FACTS:
This is an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage.
Defendant bought from plaintiffs 20 parcels of land for P235,056.. The P200,000 balance was payable
within two years from the date of sale provided that at least P100,000.00 should be paid during the first
year, otherwise the whole unpaid balance would become immediately demandable. The defendant
executed a mortgage in favor of plaintiff upon the 20 parcels of land sold and on a half interest over a
parcel of land in Bulacan which was embodied in the same deed of sale.
Defendant- buyer contends that the contract of sale does not express the true agreement of the parties
because certain important conditions agreed upon were not included therein by plaintiffs' counsel
among which is the promise assumed by plaintiffs-sellers that they would undertake to construct the
roads that may be required in the subdivision subject of the sale. The condition was not placed in the
contract because plaintiffs' counsel said that it was a superfluity inasmuch as there was then in Quezon
City an ordinance which requires the construction of roads in a subdivision before the lots therein could
be sold; and that, upon the suggestion of plaintiffs' counsel, such commitment was not included in the
contract because the ordinance aforesaid was already deemed to be part of the contract.
The Trial Court and the CA sustained the contention of defendant-buyer and dismissed the complaint on
the ground that the action of plaintiffs was premature.
The plaintiffs-sellers argued that the CA erred in allowing the presentation of parole evidence to prove
that a contemporaneous oral agreement was also reached between the parties, relative to the
construction of the roads, for the same is in violation of the rule on parole evidence.
ISSUE:
Was the oral agreement coetaneous to the execution of the contract of sale?
RULING:
YES.
The rule on parole evidence provides that when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to
writing, it is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and that no evidence other
than the terms thereof can be admitted between the parties (Section 22, Rule 123).
This rule, however, only holds true if there is no allegation that the agreement does not express the true
intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is put in issue in the pleadings, the same may be the
subject of parole evidence. The fact that such failure has been put in issue in this case is patent in the
answer wherein defendant has specifically pleaded that the contract of sale in question does not
express the true intent of the parties with regard to the construction of the roads.
It appearing that plaintiffs have failed to comply with the condition precedent relative to the
construction of the roads in the subdivision in question, it follows that their action is premature as found
by the CA.