G.R. No.
212719, June 25, 2019
INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA CITY, NAMELY:
VENANCIO A. ROXAS, SATURNINO V. PARAS, EDGARDO G. MANUEL,
HERMINILDO V. CRUZ, ALLAN F. TEJADA, ROBERTO C. MARQUEZ, JULITO P.
MONDEJAR, ARMANDO M. CABUANG, JONATHAN O. CRISANTO, EDGAR
ECHENIQUE, JANMARK SARACHO, JOSENEL ALVARAN, AND CRISENCIO NERI,
JR., PETITIONERS, v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE; AND SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENTS.
ATTY. RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,
WILLIAM M. MONTINOLA, FORTUNATO P. VISTO, AND ARESENIO C.
CABANILLA, PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS,
[G.R. No. 214637]
REYNALDO D. EDAGO, PETER R. TORIDA, JIMMY E. ACLAO, WILFREDO V.
OMERES, PASCUA B. GALLADAN, VICTOR M. MACOY, JR., EDWIN C.
TRABUNCON, WILFREDO A. PATERNO, FEDERICO ELLIOT, AND ROMEO R.
MACOLBAS, PETITIONERS, v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE; SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; ACTING DIRECTOR FRANKLIN JESUS B. BUCAYU,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS; AND JAIL CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT DIONY
DACANAY MAMARIL, BUREAU OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases 1 is the legality of Section 4,
Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10592,2 which states:
SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new
procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance as
provided in Section 4 of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management,
Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule,
the grant of good conduct time allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be
prospective in application.
The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time
allowance for loyalty shall also be prospective in application as these privileges are
likewise subject to the management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC. 3
The Case
On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592,
amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).4 For reference, the modifications are underscored as follows:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. —
Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited
in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time
during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner
agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with
the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of
any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to
surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a
counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time
during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be deducted from thirty (30) years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the
possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced
and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice
to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under
review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate
release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good
conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent
without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio
order the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual
delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded
from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused
may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment.
ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability — Criminal liability is extinguished
partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing
preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence.
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of any offender qualified
for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or
of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention
center or any other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the
period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of (his) imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction
of twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed
a deduction of twenty-three days for each month of good behavior during
detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good
behavior during detention;
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during detention; and
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another
deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each
month of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above
allowances for good conduct.
ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A deduction of one fifth of the period of
his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive
imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in
Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following
the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period of his
sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his
confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe
enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive
imprisonment or serving sentence.
ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall
grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.
(Emphases ours)
Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by respondents Department
of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De Lima and Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II on March 26, 2014 and became
effective on April 18, 2014.5 Petitioners and intervenors assail the validity of its Section
4, Rule 1 that directs the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time
allowance (GCTA), time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and
special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) mainly on the ground that it violates Article 22
of the RPC.6
G.R. No. 212719
On June 18, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Preliminary Injunction)7 was filed against respondents DOJ Secretary De Lima and
DILG Secretary Roxas by Atty. Michael J. Evangelista acting as the attorney-in-fact 8 of
convicted prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), namely: Venancio A. Roxas,
Saturnino V. Paras, Edgardo G. Manuel, Herminildo V. Cruz, Allan F. Tejada, Roberto C.
Marquez, Julito P. Mondejar, Armando M. Cabuang, Jonathan O. Crisanto, Edgar
Echenique, Janmark Saracho, Josenel Alvaran, and Crisencio Neri, Jr. (Roxas et al.).
Petitioners filed the case as real parties-in-interest and as representatives of their
member organizations and the organizations' individual members, as a class suit for
themselves and in behalf of all who are similarly situated. They contend that the
provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in nature and beneficial to the inmates; hence,
should be given retroactive effect in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC. For them,
the IRR contradicts the law it implements. They are puzzled why it would be complex
for the Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR) and the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP) to retroactively apply the law when the prisoners' records are
complete and the distinctions between the pertinent provisions of the RPC and R.A. No.
10592 are easily identifiable. Petitioners submit that the simple standards added by the
new law, which are matters of record, and the creation of the Management, Screening
and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) should not override the constitutional guarantee of
the rights to liberty and due process of law aside from the principle that penal laws
beneficial to the accused are given retroactive effect.
Almost a month after, or on July 11, 2014, Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. filed a Petition
(In Intervention).9 He incorporates by reference the Roxas et al. petition, impleads the
same respondents, and adds that nowhere from the legislative history of R.A. No.
10592 that it intends to be prospective in character. On July 22, 2014, the Court
resolved to grant the leave to intervene and require the adverse parties to comment
thereon.10
Another Petition-in-Intervention11 was filed on October 21, 2014. This time, the Free
Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) served as counsel for William M. Montinola, Fortunato P.
Visto, and Arsenio C. Cabanilla (Montinola et al.), who are also inmates of the NBP. The
petition argues that Section 4, Rule I of the IRR is facially void for being contrary to the
equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution; it discriminates, without any
reasonable basis, against those who would have been benefited from the retroactive
application of the law; and is also ultra vires, as it was issued beyond the authority of
respondents to promulgate. In a Resolution dated November 25, 2014, We required the
adverse parties to comment on the petition-in-intervention. 12
On January 30, 2015, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated
Comment13 to the Petition of Roxas et al. and Petition-in-Intervention of Atty. Saguisag,
Sr. More than two years later, or on July 7, 2017, it filed a Comment 14 to the Petition-
in-Intervention of Montinola et al.
G.R. No. 214637
On October 24, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition15 was filed by Reynaldo D.
Edago, Peter R. Torida, Jimmy E. Aclao, Wilfredo V. Omeres, Pascua B. Galladan, Victor
M. Macoy, Jr., Edwin C. Trabuncon, Wilfredo A. Paterno, Federico Elliot, and Romeo R.
Macolbas (Edago et al.), who are all inmates at the Maximum Security Compound of the
NBP, against DOJ Secretary De Lima, DILG Secretary Roxas, BUCOR Acting Director
Franklin Jesus B. Bucayu, and BJMP Chief Superintendent (Officer-in-Charge) Diony
Dacanay Mamaril. The grounds of the petition are as follows:
A.
SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR PROVIDING FOR A PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE
PROVISIONS OF R.A. 10592 WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND THEREBY VOID AND ILLEGAL
FOR BEING CONTRARY AND ANATHEMA TO R.A. 10592.
a. R.A. 10592 does not state that its provisions shall have prospective
application.
b. Section 4 of the IRR of R.A. 10592 is contrary to Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code providing that penal laws that are beneficial to
the accused shall have retroactive application.
c. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR contravenes public policy and the
intent of Congress when it enacted R.A. 10592.
B.
SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR WAS ISSUED BY RESPONDENTS WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT IS
PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
a. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution.
b. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates substantive due process. 16
Per Resolution17 dated November 11, 2014, respondents were ordered to file their
comment to the petition. In compliance, BJMP Chief Mamaril filed a Comment 18 on
December 10, 2014, while the OSG did the same on February 9, 2015 19 in behalf of all
the respondents.
Subsequently, Edago et al. filed a Motion with Leave of Court to File and Admit
Reply,20 attaching therein said Reply. On July 28, 2015, We granted the motion and
noted the Reply.21
The Court's Ruling
The petition is granted.
Procedural Matters
Actual case or controversy
Respondents contend that the petition of Edago et al. did not comply with all the
elements of justiciability as the requirement of an actual case or controversy vis-a-
vis the requirement of ripeness has not been complied with. For them, the claimed
injury of petitioners has not ripened to an actual case requiring this Court's
intervention: First, the MSEC has not been constituted yet so there is effectively no
authority or specialized body to screen, evaluate and recommend any applications for
time credits based on R.A. No. 10592. Second, none of petitioners has applied for the
revised credits, making their claim of injury premature, if not anticipatory. And third,
the prison records annexed to the petition are neither signed nor certified by the
BUCOR Director which belie the claim of actual injury resulting from alleged extended
incarceration. What petitioners did was they immediately filed this case after obtaining
their prison records and computing the purported application of the revised credits for
GCTA under R.A. No. 10592.
We disagree.
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided unless the following requisites for judicial
inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.22 As to the requirement of actual case or controversy, the
Court stated in Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't of the Rep. of the Phils.
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al.:23
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to
issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere
academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence, x x x.
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a
result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 24
There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there is a contrariety
of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. Respondents stand for the prospective application of the grant of GCTA,
TASTM, and STAL while petitioners and intervenors view that such provision violates the
Constitution and Article 22 of the RPC. The legal issue posed is ripe for adjudication as
the challenged regulation has a direct adverse effect on petitioners and those detained
and convicted prisoners who are similarly situated. There exists an immediate and/or
threatened injury and they have sustained or are immediately in danger of sustaining
direct injury as a result of the act complained of. In fact, while the case is pending,
petitioners are languishing in jail. If their assertion proved to be true, their illegal
confinement or detention in the meantime is oppressive. With the prisoners' continued
incarceration, any delay in resolving the case would cause them great prejudice. Justice
demands that they be released soonest, if not on time.
There is no need to wait and see the actual organization and operation of the MSEC.
Petitioners Edago et al. correctly invoked Our ruling in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon.
Aguirre.25 There, We dismissed the novel theory that people should wait for the
implementing evil to befall on them before they could question acts that are illegal or
unconstitutional, and held that "[by] the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act." Similar to Pimentel, Jr., the real issue in
this case is whether the Constitution and the RPC are contravened by Section 4, Rule 1
of the IRR, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. Concrete acts are
not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. 26 An actual case may exist even
in the absence of tangible instances when the assailed IRR has actually and adversely
affected petitioners. The mere issuance of the subject IRR has led to the ripening of a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act. If this Court cannot await the
adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe
for judicial intervention,27 the same can be said for an IRR. Here, petitioners need not
wait for the creation of the MSEC and be individually rejected in their applications. They
do not need to actually apply for the revised credits, considering that such application
would be an exercise in futility in view of respondents' insistence that the law should be
prospectively applied. If the assailed provision is indeed unconstitutional and illegal,
there is no better time than the present action to settle such question once and for all. 28
Legal standing
We do not subscribe to respondents' supposition that it is the Congress which may
claim any injury from the alleged executive encroachment of the legislative function to
amend, modify or repeal laws and that the challenged acts of respondents have no
direct adverse effect on petitioners, considering that based on records, there was no
GCTA granted to them.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose
name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of
the right sought to be enforced."
"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The
concept has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only
that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." It must [be] shown that he has been,
or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that
he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
complained of.29
In this case, petitioners are directly affected by Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR because
they are prisoners currently serving their respective sentences at the NBP. They have a
personal stake in the outcome of this case as their stay in prison will potentially be
shortened (if the assailed provision of the IRR is declared unlawful and void) or their
dates of release will be delayed (if R.A. No. 10592 is applied prospectively). It is
erroneous to assert that the questioned provision has no direct adverse effect on
petitioners since there were no GCTAs granted to them. There is none precisely because
of the prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. It is a proof of the act complained of
rather than an evidence that petitioners lack legal standing. Further, the submission of
certified prison records is immaterial in determining whether or not petitioners' rights
were breached by the IRR because, to repeat, the possible violation was already fait
accompli by the issuance of the IRR. The prison records were merely furnished to show
that respondents have prospectively applied R.A. No. 10592 and that petitioners will be
affected thereby.
Propriety of legal remedy:
Respondents argue that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the
petitions-in-intervention, should be dismissed because such petitions are proper only
against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section
4, Rule 1 of the IRR is an administrative issuance of respondents made in the exercise
of their rule-making or quasi-legislative functions.
True, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is not an appropriate remedy to assail the
validity of the subject IRR as it was issued in the exercise of respondents' rule-making
or quasi-legislative function. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently held that
"petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review, prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials."30 In Araullo v. Aquino III,31 former Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Lucas
P. Bersamin, explained the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, thus:
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
may be determined under the Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the
special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A
similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable
only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly
explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ
of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or
officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as
to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior
court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's
judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if
allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no
other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was
then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases
in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not
proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review
judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same
as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the
power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or
situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ
of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz.:
xxxx
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of
jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a
corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal,
and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself,
while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is
directed to the court itself. The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ
of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from
further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or
person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a
lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of
justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are
performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction"
may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application
is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any
act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from
making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or
affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary
implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases,
the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is
consistent with the republican system of checks and balances. 32
In view of the foregoing, We shall proceed to discuss the substantive issues raised
herein so as to finally resolve the question on the validity of Section 4, Rule 1 of the
IRR, which is purely legal in nature. This is also because of the public importance of the
issues raised,33 and the interest of substantial justice,34 not to mention the absence of
any dispute as to any underlying fact.35
Hierarchy of courts
Respondents contend that the petition for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the
petitions-in-intervention, should still be dismissed for failure to observe the rule on
hierarchy of courts. According to them, this Court's jurisdiction over actions assailing
the validity of administrative issuances is primarily appellate in nature by virtue of
Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution. 36 An action assailing the validity of an
administrative issuance is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, which,
under Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has
exclusive original jurisdiction. Further, a petition for declaratory relief filed before the
RTC, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, is the proper remedy to question the
validity of the IRR.37
Indeed, under Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the question presented here is a matter
incapable of pecuniary estimation, which exclusively and originally pertained to the
proper RTC.38 Fundamentally, there is no doubt that this consolidated case captioned as
petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to declare the unconstitutionality and
illegality of Section 4 Rule 1 of the IRR; thus, partaking the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which We only have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Section
5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution. In accordance with Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules, the special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Nevertheless, the judicial policy has been to entertain a direct resort to this Court in
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of
serious implications, and those of transcendental importance and of first
impression.39 As the petitions clearly and specifically set out special and important
reasons therefor, We may overlook the Rules. Here, petitioners Edago et al. are correct
in asserting that R.A. No. 10592 and its IRR affect the entire correctional system of the
Philippines. Not only the social, economic, and moral well-being of the convicts and
detainees are involved but also their victims and their own families, the jails, and the
society at large. The nationwide implications of the petitions, the extensive scope of the
subject matter, the upholding of public policy, and the repercussions on the society are
factors warranting direct recourse to Us.
Yet more than anything, there is an urgent necessity to dispense substantive justice on
the numerous affected inmates. It is a must to treat this consolidated case with a
circumspect leniency, granting petitioners the fullest opportunity to establish the merits
of their case rather than lose their liberty on the basis of technicalities. 40 It need not be
said that while this case has been pending, their right to liberty is on the line. An
extended period of detention or one that is beyond the period allowed by law violates
the accused person's right to liberty.41 Hence, We shunt the rigidity of the rules of
procedure so as not to deprive such birthright. 42 The Court zealously guards against the
curtailment of a person's basic constitutional and natural right to liberty. 43 The right to
liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot
be lightly taken away.44 At its core, substantive due process guarantees a right to
liberty that cannot be taken away or unduly constricted, except through valid causes
provided by law.45
Substantive Issues
Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal
law that is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if
he is not a habitual criminal. These are the rules, the exception, and the exception to
the exception on the effectivity of laws.46
In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws
which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect) is well entrenched. 47 It
has been sanctioned since the old Penal Code.48
x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in these Islands
until the 31st of December, 1931, the principle underlying our laws granting to the
accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be
retroactive when the law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried
over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22
x x x. This is an exception to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not
retrospective, variously contained in the following maxims: Lex prospicit, non
respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex defuturo, judex de proeterito (the
law provides for the future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form
with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience and good law justify
this exception, which is contained in the well-known aphorism: Favorabilia sunt
amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one distinguished author has put it, the exception
was inspired by sentiments of humanity, and accepted by science. 49
According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a right" of the
offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish
and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception
based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice." 50
Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC
applies to said Code51 and its amendments,52 as well as to special laws,53 such as Act
No. 2126,54 Presidential Decree No. 603,55 R.A. No. 7636,56 R.A. No. 8293,57 R.A. No.
8294,58 R.A. No. 9344,59 and R.A. No. 10586,60 to cite a few.
But what exactly is a penal law?
A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as follows:
A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one. 61
Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses
and prescribing penalties for their violation.62
Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense
committed against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the power
to pardon. In common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include within the
term "penal statutes" all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish
penalties for their violation, and even those which, without expressly prohibiting certain
acts, impose a penalty upon their commission.63
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
provide for their punishment.64
The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not
procedural rules.65 Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains penal provisions does
not make it penal in nature.66
In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A. No.
10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law has become an integral part of the RPC
as Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al. further argue that if an
amendment to the RPC that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the
accused cannot be applied retroactively for being an ex post facto law, a law that
makes the penalties lighter should be considered penal laws in accordance with Article
22 of the RPC.
We concur.
While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a
penalty67 as it addresses the rehabilitation component 68 of our correctional system, its
provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the
crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the
ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls
for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works
to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the
decrease in the penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison
stay; thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed.
Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as a practical matter results
in extending their sentence and increasing their punishment. 69 Evidently, this
transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the RPC.
In support of the prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL,
respondents aver that a careful scrutiny of R.A. No. 10592 would indicate the need for
"new procedures and standards of behavior" to fully implement the law by the BUCOR
(as to persons serving their sentences after conviction) and the BJMP (as to accused
who are under preventive detention). It is alleged that the amendments introduced are
substantial and of utmost importance that they may not be implemented without a
thorough revision of the BUCOR and the BJMP operating manuals on jail management.
In particular, the establishment of the MSEC is said to be an administrative mechanism
to address the policy and necessity that the BUCOR superintendents and the BJMP jail
wardens must follow uniform guidelines in managing, screening and evaluating the
behavior or conduct of prisoners prior to their recommendation to the heads of the two
bureaus on who may be granted time allowances.
Respondents fail to persuade Us.
Except for the benefits of TASTM and the STAL granted to a prisoner who chose to stay
in the place of his confinement despite the existence of a calamity or catastrophe
enumerated in Article 158 of the RPC, the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are mere
modifications of the RPC that have been implemented by the BUCOR prior to the
issuance of the challenged IRR. In view of this, the claim of "new procedures and
standards of behavior" for the grant of time allowances is untenable.
It appears that even prior to February 1, 1916 when Act No. 2557 was
enacted,70 prisoners have already been entitled to deduct the period of preventive
imprisonment from the service of their sentences. In addition, good conduct time
allowance has been in existence since August 30, 1906 upon the passage of Act No.
1533.71 Said law provided for the diminution of sentences imposed upon convicted
prisoners in consideration of good conduct and diligence. 72 Under Act No. 1533 and
subsequently under Article 97 of the RPC, the time allowance may also apply to
detention prisoners if they voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be
assigned to them.73 Such prerequisite was removed by R.A. No. 10592.
Subject to the review, and in accordance with the rules and regulations, as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of Public Instruction, the wardens or officers in charge of
Insular or provincial jails or prisons were mandated to make and keep such records and
take such further actions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of Act No.
1533.74 When the RPC took effect on January 1, 1932,75 the Director of Prisons was
empowered to grant allowances for good conduct whenever lawfully justified. 76 With the
effectivity of R.A. No. 10592 on June 6, 2013, such authority is now vested on the
Director of the BUCOR, the Chief of the BJMP and/or the Warden of a provincial, district,
municipal or city jail.77
Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs are established to act as the
recommending body for the grant of GCTA and TASTM. 78 They are tasked to manage,
screen and evaluate the behavior and conduct of a detention or convicted prisoner and
to monitor and certify whether said prisoner has actually studied, taught or performed
mentoring activities.79 The creation of the MSEC, however, does not justify the
prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. Nowhere in the amendatory law was its
formation set as a precondition before its beneficial provisions are applied. What R.A.
No. 10592 only provides is that the Secretaries of the DOJ and the DILG are authorized
to promulgate rules and regulations on the classification system for good conduct and
time allowances, as may be necessary to implement its provisions. 80 Clearly,
respondents went outside the bounds of their legal mandate when they provided for
rules beyond what was contemplated by the law to be enforced.
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government
under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law's general provisions into effect. The
law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRSs, because an administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress.81
The contention of Edago et al. stands undisputed that, prior to the issuance of the
assailed IRR and even before the enactment of R.A. No. 10592, a Classification Board
had been handling the functions of the MSEC and implementing the provisions of the
RPC on time allowances. While there is a noble intent to systematize and/or
institutionalize existing set-up, the administrative and procedural restructuring should
not in any way prejudice the substantive rights of current detention and convicted
prisoners.
Furthermore, despite various amendments to the law, the standard of behavior in
granting GCTA remains to be "good conduct." In essence, the definition of what
constitutes "good conduct" has been invariable through the years, thus:
Act No. 1533: "not been guilty of a violation of discipline or any of the rules of the
prison, and has labored with diligence and fidelity upon all such tasks as have been
assigned to him."82
BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000: "displays good behavior and who has
no record of breach of discipline or violation of prison rules and regulations." 83
IRR of R.A. No. 10592: "the conspicuous and satisfactory behavior of a detention or
convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in rehabilitation programs,
productive participation in authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary
deeds coupled with faithful obedience to all prison/jail rules and regulations" 84
Among other data, an inmate's prison record contains information on his behavior or
conduct while in prison.85 Likewise, the certificate/diploma issued upon successful
completion of an educational program or course (i.e., elementary, secondary and
college education as well as vocational training) forms part of the record. 86 These
considered, the Court cannot but share the same sentiment of Roxas et al. It is indeed
perplexing why it is complex for respondents to retroactively apply R.A. No. 10592
when all that the MSEC has to do is to utilize the same standard of behavior for the
grant of time allowances and refer to existing prison records.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. Section 4, Rule 1 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 is DECLARED invalid
insofar as it provides for the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time
allowance, time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring, and special time
allowance for loyalty. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections and the Chief of
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology are REQUIRED to RE-COMPUTE with
reasonable dispatch the time allowances due to petitioners and all those who are
similarly situated and, thereafter, to CAUSE their immediate release from
imprisonment in case of full service of sentence, unless they are being confined thereat
for any other lawful cause.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
