the  civil  liability  is extinguished.

• CAN  YOU  COMPEL  A  JUDGE  BY  MANDAMUS  TO  AWARD  CIVIL DAMAGES?

- Yes, because every person criminally liable is also civilly liable 

- Another reason is that even if the accused is acquitted, there are cases when he is still civilly liable.

• WHAT   IS   THE   REASON   FOR   ALLOWING   CIVIL   LIABILITY   TO SUBSIST IN SPITE OF THE
ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED?

- The reason is that the parties in the criminal and civil actions are different—in the criminal
action, the party is the state, while in the civil action, the party is the private offended party

 
- Also, the two actions require different quantities of evidence—the criminal  action  requires  proof  of 
guilt  beyond  reasonable  doubt, the civil action on the other hand, requires mere preponderance of
evidence.

Preponderance of Evidence –  means the greater weight of the evidence required in a civil lawsuit for the
judge to decide in favor of one side or the other. This preponderance is based on a more convincing
evidence and its probable truth or accuracy and not on the amount of evidence.
 • ARTICLE 33: In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.

• Defamation can include libel. 

• Fraud can include estafa. 

• Physical injuries can include death or the crime of homicide but it cannot include reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.

• Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes in Article 33. There is
no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with the same
offense.

Corpus v. Paje
GR NO. L-26737 July 31, 1969

FACTS: December 23, 1956 in Lubao, Pampanga, the passenger bus driven by Felardo Paje collided with
the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia resulting to Clemente’s death and physical injuries to two other
persons. A case was filed against Paje in the CFI of Pampanga for homicide and double serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. 

On November 7, 1960, Paje was found guilty but he appealed the judgment of conviction to the
Court of Appeals. On November 21, 1961, while Paje’s appeal was pending decision in the CA, Corpus
instituted in the CFI of Rizal a separate civil action (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based upon the
criminal act of reckless imprudence against Paje & Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc. Corpus was
claiming that the defendants be ordered to pay jointly and separately the amounts of damages. 

On November 9, 1962, CA promulgated its decision in the appeal of Paje reversing the appealed
judgement and acquitting him after finding that the reckless imprudence charged against him did not
exist, and that the collision was a case of pure accident. On December 29, 1962, Paje & Victory Liner
filed in the civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal by
the CA but the motion was denied.

• ISSUE: Whether or not Corpus could claim the damages from Paje & Victory Liner as per the
civil case she filed.

RULING: No. Corpus could not claim for any damages filed on the civil case as the CFI of Rizal
dismissed the complaint on May 31, 1966 on the ground that Corpus’ action was based upon a quasi-
delict.

Quasi-delict is an act whereby  a  person,  without  malice,  but  by  fault,  negligence  or 

imprudence  not legally  excusable, causes  injury  to  another.

 As per Article 1146 of the Civil Code, upon a quasi-delict , the action must be instituted within
four years.  Corpus filed a civil case against Paje on November 21, 1961 which was already 4 years & 11
months since the incident happened on December 23, 1956.

Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec.3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the
defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily
extinguished also the civil action for damages based upon the same act.

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

Note: The present state of jurisprudence is that a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent
a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the previous one, is guilty of bigamy (Mercado v. Tan, 337 SCRA
122) and the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without
the previous one having been declared Null and void. (Capili versus People, 700 SCRA 443.)

• PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

Definition of PREJUDICIAL QUESTION: A prejudicial question is one based on a fact separate and
distinct from the crime but is so intimately related to it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused 

ELEMENTS:

1.    The previously filed civil action involves an issue which is  similar or  is  intimately  related  with 
an  issue  raised  in  the  subsequent criminal action; AND,

 
2.    The  resolution  of  the  issue  will  determine  whether  or  not  the criminal action may proceed. 

• As long as there is no judicial declaration of nullity of marriage, the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes.

• Beltran v. People, GR No. 137567, June 20, 2000

FACTS: Meynardo and Charmaine were married in 1973. After 24 years of marriage, Meynardo filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Charmaine on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Charmaine, however, alleged that it was Meynardo who left the conjugal home, and is now living with
Milagros, his paramour. Charmaine filed a case for concubinage against Meynardo before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

Meynardo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court, saying that the
pendency of the petition for nullity of his marriage with Charmaine poses a prejudicial question to the
criminal case. The lower court denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by
Meynardo, hence he filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court to stop the lower court from trying his case. The RTC denied
his petition and the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial
question to a prosecution for concubinage filed by the wife?

RULING: No. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question to a prosecution for concubinage. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must
appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not
erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil
action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.

• Te v. Choa,
G.R. No. 126446, Nov. 29, 2000 (346 SCRA 327

FACTS: In 1988, Arthur Te and Lilian Choa married in civil rites. Although they did not live together, they
would usually see each other. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to their daughter. Thereafter, Arthur stopped
visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted another marriage while still married to Liliana. Hence, Liliana
filed a bigamy case against Te and administrative case for the revocation of his and his mistress’
engineering license. Te filed a petition for nullity of marriage. RTC rendered a decision on the bigamy
case even the petition for nullity of their marriage was pending.

ISSUE: Whether or not the annulment should be resolved first before the criminal and
administrative case be decided upon.
RULING: NO. The outcome of the annulment case had no bearing on Te’s guilt in the bigamy case. The
ground cited by Te for the annulment was for voidable marriage. Hence, he was still validly married
when he committed bigamy.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION: ARTICLE 40, FC AND BIGAMY.

•  An  action  for  annulment  of  marriage  is  prejudicial  to  a  bigamy case  only  if  the  accused 
in  the  bigamy  charge  is  also  the  one asking for annulment of the second (bigamous
marriage based on vitiation of consent).

• This  is  because  in  such  a  case,  if  the  court  declares  that  the party’s consent is indeed
vitiated and annuls the marriage, then it would  mean  that  the  party  didn’t  willingly  commit 
the  crime  of bigamy 
It would thus be determinative of the guilt and innocence  of the accused.

CASE DIGESTS: REPUBLIC VERSUS OLAYBAR

SANTIAGO VERSUS PEOPLE

TENEBRO VS. CA

• EFFECTS OF A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

- the criminal case is suspended because the issues in the civil case are determinative of the
outcome of the criminal case.

- the rule authorizes only the suspension of the criminal action and not its dismissal by reason
of a prejudicial question.

• A civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity (Article 36 of
the Family Code) is not a prejudicial question in a case for parricide, especially in a case where
the crime was committed at the time that when the marriage has not yet been judicially voided.
( Pimentel versus People, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010.)

• CHAPTER ON PERSONS

Art. 37.  Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost. 

• Classes of Persons and their distinctions

Elements of civil capacity

 - Capacity may be (1) juridical capacity, and (2) capacity to act. The union of these two forms the
full civil capacity.

• Juridical capacity v. personality

- Sanchez Roman makes a distinction between personality and capacity. According to him, the
two are intimately related, but are not identical. He view personality as the conduct of capacity in law, a
necessary derivation from its existence, and the external manifestation of capacity. He considers
personality in general and in a specific sense. In a general sense, it cannot be limited, because it is the
consequence of juridical capacity, which in turn is merely a consequence of human nature. But in a
specific sense, it may suffer limitations because it is merely the result of capacity to act (1 Tolentino 155,
citing 2 Sanchez Roman 114-117).

• Presumption of Capacity

Catalan vs. Basa, G.R. No. 159567, July 31, 2007

FACTS: On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service. The Board of
Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service
due to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.
On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes one-half of the real property
through the execution of a document, titled, “Absolute deed of Donation”. On December 11, 1953,
People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to declare Feliciano incompetent.

On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for
Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly the People’s Bank and Trust Company, was appointed to be
his guardian by the trial court. On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to
her in issue in her children Delia and Jesus Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed
a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well
as damages against herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes
was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that
even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he
was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On August 14, 1997,
Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of
insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was
sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.

• ISSUE: Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation.

RULING: YES. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is
essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with
an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous.
 The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract,
renders the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his
competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia,
petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano
Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities. Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano
was of sound mind at that time and this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was
adduced. The donation was validly made.

Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from
certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. 

• Restrictions on capacity to act (MID-PC)

1) MINORITY

- this does not exempt the minor from certain obligations. If he does an act without the consent
of his parents/guardian, the contract is NOT VOID but merely VOIDABLE, that is VALID UNTIL
ANNULLED. In other words, it is not that a minor has no capacity but that his capacity is restricted.

2) INSANITY OR IMBECILITY

3) STATE OF BEING DEAF MUTE

4) PRODIGALITY; AND

5) CIVIL INTERDICTION

- A person who suffers civil interdiction is deprived:

a) to have parental or marital authority;

b) to be the guardian of the person and property of a ward;

c) to dispose of his property by an act inter vivos;

d) to manage his own property.

• Juridical capacity can exist without the capacity to act, but the existence of the latter implies
that of the former. They do not always coincide.

Juridical capacity is synonymous to legal capacity and to personality. These terms are, therefore,
used interchangeably in the law. They all refer to the aptitude for the holding and enjoyment of rights.

On the other hand, capacity to act refers to the aptitude for the exercise of rights, and is often
referred to merely as “capacity.” In this sense, it is broadly defined as “the ability, power, qualification,
or competency of persons, natural or artificial, for the performance of civil acts depending on their state
or condition (status) as defined or fixed by law” (1 Tolentino 156, citing 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 416).

In the words of the Code, while juridical capacity is the fitness of man to be the subject of legal
relations, capacity to act is the power to do acts with legal effect.

Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in
every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts
with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)

Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from
certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. 

MINORITY - The age of majority commences upon the attainment of the age of 18 years (R.A. 6809);
a person below such age is a minor, and has a limited capacity to act. The unemancipated minor cannot
enter into contracts; but he may be estopped from disavowing his contract if he has misled the other
party as to his age.

The mere fact that one month after the execution of the contract, the minor informed the other
contracting party of his minority, does not affect the case; such subsequent information is of no
moment, because his previous misrepresentation has already estopped him from disavowing the
contract.

Insanity or Imbecility. – Insanity includes the various forms of mental disease, either inherited
or acquired, in which there is a perversion of the mentality, as when the person is suffering from
illusions, hallucinations, or delusions, unnatural exaltation or depression, or insane ideas of persecution
or power. Various phases of insanity are known as dementia praecox, paranoia, schizophrenia, mania,
melancholia, etc. It is a manifestation, in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a
more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic,
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective
faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition.

An insane person cannot make a valid will or testament and he cannot validly give consent to
contracts.

Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other
codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious
belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except
in cases specified by law. (n) 

• SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADORMONREAL,

VS. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 173822 October 13, 2010

FACTS: Petitioners Atizado and Monreal are accused of killing and murdering one Rogelio Llonaon April
1994. It was said that both petitioners barged in on the house of one Desder, where the victim was a
guest and suddenly shot at Llona with their guns. After the shooting, they fled. For their defense, the
petitioners interposed that they were at their family residence and drinking gin. The RTC convicted
Atizado and Monreal for the crime of murder and sentenced them with reclusion perpetua. On appeal
to the CA, the court affirmed the conviction in 2005. It is important to note that Salvador Monreal was
a minor at the time of the commission of the crime.

• ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in finding the petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Murder.

RULING: NO, the accused’s conviction is affirmed. However, the penalty imposed on Monreal is
suspended. The witness’ positive identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on
what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona left no
doubt whatsoever that they had conspired to kill and had done so with treachery. There being no
modifying circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado.
But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor - over 15 but
under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal’s minority at the time of the
commission of the murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial. Yet, it
cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was committed on
April 18, 1994.His counter-affidavit, the police blotter and trial records show that Monreal was a minor
at the time of the commission of the crime.

• MERCADO VS. ESPIRITU

37 Phil 215

FACTS: The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father of Jose Espiritu, the defendant)
and the heirs of his sister Margarita Mercado - Domingo and Josepha Mercado, who pretended to be of
legal age to give their consent into the contract of sale of the land they inherited from their deceased
mother Margarita Mercado (sister of Luis Mercado). The siblings Domingo et. al., sought for the
annulment of contract asserting that Domingo and Josepha were minors during the perfection of
contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that they were
of legal age. 

RULING: The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if it were made and
entered into by minors, who pretended to be of legal age. The court stated that they will not be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have
them annulled.

The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on law on estoppel and Rule 123, Section 6
paragraph A which states that “whenever a party has, by its own declaration, act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another party to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, cannot be permitted to falsify it.”

RATIO: The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still valid since it was executed by minors,
who have passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the minors
pretended that they had already reached their majority. 

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-
interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person
from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. 

Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the
obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. This is in accordance with the provisions of the
law on estoppels. 

• INSANITY

Applicable Laws:

Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract: 

(1) Unemancipated minors; 

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.

Article 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if able to do so;
otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it and communicate to him, in some practicable
manner, the contents thereof. (n) 

Article 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or
dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 805
of this Code. (n)
Article 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to in a state of
drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are voidable. (n)

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

• People VS. Bulagao

GR 184757, Oct. 5, 2011

FACTS: Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in separate
Informations both dated December 21, 2000. The Informations read as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
knife, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs, have carnal knowledge of AAA, 14 years old, against the latter’s will and consent. And;

That on or about the 17th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
knife, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs, have carnal knowledge of AAA, 14 years old, against the latter’s will and consent.

On cross-examination, AAA clarified that she fabricated the charge of rape because she was
angry with the accused-appellant for making her do laundry work for him. However, when asked if she
"consented and voluntarily submitted" herself to the accused-appellant when she had sexual
intercourse with him, she answered in the negative. She had been released from the custody of the
DSWD and was alone by herself for some time, but she now lives with the family of accused-appellant.

On redirect examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant did not force himself upon her.
She affirmed that accused-appellant had a little defect in his mind. On re-cross examination, AAA
testified that accused-appellant was not her sweetheart.

Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a clinical psychologist. She conducted a
mental examination on accused-appellant on September 12, 2002, and found that accused-appellant
was suffering from mental retardation as he had an IQ of below 50.

Accused-appellant, who was 40 years old when he testified on June 15, 2005, claimed that AAA
seduced him by removing her clothes. He asserted that they ended up merely kissing each other and did
not have sexual intercourse. He denied pointing a knife at AAA. AAA accused him of rape because she
was asking for ₱300 from him after they kissed. Accused-appellant also testified that there was no legal
proceeding for the adoption of AAA ("ampun-ampunan lang").

• ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant should be convicted for the crime of rape.
RULING: YES. we agree with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental
condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by Yolanda Palma was already
present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity
bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. 

Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of the accused-appellant proven before the
court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a complete deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity
presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at
the time of the commission of the crime. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at
the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.

With respect to the retraction made by the complainant, the court ruled that retraction is
looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is exceedingly unreliable for there is always the
probability that such recantation may later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses
through intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the test of
credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the
stand.

In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court of the credibility of AAA’s accusation
and recantation is facilitated by the fact that her recantation was made in open court, by testifying for
the defense. Unlike in cases where recantations were made in affidavits, the trial court in this case had
the opportunity to see the demeanor of AAA not only when she narrated the sordid details of the
alleged rape by her "adoptive" brother, but also when she claimed that she made up her previous rape
charges out of anger.

As such, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the trial court convicted accused-appellant even
after examining the young witness as she made a complete turnaround and admitted to perjury. The
legal adage that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses thus finds an
entirely new significance in this case where AAA was subjected to grueling cross examinations, redirect
examinations, and re-cross examinations both as a prosecution and defense witness. Still, the trial court
found that the private complainant’s testimony for the prosecution was the one that was worthy of
belief.

• Oropesa v Oropesa
GR 184528, April 25, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the RTC, a petition for him to be appointed as guardian over the property of
his father, Oropesa. Said petition alleged that Oropesa has been afflicted with several maladies and
has been sickly for over 10 years already having suffered a stroke, that his judgment and memory
were impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization.

Respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. Respondent cited petitioners
lack of material evidence to support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any
relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that
Oropesa is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition.  In fact,
respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner was entitled Report of
Neuropsychological Screening which although had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the
part of Oropesa, it also contained finding that supported the view that Oropesa on the average was
indeed competent.

• ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for guardianship shall be granted.

RULING: No. The petition for guardianship must be denied. The Rules provide that in a
guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven
to be a minor or an incompetent. A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear,
positive and definite evidence.

Here, Oropesa’s incompetency was not proven by clear, positive and definite evidence; hence,
petition for guardianship shall fail.

• People VS. Boaquina

G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012

FACTS: On April 3, 2000, AAA filed before the MTC of Pili, Camarines, two (2) separate complaints
against Accused-Appellant Marcial Bayrante y Boaquina for the crime of Rape. Finding probable cause
that the Accused-Appellant may have committed the crimes charged, the Presiding Judge of the MTC
ordered the filing of the appropriate Information(s), to which the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
concurred.

Consequently, on September 4, 2002, two (2) separate Informations were filed before the RTC
charging the Accused-Appellant of two (2) counts of Rape under Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353. The Information reads:

That on or about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of February 19, 2002 at Brgy. Old San Roque, Pili,
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd design using force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his niece AAA, a 20 year old mental retardate whose
mental age is 9 to 10 years of age, against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

In his Brief, appellant maintains that AAA was his lover and that she voluntarily eloped with him
as evidenced by the affidavit she signed before Brgy. Capt. Regis. Furthermore, appellant argues that the
prosecution failed to establish the mental state of AAA which is crucial to the charge that he raped a
woman who is of the legal age but otherwise deprived of reason. In other words, he asserts that the
prosecution was not able to prove that AAA suffers from mental retardation. For these reasons,
appellant urges this Court to exculpate him from guilt.

• ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be acquitted for failure to prove that AAA suffers
from mental retardation.
RULING: NO. It is settled in jurisprudence that, under the foregoing provision of law, carnal
knowledge of a woman with a mental deficiency is considered rape because such a person is not capable
of giving consent to a sexual act. In a recent case, we had declared that in cases of rape involving a
victim suffering from mental retardation, proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being
sufficient for the State to establish (1) the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and
(2) the mental retardation of the victim.

Previously in People v. Dalandas, we described in detail the nature of mental retardation as well
as its different degrees as defined in the modern and the old intelligence quotient (IQ) scales:

Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and
characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by standardized tests. It manifests itself in
impaired adaptation to the daily demands of the individual’s own social environment. Commonly, a
mental retardate exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired
learning capacity.

Although "mental retardation" is often used interchangeably with "mental deficiency," the latter
term is usually reserved for those without recognizable brain pathology.

As to the appellant’s allegation that AAA is his lover, the court ruled that for the "sweetheart"
theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship must be proven by convincing substantial
evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence renders his claim to be self-serving and of no probative value.
For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be a corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a
substantiation by tokens of such a relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like.

Significantly, this Court has decreed that even if the alleged romantic relationship were true,
this fact does not necessarily negate rape for a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancée
and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love because love is not a license for lust.

• CIVIL INTERDICTION

DEFINITION OF CIVIL INTERDICTION

- is an accessory penalty imposed upon persons who are sentenced to a principal penalty not
lower than reclusion temporal (article 41, Revised Penal Code), which is a penalty ranging from twelve
years and one day to twenty years.

Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides: “Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender
during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the
person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property, and of the
right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.”

•  ARTICLE 31. Effects of the Penalties of Perpetual or Temporary Special Disqualification. —

The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or
calling shall produce the following effects:
 1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected;

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during
the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.

ARTICLE 41. Reclusión Perpetua and Reclusión Temporal — Their accessory penalties. — The
penalties of reclusión perpetua and reclusión temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for
life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless
the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

• Jalosjos v COMELEC
G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012

FACTS: Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in
the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.

Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already
been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by RTC of Cebu City.
Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but
stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’
probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an
Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation.
Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections, the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification
filed against him on the same grounds.

• ISSUE: Whether or not Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte.

RULING: YES. The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction
by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since
he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.

A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40
of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. Sec. 12.
Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
 • The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified.

Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. 

• ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801

DOCTRINE: Article 41: for civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less
than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery
from the maternal womb.

FACTS: Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to
conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her
marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy
proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred
a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not
know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for
damages based on the third and last abortion.

The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages,
P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

• ISSUE: Whether or not an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child
incurs injury, his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage
to the unborn child.

RULING: NO, the parents cannot recover damages on behalf of the unborn child. Personality
begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course, essential that
birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having possessed legal
personality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn
child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or
heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked
juridical personality.

It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the
Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when
separated from its mother’s womb.

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the deceased
child.

Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven
months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the
maternal womb. 

Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

- Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of
the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

- Death puts an end to civil personality.

- Dead person continues to have personality only through contract, will, or as determined by law.

- Creditors can still claim from the estate of the deceased any obligation due to them.

- No human body shall be buried unless the proper death certificate has been presented and
recorded however during an epidemic bodies may be buried provided that the death certificate
be secured within 5 days after the burial.

• THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

• EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209

• EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE:

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY: AUGUST 3, 1988

• ARTICLE 1 OF THE NEW FAMILY CODE

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
GENERAL RULE: The nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation.

Consequences: Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. 

EXCEPT: Marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.

• LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER MARRIAGE:

The constitution itself however does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
marriage and prescribe the strategy and modalities to protect it and put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect the same.

Marriage, as creating the most important relationship in life, as having more to do with the
morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of
the legislature. (Maynard vs. Hill, 125 US 190)

• GOITIA VS. CAMPOS RUEDA

35 Phil 252

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.

FACTS:  Eloisa Goitia De La Camara and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married in the City of Manila on
Jan. 7, 1915. They established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for
about a month until the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. It was alleged that respondent
demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. The plaintiff spurned the
obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, defendant maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting
injuries upon her lips, face and different parts of her body; and that, as Goitia was unable by any means
to induce her husband to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was
obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.

Goitia filed a complaint against defendant for support outside the conjugal home. The CFI ruled
in favor of defendant Rueda and held that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff,
except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation
from the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

• ISSUE:   Whether Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

RULING:   YES. The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act
of marriage. Article 299 of the Civil Code provides that the person obliged to give support may, at his
option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his
own home the person having the right to the same. However, this option granted by law is not absolute.
The law does not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife
is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.

In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal home abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assault of the husband. Therefore, it is only but right, to claim support from the
husband for separate maintenance albeit outside the conjugal home.

• Silverio vs Republic
G.R. No. 174689; October 22, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation and sex reassignment surgery.

From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought
to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to
female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the
OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the
Republic.

• ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth
certificate.

RULING: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.  In this case,
he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is
necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical
record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable
 For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy
to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

• People VS. De La Cruz

G.R. No.187683, February 11, 2010

FACTS: Victoriano was charged with the crime of Parricide in an Information dated January 2, 2003,
which reads:

That on or about the 18th day of August, 2002, in the municipality of Malolos, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill his wife Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, use personal violence and stab the said
Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, hitting the latter on her trunk and on the different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which directly caused her death. Contrary to law.

Victoriano testified that, at around 6:30 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he came home very drunk
from a friend's house. Before he could enter their house, his wife, Anna, started nagging him saying,
"Hindi ka naman pala namamasada, nakipag-inuman ka pa." He asked her to go inside their house but
she refused. Thus, Victoriano slapped Anna and dragged her inside their house.

Due to the continuous nagging of Anna, Victoriano pushed her aside so he could go out of the
house. However, she fell on a jalousie window, breaking it in the process. When he helped her stand up,
Victoriano noticed that her back was punctured by a piece of shattered glass of the jalousie. He brought
her outside immediately and asked the help of his neighbors who were playing tong-its nearby.
Victoriano admitted that Joel accompanied him and his wife to the hospital.

At the hospital, Victoriano was taken into custody by policemen for questioning. It was only in
the following morning that Victoriano learned of his wife’s passing.

• ISSUE: Whether or not Victoriano is guilty of Parricide.

RULING: YES. The crime of Parricide is defined and punished under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), to wit:

Art. 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and
shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in Parricide ―
other than the fact of killing ― is the relationship of the offender to the victim. In the case of Parricide of
a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the
marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in
itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal
interest. Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife.

• De Santis VS. Intestate Estate Jalandoni

December 1, 2010

FACTS: Rodolfo Jalandoni died intestate. His brother, Bernardino Jalandoni filed with RTC a petition for
issuance of letters of administration. Anonuevo et al intervened and claimed that their mother Sylvia De
Santis was daughter of Isabel and John. They alleged that at the time of Rodolfo’s death, their
grandmother Isabel was the lawful wife of Rodolfo based on a marriage certificate. Rodolfo’s brother
opposed asserting that the birth certificate of Sylvia states that Isabel and John were married, hence,
Isabel and Rodolfo’s marriage was null and void. Petitioners argued that the entries in the birth
certificate of Sylvia could not be used as proof that Isabel and John were indeed married.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Isabel and Rodolfo was valid.

RULING: No. The birth certificate of Sylvia which indicates that Isabel and John were married is
sufficient proof that indeed they were married. Therefore Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo is void because at
that time, she was still married to John. Consequently, her descendants have no share in the estate of
Rodolfo.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage
may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

• Espinosa VS. Omana

AC No. 9081, October 12, 2011

FACTS: Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and
Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaña (Omaña). Complainants Espinosa and Glindo
charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal
(Marantal) sought Omaña's legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their
marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay”. Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the
contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal
eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired
during their union.
 Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a Law graduate, who
informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the
services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

• ISSUE: Whether or not the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay” dissolved the marriage of the
spouses.

RULING: NO. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the
disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

We cannot accept Omaña's allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the
contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that
it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña’s negligence in doing her
notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial
register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or
any member of his staff.

• REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN

GR No. 166676; September 12, 2008

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer
Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where
afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics.

Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.”

• ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of
the available evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as
a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.

• ESSENTIAL AND FORMAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:’

1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

LEGAL CAPACITY OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES (AGE)

APPLICABLE LAWS IN THE FAMILY CODE REGARDING THE REQUIREMENT OF AGE:

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents
or guardians;

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen
years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the
consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in
that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as husband and wife;

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void  ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
(n)

EXAMPLE: ABSENCE OF CONSENT (MARRIAGE IN JEST)

DEFECTIVE OR VITIATED CONSENT ( WHEN THERE IS FRAUD AS STATED IN ARTICLE 46 OF

THE FAMILY CODE.

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.

• MARRIAGE CEREMONY

Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It
shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be
signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the
marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of
said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer.

• MARTINEZ VS. TAN

12 Phil 731

FACTS: Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan were married before a justice of the peace in Leyte. They
executed an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition
directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed both by Martinez and
Tan, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the
justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Marriage was solemnized with two
witnesses.
 The couple did not live together and when Martinez went home to Ormoc, her relatives
convinced her to file charges claiming that the marriage was not valid since she signed the document in
her own home thinking that it was a paper authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her parents to the
marriage.

• ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is valid.

RULING: YES. They were married since there was an expression of mutual consent and both of them
appeared before the justice of the peace. They both understood Spanish thus they knew the contents of
the document they were signing.

• CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ VS. BRENT HOSPITAL

GR No. 187417, 2016-02-24

FACTS: Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at
the time of her indefinite suspension from employment in 2006. The cause of suspension was Cadiz's
Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. It appears that Cadiz became
pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent imposed the suspension until such time that she marries her
boyfriend in accordance with law.

Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive
Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and Damages with prayer for Reinstatement.

Ruling of the Labor Tribunals:

In its Decision dated April 12, 2007, the LA found that Cadiz's indefinite suspension amounted to
a constructive dismissal; nevertheless, the LA ruled that Cadiz was not illegally dismissed as there was
just cause for her dismissal, that is, she engaged in premarital sexual relations with her boyfriend
resulting in a pregnancy out of wedlock. LA further stated that her "immoral conduct x x x [was]
magnified as serious misconduct by the fact that Brent is an institution of the Episcopal Church in the
Philippines operating both a hospital and college where Cadiz was employed.

Cadiz appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the LA
decision. The CA, however, dismissed her petition outright due to technical defects in the petition: (1)
incomplete statement of material dates; (2) failure to attach registry receipts; and (3) failure to indicate
the place of issue of counsel's PTR and IBP official receipts. Cadiz sought reconsideration of the assailed
CA Resolution dated July 22, 2008 but it was denied in the assailed Resolution dated February 24, 2009.
The CA further ruled that "a perusal of the petition will reveal that public respondent NLRC committed
no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction holding Cadiz's dismissal from
employment valid.

• ISSUE: Whether or not pregnancy out-of-wedlock considered immorality and is a ground for
the dismissal of an employee?
RULING: NO. Facts leading to Cadiz’s dismissal are straightforward - she was employed as a human
resource officer in an educational and medical institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines; she
and her boyfriend at that time were both single; they engaged in premarital sexual relations, which
resulted in pregnancy. 

The labor tribunals characterized these as constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct. They also
concluded that as human resource officer, Cadiz should have been the epitome of proper conduct and
her indiscretion “surely scandalized the Brent community.”

The foregoing circumstances, however, do not readily equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Brent’s Policy Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies do not define what constitutes immorality; it
simply stated immorality as a ground for disciplinary action. Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the
standard dictionary definition of fornication as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that
Cadiz’s acts fell under such classification, thus constituting immorality.

Jurisprudence has set the standard of morality with which an act should be gauged - it is public and
secular, not religious. Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in
accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those conducts which
are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society. That a particular act does not conform to the traditional moral views of a
sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify an act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not
conform to public and secular standards. More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to
establish that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or
immoral.

The totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify the conclusion that Cadiz committed acts
of immorality. Similar to Leus, Cadiz and her boyfriend were both single and had no legal impediment to
marry at the time she committed the alleged immoral conduct. In fact, they eventually married on April
15, 2008. 

• Abbas v. Abbas
G.R. No. 18396, January 30, 2013

FACTS: Syed, a Pakistani citizen, and Gloria, a Filipino citizen, met in Taiwan in 1991. He arrived in the
Philippines and on January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s
residence, in Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He was told that he was
going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not
told of the nature of said ceremony where he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he only
found out that it was a marriage contract when Gloria told him. He further testified that he did not go
to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.
 In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license. The Municipal Civil Registrar, issued a certification stating that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted was the number of another marriage license
issued to another couple. He also alleged that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002. On the other hand, Gloria presented her own side. Rev. Mario Dauz, a minister of the Gospel and
a brgy captain stated that he is authorized to solemnize marriage and that he was doing it since 1982
and he is familiar with the requirements. There were two witnesses, one of them was Atty Sanchez who
handed him the marriage license on the day of the wedding. Gloria testified that a certain Qualin went
to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned
with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned
with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria also alleged that she has a daughter with Syed. She filed a bigamy case
because Syed married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.

• Abbas v. Abbas
G.R. No. 18396, January 30, 2013

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.

• RULING:

NO, the marriage is void. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove
the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that
he requested certification that no such license was issued.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly,
neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify
to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the
existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not
reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from.
The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to
how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well
as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued
for her and Syed.

This marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

• CIVIL LAW; MARRIAGE; VALIDITY; MARRIAGE WHICH PRECEDED THE ISSUANCE OF THE
MARRIAGE LICENSE IS VOID; RATIONALE

• In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license
is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota
of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives
the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law. (Arañes v. Occiano, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 (formerly IPI No.
01-1049-MTJ), [April 11, 2002], 430 PHIL 197-204)

• SALLY GO-BANGAYAN VS. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.

G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions, in accord with Article 148.

FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be
registered. Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin,
using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of
a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground
that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties
during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children.
A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from
the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

• The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting
marriage with Azucena. The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
not bigamous.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is void for not having a marriage license.
RULING: YES. We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void
ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be
void from the beginning.”

In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was
duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did
not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of
February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab
initio.

The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void
ab initio and non-existent.

• MARRIAGES THAT ARE EXEMPT FROM THE REQUIREMENT OF MARRIAGE LICENSE

A) Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage
may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the
ailing party subsequently survives.

B) B) Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation
to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be
solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.

C) c) Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities
may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are
solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices.

• VALIDATION OF MARITAL COHABITATION (Legal Ratification of Marital Cohabitation)

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage

• Republic vs. Dayot, GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986.   In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years.   On
August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual.  They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board.  Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against
Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman.  On the other hand, Jose filed
a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.    

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

• Republic vs. Dayot, GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

HELD:

Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage.  Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months
before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. The solemnization of a marriage without
prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the
allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would
have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a
mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio.   The court also
ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.  The right to impugn marriage does not
prescribe and may be raised any time. 

• THE DOCTRINE IN THE CASE OF NIÑAL v. NORMA BAYADOG, [G.R. No. 133778. March 14,
2000.]

• Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully
married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period. This is the prevailing doctrine.

(disregard the doctrine in the Manzano versus Sanchez.)

• How to count the five-year period?

• The five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife"
where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In
other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken.
 • Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

• COSCA VS. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-
BAROY, Clerk of Court II,
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721. September 30, 1994.

FACTS: Complainants Juvy n. Cosca, Edmund B. Eralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are
Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Cler II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are
respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.

In administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992,
herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment
in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained
prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.

Complainants alleged that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage licenses. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of
paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. In addition,
respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization,
the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties
which was usually several days after the ceremony. The marriage contracts were not filed with the local
civil registrar.

It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the
month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that
respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but
the Notarial Registrar will show that there were notarized during that month; and that respondents
reported a notarial fee of only P 18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P 20.00
therefore and failed to account for the difference.

• ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent are guilty of violating the provision of Article 4 of the
Family Code.

RULING: YES. On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code patiently provides that the
formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential requisites shall generally
render the marriage void ab initio and that, while and irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriages, and what the court provides for pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all
without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that priests or
ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law. This
is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;

WHAT IS THE EFFECT TO THE MARRIAGE IF THE JUDGE CELEBRATES THE MARRIAGE OUTSIDE OF HIS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION?

According to RABUYA, it is mere irregularity which will not affect the validity of marriage but will subject
the judge to civil administrative and criminal sanction. ( Read the cases of Navarro versus Domagtoy,
259 SCRA 129; Beso versus Daguman, 323 SCRA 566 and Aranes vs. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402.

Aranes v. Occiano 380 SCRA 402; April 11,2002

• Topic: Formal Requisites; Authority of the solemnizing officer; how authorized

• Doctrine: Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 (FAMILY
CODE), which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.

Facts:

• Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the MTC of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that
on 17 February 2000, respondent solemnized her marriage to Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction. When her husband passed away, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties”
left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of
Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy since the marriage was a nullity.

• Respondent averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to
solemnize the marriage of the parties. Having been assured that all the documents to the
marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.  However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that
Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is
 located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent
judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.

• Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess
the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting
to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the
delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. 

• ISSUES:

1)     Whether or not the respondent may validly solemnize a marriage outside his jurisdiction.

2)     Whether or not respondent-Judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage

without the requisite marriage license

• RULING:

1) No. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.

• The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129, a judge held
office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos.

• An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.

• RULING:

2) Yes

In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is
void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of
validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in
gross ignorance of the law.

• RODOLFO G. NAVARRO VS. JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088; July 19, 1996.

FACTS: On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma D. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. in relation to the charges
against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife , and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied in the affidavit issued by the Municipal trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.

With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between
Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph I of the Family code which states that:
“Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s
jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

• ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in

office and ignorance of the law.

RULING: In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to
Ida Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge
to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.

In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By
citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law

Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the

Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is suspended for a
period of six months.

• Who may solemnize marriages?

(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his
church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits
of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one
of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect;
(ADONG vs. CHEONG SENG GEE, 43 PHIL. 43)
 (3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case Mentioned in Article 31;

(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the
latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;

(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.

Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or
vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the
local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be
performed by said consular official.

CONSUL-GENERAL, CONSUL, VICE-CONSUL are authorized to solemnize but not consul-agents (Article 9,
Vienna Convention of 1963)

CONSUL-GENERAL, CONSUL, VICE-CONSUL are authorized to solemnize marriage between Filipinos but
not between a Filipino and a foreigner. (ARTICLE 10.)

Can a marriage be solemnized by CONSUL-GENERAL, CONSUL, VICE-CONSUL in the Philippines? No, only
between Filipino citizens abroad.

EFFECT OF GOOD FAITH OF PARTIES to the lack of authority of the solemnizing officer: THE MARRIAGE
IS VALID.

ARTICLE 35 (2)

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages
were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the
legal authority to do so;

The authority of the mayor to celebrate marriage under the Local Government Code.

• People VS. Bustamante

105 Phils. 64

FACTS: Federico Bustamante was charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan.

The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one Maria
Perez on August 9, 1954, before the Justice of Peace of Binaloan, Pangasinan, a little over a year late, or
on September 16, 195, he contracted a second marriage with Demetria I. Tibayan, solemnized before
Vice-Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as mayor of the said
municipality, while the first marriage was still subsisting.

 The defendant contended that there could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as
Nato was merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to do
so. He lays stress on the distinction between “Acting Mayor” and “Vice Mayor acting as Mayor”, urging
that while the former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.

• ISSUES:
1.       Whether or not the second marriage was valid.
2.       Whether or not the Vice Mayor has the authority to solemnize the
second marriage.

RULING: Yes, the marriage was valid and Vice Mayor Federico Nato, acting as mayor, has the authority
to solemnize the marriage.  As acting mayor, he discharges all duties and wields the power appurtenant
to said office.  This instance does not involve a question of title to the office, but the performance of
the functions thereunto appertaining by one who is admitted to be temporarily vested with it.   The
case even concedes and recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice Mayor
whenever the latter is in an acting capacity.  The word “acting,” when preceding the title of an office
connotes merely the temporary character as nature of the same.