SUCCESSION

Cases for Reading

1. Perez v Tolete
2. Avena v Garcia, 42 Phil 145
3. Estate of Tampoy v Alberastine, L-14322, Feb. 25, 1960
4. Re Andrada, 42 Phil 180
5. Singson v Florentino, L-4603, Oct. 25, 1952
6. Diaz v De Leon, 43 Phil 413
Diaz v. De Leon 
G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922

Facts:
Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the requirements
under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to him. As it was
returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse. After
sometime, he was asked by his physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will has already
been destroyed.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or
change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the
witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will
which was presented for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and
testament of testator.

7. Payad v Tolentino, 62 Phil 846

Payad v. Tolentino
G.R. No. 42258, 5 September 1936, 62 Phil 848
FACTS:

Victorio Payad filed a petition for the probate of the will of the decedent Leoncia Tolentino. This was
opposed by Aquilina Tolentino, averring that said Will was made only after the death of the testatrix.
The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the attestation clause was not in
conformity with the requirements of the law since it was not stated therein that the testatrix caused Atty.
Almario to write her name at her express direction. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Was it necessary that the attestation clause state that the testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name
at her express direction?

RULING:

The evidence of record establishes the fact the Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by Attorney Almario, placed
her thumb mark on each and every page of the questioned will and that said attorney merely wrote her
name to indicate the place where she placed said thumb mark. In other words Attorney Almario did not
sign for the testatrix. She signed by placing her thumb mark on each and every page thereof. “A statute
requiring a will to be ‘signed’ is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator’s mark. It is clear,
therefore, that it was not necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix
requested Attorney Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in question in
accordance with law.

8. Garcia v Lacuesta, 90 Phil 489

Garcia v. Lacuesta
G.R. No. L-4067, 29 November 1951, 90 Phil 489
FACTS:

Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will appears to have been signed by Atty.
Florentino Javier as he wrote the name of Antero Mercado and his name for the testatior on the will.
However, immediately after Antero Mercado’s will, Mercado himself placed an “X” mark.
The attestation clause was signed by three instrumental witnesses. Said attestation clause states that all
pages of the will were “signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the
presence of the testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.” The attestation clause however
did not indicate that Javier wrote Antero Mercado’s name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid.

HELD:

No. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty.
Florentino Javier to write the testator’s name under his express direction, as required by Section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner’s argument that such recital is unnecessary because the testator
signed the will himself using a cross mark which should be considered the same as a thumb-mark
(which has been held sufficient in past cases) is not acceptable. A cross mark is not the same as a thumb
mark, because the cross mark does not have the same trustworthiness of a thumb mark.

9. Cruz v Villasor, 54 SCRA 31

Cruz v. Villasor
G.R. No. L-32213, 26 November 1973, 54 SCRA 31
FACTS:

The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the will of Valenti Cruz. Petitioner Agapita Cruz, spouse of the
decedent, however, opposed the allowance of such will alleging that it was executed through fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. She further alleged that the instrument was executed
without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in
accordance with law. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary public before whom the
will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the
ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses
notwithstanding the fact that the notary public was one of them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid.

RULING:

NO. The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since
he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot
serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and ‘before’ means in
front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one
will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such
situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a
function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested
in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. he
would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to
minimize fraud.

10. Gan v Yap, 104 Phil 509

Gan v. Yap
104 P 509

FACTS:

Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in Manila.

Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with a petition for the
probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.
The will was not presented because Felicidad’s husband, Ildefonso, supposedly took it. What
was presented were witness accounts of relatives who knew of her intention to make a will and
allegedly saw it as well. According to the witnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to
know about it, but she had made known to her other relatives that she made a will.

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not
left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused to probate the
alleged will on account of the discrepancies arising from the facts. For one thing, it is strange
that Felicidad made her will known to so many of her relatives when she wanted to keep it a
secret and she would not have carried it in her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband
may have access to it. There was also no evidence presented that her niece was her confidant.

In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor’s evidence that
Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.

ISSUE:

1. May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen
it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
2. W/N Felicidad could have executed the holographic will.

HELD:

1. No. The will must be presented.

The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. “A person
may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.”

This is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills under Act 190,
which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be subscribed by the testator and
three credible witnesses in each and every page; such witnesses to attest to the number of
sheets used and to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the
presence of the testator and of each other. Authenticity and due execution is the dominant
requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that
purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no
opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if available. From the testimony
of such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the
genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.

With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since
as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are “entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself.”
“In the probate of a holographic will” says the New Civil Code, “it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare
that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at
least three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar
with decedent’s handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to.”

The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will, but they must be
familiar with the decedent’s handwriting. Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these
means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only
guaranty of authenticity — the testator’s handwriting — has disappeared.

The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed
will by secondary — evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet
such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly
made here. Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills? (NO)

Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic will is that it
may be lost or stolen — an implied admission that such loss or theft renders it useless.

As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the testator and by
himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the above
article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they
know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote it.
Obviously, this they can’t do unless the will itself is presented to the Court and to them.

This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo, admittedly the basis
of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the matter.(According to the Fuero, the will itself must
be compared with specimens of the testators handwriting.)

All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in
accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and signature.

Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution and
the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike
holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed.
The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is
the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental
witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the
only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to
authenticate.

In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary)
deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their whereabouts and
acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their
intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the testator they
are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not
least, they can not receive anything on account of the will.

Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only one man could
engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and
signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and
read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they
would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost — the
forger may have purposely destroyed it in an “accident” — the oppositors have no way to
expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that
the holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only one of them need be signed,
the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go
undetected.

If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature —

feasibility of forgery — would be added to the several objections to this kind of wills  listed by
Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and
teachers of Civil Law.

One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses
would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the
will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their
opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in
court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.

In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will,
we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and
inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that “clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77,
sec. 6.

2. No. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will,
we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and
inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that “clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77,
sec. 6.

11. Rodelas v Aranza

12. Molo v Molo, 90 Phil 37
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. 

Facts:

Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will
contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any
forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the
probate were his nephews and nieces.

Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of
the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the
petitioner failed to prove its due execution. 

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time.
Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They
contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and
thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: 

Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent
disallowed 1939 will

RULING: 

Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it
was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous
will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause
contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle
of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a
will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for
some reason.

13. Nuguid v Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449

Nuguid v. Nuguid
G.R. No. L-23445, 23 June 1966, 17 SCRA 449

FACTS:

Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17,
1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that
letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of
the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor is that by
the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void.

RTC ruled the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid” and dismissed the petition on the ground of

ISSUE:

Whether there is preterition

HELD:

Yes. Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited.” Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir
of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will here does not explicitly disinherit the
testatrix’s parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, “shall annul the institution of heir”.
This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of
devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance
shall also “annul the institution of heirs”, put only “insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited”, which
last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to
that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.

14. Pecson v Coronel, 45 Phil 216

FACTS:        On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
probated as the last will and testament of Dolores Coronel (testatrix) who named as
her sole heir Lorenzo Pecson, the husband of her niece. The relatives of testatrix by
consanguinity questioned the genuineness of the will on the following grounds: First,
that it was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her
estate by excluding her blood relatives; and second, that if such will was not expressed
in fact, it was due to extraneous illegal influence.
 

ISSUE:        Whether the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition
of her estate.
 

HELD:        YES. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very
strong but we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are
not rare. The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced
(compulsory) heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines
since 1989.
 

The SC held that nothing is strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her
blood relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary.
Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the most
usual and customary, still this would not be null per se.
 

“In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion
over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to
natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity
to make a will, and the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud or undue
influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable,
or unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric, as
injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate. X X X ” (40 Cyc.,
1079.)

15. Coso v Fernandez Dez, 42 Phil 596

16. Teotica v Del Val, 13 SCRA 406

Teotico v. Del Val

G.R. No. L-18753, 26 March 1965, 13 SCRA 406

FACTS:

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila with no ascendants
or descendants. She left properties worth P600, 000.00 and a will written in Spanish which she executed at
her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and
on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of three witnesses who in turn affixed their
signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before a Notary Public by the
testatrix and her witnesses.

In said will Maria stated among others that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that
she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any
influence of fear or threat and that she freely and spontaneously executed said will.

She left P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to her niece named Josefina Mortera; and the usufruct of
her interest in the Calvo building to the said spouses. However, the naked ownership of the building was left
in equal parts to the legitimate children of said spouses. She also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

Thereafter, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. However, Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister
of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same
testatrix.

ISSUES:

(1) WON oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding;

(2) WON the will in question been duly admitted to probate;

(3) WON the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and
in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of
Dr. Rene Teotico;
HELD:

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate
either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will,
because nowhere in the will was any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of
the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim
against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.

Additionally, if the will is denied probate, she would not acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left
by the testatrix. She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not
under our Civil Code. It is true that she claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose and also an
adopted daughter of Francisca. But the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of Maria
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her
natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;”

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this
probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

On the secon issue, the claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of
record. The will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence.

Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina and her husband Rene had the opportunity to exert pressure on the
testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she
was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years
prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified in court. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be
of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and
make her express the will of another rather than her own

On the third issue, the question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions. In Castañeda v. Alemany, the
Court had stated, thus:
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and
can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions
made in the will. It canno decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the
legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of
its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not
given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this
proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of
some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.