Woodchild Holdings v. Roxas Electric G.R. No.
140667, August 12,
2004
Woodchild Holdings v. Roxas Electric
G.R. No. 140667, August 12, 2004
Corporation Law Case Digest by John Paul C. Ladiao (15 March 2016)
(Topic: Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction)
FACTS:
The respondent Roxas Electric and Construction Company, Inc. (RECCI), , was the owner of two
parcels of land, identified as Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
78085 and Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 covered by TCT No. 78086. A portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 which
abutted Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 was a dirt road accessing to the Sumulong Highway, Antipolo, Rizal.
At a special meeting on May 17, 1991, the respondent's Board of Directors approved a
resolution authorizing the corporation, through its president, Roberto B. Roxas, to sell the Lots,
at a price and under such terms and conditions which he deemed most reasonable and
advantageous to the corporation; and to execute, sign and deliver the pertinent sales
documents and receive the proceeds of the sale for and on behalf of the company.
Petitioner Woodchild Holdings, Inc. (WHI) wanted to buy the Lot on which it planned to construct
its warehouse building, and a portion of the adjoining lot, so that its 45-foot container van would
be able to readily enter or leave the property.
On September 5, 1991, a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of WHI was issued, under which the
Lot was sold for P5,000,000, receipt of which was acknowledged by Roxas under the following
terms and conditions:
The Vendor agree (sic), as it hereby agrees and binds itself to give Vendee the beneficial use of
and a right of way from Sumulong Highway to the property herein conveyed consists of 25
square meters wide to be used as the latter's egress from and ingress to and an additional 25
square meters in the corner of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1, as turning and/or maneuvering area for
Vendee's vehicles.
The Vendor agrees that in the event that the right of way is insufficient for the Vendee's use (ex
entry of a 45-foot container) the Vendor agrees to sell additional square meters from its current
adjacent property to allow the Vendee full access and full use of the property.
WHI complained to Roberto Roxas that the vehicles of RECCI were parked on a portion of
the property over which WHI had been granted a right of way. Roxas promised to look into the
matter. Dy and Roxas discussed the need of the WHI to buy a 500-square-meter portion of Lot No.
491-A-3-B-1 covered by TCT No. 78085 as provided for in the deed of absolute sale. However,
Roxas died soon thereafter. On April 15, 1992, the WHI wrote the RECCI, reiterating its verbal
requests to purchase a portion of the said lot as provided for in the deed of absolute sale, and
complained about the latter’s failure to eject the squatters within the three-month period agreed upon
in the said deed.
The WHI demanded that the RECCI sell a portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1. There was no response.
the respondent posits that Roxas was not so authorized under the May 17, 1991 Resolution of
its Board of Directors to impose a burden or to grant a right of way in favor of the petitioner on
Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1, much less convey a portion thereof to the petitioner. Hence, the
respondent was not bound by such provisions contained in the deed of absolute sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is bound by the provisions in the deed of absolute sale granting
to the petitioner beneficial use and a right of way over a portion of Lot accessing to the
Sumulong Highway and granting the option to the petitioner to buy a portion thereof, and, if so,
whether such agreement is enforceable against the respondent?
HELD:
No.
Generally, the acts of the corporate officers within the scope of their authority are binding on the
corporation. However, under Article 1910 of the New Civil Code, acts done by such officers
beyond the scope of their authority cannot bind the corporation unless it has ratified such acts
expressly or tacitly, or is estopped from denying them.
Thus, contracts entered into by corporate officers beyond the scope of authority are
unenforceable against the corporation unless ratified by the corporation.
Evidently, Roxas was not specifically authorized under the said resolution to grant a right of way
in favor of the petitioner on a portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 or to agree to sell to the petitioner a
portion thereof. The authority of Roxas, under the resolution, to sell Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2
covered by TCT No. 78086 did not include the authority to sell a portion of the adjacent lot, Lot
No. 491-A-3-B-1, or to create or convey real rights thereon. Neither may such authority be
implied from the authority granted to Roxas to sell Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 to the petitioner "on
such terms and conditions which he deems most reasonable and advantageous."
The general rule is that the power of attorney must be pursued within legal strictures, and the
agent can neither go beyond it; nor beside it. The act done must be legally identical with that
authorized to be done.30 In sum, then, the consent of the respondent to the assailed provisions
in the deed of absolute sale was not obtained; THEREFORE, the assailed provisions are not
binding on it.
There can be no apparent authority of an agent without acts or conduct on the part of the
principal and such acts or conduct of the principal must have been known and relied upon in
good faith and as a result of the exercise of reasonable prudence by a third person as claimant
and such must have produced a change of position to its detriment.
The apparent power of an agent is to be determined by the acts of the principal and not by the
acts of the agent.
