Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 210759 June 23, 2015

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as Chairperson1 of Bureau of Immigration and

Deportation,2 Petitioner,

vs.

HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court-Manila,
Branch 47 and JA HOON KU, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 211403

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, as the Chairperson of Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,

Petitioner,

vs.

HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 and
JAHOONKU, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 211590

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as the Chairperson of Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, Petitioner,
vs.

JA HOON KU, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is .an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns
of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and
granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the
indiscriminate filing of Amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.3

For the consideration of the Court are three consolidated petitions assailing the Orders dated 28 January
2014,4 29 January 2014,5 and 18 February 2014,6 as well as the Resolution dated 14 March 2014,7 all
issued by respondent Presiding Judge Paulino Gallegos (Judge Gallegos) of the Regional Trial Court-
Manila, Branch 47 in SP. PROC. No. 14-131282.

The records show that on 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of
Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice8 to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and
deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of
Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request9 to
petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest
and deportatio n of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien.

Meanwhile, on 1 January 2014, Ku’s visa expired.10

On 3 January 2014, Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk
to public interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711.11This finding was approved by the BI Board of
Commissioners which, on 16 January 2014, issued a Summary Deportation Order.12

On the same day, 16 January 2014, BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant
and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained.13
On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku’s passport.14

Also on 17 January 2014, Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies,
docketed as SP PROC. No. 14- 131282.15 On 22 January 2014, he also filed a Supplemental Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.16

Finding said supple mental petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Judge Gallegos, in an Order
dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo.17 On 24 January 2014, Ku filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).18 Judge Gallegos then set the hearing on the TPO on
27 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m.,19 while he set the hearing on the petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo on 29 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m.20

In the afternoon of 27 January 2014, petitioner filed his Return of the Writ.21 He was then notified that
a hearing on the TPO was held earlier in the morning and that the same was already submitted for
resolution.22

Petitioner then filed an Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of TPO on 28 January 2014.23

On 28 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of
TPO, entrusting Ku’s custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard
Gordon, and directing the Philippine National Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to
protect Ku and his immediate family.24 On 29 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the second assailed
Order directing the transfer of custody and protection of Ku to the PNP-PSPG.25 Petitioner challenged
these orders before the Court via a Petition for Certiorari26 docketed as G.R. No. 210759.

On 4 February 2014, the Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 210759 issuing a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and directing the BI
to retain custody of Ku, as well as requiring Ku to comment on the petition.27 In issuing this resolution,
the Court intimated the possibility of misuse by Ku of the writ of amparo given that he was validly
arrested and placed under the jurisdiction and custody of the BI; thus the case cannot be categorized as
one of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance.28

Owing to the Court’s Resolution dated 4 February 2014, in the hearing set on 11 February 2014 before
the trial court, petitioner verbally moved for the dismissal of the amparo petition.29On 18 February
2014, however, Judge Gallegos issued the third assailed order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit.30Thus, petitioner appealed the matter to the Court via the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition31 docketed as G.R. No. 211403.
On 25 February 2014, Ku filed an appeal memorandum on his deportation order addressed to the Office
of the President (OP).32

On 14 March 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the assailed Resolution granting the privilege of the writ of
amparo, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby GRANTED. [Ku] is ordered immediately
released from [petitioner’s] custody without prejudice to the institution of the proper remedy to
extradition. Moreover, the [petitioner] and/or agents are ordered to cease and desist from further
violating the right to liberty of [Ku] and the members of his family by filing cases to legitimize his
detention.33

Meanwhile, in the Resolution dated 18 March 2014 in G.R. No. 211403, the Court issued a TRO enjoining
the RTC from enforcing the Order dated 18 February 2014 and from further proceeding with the case.34

On 19 March 2014, the OP granted Ku provisional liberty only until 31 August 2014 or until his appeal
was resolved, whichever came first.35Ku then moved for the release of his passport before the RTC,
which petitioner opposed and to which he filed a counter-motion for the RTC to release said passport to
the BI, given that such was one of the conditions for the OP’s grant of provisional liberty to Ku.36 In the
Order dated 26 March 2014, however, Judge Gallegos merely noted petitioner’s motion for being moot,
considering that he already released Ku’s passport on 20 March 2014, upon the personal request of
Ku.37

Due to the complexities involved, petitioner filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No.
211590, essentially assailing the Resolution dated 14 March 2014.

Condensing the various issues raised in these petitions,38 we come to the central question of whether
or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.

We rule in the negative.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)39 provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded
power to promulgate rules to protect our people’ s constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As
the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. "Extralegal killings" are ‘killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or where about s of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law."40

This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v.
Macapagal-Arroyo41 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined
only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what
constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico42 enumerated the elements
constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information
on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time.44
As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851, the Amparo Rule is now a procedural law
anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory
definition as well of what an ‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC’s reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary
disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced
disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9851.45

Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not
come under the statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was
arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest
nor was there any refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the
BI had any intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time.

Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that he was not
read his rights under the constitution and was not informed of the reason for hi s arrest, nor provided a
copy of any document leading to his arrest and detention,46 the arresting officers are all consistent in
testifying that, upon Ku’s arrest, they introduced themselves as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the
Warrant of Deportation, and informed him of his constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his
visa.47

More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within
the Bureau, Ku’s arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were
well-documented as evidenced by the Return of Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January 201448 and
the After-Mission Report dated 17 January 2014.49

More importantly, in the Return of the Writ, petitioner readily disclosed to the trial court that Ku was in
the custody of the BI pursuant to a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order.50

These documents and pleading show that there was never any intention on the part of the BI to re move
Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time. Besides, when Ku was arrested at 9:30 p.m. on
16 January 2014, and received at the BI Detention Center at 11:30 p.m. also on 16 January 2014,51 the
following day or on 17 January 2014, Ku’s counsel was immediately able to file his Entry of Appearance
with Motion for Reconsideration before the BI,52 thereby showing that Ku’s legal rights were amply
guarded and that he was never removed from the protection of the law.
Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among which is the
right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits, to wit:

SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. – The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission,
or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of
the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long period of
time without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases against him to hold
him under detention.53

According to Ku, what he seeks to obtain in filing an amparo petition is the protection it will give to his
person against the actions of some government officials who will likely take advantage of their positions
and use the power of the government at their command. Ku adds that the longer he stays in
confinement the more he is exposed to life-threatening situations and the further the violation of his
guaranteed rights.54

The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties to
establish their claims by substantial evidence.55 Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku was
not able to present evidence that he was exposed to "life-threatening situations" while confined at the
BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he
has access to his counsel.

Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the amparo petition, was that the BI would
trump up charges against him so as to justify his detention. The fact remains, however, that even before
his arrest, deportation charges against him were already duly filed and ruled upon by the BI.

As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was
improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his
life, liberty and security were unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the
fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the
extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts
were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case
at bar.

It is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject of a Warrant of
Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order, Ku’s proper recourse is with the BI and, thereafter, with
the DOJ and the OP.56

Ku knows this and, in fact, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the BI and an Appeal before the
OP. When Ku, however, injudiciously filed a Petition and a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo, he committed forum shopping by seeking a remedy which he had already solicited from
another tribunal.

In Kiani v. BID,57 where petitioner therein file d before the trial court a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus seeking to have the detention of her husband declared as illegal and to order the latter’s release,
and where her husband filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) an omnibus
motion seeking to question the summary deportation order issued against him, the Court held that
petitioner indulged in forum shopping.
The Court clarified that under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power
to deport aliens is vested in the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due process.
The Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Thus, a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued
by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus . Conformably with ruling of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer , such party may file a motion for the
reconsideration thereof before the BOC.58

Citing Balite v. Court of Appeals,59 the Court held that there is forum shopping when a party seeks to
obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts and
other proceedings in other tribunals. While a party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of
Court, such party is not free to resort to them simultaneously or at his/her pleasure or caprice. A party
should not be allowed to present simultaneous remedies in two different forums, for it degrades and
wreaks havoc to the rule on orderly procedure. A party must follow the sequence and hierarchical order
in availing of such remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and loose with the
said rules. Forum shopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and abusing
their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice.

On a final note, the Court observes that Judge Gallegos knowingly disregarded the Court’s directives as
regards this case. The records show that the Court’s Resolution dated 4 February 2014, wherein we
issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and intimated the
impropriety of the amparo petition, was received by the RTC on 5 February 2014.60 This should have
alerted Judge Gallegos to proceed with caution and restraint in granting the privilege of the writ of
amparo. And yet, despite having knowledge of the Court’s pronouncements, Judge Gallegos proceeded
to grant the said privilege.

Also, the records show that the Court’s Resolution dated 18 March 2014, wherein we issued a TRO
enjoining the enforcement of the Order dated 18 February 2014 and enjoining the RTC from further
proceeding with the case, was received by the RTC on 20 March 2014 at 9:00 a.m.61

Although by then, Judge Gallegos already issued the Resolution dated 14 March 2014 which granted the
privilege of the writ of amparo, his receipt of the Court’s Resolution dated 18 Marc h 2014 should have
forewarned him against releasing Ku’s passport. That he did so demonstrates his resistance and
unwillingness to follow the Court’s edicts.

It is well to note that a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and
should be complied with promptly and completely.1âwphi1 Such failure to comply accordingly betrays
not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but al so disrespect for the Court’s lawful order and
directive.62
Judge Gallegos should know that judges must respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals,
especially the Supreme Court from which all other courts take their bearings. A resolution of the
Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere request nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately or selectively.63

In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The exacting standards of
conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is
sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.64

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:

a) GRANT the present petitions, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated 14 March 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court which granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;

b) DENY the privilege of the Writ of Amparo sought via the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo
and the Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo in SP. PROC.No. 14131282 before the
Regional Trial of Manila, Branch 47; and

c) DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to file the appropriate administrative charge/s against
Judge Paulino Q. Gallegos in accordance with the tenor of this Decision, and to forthwith submit to the
Court its report and recommendation thereon.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice (On Leave)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice (On leave)

ARTURO D. BRION*

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

MARIANO C DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

(No Part)

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA**

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 He is the Commissioner of the Bureau, thus he is also the Chairperson of the Board of Commissioners
of the Bureau.

2 Executive Order No. 292 (1987) renamed the office "Bureau of immigration."

* On Leave.

** No part.

3 Padorv. Arcayan, G.R. No. 183460, 12 March 2013, 693 SCRA 192, 199-200.

4 Rollo (G.R. No. 210759), pp. 152-154.

5 Rollo (G.R. No. 211403), pp. 79-80.

6 Id. at. 46-47.

7 Rollo (G.R. No. 211590), pp. 55-79.

8 Rollo (G.R. No. 210759), p. 87.

9 Id. at 88.

10 Id. at 233; Comment/Opposition (to the Petition for Review on Certiorari).

11 Id. at 101; Charge Sheet.

12 Id. at102.

13 Id at 107-108; After-Mission Report dated 17 January 2014.

14 Rollo (G.R. No. 211590), p. 289; Certification issued by the Embassy of the Republic of Korea dated 3
February 2014.

15 Rollo (G.R. No. 210759), pp. 48-54.

16 Id. at 55.

17 Id. at 65.

18 Id. at 45-47.

19 Id. at 69; Order dated 24 January 2014.

20 Id. at 66-67; Order dated 22 January 2014.

21 Id. at 70-80.

22 Id. at 11; Petition for Certiorari.

23 Id. at 38-44.

24 Id. at 34-35.

25 Id. at 37.

26 Id. at 3-52.

27 Id. at 155-160; Resolution dated 4 February 2014.

28 Rollo (G.R. No. 211403), p. 219; Resolution dated 18 March 2014.

29 Id. at 46; Order dated 18 February 2014.

30 Id. at 47.

31 Id. at 7-43.

32 Id. at 254; Order dated 19 March 2014.

33 Rollo (G.R. No. 211590), p. 79.

34 Rollo (G.R. No. 211403), pp. 217-221.

35 Id. at 256.

36 Id. at 255-256.

The Order dated 19 March 2014 of the OP provides:

In view of the foregoing, BI is hereby directed to provisionally release [Ku] upon his posting of a cash
bond amounting to Fifty Thousand Dollars (US$50,000.00) and compliance with the following conditions:

1. [Ku’s] name should be included in the BI’s Hold Departure List to prevent his unauthorized departure
from the Philippines.

2. [Ku] shall surrender his passport to the BI.

3. [Ku] shall personally (physical and actual appearance) report to the BI’s intelligence Division every first
and third Monday of the month.

4. An authorized official of Iglesia ni Cristo should execute an Affidavit of Undertaking specifying that he
will absolutely be responsible for [Ku’s] custody with the duty at all time to keep [Ku] under his
surveillance. He must further state that in case respondent-appellant escapes, he cannot be relieved of
liability on his recognizance on the claim that he had not participated in nor consented to the escape.
Also, he must indicate in the undertaking that he will return the custody of [Ku] to the BI on 1
September 2014, in case the appeal is still pending resolution by this Office.

5. [Ku’s] provisional liberty is valid only until 31 August 2014 or until the Appeal is resolved, whichever
comes first, unless this Order is revoked or recalled by this Office while the case is still pending
resolution. Meanwhile, the execution of the order appealed from is stayed because of the Appeal within
the period prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 22 dated 11 October 2011.

37 Id. at 271-273; Manifestation dated 5 May 2014.

38 In G.R. No. 210759:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED
ORDERS.

A. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ISSUED THE ASSAILED ORDERS WITHOUT GIVING THE PETITIONER DUE
PROCESS.
B. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND ITS INTERIM REMEDIES HAVE A SPECIFIC OBJECT – TO PREVENT
EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES. IN THIS CASE, THE PETITION FAILED TO
PROVIDE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS.

DISCHARGE FROM CONFINEMENT IS NOT AMONG THE RELIEF COVERED BY THE WRIT OF AMPARO YET
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE NONETHELESS GRANTED THE SAME.

PRIOR TO THE JANUARY 29, 2014 HEARING, THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT PRAY FOR HIS RELEASE
TO THE PSPG, AND THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ORDER SO. WHEN PETITIONER, IN OPEN COURT,
POINTED THAT ASSUMING THE FIRST ASSAILED ORDER IS VALID, ANY TRANSFER OF CUSTODY WILL
ONLY BE UPON THIS HONORABLE COURT’S ACCREDITATION, THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ORDERED FOR
THE TRANSFER OF CUSTODY TO THE PSPG, EVEN IF IT IS NOT PART OF THE PSPG’S MANDATE TO TAKE
CUSTODY OF DETAINED UNDOCUMENTED AND UNDESIRABLE ALIENS.

THE PETITIONER IS VALIDLY DETAINED BY THE BI. HIS RELEASE IS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE
BI.

In G.R. No. 211403:

FOR CERTIORARI

I.

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS.

A. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR RESPONDENT JUDGE TO ISSUE THE WRIT OF AMPARO OR TO GRANT THE
PRIVILEGES OF THE WRIT. THE MATTER OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S DETENTION IS WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE BI AND NOW, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WHERE PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
APPEAL IS NOW PENDING.
1. THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND ITS INTERIM REMEDIES HAVE A SPECIFIC OBJECT – TO PREVENT
EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES. THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF AMPARO FAILED TO PROVIDE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THREATS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, OR SECURITY
DUE TO UNLAWFUL ACTS OF PETITIONER.

2. PETITIONER HAS RAISED THE MATTER OF LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ITS RETURN OF THE WRIT. THE
PROHIBITION IN FILING A MOTION TO DISMISS NO LONGER APPLIES.

B. THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS AFFIRMED THE LACK OF BASIS FOR RESPONDENT JUDGE TO GRANT
THE PRIVILEGES OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO.

FOR PROHIBITION

II.

RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD BE RELIEVED FROM RULING ON THE CASE.

In G.R. No. 211590:

WHETHER COUNSEL, IN A PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO, COULD SIGN THE
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING.

II.

WHETHER FORUM SHOPPING IS COMMITTED WHEN A PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO
AND AN APPLICATION FOR PROVISIONAL RELEASE PE NDING APPEAL WITH THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT ARE BOTH FILED TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE CLAIMANT.

III.
WHETHER A PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IS PROPER TO QUESTION THE LEGALITY OF
THE DETENTION OF A POTENTIAL DEPORTEE UNDER THE CUSTODY OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION.

IV.

ASSUMING A PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IS PROPER, WHETHER OR NOT A

POTENTIAL DEPORTEE COULD BE RELEASED THEREUNDER.

39 A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC.

40 Secretary of National Defense of National Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1, 37-38 (2008).

41 G.R. No. 184379-80, 24 April 2012, 670 SCRA 545.

42 688 Phil. 266, 279 (2012).

43 Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes
Against Humanity.

44 Caram v. Segui, G.R. No. 193652, 5 August 2014, 732 SCRA 86, 97.

45 Navia v. Pardico , supra note 42.

46 Rollo (G.R. No. 210759), pp. 48-53; Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.

47 Id. at 107, After-Mission Report; Id. at 111, Judicial Affidavit of Armelo B. De Castro; Id. at 117,
Judicial Affidavit of Dione D. Bustonera, Jr.

48 Id. at 89.
49 Id. at 107-108.

50 Id. at 70.

51 Id. at 107-108; After-Mission Report.

52 Id. at 103; Resolution dated 23 January 2014.

53 Id. at 49; Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo.

54 Id. at 59-60; Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo

55 Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The Parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required
by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent
public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed to evade responsibility or liability.

56 Kiani v. BID, 518 Phil. 501, 515 (2006).

57 Id. at 512.

58 Id. at 515.

59 486 Phil. 638, 650-651 (2004).

60 Rollo (G.R. No. 210759), p. 165-K

61 Rollo (G.R. No. 211403), p. 227-F.

62 Office of the Court Administrator v. Indar, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2287, 22 January 2014, 714 SCRA 381, 393
citing Falsification of Daily Time Records of Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos , 675 Phil. 459, 465 (2011).

63 Id. citing Soria v. Judge Villegas, 461 Phil. 665, 669-670 (2003).

64 Id. at 394.