13 Gsis PDF

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 414 02/09/2020, 2'22 PM
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 28, 2003 563

Government Service Insurance System vs. Santiago
*
G.R. No. 155206. October 28, 2003.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,

petitioner, vs. EDUARDO M. SANTIAGO, substituted by
his widow ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in

a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law.·At the outset, it
bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law. This Court is
not a trier of facts. Case law has it that the findings of the trial
court especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. Although there are exceptions to the
said rule, we find no reason to deviate therefrom. By assailing the
findings of facts of the trial court as affirmed by the CA, that it
acted in bad faith, the petitioner thereby raised questions of facts in
its petition.
Civil Law; Mortgages; Due diligence required of banks extend
even to persons, or institutions regularly engaged in the business of
lending money secured by real estate mortgages.·The Court agrees
with the findings and conclusion of the trial court and the CA. The
petitioner is not an ordinary mortgagee. It is a government
financial institution and, like banks, is expected to exercise greater
care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving
registered lands. Due diligence required of banks extend even to
persons, or institutions like the petitioner, regularly engaged in the
business of lending money secured by real estate mortgages.
Same; Reconveyance; Prescription; An action for reconveyance of
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001744d79635837948c96003600fb002c009e/p/APB056/?username=Guest Page 1 of 15
real property based on fraud prescribes in four years from the

discovery of fraud, such discovery is deemed to have taken place
upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the property; An
action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration on
date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.·On the
issue of prescription, generally, an action for reconveyance of real
property based on fraud prescribes in four years from the discovery
of fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Registration of
real property is a constructive notice to all persons and, thus, the
four-year period shall be counted therefrom. On the other hand,
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1456. If property is
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes. An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent
registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.
Same; Same; Same; Court reckoned the prescriptive period for
the filing of the action for reconveyance based on implied trust from
the actual discovery of fraud.·The petitionerÊs defense of
prescription is untenable. As held by the CA, the general rule that
the discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place upon the
registration of real property because it is „considered a constructive
notice to all persons‰ does not apply in this case. The CA correctly
cited the cases of Adille v. Court of Appeals and Samonte v. Court of
Appeals, where this Court reckoned the prescriptive period for the
filing of the action for reconveyance based on implied trust from the
actual discovery of fraud.
Same; Same; Having acted in bad faith in securing titles over
the subject lots, petitioner is a holder in bad faith of certificates of
title over the same; Petitioner is not entitled to the protection of the
law for the law cannot be used as a shield for frauds.·Following the
CourtÊs pronouncements in Adille and Samonte, the institution of
the action for reconveyance in the court a quo in 1990 was thus well
within the prescriptive period. Having acted in bad faith in securing
titles over the subject lots, the petitioner is a holder in bad faith of
certificates of title over the subject lots. The petitioner is not
entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a
shield for frauds.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Officer-in-Charge, Legal Services Group for
petitioner.
Ungco & Ungco for Escasa and Urbano.
Herminio T. Sugay for respondent Gonzales.
Jose A. Suing for respondent E. Santiago.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari

filed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
seeking to re-
565
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 28, 2003 565

1
verse and set aside the Decision dated February 22, 2002
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 62309 and
its Resolution dated September 5, 2002 denying its motion
for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the
assailed CA decision and that of the trial court, are as
follows:
Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained

various loans from defendant GSIS for (the) period September, 1956
to October, 1957 in the total amount of P3,117,000.00 secured by
real estate mortgages over parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
26105, 37177 and 50365. The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to
defendant GSIS and the latter foreclosed the real estate mortgages
dated September 25, 1956, March 6, 1957, April 4, 1957 and
October 15, 1957.
On August 14, 1974, the mortgaged properties were sold at
public auction by defendant GSIS submitting a bid price of
P5,229,927.84. Not all lots covered by the mortgaged titles,
however, were sold. Ninety-one (91) lots were expressly excluded
from the auction since the lots were sufficient to pay for all the
mortgage debts. A Certificate of Sale (Annex „F,‰ Records, Vol. I, pp.
23-28) was issued by then Provincial Sheriff Nicanor D. Salaysay.
The Certificate of Sale dated August 14, 1974 had been
annotated and inscribed in TCT Nos. 26105, 37177 and 50356, with
the following notations: „(T)he following lots which form part of this
title (TCT No. 26105) are not covered by the mortgage contract due
to sale to third parties and donation to the government: 50-H-5-C-9-
J-65-H-8, 50-H-5-C-9J-M7; 50-H-5-C-9-J-65-H-5; 1 lots Nos. 1 to 13,
Block No. 1-6,138 sq. m. 2. Lots Nos. 1 to 11, Block No. 2 -4,660 sq.
m. 3. Lot No. 15, Block No. 3 -487 sq. m. 4. Lot No. 17, Block No. 4
-263 sq. m. 5. Lot No. 1, Block No. 7 - 402 sq. m. 6. Road Lots Nos. 1,
2, 3, & 4 - 2,747 sq. m.‰
In another „NOTE: The following lots in the Antonio Subdivision
were already released by the GSIS and therefore are not included in
this sale, namely: LOT NO. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13 (Old Plan) Block
I; 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 (Old Plan) Block II; 3, 10, 12 and 13 (New
Plan) Block I (Old Plan) Block III; 7, 14 and 20 (New Plan) Block III
(Old Plan) Block V; 13 and 20 (New Plan) Block IV (Old Plan) Block
VI; 1, 2, 3 and 10 (New Plan) Block V (Old Plan) Block VII; 1, 5, 8,
15, 26 and 27 (New Plan) Block VI (Old Plan) Block VIII; 7, 12 and
20 (New Plan) Block VII (Old Plan) Block II; 1, 4 and 6 (New Plan)
Block VIII (Old Plan) Block X; 5 (New Plan) Block X (Old Plan)
Block ZXII; 6 (New Plan) Block XI (Old Plan) Block XII; 1, Block 9;
12 Block 1; 11 Block 2; 19 Block 1; 10 Block 6; 23 Block 3.‰
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño with Associate
Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Martin S. Villanueva, Jr.,

concurring.
566

And the lots on „ADDITIONAL EXCLUSION FROM PUBLIC

SALE‰ are „LOTS NO. 6 Block 4; 2 Block 2; 5 Block 5; 1, 2 and 3
Block 11, 1, 2, 3 and 4 Block 10; 5 Block 11 (New); 1 Block 3; 5 Block
1; 15 Block 7; 11 Block 9; 13 Block 5; 12 Block 5; 3 Block 10; 6.‰
On November 25, 1975, an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership (Annex „G,‰ Records, Vol. I, pp. 29-31) was executed by
defendant GSIS over ZuluetaÊs lots, including the lots, which as
earlier stated, were already excluded from the foreclosure.
On March 6, 1980, defendant GSIS sold the foreclosed properties
to Yorkstown Development Corporation which sale was disapproved
by the Office of the President of the Philippines. The sold properties
were returned to defendant GSIS.
The Register of Deeds of Rizal cancelled the land titles issued to
Yorkstown Development Corporation. On July 2, 1980, TCT No.
23552 was issued cancelling TCT No. 21926; TCT No. 23553
cancelled TCT No. 21925; and TCT No. 23554 cancelling TCT No.
21924, all in the name of defendant GSIS.
After defendant GSIS had re-acquired the properties sold to
Yorkstown Development Corporation, it began disposing the
foreclosed lots including the excluded ones.
On April 7, 1990, representative Eduardo Santiago and then
plaintiff Antonio Vic Zulueta executed an agreement whereby
Zulueta transferred all his rights and interests over the excluded
lots. Plaintiff Eduardo SantiagoÊs lawyer, Atty. Wenceslao B.
Trinidad, wrote a demand letter dated May 11, 1989 (Annex „H‰,
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 32-33) to defendant GSIS asking for the return
2
of the eighty-one (81) excluded lots.
On May 7, 1990, Antonio Vic Zulueta, represented by

Eduardo M. Santiago, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, a complaint for
reconveyance of real estate against the GSIS. Spouses Alfeo
and Nenita Escasa, Manuel III and Sylvia G. Urbano, and
Marciana P. Gonzales and the heirs of Mamerto Gonzales
moved to be included as intervenors and filed their

respective answers in intervention. Subsequently, the
petitioner, as defendant therein, filed its answer alleging
inter alia that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations and/or laches and that the complaint stated no
cause of action. Subsequently, Zulueta was substituted by
Santiago as the plaintiff in the complaint a quo. Upon the
death of Santiago on March 6, 1996, he
_______________
2 CA Decision, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 37-39.
567
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 28, 2003 567

was substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez Vda. de

Santiago, as the plaintiff.
After due trial, the RTC rendered judgment against the
petitioner ordering it to reconvey to the respondent,
Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago, in substitution of her
deceased husband Eduardo, the seventy-eight lots excluded
from the foreclosure sale. The dispositive portion of the
RTC decision reads:
„WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff

and against the defendant:
1. Ordering defendant to reconvey to plaintiff the seventy-

eight (78) lots released and excluded from the foreclosure
sale including the additional exclusion from the public sale,
namely:
a. Lot Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, Block I (Old Plan).

b. Lot Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10, Block II (Old Plan).
c. Lot Nos. 3, 10, 12, and 13, Block I (New Plan), Block III (Old
Plan).
d. Lot Nos. 7, 14 and 20, Block III (New Plan), Block V (Old
Plan).
e. Lot Nos. 13 and 20, Block IV (New Plan), Block VI (Old
Plan).
f. Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10, Block V (New Plan), Block VII (Old
Plan).
g. Lot Nos. 1, 5, 8, 15, 26 and 27, Block VI (New Plan), Block
VIII (Old Plan).
h. Lot Nos. 7 and 12, Block VII (New Plan), Block II (Old
Plan).
i. Lot Nos. 1, 4 and 6, Block VIII (New Plan), Block X (Old
Plan).
j. Lot 5, Block X (New Plan), Block XII (Old Plan),
k. Lot 6, Block XI (New Plan), Block XII (Old Plan).
l.. Lots 2, 5, 12 and 15, Block I.
m. Lots 6, 9 and 11, Block 2.
n. Lots 1, 5, 6, 7, 16 and 23, Block 3.
o. Lot 6, Block 4.
p. Lots 5, 12, 13 and 24, Block 5.
q. Lots 10 and 16, Block 6.
r. Lots 6 and 15, Block 7.
s. Lots 13, 24, 28 and 29, Block 8.
568

t. Lots 1, 11, 17 and 22, Block 9.

u. Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Block 10.
v. Lots 1, 2, 3 and 5 (New), Block 11.
2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, if the seventy-eight (78)

excluded lots could not be reconveyed, the fair market value
of each of said lots.
3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to cancel the
land titles covering the excluded lots in the name of
defendant or any of its successors-in-interest including all
derivative titles therefrom and to issue new land titles in
plaintiff Ês name.
4. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to cancel the
Notices of Lis Pendens inscribed in TCT No. PT-80342

under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554; TCT No. 81812 under
Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554; and TCT No. PT-84913 under
Entry No. PT-I2267/T-23554.
3
5. Costs of suit.‰
The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which rendered

the assailed decision affirming that of the RTC. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
„WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein appeal is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of December 17, 1997 of
Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby
4
AFFIRMED.‰
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid

decision but the same was denied in the assailed CA
Resolution of September 5, 2002.
The petitioner now comes to this Court alleging that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN RULING THAT A) PETITIONER WAS GUILTY OF
BAD FAITH WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, THERE WAS NO
SUFFICIENT GROUND TO SUPPORT SUCH CONCLUSION;
5
AND B) THERE WAS NO PRESCRIPTION IN THIS CASE.
In its petition, the petitioner maintains that it did not act

in bad faith when it erroneously included in its certificate
of sale, and subsequently consolidated the titles in its name
over the seventy-
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 36.
4 Id., at p. 44.
5 Id.,at pp. 21-22.
569
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 28, 2003 569

eight lots („subject lots‰) that were excluded from the
foreclosure sale. There was no proof of bad faith nor could

fraud or malice be attributed to the petitioner when it
erroneously caused the issuance of certificates of title over
the subject lots despite the fact that these were expressly
excluded from the foreclosure sale.
The petitioner asserts that the action for reconveyance
instituted by the respondent had already prescribed after
the lapse of ten years from November 25, 1975 when the
petitioner consolidated its ownership over the subject lots.
According to the petitioner, an action for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged
fraudulent registration of the property. In this case, when
the action was instituted on May 7, 1990, more than
fourteen years had already lapsed. Thus, the petitioner
contends that the same was already barred by prescription
as well as laches.
The petitioner likewise takes exception to the holding of
the trial court and the CA that it (the petitioner) failed to
apprise or return to the Zuluetas, the respondentÊs
predecessors-in-interest, the seventy-eight lots excluded
from the foreclosure sale because the petitioner had no
such obligation under the pertinent loan and mortgage
agreement.
The petitionerÊs arguments fail to persuade.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of
this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is limited to
reviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a trier of
facts. Case law has it that the findings of the trial court
especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. Although there are exceptions 6
to the said rule, we find no reason to deviate therefrom. By
assailing the findings of facts of the trial court as affirmed
by the CA, that it acted in bad faith, the petitioner thereby
raised questions of facts in its petition.
Nonetheless, even if we indulged the petition and delved
into the factual issues, we find the petition barren of merit.
That the petitioner acted in bad faith in consolidating
ownership and causing the issuance of titles in its name
over the subject lots, notwithstanding that these were
expressly excluded from the fore-
_______________
6 Baricuatro v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137 (2000).
570

closure sale was the uniform ruling of the trial court and
appellate court. As declared by the CA:
The acts of defendant-appellant GSIS in concealing from the

Zuluetas [the respondentÊs predecessors-in-interest] the existence of
these lots, in failing to notify or apprise the spouses Zulueta about
the excluded lots from the time it consolidated its titles on their
foreclosed properties in 1975, in failing to inform them when it
entered into a contract of sale of the foreclosed properties to
Yorkstown Development Corporation in 1980 as well as when the
said sale was revoked by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
during the same year demonstrated a clear effort on its part to
defraud the spouses Zulueta and appropriate for itself the subject
properties. Even if titles over the lots had been issued in the name
of the defendant-appellant, still it could not legally claim ownership
and absolute dominion over them because indefensibility of title
under the Torrens system does not attach to titles secured by fraud
or misrepresentation. The fraud committed by defendant-appellant
in the form of concealment of the existence of said lots and failure to
return the same to the real owners after their exclusion from the
foreclosure sale made defendant-appellant holders in bad faith. It is
well-settled that a holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not
entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a
7
shield for fraud.
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the

trial court and the CA. The petitioner is not an ordinary
mortgagee. It is a government financial institution and,
like banks, is expected to exercise greater care and
prudence in its8 dealings, including those involving
registered lands.9 The CourtÊs ruling in Rural Bank of
Compostela v. CA is apropos:
Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing
even with registered lands, than private individuals for their

business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust money
belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against loss
by not committing any act of negligence which amounts to lack of
good faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of
land registration statute, Act [No.] 496, extended only to purchasers
for value and in good faith, as well as to mortgagees of the same
10
character and description.
_______________
7 Id., at p. 42. (Citations omitted)

8 Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, 379 SCRA 490 (2002).
9 271 SCRA 76 (1997).
10 Id.,at p. 88.
571
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 28, 2003 571

Due diligence required of banks extend even to persons, or

institutions like the petitioner, regularly engaged in the
business of 11
lending money secured by real estate
mortgages.
In this case, the petitioner executed an affidavit in
consolidating its ownership and causing the issuance of
titles in its name over the subject lots despite the fact that
these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale. By
so doing, the petitioner acted in gross and evident bad
faith. It cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the subject
lots were excluded from the sale at public auction. At the
least, its act constituted gross negligence amounting to bad
faith. Further, as found by the CA, the petitionerÊs acts of
concealing the existence of these lots, its failure to return
them to the Zuluetas and even its attempt to sell them to a
third party is proof of the petitionerÊs intent to defraud the
Zuluetas and appropriate for itself the subject lots.
On the issue of prescription, generally, an action for
reconveyance of real property based on fraud prescribes in
four years from the discovery of fraud; such discovery is
deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. Registration of real

property is a constructive notice to all persons and,
12
thus,
the four-year period shall be counted therefrom. On the
other hand, Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the

person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
An action for reconveyance based on implied or

constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged
fraudulent registration or 13
date of issuance of the certificate
of title over the property.
The petitionerÊs defense of prescription is untenable. As
held by the CA, the general rule that the discovery of fraud
is deemed to have taken place upon the registration of real
property because it is „considered a constructive notice to
all persons‰ does not apply in this case. The CA correctly
cited the cases of Adille v. Court of
_______________
11 Adriano v. Pangilinan, 373 SCRA 544 (2002).

12 Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Fernandez, 358 SCRA 489
(2001).
13 Ibid.
572

14 15
Appeals and Samonte v. Court of Appeals, where this
Court reckoned the prescriptive period for the filing of the
action for reconveyance based on implied trust from the
actual discovery of fraud.
In ruling that the action had not yet prescribed despite
the fact that more than ten years had lapsed between the
date of registration and the institution of the action for
reconveyance, the Court in Adille ratiocinated:
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive
notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens
title does not furnish a shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument
to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of
repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-
standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of
title.
For the same reason, we cannot dismiss private respondentsÊ
claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955. While
actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years,
reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, we, as we
said, are not prepared to count the period from such a date in this
case. We note the petitionerÊs sub rosa efforts to get hold of the
property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent
misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial
settlement that he is „the only heir and child of his mother Feliza
with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name
[alone].‰ Accordingly, we hold that the right of the private
respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the
petitionerÊs act of defraudation. According to the respondent Court
of Appeals, they „came to know [of it] apparently only during the
16
progress of the litigation.‰ Hence, prescription is not a bar.
The above ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of

Samonte. In this case, as established by the CA, the
respondent actually discovered the fraudulent act of the
petitioner only in 1989:
. . . [T]he prescriptive period of the action is to be reckoned from the

time plaintiff-appellee (then Eduardo M. Santiago) had actually
discovered the fraudulent act of defendant-appellant which was, as
borne out by the records, only in 1989. Plaintiff-appellee Eduardo
M. Santiago categorically testified (TSN of July 11, 1995, pp. 14-15)
that he came to know that there were 91 excluded lots in Antonio
Village which were foreclosed by the
_______________
14 157 SCRA 455 (1988).

15 361 SCRA 173 (2001).
16 Supra.
573
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 28, 2003 573

GSIS and included in its consolidation of ownership in 1975 when,

in 1989, he and Antonio Vic Zulueta discussed it and he was given
by Zulueta a special power of attorney to represent him to recover
the subject properties from GSIS. The complaint for reconveyance
17
was filed barely a year from the discovery of the fraud.
Following the CourtÊs pronouncements in Adille and

Samonte, the institution of the action for reconveyance in
the court a quo in 1990 was thus well within the
prescriptive period. Having acted in bad faith in securing
titles over the subject lots, the petitioner is a holder in bad
faith of certificates of title over the subject lots. The
petitioner is not entitled to the protection18of the law for the
law cannot be used as a shield for frauds.
Contrary to its claim, the petitioner unarguably had the
legal duty to return the subject lots to the Zuluetas. The
petitionerÊs attempts to justify its omission by insisting
that it had no such duty under the mortgage contract is
obviously clutching at straw. Article 22 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that „every person who, through an act
of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.‰
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Decision dated February 22, 2002 and
Resolution dated September 5, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 62309 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-

Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed in

toto.
Note.·Rights and actions can be lost by the fact of

delay and by the effect of delay. (Ochagabia vs. Court of
Appeals, 304 SCRA 587 [1999])
··o0o··
_______________
17 Rollo, pp. 41-42.

18 See note 6.
574
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 414 02/09/2020, 2'22 PM

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 28, 2003 563

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in

real property based on fraud prescribes in four years from the

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government Service Insurance System vs. Santiago

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 28, 2003 565

Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained

1 Penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño with Associate

Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Martin S. Villanueva, Jr.,

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

And the lots on „ADDITIONAL EXCLUSION FROM PUBLIC

On May 7, 1990, Antonio Vic Zulueta, represented by

moved to be included as intervenors and filed their

2 CA Decision, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 37-39.

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 28, 2003 567

was substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez Vda. de

„WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff

1. Ordering defendant to reconvey to plaintiff the seventy-

a. Lot Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, Block I (Old Plan).

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

t. Lots 1, 11, 17 and 22, Block 9.

2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, if the seventy-eight (78)

Notices of Lis Pendens inscribed in TCT No. PT-80342

The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which rendered

„WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein appeal is

The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

In its petition, the petitioner maintains that it did not act

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 28, 2003 569

eight lots („subject lots‰) that were excluded from the

foreclosure sale. There was no proof of bad faith nor could

6 Baricuatro v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137 (2000).

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The acts of defendant-appellant GSIS in concealing from the

The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the

Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing

even with registered lands, than private individuals for their

7 Id., at p. 42. (Citations omitted)

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 28, 2003 571

Due diligence required of banks extend even to persons, or

certificate of title over the property. Registration of real

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the

An action for reconveyance based on implied or

11 Adriano v. Pangilinan, 373 SCRA 544 (2002).

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive

The above ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of

. . . [T]he prescriptive period of the action is to be reckoned from the

14 157 SCRA 455 (1988).

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GSIS and included in its consolidation of ownership in 1975 when,