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Ethical Issues in the Mahabharata in the Context of Dharma

T.S.Rukmani

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of moral behaviour in the context of dharma in the

Mahabharata (MBh). Even though there are many guidelines for what constitutes

dharma in the Dharmasutra/Dharmasastra texts there are many instances when characters

in the MBh do not conform to the dictates of dharma given in textbooks. A refrain

therefore throughout the MBh is that dharma in truth is not easy to understand.

Underlying the paper is also the argument that dharma cannot be subsumed under an all

embracing specific moral theory as is attempted in western moral theories and it is more

or else based on specific situations one faces. Keeping these in mind the paper then

examines characters like Satyavati, Bhisma, Kunti, Karna and Yudhisthira in the context

of dharma.

The capacity to decide what is right and what is wrong in any situation is a

difficult task at all times. How to behave in a right way in any given situation is what an

ethical issue is concerned with. Thus the literature on Moral Philosophy is something

which has no closure. Whether morality is something transcendental or empirical or again

rooted in an overall ethos of individual societies is again something we will never be able

to decide. Different cultures have come up with models of behaviour based on their

understanding of what it is to be right under varied circumstances. I would like to state

that in common with authors like Austin Creel, P.T.Raju and G.C Pande, I subscribe to

the view that a moral life in the Hindu worldview was a life lived in accordance with

dharma .
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Till recently in the West it was fashionable to talk about ideal moral behaviour

based on either de-ontological or utilitarian principles and advocates were divided on

those lines. But beset with many problems, the West is turning back to Virtue Ethics

(Rosalind Hursthouse, 1999) which has a history going back to the times of Aristotle.

Virtue ethics recognizes the specific cultural moorings of any society based on which

ethical behaviour is determined. Thus it understands virtues based on ‘norms that are

local both in origin and in application’ (Rukmani in SSEASR, 2007). This is a

recognition of the fact that every culture has its own world view and moral behaviour in

accordance with that world view. Of course how one arrives at some world view and

specific moral virtues in any given society is something which can not be solved

categorically. But it is reasonable to expect that virtues would be based on the values that

any society prizes.

It is also important to understand that while ethical issues will arise wherever

humans exist as a community, it is not necessary nor may it be possible to have an

overarching moral philosophical theory to explain every single ethical behaviour. The

task that Vyasa sets himself to do as a pragmatist in the MBh was to depict human

characters who though tutored in normative ethical behaviour still deviated in many ways

due to other pressures. In a sense Vyasa was presenting to us the moral dilemmas we all

face as humans in real life situations.

In India moral behaviour was itself viewed as part of a holistic approach to life.

It was based on some basic rules of conduct and much like the religion developed along

with the development of society itself. “Do unto others as you would like to be dealt

with” (Krishan in Matilal, 1989: 55) was perhaps the guiding principle in general and a
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number of rules also gradually came into being based on the concepts of rta and dharma.

If Aristotle in Greek philosophy based his ethics on what are called the Virtues, in India

right from the time of the Vedas, there was an emphasis of maintaining cosmic order by

behaving in a certain moral way. In other words Vedic culture believed that there was a

symbiotic relationship between how humans behaved in order to maintain the

physiological and moral order called rta in the universe. At many places the MBh also

makes this connection of the conduct of the good bringing back the world to its virtuous

path when it has fallen from dharma ( XIV. 18, 15-21). This world view is again hinted at

in literature. When Duṣyanta, for instance, in the Abhijñānaśākuntalam, wonders whether

his behaviour has resulted in upsetting the natural balance in the āśrama surroundings

(Śakuntalā, V.9)1, Kālidāsa is indeed pointing to the way that dhārmic behaviour and

cosmic order were closely entwined within society.

While r̥ta was the overruling principle during Vedic times the very looseness of

the definition of what constitutes r̥ta allowed for its development in different directions in

subsequent periods, keeping pace with the cultural development of its people (Rukmani

in Sherma, 2008: 152). Thus by the time of the MBh it is dharma that stands supreme as

the principle of stability and harmony both in a physiological and moral sense. Moreover,

dhārmic behaviour not only helped an individual in the realization of a soteriological goal

but was also necessary to maintain social order.

When we look at the many sidedness of the dhārmic principle as depicted in the

Dharmasūtras, Smr̥its and the epics, we find that it covers many aspects of the life of an

individual both as an individual and as a community member. Dharma then can be

viewed in two ways. One as a general set of basic principles that humans had to cultivate
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in order to live in peace with each other in society. At a miminum this meant that humans

were supposed to observe certain decent ethical (dhārmic) virtues to enable maintenance

of order in society. But gradually as society progressed many more dhārmic ideas came

into being and they got crystallized into various specific categories under the broad

canopy of dharma. If one can view Dharma as the major set regulating one’s conduct,

we can then consider the others like the pañcayajñas2, the varṇa and āśrama dharmas

(svadharmas), the four puruṣārthas, sādhāraṇa-dharmas 3 etc., etc., as subsets under the

Dharma umbrella.

Sādhāraṇa-dharmas came to be gradually known as five i.e ahiṃsā, satya,

asteya, brahmacarya and aparigraha. The MBh, however, mentions the sādhāraṇa-

dharmas in many places which sometimes agrees with the above five and at times

mentions many others as well. Thus abstinence from violence towards all living beings,

contentment, good conduct, straightforwardness, austerity, self control, truthfulness and

charitable acts are mentioned in one place as equivalent to sacrifices themselves

(XIV.90,120). Which dhārmic principle would determine an individual’s ethical

behaviour at a particular point would thus depend on a number of factors. That dharma

can never be fully understood is a refrain throughout the MBh (II. 69.14; XIV. 49.13) It

isn’t as if humans do not know the difference between right and wrong but as put in the

mouth of Dhr̥tarāṣtra, in spite of knowing the difference between what is right and wrong

they find it difficult to take the right decision. Thus Dhr̥tarāṣtra laments his inability to

follow dharma even if he is aware of it and also desist from adharma knowing fully well

its adhārmic nature4. However the MBh also states that an adhārmic behaviour as
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exemplified by Duryodhana’s life, was bound for destruction while its opposite was

bound to be rewarded 5.

The MBh also recognizes the four human aspirations known as the four

puruṣārthas with the caveat that all aspirations had to be regulated by the notion of

dharma. There are numerous occasions in the MBh when undue attachment to kāma also

called tr̥ṣṇā resulted in destruction. It is interesting to note that when Yudhiṣṭhira was

asked why Draupadī had fallen on the wayside in the Mahāprasthānika-parvan he

mentions her secret attachment or kāma for Arjuna as the reason for her fall (XVII. 2.6).

In a local version of this story there is mention of Draupadī’s secret longing for Karṇa as

the reason for this plight. Regulation by dharma is a warning to integrate one’s human

nature with a sound sense of what is right and what is wrong. It is not against artha and

kāma; thus it asserts that it is in their combination that society can function smoothly.

Apart from the dharmas given sanction during normal times the MBh also includes a

category known as āpaddharma or dharma for abnormal times which was used to explain

abnormal behaviour (Rukmani, 2005:). Yudhiṣṭhira’s consent to pronounce Aśvatthāma

dead in the hearing of Droṇa though untrue can be covered under this umbrella.

One can naturally ask the question that given so many different kinds of dharma

from which one could choose, whether there were any guidelines as to how to act

dhārmically in any situation. The simple answer to that question is, as mentioned above,

that there were some general guidelines like honesty etc., which were available as to how

a human being should behave, along with more specific forms of dharma like sva-

dharma, kula-dharma etc. P.V.Kane has discussed the many sidedness of Dharma in his

monumental volumes on the History of Dharmaśāstra. The Dharmasūtras and

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Dharmaśāstras mention that “the authority (for the dharmas) is the consensus of those

that know dharma and the Vedas” (Kane, Vol.I:6). The Manusmr̥ti (MS) and

Yājñavalkyasmr̥ti (YS) elaborate these rules and the YS mentions that “The Veda,

traditional lore, the usages of good men, what is agreeable to one’s self and desire born of

deliberation-that is traditionally recognized as the source of dharma”(Kane, ibid).

In Kane’s words: “Know Dharma to be that which is practiced by the learned that lead a

moral life, that are free from hatred and partiality, and that is accepted by their hearts

(conscience)” Kane, Vol. I:5). In II.16 Manu elaborates the same concept of acceptance

by the heart as ‘pleasing to oneself’. All these point to the fact that a lot of time was spent

in providing sources for moral behaviour in the tradition.

Since there was no one way of defining dharma we come across many ‘situational

dharmas’ in the MBh as Matilal calls them, when characters decide after due

consideration what is the best dharmic behaviour in a particular situation

(Matilal,1989:9-10). If Arjuna chooses eventually, under Krishna’s advice to fight the

war as opposed to withdrawing from the battle, he had chosen to act in accordance with

his varna dharma as opposed to the sadharana-dharma of following ahimsa or even

kuladharma which would protect his own lineage. There are many such situations in the

MBh where one has to figure out why a particular line of action was chosen even when

on the surface it might appear to be flawed. By placing characters like Bhisma,

Yudhisthira, Drona and even Sri Krishna in difficult situations, Vyasa seems to

emphasize the fact that life is not a straightforward path of dharma but one where

dharma befitting the occasion has to be decided based on a lifelong commitment to

dharma. No wonder discussion about the behaviour of some of the main characters in the
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MBh has been and continues to be the subject of wide ranging debate both amongst

scholars and others to the present day.

The above introduction should have made it clear that it is not possible to analyse

the behaviour of the MBh characters under a single western theoretical framework as is

sometimes attempted (Agrawal in Matilal, 1989:129-142). Western theories are mainly

theoretical constructions and they are not aimed as guide posts for humans placed in

particular situations. They are about the ideal possible human behaviour. It is much like

western philosophy which is also more concerned with theory rather than practice as

opposed to Indian philosophy (darsanas) which is oriented towards a goal and provides

guidance to lead one’s life. To my mind therefore, the ethical issues in the MBh cannot

be analysed in terms of western theories and there is also no need to do so. Let us now

look at some characters in the MBh starting with Satyavati.

Satyavati

Satyavati was an independent woman helping her father with his job. Before meeting

Bhisma’s father Satyavati dealt with Parasara’s infatuation with her and she made sure

that her virginity would be protected even when she was violated Thus we see that

societal pressure can trump ethical decisions. However in the case of the dealings with

Santanu she let her father take all the decisions but we have to assume that everything

was done with her knowledge and approval. When Satyavati’s father extracts the promise

of her offspring inheriting the kingdom of the Kurus that was definitely not acting in a

dharmic way. This was sheer selfish interest protecting presumably her motherly

aspirations and her future security, but it does not fit the definition of dharma and the

desire was also not regulated by dharma. In fact his words “those who have a daughter
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must say this” (I.100.90) points to a woman’s motherly instincts and if we are charitable,

he could be forgiven for that. Given the position of women in those days one might even

condone the father’s behaviour as he was only assuring a secure position for his daughter

in the royal household for after all she was of low birth and anything could go wrong. But

can the further desire for Bhisma’s offspring also to be deprived of the kingdom, be

considered a dharma attitude. Even if the immediate security of Satyavati and her

offspring was taken care of to further demand Bhisma’s offspring to be denied any place

in the future of the kingdom was an utterly selfish act without any care for the future of

Hastinapura. In any case for all practical purposes since Bhisma was the regent looking

after the kingdom it also did not make sense (Chatterjee in Rukmani 2005).

The entire conversation between Satyavati’s father and Bhisma uses the word

dharma to apply to the father only once and it seems that Vyasa is pointing to the purely

selfish behaviour of the father and daughter in this context. One even gets the feeling that

Vyasa is already predicting that such an adharmic action is bound to go awry as it was an

act of kama or greed not regulated by dharma at all. So the whole start of the MBh had a

ring of adharma to it and what subsequently happened could be attributed to the false

adharmic start of the whole history of the Kauravas. Even the way that Santanu,

Bhisma’s father, covered up the reason for his dejection did not do justice to him as well.

Instead of acknowledging his desire for Satyavati he made it appear as if he was worried

about the future of Hastinapura in case Devavrata were to die in battle or elsewhere

(I.100.64-71). He could not be accused of not knowing what dharma is and he was again

carried away by kama and that too kama unregulated by dharma. That the whole episode

was utterly selfish is revealed when Satyavati faced with the prospects of not having any
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heir to the throne after the deaths of her sons Vichitravirya and Citrangada requests

Bhisma to produce children by niyoga. It is Bhisma who refuses bound by his promise

while Satyavati uses the dharmic belief that one’s ancestors would suffer if not

propitiated by male descendants to force Bhisma to accede to her request. This sensitivity

to dharma was totally absent in her previous consent to the conditions imposed by her

father.

Bhisma

Bhisma meets Satyavati’s father to ask for her to marry his father. This is in itself a

reversal of convention when normally it is the father of the boy who approaches the girl’s

father to ask for her in marriage. In his meeting with Satyavati’s father Bhisma does not

measure up to our expectations and disappoints miserably. Without reflecting on the

consequences of his action Bhisma agrees to a number of promises just so that Satyavati

can marry Santanu. If dharma is equated with ‘truth’ as we are told on many occasions in

the MBh, in the encounter between Bhisma and Satyavati’s father there seems to be a

stress on ‘promise keeping’ and a confusion between keeping a promise rather than the

maintenance of truth. In fact the word ‘pratijna’ stands for a promise and that is what is

used in this context (I.100.91). Satya which stands for truth per se is missing in the

exchange between Satyavati’s father and Bhisma. Bhisma equated his promise keeping

as truth and was clouded in his judgment and allowed “his love for his father [to]

completely engulf his moral judgments (Chatterjee in Rukmani 2005:150). In fact a

wiser Bhisma later says in the Santiparvan that if ‘falsehood appears as truth it must be

avoided and if truth appears as untruth it must also be avoided.” More importantly he

says that if truth is associated with adharma it is not to be spoken. (XII.109. 2-3). One
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does not make a promise without due consideration for the consequences of that promise

specially by a person of the caliber of Bhisma. His subsequent behaviour of silent

suffering during Draupadi’s insult in Dhrtarashtra’s court was again due to a misguided

loyalty to his father’s lineage. Since he had relinquished the throne through his promise

he probably interpreted that to mean that he had no right to interfere in the decisions

being taken at the court as well. He again took refuge in his keeping a promise in spite of

the travesty of justice that was being enacted in the court of Dhrtarastra. He interpreted

his loyalty to mean that he could not turn against those whose salt he had eaten.

The behaviour of Bhisma who is supposed to know the difference between

dharma and adharma, sitting quietly in Dhrtarashtra’s court at the time when Draupadi

was dragged into the assembly with the object of disrobing her is indeed shocking. If

Bhisma could walk out of the court in protest when Duryodhana proposed making

Krishna a prisoner when he arrived as an ambassador to the Kaurava court (V.88, 13-14

& 23), one fails to understand why he sat quietly during the shameful incident of

Draupadi’s insult. Bhisma did have the option to act according to reason and his

conscience as permitted by Manu, and it could have been exercised in this context. But

Bhisma lost his sense of reason and could not see beyond his ‘promise keeping nose’ and

lost an opportunity to redeem his character.

One wonders whether it was just his promise keeping that prevented Bhisma

from doing the right thing. It could be that he was convinced that the husband had full

authority over the wife and that clouded his judgment. Thus first of all in answer to

Draupadi’s question, he points out the subtlety of dharma but is also emphatic of the

control of the wife by her husband (II. 67.47-48). Thus as far as Draupadi is concerned
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she is not independent to question the action of Yudhisthira in his view and he thus bows

down to societal convention. Secondly Vikarna pointed out that Draupadi being the wife

of all the five Pandavas Yudhisthira had no right to take a decision unilaterally in this

regard (II. 68.23)). This was an opportunity for the other Pandavas to speak on

Draupadi’s behalf. But none of them did so apart from hinting at Yudhisthira’s lack of

authority to do so without any positive denial of his authority. The convention of a wife

being under the control of her husband was still very strong in society for a single voice

of Draupadi to shake it. Lacking the courage to take a stand even Bhisma resorts to

obfuscating the issue by pointing out to the subtle nature of dharma.

Sitanshu Chakravarti talks about the changing values during MBh times and how

Bhisma was stuck in the groove of old world values while the world itself had moved on

(2006). Similarly James Fitzerald talks about the “the historical shift from the ritual ethics

of deeds to the newer yoga-ethics of refining oneself” (Rukmani in SSEASR 2007: 81).

That there is a shift in the values is evident from the MBh itself. Thus one sees the

attempt to accommodate seriously non-violence (ahimsa), a vegetarian diet, non-greed,

truth and niskama-karma as new values along with Vedic sacrifices in society which is a

reflection of the post Mauryan period in which the MBh was presumably composed. In

Bhisma’s old world view the wife is subordinate to the husband pace Manu, loyalty to

one’s employer who provides bread and butter is unquestionable and promise-keeping or

one’s word once uttered cannot be changed. There was a rigidity and an inflexibility to

make changes within oneself in the old world order. Subordination to the authority of the

eldest brother also played a part in the hesitant attitude displayed by the Pandavas

(II.68.8) and by Bhisma in particular during this incident. All these qualities are evident
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in Bhisma’s as well as in the Pandavas’ behaviour at the time of the insult to Draupadi in

the court of Dhrtarastra after the dice game.

Kunti

If the story of the MBh could not have proceeded without Satyavati the matron of the

Kaurava branch of the Kuru clan, Kunti as the matriarch of the Pandava branch was

equally important for the progress of the story. Kunti’s story is pathetic from start to

finish. She gives birth by all accounts to an illegitimate child by Surya, (Karna), and had

to abandon him by letting him float on a river much like what happens even nowadays

with the abandonment of illegitimate children. The birth was made possible through the

efficacy of the mantra that Durvasas gave her, pleased with the way she looked after him

as a guest in her father’s palace.

Kunti’s behaviour has been discussed in a moral context, but the question of

whether it was ethical for Durvasas to give Kunti the mantra to enable her to conceive

has not been generally raised. After all a rishi of the caliber of Durvasas should have

known how his boon could corrupt a young girl’s mind. If indeed he did have ascetic

powers as is claimed, he should have been able to foresee what would be the

consequences of his giving this boon to Kunti in the first place. In fact Kunti herself

mentions how her curiosity to test the efficacy of the mantra and her anxiety to avoid

censure both to herself and her family made her take recourse to this extreme step

(V. 141,4; 144.20-24). So was Kunti wrong in satisfying her adolescent curiosity or was

Durvasas to be faulted for giving Kunti the mantra in the first place. Knowing fully well

the heavy price that society placed on virginity in women till the time of marriage, by all

accounts Durvasas cannot be excused for giving her this mantra. Durvasas has to share a
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large part of the blame for this predicament. Ethical conduct that is constrained by

societal pressures is very much a fact in everyday life. It is the fear of censure of an

unwed mother giving birth to a child that compels Kunti to abandon her new born child

and Durvasas cannot be absolved of his part in this situation.

Later when Kunti approaches Karna before the battle to appeal to him to change

sides Karna taunts her by saying that even an enemy would not have harmed him as much

as Kunti did by abandoning him. He further points out that she had not behaved towards

him as a mother should and it was only because she was afraid that the Pandavas would

be defeated by him in battle that she was approaching him now (V. 146. 6-8). Was this a

fair criticism of Kunti. Keeping the conventional norms of society it would be difficult

for Kunti to have nurtured Karna herself. Here is a moral dilemma which was won by

societal convention. This is brought out clearly when even at this juncture both Kunti and

Sri Krsna do not reveal the identity of Karna to the wider world but only to Karna

himself. It is mentioned that Karna did not want his identity revealed to the Pandavas

themselves as Yudhisthira would then give up his claim to the throne in favour of Karna

(V. 141, 20-21). The message of the MBh is also to bring to our attention that societal

pressures can make humans behave in unnatural ways and so maybe a caution to respect

those conventions or pay the price for the lapses. After all many such situations do arise

in the everyday world even today forcing one very often to bow down to societal

pressure. It is a rare courageous individual who can stand up to collective societal

pressure even today.

Karna
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We may count Duryodhana and Karna amongst the many anti heroes in the MBh. Karna

is remembered primarily for his loyalty to his foster parents and to the Kauravas,

Duryodhana in particular (V. 141. 6-15). He stuck to his loyalty to Duryodhana in spite of

both Krishna’s and Kunti’s appeal to him to shift sides and go back to his biological

brothers’ side. He refused in strong terms questioning Kunti’s past indifference and

contrasting it with her present interest. Karna thus exercises the condition of being true to

one’s own conscience mentioned by the smritikaras like Manu and Yajnavalkya. His

generosity is legendary. Who would give away the golden earrings and protective armour

with which he was born knowing fully well that without those he was vulnerable and can

be killed. Yet that is precisely what he did when Indra appeared before him and asked for

his most precious possessions. When one thinks of Karna these ethical virtues of loyalty,

gratitude and generosity are what come to the forefront. However we have to question

whether Karna indeed acted in accordance with dharma at all times. In spite of the

glowing picture of Karna, there is another side of Karna which is presented in the MBh.

At the time of the undressing of Draupadi in the court after the dice game one sees

Karna at his worst laughing vociferously when Draupadi was insulted in the open court

(II.64.44). In fact it is Karna who applauded when Draupadi was called a slave repeatedly

by Duhshasana (ibid. 67.45; V.29,43) and was the one who also ordered the undressing of

all the Pandavas and Draupadi as well ( II. 68.38). He is the one who admonished

Vikarna who stood up for Draupadi in the court (II. 68. 28-38). Time and again Karna is

represented as being Duryodhana’s partner in crime and goading him on to take on the

Pandavas in battle ( V.49, 35-36; 93. 9). Duryodhana always harboured the insults he was

subjected to when he was laughed at and made fun of by the Pandavas as well as by
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Draupadi when he was at Khandavaprastha for Yudhisthira’s Rajasuya sacrifice ( II.50

29-35). This in turn led to the dice game and it is there that one sees Karna’s behaviour at

its very worst. He excelled Duryodhana in his hatred for the Pandavas by abetting the evil

deeds of Duryodhana in many ways. Karna is thus presented by Vyasa as a complex

personality and suggesting perhaps, in some ways, that within each of us there is in some

sense this Karna with some flaw/flaws in our characters that shows up in spite of one’s

best efforts to suppress it. It is easier to identify ourselves with Karna unlike with a

person like Yudhisthira who is full of dharma and makes it difficult to emulate him.

Karna is a “flawed hero” like most humans who, in spite of the best efforts, sometimes

give in to human limitations.

Yudhisthira

Vyasa also presents an ideal dharmic person in Yudhisthira much like Rama of the

Ramayana. In some respects Yudhisthira even excels Rama in his strict adherence to

truth as I have written elsewhere (Rukmani, 2005). He measures up to the highest

standard of dharma when he requests the yaksa in the Yaksa-prasna narrative to restore

to life Nakula instead of Bhima or Arjuna. When the yaksa questions him about this

choice he says that since one of Kunti’s sons (himself) was alive it was but fair for one of

Madri’s sons to survive (Rukmani, 2005:180). The Yaksa was so pleased with that reply

that he allowed all the brothers to come alive. Yudhisthira here was the epitome of total

unselfishness and an embodiment of dharma. This characteristic also comes alive in the

last Swargarohanaparvan when he refuses to abandon the dog that followed him

throughout his journey to the end.

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If we now have to ponder on how the MBh handles ethical issues there is no easy

answer at all. Matilal talks about a certain malleability in the application of our practical

wisdom and compares it to the MBh dharma-ethics (Ganeri: 33). However that “does not

mean that the fixity and universality of ethical laws will be entirely negotiable”

(Ganeri:33). There were guidelines provided by varnasrama-dharmas and sadharana-

dharmas and each one had to choose his/her dharma. But there was an unwritten

convention that ‘dharma alone saves while adharma leads one to ruin’ within which one

had the freedom to act within the canopy of dharma 5. We can compare dharma ethics to

the freedom of speech and freedom to seek one’s own destiny enshrined in many

democratic constitutions today. While one has the freedom of speech one needs to

remember that it is automatically circumscribed by the freedom of the others as well to

the same right.

Thus dharma is a double edged sword. Even while negotiating the best dharmic

path in a given situation one needs to also take into consideration the basic dharma of

preserving the other’s right to dharma as well. It is because of his concern for the other

person at all times that we find Yudhisthira depicted as the most dharmic person in the

MBh. There is a reason that he is known as the son of Dharma and it is a metaphor for

Yudhisthira being an embodiment of dharma itself. Thus while the best exemplar of

dharmic/ethical conduct in the MBh is Yudhisthira himself it is the other characters who

in their struggles while coping in the world represent the many sidedness of virtue and

vice in this great epic. The MBh’s hope is that a person will gain in wisdom and

experience as he negotiates life’s vicissitudes and may gain an insight into dharma as

well. Thus while Bhisma was rigid in his promise-keeping vow in his early days he talks
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about truth and its various dimensions when he lies on his bed of arrows advising

Yudhisthira on the intricacies of truth. So also while Yudhisthira would not budge from

truth in his earlier days when it came to winning the dharma-yuddha’ he reluctantly

agreed to tell a half truth of Asvatthama the elephant being killed in Drona’s hearing.

When Vyasa laments at the end of his work stating: “With uplifted arms I cry

aloud but no one hears me. Both artha and kama proceed from Dharma. So why is it that

Dharma is not followed”. (XIII.5.62) 6 he acknowledges the fact that it is difficult to

stick to the text book definition of dharma. The only answer to that question is also

provided by Vyasa himself when he says that the truth of dharma is hidden in the cave 7.

The MBh seems to hold the view that if tutored in the high value of upholding dharma,

the agent when faced with ethical issues will be able to make the best choice under the

given circumstances even though (as stated above) it may not necessarily be in

accordance with the text book definition.

References

Agrawal M.M. “Arjuna’s Moral Predicament” pp. 129-142 in Matilal B.K. (Ed) Moral

Dilemmas in the Mahabharata” (1989), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass

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11
Dusyanta wonders whether the reason for the visit is (1) due to obstacles to the practice of austerities of the asramites,
or (2) whether the asrama animals have been hurt by someone, or (3)whether the growth of the trees in the asrama
sourroundings has been affected because of his own wrong doings. The third doubt literally connects the king’s own
behaviour to the general prosperity of the kingdom.
22
These are called sacrifices (yajnas) and are brahma-yajna, deva-yajna, pitr-yajna, manusya-yajna and bhuta-yajna.
3
Came to be enumerated as five (ahimsa, satya, asteya, brahmacarya and aparigraha) though in many places in the MBh
they are mentioned as more than five and also not always the same.
4
janami dharmam na ca me pravrttih, janami adharmam na ca me nivrttih (I now what is dharma but I do not follow it, I
know what is adharma but I cannot desist from it), This verse though generally believed to be uttered by Dhrtarastra is not
found in the MBh but it is in the Pancadasi of Madhavacarya which was pointed out to me by Prof. G.C.Tripathi.
5
Dharmo raksati raksatah
5
6
Urdhvabahur-viraumyesa na ca kascit srnoti me, dharmadarthasca kamasca sa kimartham na sevyate
7
Dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhayam