CIRCUMSTANCES

JUSTIFYING

G.R. No. L-28129            October 31, 1969

ELIAS VALCORZA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Nemesio G. Beltran for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and
Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for respondent.

DIZON, J.:

Elias Valcorza was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon where, after trial, he was
found guilty thereof, with the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as the
one committed and voluntary surrender, and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of not less than two
years, four months and one day of prision correccional, nor more than eight years and one day of prision
mayor, to indemnify the heirs of Roberto Pimentel in the amount of 6,000, but without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He appealed to the Court of Appeals where, on August 16, 1967,
judgment was rendered modifying the decision of the trial court, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the judgment is modified as to the prison term and appellant Elias Valcorza is declared
guilty of homicide with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation
and, accordingly, he is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as maximum, with the accessories of the law; to pay the heirs of the deceased, Roberto Pimentel, in the
sum of six thousand pesos (P6,000.00), together with the costs.

In all other respects, the appealed judgment is affirmed.

From the above decision the present appeal by certiorari was taken, it being petitioner's claim that the Court of
Appeals committed the following errors:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT PETITIONER ALTHOUGH IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY AS PEACE OFFICER
WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN SHOOTING THE DECEASED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO DANGER
TO HIS LIFE OR LIMB, A RULING WHICH IS BEYOND THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 11,
PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND CONTRARY TO THE RULING LAID BY
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN PEOPLE VERSUS DELIMA, 46 PHIL. 738;

II
 THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN LIKING
PETITIONER TO A TRIGGER-HAPPY POLICEMAN AND IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEASED
HAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A DANGEROUS PERSON, A RULING WHICH IS CONTRARY TO ITS
FINDING OF FACTS;

III

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN NOT

ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BASED ON THE FACTS IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 11,
PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

The facts found by the Court of Appeals — which must be deemed conclusive for the purpose of this appeal —
are as follows:

The deceased, Roberto Pimentel, was confined an June 4, 1960 in the municipal jail of Maramag,
Bukidnon, as a detention prisoner to answer a charge of stealing a chicken. At about 1:00 p.m. when
appellant was the police guard on duty, Roberto Pimentel escaped. The following day a police patrol
team composed of Police Sgt. Federico Daiton and Patrolmen Melquiades Cañas, Pablo Lubido and the
appellant himself went to a place called Poultry Area in barrio Cuya, Maramag, Bukidnon, where the
accused had been reported to be hiding, for the purpose of bringing him back to jail. Their efforts to
locate and apprehend Roberto Pimentel having been fruitless, they decided to pass the night in the house
of one Gavino Tirayosa intending to return to town the following morning.

At about five o'clock in the morning of the next day, June 6, 1960, Sgt. Daiton went down from the
house of Gavino Tirayosa to answer a call of nature. He went to a nearby bridge and squatted thereon to
defecate. While he was in that position, he saw a person approaching slowly and he ordered him to halt.
The latter instead of doing so, jumped down into the creek spanned by the bridge. He yelled for his
companions, saying that the person who jumped into the creek could be their quarry. Patrolmen Cañas,
Lubido and the appellant rushed out of the house of Gavino Tirayosa, Cañas and appellant going to the
place at the creek where the person had jumped down.

Sgt. Daiton stationed himself near the bridge and Patrolman Lubido went to the other side of the creek.
Appellant and Cañas followed the course of the creek and after covering a distance of 100 meters they
came across footprints which they examined separately. While they were doing so, Roberto Pimentel
emerged suddenly from the bushes and lunged at the appellant, hitting him with a stone at the right
cheek and causing him to fall to the ground. When appellant Valcorza was on the ground, Roberto
Pimentel again struck him with a stone on the right arm. Fearing that Pimentel might grab his service
revolver, appellant Valcorza summoned Patrolman Cañas who dashed towards the place but Pimentel
ran away. Appellant Valcorza regained his composure and immediately chased the deceased, firing a
shot into the air and ordering him to stop. As the deceased did not heed his order, appellant fired four
times into the air, at the same time pursuing the prisoner for a distance of about 100 meters. At that
point, fearing that the patrol team might fail in apprehending the deceased, appellant Valcorza fired a
fifth shot at Pimentel as the latter was in an act of again jumping down into another part of the creek and
when the distance between the two was only three meters. Patrolman Ca_¤_as could not be of much help
in the chase because his revolver got entangled with some vines and he dropped it. After recovering his
revolver he joined Valcorza but Pimentel had already jumped down into the water of the creek.

The members of the patrol team went down into the water to locate Pimentel and they saw him floating,
with a wound on his back. As Pimentel was still alive, he was placed in the police jeep and taken to the
poblacion of Maramag for treatment, but he died a few minutes after arrival in the municipal building.
 The physician who examined the cadaver of the victim gave the opinion that the missile from the gun
fired against the victim entered at the right side of the back but the slug was lodged inside the body. The
gray discoloration at the edge or rim of the wound of entry showed the presence of powder burns which,
in the opinion of the physician, indicates that the gun was fired at close range.

Elias Valcorza surrendered himself and his firearm to the Chief of Police upon arrival in the municipal
building of Maramag.

Appellant seeks to justify his firing the shot against the deceased by stating that he tried to hit him only
at the leg, after he had disregarded his several warning shots and orders to stop running away. He claims
that he did so at the spur of the moment probably because he feared that his patrol team might not
succeed in apprehending the deceased and bringing him back to jail. Furthermore, he also claims that he
only fired at the deceased when the latter was in the act of jumping down into the creek which had water
of 8 feet deep, and if the deceased succeeded in crossing the creek the patrol team might not be able to
apprehend him. In brief the appellant conveys idea that he had to fire at the deceased in order that he
may not continue escaping.

The above version of the appellant was given in open court when he testified on October 4, 1962 (t.s.n.
— pp. 9, 76). However, he claims that he aimed only at the leg of the deceased is not consistent with
what he said in his sworn statement, Exhibit A. 'Question and Answer No. 7' (p. 1, Criminal Case
Record), given to the Constabulary soldiers on the afternoon of the day of the incident, or at 3:15 p.m. of
June 6, 1960. In narrating how the deceased was shot, appellant Valcorza stated in part as follows:

"But said Roberto Pimentel tried his very best to make another escape then he ran away cause I
was fell down on the ground during the time I wrestled him, Roberto Pimentel. Then I still
follow him and fire my revolver four (4) times up in the sky to stop him but still he continue
running, so what I did I fired him one direct hit shot on his back then he tried dive escape into the
water, and because he could not do anything cause he was already suffering from a gunshot
wound we pick him up and bring him to our headquarters in the Office of the Chief of Police of
Maramag, Bukidnon, for the necessary treatment of the gunshot wound on his right side
back ... ."

What the appellant said on June 6, 1960 in his statement, Exhibit A, which he subscribed and sworn to
before the Justice of the Peace of Maramag, Bukidnon, on June 7, 1960, is an unadulterated narration of
what happened on the day of the incident more than two years before he took the witness stand. This
first narration is more reliable because it was made when there was yet no time for reflection so as to
make his story fit into the facts of the incident. After the lapse of two years during which he could
deliberate and analyze the occurrence and prepare his defense, his testimony in court no longer jibed
with what he said shortly after the event. This inconsistency affects his credibility and wrecks his theory
that he had no intention to kill the deceased but only meant to disable him from further escaping. It also
seriously impairs his defense as it shows that there was no reasonable necessity for appellant to shoot the
deceased at the time he was running away with no weapon in his hands which he could use for
aggression against the appellant in case he desired to turn back and face the latter. (pp. 3-7, Annex "A",
Petitioner's brief.)

There is no question, therefore, that: on June 4, 1960, the deceased Roberto Pimentel was a detention prisoner
confined in the municipal jail of Maramag, Bukidnon, from which he escaped at about one o'clock p.m. that day
when petitioner was on guard duty; the following day four members of the police force of the municipality,
petitioner included, went after him to a place called Poultry Area in barrio Cuya, their first efforts to locate him
there being unsuccessful; early the following morning, while Sgt. Daiton, who led the patrol, was squatting on a
bridge to answer a call of nature, he saw a man approaching slowly and he ordered him to stop; the latter, who
happened to be the escaped detainee, instead of doing so, jumped into the creek spanned by the bridge,
whereupon Sgt. Daiton summoned his three companions who all rushed out of the house where they had spent
the night, and went after the escaping prisoner; petitioner and policeman Ca_¤_as, while following the course of
the creek and examining certain footprints they had found, saw their quarry suddenly emerging from nearby
bushes; the latter lunged at petitioner hitting him with a stone on the right cheek, as a consequence of which he
fell down, and while in that position on the ground he was struck again with a stone by the escaping detainee;
thereafter the latter ran away pursued by petitioner and his companion; in the course of the pursuit the former
fired a warning shot into the air, and as the escaping detainee paid no heed to this, petitioner fired into the air
four times more and kept on pursuing him; as the latter was apparently widening the distance between them,
and fearing that he might finally be able to elude arrest, petitioner fired directly at him while he was in the act of
jumping again into another part of the creek, the shot having hit him on the back; as a result of the wound thus
inflicted upon him, Pimentel died a few minutes after arrival at the municipal building to which he was taken.

While We have not lost sight of the fact that the deceased Pimentel was charged with a relatively minor offense,
namely, stealing a chicken; and while We do not in any way wish to encourage law enforcing officers to be
trigger-happy nor to employ force and violence upon persons under their custody, We cannot, in the
consideration of this case, disregard the following facts: the said deceased, in violation of the law, had escaped
from detention; when ordered to stop by Sgt. Daiton — whom he must have recognized as a peace officer in his
pursuit — he ran away and then threw himself into a creek to elude his pursuer; after sometime he suddenly
emerged from bushes near which petitioner and a fellow policeman were and assaulted the former twice with a
stone and then ran away again pursued by petitioner and his companion; that petitioner does not appear to be a
trigger-happy policeman as shown by the fact that he had fired five cautionary shots into the air and decided to
aim directly at the escaping detainee only when he had already reasons to fear that the latter would be able to
elude him and his companions. These facts and circumstances constrain Us to hold that the act thus performed
by petitioner — and which unfortunately resulted in the death of the escaping detainee — was committed in the
performance of his official duty and was more or less necessary to prevent the escaping prisoner from
successfully eluding the officers of the law. To hold him guilty of homicide may have the effect of demoralizing
police officers discharging official functions identical or similar to those in the performance of which petitioner
was engaged at the time he fired at the deceased Pimentel, with the result that thereafter We would have half-
hearted and dispirited efforts on their part to comply with such official duty. This of course, would be to the
great detriment of public interest.

CONSEQUENTLY, in the spirit of our decision in People vs. Delima, 46 Phil. 738, the decision appealed from
is hereby reversed and, as a consequence, petitioner is acquitted, with costs de officio.

G.R. No. L-38180 October 23, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SALVADOR CRISOSTOMO and INOCENCIO RAGSAC, accused-appellants.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

In an information dated July 9, 1973 filed with the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig,
Rizal, Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac were charged with murder alleged to have been committed as
follows:

That on or about the 27th day of May, 1972 , in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while then confined at the said
institution, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with treachery, evident premeditation and
deliberate intent to kill, each armed with improvised bladed weapon-did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and wound therewith one Antonio Waje, No. 21909-P, a sentenced prisoner in the same
institution, thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds in the different parts of his body while then
unarmed and unable to defend himself from the attack launched by the accused, as a result of which the said
Antonio Waje died instantly.

The commission of the foregoing offense is attended by the aggravating circumstances of recidivism and quasi-
recidivism based on the previous convictions of the above-named accused as follows:

Salvador Crisostomo having been convicted of Theft by the JPC Tanauan, Batangas on November 5, 1953;
Robbery by the CFI Batangas, 18th Judicial District, Lipa City on March 25, 1954; Illegal Possession of
Firearm and ammunition by the same court on June 16, 1955; Murder by the CFI Davao, Branch II on June 12,
1958 and Evasion of Service of Sentence by the CFI Rizal, Branch XIII on March 4, 1970;

Inocencio Ragsac having been convicted fo Homicide by the CFI-Ilocos Sur, Branch III on May 20, 1968 and
Evasion of Service of Sentence by the CFI Rizal, Branch X on July 20, 1971.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

The two accused, duly assisted by their counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty when arraigned.

After trial, Judge Onofre A. Villaluz, rendered judgment on December 28, 1973, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac, GUILTY, beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime of Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the
information, the Court hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the
offended party the amount of P10,000.00; to pay moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 and another
P5,000.00, as exemplary damages, jointly and severally; and to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 2

Hence, the present automatic review of the trial court's decision by this Court.

The trial court convicted the two accused Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac of murder as charged in
the information on the following findings of fact:

Four days prior to May 27, 1972, the accused Crisostomo gave sixty-two (P 62.00) to the victim Maje to buy
cigarettes and sugar. When Crisostomo asked for the things he requested Waje to buy, the latter replied that the
money was lost. Crisostomo then asked Waje to repeat what he Waje said and the latter said, "Maulit ka" and
dared Crisostomo to fight it out with him. Infuriated by the actuations and remarks of Waje and compounded by
the facts that Waje killed prison guards Anselmo Villablanca and Fortunato Villareal, of the Davao Penal
Colony on November 13, 1958, who were the former supervisors of Crisostomo, the accused Salvador
Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac planned to kill Waje. At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1972,
the two accused went out of their dormitory to carry out their plan. Crisostomo followed the group of prisoners
who were assigned to collect garbage inside the prison compound while Ragsac proceeded to the general
kitchen. Then Crisostomo went to the general kitchen where he met Ragsac. There they waited for the
opportune time. When the accused saw the deceased walking towards the Reception and Diagnostic Center,
they followed him. Upon hearing the victim, Crisostomo immediately stabbed Waje. The first trust did not
prove fatal, so Ragsac stabbed Waje and the two accused took turns in stabbing the victim. When Servideo
Camarillo saw Crisostomo and Ragsac stabbing the deceased, he fired shots in the air. The two accused ran
towards the direction of the general kitchen and they lied face down. The PC and the security guards arrived.
Camarillo then went to the place where the accused ran to and there he recovered the weapons used by the
accused in the stabbing. 3

Waje was brought to the prison hospital but he died on arrival. The cause of his death was determined to the
hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds. The post-mortem examination disclosed that Waje was stabbed seven
times. 4

That same morning of May 27, 1972, Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac were treated for their wounds
at the prison's hospital by its resident physician, Luz Alma Romero Santos. The accused Crisostomo was found
to have sustained the following injuries: abrasion-bridge of the nose; ecchymosis — right eye; abrasion with
contusion chin right; abrasion, right and 'left knee; lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inch above the right ear; and
contusion right index finger. The accused Ragsac was found to have the following injuries: abrasion with
contusion left wrist; abrasion with contusion dorsal surface of left arm, proximal third; contusion left cheek-
bone; contusion dorsal surface of left hand; abrasion both knees; lacerated wound occipital region right head. 5

After having been treated in the prison's hospital, the two accused Crisostomo and Ragsac were investigated by
prison guard Tolentino Avelina, the one assigned as investigator for the death of Waje. 6 The investigation was
conducted in Tagalog. The accused Crisostomo was interrogated between 11:00 a.m. and 12:40 p.m. on May
27, 1972. He executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "F") 7 wherein he related that he had been in prison since
1953 for the crimes of theft, robbery in band, murder and illegal possession of firearms; that about 7:00 A.M. on
that day he plotted with the accused Ragsac to kill Waje; that his reasons for wanting to kill Waje were the
following. a) because Waje killed prison guards Anselmo Villablanca and Fortunato Villareal and wounded
prison guard Predisvino Calugay who were his supervisors and friends at the Davao Penal Colony in 1958; and
b) because Waje swindled him in 1962 of the amount of P62.00. When asked who were his companions in
stabbing the victim, he pointed at Inocencio Ragsac. 8

Likewise, the accused. Ragsac executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "G"). 9 He admitted therein that he stabbed
Waje several times. His motive was that he killed Waje because he was asked by Crisostomo and that he cannot
refuse him because he is a friend. Moreover, the victim was a member of the Commando Gang, an enemy of the
Genuine Ilocano Gang to which he belonged. 10 He was interrogated from 1:00 p.m. to 2:40 p.m. on the same
day.

Aside from the two accused, prison guard Servideo Camarillo, who was an eyewitness to the commission of the
crime, was also investigated (Exhibit "H"). 11 He was asked by the investigator to Identify from among four
weapons the two that he had recovered from the two accused. He pointed at the weapons marked as Exhibits
"C" and "D" as the ones used by the accused Ragsac and Crisostomo respectively. These were the very same
weapons Identified by the two accused when they were investigated by Avelina.

During the trial, the two accused gave a version of the incident which was different from the one they related in
their respective sworn statements, Exhibits "F" and "G". According to their new version, the accused
Crisostomo was the only one who stabbed Waje. The accused Ragsac denied participation in the stabbing for he
was with the brigade of prisoners collecting garbage in the prison premises. Furthermore, the accused
Crisostomo allegedly acted in self-defense. According to him four days prior to the incident, he requested Waje
to buy him sugar and cigarettes at the prison Post Exchange. For that purpose, he gave Waje P62.00. On May
27, 1972, he saw Waje and asked him about his request. Waje said that he lost the money. When asked how the
money was lost Waje became irritated and threatened to add him to the persons he had killed. At the same time,
Waje struck him with a "chaco" (a weapon made of two sharp-edged pieces of wood, connected together with a
string). Crisostomo allegedly saw Waje pulling something from his body, so Crisostomo immediately brought
out his own weapon (Exhibit "D") known in prison parlance as "matalas" and stabbed Waje with it. 12

In their brief, the two accused assigned the following errors: 13

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS SALVADOR
CRISOSTOMO AND INOCENCIO RAGSAC CONSPIRED TO KILL ANTONIO WAJE AND THAT THE
LATTER WAS KILLED WITH EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND TREACHERY.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT INOCENCIO RAGSAC
PARTICIPATED IN THE KILLING OF ANTONIO WAJE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT DEFENDANT- APPELLANT SALVADOR
CRISOSTOMO DID NOT ACT IN SELF- DEFENSE WHEN HE KILLED ANTONIO WAJE.

It is apparent that the trial court's finding of the existence of conspiracy to kill Waje between the two accused
and the alleged treacherous manner in which the killing was executed is based on the sworn statements executed
by Salvador Crisostomo (Exhibit "F") and by Inocencio Ragsac (Exhibit "G").

It is, therefore, necessary to pass upon the admissibility of the confessions and their sufficiency to sustain the
conviction.

For a confession to be admissible in evidence, it is a general rule that it must have been made without hope of
benefit, without fear or duress, and without the use of threat, torture, violence, artifice or deception. 14
Likewise, "written statements which were made freely and voluntarily whereby they admitted participation in
the act complained of and sufficiently corroborated by other and independent evidence introduced during the
trial of the case are sufficient basis for conviction. 15

The question before the Court is whether the sworn statements made by the two accused were freely and
voluntarily given.

There is merit in the contention of the Solicitor General.16 that the injuries suffered by the two accused
(Exhibits "1" and "2") do not necessarily prove that they were maltreated. The injuries of the two accused
consisted of bruises and abrasions in the arms and knees and ecchymosis in the right eye. Indeed, these kinds of
injuries are very likely to be sustained by one who suddenly drops prone to the ground while in the act of
running very fast as the two accused did when they heard the shots fired by prison guard Camarillo. Likewise, if
the testimony of the accused Crisostomo that he was hit in the head with a "chaco" by Waje is to be given
credence, then his head wound was not due to maltreatment.

Moreover, as pointed out in the Appellee's Brief, 17 assuming arguendo that the two accused were tortured, the
torture was inflicted when the guards and soldiers were trying to apprehend them following their assault on
Waje, 18 and not when their admissions were taken by Tolentino Avelina. In fact, the two accused admitted
during the trial that Avelina was good to them and that the latter did not threaten or maltreat them. 19

Notable also is the time which lapsed between the alleged maltreatment which was around 9:00 A.M. to 9:30
A.M. of May 27, 1972, as in fact they were treated for the injuries sustained by reason thereof at around 9:35
A.M. of the same day, 20 and the taking of their admissions which were from 11:00 A.M. to 12:40 P.M. for
Salvador Crisostomo and from 1:00 P.M. to 2:40 P.M. of the same days for Inocencio Ragsac. 21 They had
sufficient time to retract whatever admissions they made during the alleged maltreatment when they were
formally investigated more than two hours later by Tolentino Avelina, who was admittedly good to them.
As regards the contention of counsel for the two accused that the admission of their sworn statements is
unconstitutional in the light of Sec. 20, Art. IV of the New Constitution because they were not assisted by
counsel, it is settled that proscription against the admissibility of confessions obtained from the accused during
the period of custodial interrogation in violation of the procedural safeguards, applies to confessions after the
effectivity of the new charter on January 17, 1973. 22 The sworn statements of the two accused were executed
before the new constitution took effect.

The question of whether or not the two accused committed the killing in conspiracy and with evident
premeditation and treachery will now be taken up.

The conspiracy between the two accused is shown by the admitted fact that they agreed to kill Waje two hours
before he was actually killed. It is shown by the concerted acts of the two accused of leaving their dormitory
XI-B-3 at 7:00 A.M. on the day of the killing, of meeting at the prison kitchen, of waiting for Waje to appear, of
approaching him and simultaneously stabbing him.

Because of the existence of conspiracy between the two accused the acts of one are already considered the acts
of the other. 23 Both are liable as principals.

Treachery is shown by the admission of the accused Crisostomo that he approached Waje from behind, turned
him about, then stabbed him (Exhibit "F"). The suddenness of the attack was consciously adopted to facilitate
the perpetration of the crime without risk to themselves. 24

Evident premeditation can not be appreciated. The two accused allegedly planned to kill Waje at 7:00 o'clock in
the morning and the killing took place at 9:00 A.M. (Exhibits "F" and "G"). The two accused did not have
sufficient time to reflect during the two hours that preceded the killing.

The final question to be resolved is whether the accused Crisostomo acted in self-defense or not. He contends
that he should not be liable for the death of Waje because he acted in self-defense. According to the accused
Crisostomo, Waje attacked him with a "chaco" when he asked him about the P62.00 which he gave him for the
purchase of sugar and cigarettes at the prison Post Exchange.

By invoking self-defense, the accused Crisostomo admitted that he killed Antonio Waje. With his admission,
the burden is upon him to prove by sufficient and convincing evidence that he was defending himself when he
killed Waje. 25

To avail of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the following elements must be present — unlawful
aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself.

The trial court found the prosecution witnesses more credible than the defense witnesses. This finding is entitled
to great weight and should be given full faith and credit in the absence of a showing that the trial court failed to
take into account circumstances of weight and importance in arriving at the findings.

Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind.
26 There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one's life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. There
must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon.

The claim of the accused Crisostomo that Waje was the one who attacked him cannot be believed. It is contrary
to common experience and to human nature to take offense at the inquiry of the former on how the money was
lost.
Although it is claimed by the accused Crisostomo that after he was struck with the "chaco", he grabbed the
same, the "chaco" was never presented to the prison investigator. Nor was the said "chaco" ever mentioned in
Exhibits "F" and "G". It was brought up for the first time during the trial before the lower court.

There is no sufficient showing that Waje was armed at the time he was killed.

The victim not being armed, it was not reasonable for the two accused, both armed with "matalas" to attack
Waje and inflict upon him seven (7) stab wounds. The accused Inocencio Ragsac escaped during the pendency
of the review of this case. Being a death convict, his flight from prison while his case was pending review, as
held by this Court in a similar case, 27 is evidence of his consciousness of guilt.

The two accused participated in the killing of the victim. The crime they committed is murder qualified by
treachery with the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. Hence the trial court correctly imposed the death
penalty. However, for lack of the necessary votes, the penalty next lower in degree is imposed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua and the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased Antonio Waje is increased to the
sum of P12,000.00, with costs.

G.R. No. 80089 April 13, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

SATURNINO REY, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Julius L. Abela for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

Saturnino Rey was charged with the crime of Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, committed as
follows:
That on or about 8:40 o'clock in the evening of May 28, 1983, at Poblacion, Pilar, Capiz, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused armed with a .45 caliber pistol, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot one NICOLAS PAGAYUNAN in a sudden and in unexpected manner,
thereby inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound above the nipple and sternum, right, thru and thru which
caused his death thereafter; 1

After trial, Judge Rodrigo V. Cosico found the following facts to have been established:

... On the evening of May 28, 1983, which was a fiesta day, while Rosette Pagayunan, a teacher at the San
Esteban Elementary School, was preparing to cook food at her house, she found out that there was no water.
Accordingly, Mrs. Pagayunan instructed her two (2) children, Babette and Nicolas, to get water from the faucet
of the accused Saturnino Rey, also a public school teacher. At that time, Mr. Rey's faucet was allegedly the only
one with water at the neighborhood because of the long drought. Nicolas was then a nineteen-year old fourth
year high school student at the Colegio de la Purisima Concepcion, Roxas City. Babette and Nicolas proceeded
towards the house of Mr. Rey to get water. Babette and Nicolas found Roban Rey, son of the accused, near the
faucet. Roban was sitting atop the steps of the kitchen stairway talking with Nicolas. While Nicolas was
standing beside the faucet waiting for his pail to be filled with water, he was shot twice by Saturnino Rey from
the window of his bedroom which was about four (4) meters away. The shooting was witnessed by Roban Rey
and Babette Pagayunan, who was about three (3) meters away from the faucet. After he was hit, Nicolas said to
Roban: "I was hit." Soon after, Nicolas fell in front of Roban Roban went up their house and told Saturnino
Rey: "Daddy you hit Colas." Babette went home and reported the shooting incident to her mother who fainted.
The Pagayunan sisters and their group went to the place to get the body of Nicolas, who was taken to the
Medicare Hospital in Pilar, Capiz, where he was given a first-aid treatment. Thereafter, Nicolas was taken to
Roxas City but died before reaching the hospital.

On the morning of May 29, 1983, Patrolmen Jose Ballera and Hanzel Villareal conducted an investigation at the
place of the shooting incident and found an empty shell (Exh. C) below the window of the room of Saturnino
Rey. During the investigation, Roban Rey, in the presence of the police investigators and Romeo Bacalocos,
pointed to the direction of the window of the room of his father, Saturnino Rey, as the place where the firing
came from.2

The trial court found the defendant-appellant guilty, as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P30,000.00, to pay the heirs of the
victim the amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages and to pay the costs.

From this judgment, the accused Saturnino Rey appealed. His counsel assails the trial court for completely
believing the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Counsel points to certain facts and circumstances of
weight and substance which the trial court allegedly overlooked, misapplied or misinterpreted, and which, if
considered, will materially alter the result, to wit: "1) the fact that it was summer and the water system
connections, particularly those in the higher level of the town, were not functioning; 2) the fact that the water
faucet at the backyard of the accused-appellant was not functioning, not merely because the water pressure was
too weak for the faucet to function but also because the water connection had been disconnected (t.s.n., p. 283);
3) the fact that the houses of both the deceased and the accused-appellant and their immediate neighborhood are
on the same higher level of the town; 4) the fact that the household of the accused-appellant were getting their
water supply from Martin Cunada, their nearest neighbor, because he had a water pump, several water storage
tanks, and a well; 5) the fact that the immediate neighbors of the Pagayunans had wells, water storage tanks, as
well as water system connections and some of their neighbors were relatives and close friends of the
Pagayunans; 6) the fact that the Pagayunans were known and seen to obtain their water supply from these
immediate neighbors; 7) the fact that the Pagayunans (who were relatively new in the neighborhood) had never
drawn water from the faucet of the accused-appellant; 8) the fact that the house of the accused-appellant was at
least 120 meters away from the house of the deceased; 9) the fact that the only access to the accused-appellant's
bedroom window from the outside was through the shuttered gate of the wire-enclosed vegetable garden; 10)
the fact that the six-foot-high chicken and barb-wire fence of the vegetable garden was covered with climbing
plants, thereby blocking the view from the windows as well as from the outside into the bedroom; 11) the fact
that the accused- appellant's house was of the bungalow type and the sill of the bedroom window was only
about 3.5 feet from the ground; 12) the fact that the deceased was found just below or near the bedroom window
and within the enclosed vegetable garden, not only by members of the accused-appellant's family but also by
Martin Cunada, a friend and barkada of the deceased, who happened to be passing by just after gunfire sounded;
13) the fact that Martin Cunada, who stayed for some five minutes at the scene of the incident right after the
shooting, did not see Babette Pagayunan or any other member of the deceased's family anywhere in the vicinity;
14) the fact that after the shooting only Babette Pagayunan of the Pagayunan household was seen with the
deceased and the Rey children at the Medicare Hospital and in Roxas City; 15) the fact that none of the four
water containers the deceased allegedly brought with him to the accused-appellant's backyard faucet was ever
found or seen before, during, or after the shooting; 16) the fact that except for Dr. Buenvenida, all the other four
(4) witnesses of the prosecution concocted some material portions of their testimonies; 17) the fact that in a
small rural town in the interior the inhabitants sup and sleep early; and 18) the fact that it was the night of the
town fiesta and older folks tend to be more security-conscious." 3

The appeal is without merit. The circumstances enumerated by the counsel for the appellant are of little
importance because the accused-appellant, Saturnino Rey, had admitted having fired the shot that killed the
deceased Nicolas Pagayunan. His testimony in court reads, as follows:

Q Now, will you please inform the Honorable Court at about 8:40 in the night of May 28, 1983 where you were
and what you were doing.

A I was inside my room of my house.

Q And what were you doing.

A I was lying down.

Q Did you have any companion in your room that night and at that time?
A Yes, sir.

Q Inform the court who were your companions.

A My child aging four years of age with my second wife.

Q What happened while you were in your room that night and that time with your child?

A There was a person who opened my window, the window of my room where I was lying down.

Q Now do you know who was that person who opened the window of your room where you were, lying down?

A No, sir. At first I did not know.

Q Will you please describe to the Honorable Court the room where you were staying in and the window which
was opened?

A The frontage of my house is facing (witness pointing to the western direction). The elevation of the flooring
is one foot. The height of the window from the floor is this high (witness referring to the window of the
courtroom estimated to be 2 1/2 feet).

Q After you noticed that a person opened your window, the window of your bedroom, what happened?

A I felt for my pistol.

Q What happened after that?

A I sat on the bed and asked, Who are you?'

Q And did you receive an answer after asking who was that person?

A No, sir.

Q What happened after you received no answer?

A I fired a shot.

Q How many times did you fire your pistol?

A Twice.

Q By the way, how wide was that window in your room?

A About 1 1/2 meters wide.

Q And did you see anybody to whom or at whom you fired your pistol?

A The first shot that I fired was upward, on the air.

Q My question to you is, did you see any person outside the window?

A Yes, sir.
Q Were you able to discern the facial features of the person you saw at the window?

ATTY. PATRICIO:

Objection, your Honor.

COURT:

All right, reform.

ATTY. ABELA:

Q How well did you see the person you saw at your window?

A Silhouette.

Q Will you be able to recognize the person you saw at your window that night?

A No, sir.

Q And what was the person you saw at your window doing when you fired the shot?

A You mean the first shot?

Q The first shot what was the person doing.?

A After he pushed the shutter of the window he put his hand down.

Q And at that time you fired the second shot what was the man doing.?

A I was looking at him and he had the action of drawing something and that was the time I fired the second
shot.

Q By the way how close was the man to your window that night?

A Just like this, from myself up to Atty. Abela (distance estimated to be 1 1/2 meters).

Q My question to you is, how close was that man to the window of your room?

A He was right at the window.

Q And what part of the body of that man can be seen by you?

A From the waist.

Q And how far were you seated on your bed, how far was your bed from the wall of the window?

A About one foot.

Q What happened after you fired the second shot directed at that man at your window?
A I gave out an alarm to my children.4

Having invoked self-defense, it was incumbent upon the defendant-appellant to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the fact that he acted in self-defense. The defendant must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
accused himself admitted the killing. 5 In this regard, defendant-appellant failed to discharge the burden
reposed upon him by law to prove self-defense. The trial court found that the testimony of the defendant-
appellant gave evasive and ambiguous answers before the court. 6 We have examined the record of the case and
we find no cogent reason to disturb said findings of the trial court. The witnesses for the prosecution had no evil
motive to testify falsely against the appellant.

Besides, defendant-appellant's testimony, even if true, does not establish a case of self-defense. There is no
evidence of unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. The defendant-appellant merely testified that he
saw a person open the window of his bedroom and when he inquired who the person was and received no
answer, he fired a shot into the air then, when said person lifted his right arm chest high, 7 he fired the second
shot. The interval between the two shots was only about three (3) to five (5) seconds. 8 For unlawful aggression
to be appreciated in self-defense, there must be an actual sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. 9 The raising of the right arm chest high alone by
an unarmed person cannot be considered unlawful aggression. Absent unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased, there cannot be self-defense on the part of the accused.

The defendant-appellant also failed to rebut the presumption that the shooting was done with criminal intention.
His conduct after the shooting incident was inconsistent with the conduct of a person who had innocently shot a
person by accident. It would appear that he did not do anything to help his victim who was lying down on the
ground, bleeding and moaning. He did not go down from his house even after finding that the person he had
shot was Nicolas Pagayunan. Instead, he uttered curses.10 Then, very early the next morning, at about 5:30
o'clock, he left his house and stayed with his brother in a neighboring municipality, 11 and did not go home
even to help the police in their investigation. 12 Flight is an indication of a guilty mind.

The defendant-appellant also contends that treachery or alevosia was not charged in the information filed
against him, or proven by the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.

The contention is without merit. The information filed in this case specifically stated that the accused, Saturnino
Rey, armed with a.45 caliber pistol, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot Nicolas Pagayunan "in a sudden
and unexpected manner." This is sufficient allegation of treachery because a sudden and unexpected attack,
without the slightest provocation on the person of the one attacked is the essence of treachery or alevosia. It is
not necessary that the information should use specifically the word "alevosia" or treachery. It is sufficient if the
information alleges facts in clear and explicit language which would show treachery or alevosia without the use
of the specific word.13
Treachery in the shooting of Nicolas Pagayunan was established by the testimony of Babette Pagayunan who
declared that the accused-appellant suddenly and without warning shot the deceased as the latter was waiting for
his pail to be filled with water and while talking to the son of the accused-appellant. The attack was sudden,
unexpected, without warning, and without giving the victim an opportunity to defend himself or repel the
aggression. In fact, the deceased did not sense any danger that he would be shot by the defendant-appellant as
there was no previous grudge or misunderstanding between them.

The claim of the defendant-appellant that he had fired a warning shot into the air appears to be an afterthought.
Babette Pagayunan categorically declared that her brother, Nicolas Pagayunan, was hit on the first shot. Her
testimony, on cross examination, reads as follows:

Q How many shots did Saturnino Rey the accused, direct to your brother?

A Two shots were delivered by Saturnino Rey. The first shot hit my brother. I did not know whether the second
shot hit my brother. After the first shot my brother staggered towards Roban. 14

Besides, the shots were fired in rapid succession so that the first shot could not serve as a warning shot. Babette
Pagayunan stated:

Q How long after the first shot did you hear the second shot?

A Seconds only. The interval was seconds.

Q So that the second shot came right after the first shot?

A Yes, sir.15

The defendant-appellant, Saturnino Rey, also testified, as follows:

Q You testified a while ago that you fired two shots. How long after you fired the first shot that you also fired
the second shot?
A The interval was only seconds.

Q About two seconds?

A Three seconds or more.

Q But it could not be more than five seconds, right?

A No, sir. 16

As the People's counsel observed, if the version of the defendant-appellant were true, the empty shell would
have fallen near the defendant-appellant's bed, inside his room, and not outside the house where Pat. Hanzel
Villareal found it; and that the first shot would have hit a part of the house.

The trial court, therefore, correctly found the offense committed by the defendant-appellant to be murder,
qualified as it was by treachery.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED With costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-41674             March 30, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REMEDIOS DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Silvino Lopez de Jesus for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, finding the defendant guilty of
homicide and sentencing her to suffer not more than fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal and not less than eight years and one day of prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Francisco Rivera in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.

Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:

I. El Juzgado a quo, erro al dar absoluto credito a las pruebas de la acusacion, las que son insuficientes
para apoyar una declaracion de conviccion.

II. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que los celos fueron el motivo que impulso a la acusada al agredir al
occiso Francisco Rivera.

III. El Juzgado a quo al declarar increible el testimonio de la acusada en esta causa.

IV. Y el Juzgado a quo erro al no absolver a la acusada.

It appears from the evidence that on the evening of February 18, 1934, Francisco Ramos and his wife, Brigida
Vistada; his sister, Baltazara Ramos; and a woman named Consuelo or Natividad Santoyo called at the house of
the defendant and asked her to go with them to a wake in honor of one Sion, who had died in the house of Maria
Inguit. About nine o'clock the defendant and her friends started home. They were followed about five minutes
later, according to Enrique Bautista, by the deceased Francisco Rivera, who had been playing cards in the house
where the wake was held. He was accompanied by Enrique Bautista. Rivera and Bautista overtook defendant's
party. When they reached a narrow part of the path, Rivera went ahead of Bautista. At that time the members of
the defendant's party were walking in single file. Baltazara Ramos was in the lead and the defendant was the
hindmost. She was about two brazas from the person immediately ahead of her. Francisco Ramos, the only one
of defendant's companions that was called to testify, heard someone cry out "Aruy, Dios mio". He went back
and found that Francisco Rivera had been stabbed under the right breast. The wounded man was taken to the
hospital, where he died the next afternoon.

Francisco Ramos testified that it took him about two minutes to go back to the place where Francisco Rivera
was. He found and that Enrique Bautista was with the wounded man, and the defendant had started back
towards the house of mourning. He overtook her. She had a knife in her hand. When they reached the house of
Maria Inguit, Remedios de la Cruz stuck the knife into a table and said that she stabbed Francisco Rivera
because he embraced her.

The case for the prosecution rests upon the testimony of Enrique Bautista. According to him the defendant
waited on the right side of the path near some guava trees and stabbed Francisco Rivera with a knife in her right
hand when he arrived in front of her; that the injured man cried "Aruy, Dios mio", while the defendant turned
around and returned to the house of Maria Inguit, saying "Icao ay malaon na" (hacia tiempo ya). He further
testified that the defendant stabbed the deceased before either of them had said anything; that the distance
between him and the deceased was about one foot; that he did not see any of the companions of the defendant
after they reached the path and had to walk one behind the other.

The defendant on the other hand testified that after they had passed a fork in the trail and reached a narrow part
a man suddenly threw his arms around her from behind, caught hold of her breasts and kissed her, and seized
her in her private parts; that she tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down; that when she
felt weak and could do nothing more against the strength of the man, she got a knife from her pocket, opened it,
and stabbed him in defense of her honor. She further testified that the man who attacked her did not say
anything; that she asked him who he was but he did not answer; that when she was assaulted she cried for help,
saying "Madre mia; Dios mio"; that when she was seized, she was about two brazas behind her nearest
companion; that when she was face to face with her assailant during the struggle she could scarcely recognize
his face in the darkness and could not be sure that it was Francisco Rivera.

Her testimony as to what occurred is as follows:

P. ¿Y que paso siendo usted la ultima de entre sus compañeros? — R. Despues de pasar nosotros en una
bifurcacion de los caminos cuando llegabamos en una parte estrecha el occiso subitamente me abrazo
por detras cogiendome los pechos y basandome.

P. ¿Y entonces que hizo usted cuando usted sintio ese abrazo y beso? — R. todavia me agarro en mi
parte genital y en eso yo trataba de desasirme de el; el me siguio abrazando cogiendome de los pechos y
basandome, y yo a mi vez seguia tratando de desasirme de el insistentemente.

P. ¿Y que sucedio? — R. Cuando yo trataba de desasirma de el, el me siguio abrazando y yo a mi vez

seguia tratandome de desassirme de el y el llego a agarrarme en la parte genital y trato de lanzarme.

P. ¿Y que hizo usted cuando le trataba de lanzarle a usted el occiso? — R. Yo procuraba desasirme de el
y cuando me quede debilitada y ya no podia hacer nada contra la fuerza de el yo saque de mo bolsillo un
cortaplumas.

P. ¿Y que hizo usted del cortaplumas? — R. Lo abri porque cuando ya no podia hacer nada y estaba y a
debil yo hice lo que debia hacer en defensa de mi pudor, le apuñale.

She further testified that she was engaged in selling fruit, and that the fanknife in question was in a pocket of the
overcoat she was wearing that day; that she went off with her friends without having an opportunity of changing
her clothes.

We cannot believe the testimony of Enrique Bautista, because Francisco Ramos, one of the witnesses for the
prosecution, testified that it was a dark night, and Bautista himself said that he could scarcely see anyone in the
darkness ("Apenas se podia ver a alguien en esa obscuridad."); that he did not see any of the companions of the
defendant.

It appears from the evidence that the deceased had been making love to the defendant, and also to another girl
named Felicisima Sincaban; but the finding of the trial judge that Francisco Rivera and the defendant were
engaged, that she was madly in love with him and was extremely jealous of Felicisima Sincaban is not sustained
by the evidence of record.

The appellant stabbed the deceased only once, although she retained possession of the knife, and undoubtedly
could have inflicted other wounds on him if she had desired. In other words she desisted as soon as he released
her.

The evidence shows that an officer of the Constabulary went to see the injured man about eleven o'clock that
night in the hospital, but it does not appear that Rivera told him anything about the circumstances under which
he had been stabbed.

The appellant is an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, and scarcely eighteen years old. We do not
believe her story is a fabrication. In this connection it is to be noted that almost immediately after the incident in
question took place, the appellant said she stabbed Francisco Rivera because he embraced her. It is not
improbable that she was reluctant to relate in the presence of all the people in the house of Maria Inguit the
details of what had occurred.
We are convinced from a study of the record that the deceased did in fact grab hold of the defendant on the
night in question, and whether he intended to rape her or not, taking into consideration that it was a dark night
and that the deceased grabbed her from behind without warning and without making himself known and refused
to say who he was, and in the struggle that followed touched her private parts, and the fact that she was unable
to free herself by means of her strength alone, we are of the opinion that she was justified in making use of the
pocket-knife in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, since she had no other means of
defending herself.

In the case of the United States vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488), this court held that a person is not criminally
responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were
as he supposed them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true state of facts at the time,
provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

The appellant claims to have cried for help, but so far as the record shows her cries were not heard by any of her
companions. Whether she did in fact cry for help, as claimed by her, or failed to do so because of the
suddenness with which the deceased grabbed her and the fright which it naturally caused, taking into
consideration the circumstances of the case, we still think she is exempt from criminal liability. In the case of
the United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos (22 Phil., 249), this court held that a woman in defense of her honor
is justified in inflicting wounds or her assailant with a bolo which she happens to be carrying, even though her
cry for assistance might have been heard by people near by.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant is acquitted, with the costs
de oficio.

G.R. No. L-5272             March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused
himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon
which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the
defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence
touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of
the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal
Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
"Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in
August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a
narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the
house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room
was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small
hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the
door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the
room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was
suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice,
"Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open
by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the
porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his
feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by
the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant
thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a
burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by
the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his
pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to
his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one
of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was
because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms
prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door
and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a
walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28,
the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and
Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party
separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting
on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the
impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite
defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the
boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by
forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe
that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died
from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the
minimum penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but
insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right
of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx             xxx             xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the
door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one,
under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the
thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat
that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the
night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an
assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first
blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor
his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal
blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he
was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or
his property or the property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible
who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if
the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if
the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except
in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a
crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different
from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim.
Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs.
People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration
is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and
assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given
of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that
the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the
actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the
actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of
the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the
general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the
Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient
of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal
intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express
provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or
imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these
exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a
wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again,
"There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of
them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in
the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or
less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows
the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm"
(Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt
mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall
appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the
wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article,
say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention
(intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and
includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code
of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was
redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from
criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in
the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions
of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as
we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there
is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if
there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the
Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of
May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from
the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil
effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial
church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which
characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact
submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various
crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article
568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a
grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision
correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence
shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being
subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or
less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one
thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the
direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of
malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word
"willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that
while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently
understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it
signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in
contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing
lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad
purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious,"
"maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or
willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to
require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal
justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it
be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various
modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will
always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must
combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases,
thus forcely present this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes
important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence
of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or
mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind
was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of
an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself
does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an
act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal
jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the
result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the
dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its
jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the
innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure,
he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another
to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And
whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from
its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself
spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with
the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are
only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior
to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract
justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law
excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the
same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class
of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the
doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always
held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to
the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol.
12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real
departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the
evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact
forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in
fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the
maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed
offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal
liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt
of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P.
vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb.,
625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to
say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is
to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the
effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the
intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts
which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide;
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they
appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are
in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where
a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken
belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are
in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer
believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal
liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly
be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of
the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same
time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed
"voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design
against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was
no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide,
according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand
jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms
and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached
near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the
instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder
only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more
criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine
must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the
pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And
when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the
reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's
Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here
set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of
his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was
attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one
or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and
took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a
blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the
unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law,
to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in
consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had
always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness,
demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility,
as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal
Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor,
without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the
force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty
months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was
acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the
sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside
his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish
with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire
light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that
they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his
assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with
which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were
 not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he
took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the
consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or
distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that
which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts
that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of
article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the
city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8
paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he
fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had
before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance,
finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am
ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his
friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as
the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but
only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness
of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one
day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence,
holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of
the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means
employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada,
Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone
thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted,
and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of
which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same
spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense
with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to
exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed,
and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon
appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors,
who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just
self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman
struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of
his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property
and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented
themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief
that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he
can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake
as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. 199877               August 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.

VILLARAMA, JR.,*

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 03685. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated October 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Pasig City, Branch 268, finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC:

On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
armed with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with one unidentified person who is still at-large, and
both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M.
Bautista cash money amounting to ₱ 230,000.00 more or less and belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services,
Inc. represented by Enrique Sumulong; that on the occasion of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with
the said gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.4

Following Lara’s plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique
Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).

Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San Sebastian);
(b) on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of ₱ 230,000.00 from the
Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian; (c) in going to
the bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito
Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at
around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City,
Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang
pera, iyong bag, nasaan?"; (f) Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g) heeding
Bautista’s advice, he threw the bag in Bautista’s direction; (h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted
from the pick-up and ran; (i) seein Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j) when he had the chance
to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the
incident; (k) when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle and
saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken
away from him; (m) when barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other companions were
brought to the police station for investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga,
Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City; (o) he alerted the
police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified Lara as
the one who shot and robbed them of San Sebastian’s money.5

SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) at
around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he saw
Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where
they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified; (d) they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning; (e) at
the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and
Atie; and (f) after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.6

PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police
Station; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place at the corner of Mercedes and
Market Avenues, Pasig City; (c) he, together with three (3) other police officers, proceeded to the crime scene;
(d) upon arriving thereat, one of the police officers who were able to respond ahead of them, handed to him
eleven (11) pieces of empty shells and six (6) deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his investigation, he
interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station; and (f) before Bautista died, he was able to
interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the incident.7

In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig
City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was
constructing a comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on
June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers
arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers
asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol
car, one of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in another place we
will kill you" (sic); (g) he was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told
where he was investigated for robbery with homicide; (h) when he told the police that he was at home when the
subject incident took place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses arrived at the
station, one of the police officers told them to come back the following day; (j) while he was at the police line-
up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k)
when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest.8

To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that on
May 31, 2001, while she was manning her store, she saw Lara working on a sewer trench from 9:00 in the
morning to 5:00 in the afternoon.9 Lara also presented his sister, Edjosa Manalo, who testified that he was
working on a sewer line the whole day of May 31, 2001.10

On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide in a Decision,11 the dispositive portion
of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 (1)
as amended by Republic Act 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law.

Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and Php230,000.00 representing the money carted by the said accused.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC rejected Lara’s defense of alibi as follows:

The prosecution’s witness Enrique Sumulong positively identified accused Arturo Lara as the person who
carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., on May 31, 2001 at around 10:30 o’clock
in the morning along the corner of Mercedez and Market Ave., Pasig City and the one who shot Joselito
Bautista which caused his instantaneous death on the same day. As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For
alibi to prosper, an accused must show he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was
impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime" (People versus
Bano, 419 SCRA 697). Considering the proximity of the distance between the place of the incident and the
residence of the accused where he allegedly stayed the whole day of May 31, 2001, it is not physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene within the same barangay. The positive identification of the accused
which were categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses,
should prevail over the alibi and denial of the accused whose testimony was not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence (People versus Aves 420 SCRA 259).13 (Emphasis supplied)

On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he was arrested
without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all proceedings
including those that led to his conviction. Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in
a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already attached.
Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to
present a witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the
one who shot Bautista and who took the bag of money from him. The physical description of Lara that
Sumulong gave to the police was different from the one he gave during the trial, indicating that he did not have
a fair glimpse of the perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his unidentified
companion who shot Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably claimed that
his conviction was attended with moral certainty. Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his
witnesses. Without any showing that they were impelled by improper motives in testifying in his favor, their
testimonies should have been given the credence they deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and
neighbor, this does not by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.

The CA affirmed Lara’s conviction. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a
ground to invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated invocation. Any
objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before
the accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is
not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes
culpability:

Appellant’s avowal could hardly wash.

It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In
voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the
information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to
assail the legality of his arrest. Applying the foregoing jurisprudential touchstone, appellant is estopped from
questioning the validity of his arrest since he never raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash the
Information.

What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void
all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the
state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.14
(Citations omitted)

As to whether the identification of Lara during the police line-up is inadmissible as his right to counsel was
violated, the CA ruled that there was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since
the latter is not part of custodial investigation.

Appellant’s assertion that he was under custodial investigation at the time he was identified in a police line-up
and therefore had the right to counsel does not hold water. Ingrained in our jurisdiction is the rule that an
accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part
of custodial investigation. An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at
the start of the investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution
witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was
interrogated at all or that a statement or confession was extracted from him. A priori, We refuse to hearken to
appellant’s hollow cry that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel given the hard fact that during
the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet commenced.

Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to interrogation sans counsel during the police line-up, it
does not in any way affect his culpability. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution
witness and not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission.15 (Citations omitted)

The CA addressed Lara’s claim that the prosecution’s failure to present a witness who actually saw him commit
the crime charged as follows:

Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the prosecution to present an eyewitness to prove that
he shot the victim and took the money.

Such posture is unpersuasive.

Contrary to appellant’s assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim.
Sumulong vividly recounted, viz:

"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from this act was there any other words spoken by this
person?

A There was, sir.

Q What did he say?

A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.

Q Where were you looking when this person approached you?

A I was looking at his face, sir.

Q And upon hearing those words, what did you do?

A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at that time.

Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the money to him?

A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) shouted not to give the money or the bag so I immediately
threw away the bag at the back seat, sir.

Q And how long approximately was that person standing by your car window?

A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.

Q And after you have thrown the black bag containing money to the back of the vehicle, what did that
person do?

A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying the bag and ran away, sir, and I also saw somebody
shoot a gun?

Q Who was firing the gun?

A The one who held-up us, sir.

Q By how, do you know his name?

A No, sir.

Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able to recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please look around and please tell this Honorable Court whether indeed the person you saw holding
you up at that time is in court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to identify him?

Interpreter:

The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on the first bench of the courtroom wearing yellow t-
shirt and black pants who when ask identify himself as Arturo Lara (sic).

Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted from the vehicle and ran away with it, what did the
accused do? (sic)
 A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle, sir.

Q Around how many shots according to your recollection were fired?

A There were several shots, more or less nine (9) shots, sir.

x x x x x x"

"Q So, you did not personally notice what had transpired or happened after you stepped down from the
Nissan pick-up, that is correct?

A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista was shot.

Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already proceeding towards that store to call your office by
phone, that is correct?

A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.

Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the Nissan Sentra when you heard this gunfire?

A Yes, sir.

Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was also at the back of the vehicle, that is correct?

A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the vehicle, he followed Joselito Bautista and shot him.

Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the rear, this alleged holdup(p)er followed him?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire? A Yes, sir.

Q So, you did not personally see who fired that firearm?

A Because at that time he was the one holding the gun, sir.

Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who fired the gun because he was holding the gun, am I
correct?

A Yes, sir."

xxxx

Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the
following requisites concur:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
 (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove that the guilt of appellant is beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:

1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly
emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to produce the bag
containing the money.

2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle.

3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.

4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.

5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.

6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells.16 (Citations omitted
and emphasis supplied)

Finally, the CA found that Lara’s alibi failed to convince. Specifically:

Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical
and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over
the alibi and denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime
transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.
Appellant miserably failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time of
the perpetration of the felonious act. He himself admitted that his house was just a stone’s throw (about three
minutes away) from the crime scene.17 (Citations omitted)

In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua and the parties were afforded an opportunity to file their supplemental briefs. Both parties waived their
right to do so, stating that they would adopt the allegations in their respective briefs that they filed with the CA.

Issues

The present review of Lara’s conviction for robbery with homicide gives rise to the following issues:

a. whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible
because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel;

b. whether Lara’s supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal for the purpose of
nullifying his conviction;

c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara; and

 d. whether Lara’s alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him from the crime charged.

Our Ruling

This Court resolves to deny the appeal.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of
arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court.19 Any
objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial
court upon entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any
irregularities that may have attended his arrest.20

Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that
was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error.21 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except
those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

II

Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a police line-up did not
invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of
counsel did not render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have
arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22

The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The
right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This
is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it
is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the
line-up.23 (Citations omitted)

III

It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against Lara is based on
circumstantial evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this wise considering that only direct and not circumstantial
evidence can overcome the presumption of innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct evidence,
conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other
and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.24

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to
convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is charged. Resort
to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting
felons free and denying proper protection to the community.25

As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances established by the evidence for the prosecution strongly
indicate Lara’s guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he appeared at the front passenger side thereof armed with a
gun; (b) while pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at the front passenger seat, Lara demanded that
Sumulong give him the bag containing the money; (c) instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to
Bautista who was seated at the back of the pick-up; (d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran
towards the back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing so, fired his gun at Bautista’s
direction; (f) Bautista sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g) Bautista’s blood was on the crime scene and
empty shells were recovered therefrom.

Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must itself be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the physical act of asportation by the
accused must be presented by the prosecution. It must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit
was robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery by reason or on
the occasion of the robbery.26 The mere presence of the accused at the crime scene is not enough to implicate
him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob and the use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.

In this case, Lara’s intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s positive narration that it was Lara who pointed the
gun at him and demanded that the bag containing the money be turned over to him. That Lara resorted to
violence in order to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun
at the direction of Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking
possession of the money.

Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of a street. Thus, where considerations of
visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the accused, his or her assertions as
to the identity of the malefactor should be normally accepted.27

Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious
motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial
court found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an
accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and
against the presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former.28

IV

In view of Sumulong’s positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara’s alibi outright. It is
well-settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule,
for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove.29
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere
else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was
not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof.

In this case, the proximity of Lara’s house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi. Assuming as true
Lara’s claim and that of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer trench on the day of the incident, it is
possible that his witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and returning given that the distance between his
house and the place where the subject incident took place can be negotiated, even by walking, in just a matter of
minutes. Simply put, Lara and his witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime.

In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all respects.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-35524             March 18, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JULIAN SUMICAD, defendant-appellant.

Felipe K. Medina for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

STREET, J.:

This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Occidental
Misamis, finding the appellant, Julian Sumicad, guilty of the offense of homicide and sentencing him to
undergo imprisonment for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, and requiring him to indemnify the
family of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, as well as to pay the costs of prosecution.

On February 23, 1931, the accused, a resident of Buenavoluntad, in the municipality of Plaridel, Occidental
Misamis, was engaged with others in the gratuitous labor of hauling logs for the construction of a chapel in the
barrio above-mentioned. At about 5.30 o'clock in the afternoon on the day mentioned, when the laborers were
resting from the work of the day, one Segundo Cubol happened to pass the place where the accused was sitting.
Prior to this date the accused had rendered five and one-half days service to Cubol, and as the latter passed, the
accused said to him, "Segundo, pay me for the five and one-half days work for which you owe me." Cubol
replied, "What debt!," an exclamation which was followed by an insulting expression. At the same time he
struck the accused with his fist. The accused arose from the log upon which he was sitting and moved
backward, trying to escape, but Cubol pursued him and continued striking him with his fists. As the accused
receded he found himself cornered by a pile of logs, the wings of which extended out on either side, effectually
preventing any further retreat. As Cubol pressed upon him, the accused drew his bolo and delivered a blow on
Cubol's right shoulder. Upon this Cubol lunged at the accused with the evident intention of wresting the bolo
from the accused. To prevent this the accused struck two other blows with the bolo, inflicting two deep cuts on
Cubol's forehead above the left eye. One of these blows broke through the cranium. The other made a cut
extending from the left eyebrow to the nose and upper lip. Upon finding a seat on a log nearby. A witness,
named Francisco Villegas, who came up in a moment, after learning something about the matter, asked Cubol
whether he had struck the accused blows with his fist. Cubols replied that he had. The witness Villegas then
turned to the accused, who was standing a short distance away, and told him to put up his bolo and go to the
poblacion. Acting upon this suggestion the accused immediately repaired to the office of the justice of the peace
and surrendered himself to the authorities. Cubol lived only an hour or so, and died from the effect of the
wounds received. In one of the pockets of the deceased a knife was found, and the accused testified that, when
he struck the deceased with his bolo, the latter was attempting to draw a knife from his pocket.

The accused was 25 years of age when this case was tried, has a height of 5 feet and 1-½ inches, and weight of
105 pounds. The deceased appears to have been taller, larger and stronger man. The evidence shows that the
deceased was quarrelsome and in the habit of making frequent trouble by fighting in the places where he
happened to be present with others. In the local courts he had been convicted and sentenced to jail for assault
and battery in two different cases. In another case he was convicted of the offense of inflicting minor physical
injuries, being sentenced to imprisonment for one month and one day. In still another case he had been
convicted of theft and sentenced to imprisonment for the same period of one month and one day. The proof
leaves no reason to doubt that the deceased was hot-tempered and that he had the reputation of being a trouble
maker. It is a safe inference from this proof — and there is nothing to the contrary, — that the deceased was
with good reason considered by his neighbors to be a dangerous man.

From the facts above stated it is evident that the quarrel which resulted in the death of Segundo Cubol was of
his own making, and that the accused was not materially to blame in bringing about the trouble. Two of the
elements of self-defense were therefore clearly present, namely, that the deceased was the aggressor and that
there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. The only further question that can therefore
arise in discussion the criminal liability of the accused is whether there was reasonable necessity for the means
employed by him to prevent or repel the aggression to which he was subjected. Upon this point it will be noted
that, when the aggression was begun by the deceased, the accused retreated until he was cornered in the angle of
a pile of logs. His further retreat was this effectually cut off both in the rear and at the sides. In response to the
blows which the deceased delivered with his fists, the accused first delivered a cut on the left shoulder of the
deceased; but, if we rightly interpret the transcript of the record on this point , the sanitary officer who
exclaimed the body of the deceased meant to say that this wound alone could not have resulted in death. This
we consider to be the decisive turning point in the case. Upon receiving that cut the deceased should have been
admonished that further aggression on his part would be met by determined resistance and that any further
advance would be at grave peril to himself. Instead of acting upon this warning, the deceased pressed forward in
the attempt to possess himself of the bolo, the only means of defense then at the command of the accused.

Under these circumstances what might the accused have been reasonably expected to do. Was he to surrender
the weapon to his assailant, a larger and stronger man than himself, who was now infuriated by the blood that
had been drawn from his shoulder? Or was he justified in keeping the weapon in his hands and, as an ultimate
resort, in using it as a means for his own defense? Our reply is that he was justified in pursuing the latter
alternative; for it would probably have been an act of suicide to permit that weapon to pass into the hands of his
assailant. In judging a question of this kind the reputation of the deceased for violence is pertinent, for it tends
to show that when the fatal blows were struck the accused had reasonable grounds for believing that he was in
grave peril to life or limb.

It is undoubtedly well established in jurisprudence that a man is not, as a rule, justified in taking the life of one
who assaults him with his fist only, without the use of a dangerous weapon. The person assaulted must, in such
case, either resist with the arms that nature gave him or with other means of defense at his disposal, short of
taking life. But that rule contemplates the situation where the contestants are in the open and the person
assaulted can exercise the option of running away. It can have no binding force in the case where the person
assaulted has retreated to the wall, as the saying is, and uses in a defensive way the only weapon at his disposal.
One is not required, when hard pressed, to draw fine distinctions as to the extent of the injury which a reckless
and infuriated assailant might probably inflict upon him (Browell vs. People, 38 Mich., 732). And it was not
incumbent on the accused in this case, when assailed by a bully of known violent disposition, who was larger
and stronger than himself. On the contrary, under the circumstances stated, he had the right to resist the
aggression with the bolo, and if he unfortunately inflicted a fatal blow, it must be considered to have been given
in justifiable self-defense. Upon this point it may be recalled that the deceased, when asked about the
circumstances of the homicide, admitted that he himself was the aggressor; and it is noteworthy that he used no
word placing blame upon the accused.

We are of the opinion that all the elements necessary to constitute justifiable self-defense were present in this
case and the accused should have been acquitted.

The judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed and the appellant absolved from the information, with
costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.

C.A. No. 384             February 21, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants.
AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant.

Jose Ma. Recto for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Enriquez and Solicitor Palma for appellee..

DE JOYA, J.:

Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime
of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of
homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day of
prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-
half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her.

From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern
Luzon, and in her brief filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed —

(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had acted in the legitimate defense of her
honor and that she should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility;

(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional mitigating circumstances that (a)
she did not have the intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed, and that (b) she
voluntarily surrendered to the agents of the authorities; and
 (3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged offense was attended by the
aggravating circumstance of having been committed in a sacred place.

The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has sufficiently established the following
facts:

That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado Capina lived in the barrio of
Sta. Isabel, City of San Pablo, Province of Laguna; that for sometime prior to the stabbing of the deceased by
defendant and appellant, in the evening of September 20, 1942, the former had been courting the latter in vain,
and that on one occasion, about one month before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched a handkerchief
belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling," while it was being washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.

On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached her and spoke to
her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her
breasts, on account of which Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows
and kicked him. She kept the matter to herself, until the following morning when she informed her mother about
it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife, whenever she went out, evidently for self-protection.

On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant and appellant, and
surreptitiously entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with the intention of
abusing her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and brought them to her side.
Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed in Avelina's room and kissed the hand of Nicolas
Jaurigue, her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made an attempt to beat Amado, her
husband prevented her from doing so, stating that Amado probably did not realize what he was doing. Nicolas
Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the following morning.
Amado's parents came to the house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the misconduct of their son; and as
Nicolas Jaurigue was then angry, he told them to end the conversation, as he might not be able to control
himself.

In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had been falsely boasting in
the neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person and that she had even asked him to elope with her
and that if he should not marry her, she would take poison; and that Avelina again received information of
Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.

At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of
the Seventh Day Adventists of which he was the treasurer, in their barrio, just across the provincial road from
his house, to attend religious services, and sat on the front bench facing the altar with the other officials of the
organization and the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada. Inside the chapel it was quite bright as there were
electric lights.

Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also for the
purpose of attending religious services, and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door. Amado
Capina was seated on the other side of the chapel. Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado
Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a word,
Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. On observing this
highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capina, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity
and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a pocket of her
dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she
quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck,
inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who was
seated on one of the front benches, saw Amado bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his
daughter still holding the bloody knife, he approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and answering
him Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure anymore." Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes
later. Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada, who was also in the same chapel, approached Avelina and asked her
why she did that, and Avelina surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po ang bahala sa aquin," meaning: "I hope
you will take care of me," or more correctly, "I place myself at your disposal." Fearing that Amado's relatives
might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go
home immediately, to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless
accompanied by him. That father and daughter went home and locked themselves up, following instructions of
the barrio lieutenant, and waited for the arrival of the municipal authorities; and when three policemen arrived
in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant
immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen briefly of what had
actually happened in the chapel and of the previous acts and conduct of the deceased, as already stated above,
and went with said policemen to the police headquarters, where her written statements were taken, and which
were presented as a part of the evidence for the prosecution.

The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble they may be, is universal. It has
been entertained and has existed in all civilized communities.

A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous woman represents the
only true nobility. And they are the future wives and mothers of the land. Such are the reasons why, in the
defense of their honor, when brutally attacked, women are permitted to make use of all reasonable means
available within their reach, under the circumstances. Criminologists and courts of justice have entertained and
upheld this view.

On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to womanhood, as in the days of
chivalry. There is a country where women freely go out unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in their public
gardens, they always receive the protection of all. That country is Switzerland.

In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our own person,
we have the right to property acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of our
patrimony (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., pp. 172, 173).

The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate
defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very
existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be
afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it
became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th
ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). .

As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the defense of
her honor. Thus, where the deceased grabbed the defendant in a dark night at about 9 o'clock, in an isolated
barrio trail, holding her firmly from behind, without warning and without revealing his identity, and, in the
struggle that followed, touched her private parts, and that she was unable to free herself by means of her
strength alone, she was considered justified in making use of a pocket knife in repelling what she believed to be
an attack upon her honor, and which ended in his death, since she had no other means of defending herself, and
consequently exempt from all criminal liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 16 Phil., 344).

And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant with a bolo
which she happened to be carrying at the time, even though her cry for assistance might have been heard by
people nearby, when the deceased tried to assault her in a dark and isolated place, while she was going from her
house to a certain tienda, for the purpose of making purchases (United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos, 22
Phil., 249).
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by someone touching her arm, and,
believing that some person was attempting to abuse her, she asked who the intruder was and receiving no reply,
attacked and killed the said person with a pocket knife, it was held that, notwithstanding the woman's belief in
the supposed attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or aggression to justify her completely in using deadly
weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the beginning of an attempt against her, she was not completely
warranted in making such a deadly assault, as the injured person, who turned out to be her own brother-in-law
returning home with his wife, did not do any other act which could be considered as an attempt against her
honor (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391)..

In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the latter climbed up her house
late at night on September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose of
raping her, as indicated by his previous acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for help, she could have
been perfectly justified in killing him, as shown by the authorities cited above..

According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this case, when the
deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and
placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with
electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside the chapel, including her own
father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and under the circumstances, there was
and there could be no possibility of her being raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base of
the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few
moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the
facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability..

But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the
barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and
agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant,
an agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the further fact that she had acted in
the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such
provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be
considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People vs. Sakam, 61
Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).

Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to
punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single
wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in her favor (United States vs.
Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123).

The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was committed by the
defendant and appellant, with the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to
religious worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant
had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a criminal by nature. She
happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing young woman, typical of our country girls,
who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world where so many others have hopelessly lost the
faith of their elders and now drifting away they know not where.

The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear, therefore, to be well taken; and so is
the first assignment of error to a certain degree.

In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina, in the
manner and form and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the
crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating
circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor; and, in accordance with the provisions of
article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by one or two degrees in the penalty to be
imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the instant case, the defendant and appellant should be
accorded the most liberal consideration possible under the law (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391; United
States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950)..

The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide; and if it should be reduced by
two degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the instant case is that of prision correccional; and pursuant to the
provisions of section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, herein defendant and appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto
mayor in its medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree. Consequently, with the modification
of judgment appealed from, defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and
one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant
and appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked
Exhibit B ordered confiscated. So ordered..

G.R. Nos. 128159-62            July 14, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
HIPOLITO PASCUA, appellant.

CORONA, J.:

Before us is an appeal from the decision dated November 14, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan,
Branch 38, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case.

The appellant was charged with four counts of rape in separate informations which read:

"CRIM. CASE NO. L-5409

"That on or about the 27th day of January, 1996 in the evening, in barangay Calvo, municipality of
Mangatarem, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Liza Paragas, a 12-year old minor inside his house
against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

"CONTRARY to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659.

"CRIM. CASE NO. L-5410

 "That on or about the 6th day of August 1995 in the evening, in barangay Calvo, municipality of
Mangatarem, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Liza Paragas, a 12-year old minor inside his house
against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

"CONTRARY to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659.

"CRIM. CASE NO. L-5411

"That on or about the 20th day of January 1996 in the evening, in barangay Calvo, municipality of
Mangatarem, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Anna Paragas, a 12-year old minor inside his house
against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

"CONTRARY to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659.

"CRIM. CASE NO. L-5412

"That on or about the month of August 1995 in the evening, in barangay Calvo, municipality of
Mangatarem, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Anna Paragas, a 12-year old minor inside his house
against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

"CONTRARY to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659."1

On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to all charges. Thereupon, joint trial of the cases ensued.

The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

Private complainants Liza and Anna, both surnamed Paragas, are twins born on July 12, 1983. The appellant
was their neighbor in Calvo, Mangatarem, Pangasinan. Liza and Anna considered appellant as their grandfather
although he was not related to them.

On August 6, 1995, private complainants were playing near the house of the appellant when the latter called
Liza and instructed her to buy juice at the store. Liza obeyed. After she returned from the store, the appellant
ordered Liza to go inside his house and lie down on the floor. Appellant then removed Liza’s pants and
underwear, went on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements. Liza tried
to scream but appellant threatened to kill her.

After the sexual intercourse, the appellant gave Liza P10 and warned her not to reveal the incident to her
mother. Liza then went home but did not tell her mother what happened for fear that her mother would punish
her.

The same thing happened on January 27, 1996 when Liza was called by the appellant as she was passing by his
house. Once Liza was inside, she was forced to lie down by the appellant who then removed her pants and
underwear. Appellant went on top of Liza and inserted his penis into her vagina before making push and pull
movements. Liza was not able to shout because appellant again threatened to kill her. After her ordeal, the
appellant gave Liza P5 and reminded her not to tell her mother what happened. So Liza went home without
telling her mother that she was sexually abused by the appellant.

Liza’s twin sister, Anna, suffered the same fate at the hands of the appellant. Sometime in August 1995, while
Anna was playing with her cousins, the appellant called her and asked her to go inside his house. As soon as
Anna entered his house, the appellant closed the door, removed Anna’s pants and underwear, and made her lie
down on the floor. Thereafter, the appellant inserted his penis into Anna’s vagina and ravished her. Anna felt
pain but could not shout as appellant threatened to kill her. The appellant also warned her not to tell her mother
about the incident. Thus, when Anna went home, she did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her.

On January 20, 1996, Anna was on her way home after buying charcoal from the store when the appellant
called her anew. As soon as Anna was inside appellant’s house, the latter told her to remove her pants and
underwear but Anna refused. So appellant himself forcibly removed Anna’s clothes and went on top of her
before inserting his penis into her vagina. Again, Anna was not able to shout because she was afraid that the
appellant would kill her. As in the prior incident, Anna did not tell her mother that the appellant molested her.

Private complainants’ mother, Leticia Paragas, learned of her daughters’ ordeal through her older daughter,
Rosalina, who, in turn, came to know of the rape incidents from the appellant’s granddaughter. Apparently the
granddaughter witnessed the appellant as he was raping Liza and told Rosalina about it.

Upon learning what the appellant had done to her daughters, Leticia confronted them. Liza and Anna were
initially reluctant to talk but upon further questioning, they finally revealed that the appellant had sexually
abused them. Leticia wasted no time in reporting the matter to their barangay chairman and to the police before
whom she filed criminal complaints against the appellant. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Mangatarem
District Hospital where the victims were examined by Dr. Athena Merrera.

The medico-legal examination conducted on Liza disclosed that she had lacerations at the 3, 4, 5 and 9 o’clock
positions which were caused by the insertion of a hard object like the erect penis of a man. On the other hand,
the medical findings on Anna showed that she had lacerations at the 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10 o’clock positions which
were also caused by the insertion of a hard object such as an erect penis. These lacerations suffered by both
victims were determined to have been inflicted several weeks or months before the examination on February 14,
1996.

At the trial, appellant Hipolito Pascua and his granddaughter, Joy Javier, testified for the defense. The appellant
admitted having sexual intercourse with private complainants but insisted that Liza and Anna freely consented
to the repeated sexual acts in exchange for money ranging from P5 to P10. On several occasions, Liza and Anna
allegedly visited him at home asking for money and sexual satisfaction. In fact, it was private complainants’
supposed persistence which drove him to accede to their demands to have sex, even if he was having difficulty
achieving erection as he was suffering from hernia. Thus, there was never an instance when the appellant forced
or threatened private complainants into having sexual intercourse with him.

Joy Javier declared that she often saw private complainants at the house of the appellant. At one time, she asked
Anna if she had sexual intercourse with the appellant to which Anna nodded. She even warned both Liza and
Anna that if they continued to go to appellant’s house, their mother would know about it. However, despite said
warning, she still saw private complainants at the house of the appellant almost everyday.

On November 14, 1996, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

Wherefore, in the light of all the considerations discussed above, the court hereby renders judgment in
the above-entitled cases as follows:
 In Criminal Case Nos. L-5409 and L-5410, the court hereby finds and holds the accused, Hipolito
Pascua, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape on two (2) counts as charged in the
informations filed against him, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, and conformable thereto, pursuant to law, hereby sentences said
accused in each case to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.

The court further directs the accused to indemnify the offended party, Liza Paragas, the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in each case or a total of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, as
moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In Criminal Cases Nos. L-5411 and L-5412, the court likewise finds and holds the accused Hipolito
Pascua, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape on two (2) counts as charged in the
informations filed against him, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, and conformable thereto, pursuant to law, hereby sentences the
said accused in each case to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.

The court likewise directs the accused to indemnify the offended party, Anna Paragas, the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in each case or a total of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, as
moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.2

Insisting on his innocence, the appellant claims in his appeal that he is not guilty of rape because private
complainants voluntarily submitted to his sexual desires. The appellant even postulates that, if there should at
all be any liability on his part, it should only be for simple seduction.

After an exhaustive review, we find ourselves unable to agree with appellant’s reasoning. The appellant’s
defense that the victims consented to his lascivious desires is simply too preposterous to deserve serious
consideration. The same is not only revolting but goes against established norms. No young child in her right
mind will consent to have sexual intercourse with a 65-year-old man, specially one whom she considers her
grandfather. The appellant desperately tries to portray private complainants as sex-starved maniacs who, at the
tender age of 12, persistently demanded sex with him. Further, his story that private complainants would even
go naked on top of him was nothing but a yarn that offends sensibilities and Filipino values. Indeed, after
admitting that he had carnal knowledge of private complainants on several occasions, the appellant assumed the
burden of proving his defense by substantial evidence. The record shows that, other than his self-serving
assertions, the appellant had nothing to support his claim that private complainants were teenagers of loose
morals and that the repeated acts of sexual intercourse were consensual.

It is culturally instinctive for young and decent Filipinas to protect their honor and obtain justice for the wicked
acts committed on them. Thus, it is difficult to believe that private complainants would fabricate a tale of
defloration, allow the embarrassing examination of their private parts, reveal the shame to the small rural town
where they grew up and permit themselves to be subjected to a humiliating public trial if they had not in fact
been really ravished. When the offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16, as in this case,
courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability but also the public humiliation to which they would be exposed by court trial if their accusation
were not true.3

We entertain no doubt that Liza and Anna told the truth. Their testimony was clear that they never consented to
the rape. Their declarations during the trial were simple, straightforward and unflawed by any inconsistency or
contradiction. A candid and honest narration by the victim of how she was abused must be given full faith and
credit for they contain earmarks of credibility.4 In this case, the trial court found these badges of truth to be
present in the following testimony of Liza Paragas:
 FISCAL:

Q         Where were you by that time when you were ordered by the accused to lie down on the flooring?

WITNESS:

A         I was in his house, sir.

Q         Now, what transpired after you were ordered to lie down?

A         He removed my pants and my underwear, sir.

Q         After removing your pants and underwear, what transpired next?

A         Then, he went on top of me, sir.

Q         What happened next after the accused went on top of you?

A         Then, he made a (sic) push and pull movements, sir.

COURT:

Coitus movement.

FISCAL:

Q         What did the accused do when he made this coitus movement?

WITNESS:

A         He insert (sic) his penis on (sic) my vagina, sir.

Q         When he insert (sic) his penis inside your vagina, can you tell if you shouted?

A         He warned me not to shout or else he will kill me, sir.

Q         At what point and time when the accused threaten (sic) you that he will kill you if you will shout,
before he place (sic) his penis inside your vagina or after he placed already his penis inside your vagina?

A         Before inserting his penis on (sic) my vagina, sir.

Q         How long a time did the accused make this coitus movement as his penis was inside your
vagina?

A         For five (5) minutes, sir.5

It is clear from the foregoing testimony that private complainants tried to scream but the appellant prevented
them by threatening to kill them. Also, after each rape incident, private complainants were warned by the
appellant not to tell their mother what happened to them. It is settled that a rape victim is not required to resist
her attacker unto death. Force, as an element of rape, need not be irresistible; it need only be present and so long
as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the
point.6 Indeed, physical resistance need not be established in rape when, as in this case, intimidation was used
on the victim and she submitted to the rapist’s lust for fear of her life or her personal safety. Jurisprudence holds
that even though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet, if by an array of physical forces, he so overpowers her
mind that she does not resist or she ceases resistance through fear of greater harm, the consummation of
unlawful intercourse by the man is rape.7 Without question, the prosecution was able to prove that force or
intimidation was actually employed by the appellant on the two victims to satisfy his lust.

Equally untenable is the argument of the appellant that, if he is at all liable for anything, it should only be for
simple seduction. Under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code, to constitute seduction, there must in all cases
be some deceitful promise or inducement. The woman should have yielded because of this promise or
inducement. In this case, the appellant claims that the acts of sexual intercourse with the private complainants
were in exchange for money. He declared that, prior to every sexual intercourse with Liza and Anna, he would
promise them P20. However, aside from his bare testimony, the appellant presented no proof that private
complainants’ consent was secured by means of such promise. As aptly opined by the trial court, the money
given by the appellant to private complainants was not intended to lure them to have sex with him. Rather, it
was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure that nobody discovered his dastardly acts. The evidence for
the prosecution was more than enough to show that the element of voluntariness on the part of private
complainants was totally absent. Liza and Anna’s respective testimonies established that the appellant had
sexual intercourse with them without their consent and against their will. Considering that the victims’ accounts
of what the appellant did to them were absolutely credible and believable, the trial court correctly convicted the
appellant of several crimes of rape against the 12-year-old twins, Liza and Anna Paragas.

The Court finds the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on the appellant for each count of rape committed
against private complainants to be in accord with law. The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000
for each offense, or a total of P100,000 for each victim, is also correct because, under prevailing jurisprudence,
moral damages are mandatory in rape cases involving young girls between 12 and 19 years of age, taking into
account the immeasurable havoc wrought on their youthful psyche.8 The trial court, however, failed to award
civil indemnity which is automatically granted to the offended party without need of further evidence other than
the commission of the rape. Hence, an additional P50,000 for each count of rape, or a total of P100,000, should
be given each private complainant as civil indemnity.

WHEREFORE, except for the MODIFICATION awarding private complainants an additional amount of
P100,000 each as civil indemnity, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

G.R. No. L-26458 January 30, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALFONSO PAJENADO @ OSOY EDILBERTO PAJENADO, CECILIO PAJENADO, CARLITO
PAJENADO, and ANICETO TOLING, defendants-appellants.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Solicitor Teodulo R. Diño for plaintiff-appellee.

Cesar A. Seville for defendants-appeallants.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

Mandatory review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Samar finding the accused guilty of the
crime of Murder and sentencing all of them to DEATH, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Jorge Tapong the sum of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs.

In the evening of March 26, 1966, there was a party at the house of Constancio Pajenado in barrio Dapdap, Las
Navas, Samar, to celebrate the betrothal of his daughter to the son of one Guillermo Quebec. Food and drinks
were served to the guests among whom were the municipal mayor of Las Navas, one Ases Jolejole, barrio
captain Teofilo Jorda, barrio policemen Domingo Pajac and Benito Sacay, the deceased Jorge Tapong, and the
five accused. At the height of the festivities, Mayor Jolejole commented that the deceased Jorge Tapong was
already drunk and should be brought home. Consequently, the barrio captain, Teofilo Jorda, ordered two of his
barrio policemen then present, Domingo Pajac and Benito Sacay, to help him in taking

Tapong to the house of Pelagia Tapong Gutaba, a cousin of the deceased. While they were on their way, the five
accused, each armed with a piece of wood suddenly emerged between the houses of Victoria Pajac and Elicito
Gutaba, and with the accused Alfonso Pajenado focusing his flashlight on the eyes of Tapong, they started
beating the latter in different parts of his body until he fell. At the time of the incident, the street was well-
lighted by the light coming from a Petromax lamp in the house of one Donata Pajac. Teofilo Jorda who was
following behind and who witnessed the entire incident blew his whistle and tried to stop the said accused from
beating Tapong, but they did not heed him. After Tapong fell down, the five accused ran away.

Teofilo Jorda aided by rural policeman Pajac and Sacay brought Tapong to hs house and attempted to secure a
statement from him. But, the deceased was already in a coma and was unable to talk. So, Jorda sent for
Tapong's relatives who took the deceased to the poblacion of Las Navas to seek medical attendance, but Tapong
died while they were on the way.

Jorda immediately reported the incident to the chief of police of Las Navas. Thereafter, an autopsy of the
deceased was made by Dr. Angel Tan. The medical examiner found that the deceased suffered the following
external injuries:

1. Hematoma 4 cm. x 1 cm., irregular in shape, left supraorbital region.

2. Abrasion-hematoma, linear in shape surrounded by an area of swelling, forearm, right, proximal portion.

3. Abrasion-hematoma, 6 cm. x 1 cm., with its long axis perpendicular to the neck, situated at the left supra-
auricular region.

4. Abrasion-hematoma, 4 cm. x 4 cm. infra-suricular region, right.

5. Abrasion-hematoma, linear in shape 3 cm. x 3 cm. situated at the left lateral aspect of the trunk, crossing the
6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th ribs backwards and downwards.

6. Swelling neck, right side.

7. Hematoma with swelling right parieto-temporal region.

He concluded that the cause of death is "Uncal herniation leading to death from an increase in intracranial
pressure brought about by an intracranial hemorrhage on account of a fracture of the right parieto-temporal
bone"; and that "the swelling in the right side of the neck could have exerted pressure on the trachea thereby
further embarrassing respiratory excursions and should therefore be considered as contributory factors in the
causation of death." 1 The doctor further testified that the aforesaid injuries could have been caused by a blunt
instrument like a piece of wood.

The accused Aniceto Toling admitted responsibility for the injuries sustained by the deceased Jorge Tapong and
denied that his other co-accused had any hand in beating up the deceased. In justification, he claims that he
acted in the lawful performance of a duty or office. According to him, he was a barrio policeman of barrio
Dapdap and was also present in the house of Constancio Pajenado when the incident' complained of took Place;
that when Tapong became drunk and noisy at the party, he helped Teofilo Jorda and Benito Sacay taking
Tapong to the house of Pelagia Tapong Gutaba; that while they -were on their way, Tapong was asking why he
was taken away from the party; that when they arrived at the house of Pelagia Tapong again asked them why he
was brought there, and the barrio captain relied that his actuations were shameful to the mayor; that Tapong
became angry and got a bolo depang from the wall of the house and jumped out; that the barrio captain blew his
whistle and ordered them to disarm Tapong; that in compliance with said order, he picked up a piece of bamboo
and told Tapong to drop his weapon, but Tapong, instead, lunged at him, for which reason, he struck Tapong in
the arm; that Sacay, who was behind Tapong, also beat Tapong several times with a lice of wood; that his co-
accused Alfonso. Pajenado was focusing his flashlight on Tapong while he was beating up the latter; that after
Tapong fell, he got the bolo from the hands of the ate Tapong and handed it to Patrolman Ortiz who was
standing nearby, and then left for home, across the river; that the following morning, he went to his farm and
while there, his conscience bothered him for which reason, he went to the chief of police of Las Navas the next
day and reported the matter, but the chief of police told him to wait for the complaint; and that in the meantime,
he was held in protective custody.

The accused Alfonso Pajenado admitted that he was the one focusing his flashlight on the deceased when
Toling was beating Tapong, but denied having participated in the said beating of the deceased.

All the other accused, namely: Edilberto Pajenado, Cecilia Pajenado, and Carlito Pajenado, did not testify in
court.

Inasmuch as Aniceto Toling admitted that he was the author of the death of the deceased Jorge Tapong, it was
incumbent upon him, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him on
the strength of his own evidence without relying on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the
evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the
killing. 2

A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise-of a right
or office. 3 There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the
offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (b) that the injury
or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise
of such right or office. 4 In the case at bar, we find no legal basis to justify Toling's action. As found by the trial
court, Toling's claim that he was a barrio policeman of Dapdap at the time of the incident is not worthy of belief
as his appointment as such by the Municipal Mayor of Las Navas, Samar on February 24, 1964 is null and void
inasmuch as the municipal mayor does not possess the power to appoint barrio policemen, such power being
vested in the barrio captain pursuant to the provisions of Section 14 (e) and (i) of Republic Act No. 3590.
Further, barrio captain Teofilo Jorda categorically stated that the accused Aniceto Toling is not a policeman of
the said barrio.

Besides, we find Toling's action not indicative of a person clothed with authority performing a lawful duty.
Thus, he testified that after Tapong fell he ran towards the people who had gathered around, especially towards
the person who was focusing a flashlight, and after recognizing his co-accused Alfonso Pajenado to be the one
doing it, he came back to the deceased and picked up the bolo depang from the hands of the prostrate Tapong
and gave it to the municipal policeman who was standing nearby. Immediately thereafter, he ran home and the
following day, he went to his farm. Why did he run? To run away from the scene of a crime is indicative of
guilt. Why did he not inform the barrio captain of the incident considering that it was the barrio captain who had
allegedly ordered him to disarm Tapong? Such unnatural action negates and renders improbable the claim that
he was acting in the fulfillment of a duty.

Appellants' counsel points to several facts and circumstances which the trial court allegedly failed to appreciate
or give due weight to, which should have caused the rejection of the case for the prosecution or, at least,
rendered it doubtful.

Foremost, is the alleged lack of motive for the five accused to harm the deceased. It is true that no motive has
been shown why the appellants would beat Jorge Tapong to death, but this Court has repeatedly held that
motive is pertinent only when there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit, something which does not obtain in
the case at bar as the five accused were Positively Identified by prosecution witnesses to be the assailants of the
victim. 5

Appellants make capital of the affidavits executed by prosecution witnesses Teofilo Jorda and Domingo Pajac
which are conflicting and contradictory to what they have testified in court. It is unfortunate that the original
records of this case were lost 6 and the aforementioned affidavits have not been reconstituted. At any rate, it can
be gleaned from the records that on March 28, 1966, when Teofilo Jorda and Domingo Pajac reported the
incident to the chief of police of Las Navas, their statements were reduced to writing. 7 In said statements, they
said, among others, that while they were escorting Jorge Tapong to the house of Pelagia Tapong Gutaba,
Tapong got sore and attacked the policemen with a bolo depang so that they scampered away and did not know
who later on beat up Tapong. Then, on March 29, 1966, they subscribed to affidavits 8 pointing to the accused
as the assailants of the declared but disclaiming knowledge of the start of the incident, for Jorda stated that he
just saw the accused beating the deceased, while. Pajac said that he arrived at the scene only upon hearing the
whistle blown by Jorda Admittedly, their declarations are conflicting. These inconsistent statements, however,
were explained by Jorda and Pajac to the effect that their first statements (Exhs. 2 & 4) were dictated to them by
Mayor Jolejole who wanted to protect the accused who were his political followers and they were afraid to
displease the mayor, 9 and that the wording of their second statements (Exhs. 1 & 3) was that of the chief of
police who typed the same. 10 Anyway, the inconsistency refers to a trivial detail. It cannot destroy the
probative value of their consistent testimony on how the five accused assaulted the deceased.

Counsel for the appellants would also want this Court to disregard the testimony of the People's rebuttal
witnesses Gertrudes Adora, Angel Tapong, and Pelagia Tapong Gutaba for the reasons that Gertrudes Adora,
being the sister-in-law of Domingo Pajac is biased that Angel Tapong and Pelagia Tapong Gutaba, brother and
sister, being cousins of the deceased, and the son of Angel Tapong having been recently slain by the son of the
accused Alfonso Pajenado, have plainly an axe to grind against the defendants surnamed Pajenado Mere
relationship, however, is not sufficient to discard the testimony of credible witnesses, especially where there is
no showing that these witnesses have testified merely by reason of relationship or alleged interest in the case,
other than a desire to see that justice is done.

It results that the trial court did not err in accepting the prosecution's version as worthy of belief and in
concluding that the guilt of the five accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellants dispute the findings of the trial court that all the accused helped one another in beating the
deceased Tapong with pieces of wood. Conspiracy, however, may be inferred from the appellants' conduct. The
five accused emerged between the houses of Victoria Pajac and Elisoto Gutaba. All of them were armed with
pieces of wood. The accused Alfonso Pajenado had with him a flashlight which he focused on the eyes of Jorge
Tapong while they were all beating Tapong. All of them fled after Tapong fell down due to the blows inflicted
upon him. It is evident that they had community of design.

The appellants, likewise, contend that the crime committed by them, if any, is only homicide and not murder in
view of the absence of the qualifying circumstance of either treachery and/or abuse of superior strength. There
was treachery because the five accused suddenly intercepted Tapong while he was on his way to the house of
Pelagia. The appellants resorted to a mode of attack which insured the consummation of the crime without any
risk to themselves. The victim was unarmed and he had no time to defend himself in view of the suddenness of
the assault and the fact that he was drunk at the time. Alevosia qualifies the killing as murder. It is not necessary
to resolve whether there was abuse of superior strength because the circumstance, if present, would be absorbed
in treachery. 11

Appellants further contend that the trial court failed to appreciate in their favor the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. They claim that the weapons used are mere pieces of wood, and
the fact that only seven blows were dealt the deceased by the five of them, only two of which turned out to be
fatal, shows that the tragic and grievous result was far from their minds. The record shows, however, that the
offense committed was characterized by treachery and tile appellants left the scene of the crime only after the
victim had fallen down. Hence, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention cannot be appreciated in favor
of the appellants. 12

The crime committed is murder qualified by treachery. Although, as recommended by the Solicitor-General, the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is merged in treachery, there is, however, present the aggravating
circumstance of the offense having been committed by a band. 13 The penalty to be imposed should therefore
be DEATH. However, for lack of the necessary number of votes, we hereby impose the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The indemnity should be increased to P12,000.00.

WHEREFORE, modified as thus indicated, the decision under review is affirmed in all other respects, with
costs against the appellants.

G.R. No. L-18660 December 22, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELIPE DELIMA, defendant-appellant.

Tancinco & Rosales for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence.

Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the house of Jorge
Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender. The
fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged, it, and to impose his authority fired his
revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. These peace
officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him.

The policeman was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and the accessory
penalties. He appeals from that judgment which must be reversed.

That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender, and
had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the
hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal,
was justified by the circumstances.lawphil.net

Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is hereby
acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-31563 January 16, 1930

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LUCIANO BARROGA Y

SALGADO, Defendant-Appellant.

M. H. de Joya and Briccio de Jesus for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

Convicted of the crime of falsification of a private document, the defendant appeals from the judgment
sentencing him to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the
Compa�ia General de Tabacos de Filipinas in the sum of P10,857.11, with subsidiary imprisonment, the
accessaries of law, and the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The errors attributed by the appellant to the trial court are:

1. In considering the evidence of the prosecution more worthy of credit than that of the
defense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. In finding the defendant-appellant guilty of the crime of falsification of private documents, and in imposing
upon him the penalty of one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the
Compa�ia General de Tabacos de Filipinas in the sum of P10,857.11, and to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial, notwithstanding the
insufficiency of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

The defendant freely admits that he prepared the falsified documents with full knowledge of their falsity; but he
alleges that he did so from data furnished by his immediate chief, the now deceased Baldomero Fernandez, and
only in obedience to instructions from him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As regards the data, we find it to be sufficiently proven that they were not supplied by the aforementioned
Baldomero Fernandez, but by the head of the pressmen, Hermenegildo de la Cruz, and the defendant later
collated them with the books of the daily pressings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

With respect to the alleged instructions give by said Baldomero Fernandez, even supposing that he did in fact
give them, and that the defendant committed the crime charged by virtue thereof, inasmuch as such instructions
were not lawful, they do not legally shield the appellant, nor relieve him from criminal liability. In order to
exempt from guilt, obedience must be due, or as Viada lucidly states, it must be a compliance with "a lawful
order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern, and that the person commanding, act within the scope
of his authority. As a general rule, an inferior should obey his superior but, as an illustrious commentator has
said, "between a general law which enjoins obedience to a superior giving just orders, etc., and a prohibitive law
which plaintiff forbids what that superior commands, the choice is not doubtful." (1 Penal Code, Viada, 5th
edition, p. 528.) chanrobles virtual law library

We reiterate the statement that it has not been proved that the defendant committed the acts charged in the
information in obedience to the instructions of a third party. But even granting, for the sake of argument, that
such was the case, we repeat that such obedience was not legally due, and therefore does not exempt from
criminal liability. (U. S. vs Cuison, 20 Phil., 433.) chanrobles virtual law library

There being no merit in the assignments of error, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-2681             March 30, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DARIO MARGEN, ET AL., defendants.
ANDRES MIDORANDA, appellant.

Tomas Gomez, Jr. for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.

REYES, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Samar convincing appellant of murder and
sentencing him to life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Diego Testor in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.

The evidence shows that some time before March 11, 1944, the now deceased Diego Testor was asked by one
Ponting in the barrio of Trinidad, municipality of Calbayog, Province of Samar. The detachment was made up
of seven or eight men with Dario Margen in command. Needing food for his children, Testor traded the fish for
camote, and when he was sent for the Sergeant Margen to make him to the barracks a quantity of another kind
of fish, called kalapion. Irritated by Testor's conduct, Sergeant Margen took hold of the fish and threw them into
Testor's face, and then he had Testor's hand tied behind his back and gave him fish blows. Taking their cue from
the sergeant, three of the soldiers namely, Julian Tarrayo, Domingo Ramos (now deceased) and Andres
Midoranda also maltreated Testor's by hitting him in different parts of the body. Thereafter, Sergeant Margen
forced Testor to eat up to two of the kalapions. In this the sergeant forced Testor's mouth, and by Miranda, who
had the lose end of the rope with which Testor's hand were tied. After this ordeal Testor was taken to Calbayog
where, despite medical attendance, he died the following day, March 12, 1944. The cadaver presented various
contusions, but autopsy revealed that death was due the intestines by fish bones.

For the death of Diego Testor, Margen, Tarrayo, and Midoranda were prosecuted for murder. But only
Midoranda, the herein appellant, was tried because the other two were able to escape.

There is hardly any doubt as to the essential facts. While appellant would have the court believe that he did not
join his companions in maltreating the deceased, alleging that all he did was stand by the watch, this allegation
is believe by the testimony of eye-witness whose veracity has not been put in doubt. Indeed, appellant's own
witness, Eleuterio Anabeso, admitted on cross-examination that appellant was among those who slapped the
deceased in the face. The evidence is, we believe, quite clear that appellant cooperated with his codefendants in
binding and beating up the decease as well as in the no less inhuman act of making him devour raw fish—flesh,
scales, spines, and all.

It is not disputed that the crime of murder was committed in this case, it appearing that the acts which resulted
in the death of Diego Testor were performed when the latter, with his hands bound behind his back, was entirely
defenseless. But counsel for the defense argues that, in the absence of proof of conspiracy, appellant should not
be held liable for the said crime because he merely obeyed the orders of his superior.

Obedience to an order of a superior give rise to exemption from criminal liability only when the order is for
some lawful purpose (art. 11, par. 6, Revised Penal Code). Sergeant Margen's order to have the deceased
tortured was not that did not give the sergeant the right to take the law in his own hands and have the offender
subjected to inhuman punishment. The order was illegal, and appellant was not bound to obey it. Moreover, it
does not appear that in taking part in the maltreatment of the decease, appellant was prompted solely by his
sense of duty toward his superior. What appeared is that he and his companions had a common grievance
against the deceased, because the latter had misappropriated a quantity of fish intended for their consumption. It
was, therefore, but natural that they should all want to teach the deceased a lesson by making him suffer for the
fault he had committed.

Having taken direct part in the unlawful acts which resulted in the death of the deceased and nothing having
been proved which would exempt him from criminal liability, appellant must be held as coprincipal of the crime
of murder changed in the information. We do not find in circumstances attending the commission of the crime
anything that should aggravate or mitigating criminal liability, and as the penalty imposed below is in
accordance with law, the sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-4445             February 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and JACINTO
ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants.

Agripino A. Brillantes, Valera, Eufemio and Bernardez for appellants.

Prospero C. Sanidad and Claro M. Recto for defendant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jaime R. de los Angeles and Martiniano P. Vivo for
appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder for
the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz , Province of Abra.

Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor
during the Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon
his life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor
of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army, operating as a
guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military Mayor, Beronilla
received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon,
authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding
and abetting (of ) the enemy" (Exhibit 9). He also received from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a list of
all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La
Paz), with a memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them
complaints from people of the municipality for collaboration with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a).

Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in progress,
Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla,
pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the residents of La Paz to file complaints
against him. In no time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed against
Borjal; a 12-man jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of Jesus Labuguen as chairman, and Benjamin
Adriatico, Andres Afos, Juanito Casal, Santiago Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos, Mariano Ajel,
Felimon Labuguen, Felix Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and Delfin Labuguen as members; while Felix Alverne and
Juan Balmaceda were named prosecutors, Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Lino Inovermo as counsel
for the accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras voluntarily appeared and served as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban
Cabanos observed the proceedings for several days upon instructions of Headquarters, 15th Infantry. The trial
lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon him
instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the
15th Infantry for review. Said records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold to Beronilla on April 18, 1945 with the
following instructions:

HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT

15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field

16 April 1945

Msg. No. 337

Subject: Arsenio Borjal, Charges Against
To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra.
 1. Returned herewith are the papers on the case of Arsenio Borjal.
2. This is a matter best handled by your government and whatever disposition you make of the case is
hereby approved.

(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding

Received April 18, 1945, 10:35 a.m.

(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA

Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra

(Exhibit 8, 8-a)

and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico
acted as executioner and Antonio Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was
asked to administer the last confession to the prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church
performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the matter to
Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report, sent him the following message:

HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT

15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field

22 April 1945

Msg. No. 398

Subject: Report and information Re Borjal case
To: Military Mayor Beronilla

1. Received your letter dated 18 April 1945, subject, above.

2. My request that you withhold action in this case was only dictated because of a query from Higher
Headquarters regarding same. Actually, I believe there was no doubt as to the treasonable acts of the
accused Arsenio Borjal and I know that your trial was absolutely impartial and fair. Consequently, I Can
only compliment you for your impartial independent way of handling the whole case.

(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding

Received April 26, 1947 7:00 a.m.

(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA

Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra

(Exhibit 21, 21-a)

Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix
Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen, Servillano
Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel, Santiago Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin
Abella, and Pedro Turqueza as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner, Severo Afos as grave
digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the Court of First Instance of
Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter,
the late President Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who
committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the
Philippine Army, applied for and was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of the defendant filed their application for amnesty with the Second
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who denied their application on the ground that the crime had been inspired by
purely personal motives, and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits.

Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who had been granted amnesty by
the Amnesty Commission of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was ordered provisionally dismissed:
defendant Juan Balmaceda was discharged from the information so that he might be utilized as state witness,
although actually he was not called to testify; while the case against defendants Antonio Palope (the grave
digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.

Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court below rendered judgment,
acquitting the members of the jury and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not
participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos,
and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in the crime; but convicting
defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and co-
principals of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of from 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Arsenio Borjal jointly and severally
in the amount of P4,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of the
costs. In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found that while the crime committed by them fell within
the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation, they were not entitled to the benefits thereof because the crime
was committed after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased
Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation of La Paz, Abra.

In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico
appealed to this Court.

The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio
Borjal were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9 and 12-a), instructing
all military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather evidence against puppet officials and to appoint juries of at
least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two thirds vote. It is to be noted that Arsenio Borjal
was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to be prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).

In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of Borjal was done in
accordance with instructions of superior military authorities, altho it point to irregularities that were due more to
ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity against Borjal. The state, however, predicates its case
principally on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area commander, to Lt.
Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the
prosecution claims was known to the accused Beronilla. Said message is as follows:

"Message:
 VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT MUNICIPALITIES OF ABRA HAVE
ORGANIZED JURY SYSTEM PD BELIEVE THAT THIS BODY IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT TRY
PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION
FRO PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON ONE ARSENIO BORJAL OF LA PAZ WHO HAS
BEEN TRIED CMA CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO BE HANGED PD REPORT ACTION
TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS MATTER PD MSG BEGINS CLN"

(EXH. H)

The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally sent to Arnold's quarters in San
Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed by the latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of April
18, 1945, together with the package of records of Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to and received by
Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously, if the Volckmann message
was known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal on the night of April 18, 1945 can not be justified.

We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no satisfactory proof that Beronilla
did actually receive the radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The
messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what papers were enclosed in the package he delivered to
Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who claimed to have been
present at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.

The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was Rafael
Balmaceda, a relative of Borjal, who claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the receipt of
the message and to have read it over Beronilla's shoulder. This testimony, however, can not be accorded
credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness before Fiscal Antonio of Abra (Exhibit 4),
Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even the receipt, of the message. In the affidavit, he
stated:

Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual occurrence that transpired in La Paz, Abra?
— A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you state what is the event? — A. On April 17, 1945, I was assigned as guard at the Presidencia
where Mayor Arsenio Borjal is confined. On the 18th of April, 1945, six bolomen came to me while I
was on duty as guard, that Mayor Borjal should be tied, on orders of Mayor Beronilla, Mayor Borjal
wanted to know the reason why he would be tied, as he had not yet learned of the decision of the jury
against him. Mayor Borjal wrote a note to Mayor Beronilla, asking the reason for his being ordered to be
tied. I personally delivered the note of Borjal to Mayor Beronilla. Mayor Beronilla did not answer the
note, but instead told me that I should tie Mayor Borjal, as tomorrow he would die, as he cannot escape.
I returned to the Presidencia, and Mayor Borjal was tied, as that was the ordered of Mayor Beronilla.

The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was not with Beronilla when the message
arrived, otherwise Beronilla would have given him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified later at the trial.
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that having learned of the contents of the Volckmann message, Balmaceda
should not have relayed it to Borjal , or to some member of the latter's family, considering that they were
relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by Bayken, another prosecution witness, as to the hatching
of the alleged conspiracy to kill Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in
the early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that the agreement was made about ten o'clock in the
morning, shortly after the accused had denied Borjal's petition to be allowed to hear mass.

Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed Borjal
in violation of superior orders, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same
day, April 18th, 1945, as he did (Exhibit 20), half an hour after the execution. And what is even more important,
if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on April 21, 1945, write in reply
(Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole
case" instead of berating Beronilla and ordering his court martial for disobedience?

Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to transmit the
Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal
must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly
sentenced to death.

The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even so, it has been already decided
that the concurrence of personal hatred and collaboration with the enemy as motives for a liquidation does not
operate to exclude the case from the benefits of the Amnesty claimed by appellants, since then "it may not be
held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal motives" (People vs. Barrioquinto,* G. R. Nos. L-
2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that these appellants
were impelled by malice (dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher
command; the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel, one of them (attorney Jovito Barreras)
chosen by Borjal's sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its
legality, and it was not resumed until headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and
sent an observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure were
followed; and when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence imposed, the records were sent to
Arnold's headquarters for review, and Borjal was not punished until the records were returned eight days later
with the statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved" (Exhibit 8),
which on its face was an assent to the verdict and the sentence. The lower Court, after finding that the late
Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden
American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was
not for political or personal reason that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p.
727).

It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon orders,
of a superior officers that they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without
being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, we can not say that criminal intent
has been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil., 48; Sent. of the Tribunal
Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929). Actus non
facit reum nisi mens si rea.

To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is equivalent
to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea-a crime is not committed if the
minds of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507).

But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below should
not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz., 2072)on
the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy control
and occupation. The evidence on record regarding the date of liberation of La Paz, Abra, is contradictory. The
Military Amnesty Commission that decided the case of one of the original accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La
Paz, Abra, was liberated on July 1, 1945, according to its records; and this finding was accepted by Judge
Letargo when he dismissed the case against said accused on March 15, 1949. On the other hand, Judge Bocar
and Hilario, who subsequently took cognizance of the case, relied on Department Order No. 25, of the
Department of the Interior, dated August 12, 1948, setting the liberation of the Province of Abra on April 4,
1945, fifteen days before Borjal was slain. The two dates are not strictly contradictory; but given the benefit of
the Presidential directive to the Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No. 11, of October 2, 1946) that "any
reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation shall be resolved in favor of
the accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done in People vs. Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.

For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with costs de
oficio.

EXEMPTING

G.R. No. L-52688 October 17, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:

Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin convicting him of
parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos
to the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No. 155-C).

In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some flowering plants near the house of
Honorato Ambal located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-Ambal, 48, mortally
wounded. She asked for drinking water and medical assistance.

She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was placed in an improvised hammock
and brought to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat (Exh. B and G).

On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting his child to a neighbor, went to
the house of the barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he (Honorato) had killed his wife Feling.
After making that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and surrendered to a
policeman, also confessing to the latter that he had liquidated his wife.

The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was bespattered
with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak.

The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and bickerings which were
exacerbated by the fact that the wife sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and chose to spend the night
in the poblacion of Mambajao. The couple had eight children.

The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's failure to buy medicine for
Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated alteration. Felicula told her husband that
it would be better if he were dead ("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark infuriated Ambal and
impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the municipal court. After a
preliminary examination, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on March 4, 1977 the fiscal
filed against Ambal an information for parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty.

After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the defense of
Ambal was insanity.

The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal health officer, Doctor Maximino R.
Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who had undergone a six-month training in psychiatry in the National
Mental Hospital, to examine Ambal and to submit within one month a report on the latter's mental condition (p.
65, Record).

Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a "passive-aggressive, emotionally
unstable, explosive or inadequate personality" (Exh. 1).

Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days after the killing) to November 3,
1977, when he placed Ambal under observation, the latter did not show any mental defect and was normal (44-
46 tsn November 3,1977).

Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect, Doctor Balbas replied: "Before the
commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission of the crime, normal, but during the
commission of the crime, that is what we call "Psychosis" due to short frustration tolerance" (45 tsn).

Doctor Cresogono Llacuna,a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-month observation of mental cases
and who in the course of his long practice had treated around one hundred cases of mental disorders, attended to
Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a psychoneurosis, a disturbance of the functional nervous
system which is not insanity (65 November 15, 1977). The doctor concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal
was normal but nervous (68 He had no mental disorder.

Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about ten months after the incident. He
said that at the time of the killing he did not know what he was doing because he was allegedly not in full
possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that he was charged with the capital
offense of having killed his wife.

But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her death. During his
confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked in the
town plaza or was sent unescorted to buy food in the market.

He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that he rode on a tricycle when he
surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident he got wet while plowing.
He feel asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he had chills. That was the
commencement, his last illness.

The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident that he was not insane and that
he acted like a normal human being. We agree with the court's conclusion.

Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere
depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment
through a general plea of insanity. (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an insane person unless the
latter has acted during a lucid interval. *

According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while an insane person is one
who has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder. "imbecil vale tanto como escaso de razon y es loco
el que ha perdido el juico." An insane person may have lucid intervals but "el embecil no puede tener, no tiene
estos intervalos de Corazon, pues en el no hay una alteracion, sino una carencia del juico mismo" (1 Viada,
Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)

Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or a more
or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized
by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or
disordered volition" (Sec. 1039, Revised Administrative Code).

The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary (Art. 800, Civil
Code re Testamentary Succession; U.S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305, 308). The law always presumes all acts to be
voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292;
People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; People vs. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841).

When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind at the time he performed the criminal act
charged to him, or that he performed it at the time of madness or of mental derangement, or that he was
generally considered to be insane — his habitual condition being, on the contrary, healthy — the legal
presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the burden is upon the defendant to overcome this
presumption (U.S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218.)

Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during
the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition (U.S. vs. Hontiveros
Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).

A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of establishing
that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed (People vs. Bascos, 44
Phil. 204.)

What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the rule, based on Spanish
jurisprudence, that in order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at
the time of committing the crime (People vs. Formigonez, 87 Phil. 658, 660)

In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete deprivation of
intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,292; People
vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31,1974,57 SCRA 275, 286.)

A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to vindicate his honor by taking violent measures to
the extent of killing his wife (whom he suspected of infidelity) can hardly be regarded as an imbecile
(Formigones case).

Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to having violent fits when angry, his acts of
breaking glasses and smashing dishes are indications of an explosive temper and not insanity, especially
considering that he did not turn violent when a policeman intercepted him after he had killed his wife. (Cruz
case.)
There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of
anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get into a quarrel or fight
seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a
madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word I
"crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane", "non compos mentis," "unsound mind","idiot", or
"lunatic" (U.S. vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88, 91.)

The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge is not insanity. (People vs.
Foy, 138 N.Y. 664, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)

One who, in possession of a sound and, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or revenge, which
may temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shielded from the
consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a criminal act,
when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that the offense was the
direct consequence of his insanity (State vs. Strickly, 41 Iowa 232, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 94.)

The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the accused killed by strangulation a sixteen-year-old girl,
who got leaves from his banana plants, and sliced the flesh of her legs, thighs and shoulders, cooked the flesh
and ate it like a cannibal. (People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 155).

Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is insane (People vs. Martin, 120 Phil. 14, 20-
21).

Justice Cardozo in his article, "What Medicine Can Do For The Law", traces briefly the origin of the rule
regarding insanity as a defense. He says:

In the early stages of our law, way back in medieval times, insanity was never a defense for crime. The insane
killer, like the man who killed in self-defense, might seek a pardon from the king, and would often get one. He
had no defense at law. Gradually insanity was allowed, but only within narrow limits This was what was
become known as the wild-beast stage of the defense. Then the limits of the defense were expanded, but still
slowly and narrowly. The killer was excused if the disease of the mind was such that he was incapable of
appreciating the difference between right and wrong. At first this meant, not the right and wrong of particular
case, but right and wrong generally or in the abstract, the difference, as it was sometimes said, between good
and evil. Later, the rule was modified in favor of the prisoner so that capacity to distinguish between right and
wrong generally would not charge with responsibility if there was no capacity to understand the difference in
relation to the particular act, the subject of the crime.

The rule governing the subject was crystallized in England in 1843 by the answer made by the House of Lords
to questions submitted by judges in the famous case of McNaghten, who was tried for the murder of one
Drummond, the secretary of Sir Robert Peel.

In the M'Naghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and Finelly 200, the following rule was laid down: "To establish
a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not, to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."

In the M'Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M'Naghten shot Edward Drummond on January 20, 1843.
Drummond died as a consequence of the gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond was the private
secretary of Sir Robert Peel, prime minister M'Naghten shot Drummond, thinking he was Sir Robert.
M'Naghten labored under the the insane delusion that he was being hounded by his enemies and that the prime
minister was one of them. Medical evidence tended to prove that M'Naghten was affected by morbid delusions
which carried him beyond the power of his own control, leaving him unable to distinguish right and wrong, and
that he was incapable of controlling his conduct in connection with the delusion. The jury found him not guilty
by reason of insanity.

As stated in another case, the "test of the responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity is asserted, is the
capacity of the accused to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and with respect to the act which is
the subject of the inquiry. (Coleman's case,1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)

Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's knowledge of
the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind,
defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself from
doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." The commission of the crime is excused even if the accused
knew what he was doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental disease he lacked the power to resist the
impulse to commit the act. (State v. White, 270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie Kast, 31 North Dakota Law Review,
pp. 170, 173.)

The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible impulse test,
does not alone supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of a person alleged mental
incapacity." "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a
mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of criminal responsibility for his unlawful act is a
condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a mental defect having such effect on criminal
responsibility is a condition not considered capable of improvement or deterioration, and either congenital, or
the result of injury or of a physical or mental disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45
A.L.R. 2d. 1430 [1954].)

As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal responsibility may be stated to be the capacity to
understand the nature and consequences of the act charged and the ability to distinguish between right and
wrong as to such act, and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."

And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten case exists along with the "irresistible impulse"
test or some other formula permitting a defendant to be exculpated on the ground that, although he knew the act
was wrong, he was unable to refrain from committing it.

Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham or "Product" rule, also permits inability to distinguish
between right and wrong to be considered, even though it refuses to limit the inquiry to that topic, it would
appear that insanity which meets this test is a defense in all Anglo-American jurisdictions and that the only
controversy is over whether there are some cases in which the right-and-wrong test is not met, but in which a
defense on grounds of insanity should nevertheless be recognized. (21 Am Jur 2d 118.)

In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The
presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom
of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease or defect.

The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing authorities is
incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.

Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities. Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser penalty should
be imposed because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of aggravating
circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry,"
accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:

The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping
for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the
Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.

In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as
Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed
in the following manner:

That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away
one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the
Civil Code.1

On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a judgment
promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway,
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE
AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed on a highway and, in accordance with
P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.

The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private victim Ma. Socorro M.
Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate damages.3

Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under
Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the
offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense
charged.4

For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of facts in the
People's brief5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with page
references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial divergence in the
version proffered by the defense.

This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by the two accused (tsn,
Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).

Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and
Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).

At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of
Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived
at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency
(something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).

Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz of her
husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it
stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).

Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was
seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).

Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from
you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained
P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).

Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would
they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa
area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at
her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro
to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30
thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).

Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards
Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her
dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she
jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).

On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).

Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at
PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except that,
according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out
of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and
he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway.7

Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and
parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot.8 Much
later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining
that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.9

On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been advanced as to
what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the
crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.

Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for
which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant
offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive
and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation
and accurate conclusion thereon.

Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine the specific
nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which
case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives for committing the
murder independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case rebellion and murder would
constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in
the actual performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the
attack was by reason of the previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would
be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11

In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the
time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under
the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric
qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his
predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina
was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you
doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an
(sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12

With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can
rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof
that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where such
restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily
intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter,
15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an
appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable
for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of
the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.

That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal
liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?

A Santo Domingo Exit.

Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was (sic) being handed to you?

A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.

Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo,
after all you already received the money and the checks?

A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we will take her to her house at Villa
(sic) Verde.

Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is (sic) already given you the
checks?

A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we reach Balintawak or some other
place along the way we might be apprehended by the police. So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her
"Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16

Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering
the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law,
is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash
and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated
with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily
surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by
appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the
Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery
contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.

The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:

The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the information that the
victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The accused admitted that the robbery was carried on
from Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they
intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she had with her at the time for which reason Ma.
Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .

In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that punishable under P.D. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the highway is
accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua.18

The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section 5 of said
decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267
which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate an
evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent
Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement has
as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on
brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery"
invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law,
that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20

Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion thereon in the
proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is
more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the
American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law
was passed. 21

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the
subject and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense
consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such
formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution
under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose
attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to
be such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members
were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be
brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed
persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is
required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. 23
The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives
announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same,
there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous
construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be
construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery
perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined
therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the
preambular clauses thereof, to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of
depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and
social progress of the people:

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of
depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to
the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused as
their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel
from one place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and
social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway
robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on
the ridiculous.

True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed
on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does
not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code
that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this
we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful
acts are directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective
victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of
brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its
aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25

Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery committed
by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway.
Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements which thereby
necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would
be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways
would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law
should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary
caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the
fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.

If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for the
application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd,
effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of
reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum
in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary
or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto,
would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit
of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act
of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which
are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the
accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the
Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28

We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was
committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within
the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision
precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery
conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.

Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293 and
punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by
their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the determination of their
respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and
that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in
favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty
shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.

We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of simple
robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has
been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former offense,
it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through
intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain
(animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking
(apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31

These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which, as
formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the
complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly convey
that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to
gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does
not include but could negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as
Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING
on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party,
Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages, with costs.

G.R. No. 87084 June 27, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-apellee,

vs.
JUANITO Q. AQUINO, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

In the criminal justice systems of modem civilized nations, insanity is invariably recognized as a valid
defense against punishment for crime. The proverbial bone of contention, however, is in the
ascertainment of the veracity of the claimed affliction and the determination of the degree of mental
aberration, as a ground for acquittal or a basis for extenuation of criminal liability. We have such a
situation before us in the present appeal.
Appellant Juanito Q. Aquino was charged with rape with homicide before the Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Branch 57 in San CARLOS City, Pangasinan, under the following information, to wit:

That an or about the 13th day of February, 1987, in the evening in barangay Poblacion, * province of
Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen', against her will, and on
the on thereof the said accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike her with the
use of stone which directly cause (sic) the death of Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen' to the damage and
prejudice of her heirs.

Contrary to Art. 335 in relation to Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 1

In a motion dated June 26, 1987, counsel for appellant moved for the indefinite suspension of the trial and asked
for the commitment of the accused to the National Mental Hospital. 2 In its order dated July 1, 1987, the trial
court granted the motion and held in abeyance the arraignment of the accused and the trial of the case. 3 On
January 26, 1988, the National Center for Mental Health submitted the clinical case report on the mental and
physical condition of appellant.4 He was later returned to the custody of the court for trial and was arraigned on
April 27, 1988. 5

The material and established facts of this case, as well as the points in dispute between the parties, having been
succinctly but thoroughly summarized by the Solicitor General, we are minded to quote at length therefrom.

On the night of February 13, 1987, Armando Frias, while on duty as member of the Integrated National Police
of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, received a report that there was a victim of a crime in the clinic of Dr. Padlan in the
poblacion. He proceeded to the clinic and found the victim lying down with her head bleeding. He asked her
how she felt and when she replied that she was weak, he took her ante-mortem statement (TSN, November 4,
1988, pp. 3-5). The victim, Carmelita Morado, 18 years old, told Frias that she was raped and struck with a
stone by Juanita Aquino, appellant herein. Frias took down her statement which was duly witnessed by
attending physician Dr. Padlan and Capt. Eddie Ramos. The written statement was also thumbmarked by
Carmelita Morado (TSN, pp. 3-5, 8, 10, November 4, 1988, Armando Frias). Pat. Jaime Datuin and Pat. Renato
Solomon were also among the people who were present when Frias took the statement of the victim. After the
victim gave her statement she shouted that she be taken to the hospital because she was weak. (Id., p. 9).
Carmelita Morado was taken to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center in San Carlos City and admitted at 11:35
p.m. of that same evening in serious condition. Dr. Saturnino Posadas, director of said Medical Center, testified
that Carmelita Morado sustained the following injuries;

1. lacerated wound about 10 cm. at the front of the head;

2. skull fracture located on the front portion of the skull;

3. hemorrhage or bleeding on the left eye;

4. laceration of the brain;

5. laceration perineum; (sic)

6. laceration of the urethal (sic)

(TSN pp. 2-3. November 18, 1988; Dr. Saturnino Posadas; Medico Legal Certificate, Exhibit 'C')
She died the following morning before surgical operations could be performed (TSN, p. 4 November 18, 1988,
Dr. Saturnino Posadas).

A team of police officers was sent out to arrest Juanita Aquino. He was found and arrested inside the town
auditorium at around 11:00 that same evening of February 13, 1987 attending a Valentine dance (TSN, pp. 7-8,
September 15, 1988).

Appellant was detained at the municipal jail in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. However, it was only on February 17,
1987 that the statement of appellant was taken as the police officers waited for the parents of appellant (TSN,
pp. 3, 13-14, August 24, 1988).

Before appellant's interrogation begun, he was asked if he had a lawyer. As he had none, Armando Frias and the
Station Commander Captain Ramos fetched Atty. Liliosa Rosario of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office to
assist appellant during the investigation. Atty. Rosario, upon arrival at the office of Frias where the
investigation was to take place, interviewed appellant (supra at pp. 14-16).

At the start of the investigation, Armando Frias informed appellant of his constitutional rights, of his right to
remain silent and to counsel. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Rosario throughout the investigation (TSN, p. 10,
August 23, 1988; p. 18, August 24, 1988). After appellant signed his statement, Frias took appellant and his
counsel to the office of Judge Juan C. Austria, of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, who called the
Interpreter and the Clerk of Court to read the statement and translate the same to appellant to ensure that
appellant understood what was written. Judge Austria made appellant sign the statement in his presence (TSN,
pp. 21-23, August 24, 1988).

However, after the complaint was filed but before appellant could be arraigned, a Motion to Commit appellant
to the National Center for Mental Health, as earlier mentioned, was filed by appellant's counsel as appellant was
allegedly manifesting unstable behavior with fits of violence. Appellant was duly committed sometime in July,
1987. He was released in 1988 whereupon he was duly arraigned. Appellant pleaded 'not guilty' and put up the
defense of insanity.

To prove insanity, appellant presented Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, a psychiatrist at the National Center for Mental
Health who was in charge of the pavilion where appellant was committed. After Juanita Aquino was admitted to
the mental hospital in July 1987, he conducted physical, mental and psychological examinations and found him
to be suffering from mental disorder classified under organic mental disorder with psychosis (TSN, pp. 4-5, 7,
May 23, 1988). Dr. Echavez was of the opinion that when appellant Juanita Aquino committed the heinous act,
the latter was totally deprived of mind (supra at pp. 15-16).

Patricio Aquino, appellant's father, also testified that his son was already mentally HI even when he was still
young. Appellant was suspended from school because he was very playful, overactive and naughty especially
with his classmates (TSN, p. 4, May 24, 1988); that appellant was cruel to his brothers and sisters, stole his
mother's jewelry which he sold for a low sum, wandered sometimes naked, and oftentimes not coming home for
extended periods of time (supra at pp. 5, 8). Appellant was previously confined at the Mental Hospital in 1985
when he was caught wandering around naked (supra at p. 10).

Sgt. Raymundo Lomboy, the police officer charged with appellant's custody and who transferred appellant for
commitment to the National Center for Mental Health, recalled that while appellant was in his custody,
appellant acted abnormally by singing, shouting, dancing and generally disturbing the other inmates (TSN, p. 7,
July 21, 1988). After appellant was treated and released from the National Center for Mental Health, he acted
queerly by singing and shouting whenever he failed to drink his medicine (supra at p. 15).

Appellant himself was also presented as witness, the doctor having certified that he could withstand trial.
However, the gist of appellants' testimony was to deny any knowledge of the crime, the persons, things and
events connected with it. He admitted he knew that he has some mental illness and had undergone treatment
like electric shock (TSN, pp. 5-7, 18-19, July 14, 1988).

On the other hand, the prosecution presented an array of witnesses to prove that appellant was lucid before and
after the crime was committed and that he acted with discernment.

Armando Frias testified that from the time of appellant's arrest and during the investigation, appellant acted
normally, and gave responsive answers to all the questions propounded to him (TSN, pp. 5, 9, 13-15 August 23,
1988). Frias knew appellant even prior to the incident because he worked as a laborer in the construction of the
theatre in the town proper. He believed appellant to be normal.

Angel Baysic, another member of the Integrated National Police in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan whose house is
located near the theatre being constructed, also knew appellant who worked there as a laborer and sometimes
cooked the laborer's meals. Baysic became closely acquainted with appellant and sometimes they drank together
with other laborers after work. During these times, he observed appellant to act normally and was responsive to
conversation (TSN, pp. 4-7, September 6, 1988).

Carlos Sabangon, one of the police officers who arrested appellant at the town auditorium, testified that when
appellant was arrested during the valentine dance, he was appropriately dressed and behaved normally and in
fact was just about to sit down after dancing when they arrived to arrest him (TSN, pp. 8-9, 17 September 15,
1988).

Eduardo Fernandez, a jail guard, was one on duty when appellant escaped from prison on May 3, 1987. While
appellant was confined in the provincial jail, Fernandez did not observe any queer behavior from appellant
(TSN, pp. 34- 35, 41, 43, September 15, 1988). 6

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered its verdict convicting appellant of the crime of rape with
homicide and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P35,000.00 as damages. 7

Appellant, through counsel, manifested his intention to appeal the judgment of conviction to the Court of
Appeals. 8 The case was, however, brought to us for review, with appellant taking the court below to task on the
following assignment of errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE AC, CUSED-APPELLANT INSANE AT THE
TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME;

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE MEDICAL
FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH AS TO THE INSANITY OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT;

3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION

OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 9

The controversy boils down into one issue, that is, whether or not appellant, who has invoked insanity as his
defense, has overcome the presumption of sanity.

Sanity being the normal condition of the human mind, the prosecution may proceed in the first instance upon
the presumption that the defendant was sane and responsible when the act was committed. The presumption is
always in favor of sanity and the burden of proof of insanity is on the defense.10 The basis for the presumption
of sanity is well explained by the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of Davis vs, United States, 11
in this wise: "If that presumption were not indulged, the government would always be under the necessity of
adducing affirmative evidence of the sanity of an accused. But a requirement of that character would seriously
delay and embarrass the enforcement of the laws against crime and in most cases be unnecessary. Consequently,
the law presumes that everyone charged with crime is sane and thus, supplies in the first instance the required
proof of capacity to commit crime."

As we have done in a prior case, for purposes of disposing of appellant's defense it is well to restate and keep in
mind certain basic principles in law, viz: that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him; that a
felonious or criminal act (delito doloso) is presumed to have been done with deliberate intent, that is, with
freedom, intelligence and malice because the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and intelligence
constitute the normal condition of a person in the absence of evidence to the contrary; that one of the causes
which will overthrow this presumption of voluntariness and intelligence is insanity in which event the actor is
exempt from criminal liability as provided for in Article 12, Paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. 12

It will readily be observed that the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant clearly reveals how the crime
charged against him was perpetrated. This confession is, however, being assailed as inadmissible in evidence on
the ground that it was executed without the assistance of counsel engaged by appellant himself, and that he did
not understand nor was he informed of his constitutional rights. 13

We do not agree with this submission. The extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence. Atty. Liliosa
Rosario, a lawyer from the then Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), assisted appellant when he was
placed under custodial investigation. The same lawyer represented him during the early part of the trial. In
People vs. Layuso, 14 we strongly denounced the widespread misconception that the presence of a lawyer under
the right to counsel provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused from saying anything which
might incriminate him. The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is
always the ascertainment of truth. As explained in Gamboa vs.Cruz, etc., 15 the person being interrogated must
be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of persons undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense.

The presence and assistance of Atty. Liliosa Rosario adequately precluded the possibility of extracting from
appellant any false or coerced confession or admission. Furthermore, it was shown that the extrajudicial
confession executed by appellant was explained to him in his dialect when he was brought before Judge Juan C.
Austria where such confession was subscribed and sworn to by appellant. 16 The records also show that the
validity of the extrajudicial confession is not being questioned. Only the reliability of its contents is being
placed in doubt, ostensibly because of the main submission of the defense that appellant was insane when the
crime was committed. 17 Moreover, the CLAO attorney would not have affixed her signature in the
extrajudicial confession had she known of any legal infirmity in its execution.

Coming now to his principal submission, appellant relies heavily on the clinical case report regarding his mental
and physical condition. He stresses in his brief that the testimony of Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, Physician-In-
Charge, Male Court Case Pavilion of the National Center for Mental Health, has explicitly shown that appellant
was supposedly insane immediately before, during and after the commission of the crime and that the evidence
adduced explicate that the mental illness of appellant is incurable and that he has no lucid intervals. 18 He
explains that the normal appearance and behavior of appellant while testifying in court is not surprising. He says
that it is due to the fact that, during that time, he was undergoing medical treatment and his mental condition
during the trial of the case where he had been regularly taking medicine should not be confused with his mental
status at the time of the commission of the offense.19

Appellant is clutching at straws of argument, a clear indicium of a dearth in plausible explanations. Nor was the
trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe and evaluate his demeanor on the witness stand, including his
manner of testifying and the answers he also gave in his extrajudicial confession, the least bit impressed by
appellant's defense of insanity as vividly explained in his decision. And well must it be so, for the rule is that
insanity must be positively proven. The presumption, we repeat, is in favor of sanity. The rule has consistently
been that when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of
establishing that fact rests upon him. 20

Now, it has long been settled that the period to which an inquiry into the mental state of the accused should be
directed is that transpiring immediately before and/or at the very moment of the act or acts under prosecution.
21 In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete
absence of the power to discern, or there is total deprivation of the freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The onus probandi rests upon whoever invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance and must prove it by clear and positive evidence. 22

Insanity itself is a condition, not a thing. It is not susceptible of the usual means of proof and to this fact is due
the unusual difficulty of making proof of its existence and measuring its effect, when once proven to exist. As
no man can look into the mind of another, the state of such mind can only be measured as the same is reflected
in the actions of the body it is created to govern. Thus, we have held that mind can only be known by outward
acts. Thereby we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his
acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 23 In interpreting these physical manifestations, scientific
knowledge and experience have been resorted to by our judicial agencies.

The records indubitably disclose that appellant sexually abused the victim. After consummating his lustful
desire, he violently struck the victim on the head with a stone for fear that the victim would report him, and
thereafter he left her in the belief that she was already dead.24 The victim did not immediately die. In the clinic
of Dr. Serafin Padlan in the poblacion, Pat. Armando Friars saw the victim with her head bleeding. He took the
statement of the victim in the local dialect. 25 Thereafter, he translated the statement to English and reduced it
into writing. 26 The statement disclosed the Identity of appellant. That same evening, the victim was still
brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center where she was treated. She was serious but still conscious, and
was able to narrate to Dr. Saturnino Posadas what happened to her. She died the following morning. 27

The evidence adduced for appellant that he was insane immediately before or at the very moment the crime was
committed is too nebulous and conjectural to be convincing. While Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez of the National
Center for Mental Health described the mental illness of the accused as "organic mental disorder with
psychosis" 28 he admitted that a person suffering from insanity may know that what he is doing is wrong. 29
The same witness also testified that there is no possibility of appellant having lucid intervals, 30 but he,
however, also observed that the mental illness of appellant came on and off. 31

The clinical case report also shows that appellant, when interviewed upon his admission to the mental
institution, recalled having taken 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks of
marijuana before the commission of the crime. 32 This admission substantially affirms his prior extrajudicial
confession that he was under the influence of marijuana when he sexually abused the victim and, on the
occasion thereof, killed her. 33 It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming appellant had some form of mental
illness, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him
to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounts any
intimation of insanity of appellant when he committed the dastardly felonies. The annals of crime are replete
with documented records, and we are not without our share in this jurisdiction, where mental illness has been
feigned and invoked to provide a defense for the accused in a criminal prosecution.

One more thing. The trial court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment on appellant. In a judgment of
conviction for a felony, the court should specify the appropriate name of the penalty, which in this case should
be reclusion perpetua and not life imprisonment, since under the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code
the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties, unlike
those generally provided for crimes in special laws.

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the principal penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, and
the reduction of the civil indemnity to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the judgment of the trial
court is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-45130             February 17, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.

Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.

LAUREL, J.:

On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information charging Celestino
Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said
accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison,
attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby
inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:

"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surace of the right
lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral
lumbar region, and left elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days
afterwards.

On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel forthwith
objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time
confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital
to render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist,
rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935, the case was again called for the
arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring
the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete record
pertaining to the mental condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared
before the court on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked
the court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the accused,
or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then issued an order
directing that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic Hospital
for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report as to the true mental condition of the
patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on
June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and
ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof,
the case was suspended indefinitely.

On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be discharged from the
hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez,
appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the accused
was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.

After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-quoted
and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay
the costs.

The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment of errors:

A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has had dementia only
occasionally and intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the commission of the defense.

B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that during and
immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of abnormality
either in behavior, language and appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was mentally
deranged.

C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was on the defense to
show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the
defense did not establish any evidence to this effect.

D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting him
thereof.

It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now deceased
Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at
the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around and saw
the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog,
"I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left
side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan
and took possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he died
two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los
Angeles.

As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem necessary to indulge in
any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being that of
insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant was insane
at the time of the commission of the crime charged.

On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the legal
presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp
conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog, Alfred
W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p.
11 et seq.) The first view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not made
out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of committing
the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity
(Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative verdict of
insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is
the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Virginia and West Virginia. The third view is that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt
(Dais vs. United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186
U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No.
15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the proposition that while it
is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of
the crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that a fortiori where the accused
introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt.

In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of
mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil.,
305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.

In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the time he killed the deceased,
the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine distinctions
as to the character and degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing evidence, direct or
circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was insane at the time of the
perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is
permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time.
Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W.,
1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I
Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to
established insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the
motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of
sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs.
Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).

The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of the commission of the
act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not
permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging in the
preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe contrary
rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental
weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not cconcerned with
connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or
periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the commission of the crime charged,
and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of the act complained
of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be overlooked.The following
considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a conclusion
different from that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that the
herein defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to
January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a
disease diagnosed as dementia præcox. His confinement during these periods, it is true, was long before
the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to show
that the recurrence of the ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any
rational or scientific foundation.

(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as having mental disease to a
degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal
Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol.
I, p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the
symptoms of dementia præcox, in certain peeriods of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive
psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person
becomes affected by this kind of disease, either dementia præcox or manic depresive psychosis, during
the period of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under
the general medico-legal classification of manic-depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the
question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations of manic actions will have to be considered. There is
in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead
to actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and
Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).

(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an interne at
San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding December 12, 1934 — the date when the
crime was committed — the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the
symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S.
Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).

(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station on the very
same day of the perpetration of the crime, and although attempted were made by detectives to secure a
statement from him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent
by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following the commission of the crime.
This is an indication that the police authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused,
which doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists of the San Lazaro
Hospital.

(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report was
made within the first month of treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called
manic depressive psychosis.We quote the report in full:

INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL

MANDALUYONG, RIZAL

January 15, 1935.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic

Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,
Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
 Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.

1. MENTAL STATUS:

(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his bed with his
eyes closed and practically totally motionless. At other times, however, but on very rare
occassions and at short intervals he apparently wakes up and then he walks around, and makes
signs and ritualistic movements with the extremities and other parts of the body. Ordinarily he
takes his meal but at times he refuses to take even the food offered by his mother or sister, so that
there have been days in the hospital when he did not take any nourishment. On several
occassions he refused to have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear
untidy. He would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he
displayed impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or other parts of the body with his fists and
at one time after a short interview, he struck strongly with his fist the door of the nurse's office
without apparent motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands strongly
without provocation.

(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to speak, and would
not answer in any form the questions propounded to him. Very often he is seen with his eyes
closed apparently praying as he was mumbling words but would not answer at all when talked to.
At one time he was seen in this condition with a cross made of small pieces of strick in his hand.
He at times during the interviews recited passages in the literature as for example the following.

"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre. (Truthfulness,
honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable character.)"

At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.

(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks anxious and rather
irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the hospital.

(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found oriented as to place
and person but he did not know the day or the date.

(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that he could not sleep
he could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for example, told that he should escape.
That he was going to be killed because he was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the
shadow of his former sweetheart in the hospital. There are times however when he could not hear
or see at all anything.

(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner that he could not
talk in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his throat. He sometimes
thinks that he is already dead and already buried in the La Loma Cemetery.

(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.

(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his memory for
recent events or for example, for events that took place during his stay in the hospital he has no
recollection at all.
 (i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general information. He
could not, however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.

( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have been insane
during his first days in the hospital, but just during the interview on January 14, 1935, he felt
fairly well. Insight and judgment were, of course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the
last two days he has shown marked improvement in his behavior as to be cooperative, and
coherent in his speech.

2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:

The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a form of
physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis.

(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.

Assistant Alienist

In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another assistant
alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:

I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic Depressive
form of psychosis. It might be premature to state before the court has decided this case, but I
believe it a duty to state, that this person is not safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality
make-up, a personality lacking in control, overtly serious in his dealings with the every day
events of this earthly world, taking justice with his own hands and many times executing it in an
impulsive manner as to make his action over proportionate — beyond normal acceptance. He is
sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer before the
average conception of an earthly man.

He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.

(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist

To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon
arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and the defendant-
appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant bought the knife,
Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been watching for Guison in order to
kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and corroborated the testimony of
policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the
commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine,
University of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of
dementia præcox, "the crime is ussually preceded by much complaining and planning. In these people,
homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their
property is being taken."

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the time he
perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal
liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant
acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other hospital for the
insane as may be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the
Court of First Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-27031 May 31, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LORETO RENEGADO y SENORA, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy for plaintiff-appellee.

Roberto C. Alip as counsel de oficio for accused-appellant.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:p

On September 4, 1966, Mamerto de Lira, a teacher of the "Tiburcio Tancinco Memorial Vocational School,"
died at the Calbayog City General Hospital from a stab wound inflicted upon him a few days before, more
particularly, on August 29, within the premises of the school by Loreto Renegado, an employee of the same
institution. As a result, the City Fiscal of Calbayog City filed with the local Court of First Instance an
Information against Loreto Renegado for "Murder with assault upon a person in authority," which, as amended,
reads:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1966, at about 9:30 A.M., in Calbayog City, Philippines, and within
the premises of the Tiburcio Tancinco Vocational School and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court;
the above-named accused armed with a sharp-pointed double bladed weapon, with decided intent to kill, with
assault upon a person in authority; the deceased being at the time a public school teacher of the Tiburcio
Vocational School and therefore a person in authority; and at the time was in the lawful performance of his
duties as such or on the occasion of such performance and, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with his weapon Mamerto de Lira, who,
as a result thereof, sustained stab wound on his abdomen which caused his death. (p. 11, original record)

The Hon. Jesus N. Borromeo who conducted the trial of the case found the accused guilty as charged and
pursuant to Articles 148 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 48 thereof, sentenced him to
"suffer the supreme penalty of death; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Mamerto de Lira in the amount of
P6,000.00; and to pay the costs." (p. 94, ibid) The case is now before Us on automatic review.

We find the following facts duly established by the evidence of the prosecution: .

The Tiburcio Tancinco Memorial Vocational School is run by the national government in the City of Calbayog,
and for the school year 1966-67 its principal was Mr. Bartolome B. Calbes, and in his absence, Mr. Felix U.
Tingzon was authorized to act as officer-in-charge (Exhibit E). The deceased Mamerto de Lira was a classroom
teacher of mathematics in said school with daily classes from Monday to Friday, starting at 7:10 o'clock in the
morning till about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon with vacant periods in-between (Exhibit D) while accused-
appellant, Loreto Renegado, was a clerk in the same institution whose duties included the following:

1. To type correspondence, memorandum, circulars of the Head of the school.

2. To help type test questions of teachers for every periodical test.

3. To help type reports of the schools.

4. To help type handout of the teachers.

5. To file and account records of the school.

6. To mail some reports, prepared form like Form 137 and mail it, etc. (Exhibit F)

A periodical test was scheduled on September 2, 1966, and the teachers were instructed to submit their
questions for approval and cutting of the stencil for mimeographing purposes by August 25 and 26.1

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Friday, August 26, 1966, appellant Renegado was in the school
canteen and other persons present at the time were teachers Natividad Boco, Mrs. Alviola, and Mrs. Benita Tan,
and some students. On that occasion Lira entered the canteen and seeing Renegado he requested the latter to
type the stencil of his test questions for the examination set for September 2. Renegado answered that he had
much work in the principal's office and that typing test questions was not among his duties. Lira reminded
Renegado of the instructions of the principal that he could be asked by the teachers to type their test questions
especially if the teacher concerned had no knowledge of typing, and Lira finished his remark stating: "you can
finish your work if you only will sit down and work." At this remark, Renegado became angry and as he
stepped out of the canteen he boxed with his fist a cabinet which belonged to Mrs. Alviola. Seeing the hostile
attitude of Renegado, Lira followed the latter outside of the canteen and asked Renegado if he was challenging
him. Renegado did not answer but quickly left the place.2

On his way out of the school premises, later that afternoon, Renegado passed by the guardhouse where he met
security guard, Primitivo Velasco, and Renegado told the latter: "Friend, I will be sad if I could not kill
somebody," and having learned about the altercation between Renegado and Lira, Velasco placed his arm
around the shoulder of Renegado and pacified him with these words: "Loreto, do not do that because that is a
little trouble, you might be able to kill someone and you will be separated from your family."3 Also on that
afternoon before leaving the school, Renegado met Basilio Ramirez, another employee, to whom he recounted
his altercation with Lira and ended up saying: "I am going to kill him." Basilio Ramirez, however, advised
Renegade: "Padi, do not take that to the extent because to kill a person is not good, think of your family, you
have many children."4

In the evening of that Friday, August 26, there was a dance at the school premises and on that occasion
Renegado was seen cycling around the school several times,5 and Renegado inquired from security guard,
Nicomedes Leonor, if Lira was at the dance. Leonor informed Renegado that the teacher was not around and at
the same time advised Renegado thus: "Choy, do not attend to that small trouble and we have families. Have
patience because we have families."6 Another teacher, Arturo Querubin, likewise saw Renegado that evening
acting in a suspicious manner and sensing the state of mind of Renegado because of the incident which
happened earlier in the afternoon, Querubin approached Renegado, advised him to "calm his temper," and told
him "remember, you have plenty of children, please be calm."7
Came Monday morning, August 29, and at around 9:00 o'clock, Erlinda Rojo, a bookkeeper in the school, met
accused Renegado in the office of the principal. Renegado inquired from Erlinda about his salary loan, and
during their conversation, the school janitor called the attention of the two to some boys quarreling near the
school's shop building and Renegado remarked: "stab him"; to those words Erlinda replied: "That is the case
with you. Your intention is to stab. If that is your attitude, there will be nobody left on earth, they will all die,"
to which Renegado countered: "So that the bad persons will be taken away and eliminated," and after that
exchange of remarks Renegado left the room.8

That same morning, past 9:00 o'clock, which was his vacant period, Lira went to the school canteen, seated
himself at the counter, and ordered a bottle of "pepsi cola" from the girls who were then serving, namely,
Venecia Icayan and Lolita Francisco. At about 9:30 while Lira was drinking his "pepsi cola" Renegado entered
the canteen and seeing Lira with his back towards him, he immediately and without warning stabbed Lira with a
knife hitting the latter on the right lumbar region. The wounded Lira turned around holding his abdomen and
raised a chair to ward off his assailant who was poised to stab him for the second time. Renegado tried to reach
Lira but he was blocked by Mrs. Tan who shouted "Stop it, Loreto, don't anymore." Because of the intervention
of Mrs. Tan and the screaming of the girls inside the canteen, Renegado desisted from continuing with his
attack and left the canteen.9 During that incident, Felix Tingzon was also in the canteen having a snack with a
guest and although he did not actually see the very act of stabbing, he saw however that when Renegado entered
the canteen Lira was beside the counter and had his back towards appellant Renegado.9a

Lira was brought to the Calbayog City General Hospital and was attended by Dr. Erlinda Ortiz who performed
an operation on him. Dr. Ortiz found that the weapon of the assailant entered through the right lumbar region of
the victim and penetrated the right lower lobe of the liver. Notwithstanding the medical attention given to Lira,
the latter died on September 4, 1966, from "hepatic insufficiency" caused by the stab wound which perforated
the right lower lobe of the liver resulting in internal hemorrhage.10

Appellant Renegado asks Us not to believe the above-given narration of the witnesses for the prosecution and
submits instead his own version of the incident as follows:

At about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of Friday, August 26, he was in the school canteen for a snack and on that
occasion Lira arrived and approached him with a bunch of papers and told him to type the stencil of his test,
questions; he answered that he could not do the work because he was busy in the principal's office; Lira got mad
and pointing his finger at him said: "The question with you is that the work that you can do in a day you finish it
in so many days, because you stroll only in the office and keep on sleeping."; scared by the aggressive mood of
Lira, he went out of the canteen, but Lira followed him and, overtaking him near the door, boxed him on his
stomach; he told Lira that he was not fighting back, however, Lira angrily shook his fingers at him and said:
"don't show yourself to me, I will kill you with maltreatment"; he proceeded to the office of the principal and
informed the latter about the incident but the principal advised him not to mind Mr. Lira and to go ahead with
his work; later, in the afternoon he went home; the following morning, Saturday, he was in his house repairing
the "pantao" or wash stand and on that occasion spouse Lourdes and Feling Renegado came to the house and
they talked about the incident between him and Lira; Lourdes Renegado suggested the filing of a complaint
against Lira but he replied he was not taking the matter seriously and, at any rate, he was resigning from his job;
on Monday, August 29, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning he went to his work in the school as usual; upon
reaching the school, he proceeded to the room of Miss Rojo to get some papers on which he was working, and
then he returned to his room; at about 9:30, he went to the canteen for a snack and on the way, he was "singing,
whistling, and tossing a coin in his hand"; before reaching the canteen, he saw Lira and Manuel Cordove
conversing and when the two parted, Lira went to his room; upon reaching the canteen, he went to the counter
(see Exhibits 3 and 3-A), and while he was there standing, Lira arrived, stood beside him, elbowed him, and
said in a loud voice: "Ano ka?"; he turned around to face Lira and the latter banged on the counter the folders he
(Lira) was carrying; Lira then placed his right hand inside his pocket, pulled with the other hand a chair and
pushed it at him; he became confused and remembered that on Friday afternoon Lira threatened to kill him if he
(Lira) would meet him again; after a while he saw Mrs. Tan standing before him and heard her say: "Loreto,
don't do that"; upon hearing those words, "he regained his senses" and only then did, he realize that he had
wounded Lira; he became panicky, left the canteen, proceeded home, and informed his wife that he had
wounded a person; he then called for a tricycle, looked for a policeman, and surrendered to the
latter.11

To corroborate his testimony that in the morning of the stabbing incident he was ahead of Lira in the school
canteen, appellant called to the witness stand Manuel Cordove who declared that on Monday morning after he
and Lira had conversed and parted, Lira proceeded to his (Lira's) office while he went to his own room and on
the way he passed by Renegado who was then standing by the door of the canteen and greeted him; after a short
while he heard shouts from the canteen and he learned that Renegado had stabbed Lira.12 Another witness,
Lourdes Renegado, testified on the conversation between her and her brother-in-law, the herein appellant, on
Saturday morning, and she tried to impress the court that appellant Renegado had dismissed from his mind his
altercation with Lira and as a matter of fact on the following day, Sunday, she met Renegado who had just come
from church and was on his way to attend a cockfight.13 Appellant's wife, Elena de Guia, also took the witness
stand and declared inter alia that when her husband returned home on Friday afternoon and narrated to her the
occurrence at the canteen she suggested that a complaint be filed against Lira but her husband said: "never
mind"; in the evening of that same day, Friday, her husband invited her to go with him to the school dance,
however, she excused herself because of the children; on Monday morning, August 29, her husband reported for
work at the school as usual and before leaving the house he told her that he was returning about 9:00 o'clock for
his "merienda"; her husband returned later in the morning only to tell her that he had stabbed someone; upon
hearing the news she cried out: "Oh my God what have you done to us?", and he replied: "I would not have
done that had he not bullied me, he purposely did it to me, that is why I was hurt."; after that, her husband left
the house to surrender to the police.14

On the basis of the testimony of appellant, his counsel-de-oficio, Atty. Roberto C. Alip, in his well-written brief
pleads for an acquittal with the argument that accused should be exempt from criminal liability "because at the
precise time that the prosecution claims de Lira was stabbed, accused lost his senses and he simply did not
know what he was doing."15 To bolster his argument on the mental condition of appellant, defense counsel
directs Our attention to that portion of the evidence showing that sometime in June of 1950 Renegado was
"clubbed" on the forehead by Antonio Redema and was treated by Dr. J.P. Rosales for head injuries (Exh. 4-A),
and as a result of that incident Redema was charged with and convicted of "frustrated murder" in the Court of
First Instance of Samar on July 21, 1950;16 that the head injury of appellant produced "ill-effects" because
since that particular occurrence appellant would have fits of violent temper such as maltreating his wife and
children for no reason at all, and for which he would ask forgiveness from his wife because "he lost his
head."17

For purposes of disposing of appellant's defense it becomes necessary to restate certain basic principles in
criminal law, viz: that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him;18 that a felonious or criminal
act (delito doloso) is presumed to have been done with deliberate intent, that is, with freedom, intelligence, and
malice19 because the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal
condition of a person in the absence of evidence to the contrary;20 that one of the causes which will overthrow
this presumption of voluntariness and intelligence is insanity in which event the actor is exempt from criminal
liability as provided for in Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing act,
that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will, mere abnormality of
the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.21 The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as
an exempting circumstance and he must prove it by clear and positive evidence.22

Applying the foregoing basic principles to the herein appellant, his defense perforce must fail.
By his testimony appellant wants to convey that for one brief moment he was unaware or unconscious of what
he was doing, that he "regained his senses" when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan telling him: "Loreto, don't do
that," and only then did he realize that he had wounded Lira. That, to Us, is incredible. For it is most unusual for
appellant's mind which was in a perfect normal state on Monday morning, August 29, to suddenly turn blank at
that particular moment when he stabbed Lira. Appellant himself testified that he was acting very sanely that
Monday morning, as shown by the fact that he went to the canteen in a jovial mood "singing, whistling, and
tossing a coin in his hand"; he saw the persons inside the canteen namely Venecia Icayan, Lolita Francisco,
Benita Tan, Felipe Tingzon and a guest of the latter (all of whom, except the last one, testified for the
prosecution); he noticed the arrival of Lira who banged his folders on the table, elbowed him, and said in a loud
"ano ka"; he saw Lira put his right hand inside his pocket and with the other hand push a chair towards him; he
became "confused" because he remembered that Lira threatened to kill him if he would see him again; at this
point he "lost his senses" and regained it when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan saying: "Loreto, don't do that",
and he then found out that he had wounded Lira. If appellant was able to recall all those incidents, We cannot
understand why his memory stood still at that very crucial moment when he stabbed Lira to return at the snap of
finger as it were, after he accomplished the act of stabbing his victim. His is not a diseased mind, for there is no
evidence whatsoever, expert or otherwise, to show that he is suffering from insanity or from any other mental
sickness which impaired his memory or his will. The evidence shows and the trial court did find that appellant
is a perfectly normal being, and that being the case, the presumption is that his normal state of mind on that
Monday morning continued and remained throughout the entire incident..

The testimony of appellant's wife, Elena, that her husband at times manifests unusual behaviour, exempli gratia:
lashing at his children if the latter refuses to play with him, tearing off the mosquito net if not properly tied,
"executing a judo" on her person, boxing her, and so on and so forth, is not the evidence needed to prove a state
of insanity. At most such testimony shows that appellant Renegado is a man of violent temper who can be easily
provoked to violence for no valid reason at all. Thus in People vs. Cruz, this Court held that breaking glasses
and smashing dishes are simply demonstrations of an explosive temper and do not constitute clear and
satisfactory proof of insanity; they are indications of the passionate nature of the accused, his tendency to
violent fits when angry, and inasmuch as the accused was not deprived of the consciousness of his acts but was
simply obfuscated by the refusal of his wife to live with him, his conviction for parricide was proper.23

Very relevant to the case now before Us in U.S. vs. Ramon Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62, where the
appellant was accused of serious physical injuries committed on his wife, mother-in-law, and sisters-in-law. The
accused Hontiveros pleaded insanity as a defense, and claimed that immediately before the incident he had
intermittent fever at intervals of a few hours during which he lost consciousness and after he regained
consciousness he found himself outside of the house and heard voices commanding him to surrender his
weapon, and he came to know that he had wounded his wife, his mother-in-law and sisters-in-law. The Court
sustained the conviction of the accused holding:

In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to
conclude that he acted unconsciously in order to relieve him from responsibility on the ground of exceptional
mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proven .... Acts penalized by law are always
considered to be voluntary, unless the contrary be shown, and by this rule of law Ramon Hontiveros, by
inflicting upon the offended parties the respective wounds, is considered to have been in a normal, healthy,
mental condition, and no weight can be given to the defendant's allegation of insanity and lack of reason, which
would constitute an exceptional condition; nor, for lack of evidence, can his state of mind be deemed to have
been abnormal." (p. 65, emphasis supplied)

The next point raised by the defense is that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution comes from "biased,
partial, and highly questionable sources," and is not to be believed.23
Appellant claims that it is highly improbable for a person who intends to kill someone to reveal his plan to
others such as what the prosecution witnesses Velasco and Ramirez testified that Renegado told them on Friday
afternoon that he was going to kill Lira. It may be true that ordinarily one would keep to one's self such a
hideous plot, but the workings of the human mind are at times mysteriously incomprehensible, and to a man like
the herein appellant who is pictured by his own evidence to be one of violent disposition, it was natural for him
to blurt out his outraged feelings and his evil design to his two co-employees in the school because the incident
with Lira was still fresh in his mind at the time.

Appellant also contends that the prosecution witnesses are biased and partial. We find that contention
unjustified. The mere fact that the witnesses of the People were employees, students, and teachers in the school
is no reason to consider their declarations biased in the absence of satisfactory proof that any of them had
personal motives if his own either to favor the deceased or prejudice the herein appellant. In assessing the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the trial judge found no sufficient evidence proving hostility towards
the herein appellant or any notable relationship of friendship with the deceased, and We see no valid reason for
discrediting His Honor's findings in this regard. Time and again this Tribunal has stated that the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are not to be disturbed for the trial judge is in a better position to
appreciate the same, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behaviour and manner
of testifying during the trial, unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case; in
the case at bar, there is no such showing.24 The rule is so, because as rightly said, the opportunity to observe
the demeanor and appearance of witnesses in many instances is the very touchstone of credibility.25

As a last issue, appellant claims that the court a quo erred in holding the appellant guilty of "murder with assault
upon a person in authority."26

The zeal of appellant's counsel-de-oficio in pursuing all possible lines of defense so as to secure the acquittal of
his client or at least to minimize his liability is truly laudable. However, predicated on the credible and impartial
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses the judgment of the trial court finding the accused guilty as charged is
to be sustained for the following reasons:

First, the killing of Mamerto de Lira is qualified by evident premeditation. The circumstance of evident
premeditation is present because on that very Friday afternoon immediately after the incident at the canteen
appellant Renegado, giving vent to his anger, told his co-employee, Ramirez, and the security guard, Velasco,
that he was going to kill Lira. That state of mind of appellant was evident once more when he went to the school
dance that same Friday evening and was seen cycling around the school premises several times, and he asked
another security guard, Nicomedes Leonor, if Lira was at the dance. On the following day, Saturday, appellant
met Mrs. Benita Tan to whom he confided that had he seen Lira the night before he would surely have killed
him. And on Monday morning, knowing the time of Lira for a snack (tsn, Nov. 17, 1966, p. 307), appellant
armed himself with a knife or some bladed weapon which by his own admission on cross-examination was his
and which he used for "cutting bond paper" (tsn. ibid, p. 299), proceeded to the canteen at around 9:30 o'clock,
and seeing the teacher Lira with his back towards him, without much ado, stabbed Lira from behind hitting the
victim on the right lumbar region. Appellant's attempt to show that he does not remember how the weapon
reached the canteen is of course futile, preposterous as it is. (tsn. ibid, pp. 299-300) There is no doubt that the
act of appellant in bringing with him his knife to the canteen on Monday morning was the culmination of his
plan to avenge himself on Lira for the remark made by the latter on Friday afternoon. Evident premeditation
exists when sufficient time had elapsed for the actor to reflect and allow his conscience to overcome his
resolution to kill but he persisted in his plan and carried it into effect.27 Here, appellant Renegado had more or
less sixty-four hours from the Friday incident up to 9:30 o'clock of Monday morning within which to ponder
over his plan and listen to the advice of his co-employees and of his own conscience, and such length of time
was more than sufficient for him to reflect on his intended revenge.
Second, treachery attended the killing of Lira because the latter, who was unarmed, was stabbed from behind,
was totally unaware of the coming attack, and was not in a position to defend himself against it. There is
treachery where the victim who was not armed was never in a position to defend himself or offer resistance, nor
to present risk or danger to the accused when assaulted.28

Third, the killing of Lira is complexed with assault upon a person in authority. A teacher either of a public or of
a duly recognized private school is a person in authority under Art. 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 578.29

The defense claims, however, that while it is true that Mamerto de Lira was at the time of his death a teacher of
the Tiburcio Memorial Vocational School run by the national government, he was not stabbed while in the
performance of his duties nor on the occasion of such performance. According to the defense counsel, the
motive of the assault is important to determine whether or not the assault falls under Art. 148 of the Revised
Penal Code;30 in the instant case it is clear that the underlying motive for the assault was not that Renegado was
asked to type the test questions of the teacher Lira but that the latter made insulting and slanderous remarks to
the herein appellant. This contention of the defense is incorrect. The assault or attack on Lira was committed on
the occasion of the performance of the duties of the latter as a teacher because: as narrated in the early part of
this Decision, Lira was scheduled to give a periodical test on September 2, 1966, and was required to submit
his, test questions for approval and mimeographing by August 25 and 26; Lira asked appellant Renegado to
prepare the stencil of his questions inasmuch as he was not versed with typing; appellant was duty bound to
type said stencil under the memorandum-circular enumerating his duties as a clerk of the school; appellant
refused the request of Lira under pretext that he had much work in the principal's office and furthermore that
typing test questions for teachers was not among his duties; Lira reminded Renegado that the principal gave
necessary instructions for that purpose, and ended up with the remark: "you can finish your work if you only
will sit down and work"; Lira's remark was neither insulting nor slanderous but more of a reminder to Renegado
that if he would sit down and work he could finish all the work that had to be done; as a teacher of the school,
Lira had the authority to call the attention of an employee of the institution to comply with his duties and to be
conscientious and efficient in his work; it was Renegado's violent character, as shown by his own evidence,
which led him to react angrily to the remark of Lira and conceive of a plan to attack the latter. Under these
enumerated facts, We conclude that the impelling motive for the attack on Mamerto de Lira was the
performance by the latter of his duties as a teacher.

In Justo vs. Court of Appeals, wherein the offended party was a district supervisor of the Bureau of Public
Schools, the Court held that the phraseology "on occasion of such performance" used in Art. 148 of the Revised
Penal Code signifies "because" or "by reason" of the past performance of official duty, even if at the very time
of the assault no official duty was being discharged, inasmuch as the evident purpose of the law is to allow
public officials and their agents to discharge their official duties without being haunted by the fear of being
assaulted or injured by reason thereof.31

Inasmuch as the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority and the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender is offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the penalty of
DEATH imposed by the trial court is pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Articles 148 and 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. The court a quo, however, in its decision recommends to the President of the Republic the
commutation of the death penalty to reclusion perpetua, and the Solicitor General * concurs with such
recommendation. On the part of the Court, for lack of ten votes for purposes of imposing the death sentence, the
penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, is to be imposed.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the conviction of appellant Loreto Renegado for murder with assault on
a person in authority and We sentence him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Mamerto de Lira in the sum of twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos 32 and to pay the costs. Decision
modified.
G.R. No. L-26361             January 20, 1927

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CRISPINO MANCAO and CIRIACO AGUILAR, defendants-appellants.

Jakosalem, Gullas & Briones for appellants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by Crispino Mancao and Ciriaco Aguilar from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu convicting them, in accordance with the complaint, of the crime of homicide, and sentencing each of
them to fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with accesories of the law, to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Roberto Villela in the sum of P1,000, and each to pay one-half of
the costs.

In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its
judgment, to wit: (1) The lower court erred in giving too much weight to the testimony of Baldomero Villela
and Eusebio Villela, aged 15 and 14 years, respectively, and in basing its judgment upon said testimony; (2) the
lower court also erred in not holding that the evidence for the defense preponderates and is more worthy of
credit than that for the prosecution; (3) the lower court likewise erred in not finding that, in view of the evidence
presented by both parties, the accused are at least entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt; (4) the lower court
erred in not holding that the accused Ciriaco Aguilar is mentally deficient and is, therefore, not criminally
liable, and, (5) the lower court erred in sentencing the accused instead of acquitting them as it should have done
in view of the absence of incriminating evidence.

The prosecution and the defense are agreed that Hilaria Dejan, upon her death, left personal property, cattle and
real property, the latter consisting of corn fields, some of which were in the possession of Roberto Villela who
had leased them. The probate of the will of said deceased Hilaria Dejan, wherein she bequeathed one-half of her
property to her nephew Roberto Villela and her niece Josefa Billones, having been denied and proceedings for
the administration of the property left by her having been instituted, Crispino Mancao was appointed
administrator thereof on June 26, 1916. Roberto Villela refused to deliver the lands in his possession to the
administrator, alleging that the products of the same were to go to the deceased's creditors. On January 31,
1918, Crispino Mancao, as administrator of the property of the intestate estate of Hilaria Dejan, was cited to
appear before the Court of First Instance to explain why almost all the deceased's property did not appear in the
inventory.

As to the disputed facts, the prosecution tried to prove the following: In the afternoon of August 10, 1925,
Crispino Mancao, accompanied by three men and several women, approached Graciana Sedimo, Roberto
Villela's tenant, and inquired if there was still corn to be harvested and divided between her and Roberto Villela
by virtue of the lease. The unharvested and undivided portion of the corn field having been pointed out to them,
the accused Crispino Mancao ordered the persons with him to begin harvesting said corn. In view of Crispino
Mancao's actions, Graciana Sedimo ordered her nephew Baldomero Villela to notify Roberto Villela of the
matter. Upon arriving at the corn field Roberto Villela asked the harvesters who ordered them to harvest the
corn. Crispino Mancao, who was in the corn field, replied that he was the one who ordered them to do so and
started towards Roberto Villela. The latter then asked the former if he had an order from the court to harvest the
products. Crispino Mancao struck him with a bamboo stick and said: "This is the order." Roberto Villela dodged
the blow and snatched the cane. Having been deprived of his bamboo stick, Crispino Mancao took hold of his
bolo and attempted to strike Roberto Villela which the latter warded off with a stick he had in his hand.
Crispino Mancao continued to strike Roberto Villela inflicting but slight wounds. Upon being attacked, Roberto
Villela rushed at Crispino Mancao and a hand to hand fight ensued, in the course of which they fell down and
the former succeeded in disarming the latter. After getting up, they continued to fight, Crispino Mancao
receiving a wound on his right hand and another on the right calf, and seeing that he was getting the worst of it,
shouted for help. A men dressed in khaki immediately appeared upon the scene and struck Roberto Villela a
blow on the thigh as a result of which he fell to his knees. While in this position another man, wearing an
undershirt, approached and, after striking him twice on the thigh, ran away. Crispino Mancao then took hold of
Roberto Villela by the hands and while thus held, the accused Ciriaco Aguilar struck him with his sickle in the
back as a result of which Roberto Villela fell to the ground unconscious. Upon Graciana Sedimo and the boy
Baldomero Villela shouting for help, Crispino Mancao left the place and at about 6:30 in the evening presented
himself to the councilman of the barrio, Victor Bienvenido, carrying a bolo in his belt, and informed the latter
what had happened. The justice of the peace of Alonguisan, Cebu, accompanied by the chief of police, upon
investigation at the scene of the combat, found the stick Exhibit A, and Roberto Villela's belt which had been
slit with a sharp instrument. Upon examination of Roberto Villela's body which had been taken to Graciana
Sedimo's house, he found a wound caused by a sharp instrument on the right side of the forehead; a small
wound on the right side of the throat just below the Adam's apple; a large wound above the left knee; two
wounds below the left knee, one over the other; a deep wound on the spine which almost completely severed the
lumbar region; five deep wounds in about the same place and a wound in the palm of the left hand. Conscious
of the seriousness of his condition and the hopelessness of living, Roberto Villela made a declaration which is
contained in Exhibit C. The wounded man died on August 26, 1925 as a result of said wounds.

The defense tried to prove that while the accused and his companions were harvesting the corn on Hilaria
Dejan's land on the afternoon of August 10, 1925, Roberto Villela approached and inquired: "Who ordered the
harvesting of the corn?" that the accused Crispino Mancao replied: "I did it by order of the court and not of my
own accord," and at the same time Roberto Villela drew his bolo and attempted to strike Crispino Mancao a
blow on the neck which the latter succeeded in warding off, only striking the brim of his hat; that Roberto
Villela continued to strike him and he defended himself by means of the stick which he had, but in spite of it he
received a wound on the left hand, the stick falling from his hand; that once unarmed Crispino Mancao rushed
at Roberto Villela and grasped him in order to take the bolo from him; that in doing so Crispino Mancao took
hold of the blade of Roberto Villela's bolo, wounding the first and second fingers of his right hand; that in the
course of the fight both fell to the ground, and as Roberto Villela was the taller and stronger of the two, he
succeeded in pinning Crispino Mancao to the ground, who shouted for help; that the other accused Ciriaco
Aguilar approached and said: "What have you done to him, he has done you no wrong;" that as Roberto Villela
did not pay any attention to him the accused Ciriaco Aguilar struck him on the back with a sickle which he
carried; that as Roberto Villela still did not mind him notwithstanding the wounds he had received on his back,
the accused put the sickle around the former's left thigh and pulled it, forcing him to incline and free Crispino
Mancao; that while Roberto Villela was on top of Crispino Mancao he continued kicking Ciriaco Aguilar who
wounded him on the right thigh with his sickle; that one of the bolo blows of Ciriaco Aguilar aimed at Roberto
Villela hit Crispino Mancao wounding him below the right knee; that Crispino Mancao had no bolo at the time;
that the accused Ciriaco Aguilar is an epileptic and as such is susceptible to fits which deprive him of his reason
and attempt to commit suicide or homicide without being aware of it; that, at times, due to his affliction, the
accused Ciriaco Aguilar speaks at random, particularly when talking for any length of time.

Of the five assignments of error, four relate to findings of fact made by the trial court, and the fifth to the
conclusion of law based upon said findings of fact.
A careful and detailed examination of the oral and documentary evidence presented by both parties, and the
consideration given the antecedents of the case and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
criminal act, convince us that the accused Crispino Mancao was the instigator and aggressor, Roberto Villela
having done nothing but to defendant himself, first disarming the former of his stick with which he was
assaulted, and later of his bolo which he used after having been assaulted, and later of his bolo which he used
after having been deprived of his stick. Roberto Villela might have had the advantage in the fight had not one of
Crispino Mancao's laborers, dressed in khaki, come to his rescue, upon his cry for help, and struck Roberto
Villela on the thigh; then, another man wearing an undershirt who stuck Roberto Villela several times on the
left knee; and, lastly, the accused Ciriaco Aguilar who struck Roberto Villela several blows on the back with his
sickle, one of which nearly severed his spine in the lumbar region which later caused his death.

The allegation of self-defense made by the accused Crispino Mancao is groundless. The evidence sufficiently
proves that he carried a stick and a bolo while Roberto Villela was unarmed. The latter refused to surrender the
lands belonging to the intestate estate of the deceased Hilaria Dejan which were in his possession. And in view
of this and of the fact that it did not appear in the inventory presented by Crispino Mancao, as administrator,
that he was in possession of said lands, the court cited him to appear and explain his side of the matter, and
ordered him to take the necessary steps to obtain possession of said lands. Crispino Mancao ordered the
harvesting of the corn on said lands without any judicial order that effect, knowing full well that Roberto Villela
would object to his doing so. Crispino Mancao's behaviour showed that he was ready to face the consequences
of his act. In this state of mind he undoubtedly became annoyed upon being asked by Roberto Villela, on the
afternoon in question , if he had an order from the court to harvest the corn, and he replied by striking said
Roberto Villela with a stick, saying that was the order of the court.

While it is true that the wounds which caused Roberto Villela's death were not inflicted by Crispino Mancao but
by his coaccused Ciriaco Aguilar, yet said Crispino Mancao having been the instigator and aggressor, and
having called his harvesters to his aid, among them the said Ciriaco Aguilar, he wanted them to carry out, as in
fact they did, the criminal act started by him and, therefore, he is liable not only for his own acts, but also for
the acts of those who aided him.

Neither can the defense of lack of free will of the accused Ciriaco Aguilar, who is an epileptic, be sustained.
While Ciriaco Aguilar, as an epileptic, was susceptible to nervous attacks that may momentarily deprive him of
his mental faculties and lead him to unconsciously attempt to take his own life and the lives of others,
nevertheless, it has not been shown that he was under the influence of an epileptic fit before, during, and
immediately after the aggression.

For the foregoing, we arrive at the conclusion that the said accused are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
crime imputed to them, each being criminally liable as principal for having taken direct part in the commission
of the crime.

Wherefore, and no error being found in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts,
with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-37673             March 31, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.

Carlos S. Tan for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc,
Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the
house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep
and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop
him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to
attack his father after which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died
five days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.

An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced by the
trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a quarrel over a
glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when
he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the
crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe
stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when he fell asleep. The defendant states
that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his
feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he
armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she
was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his
enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.

The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her
dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.

Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive for
committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to
us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden away and inaccessible
to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a man commit
a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under the special circumstances of the
case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the
fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived,
besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the
evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts
complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.

Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that considering
the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination and
not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct result of the
defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not
clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw how the
wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her
say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the
defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his
wife but he was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in
desperation, he stabbed himself.

In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that the
defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined
in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his liberty
would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 6897. February 15, 1912. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. POLICARPIO TAYONGTONG, Defendant-Appellant.

Jose M. Arroyo, for Appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. AUTOMOBILES; HOMICIDE BY RECKLESS DRIVING; PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE AND

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH. — In a prosecution directed against the driver of an automobile, who is
charged with homicide caused by negligently and recklessly driving his machine, in order to support a
conviction it must be shown that the accused was actually guilty of negligence and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death

2. ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. — The negligence of the deceased, in such a
case, is no defense to the charge, where it appears that the accused himself was negligent and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the death of the victim thereof.

3. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION. — The evidence in this case
examined and held to be insufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence.

DECISION

MORELAND, J. :
The defendant in this case was convicted of the crime of homicide by negligence (homicidio por imprudencia
temeraria). He appealed, basing his whole case here upon the proposition that the evidence does not warrant the
conviction.

It appears that on the 19th day of January, 1911, one Severino Resume was engaged in painting telephone poles
located along the highway between Jaro and Iloilo. On that day he was killed by being run over by an
automobile driven by the defendant. The highway at the point where Severino met his death was straight, of
considerable width, and in good condition. The telephone pole upon which Severino was at work at the time of
the accident was out-side of the beaten portion of the highway and located about 2 feet into the grass at the side.
Between it and the edge of the road was a pathway used by people traveling on foot. The machine which caused
the death of the deceased is a large passenger automobile, seating 35 passengers, and having upon each side and
extending about 2 feet out beyond the wheels a rack or other contrivance for the carrying of parcels, baggage,
and freight. It is used solely for the purpose of carrying passengers back and forth between Iloilo and Jaro.

The accident happened at about 10 o’clock in the morning. The automobile was then engaged in making its
third trip from Iloilo to Jaro, and was loaded to its fullest capacity. There were several people who claim to have
witnessed the accident. One of them, the principal witness for the prosecution, and its only witness who saw the
occurrence, named Pablo Tayson, is alleged to have been standing within a few feet of the deceased, talking
with him, at the time he was run down. Another person, who was near by at the time of the accident, was
Basilio Severaldo, who was engaged in the same work as the deceased but, just prior to the passage of the
automobile, had gone away from the locality where the accident occurred and saw nothing of what happened.
Two other persons, who have been produced as witnesses for the defendant, allege that they were present and
saw the whole occurrence.

Pablo Tayson, who, as we have said, is the only witness for the prosecution testifying directly to the facts and
substantially the only witness upon whom the prosecution relies for a conviction, testified that at the time of the
accident he and the deceased were located on the left-hand side of the highway going from Iloilo to Jaro; that he
was standing a few feet from the deceased who was also on the same side of the highway; that the deceased was
standing up painting the side of the telephone pole toward Jaro; that the telephone pole was, therefore, between
the deceased and Iloilo, the direction from which the automobile was coming; that the road on that day was very
dusty and the automobile, as he saw it coming from Iloilo toward him and the deceased, was raising a cloud of
dust which was drifting to the side of the road upon which he and the deceased were located. This witness
further asserted that he saw the automobile when it was within about 1,200 feet of the place where he stood; that
it was coming at a rate of speed variously termed by him "very fast" and "at full speed;" that, on observing the
machine as it approached, he saw that the driver, the accused, was turning the steering wheel first in one
direction and then in the other, as if uncertain what course he was going to pursue; that the machine, as a
consequence, was darting first to one side of the road and then to the other, thus zigzagging back and forth
across the traveled portion of the highway; that just before reaching the place where deceased was painting the
telephone pole it crossed to the side of the road opposite to him and then suddenly started back across the road,
striking the deceased as he stood painting; that by the impact the deceased was thrown upon the ground
somewhat toward the front of the machine, which was going so fast that, although the accused was not within
the reach of its wheels, nevertheless, the "suction," as the witness called it, created by the swift passage of the
machine drew the deceased under its wheels where he was run over and crushed.

From the testimony of this witness it does not appear that the deceased moved or stirred in any way until he was
hit by the automobile.

The accused testified, and produced several witnesses to support his testimony, that at the time of the accident
he was driving the machine, which was loaded to its fullest capacity with passengers and baggage, at about 10
to 15 miles an hour; that he was driving in or near the center of the road; that there was no person in the
highway and no vehicle or other obstruction which required him to leave the center of the road and pass to
either side; that the machine was under full control and was going steadily and smoothly without deviating to
the right or to the left; that on approaching the place where the witness Pablo Tayson stood he saw him turn his
back toward the road and place his cap over his face in such a way as to cover his nose, mouth and eyes,
evidently to protect them from the cloud of dust which was rolling from behind the machine over toward the
side of the road on which he was; that the deceased, as the machine approached, probably seeing the cloud of
dust which it was raising and which would inevitably drift in his direction, and observing his companion, Pablo
Tayson, under the necessity of protecting himself from the dust in the manner described, just before the
machine reached a point opposite him, started to cross the road to the other side, evidently to escape the dust;
that he misjudged the distance and started too late; that in attempting to cross he placed himself squarely in
front of the machine; that his movement was so sudden and unexpected and, when he reached the road, he was
so close to the machine that it was impossible to stop it in time to avert the catastrophe; that he did everything
that was possible to be done to avoid the accident; that he put on both brakes as hard as possible and turned the
machine as much as could be done under the circumstances; that in proof thereof he shows that only the front
wheel of the machine passed over the body of the deceased, it having been turned by him sufficiently so that the
hind wheel missed him, and that the machine was stopped a very few feet beyond the point where the accident
occurred. The accused testified, and his evidence in this regard is uncontradicted, that he was thoroughly
qualified as a driver, having served his apprenticeship on this very road and this very machine before being
employed.

The accused denies absolutely that portion of the story told by Pablo Tayson in which he alleges that the
accused was driving at a high rate of speed; that he was zigzagging from one side of the road to the other; and
that he struck the deceased while he stood painting the telephone pole.

We are satisfied that the evidence is not sufficient to convict. On the contrary, we believe that, under all of the
facts and circumstances of the case, the fair preponderance of the evidence indicates that the deceased met his
death in substantially the manner described by the accused. In the first place, the testimony of Pablo Tayson is
affected by an attack made upon his credibility during the progress of the trial. It was shown that, on the
preliminary investigation had by the justice of the peace, this witness testified, precisely as the accused asserted
in his evidence, that just as the machine was arriving at a point in the highway opposite him, he, desiring to
avoid the unpleasantness of the dust, turned his back toward the road and covered his face with his cap, thereby
excluding the dust from his mouth, eyes, and nostrils. That he so testified on the preliminary investigation,
according to the record thereof, is admitted. In his testimony on the trial of this case he stated, at first, that he
turned his right side to the road and placed his hand over the side of his face, leaving his eyes uncovered, so that
he was able to see and did see the deceased at the time he was run down. Upon cross-examination he changed
this testimony to the extent of saying that he covered the right side of his face with his cap instead of his hand,
maintaining, however, that he did not cover his eyes and that he was able to see the deceased and all that
transpired. When confronted with the evidence which he gave on the preliminary examination, he sought to
explain the difference between his two declarations by stating that the testimony before the justice of the peace,
which was reduced to writing and signed by him, was in a different language from that which he was able to
speak and that it was not translated so that he knew what he was signing.

In the second place, the testimony of this witness is unreasonable. It is improbable that a machine as large as the
one in question, going at the rate of speed described by Pablo Tayson, could zigzag from one side of the high-
way to the other in the manner described by the witness. It is still more improbable that this machine could have
dodged from the right-hand side of the road to the left and, in some unknown manner, picked the deceased out
from behind the telephone pole, dragged him into the highway and there run over him. It is not clear how an
automobile can run over a man when it is admitted that he is on the opposite side of a telephone post from the
machine which runs him down, with only a portion of his body extending beyond it. Even if the machine had
started to- ward him in the manner described he would undoubtedly have seen it quickly enough to have passed
around the other side of the post and save himself from being touched. This is especially evident when we
observe that it is admitted that the deceased stood facing the automobile all the time and could see it plainly and
its every movement. It is difficult to believe that a machine of the size of the one in question, driven at the high
rate of speed alleged by the witness could have turned suddenly, darted toward the ditch, and struck the
deceased while located partly on the opposite side of a post from the machine without having collided with the
post or gone into the ditch, it being remembered that the post was not more than 6 feet from the ditch.

From the description given of the machine it appears, as we have already seen, that there were certain portions
of the body of the machine extending over and beyond the wheels, which were used as receptacles for the
baggage and bundles of passengers. This projection, under the theory of the prosecuting would necessarily have
been the portion of the machine to hit the deceased for the reason that no other part of the machine could have
come in contact with him without the projection referred to striking the telephone pole. If this projection is that
which struck the deceased first, then he would have been thrown into the ditch away from the machine and not
into the highway under the machine. This is what would necessarily have happened when we remember that at
the time the deceased was struck the machine was going at full speed toward the ditch. It was apparently to
avoid the contradiction of his previous testimony inherent in this necessary result that the witness testified that
the force which prevented the deceased from going into the ditch and drew him under the machine was the
"suction" created by its rapid passage along the highway.

It is the undisputed evidence of the case that that portion of the machine which struck the deceased first was the
mudguard over the left wheel. This fact alone shows the impossibility of the machine having hit the deceased
while standing at the post, as it is admitted that no part of the automobile collided with the post. If the deceased
had been at the post, as described by Tayson, the guard could not possibly have struck him without the extended
portions above described having struck the post itself.

On the other hand, the story told by the accused and supported by some of the passengers who saw the accident
is entirely reasonable, accords with common sense and ordinary experience. It was clearly told, in a manner
frank and straightforward, was free from contradictions and needs no explanation or excuses.

We have read with detention the opinion upon which the judgment of conviction is based. In spite of careful
study, we are unable to discover anything therein that alters our views in relation to the merits. As between the
two theories, the one of the prosecution and the other of the defense, we cannot have, under the evidence and
record, any hesitation in choosing. The evidence presented by the prosecution itself, and it is upon that evidence
alone that the conviction must stand, every other fact in the record being conspicuously in exculpation of the
accused, shows the deceased standing upon the east side of a telephone pole facing an automobile coming
toward him from the west, about half of his body extending beyond the pole toward the highway on his left. On
his right was the highway drainage ditch. The pole was outside of the traveled portion of the highway so far that
a footpath lay between it and said traveled portion. The automobile was coming toward him at a high rate of
speed, to judge from the evidence of this witness, at least 40 miles an hour, possibly more. The machine was not
proceeding in a straight line but it was going from one side of the road to the other. Just before arriving opposite
the deceased it darted to the right-hand side of the road and then, turning, it started toward the left-hand side
directly at the deceased. All of these things the deceased saw, yet he did not move or attempt to save himself in
any way. On the contrary, he stood still and permitted the machine to strike him upon his left side. Having
collided with him, the machine turned back toward the center of the highway, carrying the deceased with it,
depositing him within the traveled portion of the highway, where it ran over him. On the other hand, the
evidence of the defendant shows that he was driving the machine at a moderate rate of speed within the usually
traveled portion of the highway, guiding it in a substantially straight line and handling it in the usual and
ordinary manner. The machine, one of extraordinary size and capable of carrying 35 passengers with their
baggage and effects, was incapable of running at the rate of speed described by the prosecution. Arriving at a
point in the highway just in front of the deceased, the latter, to avoid the cloud of dust which was drifting to his
side of the road, started to cross the road to the other side. He miscalculated the time and distance and as a result
was struck by the automobile and run over. His action in starting across the road was so sudden and unexpected
and, when he reached the road, he was so close to the automobile, that it was impossible to stop the machine in
time to save him. The body was picked up within the traveled portion of the highway.
Which of these two stories is the most reasonable? We have no hesitation in answering. The story of the
prosecution presents so many things that are unreasonable and incredible and for which there exists in the
record no explanation whatever, and concerning which no reasonable explanation can be given, that it must
necessarily be rejected. Even if, going at such a high rate of speed, the accused could have driven the
automobile from one side of the road to the other as alleged, what could possibly be his reason for so doing? It
was market day at Jaro; this was his third trip; the machine was loaded to its utmost capacity, both with
passengers and with baggage; he was doubtless running according to a schedule and would have no time to
waste in going from one side of the road to the other; no reason is suggested and none can be supplied why a
driver should handle his machine in the manner described by the only witness for the prosecution who saw the
whole occurrence. Instead of keeping to the traveled portion of the highway, which was admittedly in fine
condition, why should the accused go outside of it, across a footpath used by pedestrians, and skim alongside of
the telephone poles located on that side? What object could he have had in thus exposing himself, his
passengers, and his machine to the risks and dangers of plunging into the drainage ditch or driving against the
telephone poles or of meeting the other disasters and dangers which might be encountered outside of the usually
traveled portion of the highway? No explanation of such extraordinary conduct is given in the record and none
can be conceived. He was not engaged in taking a party of hilarious companions on a "joy" ride, nor in giving
an exhibition of his skill in handling an automobile of that size and class. It does not appear that he was drunk
or foolish. He was engaged in a business enterprise, employed by a business man for business purposes. What
could possibly have been his purpose when, on arriving at a point in front of the deceased, he turned his
automobile across the road and started squarely toward the telephone pole and the deceased? That he saw the
deceased and that the deceased saw him is admitted. What spirit or purpose could have animated him in driving
his automobile outside of the highway directly toward not only a telephone post but the drainage ditch itself in
order to run down an unoffending person? What motive can be assigned by the prosecution when it asserts that
the accused did this unaccountable thing? What purpose does the prosecution allege the accused sought to
subserve when, by this conduct, he placed the safety of his passengers and of his machine, as well as of himself,
at stake in thus driving directly toward a place of great danger? Above all, why did the deceased stand still,
instead of stepping around behind the post, and permit himself to be crushed to death by the machine which he
clearly saw bearing down upon him? These unreasonable and unaccountable things must be satisfactorily
explained by the prosecution when it is confronted by the statement of the accused, supported by a number of
disinterested witnesses, that none of those things ever occurred. We have already pointed out that, giving the
story as told by the prosecution credence, it would have been little short of an impossibility for the body of the
deceased to have found itself in the traveled portion of the highway after the accident. He would inevitably have
been driven further away from the highway and toward the ditch by the blow from the machine going in the
direction in which it was alleged by the prosecution to have been going.

Turning to the story of the event as given by the defendant and his witnesses, we meet nothing that requires
explanation. There can, therefore, be no hesitation on our part in accepting the truth of the story told by the
defendant.

Although we have held in a recent case (U. S. v. Reyes, 10 Off. Gaz., 1045), a criminal action for homicide by
imprudencia temeraria, that contributory negligence on the part of the person killed is no defense, provided the
driver of the automobile himself was negligent and that negligence was the proximate cause of the death,
nevertheless, that doctrine does not in any way inveigh against the proposition which we here assert that, where
death is due to the negligence of the decedent himself and not to the negligence of the driver of the automobile,
the latter cannot be held for homicide. In this case the death of the deceased was due entirely to his own
negligence. There is not sufficient reliable proof in the record to establish negligence on the part of the accused.
There being no negligence, he is not responsible, no matter what the result of the accident may have been.

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the accused acquitted.

G.R. No. L-482             February 25, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BIENVENIDO NOCUM, defendant-appellant.

Severino P. Izon for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Umali for appellee.

BENGZON, J.:

For having discharged a gun and accidentally killed Eugenio Francisco, the defendant Bienvenido Nocum, alias
Bembe, was tried in the Court of First Instance Manila, before the Honorable Alfonso Felix, judge. Found guilty
of homicide through reckless negligence, he appealed in due course.

According to the evidence, about 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1945, there was a fistic fight
between Federico Bautista and Vicente Aurencio at the corner of Mayhaligue and Magdalena Streets, City of
Manila. Desiring to stop the encounter, defendant shouted at the combatants. As these paid him no attention, he
drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice at the air. The bout continued, however; so he fired another shot at the
ground, but unfortunately the bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Francisco, an innocent by-stander, resident of
the place. The wounded man was promptly carried to the St. Luke's Hospital where he expired soon after.

The above paragraph is a composite and abridged statement of the declarations of several witnesses (Jesus
Santos, Vicente and Juan Aurencio and Ramon Gagui) in connection with defendant's confession Exhibit F.1
But his attorney, assailing the validity of said confession in the ground of involuntariness, contends in this Court
that in asmuch as the corpus delicti had not been demonstrated by evidence dehors that document, his client
should be absolved, pursuant to several pertinent decisions. (United States vs. De la Cruz, 2 Phil., 148; and
People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil., 834.) Particular attention has been given to these points. Yet there is competent
proof establishing the fact that, during the affray, pistol detonations were heard, and that one of the bullets
produced the tragic death of Eugenio Francisco, whose photograph is Exhibit B. That is proof of the corpus
delicti, i. e., proof of violent death, whether or not feloniously caused. (See Moran, Law of Evidence, Revised
Edition, pp. 108, 109; People vs. Mones, 58 Phil., 46.) The confession Exhibit F served to identify the person
who fired those shots and committed the offense.

We feel no inclination to reject such confession, because the uncorroborated and implausible testimony of the
accused, alleging he had been manhandled before signing this document, about which he knew nothing, could
not definitely overcome the positive assertions of Pablo Montilla of the Manila Police Department (before
whom Exhibit F had been executed) that no force or intimidation had been employed on Nocum, who willingly
signed it "after propounding to him all the questions and explaining to him the contents" thereof. The
impartiality of that officer of the law has not been shaken by the lone testimony of herein appellant, which, as
explained in the People's brief, deserves no credence. Nocum said in court that he signed Exhibit F when
Montilla told him "it was simply a proof that they arrested me" (p. 27, t.s.n.). This is inconsistent with the
alleged third-degree methods. If he was forced, deceit was unneccessary. And yet, he could not be deceived
thusly, because he was no illiterate, being seventh grader.
Anyway, the trial judge had the chance to see the opposing witnesses, and to observe their demeanor on the
stand; and in the conflict of their statements we will not interfere with his judgment, unless the record discloses
some important circumstance which was overlooked, (United States vs. Remigio, 37 Phil., 599; United States
vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155), it being the peculiar province of trial courts to resolve questions relating to the
credibility of witnesses. (United States vs. Pico, 15 Phil., 549.)

The mishap should be classed as homicide through reckless imprudence, the slaying having been unintentional
(cf. People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939; and United States vs. Reodique, 32 Phil., 458). It is apparent the defendant
wilfully discharged his gun — for which he exhibited no license, by the way — without taking the precautions
demanded by the circumstance that the district was populated, and the likehood that his bullet would glance
over the hard pavement of the Manila thoroughfare.

A landowner surprise a youngster in the act of stealing some fruit in his orchard. To scare the intruder he fired a
shotgun aiming at the foliage of a cherry tree. The shot scattered and a pellet injured the boy, who was standing
under the tree. That was reckless negligence, the Spanish Supreme Court decided. (Sent. June 20, 1900, Viada,
5th ed., Vol. 7, p. 14.)

The penalty imposed on the appellant is 2 months and 1 day to 1 year and 1 day, indemnity of P2,000 with
subsidiary imprisonment, and costs. It is within the limits authorized by law. (Article 365, Rev. Penal Code, and
Act No. 4103.) (Act No. 284.)

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Appellant is indicted for homicide committed on November 21, 1945, which caused the death of Eugenio
Francisco. The lower court sentenced him to from two months and one day of arresto mayor to one year and
one day of prision correccional, to indemnify the heirs of Eugenio Francisco in the sum of P2,000 and to suffer
the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The lower court found appellant guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence, upon the prosecution's theory,
stated in the appealed decision as follows: "On November 21, 1945, at about 9 o'clock in the evening, and at the
corner of Mayhaligue and Magdalena Streets in the District of Sta. Cruz of this City of Manila, a quarrel
developed between Vicente Aurencio and Federico Bautista in which other gangsters intervened. On that
occasion defendant Bienvenido Nocum, one of the members of the gang, desiring to stop the fight, shouted at
the combatants in vain; so he decided to discharge his revolver twice in the air, but seeing that even this
recourse was not taken heed of by his quarrelling friends, he fired another shot to the ground which
unfortunately ricocheted and hit a passer-by named Eugenio Francisco. The wounded man was taken to the
hospital where he expired soon after his arrival therein."

These pronouncement of the lower court are not supported by the evidence. They are based on fantasy.

The prosecution called five witnesses to testify and presented two exhibits as evidence.
Pablo Montilla has no personal knowledge of the incident, because he arrived at the place about thirty minutes
after the incident was over. His testimony, notwithstanding, tends to show alleged admissions of appellant
during the investigation and about the voluntariness of appellant's written statement Exhibit F. Jesus Santos,
another police officer, has no personal knowledge as to how the deceased Eugenio Francisco was shot, because
when he arrived at the place he saw the deceased being held and attended inside the store where the witness was
told that somebody was shot. Ramon Gagui, testified that he never had seen Bienvenido Nocum, although he
was present during the incident in which Federico Bautista and Vicente Aurencio had been fighting and he
heard shots during the fight. Vicente Aurencio and Juan Aurencio did not testify anything against Nocum. They
have not seen him at the place of the incident. They do not know him. The two exhibits of the prosecution
which were admitted are Exhibit B, which is a photograph of the deceased, and Exhibit F, which is the written
statement attributed to appellant.

Appellant, a laborer, 22 years of age, sixth grade, testified that he had never seen the deceased and denied
having been at the place of the incident on November 21, 1945, because at that time he was in the province
where he had been since September. When he signed Exhibit F, he was not asked by Pablo Montilla questions
regarding the killing of Eugenio Francisco. Appellant did not see Exhibit F being typewritten. He denied having
been asked by Montilla the questions appearing in the statement and having given the answer attributed to him.
He never possessed any revolver, be it .45 caliber or any other caliber. Exhibit F was not read or translated in
Tagalog to the appellant, who was told to sign it simply as a proof that he was arrested. Appellant was not given
the opportunity to read the document. "This statement was rolled in such a way that I could not see the contents;
and before I was asked to sign it the policeman hurt me," pointing to Pablo Montilla as the one who hurt him.
Explaining why he appeared in court wearing torn dress, appellant said: "Because when he boxed me in the
stomach I turned towards the right, and he held me by the right arm." The witness was wearing the same suit
when he was compelled to sign Exhibit F. "Afterwards two of his companions arrived, bringing pieces of wet
cloth. They tied them in my neck and, after tying them, they folded their sides and I did not know what
happened to me afterwards," that is, the witness became unconscious "and I fell to the ground." Only after the
lapse of some time, when appellant recovered consciousness, when he was to sign Exhibit F. Exhibit F appears
to have been signed on March 12, 1946, nearly four months after the shooting of Eugenio Francisco, and about
one month after appellant had been arrested on February 14, 1946.

Appellant's testimony as to the torture he underwent before he was made to sign Exhibit F has never been
rebutted by the prosecution. Although police officer Pablo Montilla was present in the court room at the time
appellant testified as to his torture, so much so as he pointed to Montilla as one of the three police officers who
boxed him and tortured him with wet cloth, until the accused lost consciousness and fell down, said Montilla
did not dare to contradict appellant's testimony. The testimony remains unchallenged and should be given its
full value.

We are not willing to lend our support to a sentence convicting a man of a crime and sending him to prison
upon the involuntary evidence of an alleged confession extracted from him by torture. It would simply be
iniquitous. All words of condemnation against the third degree methods are not enough to paint in all its
ugliness the practice compelling a person to sign an involuntary confession through physical sufferings. We
should eradicate completely, once and for all, all traces which symbolize the kempei methods at Fort Bonifacio,
zoning camps, and other torture chambers operated by the sadistic Nippon regime.

The second paragraph of the majority opinion, wherein it appears that appellant fired a bullet which ricocheted
and hit Eugenio Francisco, is represented by the majority as a composite and abridged statement of the
declarations of witnesses Jesus Santos, Vicente Aurencio, Juan Aurencio, and Ramon Gagui. We regret to
disagree. There is absolutely nothing in the declaration of the said persons to show that appellant was present in
the place where the incident took place, much less that he fired any shot at all. It seems to us beyond all
understanding how the majority were able to read in the declarations of said witnesses what no one will be able
to find therein. No one should be convicted on what can be imagined appearing in the testimonies of witnesses
but which, as a matter of fact, does not appear in them. An accused must be convicted on the strength of actual
evidence; never on the hazy creatures of our imaginations. We have read and re-read the declarations of the four
witnesses mentioned in the majority decision, but we were unable to find any support to the majority position.
No one even mentioned the name of appellant Nocum and, as to Vicente Aurencio, Juan Aurencio and Ramon
Gagui, notwithstanding the leading questions propounded by the fiscal they stated categorically that they had
not seen Bienvenido Nocum and that they do not even know him.

Vicente Aurencio testified:

"Q. El acusado Bienvenido Nocum estaba alli en aquella ocasion? — A. No setaba alli; no le conozo. Con
mayor razon no estaba. No le conozco a ese."

Juan Aurencio testified equally that "no recuerdo que este acusado Nocum fuera companero de ellos." Asked if
he knows Bienvenido Nocum, he answered, "No señor." Asked if he saw him on the occasion of the incident he
answered, "No senor." Concerning the shots fired he said: "Yo oi una detonacion pero no se quien disparo."

In the whole testimony of Jesus Santos there is absolutely no mention of Nocum.

As to the alleged confession Exhibit F of appellant, because appellant testified that he was told "that it was
simply a proof that they arrested me," the majority would not believe that appellant's signature in the document
was obtained by third degree methods, upon the novel theory of inconsistency of deceit and force or torture as
means to extract involuntary confessions or admissions. Such naive proposition shows lack of sense of reality.
There is absolutely no incompatibility in the use of deceit and torture to secure involuntary admissions or
confessions. As a matter of fact they are complementary, and in many cases they have been simultaneously
used.

The majority do not accept that appellant could have been deceived, "because he was no illiterate, being a
seventh grader." In the first place, literacy has never been an absolute guarantee against deceit. There is no kind,
grade or measure of culture which can be considered absolutely deceit-proof.

We vote to reverse the appealed decision and for the acquittal of appellant.

G.R. No. L-14110             March 29, 1963

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEFINA N. SAMSON, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
Charged with parricide (case No. 1616) for the death of Jose V. Samson, who was shot in the morning of 13
October 1954, and illegal possession of a firearm (case No. 1617), after trial Josefina N. Samson was acquitted
of the last charge but found guilty of parricide and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Albay to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000 and to pay the
costs.

The defendant has appealed.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 13 October 1954, while
standing on the stairway of his house and facing the street in the municipality of Libon, province of Albay, Jose
V. Samson was shot twice by Josefina N. Samson, who was behind him holding a carbine (Exhibit A). After the
shooting she went to the municipal building and reported to the Chief of Police Julian Cerdena that she had shot
her husband and requested him (Cerdena) to go to her house and see the body. The Chief of Police told the
guard to lock her up inside the jail and he (the Chief of Police) and patrolman Francisco Fernandez repaired to
the house of Jose V. Samson and there found his body living on his back at the door of the house. The Chief of
Police found a carbine (Exhibit A) on a table in the dining room and two empty shells (Exhibit A-3), one behind
the body of the deceased and the other on a table. Dr. Zacarias Edades, Municipal Health Officer, made a post-
mortem examination of the deceased and issued a medical certificate dated 13 October 1954 (Exhibit B),
reading as follow:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I made a physical examination and investigation on this date at Velasco St., Libon, Albay,
at the residence of Engineer Jose V. Samson and have the following noted:

1. The body of Engineer Jose V. Samson, 42 yrs., married, engineer by profession, resident of this municipality,
slumped at the doorsteps of his residence (recumbent position);

2. No sign of life is evident on him;

3. Hemorrhage profuse and apparently beginning to clot;

4. Presence of a bullet entrance wound at the postero-lateral aspect of the nape of the neck near the beginning of
the right shoulder measuring around 4 millimeters in diameter projecting downwards and inwards passing the
clavicle left and coming out about 5 centimeters above and lateral to the left nipple. Point of exit wound
measuring around 15 mm. by 20 mm.

Another wound measuring 22.1 mm. by 15 mm. at anterior aspect of the left forearm about 8 centimeters
traversing through the radial and ulnar bones (in-between) and coming out the dorsal aspect of same forearm
about 9 cm. above the wrist, wound measuring 25 mm. by 27 mm.

5. Presence of a bullet wound entrance at the right interscapular region about 10 cm. below the above stated
wound measuring about 4 millimeters in diameter projecting upwards and coming out at the lateral aspect of the
lower jaw shattering the lateral portion of the lower mandible. Wound measuring 5 cm. by 3 1/2 cm.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

In (the) evaluation to (of) the above findings the cause of death is due to the gunshots inflicted with profuse
hemorrhage resulting thereat (therefrom).
It also appears that in the morning of 13 October 1954 while Meliton Sial, a gardener, was cutting grass on the
lawn of the house of the Samsons at Libon, Albay, he heard two shots so he went up the house and there saw
Mrs. Samson near the door of the kitchen carrying a firearm (Exhibit A) from whom he inquired what was the
shot about and Mrs. Samson replied: "I shot him."

The evidence for the defense shows that the deceased Jose V. Samson was cruel and of violent character and for
many years had been maltreating his wife at the slightest provocation and on several occasions inflicting upon
her physical injuries (Exhibits 12, 12-A, 20 and 21); that the day before 13 October 1954 Jose V. Samson, who
was then the District Engineer of the province of Masbate, arrived in Legaspi, Albay, and asked his wife and
children to join him for lunch at the Eden Hotel to which he was invited by a friend named Jose Lim; that she
could not join him because on that very day she had stood as sponsor at a wedding the luncheon of which was to
be held in the same hotel; that the children joined their father for lunch and after lunch she and her children
went shopping; that she bought underwear (Exhibits 15, 15-A, 15-B, 15-C) for her husband and Nescafe; that
after shopping she and her children went to the store of Jose Lim where her husband was and together they went
home leaving on their way their daughter Glenda at the St. Agnes Academy; that after staying a short while at
their house she and her husband left, the latter going to Bato to call on his brother Jesus V. Samson and she to
the ricefields to look after her share in the palay that was being gathered or reaped; that both returned home that
same evening and ate their supper together; that while they were taking their supper she told her husband that
she has sold 80 cavans of palay; that after supper they retired and slept on the same bed; that the next morning
she prepared breakfast for her husband who was to go hunting; that later he woke up and began to take his
breakfast, that upon tasting the coffee he suddenly pulled his wife by the hair and complained of the kind of
coffee she had bought for him; that after a short while her husband resumed taking his breakfast while she
prepared sandwiches for him to bring along on his hunting trip; that when her husband was about to leave he
asked her some money and she gave him P50; that the deceased asked for more and she gave him another P50
consisting of two twenty-peso bills and one ten peso bill; that her husband asked for more money and she gave
him P2.00; that this made him angry and he grabbed her by the arm and twisted it and also by the neck until she
could no longer speak and was thrown against the table; that her husband in a loud voice told her that "if you
don't give me money I will kill you" and that "if you don't have money any more you better work as a
maidservant, if not, be prostitute;" that her husband took the carbine from the table and holding it by the muzzle
raised it above his right shoulder in an attempt to strike her; that she side-stepped and grappled with him for the
possession of the gun and in the scuffle the gun went off, the bullet hitting her husband in the neck; that when
she saw the neck of her husband bleeding; she rushed to the municipal building where, she asked Dr. Edades,
the municipal health officer, to attend to her husband and at the same time informed the Chief of Police of what
had happened, that she was placed under arrest and locked up in the municipal jail; that during her confinement
in the municipal jail she was examined by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Zacarias E. Edades, who found the
following:

1. A linear skin abrasion about 8 mm. near the base of the index finger dorsal aspect;

2. Slight contusion wrist left forearm; no abrasion nor swelling noted;

3. Subjective complaint of pain around the neck but no visible physical findings noted; no abrasion, no
skin discoloration nor swelling noted on examination.

The above findings with no further complication and good treatment be rendered will be all right within
3-5 days. ... (Exhibit 6).

The re-enactment during the trial of the way the deceased had been shot made, under the direction of the
appellant, appearing in Exhibits 16, 18, 18-a and 18-b, clearly appears not to be normal. It was difficult, if not
well-high impossible, for her who was frail and shorter in height than her husband, who was robust and taller
(Exhibit 23), to have succeeded in taking hold of the carbine, her right hand gripping the lower part of the barrel
of the gun and the left hand, the part of the gun near the trigger, for if her husband was to strike her with the butt
of the carbine and she side-stepped, he would not have continued to hold the carbine in a raised position when
the person to be assaulted already had side-stepped and avoided the attempted or intended blow upon her. If, as
claimed by the appellant, the gun went off during the scuffle injuring her husband on the nape "projecting
downwards and inwards passing the clavicle left and coming out about 5 centimeters above and lateral to the
left nipple," a bullet wound which was fatal, how could the appellant explain the presence or causing of the
wound on the left forearm and the bullet wound "at the right interscapular region about 10 cm. below the above
stated wound ... projecting upwards and coming out at the lateral aspect of the lower jaw shattering the lateral
portion of the lower mandible?" Through actual test during the trial it was found that the carbine (Exhibit A)
was not defective and could not fire without pressing the trigger. The absence of any powder burns at the
entrance of the wounds found in the body of the deceased is convincing proof that the victim was shot from a
distance, and not with the muzzle of the gun almost resting on his shoulder or the back of the neck.

The appellant claims that there is no competent evidence that the victim and the appellant were husband and
wife. The claim is without merit. The testimony of the appellant on direct examination disclosed several times
that she was married to the deceased in both "Church and civil marriages." On cross examination, she testified
on the exact date of her marriage to the deceased (4 July 1934) and the place (Pili, Camarines Sur) where they
were married. She did not only admit that the deceased was her husband but also brought out the fact that out of
the marriage they had five children and that only three are living, namely: Glenda, Manuel and Felix. Indeed,
there could be no better proof of marriage in a parricide case than the admission by the accused of the existence
of such marriage. More, Ramon M. Velasco, mayor of Libon, Albay, and uncle of the deceased testified that
when he saw the appellant in the afternoon of 13 October 1954 at the municipal jail, she immediately begged
for his forgiveness and told him that she had shot her husband Pepe (referring to the deceased) because the latter
had a mistress and she could not bear or suffer it any longer.

The appellant contends that the action to enforce civil liability has been reserved and, therefore, the trial court
erred in awarding civil damages amounting to P6,000 to the heirs of the deceased. In support of this contention
she quotes what the trial court stated during the hearing of the case, to wit:

COURT: The court reserves the right of the heirs to prosecute the civil action independently, as soon as
a guardian is appointed in that special proceeding. We will hold this in abeyance until a guardian is
appointed by the court who can represent the heirs in this case (p. 19, t.s.n., 19 May 1955).

According to Section 1 (a) of Rule 107, the offended party must reserve his right to institute separately the civil
action to enforce the responsibility arising from the offense charged. No one is authorized to make the
reservation except the offended party. These are the minor children of the deceased. No such reservation having
been made by them or by their duly appointed guardian, the trial court did well in condemning the appellant to
pay her civil liability to the heirs of the deceased..

The finding of the trial court that there had been no evident premeditation and treachery when the appellant shot
her husband should be sustained. As the uncontradicted evidence shows that despite several quarrels and
maltreatments she had with and received from her husband, both made up very easily after each and every
quarrel. The day prior to the shooting incident the appellant bought some underwears for her husband and in the
evening of same day both the appellant and the deceased had supper together and slept on the same bed. All
these circumstances taken together would inevitably lead to the conclusion reached by the trial court that the
appellant had not planned beforehand the killing of her husband. If the fact that a few moments immediately
preceding the shooting of the deceased by the appellant, in that early morning of 13 October 1954, the latter and
the deceased had an altercation regarding the genuineness of the coffee (Nescafe) that culminated into a hair
pulling, but which as usual was made up as easily as it flared up; and that immediately thereafter the deceased
resumed eating his breakfast while the appellant prepared sandwiches for him to take along in his hunting trip,
as if nothing had happened at all, — the conclusion is inescapable that the appellant could have had neither the
resolution to kill her husband on that fateful morning nor the time to mediate or reflect on the criminal act she
would commit. It is, therefore, very clear that the shooting of the deceased husband by the appellant came about
spontaneously from the unexpected turn of events. It is also very clear that it happened in the spur of the
moment and without any intervening period during which the appellant could have meditated, reflected and
resolved upon the act she was about to commit, or sufficient time to allow her conscience to overcome the
resolution (if she did ever resolve) to carry out what she had proposed or decided to do. The adverted
circumstances, of course, preclude, the attendance of treachery in the commission of the crime at bar.

As there are two mitigating circumstances, that of voluntary surrender and of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation, and there is no aggravating circumstance, the
minimum penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime committed by the appellant, as provided for in Articles
246 and 63 of the Revised Penal Code imposed by the trial court, is correct.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-11439           October 28, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDUARDO ELICANAL, Defendant-Appellant.

Francisco Villanueva, Sr., and Francisco Villanueva, Jr., for appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The appellant in this case is one of several persons arrested and convicted of murder. He was sentenced to death
and this case comes to this court not only en consulta but by appeal also.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The accused was a member of the crew of the lorcha Cataluña cruising in the waters of the Philippine Islands
off Iloilo under the captaincy of Juan Nomo. The first mate was Guillermo Guiloresa. The accused is about 22
years of age, without education or instruction and somewhat weak physically. The lorcha left the mouth of the
Iloilo river early in the morning of the 11th of December, 1914. She had scarcely cleared the river when
Guillermo, the chief mate, suddenly and without having mentioned the subject to the accused before, said to
him that he was going to kill the captain because he was very angry with him, and asked him to assist him. The
accused took this statement as a joke as, according to him, the chief mate was a great joker; and particularly as
he was smiling at the time he made the statement; and naturally paid no more attention to it. Neither he nor the
other members of the crew held any resentment against the captain and he had no idea at that time that he would
take part in any acts directed against him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The following morning while the crew were engaged in their daily occupation, Guillermo, finding the captain in
his cabin, assaulted him, attempting to seize and hold his hands and, at the same time, calling to the crew to
come forward and help him. The crew, drawn by the cries, hastened to the spot where Guillermo was engaged
in a hand to hand fight with the captain. At the request of Guillermo the crew, with the exception of the accused,
seized the captain and tied him with the rope. After he had been rendered helpless Guillermo struck him in the
back of the neck with an iron bar an then, delivering the weapon to the accused, ordered him to come forward
and assist in disposing of the captain. The accused thereupon seized the bar and, while the captain was still
struggling struck him a blow on the head which caused his death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The sole defense of the accused is that, in killing the captain, he was acting under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury induced by the threat of Guillermo, the chief mate, and that he was so
absolutely overwhelmed thereby that, in striking the blow which killed the captain, he acted without volition of
his own and was reduced to a mere instrument in the hands of the chief mate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The learned trial court refused to accept this defense holding that the chief mate did not exercise such influence
over the accused as amounted to an uncontrollable fear or that deprived him of his volition. We are satisfied
from the evidence that the finding of the trial court was correct. It was held by the supreme court of Spain in a
decision of the 5th of November, 1880, that "a threat, in order to induce insuperable fear, must promise such
grave results, and such results must be so imminent, that the common run of men would succumb. The crime
threatened must be greater than, or at least equal to, that which we are compelled to commit." In a decision of
the same court of April 14, 1871, it was said that "inducement must precede the act induced and must be so
influential in producing the criminal act that without it the act would not have been performed." That is
substantially the principle which is at the bottom of subdivision 9 of article 8 of the Penal Code. That article
defines the different circumstances under which a person will be exempt from criminal liability. Subdivision 9
thereof covers "any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force." The foundation of these
decisions and the basis of the defense in this case is subdivision 10, which exempts from liability "any person
who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury." chanrobles virtual law
library

As we have already intimated, before a force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must produce such an
effect upon the individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such,
incapable of committing a crime. It must be such that, in spite of the resistance of the person on whom it
operates, it compels his members to act and his mind to obey. He must act not only without will but against will.
Such a force can never consist anything which springs primarily from the man himself; it must be a force which
acts upon him from the outside and by means of a third person. In order that one may take advantage of
subdivision 10 of article 8 and allege with success that he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
an equal or greater injury, it must appear that the threat which caused the uncontrollable fear related to a crime
of such gravity and so imminent that it might safely be said that the ordinary run of men would have been
governed by it. And the evil threatened must be greater than, or at least equal to, that which he is compelled to
cause. The legislature by this enactment did not intend to say that any fear would exempt one from performing
his legal duty. It was intended simply to exempt from criminal responsibility when the threat promised an evil
as grave, at the very least, as that which the one threatened was asked to produce. Viada in his commentaries on
this subdivision of article 8 of the Penal Code gives this illustration:

Certain evil-minded persons seize me and threaten me with death If I do not set fire to a neighbor's house; if I
perform the act under such threat, as grave as it is imminent, I would fall within the exemption from criminal
responsibility provided for in this number; but if the same persons threatened to lay waste my forest if I do not
kill my father my act would not come within the exemption for the reason that the evil with which I was
threatened was much less than that of killing my father.

The evidence fails to establish that the threat directed to the accused by the chief mate, if any, was of such a
character as to deprive him of all volition and to make him a mere instrument without will of his own but one
moved exclusively by him who threatened. Nor does the threat appear to have been such, or to have been made
under such circumstances, that the accused could reasonably have expected that he would suffer material injury
if he refused to comply. In other words, the fear was not insuperable. Indeed, it is doubtful if any threat at all in
the true sense was made; certainly none of such serious nature as would justify an illegal act on the part of the
accused chanrobles virtual law library

This discussion disposes of the first error assigned by counsel for the appellant. The second relates to the
finding of the trial court that the crime committed was murder instead of homicide; and counsel for appellant
urge, under this assignment, that the evidence does not sustain the finding of any qualifying circumstance which
would raise the crime from the grade of homicide to that of murder. It is quite true, as counsel argue, that
qualifying circumstances must be as clearly proved and established as the crime itself; and, unless the evidence
in this case shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed with one or more of the qualifying
circumstances required by the Penal Code to constitute murder, it must be denominated homicide and not
murder. (U. S. vs. Beecham, 15 Phil. Rep., 272; U. S. vs. Gavarlan, 18 Phil. Rep., 510; U. S. vs. Aslul, 21 Phil.
Rep., 65; U. S. vs. Ibañez, 19 Phil. Rep., 463; U. S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil. Rep., 170; U. S. vs. Amoroso, 5 Phil.
Rep., 466; U. S. vs. Cagara, 5 Phil. Rep., 277.) chanrobles virtual law library

We agree with counsel that the evidence does not establish the existence of premeditation as a qualifying
circumstance. In the case of United States vs. Bañagale (24 Phil. Rep., 69), the court said with respect to the
facts which must be proved to establish premeditation:

The record does not show whether Banagale, upon extending the invitation to Domingo Posada through
Mariano Ilao, did so for the purpose of killing the former, inasmuch as there is no proof that he had resolved
upon doing so, through deliberation, meditation, and reflection, and performed acts revealing his criminal
purpose, some days or even hours prior to carrying out his criminal determination to kill the unfortunate Posada.
Article 10, circumstance 7, of the Penal Code establishes the requisite that the criminal should have acted, in the
perpetration of the crime, with deliberate premeditation or that he should have prepared for its commission by
outward acts such as denote in the agent a persistent criminal purpose and a meditated resolution to
consummate the deed. (U. S. vs. Nalua and Kadayum, 23 Phil. Rep., 1 ; U. S. vs. Alvarez, 3 Phil. Rep., 24; U. S.
vs. Lasada and Lasada, 21 Phil. Rep., 287; U. S. vs. Catigbac, 4 Phil. Rep., 259; U. S. vs. Angeles, 6 Phil. Rep.,
480; U. S. vs. Idica, 3 Phil. Rep., 313; U. S. vs. Buncad, 25 Phil. Rep., 530.)

In the case at bar it does not appear that there was ever any consideration of the question of killing the captain
of the launch by the members of the crew, in which this accused took part. The matter, so far as the evidence
goes, was never mentioned except on the day before the crime was committed and then in such a way as not to
show any fixed purpose or determination even on the part of the chief mate and much less on that of the
accused. The fact that he, with the rest of the crew, answered the call of the chief mate while he was engaged in
his endeavor to make way with the captain is not sufficient by itself, or in connection with the conversation of
the day before, to establish that sustained reflection and continued persistence which are the special features of
the qualifying circumstance of premeditation. It does not appear that the accused had even thought of taking any
part in the death of the captain up to the very moment when the iron bar with which he dealt the fatal blow was
handed him by the chief mate. Under such circumstances it is error to find the existence of premeditation as a
qualifying circumstance (U. S. vs. Beecham, 15 Phil. Rep., 272.) chanrobles virtual law library

We cannot agree with counsel fro the appellant that the qualifying circumstance of treachery, or alevosia, has
not been proved. It appears undisputed that, at the time the accused struck the deceased with the iron bar and
thereby caused his death, the latter was bound hand and foot and was helpless and defenseless. While it is quite
true that there was no treachery at the beginning of the struggle terminating in the death of the captain, that is,
the initial attack was open and fair, the struggle being man to man between the chief mate and the captain, both
unarmed, this does not necessarily dispose of the question of treachery. This court has held repeatedly that, even
though the beginning of an attack resulting in the death of the deceased is free from treachery of any sort,
nevertheless it will be found present if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable
to defend himself. While the writer of this opinion holds the view that, where there is not treachery in the attack
which results in the death of the deceased, there can be no treachery which will qualify the crime as murder
notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the fatal blow was struck, the deceased was unarmed and defenseless,
but, the court having held so frequently the contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so well established. Counsel
for the appellant, however, maintain that the doctrine of the court in this regard was modified in the case of
United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime (19 Phil. Rep., 164). In that case the deceased was walking with the two
accused in single file in a narrow street, the deceased being between the other two.
When they were about ninety yards from any house and while in an obscure place on the railroad track, at about
eight o'clock at night, the deceased was knocked down, and while down was struck two or three blows in the
face and rendered practically unconscious. While in this unconscious condition, but still groaning, the two
defendants, one taking him by the head and the other by the feet, carried him across the embankment, which
was alongside the railroad track, and threw him into a small pond of water, face downward. The defendants then
returned to their house. The deceased remained in that position until the following day when his body was
found there by the policemen, Hartpence and Solis, who conducted the body to the morgue where it was later
identified as that of Simeon Flores by Valentin Franco, a friend and neighbor of the deceased.

The question arose in that case, under the facts just stated, whether the act of throwing the deceased into the
water while he was still alive but in a perfectly helpless and defenseless condition constituted alevosia, and
made the crime murder instead of homicide. It will be noted that the attack was not treacherously made, that is,
begun with treachery. This the court held; and, therefore, if that element is to be found at all in the case it must
be found from the fact that the decease was thrown into the water and drowned while he was unconscious and in
a helpless and defenseless condition. Discussing that question the court said:

But assuming that the deceased would have recovered from the effects of the four wounds, if he had not been
thrown into the water, yet we still think that the proofs fail to show that there was present treachery, as the
knocking down of the deceased, striking him while on the ground, and throwing him into the water were all
done in so short a time and one movement followed the other in such rapid succession. constitute one and the
same attack. In order that treachery may be considered as a qualifying circumstance to raise the classification of
the crime, or as an aggravating circumstance to augment the penalty, it must be shown that the treacherous acts
were present at and preceded the commencement of the attack which caused the injury complained of. After the
commencement of such an attack and before its termination an accused person may have employed means or
methods which were of a treacherous character, and yet such means or methods would not constitute the
circumstance of alevosia. One continuous attack, such as the one which resulted in the death of the deceased
Flores, cannot be broken up into two or more parts and made to constitute separate, distinct, and independent
attacks so that treachery may be injected therein and considered as a qualifying or aggravating circumstance.

While the writer of this opinion is inclined to agree with the contention of counsel that the doctrine laid down in
this case is quite different from, if not directly opposed to, that already stated as, theretofore, the unform holding
of this court, nevertheless the majority of the court being of the opinion that it was not the intention of the court
in the case just cited to reverse the previous decisions of this court and to set down a new doctrine, the writer
accepts that view, particularly in the face of the almost unbroken line of decisions on the subject now to be
reffered to. In the case of United States vs. De Leon (1 Phil. Rep., 163), it appeared that the accused entered the
house of the deceased, drew their bolos and compelled him to follow them. On arriving at a place called
Bulutong the deceased was bound and in that condition murdered. It was held that the fact that the accused was
bound at the time he was killed, although there was no treachery at the beginning of the assault resulting in his
death, the qualifying circumstance was present. The court said:

From the evidence there appears the qualifying circumstance of treachery. To show this it is only necessary to
mention the fact that the deceased was bound.

The head note to that case says:

The fact that the deceased was bound while killed constitutes the qualificative circumstance of alevosia and
raises the crime to the degree of murder, . . . .

The same was held in the case of U. S. vs. Ricafor (1 Phil. Rep., 173); U. S. vs. Santos (1 Phil. Rep., 222); U. S.
vs. Abelinde (1 Phil. Rep., 568); U. S. vs. Hinto Santos (2 Phil. Rep., 453); U. S. vs. Jamino (3 Phil. Rep., 102);
U. S. vs. Abaigar (2 Phil. Rep., 417); U. S. vs. Gloria (3 Phil. Rep., 333); U. S. vs. Gabriel (4 Phil. Rep., 165);
U. S. vs. Doon (4 Phil. Rep., 249) U. S. vs. Colombro (8 Phil. Rep., 391); U. S. vs. Tupas (9 Phil. Rep., 506); U.
S. vs. Nalua and Kadayum (23 Phil. Rep., 1); U. S. vs. Indanan (24 Phil. Rep., 203); U. S. vs. Reyes and De la
Cruz (11 Phil. Rep., 225) chanrobles virtual law library

For these reasons we are of the opinion that the crime was committed with treachery and that it was properly
denominated murder instead of homicide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The third error assigned charged that the court erred in refusing to apply article 11 of the Penal Code in favor of
the accused. We do not agree with this contention. The personal qualities and characteristics of the accused are
matters particularly cognizable by the trial court; and the application of this section is peculiarly within the
discretion of that court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There being neither aggravating nor extenuating circumstances, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the
accused is hereby sentenced to cadena perpetua. No costs in this instance.

G.R. Nos. L-31481, L-31482 and L-31483 February 28, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ERNESTO SARIP, alias Poor, MANUEL RAOP alias Onot, CONDALLA SARIP and DONATO
(DUMATO) MABPAN, accused ERNESTO SARIP and MANUEL RAOP, defendants whose death
sentences are under automatic review.

Paterno R Canlas Law Offices (Counsel de Oficio) for defendants.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor Emmanuel G.
Cleto for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

The Court of First Instance of Bukidnon in its decision of August 22, 1969 convicted Ernesto Sarip and Manuel
Raop (Raup) of robbery with triple homicide and sentenced each of them to death and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Ciriaco Mision, Pamposa Mision and Amparo Mision in the sum of P30,000 (Criminal Case No.
1591). They did not appeal from that decision. Their deaths sentences are now under mandatory review (Sec. 9,
Rule 122, Rule of Court).

The lower court also convicted Raop of robbery m band and illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Case
Nos. 1609 and 1611, respectively, and sentenced him to imprisonment penalties. Raop did not appeal from the
two sentences. Hence, the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 1609 and 1611 were improperly elevated to them
Court which has not acquired any appellate jurisdiction over the two cases. The offenses charged in the two
cases did not arise out of the same occurrence, and were not committed on the same occasion, as the robbery
with triple homicide.
Ernesto Sarip pleaded guilty to the charge of robbery in band in Criminal Case No. 1609 (wherein Raop was his
co-accused). That offense was committed on April 24, 1966. In the lower court's partial decision of November
11, 1968, Ernesto was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two years, four months and one day of prison
correccional to eight years and one day of prison mayor and to indemnify Alfredo Mataya in the sum of P180.
He did not appeal from that decision.

In Criminal Case No. 1591, the case now under review, five persons were involved, namely, Raop, Ernesto
Sarip, Condalla Sarip, Dumato Mabpan (Madpan) and Macadatar Tayao Mabpan. Macadatar was not arrested.
The four were tried and after trial, Condalla Sarip and Dumato Mabpan were acquitted in the lower court's order
of July 15, 1969. The acquittal was based in part on the affidavit of Ernesto Sarip, dated August 10, 1967,
wherein he swore that Dumato had no participation in the robbery and that he (Ernesto) and Raop forced
Condalla "at the point of a gun" to take part in the robbery (Exh. 5).

In said Criminal Case No. 1591, Ernesto Sarip was arraigned on March 29, 1968. He was assisted by his
counsel Manuel Valdez. At first, he pleaded not guilty. A few minutes later, Ernesto told his lawyer that he
wanted to plead guilty. His lawyer manifested to the court that Ernesto wanted to change his plea. The trial
judge, addressing Ernesto, asked him whether it was true that he wanted to plead guilty. He replied in the
affirmative So, it was made of record that he had pleaded guilty with the assistance of his lawyer.

The trial court did not then and there pronounce the judgment of conviction on Ernesto Sarip. It heard the
evidence of the prosecution and the defense. Ernesto was present throughout the trial and was Identified by the
prosecution witness. He was represented by a counsel de oficio who cross-examined the prosecution witnesses.
He did not present any evidence.

Maybe, he realized the futility of presenting any defense because the prosecution offered m evidence his
confession (Exh. J) dated August 1, 1966 which was taken down by a Constabulary Sergeant and was sworn to
before a deputy clerk of court who, like the sergeant, was cross-examined by Ernesto's counsel when he testified
on the circumstances under which the oath was administered to Ernesto.

In that confession, Ernesto stated that Datu Damiano Madpan, the barrio captain of Malipayon (brother of
Dumato Madpan), convinced him and Raop to rob and liquidate a certain family in Malipayon (referring to, but
not naming, the Mision family) and that Damiano gave him two American rifles and a paltik to accomplish that
diabolical mission.

Ernesto revealed in his confession that upon arriving at the place to be robbed, Makadatar Madpan and Dumato
madpan took the chickens and carabao under the house while he and Raop stood guard at the stairs and that
Makadatar and Dumato assaulted the occupants of the house and Dumato took their personal belongings and the
g machine. That version does not dovetail in all details with the story told by the prosecution witnesses. But the
derisive fact is that Ernesto in his confession admitted that he participated in the robbery and that he was a co-
conspirator of Raop and Makadatar.

It is now feebly contended by Ernesto's counsel de oficio that Ernesto did not understand the full implication
and import of his plea of guilty because his counsel and the trial court did not explain to him the consequences
of his plea. No serious consideration can be accorded to that contention because Ernesto Sarip in pleading guilty
simply ratified his extra-judicial confession which was corroborated by indubitable evidence of the corpus
delicti. The due execution and voluntariness of that confession have not been assailed.

As already stated, the death sentence was imposed on Ernesto Sarip in the lower court's decision of August 22,
1969. The judgement of conviction was based on the testimonies of two eyewitnesses, Ernesto's confession and
plea of guilty, the confession of Condalla Sarip and Raop's statement (Exh. G).
The Prosecutions evidence shows that at about o'clock in the evening of Saturday, April 30, 1966, Ernesto
Sarip, Manuel Raop, Condalla Sarip (Ernesto's first cousin) and Makadatar Tayao Mabpan (Madpan) were in
the vicinity of the house of the spouses Cirlaco Mision and Pamposa Mision located at Barrio Malipayon,
Pangantucan, Bukidnon. Ernesto Sarip, Makadatar and Raop had firearms. They made known their presence by
means of gunshots.

Ernesto Sarip and Makadatar, who was wearing a turban went under the house and took the chickens which
they gave to Raop and Condalla Sarip. The cackling of the chickens awakened Diosdado Mision, 12, son of
Ciriaco, and Loreto Palanog, 26, a farm helper, who were upstairs. Through the bamboo slats of the floor, they
pepped and saw what the intruders were doing under the house.

The intruders wanted to get also the carabao which was inside the coral under the house. Makadatar asked
Ciriaco in a loud voice to open the corral but the latter kept silent. Makadatar, who was armed with a gun and a
bolo, and Ernesto Sarip destroyed the corral, took the carabao and gave it to Raop and Condalla who brought it
to the plowed field nearby.

Makadatar and Ernesto Sarip (tall and short, respectively) returned to the house and asked Ciriaco to give them
rice and money but the latter replied that he did not have any. Angered by Ciriaco's refusal to comply with their
demand, Makadatar and Ernesto fired several shots directed at the inmates of the house. Ciriaco, who was lying
on the floor, was not hit but his wife, Pamposa, and daughter, Amparo, were wounded.

Makadatar went up the stairs, cut the string which tied the door, pushed the shutter, and, on seeing Ciriaco lying
on the floor face down, hacked him to death. Ernesto Sarip, armed with a rifle, followed Makadatar and went up
the house. Makadatar and Ernesto- Sarip took clothes and a sewing machine. The carabao was later released by
the robbers.

After the intruders had left, two inmates of the house were found dead. Ciriaco, 37, suffered an incised wound,
eleven by three inches, across his back, two stab wounds also in the back and a lacerated wound on the chin. His
wife, Pamposa, 35, sustained an entrance gunshot wound in the right infra-clavicular region. The bullet
penetrated her right lung and exited on her back. Amparo Mision, a daughter of the said spouses (who was older
than Diosdado), sustained a mortal wound in the back and died in the hospital

The participation of Ernesto Sarip and Raop in the robbery was confirmed by Condalla Sarip, a 22-year old
farmer, who also made a confession, with exculpatory allegations, which was sworn to before the municipal
judge on August 1, 1966.

Condalla declared that in the afternoon of April 30, 1966 he encountered Ernesto Sarip, Raop and Makadatar in
Barrio Macatol They were armed. They forced him to join them in robbing Mision's house in Barrio Malipayon
several kilometers away. Condalla was Ernesto's friend.

The group drank the liquor caged "Kulafu" before proceeding via a trail to Mision's house. Condalla said that on
arriving near Mision's house, he was stationed by Ernesto Sarip near the banana plants where he (Condalla)
received the chickens and carabao taken by Ernesto, Raop and Makadatar While Raop guarded Condalla,
Ernesto and Makadatar took clothes and the sewing machine from the house. Later, they released the carabao
because it impeded their flight from the scene of the crime.

Diosdado Mision testified that before April 30, 1966, he saw Ernesto Sarip at Barrio Malipayon with Muslim
companions. Loreto Palanog had also seen Sarip in the cockpit prior to the incident. Diosdado and Loreto knew
Ernesto before the robbery was committed.
On the other hand, defendant Raop, 25, in his sworn statement taken on June 6, 1966 by a Constabulary
corporal and in his testimony, admitted his participation the robbery but he averred that he acted under dures
exercised by his friend, Ernesto Sarip.

Raop testified that at six o'clock in the morning of April 30, 1966, his friend, Ernesto Sarip, went to his house at
Barrio Kalilangan and requested him to accompany Ernesto to the house of the latter's Aunt located at Barrio
Lampanosan. At first Raop refuse but when Sarip allegedly threatened him by pointing his rifle at Raop, Raop
consented to go with him. Ernesto gave him a homemade gun called "paliuntod". They arrived at Lampanosan
at four o'clock in the afternoon. Ernesto then told him that they were going to Barrio Mayon. On the way, they
met Condalla Sarip.

Ernesto asked Condalla to accompany them to Barrio Malipayon. Condalla refused but Ernesto poked his gun at
him and he agreed to go along with them. At Barrio Kitalo, they met Makadatar Tayao (Mabpan) who joined
them. The four of them arrived at Barrio Malipayon at about eleven o'clock in the evening.

They proceeded to Mision's house. Ernesto asked Mision to open the door of his house. Mision refused. Ernesto
asked him to come down. Mision likewise refused because he was scared. Upon Ernesto's order, Makadatar
took Mision's chickens and carabao under the house.

Ernesto allegedly reproached Raop for doing nothing. So, Raop got hold of the carabao, took it to the place near
the banana plants, and stayed there with Condalla. Raop allegedly advised Ernesto and Makadatar not to kill
any person inside Mision's house. Ernesto did not heed Raop's advice. After Ernesto and Makadatar entered the
house, Raop and Condalla, who carried the chickens, left the place. Raop let loose the carabao. In the distance,
they heard gunshots being fired inside Mision's house. Later, Ernesto and Makadatar overtook Raop and
Condalla. Ernesto allegedly warned Raop that he would be killed if he squealed to the authorities.

Counsel de oficio, who filed through his assistant a hardly legible typewritten brief (a practice which should not
be en couraged), contends that the trial court erred in holding that Ernesto Sarip was responsible of the deaths of
the three victims. That contention cannot be sustained. Ernesto was the mastermind and was a co-conspirator.
Knowing that he was the one primarily liable for the robbery with triple homicide, which the trial court
described as "most atrocious and cold-blooded", he interposed a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and did not
bother to prove any attenuating circumstances.

With respect to Raop, it is clear that his version of the robbery with homicide does not exculpate him at all. His
counsel de oficio argues that Raop acted against his welt That contention is belied by Raop's admission that he
and Ernesto are close friends (89 tsn July 16, 1959; No. 4, Exh. J). The two were residents of Barrio Kalilangan.
Raop did not prove that he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. His pretension that he was threatened with a gun by his friends,
Ernesto, is not credible because he himself Raop was armed with a rifle (Exh. E).

Counsel's third contention, that the crime of robbery and homicide should be treated separately and that only
Makadatar Tayao (Mabpan) who is at large, should be held liable for the killings, is likewise bereft of merit.

The evidence proves that Ernesto Sarip and Makadatar fired at the inmates of the house before the clothes and
the sewing machine were taken by them. Makadatar hacked Ciriaco Mision before the robbery was
consummated. It is evident that the killings were perpetrated on the occasion of the robbery. Since Makadatar,
Ernesto Sarip and Raop were conspirators, Raop is equally liable for the assaults committed by Makadatar and
Ernesto.

We are satisfied that the guilt of Ernesto Sarip and Raop has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Abuse
of superiority, dwelling and nocturnity attended the commission of the robbery with triple homicide. Even if the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty is appreciated in Sarip's favor, the death penalty should still be
imposed upon him (Arts. 63 and 294[l], Revised Penal Code).

The trial court failed to include in the indemnity the value of the stolen articles which it found to be P1,000. The
indemnity for the three should be raised from P30,000 to P36,000.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 1591, the death penalty imposed by the trial court on Ernesto Sarip and
Manuel Raop (Raup) is affirmed and they are ordered to pay solidarily to the heirs of the Mision spouse the sum
of P1,000 as the value of the articles taken during the robbery and P36,000 to the heirs of the three victims or
P12,000 for each set of heirs. Costs de oficio.

G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL y LONDETE, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Reynaldo Herrera for accused-appellants.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga
and Jimmy Marantal y Londete were charged with tile crime of Robbery with Double Rape, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay, Municipality of Libmanan, Province
of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
together with John Doe, Jose Doe, Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe, and Ricky Doe, who are still at large,
armed with firearms, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to
gain and rob, taking advantage of nighttime to better accomplish their purpose, did then and there were Ifully
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and use violence and intimidation upon the person of Elias Monge by
tying his two hands and the hands of the members of his fully and on the occasion hereof, while they were made
lying flat on the floor, the herein accused take, rob and carry away, without the consent of said Elias Monge,
owner thereof, of the following properties, to wit:

One camera with trademark Olympus worth P400.00

Two birthstones rings worth 700.00

One wedding ring with name MONDING 100.00

One pair of earrings heartshape 100.00

Two pieces of necklace solid worth 400.00

Two pieces of mosquito net 110.00

Three pieces of blankets color orange and spotted 200.00

Three men pants and also one cut of cloth 235.50

One beach towel, with decoration 35.00

One aluminum Reynold kettle 30.00

One One caserola 15.00

Two pieces of pillow case 12.00

Two cans of rice 70.00

One flashlight Eveready two batteries 30.00

TOTAL P10,619.50

all in the total amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P10,619.50), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned
amount. That on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed accused with lewd design, and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual intercourse
with Monica Monge, a virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina Monge, all against their will. 1

Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete entered a plea of
not guilty to the crime charged.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment adverse to the accused, the dispositive portion of which read:

ACCORDINGLY, we find the guilt of the accused Eustaquio Loreno has been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby find him GUILTY of Robbery with Double Rape, penalized by Par. 5 of Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code. There being present aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
offense, Eustaquio Loreno is hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the maximum penalty provided by
law.

Likewise, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused Jimmy Marantal has been established beyond reasonable
doubt and hereby finds him GUILTY of the crime of ROBBERY penalized under Par. 5 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code. Jimmy Marantal is sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS and
ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, in view of the aggravating circumstances present.

Said accused Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal shall indemnify jointly and severally Elias Monge in the
sum of P10,619.50 without subsidiary imprisonment, In addition, Eustaquio Loreno shall indemnify Monica
Monge and Cristina Monge in the sum of P10,000.00 each or a total of P20,000.00 as damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment.

The accused herein shall pay one-half of the costs each. 2

The facts of the case as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief, areas follows:

In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house located at barrio Magsaysay,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two young daughters, namely: Monica Monge, single, then 14 years old,
and Cristina Monge, married, then 22 years old, were preparing to attend the dance to be held in the barrio
proper that evening. But they had to wait for a while because his wife, Beata Monge, was still changing the
diaper of baby Rachel Baybayon, four-month old daughter of Cristina Monge. The other occupants present in
the house that evening were his sons, Mario, then 11 years old, and Nilo, then 13 years old, and their farm
helper, also staying with them, by the name of Francisco Fable. Cristina was then vacationing at her parents'
house. Her husband, Raymundo Baybayon, was in Manila (pp. 2-5, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp, 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22,
1979 AM: pp. 2-4, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).

At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said house, Francisco Fable saw at first
four men with flashlights approaching. When they came near, he heard one of them call Elias Monge saving
that there was a letter from the chief hepe). Fable called Elias Monge who was in the sala, informing him that
there was a letter from the chief. Two of the visitors, one wearing red clothes and the other in dark sweater.
came up the house. When Elias Monge went out to the balcony the man in dark sweater handed to him the
letter. Because it was dark to read it, Elias Monge invited the man in dark sweater to come inside the sala. The
other man in red clothes posted himself near the post of the balcony (pp. 4-5, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 6-7,
tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp. 4-9, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AMOUNT pp. 4-7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 4, 12-13, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

When be and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked his daughter, Monica to fetch his
reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias Monge and Monica read the following: "Kami mga NPA", which
caused Monica to run to her mother, seized with fear, informing her what she came to know about camme
visitors. Cristina Morgagor came attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo but she was held back by the man
in dark sweater who then announced to all those inside not to make any scandal. kitchen Elias Monge turned to
look at him the man in dark sweater poked his gun at him, and ordered all those inside the on the floor (pp. 13-
14, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 Pvl p. 7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 4 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 4, 13, 16, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 PM)

In the meantime outside at the balcony the man in red clothe asked Fable for a glass of water arid the latter
asked Mario Monge to get the glass of later, but Mario did not obey and instead went to the sala Hence, fabie
himself outside inside the house to the the glass of water. But, as he went inside the sala, he noticed the man in
red clothes following him. As Fabie reached the door to the sala, the man in red clothes poked his gun on
Fabie's back and pointed a sharp instrument on his neck and then he wish pushed to go inside the sala. Once
inside the sala, which Aras lighted, Fable saw and recognized the man in red clothes these to Estaquio loreno.
Also Elias Monge and his two daughters, Monica and Cristina, saw and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he
entered the sala as one of the companions of the man in dark sweater. All tile occupants of the house were
ordered by the man in dark sweater and Loreno to remain lying flat on their stomachs on the floor (pp. 5-6, tsn,
Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 10-12, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 1-8, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 PM pp. 5, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM p. 5, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).

Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed loreno to tie all their victims on the floor. Loreno tied them with
rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's hammock (duyan) and got the ropes with which he and Loreno
used to reinforce in tying the victim's hands together behind their backs. Thereafter, the man in dark sweater
instructed Loreno to go downstairs and drive the barking dog away. Loreno held Fable and brought him
downstairs to drive the barking dog away (pp, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM).

On reaching the corner of the house below the flashlight used by Loreno happened to focus on the person of
Jimmy Marantal. Fable immediately recognized Jimmy Marantal as one of the visitors who remained on the
ground as lookouts. Jimmy Marantal beamed his flashlight on the face of Fable, and seeing the latter, he kicked
him (Fabie) on the right side of his rib which caused him to fall on the ground. Marantal kicked Fable who
managed to roll on his side and was hit on his left thigh. After a while, Loreno lifted Fable bodily from the
ground, and brought am back upstairs (pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).

After Loreno and Fable returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of Monica Monge and dragged
her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried to resist but she was then still tied, Inside the room,
Monica was asked to reveal the whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She said there was none. He ransacked
the room but found none. The man in dark sweater then seized Monica and forcibly removed her pants. Monica
resisted and shouted at her parents for help. He boxed and slapped her. Despite her struggle, he was able to
remove her panty and then made her he on the floor near the bed. After undressing himself, he forcibly went on
top of her. She kept on struggling and shouting for help, but he succeeded in inserting his organ into her vagina.
She felt pain. He proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She could not do anything to stop him from
consummating his lust as she was still tied. When he was through with her, she noticed blood in her private part
(p. 9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 5, 14, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29,
1979 AM).

Below in the sala, Monica Monge's parents and others heard her shouts for help and the struggle she put up
inside the room. Hearing her shouts for help, Loreno menacingly pointed his gun at them, telling them not to
rise if they wanted to live, Then Loreno brought Beata Monge first to the masters room and then to the teacher's
room. During these two occasions, he forced Beata Monge to open the aparador and the trunk respectively, with
her keys, and he got their contents, which he brought to the sala, holding on to Beata Monge who remained tied.
All the things he got from the two rooms were poured on the floor of the sala (pp. 7, 9, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM
pp. 10-1 1, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 7-13, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 17-19, tsn,
Oct. 22, 1979 AM).

Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the sala, dragging along Monica Monge whose hair was
dishevelled and was crying, and he made her joined the others on the floor of the sala. He reached for a can of
pineapple j nice from the aparador and the sala and drank its contents. Not long thereafter, he turned his
attention to Cristina Monge, and he dragged her to the room which was then rented by school teacher Miss
Olitoquit (who was then in Naga City). Inside the room, the man in dark sweater forced his lewd designs on her
but she resisted and struggled although her hands were still tied behind her back. He boxed her, hitting her on
her right eye which caused her to lose consciousness. He then proceeded to satisfy his lust on her. When she
regained consciousness, the man in dark sweater returned her shorts. She then realized that he had succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her (p. 6, 17-19, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 11-
12, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 6, 14-15, 18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge were still inside the teacher's room, a third man entered the
sala, and he told Loreno to cover their victims on the floor with a mat. Loreno found instead a piece of lawanit
with which they covered their victims. The third man proceeded to the kitchen, and when he returned to the
sala, he was bringing along some rice. Then, a fourth man entered the sala and he asked from Elias Monge for a
cigarette. Elias Monge stood up and told him to get it from his pocket as he was still tied. Reacting to Monge's
reply, the fourth man boxed him, hitting him on his breast and solar plexus which caused him to fall on the
floor. Then Loreno asked Elias Monge to accompany him to the house of a nearby neighbor. On reaching the
balcony, Elias Monge protested and refused to accompany Loreno who then held Elias Monge by the neck,
pointing his gun at him. Beata Monge protested, telling her husband not to go along. loreno desisted from his
plan to go to the nearby neighbor's house, Elias Monge did not recognize the Identities of both the third and
fourth men (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16-17, 25-26, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 12-13, tsn, Oct. 22,
1979 AM pp. 7, 14-15, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).

Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina Monge was earlier brought by the man in dark sweater, and
he found her still lying on the floor. Loreno embraced her trying to kiss her and touch her private parts. One of
the malefactors on the ground called those upstairs to hurry because a man was approaching. Loreno then
released Cristina Monge and told her to return to the sala to breastfeed her daughter who was continuously
crying. Thereafter, the malefactors went down from the house one by one, bringing along all the things they
robbed from their victims. The man in dark sweater returned to the sala and touched the thighs of Cristina
Monge, who was already wearing her shorts, and he told them not to tell anybody what happened to them,
otherwise he will kill them. And then all the malefactors left the place (pp. 15-16, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16,
18, 19-20, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito who was On the ground near the fence of the house calling
him, asking if he was going to the dancehall Elias Monge replied from upstairs that he was not feeling well, and
Agapito left. EUSTAQUIO Monge was able to untie himself, and then he also untied the others. Fable then
revealed to him that earlier when he had gone down with Loreno, he (Fabie) saw and recognized Jimmy
Marantal as among those left on the ground as lookout for the group that had just robbed them. Cristina and
Monica Monge also told their father that they were abused by the man in dark sweater when they were brought
inside the rooms. For the rest of the night, they remained on guard and could hardly sleep (pp. 15-16, 17, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 10-11, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their following personal properties:
jewelry valued at Pl,000.00' two mosquito nets, P70.00; three bets, P200.00; one caldero of rice, P30.00; one
reversible jacket, P40.00; three chickens, P30.00; one camera, P400.00; one beach towel, P35.00; cash in the
amount of P6,500,00; and several others, all in the total of P10,305.00, more or less (pp. 4-6, 8, 14-17, tsn, Oct.
22, 1979; pp. 16-17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM).

Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno because the latter's daughter married a member of the youth
organization in the barrio when he (Fabie) was its president. Elias Monge had already known Loreno whose
occupation was catching wild pigs, and the latter used to place bobby traps in his (Monge's) place to catch pigs,
during which occasions Loreno usually slept in his house, Monica Monge and Cristina Monge also had already
known Loreno because his daughter married a neighbor near their house. Monica often saw Loreno traverse the
playground of the Magsaysay Elementary School where he was studying. Fable had also known Jimmy
Marantal because the latter often attended dances held by the barrio youth organization, and he (Marantal) even
married one of its members, He had engaged Marantal in conversations many times p. 3, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM
pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 7-8, tsn, Oct. 18-1979 AM pp. 2-3,
21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 2, 8-10, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

Despite the revelation of her daughters to him that they were sexually abused that fateful evening, Elias Monge
forced himself to report the following day, Sunday the robbery-rape incident at the PC detachment in Sipocot,
but there was no one to talk there. So he proceeded to the PC headquarters at Camp Tara, bringing along the
ropes and rattan which were used by the malefactors in tying him and his family during the robbery-rape
incident. He was given a written recommendation from the PC to the hospital with instructions to have himself
and his daughter Monica be physically examined. Cristina Monge was informed that there was no need for her
to submit for physical examination because she was already married. (pp. 18-19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 18;
tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM p. 8, tsn., Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the investigation section of the 243rd PC Company, stationed at Tara,
Camarines Sur, investigated on January 10, 1978 the robbery-rape incident. He was informed by Barangay
Captain Elias Monge that his house was robbed and his two daughters were raped by the robbers in the evening
of January 7, 1978 in their house and that he (Monge) was able to Identify two of the robbers, mentioning their
names as Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal of Barrio Calabnigan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. After Sgt.
del Socorro and his team made an ocular inspection of the place on that same day, they proceeded to barrio
Calabnigan where they picked up Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal and brought them to the PC camp. At
the PC camp on January 17, 1978, the two suspects were duly Identified upon confrontation as two of the
robbers by the above-mentioned barrio captain, his daughters Monica and Cristina Monge, and their helper
Fable. During the investigation, the two suspects refused to give their written statements. Thus, Sgt. del Socorro
was able to secure the written statements of Elias Monge, Francisco Fable, Monica Monge, and Cristina Monge
about the robbery-rape incident. Upon being Identified both said suspects told their victims ff they could just
talk and settle the matter, but Elias Monge replied that what they did that evening was an oppression (kaapihan)
against him and his family, The two suspects retorted that it was up to him (pp. 19-21, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
pp. 18-20, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 1-5, 6, 8- 12, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 AM).

Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital at Naga City, examined
Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-Ray examination's result was negative. But the doctor found him to
have sustained an external injury which he classified as "resolving hematoma, right cestal region" a close
wound, already spread out but and the process of healing, located on the right side of the middle portion of the
thorax. He gave Elias Monge a prescription for anti-infection to stop the bleeding as there was still slight
bleeding and to subside the swelling. Afterwards he gave the corresponding medical certificate to Elias Monge
(Exhibit "A"; pp. 22-26, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM p. 19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM

Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the same provincial hospital examined Monica Monge on
January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any fresh wound on her body, but examining her hymen, she found
fresh and incomplete lacerations of said hymen at 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock locations and, inserting her index finger
inside her patient's sex orifice, lt easily admitted her forefinger. She had the patient's vagina smeared for
spermatozoa but none was found after laboratory examination The doctor observed that the lacerations did not
reach the base of the hymen but the edges of the lacerated portions were still reddish and slightly swollen. The
doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the forcible penetration of a male's penis into the
patient's vagina. The doctor further expeled that the laceration of the hymen heals after five days. She also
expeled that male spermatozoa stays inside the female vagina at the most for 72 hours. She stated that,
admitting there was orgasm during the forcible sexual intercourse, any sperm must have already disappeared
when she examined Monica Monge on January 10, 1978 which was already beyond 72 hours since she was
raped in the evening of January 7, 1978 (pp. 26-28, 31, 33-34, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; Exhibit "B"). 3

Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They admitted that
they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, 4 but they were only forced by a man
wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be members of the New People's Army (NPA),
operating in the locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would be killed.
We, however, find the contention untenable.

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of Appellee's Brief. death or serious bodily harm if the act is
not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of Such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 5

A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint brief (pp. 3-10),
showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and rape against Elias
Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent with appellant's claim of
having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, to wit:

1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man in dark sweater went up
the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house, Loreno pointed the gun to the victims which enabled the
malefactors to ransack the house (p. 38, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 PM

2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony, Loreno positioned himself next to
the post in the balcony, while the man in dark sweater delivered the letter to Elias Monge. Loreno admitted that,
without prior instructions, he immediately positioned himself near the post of the balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an act
which showed his voluntary participation in the criminal acts.

3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with ropes of the hammock. Loreno in
fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the rattan which he got from inside the house (pp. 14-15, tsn,
Id.).

4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help from inside the room where she was earlier
dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno's immediate reaction was to point his gun to the victims who were
then lying on the floor, telling them not to rise if they wanted to live (p. 38, tsn., Id.).

The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to the master's
room and the teacher's room where he made her open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the
contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat
and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina
Monge in the teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried
to kiss and touch her private parts.

When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fable went downstairs to drive the barking dog away, the flashlight of
Loreno happened to be focused on the face of Jimmy Marantal who in turn beamed his flashlight on the
approaching Fable. Upon seeing Fable, Jimmy Marantal kicked the former twice causing him (Fabie) to fall to
the ground. Marantal's reaction towards Fable was due to the fact that Fable had recognized him and the blows
which he gave to Fable who was still tied at the moment was to serve as a warning to Fable not to report his
presence and participation in the robbery-rape incident to the authorities.

Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts of Monica
Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his two companions
who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his companions effective means
and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was no showing that Jimmy Marantal
raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the commission of the crimes.

All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The foregoing acts,
though separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their community of
interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy without
the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself. 6 Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts of the
accused themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and community of interest,
which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to establish the existence of conspiracy, 7 and the degree of
actual participation petition by each of the conspirators is immaterial. 8 Conspiracy having been establish, all
the conspirators are liable as co-penpals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 9

The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was combat muted on January 7, 1978, by more than three
persons, all armed, 10 in conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating circumstances of band,
nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D. 767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by death. But, for
lack of the required number of votes, the accused should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 1481            February 17, 1904

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
LIBERATO EXALTACION, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Alberto Barretto for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of that province an information charging
Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in that they, subsequently to the
4th day of November, 1901, willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part in a rebellion against the
Government of the United States in these Islands, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the purpose of
which was to overthrow the said Government by force of arms, this against the statute in the case made and
provided.

In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of Bulacan, testified under oath that the two
defendants were arrested in the month of March, 1903, the police some days before having captured a number
of documents in the encampment of one Contreras, as so-called general of bandits, situated at a place called
Langca, of the town of Meycauayan, among which documents appeared the papers now on pages 2 and 3 of the
record, signed by the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who recognized the said documents when they were
exhibited to them; that the said defendants stated to the witness that they had signed the said documents under
compulsion; that the purpose of the Katipunan Society was to obtain the independence of the Philippines; that
this statement was made in the house of the parish priest of Meycauayan in the presence of Exequiel Casas and
Fernando Nieto. The latter, upon their examination as witnesses, testified to the same facts, stating that the
defendants told Governor Tecson that they had signed the said documents under fear of death at the hands of the
thieves by whom they had been captured. The witness Casas, the municipal president of Meycauayan, testified
that he held office as such in place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was kidnapped in the month
of October, 1902.

The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second July 17, 1902, were written in Tagalog,
and contain an oath taken in the name of God, and a covenant on the part of the subscribers to carry out the
superior orders of the Katipunan, and never disobey them until their death in the defense of the mother country.
The two accused, under oath, testified to having signed the said documents and alleged that they did so under
compulsion and force while they were held as captives by the thieves; that the defendant Tanchinco was
captured in the fields one day when he was going to work on his farm by three armed men, unknown to him,
who asked him if he was an agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his replying in the negative they
compelled him in view of his denial to sign a document, now on page 3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was captured at a place called Kaibiga
in the township of Novaliches, and that on the day following his release, having been unable to pay the $300
which was demanded of him, he reported to the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant Liberato Exaltacion
under oath testified that he was captured near Meycauayan by five persons, unknown, dressed as policemen and
armed with guns or revolvers; that these men bound him and took him into the forest and there compelled him
by threats of death to sign the documents now on page 2 of the record; that thereupon they allowed him to go
upon promise to return. This defendant testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw him while on the
road in the hands of the thieves. Both the accused testified that as soon as they were released they presented
themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the presence of witnesses, and subsequently went to Bonifacio
Morales, a lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him the fact that they had been captured.

The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer, and Hipolito de Leon — of whom the
last two were present when Tanchinco appeared before Senor Testa, the president of Meycauayan, and reported
to him what had happened to him — all testified to the same fact and corroborated the statements of the accused
with respect to their capture and their subsequent report to President Testa and to the witness Morales.

The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above referred to, signed by the accused, is
not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition upon them of the penalty inflicted by the
judgment of the court below.

The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by brigands who belonged to the
Contreras band, and that they signed the said documents under compulsion and while in captivity, relieve them
from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct of the defendants
in presenting themselves first to the local president of Meycauayan and subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio
Morales, of the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon as they were released by the bandits is corroborative
of their testimony, and is the best demonstration of their innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the
trifling discrepancy between the testimony of the witness Yusay and that of the defendant Tanchinco nor the
fact the Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he was captured or that on which he appeared before
President Testa.

The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292 not having been established at the
trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion that the judgment below must be reversed and the
defendants acquitted with the costs de oficio. The judge below will be informed of this decision and a copy of
the judgment entered herein will be furnished him for his information and guidance. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-51256 August 12, 1986

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDITO PETENIA y RODA, CARLO CASTAÑEDA y SANTIAGO, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Manuel G. Montecillo and Gregorio R. Castillo for defendants-appellants.

PARAS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court in Pasig, Rizal, finding Edito
Petenia and Carlo Castaneda guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing both to suffer the
penalty of DEATH; to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased, BONIFACIA GUANLAO, in the sum
of P100,000; to pay P12,000 in moral damages, and another P12,000 in exemplary damages, and to pay
proportional costs.

The Information alleges:

That on or about the lst day of May, 1978, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, with intent of gain and with violence against person, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, rob and divest BONIFACIA EUSTAQUIO GUANLAO, of her cash and valuable amounting to
P75,000.00, Philippine Currency, and that by reason or on the occasion of the said Robbery said accused with
intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, conspiring together, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of Bonifacia Eustaquio Guanlao, by
then and there hitting her with an adobe stone on her head, thereby inflicting upon said Bonifacia Eustaquio
Guanlao serious and mortal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of her death to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount as maybe awarded under the provision of existing laws.

After pleas of not guilty by the accused, trial ensued. After trial the lower court rendered its decision, finding
the following facts to have been proven from the evidence of record:

Edito Petenia, Carlo Castaneda and Romeo Lugon were employees of the victim, Bonifacia Eustaquio Guanlao,
in her factory located at No. 52, 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City. Petenia and Lugon were factory helpers
while Castaneda was the family driver (Exh. "I-1", pp. 44-45, Rec.; pp. 14-15, tsn, June 15, 1978; p. 6, tsn, June
22, 1978).

A day or two prior to the incident in question, particularly on April 30, 1978, Petenia, Castaneda and Lugon
planned among themselves to kill Mrs, Guanlao and rob her of valuables (Exh. "I-1 ", Ibid; pp. 60, 65-66, tsn.,
June 22, 1978; pp. 56-58, tsn., June 13, 1978).

At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of May 1, 1978, while Mrs. Guanlao was inside her bag factory, Petenia
approached the victim and covered the victim's mouth with his hand.' As she struggled, she was hit with an
adobe stone from behind by Lugon (Exh. "A" to "A-3"). As the victim staggered from the blow, Petenia
delivered fistic blows on her. While the victim was lying mortally wounded on the ground, Lugon hit her again
on the head with the same adobe stone while Petenia got another adobe stone and also hit the victim's head
which caused her instantaneous death (Exhs. "E" & "H", pp. 33-42, Rec.; pp. 71-72, tsn., June 22, 1978).
Simultaneously, Castaneda entered the victim's house and cut the telephone wire. Thereafter, he entered the
victim's bedroom and took her handbag (Exh. "F-2") containing cash, jewelry and other valuables (Exh. "E-1",
Ibid; Exh. "H-1 ", p. 41, Rec. p. 27, tsn., June 22,1978). After killing the victim, Lugon and Petenia carried the
corpse to a corner of the factory and covered it with used bags to prevent detection (p. 72, tsn., June 22, 1978;
Exh. "H-1", Ibid), They then drove the Ford Fiera of the victim as their get-away vehicle with Castaneda on the
wheels, abandoning it later at Tejeron Street, Makati Metro Manila (pp. 13-15, 72-73, tsn., Ibid). From there,
the three proceeded to Pasay City where they boarded a JB Bus bound for Sorsogon They went later to Samar,
from there to Tacloban Leyte and then to Barrio Tawagan, Oras, Eastern Samar where they divided the loot (pp.
73-74 tsn., June 22, 1978). Later Petenia went to hide in Barrio Villa Alvarez, Balud, Masbate, while Castaneda
went 'to Barrio Buenavista, Bacon, Sorsogon (pp. 18-19, 74, tsn., Ibid).
The body of the deceased was delivered at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day the crane was
committed underneath the pile of bags in the warehouse of said bag factory. Detectives led by P/Lt. Cesar
Dalanon arrived at the scene and took pictures of the victim as well as the surrounding areas (Exhs. "D" to "D-
19"). Police investigation and medico-legal reports revealed that the victim was hit a number of times on the
head with two (2) adobe stones (Exh. "A" to "A-2") which were found at the scene of the crime and smeared
with the victim's blood (pp. 49-67, tsn., June 13, 1978; pp. 3-5, June 9, 1978).

On May 18, 1978, team of detectives led by P/Lt. Cesar Dalanon arrested Petenia at Barrio Villa Alvarez,
Balud, Masbate. Upon his arrest, Petenia admitted to Lt. Dalanon his participation in the commission of the
crime on May 1, 1978. He told Lt. Dalanon that two days before the commission of the crime, the three accused
agreed to kill the victim and take her valuables (pp. 56-67, tsn., June 13, 1978). Petenia said, that after Lugon
struck the victim on the head with an adobe stone, he (Petenia) delivered fistic blows on her. He volunteered to
guide the police team to Oras, Eastern Samar for the apprehension of Lugon. However, the group failed to
locate Romeo Lugon in said place (pp. 51-58, 59, tsn., June 13, 1978; p. 74 tsn., June 22, 1978).

It was on May 31, 1978, when a team of policemen led again by Lt. Dalanon, with Petenia as guide, arrested
Castaneda at Barrio Buenavista, Bacon, Sorsogon. Recovered from his possession at the time of arrest were
personal belongings of the victim consisting of a Seiko wrist watch (Exh. "F"), a bunch of keys (Exh. "F-1 "), a
travelling bag ("F-2"), an abaca bag (Exh. "F-3"), a brown folder with business entries (Exh. "F-4") and assorted
personal belongings, papers, pictures, letters, diary, etc. (Exh. "F-5" to "F-9"; pp. 11-13, tsn., June 13, 1979).
Castaneda admitted to Lt. Dalanon having participated in the killing of the victim and having taken articles from
the victim's house (p. 75, tsn., June 22, 1978; pp. 56-61, 69-70, tsn., June 13, 1978).

Thereafter, appellants were brought back to Manila. When investigated by Detective Prudente Kaabay of
Quezon City Police, Petenia and Castaneda voluntarily gave written statements admitting their participation in
the commission of the crime.

Both Edito Petenia and Carlo Castaneda assail the decision against them and submit that the lower court erred
(1) in not rejecting their extrajudicial confessions (Exhs. "E ", "G ", "G-1 ", " H "); (2) in finding that the crime
was committed in conspiracy; and (3) in not acquitting them of the crime charged despite the presence of the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear.

We find no reason to disturb the finding of conviction.

Setting aside for the moment the constitutional requisites for the validity and admissibility of extrajudicial
confessions, the fundamental rule is that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved (People
vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53). The burden is on the defense to prove that a confession was obtained as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency (People vs. Soligan, 101 SCRA 264; People vs.
Castaneda, 93 SCRA 56; People vs. Caramonte, 94 SCRA 150; People vs. Ramos, 94 SCRA 842). We have
scrutinized the records and We have found no evidence whatsoever to justify the claim that the extrajudicial
confessions of the accused were extracted by force. There was no attempt to discredit the same during the trial;
neither did appellants challenge their admissibility on grounds that they were extracted out of violence, torture
or intimidation. Moreover, both appellants affirmed on the witness stand the truth and voluntariness of their
confessions.

Carlo Castaneda testified in part as follows:

COURT: So it is true that what you have stated now is in accordance with that statement marked as Exhibit
"H"?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

Q. There is question here. 'Sino ang pumatay kay Mrs. Bonifacia Guanlao? Si Edito Petenia na isang kasamahan
namin.'Right?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

Q. Everything here you affirmed, everything you stated here?

A. Yes, Your Honor. (p. 13, tsn., June 22, 1978)

Q. Similarly, appellant Edito Petenia also confirmed this point when he testified as follows:

COURT: Do you affirm and confirm his statement of yours marked as Exhibit "E "?

A. Yes. Your Honor,

Q. You were asked question and the answers appearing in Exhibit "E " are all true and correct?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

Q. As a matter of fact you are not intimidated, coerced, or promised any leniency by the investigating officer,
Det. Kaabay ?

A. No, Your Honor.

Q. You were treated nicely by Det. Kaabay?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

(p. 63, tsn., June 22, 1978)

With respect to the claim that the lower court erred in finding that the crime was committed in conspiracy,
suffice it to say that the circumstances under which the crime was committed show a single purpose and in
unison with each act of the accused to the attainment of said purpose, clearly showing a concerted intention to
achieve a common goal. Edito Petenia in both his extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "E") and testimony in court
admitted his presence in the planning to kill the Victim He also admitted that he delivered fistic blows on her
while Romeo Lugon hit her with an adobe stone. Also in his confession, Petenia declared that Castaneda
participated in the planning of the crime, the truth of which he subsequently affirmed on the witness stand.

Thus:

ATTY. AGOOT:

You said that this Carlo and Romy were the two persons responsible for the death of Mrs. Guanlao, why did
you say that.

A. Because they planned it that night.

Q. Who planned the killing of Mrs. Guanlao?

A. Carlo and Romy, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. HILL:

xxx xxx xxx

In other words, you will also to understood that the plan was already made by Romy and Carlo Castaneda to kill
Mrs. Guanlao?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you said they plan in the evening, how long before May 1, 1978?

A. That evening, sir.

Q. Could it be April 30, 1978?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How about you, what was your participation in this Plan to killing Mrs. Guanlao and rob her?

A. What I did is to help in giving fist blows.

ATTY. HILL:

Q. Now, how did you come to know the place of the killing and robbery before May 1? Were you present
during the planning?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q. But you heard them plan clearly?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

Q. The full detail accurate planning of Romy and Carlo Castaneda?

A. Yes, Your Honor. (pp. 60, 65-66, tsn, June 22, 1978)

The existence of the conspiracy to kill and rob Mrs. Guanlao is substantially corroborated by Castaneda in his
testimony.

ATTY. GALVAN:

You often see this Romy in the house of Mrs. Guanlao, will you please inform the Court if you have talked to
him?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was the subject matter of your conversation?

A. They said that they kill Mrs. Guanlao.

(p.11, tsn., June 22, 1978)

Appellants' extrajudicial confessions and testimonies categorically pointing to each other's actual participation
in the conspiracy and in the execution of the crime are accessible in evidence and worthy of full credit.

Contrary to appellants' claim (pp. 10-15, Petenia's Brief; pp. 19-21, Castaneda's Brier, conspiracy among them
in the commission of the crime has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Each of them performed specific
acts in the commission of the crime with such closeness and coordination that would indicate a common
purpose or design. Appellants, together with Lugon, planned the commission of the crime a day or two before
its execution. As the evidence has shown, Petenia came from behind the victim and covered her mouth with his
hand.

As the victim struggled to free herself, Lugon struck her with an adobe stone on the head. As she reeled from
the blow, Petenia hit her with his fists. While she lay prostrate on the ground, Lugon and Petenia took turns in
hitting her with adobe stones. Castaneda did his part by entering the victim's bedroom and taking her handbag
containing cash, jewelry and other valuables. After killing the victim, Lugon and Petenia carried the victim's
body beside the wall and covered it with used bags. As already stated, after killing the victim, the malefactors
escaped from the scene of the crime by using the victim's Ford Fiera as their get-away vehicle. They went into
hiding and divided among themselves the personal effects of the victim.

In People vs. Dalusag, 133 SCRA 15, We made this pronouncement:

There is conspiracy where several accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and
another performing another part so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their
acts, though apparently independent are in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.

We come now to the last error imputed to the trial court, namely, that the appellants committed the crime "under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury." This defense does not deserve serious
consideration. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must
concur: (a) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an
injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.

Petenia categorically testified that Lugon did not have a knife at the time the crime was committed. He declared
that he delivered fistic blows on the victim because of his fear that Lugon and Castaneda might hit him with
hollow blocks. This is his testimony:

COURT:

As a matter of fact it was Carlo Castaneda who testified who pointed to you a sharp pointed instrument that is
why you did not participate in bumping the head of the victim?

A. It is not true that there is a knife, your Honor.

Q. How was you threatened by Carlo Castaneda?

A. Tinakot po nila ako at baka bagsakan ng hollow blocks, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

It is not true that Carlo Castaneda was being threatened by a knife or sharp pointed instrument by Romy?

A. No, your Honor.

Q. As a matter of fact, they are very close friends with each other after this incident?

A. Yes, Your Honor. (pp. 6-61, tsn., June 22, 1978)

Likewise, the claim of Castaneda that he cut the telephone connection at the victim's residence and ransacked
her bedroom because Lugon and Petenia "poked" a knife at him is incredible. If it was true that he was
threatened with a knife, Castaneda could have easily escaped from his companions when he was already at the
house of the victim as he was by then no longer within their view. In fact this was the first of a series of
opportunities for him to run away from them and to report the crime to the authorities.

The decision of the court a quo is in accord with the law and facts of the case. Independently of the extrajudicial
confessions involved (with their constitutional infirmities) it is clear from the admissions in open court, from
the circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused and the discovery of part of the loot (including valuables)
in their possession, that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the
appropriate penalty is death but in view of the lack of necessary votes to impose it, We are constrained to
impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is modified by the imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in lieu of death but AFFIRMED in all other respects.

G.R. No. L-22947 July 12, 1979

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PEDRO BORJA, PEDRO FUSTIGO,

INOCENCIO DEMEN , RUFINO PAVIA, FELIPE BENAVIDES, DOMINADOR DE LOS SANTOS,
JOHN DOE, and RICHARD DOE, Defendants-Appellants.

Manuel M. Antonio for appellant Borja.chanrobles virtual law library

Isidro T. Bangayan (Counsel de Oficio) for other appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an appeal from the consolidated decision of September 8, 1960, by the Court of First Instance of Albay,
in Criminal Case No. 2578 for murder, and Criminal Case No. 2590 for frustrated murder, both bearing the
Identical titles, PP. vs. Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen, Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides,
Dominador de los Santos, John Doe and Richard Doe.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The decision convicted the accused, as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 2590, the Court, fully convinced that Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen,
Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides and Dominador de los Santos, are guilty beyond the peradventure of reasonable
doubt of the crime of frustrated murder, as principals, hereby sentences each of them to undergo imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years, one (1) month, and eleven (11) days of prision mayor, as the minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, ten (10) months, and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; to suffer inherent
accessory penalties; to indemnify the offended party, Salustiano Isorena, in the sum of P5,000.00, as moral and
exemplary damages, severally and jointly, but not to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, by
reason of the nature of the penalty imposed; and to pay the costs of this proceeding on equal
basis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In Criminal Case No. 2578, the Court after having been convinced beyond the realm of reasonable doubt of the
guilt of Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen, Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides and Dominador de los
Santos, of the crime of murder, as principals, deeply hurting as it is, hereby sentences each of them to the
maximum penalty of death; to suffer inherent accessory penalties; to indemnify the offended parties, Mercedes
Chuidian Vda. de Gancayco and her children in the sum of P6,000.00 for the death of Santiago Gancayco, Jr.,
as a matter of law and practice, and another amount in the sum of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
both severally and jointly, but not to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, by reason of the
nature of the penalty imposed; and to pay the costs of this proceeding on equal basis.

In the decision, the trial court - pursuant to the Revised Penal Code, Article 5 - recommended to the President,
through the Secretary of Justice, with respect to the accused Dominador de los Santos, "that executive clemency
be extended to him, or that at least his death penalty be minimized or commuted to life imprisonment." The
court so recommended because "the testimony of this accused had contributed in a large measure to the Court in
its pursuit of truth and justice in these cases." It should be stated here that by resolution of January 24, 1966, the
Court noted the contents of de los Santos' motion withdrawing his appeal in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

It appears that on December 18, 1958, the Anderson Fil-American Guerrillas (AFAG) held a general meeting at
the bahay-pulungan of the religious sect known as Watawat Ng Lahi at Barrio Buragwis, Legaspi City. The
locale of the meeting was so chosen because many AFAG members are also Watawat members. One of the
accused, Pedro Borja, presided over the meeting, which was attended by more than a hundred members. Borja,
who has the rank of a full colonel, is the AFAG head for the entire Bicol region, which is said to have 36,000
members. He had good news for the members: he announced that their backpay was forthcoming at the rate of
P36,000.00 for a ranking officer, and a lesser amount for those of lower rank.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

When the meeting ended, Borja called an exclusive conference among selected officers and members, including
the other accused Rufino Pavia, Inocencio Demen, Pedro Fustigo, Felipe Benavides, Dominador de los Santos,
Alejo Balimbing, and Tito Oljina (The last two, now deceased, are referred to in the title of this case as John
Doe and Richard Doe). At the secret meeting, Balimbing proposed to Borja that they conduct a raid the
following morning at the Hacienda San Miguel, located at San Miguel Island, across the bay from Tabaco,
Albay. That same evening, Demen cleaned a .45 caliber pistol. The conference over, all eight men slept in the
bahay-pulungan.

When they woke up the next day, December 19, 1958, the eight men held an early-morning conference.
Balimbing aired to Borja his grievances against Santiago GAncayco, Jr. the manager of the hacienda. Balimbing
charged that it was Gancayco who killed Balimbing's cousin at Rawis, Tabaco, Albay. Balimbing further
complained that it was Gancayco who ordered that the camote plantations of the hacienda squatters - who were
related to Balimbing - should be bulldozed. It appears that Balimbing was only rehashing what he had already
related to Borja several months before, at the AFAG regional headquarters at Pili, Camarines
Sur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

That same morning, the eight men left by bus for Tabaco, via Legaspi City. They were armed as follows: Borja
had two pistols tucked in a shoulder holster; Pavia had a .45 caliber pistol; Balimbing had a hunting knife with a
scabbard; and Fustigo had a pistol. They were attired as follows: Borja wore a khaki suit, black jacket, buri hat,
and sunglasses; Demen wore a khaki suit; Fustigo wore a blue shirt and khaki pants; de los Santos wore a red T-
shirt, brown jacket, and maong pants; Benavides wore denim pants and printed polo shirt; Pavia wore white
pants; and Oljina wore a brown polo shirt and khaki pants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

In Tabaco, the group went to Barrio San Jose, where they ate breakfast at the house of de los Santos' brother.
Upon Borja's instruction, Balimbing hired a motorboat operated by Mariano Burac, who observed at the trial
that the eight men acted suspiciously and conferred sotto voce among themselves. They crossed the bay, and the
group disembarked at the hacienda. At a seashore conference, they agreed to pose as members of the Philippine
Constabulary, ostensibly on a mission to inspect the firearms of the hacienda. At this time, Borja started to wear
a pair of white gloves. They proceeded on their way, and Balimbing tried to open the bamboo gate of the fence
surrounding the manager's house. He was accosted by Emilio Lanon, a security guard and barrio lieutenant of
the hacienda, who was later one of the principal eyewitnesses for the prosecution. Balimbing and Lanon knew
each other. Balimbing introduced his companions as PC soldiers, Identifying Borja as a major and Pavia as a
sergeant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On Lanon's advice, Balimbing proceeded to the office and emerged with Salustiano Isorena, the hacienda
overseer. Isorena told Lanon to inform Gancayco about the presence of the visitors. Then, on Pavia's advice, he
and Isorena went to the house, where Isorena informed Mrs. Gancayco about the visitors. On Mrs. Gancayco's
suggestion, the group went to the office to await for Gancayco, who arrived
later.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Gancayco shook hands with Borja and Pavia. He offered Borja a pack of cigarettes, from which took one stick.
Informed of the group's alleged mission, Gancayco instructed Isorena to present the license of the firearms. But
Isorena failed to find the license in the office, so Gancayco went to the house to look for it there. While in the
house, he instructed his wife to prepare a meal for the guests.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Gancayco returned to the office, gave the license to Isorena, and then left. Isorena presented the license to
Borja, who remarked that the license listed only five firearms, as against reports received at the headquarters in
Albay that there were ten firearms in the hacienda. Borja then ordered Isorena to produce the firearms for
inspection; Isorena, in turn, instructed Lanon to get the firearms. Lanon went to the house and obtained a
carbine, the magazine of which he removed; as well as shotgun.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

On his way back to the office, he met de los Santos and Oljina, who took the firearms and the magazine from
him. Isorena again instructed Lanon to get the other firearms. In compliance, Lanon sent Jaime Rawit to get the
grease-gun from Lanon's house, while Lanon himself went to Gancayco's house to get another grease-gun
which had no magazine. Rawit and Lanon met at Gancayco's house and from there, while Lanon was carrying
the two grease-guns, he met Demen and Benavides, who took them away.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The group had now succeeded in obtaining possession of four of the five firearms, and they were not able to get
the one remaining firearm only because it was with an hacienda employee guarding cattle some kilometers
away. An atmosphere of menace descended on the hacienda as the men loaded the firearms and took a hostile
stance. An apprehensive Isorena asked the equally perturbed Gancayco for instructions, but was only cautioned
to remain calm and deal courteously with the group, as Gancayco had already sent someone to Tabaco to
request police assistance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

During this time, Balimbing was investigating Lanon inside the bodega. Lanon was surrounded by Balimbing
with a hunting knife, Pavia with a .45 caliber pistol, and Benavides with a grease-gun. In the course of his
interrogation, Balimbing told Lanon that they were going to kill Gancayco, Isorena, Lanon and one Pablo
Balimbing, chief herder of the hacienda, because these employees were boothlickers to the Gancaycos. Then
Balimbing pushed Lanon out of the bodega.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Gancayco and Isorena were talking at the balcony of the house. They were approached by Demen, who had a
grease-gun, and Oljina who had a shotgun. De los Santos with a carbine posted himself under the citrus tree
near the water tank in front of the house. Gancayco asked to see a search warrant from Demen, and Oljina who
referred him to Borja. So Gancayco and Isorena descended and inquired for the warrant from Borja, who was
standing in front of the house. Instead of replying, Borja talked to Pavia, who was near the guardhouse. Borja
then called Balimbing and, referring to Gancayco and Isorena, ordered him to "fix them up" since it was already
getting on towards noon. Borja herded the other men of the hacienda inside the bodega, where they were
guarded by Benavides who was armed with a grease-gun, and Fustigo, with a pistol. Borja faced the hacienda
personnel, holding in readiness his two pistols. Lanon stood in front of him, facing out of the
bodega.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the meantime, Balimbing, Pavia, Demen, de los Santos, and Oljina escorted Gancayco and Isorena towards
the office. Isorena went up the stairs and turned around when he reached the top; behind him, de los Santos held
a carbine in a ready position. Benavides asked Gancayco for the magazine of the grease-gun he was holding.
When Gancayco answered that it had no magazine, Benavides accused him of lying and sideswiped him with
the grease-gun. Then Benavides left for the bodega.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Now the men surrounded Gancayco in front of the office. Facing him was Balimbing, who was swinging his
hunting knife. Also facing him, to Balimbing's right, was Pavia whose jacket, draped over his left arm,
concealed his right hand which held a .45 caliber pistol. To Pavia's right was Demen, who was aiming the
grease-gun at Gancayco. Slightly behind Demen, Oljina aimed the shotgun at
Gancayco.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Balimbing accused Gancayco of killing Balimbing's cousin, and demanded that Gancayco produce the .45
caliber pistol which he claimed was used to perpetrate the death. Gancayco explained that it was not he but
Solon Demetrio who accidentally shot Balimbing's cousin, and that Gancayco had no such pistol. Pavia
interjected that it was unbelievable for Gancayco, as manager of the hacienda, not to have such a pistol. But
Gancayco insisted that there was none.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

While this exchange was taking place, Gancayco, who was unarmed, stood with his back towards the foot of the
stairs. He was surrounded by Balimbing who held a hunting knife; Pavia who held a .45 caliber pistol concealed
beneath his jacket; Demen, who held the grease-gun with his arms down and the muzzle of the gun pointed
slightly upward; and Oljina who held a shotgun. The four men were about two meters away from Gancayco. Up
in the balcony, de los Santos stood guard with a carbine in ready position, standing slightly back of Isorena.
Gancayco and the four men were about four meters away from Isorena and de los
Santos.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Gancayco had insisted that he had no .45 caliber pistol. At this fateful moment, Pavia suddenly jerked his right
hand upward and fired point-blank with his .45 caliber pistol at Gancayco. Hit, Gancayco stooped to holed the
pit of his stomach and cried, "Aray ko po." Instinctively, he stepped backward and was turning around when
Demen, fired at him with a grease-gun. He ran away in a crouching position towards the citrus plantation, while
Demen, continued firing at him. Then Demen, aimed rapid fire at Isorena, who fell flat on the balcony floor.
Demen's line of fire accidentaly caught de los Santos in the forehead.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

At the outburst of gunfire, Borja rushed out of the bodega. He saw Gancayco running towards the citrus
plantation and he shouted: "Habulin! Habulin!" The men carrying their firearms gave chase; they were led by
Demen, and included de los Santos. They ran along the road towards a cluster of houses in the northern part of
the hacienda, but they stopped in front of the house of Estrella Cortezano. Balimbing asked Cortezano whether
she saw where Gancayco went, but he got a negative answer. As the men ran in pursuit, Gancayco traversed the
citrus plantation and reached the cluster of, houses. Although he was bleeding profusely, he managed to cross
the road and to open the gate by removing one of the bamboo railings. He then turned towards the trail that
wound through the abaca plantation at the left side of the road.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

While the pursuers tracked their prey, Lanon left the bodega by the back door and went to Gancayco's house.
Mrs. Gancayco told him to close all the windows and take the children downstairs, and he complied. Then he
left the house and looked for Gancayco whom he found in the abaca plantation, climbing a small hill towards
another cluster of houses at the hilltop. Lanon found Gancayco bleeding profusely in the
breast.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Gancayco, his wife, and children, Isorena, and some other personnel of the hacienda, were able to rendezvous at
the seashore. They got into a waiting motorboat and sped away towards Tabaco, in the hope of taking the
wounded men to the hospital there. But this was not to be; for en route, Gancayco died in the arms of his wife.
His body was brought to Manila, where it was examined and autopsied by the National Bureau of Investigation.
Although seriously wounded, Isorena survived. He received first-aid treatment at the Tabaco Hospital and was
air lifted the next day to Manila where he was confined, first at the North General Hospital, and then at the
National Orthopedic Hospital. Dr. Casiano Flaviano, a resident Physician at the National Orthopedic Hospital
who treated Isorena testified that the latter would have died from his injuries had he not received immediate
medical attention.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

While events unfolded on Tabaco Bay, the group of eight men reached the seashore and chanced upon a
motorboat anchored there. Balimbing wrapped the four firearms in some anahaw leaves. When the men
discovered that the motorboat did not have enough gasoline, they looked for another and dragooned Bienvenido
Taller into transporting them. Taller observed that the eight men were excited and apprehensive. Balimbing told
him, with some braggadocio that they had just killed Gancayco and Isorena. The men alighted at the lighthouse
at Malinao and immediately afterwards, Taller reported to the police authorities of the town. However, he was
advised to report to the police authorities of Tabaco, who had jurisdiction over the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The eight men reached the poblacion of Malinao. On Borjas orders, they bought a jute sack where they placed
the firearms. Borja instructed Pavia and Demen, to make their separate way towards Barrio Buragwis. Before he
left with Demen, Pavia left his .45 pistol with Balimbing. The remainder of the group boarded a passenger bus
going to Tiwi.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As the bus stopped near the market at Tiwi another car overtook it and policemen from Tabaco, headed by
Chief of Police Ceferino Firaza, alighted and surrounded the bus. Firaza in a loud voice called for the surrender
of all those in the bus responsible for the killing at the Hacienda San Miguel. He was suddenly fired upon by
Borja and then by Balimbing. The fusillade hit him on the right cheek, and he ordered his men to return fire.
The encounter resulted in the death of Balimbing and Oljina the capture of Benavides and de los Santos; and the
escape of Borja and Fustigo, Lt. Melanio Rey of the Tabaco police confiscated the firearms, magazines, and
ammunition taken from the hacienda; the .45 caliber pistol and its shell; the hunting knife and its scabbard from
the dead body of Balimbing; and other paraphernalia from the dead bodies of Balimbing and
Oljina.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The encounter in Tiwi took place in the afternoon of December 19, 1958. Subsequently, the rest of the band fell
one by one into the hands of the law. Pavia, Demen, Fustigo, were arrested, and Borja, the last one to fall, was
captured on February 27, 1959 after a nationwide manhunt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The trial judge characterized this narration of the shooting of Gancayco and Isorena as both water tight and
airtight. He found that the tenor of the evidence presented - consisting in the main of the testimony Isorena, an
eyewitness; and of the accused de los Santos, who testified for the state during Borja's separate trial - was
confirmed by the testimonies of the medico-legal expert and the ballistician. He noted that the five accused who
were separately tried from Borja admitted all the facts leading to the shooting, but interposed the common
defense of fear of Borja, who, they claimed, had threatened disobedient AFAG members with death. The trial
judge was not persuaded and he discounted this common defense, characterizing it as "an after-thought to save
their respective skins in the face of the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution pointing to their voluntary
participation in the commission of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder." Instead, the trial judge found
that the five men participated in the killing "because they were inspired by the juicy thought or promise of an
enormous amount of backpay for each." chanrobles virtual law library

Borja, who was still at large at the time the five accused were being tried, had a separate trial. The trial court
found that he "has a version entirely distinct and separate from that of the five accused, which version in turn is
astronomically far from the evidence presented by the prosecution." Borja washed his hands of any complicity
in the killing which he sought to lay at Balimbing's door. Conveniently for Borja, Balimbing is dead and cannot
tell his tale. But like his colleagues, Borja failed to convince the trial judge. Noting that Borja was the
commanding officer of eight AFAG regiments in the entire Bicol region, while Balimbing was just a sergeant,
the trial court refused to believe that Balimbing openly defied Borja by instigating the sanguinary episode at the
hacienda. Instead, the trial court declared: "The contrary was the real and painful truth. Pedro Borja was the
leader of the group that raided Hacienda San Miguel, and he was the very one who ordered the liquidation of
Santiago Gancayco Jr. and Salustiano Isorena." chanrobles virtual law library

The trial court found that conspiracy was "conclusively established" and that "the guilt of all the accused has
been established by proof above the shadow of doubt." It found that the killing of Gancayco constitutes murder,
while the shooting of Isorena constitutes frustrated murder. The trial court held that either evident premeditation
or treachery qualifies the crimes to murder and frustrated murder; since the law requires only one qualifying
circumstance, the other should be considered as an aggravating circumstance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The trial court found five aggravating circumstances against Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los
Santos, to wit:

(1) the crimes of murder and frustrated murder were committed by a band, or with the aid of armed men;
chanrobles virtual law library

(2) means were employed to weaken the defense, wherein is included taking advantage of superior strength;
chanrobles virtual law library

(3) craft, fraud and/or disguise were employed; chanrobles virtual law library

(4) there was promise of backpay in the commission of the crimes; and chanrobles virtual law library
(5) there was treachery or evident premeditation, depending upon whatever is used to qualify the crimes to
murder and frustrated murder.

With respect to Pedro Borja in both cases the trial court considered against him four aggravating circumstances,
consisting of the five above-mentioned, but excluding the promise of backpay. It found another aggravating
circumstance in the case of frustrated murder, i.e. dwelling. Hence, in the case of frustrated murder, it found six
aggravating circumstances against Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos; and five aggravating
circumstances against Borja.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

All the five accused in the first trial admitted practically all the evidence for the prosecution in their testimonies
in their own behalf, and additionally in their respective affidavits narrating their individual participation in the
commission of the two crimes. Moreover, they freely and voluntarily re-enacted the crime at the hacienda, in
the presence of the trial judge. The re-enactment proceedings were photographed and tape recorded, and bore
out the version testified to by Isorena and Lanon eyewitnesses for the prosecution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

In the Brief for all accused-appellants except Pedro Borja, John Doe, and Richard Doe (John Doe and Richard
Doe refer to Alejo Balimbing and Tito Oljina who were killed during the encounter at Tiwi), the five accused -
Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos - do not deny their culpability for the offenses charged. In
their Brief, they prayed for the reduction of the penalty from death and its accessory penalties, to reclusion
temporal and its accessory penalties. They admitted with candor: "The finding of facts in the decision of the
trial court having been found to be a faithful narration of the incident as related during the trial of the case and
given in the two ocular inspections of the premises where the shooting happened, it would seem a useless
endeavor to reiterate said findings of facts, ..." (Brief for the Accused-Appellants, except Pedro Borja, pages 6-
7).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The five accused controverted the findings of the trial court that there were five aggravating circumstances in
the case for murder. Instead, they contended that the trial court should have appreciated only three aggravating
circumstances. They reasoned that any of the alleged aggravating circumstances should necessarily be absorbed
to qualify the crime of murder, thereby leaving only four aggravating circumstances. Moreover, they argued that
the aggravating circumstance of promise of backpay was not alleged in the information, and consequently
should not be taken as an aggravating circumstance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find that the trial court correctly considered that either treachery or evident premeditation qualifies the
crime to murder, and hence the other alternative circumstance should be considered as aggravating. We reject
the contention of the five accused; for while it is true that the aggravating circumstance of promise or reward
was not alleged in the information, nevertheless, it was proven during the trial, and therefore can be considered
as a generic aggravating circumstance, though not a qualifying circumstance. (People of the Philippines vs.
Navarro, et al., L-20860, November 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 530). On the other hand, as Borja contends, infra, the
other aggravating circumstances are absorbed by alevosia or treachery. Hence, if it is treachery which is
considered as the qualifying circumstance, there remain two generic aggravating circumstances which attended
the commission of the two crimes with respect to the five accused: evident premeditation; and promise or
reward (which does not apply with respect to Borja.) chanrobles virtual law library

The five accused contended that there were three mitigating circumstances in their favor: lack of instruction;
fear of Pedro Borja; and lack of motive. We find no merit in this contention. The argument of lack of instruction
is based on the allegation that the five accused did not finish primary education. But the defense adduced no
proof to establish the existence of this circumstance, leaving in full force the holding that extenuating
circumstances must be proven positively and cannot be based on mere deduction or inference. (PP. vs. Sakam,
et al., 41566, December 7, 1934, 61 Phil. 27). If by "lack of instruction" the defense refers to illiteracy, it is not
sufficient to constitute a mitigating circumstance, for there must also be lack of intelligence. (PP. vs. Gorospe,
L-10644-45, February 19, 1959, 105 Phil. 184; PP. vs. Ripas, L-6246, May 26, 1954, 95 Phil. 63; PP. vs.
Semanada, L-11361, May 26, 1958, 103 Phil. 790; PP. vs. Tengyao, L-14675, November 29, 1961, 113 Phil.
465).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The second mitigating circumstance advanced by the five accused is "awe and fear of Pedro Borja." But the
element of fear is not one of those enumerated as a mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code,
Article 13. If the defense refers to the element of "uncontrollable fear or duress" which is an exempting
circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, Article 12, the argument is still invalid, for it has been held that the
element of duress should be based on real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's life or limb and should not be
speculative, fanciful, or remote fear. (PP. vs. Quilloy No. L-2313, January 10, 1951, 88 Phil. 53). We find no
evidence to support the claim that Borja threatened any or all of the other accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The third alleged mitigating circumstance is lack of motive. We are hard put to discuss this contention because
the Revised Penal Code, Article 13 does not include "lack of motive" as one of the mitigating circumstances.
Finally, the defense argues that "the undiplomatic attitude of Gancayco and Isorena, bordering on provocation"
should be considered as another mitigating circumstance. This contention is not borne out by the evidence; on
the contrary, it appears that instead of being "undiplomatic", Gancayco was pacific, and he counselled Isorena
that "the best thing for us to do is to talk to them peacefully and follow them, whatever they want." (T.s.n. p.
1466). This leaves as the only remaining assertion of the five accused the claim that "the alleged premeditated
conspiracy to kill Gancayco was not clearly revealed in the records of the case." We shall discuss this assertion
in dealing with the defense of Borja.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the Brief for the defendant-appellant Pedro Borja, the defense contended that since a separate trial was held
for Borja, the trial court erred in rendering a single decision on which the findings of facts respecting Borja,
based on evidence adduced during his separate trial, are not distinctively set forth, thereby prejudicially
impairing Borja's substantial rights. We find no such impairment of the rights of the accused. The evidence
shows that the prosecution established the same facts in the two separate trials. Isorena and Lanon testified as
eyewitnesses to the incident of December 19, 1958; de los Santos testified as an eyewitness not only to the same
incident, but also to events before and after the shooting, showing conspiracy among the accused. Other persons
testified in both trials to supply corroborating evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Borja also contended that the trial court erred in not according credence to Borja's defense and in finding him
guilty on the basis in part of what is alleged to be incompetent evidence adduced not at his separate trial but at
that of his co-accused, and in not acquitting him upon the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. This is a blanket allegation which can be dealt with summarily, because the testimonies of
common witnesses in both trials clearly establish facts incriminatory to Borja. More specifically, Borja
contended that the trial court erred in finding that a conspiracy existed between Borja and his co-accused. We
find this contention to be an excursion outside the perimeters of credibility. Borja was the AFAG commander
for the Bicol region. After the second secret conference, he donned spurious armed forces get-up, complete with
uniform and two guns. When he was introduced to the hacienda personnel as a PC major in command of the
group, it does not appear that he raised any protest. Instead, the evidence shows that he issued the order to
Balimbing to "fix them up" referring to Gancayco and Isorena and he also issued the order "Habulin! Habulin!"
when Gancayco ran for his life. Borja consistently acted the leader as he led the dash for illicit freedom. He led
the group in fleeing the island; instructed that the firearms should be secreted away in a jute sack; and ordered
his men to separate into two groups when his group was surrounded by Tabaco policemen near Tiwi, where
Borja led the gunfight.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

He eluded his trackers for more than two months until his capture. To flee the fold of the law is to admit that
one has transgressed that law. (PP. vs. Wilson, et al., 30012-15, March 7, 1929, 52 Phil. 907). Borja's
uncontested actions would be gratuitous and illogical, unless located within the frame of conspiracy, which is
their only reasonable context. The evidence shows that Borja acted in concert with the other accused in
pursuance of the same objective. Hence, conspiracy attaches and it is no longer necessary to obtain proof as to
the previous agreement or decision to commit the crime. (PP vs Cadag, L-13830, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 388;
PP. vs. Peralta, L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759; PP. vs. Alcantara, L-26867, June 30, 1970, 33
SCRA 812).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Borja further contended that assuming his criminal liability, the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation; and the generic aggravating circumstances of band or aid
of armed men; use of means to weaken the defense; craft, fraud, and/or disguise. This contention for the first
part flies in the face of the evidence. Treachery was present because Gancayco was killed while he was
unarmed, and surrounded by enemies with firearms, including two grease-guns. Thus, Gancayco was deprived
of any means of defense while his enemies were exposed to no risk arising from the defense which the offended
party might have made. True, Borja was inside the bodega when the shooting took place; but his physical
absence does not exonerate him, for it was he who ordered the execution. Moreover, where there is conspiracy,
treachery is considered against all the offenders. (PP. vs. Carandang, et al., 32039, February 26, 1930, 54 Phil.
503). The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was sufficiently proved, for prior to the shooting
on December 19, 1958, the accused met in two secret conferences and discussed the raid on the hacienda in
order to avenge themselves by exacting redress from Gancayco for allegedly killing Balimbing's cousin and
bulldozing the camote plantations of Balimbing's relatives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

However, Borja's contention for the second part is well taken. The defense argues that the circumstance of band
and aid of armed men, cannot be taken separately from the circumstance of use of means to weaken the defense,
and advantage of superior strength. It was correctly pointed out that all these circumstances are absorbed in
treachery and may not be considered independently. (U.S. vs. Estopia, et al., No. 9411, September 29, 1914, 28
Phil. 97; U.S. vs. Oro, No. 5781, August 14, 1911, 19 Phil. 548; U.S. vs. Vitug, et al., No. 5430, September 8,
1910, 17 Phil. 1; PP vs. Sespene No. L-9346, October 30, 1957, 102 Phil. 199; PP. vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July
17, 1969, 28 SCRA 764; PP. vs. Agustin, L-18368, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 467; PP. vs. Layson, L-25177,
October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 32). It was also correctly pointed out that treachery absorbs the circumstance of
craft, fraud and disguise. (PP. vs. Malig, et al., L-2083, May 30, 1949, 83 Phil. 803). Nonetheless, this leaves
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, which applies to all the accused; and the aggravating
circumstance of promise of backpay, which applies to all the accused, except Borja.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Lastly, Borja contended that, assuming he is criminally liable, the trial court erred in not according him the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. We do not view this as error. It appears that Borja
did not surrender but was captured on February 27, 1959. His own witness, Captain Eliseo Farol of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, testified that he received a report that Borja was holed up at Barrio Sumakap, Cavinte,
Laguna. Accordingly, he sent a ranger team which located the house and called on Borja to come down. As the
house was surrounded by soldiers, Borja offered no resistance. Capt. Farol also testified that while Borja was at
large, he killed a PC soldier in an armed encounter at Catanauan, Quezon, as a result of which he was indicted
for murder in the court of first instance in that province. Capt. Farol also declared that a prize of P2,000.00 was
put on Borja's head for being a dangerous fugitive. These are not indicia of the personality seeking voluntary
surrender.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Mr. Santiago Gancayco, Jr., manager of a 1,700-hectare hacienda and scion of a prominent family, is dead. His
demise when he was only in his early thirties was rendered more tragic in that he breathed his last in the bosom
of his grieving family, consisting of his wife and six small children, in the course of his flight from ostensible
visitors who had suddenly been transformed into cold-blooded killers. Dr. Rizalino Reyes, Chief of the Medico-
Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation who performed an autopsy on the body of Santiago
Gancayco, Jr. testified that his death was due to hemorrhage, severe, secondary to multiple gunshot wounds of
the body and that shock, traumatic was contributory. It was abundantly established in the trial court that his
killing was attended by treachery, which qualifies the crime committed by the perpetrators into
murder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Five of the accused, namely: Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen, Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides and Dominador
de los Santos have been in custody since December 19, 1958, or shortly thereafter; while Pedro Borja was
apprehended on February 27, 1959. It can thus be seen that all of them have been under detention for over
twenty years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court in Criminal Case No. 2590 is hereby affirmed in toto; that in
Criminal Case No. 2578 is modified in respect of the principal penalty from death to reclusion perpetua for lack
of necessary votes, and in respect of the civil indemnity from P6,000 to P12,000.00.chanrob

G.R. No. 45186           September 30, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.

Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

DIAZ, J.:

Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the
corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence
alleging that the trial court erred:

I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had
thrown away her newborn babe, and

II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion
perpetua, with costs.

The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:

At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the
appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature
because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw
her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and
visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very
weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being
asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she
was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called
Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the
hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the
body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before.
Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked
whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.

Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president
of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found her lying in bed
still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing
his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in
her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing
her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living maritally, because the child
was not his but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his
conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he went to her
house at the time and on the date above-stated.

The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose testimony was
not corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the
appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the
appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with both. On the contrary, he
maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the
Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.

By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr.
Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the hand of
man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.

Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously, or at

least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are
committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the
full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.

The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it,
to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis
Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol — she considers him her husband
as he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was
pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child
carried by the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the
birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the
child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house after the appellant had left the
place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact
she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr.
Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the appellant denied having made
any admission to said physician and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This
illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had
upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and
therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event;
and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is
uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach
her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her
or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to
constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket
where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.

The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to her, to
respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by
doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not
because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability any person
who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).

In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant was
aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having
been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors
attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said
appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of
which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection
with this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.

Separate Opinions

VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:

I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the ground that she is exempt from criminal
liability but because she has committed no criminal act or omission.

The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the accused Josefina Bandian had spent a year of
marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by whom she was begotten with a child for the first time. Her said lover
knew that she was pregnant and both were waiting for the arrival of the happy day when the fruit of their love
should be born. Since she became pregnant she continuously had fever, was weak and dizzy. On January 31, at
about 7 o'clock in the morning, she went down from her house and entered a thicket about four or five brazas
away, where the residents of said place responded to the call of nature. After some minutes the accused emerged
from the thicket staggering and apparently unable to support herself. Her neighbor Valentin Aguilar, who saw
her enter the thicket and emerged therefrom, ran to help her, supported her and aided her in going up to her
house and to bed. Asked by Aguilar what happened to her, she merely answered that she was very dizzy.
Thinking that he alone was unable to attend to her, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived
nearby, and requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the appellant's hemorrhage. Adriano had scarcely gone
about five brazas, when he saw the body of a newborn child near the path adjoining the thicket where the
accused had been a few moments before. Upon being informed of the discovery, Valentin Aguilar told Adriano
Comcom to bring the child into the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether or not the child shown to her
was hers, the appellant answered in the affirmative. After an autopsy had been made of the body, it was found
that the child was born alive.

Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal medicine among young primiparæ who,
by reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of parturition and of the process of expulsion of fetus, are not
aware that they are giving birth when they are responding to an urgent call of nature (Dr. A. Lacassagne, Precis
de Medicine Legale, pages, 799-781; Annales de Medicine Legale, December 1926, page 530; Vibert, Manual
de Medicina Legal y Toxicologia, vol. I, pages 512-514). There is no doubt that the accused, in her feverish,
weak and dizzy condition when she went into the thicket to defecate and being a primipara with no experience
in childbirth, was not aware that upon defecating she was also expelling the child she was carrying in her
womb. Believing that she did nothing more to respond to an urgent call of nature which brought her there, she
returned home staggering for lack of strength to support herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she
was leaving a newborn child behind her, and she only knew that she had given birth when she was shown the
already dead child with wounds on the body produced by the bites of pigs.

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies, which may
be committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa); there being deceit when the
act is performed with deliberate intent, and fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence,
lack of foresight or lack of skill.

As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child had been exposed to the rough
weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she deceitfully committed the crime of infanticide
or that of abandonment of a minor, because according to the above-cited legal provision there is deceit when the
act punishable by law is performed with deliberate intent. Suffering from fever and from dizziness, the appellant
under the circumstances was not aware that she had given birth and, consequently, she could not have
deliberately intended to leave her child, of whose existence she was ignorant, to perish at the mercy of the
elements and of the animals. Neither can it be held that she faultily committed it because, as already stated, not
knowing for lack of experience in childbirth that in defecating — a perfectly lawful physiological act, being
natural — she might expel the child she carried in her womb, she cannot be considered imprudent, a
psychological defect of a person who fails to use his reasoning power to foresee the pernicious consequences of
his willful act. Having had no knowledge of the fact of her delivery, the accused could not think that by leaving
the child in the thicket, it would die as a consequence of the rough weather or of the cruelty of animals. Neither
can she be considered negligent because negligence is the omission to do what the law or morals obliges one to
do, which implies knowledge of the thing which is the subject matter of the compliance with the obligation.
Inasmuch as the accused was not aware of her delivery, her mind cannot contemplate complying with her legal
and moral duty to protect the life of her child. Neither can it be held that the appellant lacked foresight because,
having been absolutely ignorant of her delivery, she could not foresee that by abandoning her child in a thicket
it would die. Neither can it be held that her act was the result of lack of skill because she did not know that to
defecate in a state of pregnancy might precipitate her delivery, and as defecation is a natural physiological
function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.

We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which
reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it," because although the lawful act of satisfying a natural physiological
necessity accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery itself was not an injury, but the exposure of the child
at the mercy of the elements and of the animals which cased its death. As the child was born alive, if the
accused had been aware of her delivery and she had deliberately abandoned the child, her accidental delivery
would not exempt her from criminal liability because then the death of said child no longer would have been
accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
consisting in the failure to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause,
because this exempting circumstance implies knowledge of the precept of the law to be complied with but is
prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, that is by some motive which has lawfully, morally or
physically prevented one to do what the law commands. In the present case, what the law requires of the
accused-appellant, with respect to the child, is that she care for, protect and not abandon it. Had she been aware
of her delivery and of the existence of the child, neither her debility nor her dizziness resulting from the fever
which consumed her, being in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and her illness not being of such
gravity as to prevent her from asking for help, would constitute the lawful or insuperable impediment required
by law. Having been ignorant of her delivery and of the existence of the child, to her there was subjectively no
cause for the law to impose a duty for her to comply with.
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death thereof resulting from its exposure to the
rough weather and to the cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed to the accused, because she had neither
deceitfully nor faultily committed any act or omission punishable by law with regard to the child.

G.R. No. L-6082            March 18, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.

C.W. Ney for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary detention"
of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.

We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful authority of
the defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness
which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence, the alleged offense with which
the complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal
president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without
warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).

The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed, unless the evidence discloses that
having made the arrest, the defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the
complaining witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him brought before the proper
judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested. But so far as we can
gather from the extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice of the
peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True, three days were expended in doing, so, but it was
conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his
auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining
municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all
practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities
for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written complaint, which
was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the
prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume
that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like,
which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer and more
commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him exposed
to considerable inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this
record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the
prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully
authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the
arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where
the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the
peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a
particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary,
or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a
neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order were
supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.

The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and he is hereby
acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-5728            August 11, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JAMES O. PHELPS (alias PHILIPS), defendant-appellant.

P. J. Moore and W. H. Bishop, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

The defendant, James O. Phelps, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Jolo, Moro Province, with having
violated the provisions of Act No. 1761. He was tried, found guilty as charged, and sentenced to one month's
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P250, Philippine currency, and in case of insolvency to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of P2.50 a day, and to pay the costs. He appealed.

The prosecution presented but one witness in this case, Homer G. Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. This witness testified that the first time he ever saw the accused was in the international Saloon in
Jolo in the month of April, 1909; that at the time, while two or three men were sitting together in the said salon,
he heard the accused say that he on some occasions like to smoke opium; that a few hours after leaving the
saloon he asked the accused if he smoked opium, and the accused answered "yes," that he smoked sometimes;
that he knew then that it was his duty to watch the accused, that he then asked the accused what opportunities he
had for smoking opium, and the accused replied, "good opportunities;" he then said to the accused, "I wish to
smoke opium." On the invitation of the accused he looked him up that night and was told that he (the accused)
was not able to prepare a room for smoking, as the Chinamen were afraid, and asked the witness to see him the
following night; that he saw him the following night, and accused again said that he could not find a suitable
place; that they made another agreement to meet and at that time they went together to a certain house in the
barrio of Tulay, where a certain Chinaman (this Chinaman was charged in criminal case No. 292 in said court)
had prepared the opium and pipe for smoking; that the accused gave the Chinaman P2, and he (the witness)
gave him P1 in payment for the preparation of the pipe which was prepared for smoking he took the pipe and
the pan containing the opium and went directly to the justice of the peace and swore out a warrant for the arrest
of the accused and the said Chinaman.

The defendant, J. O. Phelps, a man 30 years of age, testified that Smith, who was then going under the name of
Lockwood, came to his house one night in Jolo and said that he was accustomed to smoking opium and asked
him (the accused) if he knew of any Chinaman in the town who could assist him in obtaining opium to smoke;
that he answered Smith that he did not; that Smith then asked him if the Chinaman (the one charged in criminal
case No. 292), who was the accused's servant, could look for someone to furnish him (Smith) with a pipe until
he became acquainted in town; that on the following night the witness Smith came again to his house, and after
being there about twenty minutes became very nervous, saying that it was necessary for him to have some
opium; that he told him (Smith) to go to the hospital, and received the reply that he (Smith) was working for the
quartermaster and was looking for a position as clerk, and that they probably would not give him this position if
they learned that he was an opium smoker that he again asked to have the Chinaman assist him, and he (the
accused) believing that he (Smith) was acting in good faith and was really sick, told the Chinaman to do so; that
by agreement and the witness Smith went to the house of the Chinaman in Tulay, where the Chinaman prepared
the pipe and gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving the Chinaman P2, and that he (Smith) then left, without the
accused noticing whether he smoked or not, and that he (the accused) was arrested about forty minutes later,
and that he called for the doctor to examine him about one and half hours after he left the Chinaman's house.

The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused on every material point, stating that he, after repeated
demands made by Smith, did prepare some opium in a pipe and give it to Smith.

The chief of police of Jolo, a sergeant in the United States Cavalry, who arrested the accused and the Chinaman,
testified that when he made these arrests the Chinaman and the accused did not have an opportunity to talk
together before they went to the justice of the peace where the preliminary investigation was held.

Doctor De Kraft, of the United States Army, was called by the accused himself and made an examination of the
accused about an hour and a half or two hours after he left the Chinaman's house. The doctor testified that the
accused was strong, robust man, and a man presenting no appearance of an opium smoker. On being asked by
the court whether or not he could state positively if the accused had used any opium on that day, the witness
answered, "I as sure that he did not use any opium on that day."

The court below in its decision said:

I agree with him (the doctor) that the accused does not appear to be a person who uses daily a large
amount of opium. The accused is a strong, robust man, in good physical condition, and from a casual
examination of his person no one would accuse him of being a habitual user of opium.

The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold or had in his possession any opium, neither does it
contend that he had in his possession any of the prohibited paraphernalia used in smoking this drug. He is only
charged with having smoked opium this one time in the house of the Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its
case solely upon the testimony of the witness Smith, who was an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
secretly acting in that capacity in Jolo.

On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to hide his true mission. He assumed the name of
Lockwood for the same purpose, engaged in gambling, and admits having visited the house of the appellant
three times for the purpose of making arrangements for himself and the accused to smoke opium. He urged the
accused to have the Chinaman make arrangements so they both could smoke. He went to the house of the
Chinaman with the accused and paid the said Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1 for the preparation
of the opium. If he had, by these means, induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession either
opium or any of the prohibited paraphernalia, his testimony would be more reasonable, since the mere
possession of the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law within itself.
But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused had in his possession any of these things. According to
the statements made by the witness Smith, he not only suggested the commission of this crime, but he (Smith)
also states that he desired to commit the same offense and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the
commission of the prohibited act. Such conduct on the part of a man who is employed by the Government for
the purpose of taking such steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the offense and which would
tend to the elevation and improvement of the defendant, as a would-be criminal, rather than further his
debasement, should be rebuked rather than encouraged by the courts; and when such acts as those committed by
the witness Smith are placed beside the positive testimony of the defendant, corroborated by the Chinaman and
the doctor, the testimony of such witness sinks into insignificance and certainly does not deserve credit. When
an employee of the Government, as in this case, and according to his own testimony, encourages or induces
persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible. We desire to be
understood that we base our conclusions as to the conduct of the witness Smith and the incredibility of his
testimony on his own acts according to his own testimony.

We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the appellant is not guilty of this crime. The judgment of the
lower court is reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.

G.R. No. 34917           September 7, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants.

Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuaño, H. Alo and Manuel G. Briones for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
convicting them of the illegal importation of opium, and sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a
fine of P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal
penalty, and to pay the proportional costs.

In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors as committed by the court below
in its judgment to wit:

The lower court erred:

1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular Collector of Customs to exhibit in
court the record of the administrative investigation against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of
 Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, both of whom have since
been dismissed from service.

2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments have passed thru the
customhouse without the knowledge of the customs secret service."

3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in denouncing the accused was actuated
by a desire to protect himself and to injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was
partly instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from the service.

4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs secret service agent of Cebu, is
above reproach and utterly irreconcilable with the corrupt motives attributed to him by the accused.

5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the court room while other
prosecution witnesses were testifying, despite the previous order of the court excluding the Government
witnesses from the court room, and in refusing to allow the defense to inquire from Insular Collector of
Customs Aldanese regarding the official conduct of Juan Samson as supervising customs secret service
agent of Cebu.

6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.

7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng to order the opium from
Hongkong.

8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan
Samson and the appellant Uy Se Tieng.

9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and
the appellant Lua Chu.

10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the crime of illegal importation
of opium, and in sentencing each to suffer four years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the
costs, despite the presumption of innocence which has not been overcome, despite the unlawful
inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the evidence presented by the prosecution, emanating
from a spirit of revenge and from a contaminated, polluted source.

The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial:

About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to his correspondent in
Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium.

About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, Juan Samson, had returned from
a vacation in Europe, he called upon the then collector of customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at
his office, and the latter, after a short conversation, asked him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief
of the secret service told him he had spent P2,500, the said collector of customs took from a drawer in his table,
the amount of P300, in paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for you, and a shipment will arrive
shortly, and you will soon be able to recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money, left, and
put it into the safe in his office to be kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week later,
Natividad called Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred to consisted of opium, that it was not
about to arrive, and that the owner would go to Samson's house to see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to
Samson's house and told him he had come by order of Natividad to talk to him about the opium. The said
accused informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that he had agreed to pay
Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October
awaiting a ship that would go direct to Cebu.

At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai loaded on the steamship Kolambugan,
which the Naviera Filipina — a shipping company in Cebu had had built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to
Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H." About the same date Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already
been put on board the steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that Samson would receive
P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain employees in the
customhouse.

Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the end of November, Natividad
informed the latter that the Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong on account of certain engine trouble, and
remained there until December 7th. In view of this, the shipper several times attempted to unload the shipment,
but he was told each time by the captain, who needed the cargo for ballast, that the ship was about to sail, and
the 30 cases remained on board.

The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While he was examining the
manifests, Samson detailed one of his men to watch the ship. After conferring with Natividad, the latter
instructed him to do everything possible to have the cargo unloaded, and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the
P6,000. On the morning of November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had the papers
ready to withdraw the cases marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad it would be
better for Uy Se Tieng to go to his house to have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that
night and was told that he must pay over the P6,000 before taking the opium out of the customhouse. Uy Se
Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and we see whether we can
take the money to you tomorrow." The following day Samson informed Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary,
of all that had taken place, and the said colonel instructed the provincial commander, Captain Buenconsejo, to
discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and Samson agreed to meet at the latter's
house that same night. That afternoon Samson went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the
fiscal, and asked for a stenographer to take down the conversation he would have with Uy Se Tieng that night in
the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did not have a good stenographer available, Samson got one
Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias, on the recommendation of the court stenographer. On the
evening of December 17, 1929, as agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer
went to Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which hung from the
window overlooking the entrance to the house on the ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived,
Samson asked him if he had brought the money. He replied that he had not, saying that the owner of the opium,
who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then hold him to tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might
come to Samson's house. After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a back door entrance into the garden, he asked him
where the opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the cases numbered 11 to 18, and that there were
3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock that night accompanied by his codefendant Lua Chu, who
said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a man from Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy
were also owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the opium, and the latter answered
that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if he had brought the P6,000, Lua Chu answered,
no, but promised to deliver it when the opium was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation, which
was taken down in shorthand, Samson took the accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow, why
didn't you tell me about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered: "Impossible, sir; you were
not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson how he had come to bring in the opium,
Lua Chu answered: "I was in a cockpit one Sunday when the collector called me aside and said there was good
business, because opium brought a good price, and he needed money." All this conversation was overheard by
Captain Buenconsejo. It was then agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10 o'clock next
morning. At the appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se Tieng
was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been hiding,
appeared and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills of lading
(Exhibits B and B-1), and in invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to the articles described in
Exhibit B. After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal,
Captain Buenconsejo and Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him. In the pocket of a coat
hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him, they found five letters written in Chinese characters
relating to the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to the
Constabulary headquarters, and then went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the
cases marked Nos. 11 to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value of the
opium confiscated amounted to P50,000.

In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu and asked him to tell the
truth as to who was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any
questions, for I am not going to answer to them. The only thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this
contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge of those — " pointing
towards the customhouse.

The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he
induced him to order the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu
it cost from P18 to P20, and that he could make a good deal of money by bringing in a shipment of that drug;
that Samson told Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and the collector of
customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who told him he had no objection, if
Samson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after
he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of
P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent cancelling the order, but the latter
answered that the opium had already been loaded and the captain of the Kolambugan refused to let him unload
it; that when the opium arrived, Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did not
have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of December 14th, and proposed that he participate; that at
first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the
opium had passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of December 17th,
because Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium without first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu
personally promised to pay him that amount.

The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in its judgment. Some refer to the
refusal of the trial judge to permit the presentation of certain documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of
Juan Samson, the principal witness for the Government, from the court room during the hearing; others refer to
the admission of the alleged statements of the accused taken in shorthand; and the others to the sufficiency of
the evidence of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.

With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings against Joaquin Natividad,
collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, who were
dismissed from the service, the trial court did not err in not permitting it, for, whatever the result of those
proceedings, they cannot serve to impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not one of the means prescribed in
section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure to that end.

With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness of the
Government, from the court room during the hearing, it is within the power of said judge to do so or not, and it
does not appear that he has abused his discretion (16 Corpus Juris, 842).

Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of stenographic notes of the
defendants' statements, since they contain admissions made by themselves, and the person who took them in
shorthand attested at the trial that they were faithfully taken down. Besides the contents are corroborated by
unimpeached witnesses who heard the statements.
As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in the information, we find that the
testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution should be believed, because the officers of the
Constabulary and the chief of the customs secret service, who gave it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the
defendants do not deny their participation in the illegal importation of the opium, though the accused Lua Chu
pretends that he was only a guarantor to secure the payment of the gratuity which the former collector of
customs, Joaquin Natividad, had asked of him for Juan Samson and certain customs employees. This assertion,
however, is contradicted by his own statement made to Juan Samson and overheard by Captain Buenconsejo,
that he was one of the owners of the opium that had been unlawfully imported.

But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the opium in question.
Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port
of Cebu, bears him out. A public official who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not
take the steps necessary to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before having obtained
the profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited
drug, but that was after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its
introduction into the country through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help them
carry their plan to a successful issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the
smugglers.

The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime, as laid down by the
courts of the United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons
into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent
the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a
crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was
done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in
that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if
the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact
that an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a
prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and
where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities,
and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is
nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of
liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases
holding the contrary.

As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-appellants to import the
opium in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs,
Joaquin Natividad — who had promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their
enterprise so far as the customhouse was concerned — not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of the
transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious
importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the
Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is
induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the customs secret service
pretended to agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better
to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of
the latter.

By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. 83325 May 8, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANTE MARCOS y SIBAYAN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Carlito A. Corpuz for accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal interposed by the accused Dante Marcos y Sibayan, from the decision * of the Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, Branch V, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 2890-R finding him guilty of
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Sale and Distribution of Prohibited Drugs) and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds and declares the accused DANTE MARCOS y SIBAYAN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale and distribution of marijuana as charged and hereby
sentences him to suffer life imprisonment; to pay a fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency; and to pay the costs.

In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with his preventive imprisonment under the terms
and conditions prescribed in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The confiscated marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B", "B-1" to "B-9") are hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
Government, and upon the finality of this decision, the Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over the same
to the Dangerous Drugs Custodian (NBI), through the Chief, PC Crime Laboratory, Regional Unit No. 1, Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, for disposition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.

An information was filed by the Second Assistant Fiscal Alberto G. Gorospe at the Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Branch V, Baguio City on December 3, 1985 charging the accused, Dante Marcos y Sibayan,
of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Sale and Distribution of Prohibited Drugs),
having been committed as follows:

That on or about the 4th day of December, 1985, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, and without any authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and distribute dried marijuana leaves weighing about nine (9) kilos,
more or less, contained in a big sack, for P700.00 per kilo or a total of P6,300.00, Philippine Currency, knowing
fully well that said leaves of marijuana is a prohibited drug in violation of the above-mentioned provision of
law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.

As gathered from the records, Major Florencio Junio, Commanding Officer of the First Narcotic Regional Unit,
Baguio City, acting upon an information given by a confidential informer that accused-appellant Dante Marcos
was selling marijuana at the Holy Ghost Hill Proper, Baguio City, organized on December 4, 1985 a "buy bust"
operation team composed of A2C Serafin Artizona who was to pose as the buyer of the prohibited stuff, with
Major Junio, Maximo Peralta, Freddie Cortel and Philip de Vera providing the back-up support (Rollo, pp. 58-
59). The testimony of this team which eventually apprehended the accused, constitutes the major part of the
prosecution's evidence

The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses:

Lt. Carlos V. Figueroa, a forensic chemist at the PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet,
testified that on January 2, 1986, he received a request for laboratory examination dated December 16, 1985
(Hearing of March 18, 1986; TSN, p. 3; Record, p. 4) for nine (9) bundles of marijuana stuff, weighing 9.2
kilos. He examined the same by means of the Duquenois-Levine test and the thin-layer chromatography test.
Both tests showed that the bundles were positive for marijuana (Hearing of March 18, 1986; TSN, p. 4;
Records, pp. 5-6).

A2C Serafin Artizona, a soldier, assigned at the lst Regional Narcotics Command, Baguio City, testified that on
December 4, 1985, he was assigned by his immediate chief Major Florencio Junio to compose a team to entrap
accused Dante Marcos in the Holy Ghost Proper (Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 13-14; Records, pp. 14-
15). Thereafter, together with the confidential informer they went to the Holy Ghost Proper. He was also
accompanied by the back-up team strategically positioned within the vicinity, namely Major Junio, Maximo
Peralta, Freddie Cortel and Philip de Vera (Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 14-15; Records, pp. 15-16).
Once at the Holy Ghost Proper, he was introduced by the confidential informer as a buyer of marijuana to the
accused who was then standing at the stairway together with his companion. After a while, they were asked to
proceed to the second floor (Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 20-22; Records, pp. 21-23). He then ordered
ten (10) kilos of marijuana priced at seven hundred pesos per kilo (P700.00). The accused left the room to get
the stuff, and returned with a light blue sack and gave it to him. After inspecting the contents of the aforesaid
sack, he gave the prearranged signal to his companion by spitting through the window. Accordingly, the back-
up team went inside the house. Meanwhile, he introduced himself to the accused as a NARCOM agent (Hearing
of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 16-17; Records, pp. 17-18). Eventually, the accused was arrested while his
companion was able to evade the arrest. He also testified that he did not execute any affidavit to support his
complaint against the accused (Heating of April 28, 1986; TSN, p. 18; Records, p. 19).
Pat. Maximiano Peralta, an investigator of the lst Narcotics Regional Unit, testified that on December, 1985, he
was a member of the back-up team of A2C Artizona who negotiated with the accused. He rushed to the house
when Major Junio who posted himself near the house of accused gave the prearranged signal that the accused
was already held by A2C Serafin Artizona (Hearing of January 14, 1987; TSN, pp. 31-32; Records, pp. 32-33).
Inside the house, he saw Artizona holding the accused. He further disclosed that the sack contained ten (10)
bundles of marijuana weighing more or less 9-1/2 kilos (Hearing of January 14, 1987; TSN, pp. 33-34; Records,
pp. 34-35). Moreover, he testified that he was the one who prepared the affidavit of arrest and other supporting
papers (Hearing of January 14, 1987; TSN, pp. 34-35; Records, pp. 35-36).

With the presentation of the oral testimonies of the witnesses by the prosecution and the documentary evidence
which consist of: (a) Letter-request for laboratory examination dated December 16, 1985, signed by Murphy
Bugtong, Chief of Narcotics Division, Baguio City Police Station (Exhibit "A", Original Record, p. 195); (b)
Blue sack which contained marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B" -"B-10", ibid., p. 196); (c) Chemistry Report (Exhibit
"C", ibid., p. 197); (d) Sketch (Exhibit "D", ibid., p. 198); (e) Joint Affidavit (Exhibit "E", ibid., p. 199); as well
as the physical evidence, the prosecution rested its case.

On the other hand, the defense presented the accused Dante Marcos as its principal witness who vehemently
denied the accusation against him and claimed instead that the sack of marijuana belonged to a certain Roland
Bayogan.

He testified that he was a security guard of the Freeport and Vito Security Agency and an Architectural drafting
student at the University of Baguio. He was boarding at the ground floor of No. 23-C Sumulong St., a two-
storey boarding house owned by Melita Adase (Hearing of August 24, 1987; TSN, pp. 2-3; Records, pp. 74-75).
On December 4, 1985, he went to his class until 2:30 p.m. Thereafter, he went to his boarding house and
reviewed for his last subject at 3:30 p.m. (Ibid., pp. 4-5; 15; Records, pp. 76-77; 87). However, while reviewing,
Roland Bayogan, a student from Kalinga-Apayao who was occupying a room on the second floor (Ibid., p. 4;
Records, p. 76) knocked at his door and asked him to go to his (Roland's) room to entertain his visitors as he
was to go somewhere for a while. Accordingly, he went to Roland's room, and there met Roland's visitors, an
American, a Filipino and a Negro boy. He was introduced to the three visitors and then Roland left (Ibid., pp. 5-
7; Records, pp. 77-79). Ten (10) minutes after, Roland returned carrying a big sack which he brought near the
bed which was hidden from his view by a curtain. Roland then called for the Negro boy who in turn called for
the American. When the American saw the contents of the sack he overheard him say, "Okay , I'll pay it," at the
same time brought out his money as he emerged from behind the curtain (Ibid., pp. 7-8; Records, pp. 79-80). He
testified that as Roland was sitting on his bed he was called by the Filipino visitor, who held the former. He was
also called by the same visitor who held his hands saying, "Relax lang kayo, this is NARCOM." He saw the
Negro boy jump out of the window while panicked-stricken Roland tried to free himself from the hands of the
Filipino, but the Filipino visitor pulled them both outside the door. When they were near the stairs Roland was
able to free himself. Roland ran downstairs and fled. Suddenly, he heard a shot. The Filipino held on to him
while the American went back to the room and got the sack. Later, accompanied by the Filipino and the
American, they were met by two male persons at the foot of the stairs. He was pulled inside a vehicle and
brought to the police station. He further declared that once inside the said vehicle, he heard one of them say,
"Hindi ito talaga ang target natin, iyong nakatakbo." (Hearing of August 24, 1987; TSN, pp. 8-10,; Records, pp.
80-82). He further stated that A2C Serafin Artizona was not one of the visitors of Roland Bayogan. He and Pat.
Peralta were never at the boarding house during the incident. He also claimed that the sketch of the place as
presented by A2C Artizona is erroneous (Ibid., p. 12; Record, p. 84) and insisted that his only purpose in going
to the room of Roland Bayogan was to entertain the latter's visitors.

On cross examination, the accused admitted that he came to know Roland Bayogan only on November 15,
1985. Their relationship was casual and he had been to the room of Bayogan for the second time only on
December 4, 1985, the day of the incident.
Renato Padua, a law student at the Baguio Colleges Foundation, testified and corroborated the testimony of the
accused that at about 3:30 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of December 4, 1987, he was reading in the second floor of No.
23-D Holy Ghost Proper, about 1.5 meters from No. 23-C where the accused Dante Marcos lived (Hearing of
March 11, 1987; TSN, pp. 1-5; Record, pp. 49- 53); that on the said afternoon he heard a commotion at 23-C
which was followed by successive stamping of feet going down to the first floor. He went out from his room
and stayed at the porch of his boarding house. Later, he saw Roland Bayogan, a boarder of 23-C running toward
a small alley (Ibid., pp. 7-10; Record, pp. 55-58). Meanwhile, he saw two persons who were then standing fire a
shot into the air (Ibid., p. 1 0; Record, p. 58). Thereafter, the two men came down to 23-C and met the accused
(Ibid., p. 11; Record, p. 59). At the same time, the accused was being held by a certain man followed by an
American holding a sack. Finally, they boarded a jeep and then left (Ibid., pp. 11-14; Records, pp. 59-61).

Lastly, the defense presented Raul Bayangdan an AB-BSE student at Baguio Colleges Foundation, a board
mate and province mate of the accused. He testified that he has been a boarder at the first floor of 23-C Holy
Ghost St. from June 1984 to March 1986. He corroborated the testimony of the accused as to the boarders of
that house including Roland Bayogan and his sister Anita. He declared that he came to know about the incident
from Melita Adasen and Renato Padua, a neighbor, when he went home from school. He also learned that
Roland Bayogan ran away and never returned. He asserted that he has no knowledge of the incident except that
which has been told to him (Hearing of February 8, 1988; TSN, pp. 2- 9; Records, pp. 94-100).

The trial court gave more weight to the evidence of the prosecution and found the accused-appellant Dante
Marcos guilty as charged.

Hence, this appeal.

On October 28, 1988, accused-appellant through his counsel filed his brief (Rollo, p. 35), while on May 19,
1989, the appellee's brief was filed (Rollo, p. 54).

The crucial issue of this case is whether or not there is instigation or entrapment of the accused.

Appellant contends that there was an instigation or even frame up and not a real entrapment. The "buy-bust"
operation team who went to the place does not know the accused. In fact, the alleged buyer had to be
introduced. There was no marijuana yet when the authorities came or when the alleged poseur buyer came to
buy the prohibited drug. Thus, the accused was not about to commit a crime or committing a crime.

The contention is without merit.

The testimony of Artizona, the poseur buyer, was clear and convincing and demonstrated that the accused
needed no instigation or prodding to commit a crime he would not otherwise have committed. Noteworthy is the
fact that the accused, as gathered from the records, had a ready supply of marijuana for sale and disposition to
anyone willing to pay the price asked for the prohibited material. Thus, the acts of the arresting officers here
constituted entrapment, a process not prohibited by the Revised Penal Code (People v. Sanchez, G.R. No.
77588, May 12, 1989; People v. Borja G.R. No. 71838, February 26, 1990).

It must be noted that in instigation, where the officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure
an accused into committing an offense, which he otherwise would not commit and has no intention of
committing, the accused cannot be held liable. But in entrapment, where the criminal intent or design to commit
the offense charged originates from the mind of the accused and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the
commission of the offense, the accused cannot justify his conduct. Instigation is a "trap for the unwary
innocent." Entrapment is a trap for the unwary criminal (Cabrera v. Judge Pajares, Adm. Mat. R-278-RTJ & R
309-RTJ, May 30, 1986, En Banc, Per Curiam, 142 SCRA 124).
In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his
criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into
committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal (People v. Natipravat, infra). Entrapment is no bar
to prosecution and conviction while in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted (People v. Lapatha,
167 SCRA 159).

The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the means
originate from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In
instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability.
Instigation does (Araneta v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 534 [1986]).

The mere fact that the authorities deceived the appellants into believing that the former were buyers of heroin
does not exculpate the latter from liability for selling the prohibited drugs. The police can legitimately feign
solicitation to catch criminals who habitually engage in the commission of the offense (People v. Natipravat,
145 SCRA 483 [1986]).

Moreover, as noted by this Court, the defense that the accused was framed by the apprehending officer can be
easily fabricated and not acceptable for accused being a drug pusher or seller almost always uses such defense.
(People v. Francia, 154 SCRA 694 [1987]). For the defense of having set up or framed up to prosper, the
evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. Like alibi, it is a weak defense, that is easy to concoct and is
difficult to prove (People v. Nabunat, No. 84392, February 7, 1990, First Division, Gancayco, J.).

But the more important consideration is the fact that the appellant was positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses. This should prevail over his denial and inadmission of having committed the crime for which he was
charged, since greater weight is generally accorded to the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses than
the accused's denial (People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 52 [1986]; People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]; People
v. Marilao, G.R. No. 71681, September 5,1989). As between the positive declaration of the prosecution
witnesses and the negative statement of the accused, the former deserves more credence (People v. Melgar,
G.R. No. 75268, 157 SCRA 718; People v. Marilao, G.R. No. 71861, September 5, 1989). Moreover, even if
the appellant denied the participation in the crime, his presence during the negotiation and actual delivery
indicates a common purpose with other accused to sell marijuana (People v. Natipravat, supra).

In the case at bar, the findings of the trial court are as follows:

On the other hand, the accused's pretension that he went to Roland's room that afternoon of December 4, 1985
only to entertain the latter's visitors lacks appeal to reason. Considering his own admission that he met Roland
only on November 15, 1985; that he had gone to Roland's room only once before December 4, 1985; that they
are not even townmates as Roland is from Kalinga-Apayao while the accused is from Pinged Sabangan Mt.
Province, there is simply no discernible special relationship between them that could have moved Roland to
pick on the accused as his surrogate to entertain his visitors. What is more, the accused had a scheduled
examination at 3:30 o'clock for which he had to review. Why should he accede to Roland's request and thereby
lose precious time he badly needed for his review? To top it all, even as Roland had already returned to attend
to his visitors, the accused still did not leave. The Court is thus inclined to believe that Roland and the accused
were together that afternoon because both were engaged in the illegal trafficking of marijuana.

It must be pointed out that ownership and possession are not indispensable elements of the crime. The mere act
of selling or even acting as broker in the sale of marijuana and other prohibited drugs consummates the crime
(People v. Madarang, 147 SCRA 123 [1987]).

Furthermore Artizona's testimony was corroborated by the "buy-bust" operation team especially Pat. Maximo
Peralta who confirmed that appellant was truly a marijuana dealer. The commission of the offense of illegal sale
of marijuana requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction (People v. Macuto, G.R. No. 80112,
August 25, 1989). In the case at bar, the appellant handed over the blue sack containing the ten kilos of
marijuana upon the agreement with Artizona to exchange it for money. The circumstances show that there was
an agreement between the poseur-buyer and the appellant to consummate the sale. The fact that the appellant
returned with the amount of marijuana corresponding to the aforesaid price suffices to constitute if not sale, then
delivery or giving away to another and distribution of the prohibited drug punishable under Section 4, Article 11
of Republic Act 6425 (People v. Rodriguez, April 25, 1989, G.R. No. 81332; People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520,
February 21, 1989). What is important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the
appellant and that the contents were presented as evidence in court. Proof of the transaction suffices (People v.
Macuto, supra).

Neither can the appellant aver that no consideration or payment was made. In the case of People v. Tejada,
supra, this Court held that so long as the marijuana actually given by the appellant was presented before the
lower court the absence of the marked money does not create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence (People v.
Teves, G.R. No. 81332, April 25, 1989). Recently, this Court ruled:

It is true that police officers did not have the amount of P1,600 with them to buy marijuana from the appellants
during the incident. Be that as it may, it was not indispensable for their operation. Sgt,. Raquidan went through
the motion as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the appellant who produced and delivered the marijuana.
There was no need to hand the marked money to the appellants in the payment thereof. The crime was
consummated by the delivery of the goods. (People v. Galtongo-o, 168 SCRA 716 [1988]).

The alleged contradiction in the date of the affidavit or the fact that prosecution witnesses Artizona and Peralta
did not know the number and owner of the raided house will not impair their testimonies. There is no cogent
reason for the witnesses to know the number nor the owner of the house at Holy Ghost Hills in Sumulong Street
because Artizona who posed as a buyer was accompanied by a confidential informer, who was familiar with the
place. It has been ruled that contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses not on material points
is not fatal (People v. Pulo, 147 SCRA 551 [1987]). The doctrinal jurisprudence has consistently held that minor
contradictions are to be expected but must be disregarded if they do not affect the basic credibility of the
evidence as a whole (People v. Ancheta, 148 SCRA 178; People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483; People v.
Reriodica, Jr., September 29, 1989).

Conversely, the actuations of the appellant during his arrest during which he did not make a protest, indicates
his Unusually submissive stance of the appellant after his entrapment and absence of vigorous protest when he
was arrested, destroy his alleged innocence (People v. Madarang, supra).

Appellant failed to show that the police officers were actuated by any improper motive in testifying as they did.
There is nothing in the records to suggest that the arrest was motivated by any reason other than the desire of
the police officers to accomplish their mission. Courts generally give full faith and credit to police officers for
they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner (Rule 131, Section 5(m), Rules of Court;
People v. Lamong et al., G.R. No. 82373, April 17, 1989; People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642; People v.
Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85; People v. Patog, G.R. No. 69620, September 24, 1989; People v. Natipravat, supra;
People v. de Jesus, supra). As such, their testimonies cannot be discredited where no motive is shown why they
would frame up the appellant (People v. Ranola, April 12, 1989, No. 71752; People v. Line, 71 SCRA 249
[1976]).

Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of the witnesses' testimonies are
accorded great weight and respect on appeal because the trial judge has first hand opportunity to examine and
observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during the giving of their testimonies (People v. Rodriguez,
G.R. No. 81332, April 25, 1989; People v. Tejada, supra; People v. Abonada, G.R. No. 50041, January 27,
1989; People v. Turla, G.R. No. 70270, November 11, 1988; People v. Aboga, 147 SCRA 404 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

MITIGATING

G.R. No. L-48976             October 11, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MORO MACBUL, defendant-appellant.

Cesar C. Climaco for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Madamba for appellee.

OZAETA, J.:

Appellant pleaded guilty to an information for theft of two sacks of papers valued at P10 belong to the
Provincial Government of Sulu, alleged to have been committed on March 9, 1943, in the municipality of Jolo;
it being also alleged that he was a habitual delinquent, having been twice convicted of the same crime on
November 14, 1928, and August 20, 1942. The trial court sentenced him to suffer one month and one day of
arresto mayor as principal penalty and two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional as
additional penalty for habitual delinquency.

The trial court found two mitigating circumstances: plea of guilty under paragraph 7, and extreme poverty and
necessity under paragraph 10, of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code; but it took into account the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism in imposing the principal as well as the additional penalty.

The only question raised here by counsel for the appellant is the correctness of the consideration by the trial
court of recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the additional penalty for
habitual delinquency, counsel contending that recidivism should not have been taken into account because it is
inherent in habitual delinquency. While that contention is correct, as we have decided in the case of People vs.
Tolentino, 1 Off. Gaz., 682, it is beside the point here because the error committed by the trial court lies not so
much in its having considered recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of penalizing habitual
delinquency, as in its having considered appellant as a habitual delinquent at all, it appearing from the
information that his two previous convictions were more than ten years apart. "A person shall be deems to be
habitually delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes
of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener." (See last
paragraph, article 62, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.) Therefore, appellant's first conviction, which took
place in November, 1928, cannot be taken into account because his second conviction took place in August,
1942, or fourteen years later. Hence within the purview of the Habitual Delinquency Law appellant has only
one previous conviction against him, namely, that of 1942.

The trial court considered extreme poverty and necessity as a mitigating circumstance falling within No. 10 of
article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which authorizes the court to consider in favor of an accused "any other
circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned." The trial court predicates such
consideration upon its finding that the accused, on account of extreme poverty and of the economic difficulties
brought about by the present cataclysm, was forced to pilfer the two sacks of papers mentioned in the
information from the Customhouse Building, which he sold for P2.50, in order to be able to buy something to
eat for various minor children of his. (The stolen goods were subsequently recovered.) The Solicitor General
interposes no objection to the consideration of such circumstance as mitigating under No. 10 of article 13. We
give it our stamp of approval, recognizing the immanent principle that the right to life is more sacred than a
mere property right. That is not to encourage or even countenance theft but merely to dull somewhat the keen
and pain-producing edges of the stark realities of life.

Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the sentence appealed from is modified by
affirming the principal penalty and eliminating the additional penalty, without costs.

September 4, 2017

G.R. No. 224886

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ROGER RACAL @ RAMBO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant, Roger Racal @ Rambo (Racal), assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01450, which
affirmed, with modification, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 18, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-77654, finding herein appellant guilty of the crime of murder and imposing upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The antecedents are as follows:

In an Information filed by the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office on August 15, 2006, Racal was charged with the
crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads, thus:

That on or about the 19th day of April 2006, at about 4:20 A.M., more or less, in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent,
with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there, suddenly and unexpectedly,
attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person of one Jose "Joe" Francisco by stabbing the latter, at
his body, thereby inflicting a fatal wound and as a consequence of which he died.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Upon arraignment, Racal entered a plea of not guilty.4 Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution established that around 4 o'clock in the morning of April 19, 2006, "trisikad"
drivers were lining up to pick passengers along Lopez St. at Sitio Alseca in Cebu City. Among the "trisikad"
drivers was Jose Francisco (Francisco). Also present at that place during that time was Racal, who was then
standing near Francisco. While the "trisikad" drivers were waiting for passengers, Racal spoke in a loud voice,
telling the group of drivers not to trust Francisco because he is a traitor. Francisco, who was then holding a
plastic container in one hand and a bread in another, and was eating, retorted and asked Racal why the latter
called him a traitor. Without warning, Racal approached Francisco and stabbed him several times with a knife,
hitting him in the chest and other parts of his body. Francisco, then, fell to the pavement. Immediately
thereafter, Racal stepped backwards and upon reaching a dark portion of the street, he hailed a "trisikad" and
sped away. Thereafter, one of the "trisikad" drivers called the barangay tanod, but by the time they arrived,
Francisco was already dead.

Racal, on his part, did not deny having stabbed Francisco. However, he raised the defense of insanity. He
presented expert witnesses who contended that he has a predisposition to snap into an episode where he loses
his reason and thereby acts compulsively, involuntarily and outside his conscious control. Under this state, the
defense argued that Racal could not distinguish right from wrong and, thus was not capable of forming a mental
intent at the time that he stabbed Francisco.

After Trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Racal as charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision, dated September 14, 2011, read as follows:

WHEREFORE, on the following considerations, the court renders judgment finding accused ROGER RACAL
@ RAMBO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with all its accessory penalties. He is likewise directed to pay the heirs of the late Jose "Joe" Francisco the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as actual damages, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00)
as civil indemnity, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (PS0,000.00) as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.5

The RTC ruled that the evidence for the defense is insufficient to convince the court that Racal was indeed
deprived of his mind and reason at the time when he committed the crime as to exempt him from criminal
liability becaµse his depression and psychotic features are not the kind of insanity contemplated by law. The
trial court found the circumstance of treachery to be present, but ruled out the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.

Racal filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 contending that the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and voluntary confession of guilt on
the part of Racal. However, the RTC denied the Motion for

Reconsideration in its Order7 dated December 15, 2011. Aggrieved by the ruling of the RTC, Racal appealed to
the CA. In his Appellant's Brief, Racal reiterated his defense of insanity contending that, at the time he stabbed
the victim, he snapped into a fatal episode of temporary loss of rational judgment and that such a predisposition
to "snap" was testified upon by his expert witnesses.
In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of Racal but modified the judgment of the RTC by
imposing interest on the damages awarded. The CA disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, the September 14, 2011 Judgment in Criminal Case No. CBU-77654, convicting accused-
appellant Roger Racal @ Rambo of Murder and sentencing him with reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accusedappellant is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of Jose
"Joe" Francisco, interest on damages awarded, the amount of 6% from the date of finality of the judgment until
fully paid, and to pay costs.

SO ORDERED. 8

The CA held that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime necessary to convict Racal for the murder
of Francisco. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It also affirmed the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and affirmed the trial court in ruling out the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. As to Racal's defense of insanity, the CA held that he failed
to rebut the presumption the he was sane at the time of his commission of the crime. The CA, nonetheless,
appreciated the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to an illness of the offender that would diminish the
exercise of his will-power.

Racal filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 questioning the penalty imposed upon him, but the CA denied it in
its Resolution 10 of October 22, 2015.

Thus, on November 23, 2015, Racal, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal 11 manifesting his intention to
appeal the CA Decision to this Court.

In its Resolution 12 dated March 16, 2016, the CA gave due course to Racal's Notice of Appeal and directed its
Archives Section to transmit the records of the case to this Court.

Hence, this appeal was instituted.

In a Resolution13 dated July 20, 2016, this Court, among others, notified the parties that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire.

In its Manifestation and Motion, 14 filed on September 23, 2016, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
manifested that it will no longer file a supplemental brief because it had already adequately addressed in its
brief filed before the CA all the issues and arguments raised by accused-appellant in his brief.

On the other hand, Racal filed a Supplemental Brief15 dated October 21, 2016, reiterating his defense of
insanity by contending that at the time of the commission of the crime, expert evidence demonstrates that he
had, within him, predisposing factors that cause insanity. He also argues that the lower courts failed to
appreciate the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the victim and voluntary
confession of guilt on his part.

The basic issue for the Court's resolution in the present appeal is whether or not the CA correctly upheld the
conviction of herein appellant, Racal, for murder.

The Court rules in the affirmative.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate that in the review of a case, the Court is guided by the long-standing principle
that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect.16
These factual findings should not be disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of weight and substance that
were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the case.17

In the present case, after a careful rading of the records and pleadings, this Court finds no cogent reason to
deviate from the RTC’s factual findings. There is no indication that the trial court, overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, the factual findings of the RTC
are affirmed by the CA. Hence, the Court defers to the trial court in this respect, especially considering that it
was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.

In any case, the Court will proceed to resolve the present appeal on points of law.

The Information in the instant case charged appellant with the crime of murder, for stabbing the victim,
Francisco, which offense was alleged to have been attended by treachery and evident premeditation.

Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, to wit:

Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

xxx

2. With evident premeditation;

xxx

To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that a person
was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.18

In the present case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Francisco was stabbed and killed; (2)
appellant stabbed and killed him; (3) Francisco's killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery as testified to by prosecution eyewitnesses; and, (4) the killing of Francisco was neither parricide nor
infanticide.

Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in
the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that
the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. 19 In order for treachery to be properly
appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or
forms of attack employed by him.20 These elements are extant in the facts of this case and as testified to by the
prosecution witnesses. To emphasize, the victim, Francisco, was caught off guard when appellant attacked him.
As testified to by a prosecution witness, Francisco was then holding a plastic container containing bread and
was eating. The stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was carried out gave the victim
no chance at all to evade when appellant thrust the knife to his torso. Thus, there is no denying that appellant's
sudden and unexpected onslaught upon the victim, and the fact that the former did not sustain any injury,
evidences treachery. Also, the fact that appellant was facing Francisco when he stabbed the latter is of no
consequence. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who
would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it,21 as in this case. Undoubtedly, the RTC and the CA
correctly held that the crime committed was murder under Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.

Appellant, nonetheless, insists on his defense of insanity. In this regard, the Court's pronouncement in the case
of People v. Estrada22 is instructive, to wit:

The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him.
Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free
will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he
commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with
freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so
long as free will appears unimpaired.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind and that all acts
are voluntary. The moral and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the
normal condition of a person. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these
is insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability.

The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt frorri criminal
liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the
court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which
he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. If the court
therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court
shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An
acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by
commitment of the accused to a mental institution.

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be
incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedor~/ of
the will.

Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must
prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act
under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.

To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the
condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not
required. Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. Circumstantial
evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A
person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine whether these
conform to the practice of people of sound mind.23

In the present case, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The testimonies of Dr. Preciliana
Lee Gilboy (Dr. Gilboy) and Dr. Andres Suan Gerong (Dr. Gerong), as the defense's qualified expert witnesses,
failed to support appellant's claim of insanity. As correctly observed by the CA, the separate psychiatric
evaluations of appellant were taken in June 2009 and July 2010, which are three and four years after the crime
was committed on April 19, 2006. In People v. So,24 which is a case of recent vintage, this Court ruled that an
inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment
the felony is committed.25 Hence, the results of the psychiatric tests done on appellant and testified to by the
defense witnesses, may not be relied upon to prove appellant's mental condition at the time of his commission
of the crime.

In any case, during cross-examination, Dr. Gilboy testified that for a number of years up to the time that
appellant killed Francisco, he had custody of and served as the guardian of his sister's children.26 He took care
of their welfare and safety, and he was the one who sends them to and brings them home from school.
Certainly, these acts are not manifestations of an insane mind. On his part, Dr. Gerong testified, on direct
examination, that he found appellant to have "diminish[ ed] capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the
time of the commission of the crime."27 "Diminished capacity" is not the same as "complete deprivation of
intelligence or discernment." Mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. 28 Thus, on
the basis of these examinations, it is clearly evident that the defense failed to prove that appellant acted without
the least discernment or that he was suffering from a complete absence of intelligence or the power to discern at
the time of the commission of the crime.

Furthermore, appellant's act of treachery, that is by employing means and methods to ensure the killing of
Francisco without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make, as well as his
subsequent reaction of immediately fleeing after his commission of the crime and, thereafter, evading arrest, is
not the product of a completely aberrant mind. In other words, evidence points to the fact that appellant was not
suffering from insanity immediately before, simultaneous to, and even right after the commission of the crime.

In his Supplemental Brief, appellant cites the "Durham Rule" which was used in criminal courts in the United
States of America. This rule postulated that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
result of a mental disease or defect at the time of the incident.29 However, in subsequent rulings, US Federal
Courts and State Courts, even by the court which originally adopted it, rejected and abandoned this rule for
being too broad and for lacking a clear legal standard for criminal responsibility. 30 As earlier discussed, in the
Philippines, the courts have established a clearer and more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it
is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will.31 Thus, appellant's reliance on the Durham Rule is
misplaced and, thus, may not be given credit.

Having been shown beyond doubt that the prosecution was able to prove with certainty all the elements of the
crime charged, the Court will now proceed to determine the correctness of the penalty and the civil liabilities
imposed upon appellant.

As to the penalty, the crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, with reclusion perpetua to death. As to the alleged aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation, this Court has ruled that for it to be considered as an aggravating
circumstance, the prosecution must prove (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an
act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (c) a sufficient lapse of time
between the detennination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow
his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.32 In the instant case, no proof has been adduced to
establish that appellant had previously planned the killing of Francisco. There is no evidence when and how he
planned and prepared for the same, nor was there a showing that sufficient time had lapsed between his
determination and execution. In this respect, the Court quotes with approval the disquisition of the CA, to wit:

The circumstances that transpired immediately before and after the stabbing negate evident premeditation. The
time when accused-appellant conceived the crime cannot be determined. Even assuming that there was an
altercation that arose between the accused-appellant and the victim due to the remarks made by the former to
the latter, this is not the overt act indicative of his criminal intent. Simply put, the prosecution failed to establish
that there was a sufficient lapse of time for accused-appellant to reflect on his decision to kill the victim and the
actual execution thereof. 33

Thus, the RTC and the CA are correct in not considering the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.

The Court likewise agrees with the RTC and the CA in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and voluntary plea of guilt on the part of appellant.

With respect to the alleged mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of Francisco, the rule is
that, as a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim
adequate enough to ~xcite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity.34 In the
present case, appellant asserts that several days before he stabbed the victim, the latter teased appellant to be
"gay" and taunted him that the girl whom appellant courted rejected him. However, the Court finds no cogent
reason to depart from the ruling of the RTC on this matter, to wit:

For sufficient provocation under Article 13, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines to apply,
three requisites must be present:

a) provocation must be sufficient;

b) it must be immediate to the commission of the crime; and

c) it must originate from the offended party.

"Sufficient" according to jurisprudence means adequate to excite a person to commit the crime and must
accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. In Bautista v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-46025, September 2,
1992], the mitigating circumstance did not apply since it is not enough that the provocating act be unreasonable
or annoying. Certainly, calling a person gay as in this case is not the sufficient provocation contemplated by law
that would lessen the liability of the accused.

"Immediate" on the other hand means that there is no interval of time between the provocation and the
commission of the crime. Hence, in one case [People v. Co, 67 O.G. 7451] the Supreme Court ruled that
provocation occurring more than one hour before the stabbing incident is not immediate and in People v. Benito
[62 SCRA 351] 24 hours before the commission of the crime. Per admission of the defense witnesses, the
taunting done by the victim occurred days before the stabbing incident hence the immediacy required by law
was absent. The lapse of time would have given the accused [chance] to contemplate and to recover his serenity
enough to refrain from pushing through with his evil plan. 35

Anent the supposed voluntary plea of guilt on appellant's part, it is settled that a plea of guilty made after
arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating
circumstance.36 Again, the Court quotes with approval the RTC's disquisition, thus:

The second mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilt. claimed by the accused could likewise not be
considered.1âwphi1 The voluntary plea of guilt entered by the accused is not spontaneous because it was made
after his arraignment and only to support his claim of the exempting circumstance of insanity. The voluntary
plea of guilt required by law is one that is made by the accused in cognizance of the grievous wrong he has
committed and must be done as an act of repentance and respect for the law. It is mitigating because it indicated
a moral disposition in the accused favorable to his reform. It may be recalled that accused in the case at bar did
not change his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty". In a last ditch effort to elude liability, however, accused
claimed the defense of admitting the act of [stabbing].37

The Court, however, agrees with the CA in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of illness as would
diminish the exercise of willpower of appellant without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his
acts, pursuant to Article 13, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the RPC, as he was found by his examining doctors to have
"diminish[ ed] capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the crime."38 Thus,
on the basis of the foregoing, appellant was correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably
with Article 63, paragraph 3 of the RPC.

With respect to appellant's civil liability, the prevailing rule is that when the circumstances surrounding the
crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, as in
this case, the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.39
In conformity with the foregoing rule, the awards granted by the lower courts must, therefore, be modified.
Thus, the award of moral damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Appellant should also
pay the victim's heirs exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00. The award of ₱75,000.00, as civil
indemnity, is sustained.

As regards the trial court's award of actual damages in the amount of P30,000.00, the same must, likewise, be
modified. The settled rule is that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than
the sum allowed by the Court as temperate damages, 40 the award of temperate damages is justified in lieu of
actual damages which is of a lesser amount.41 Conversely, ifthe amount of actual damages proven exceeds,
then temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages based on the receipts presented during trial
should instead be granted.42 The rationale for this rule is that it would be anomalous and unfair for the victim's
heirs, who tried and succeeded in presenting receipts and other evidence to prove actual damages, to receive an
amount which is less than that given as temperate damages to those who are not able to present any evidence at
all.43 In the present case, Francisco's heirs were able to prove, and were awarded, actual damages in the amount
of ₱30,000.00. Since, prevailing jurisprudence now fixes the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages in
murder cases, the Court finds it proper to award temperate damages to Francisco's heirs, in lieu of actual
damages.

The imposition of six percent (6%) interest per annum on all damages awarded from the time of finality of this
decision until fully paid, as well as the payment of costs, is likewise sustained.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 27, 2015, in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, finding accused-appellant Roger Racal @ Rambo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder, with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) The award of moral damages is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00);

(2) Accused-appellant is DIRECTED TO PAY the heirs of the victim Jose "Joe" Francisco exemplary
damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00); and (3) The award of actual damages is
DELETED and, in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) is
awarded to the heirs of the victim.
G.R. No. 102984 June 30, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RUBEN TAKBOBO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Domingo A. Uy for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

The nuptial vows which solemnly intone the matrimonial promise of love "(f)or better or for worse, for richer or
for poorer, in sickness and in health, till death do us part," are sometimes easier said than done, for many a
marital union figuratively ends on the reefs of matrimonial shoals. In the case now before us for appellate
review, the marriage literally ended under circumstances which the criminal law, disdainful of romanticism,
bluntly calls the felony of parricide.

Accused-appellant Ruben Takbobo, a middle-aged fisherman, was charged with the killing of his wife in
Criminal Case No. CBU-21961 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8, in an information
which alleges that on or about 11:00 P.M. on March 25, 1991, in Barangay Guiwanon, Ginatilan, Cebu, said
appellant, who was the husband of Lucia Takbobo, hacked and stabbed the latter with a knife and bolo, thereby
inflicting upon her multiple fatal hack and stab wounds which resulted in her instantaneous death.1

Appellant entered a plea of guilty at his arraignment,2 but, considering the gravity of the offense, the lower
court ordered both the prosecution and the defense to submit evidence in order to determine the motive of
appellant and the circumstances surrounding the killing of his wife,3 a course of procedure repeatedly enjoined
in our previous decisions and now enshrined in Sections 3 and 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

On October 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty as charged, imposing upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P50,000.00, as well as to pay the costs.4

The evidence of record shows that appellant Ruben Takbobo and Lucia P. Takbobo were married in 1969. They
had nine children, one of whom is already dead.5 The couple, together with their youngest daughter, 6-year old
Madilyn, and a nephew were residing at Barangay Guiwanon, Ginatilan, Cebu when the fatal incident
happened. The other Takbobo children were staying with a certain David Manus since, according to the sworn
statement of their daughter, Marybel, "they were afraid of their father."6

On the night of March 25, 1991, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, young Madilyn was awakened by noise
caused by a quarrel between her parents. She claimed that she thereafter witnessed the entire incident that
transpired. This is how she testified at the preliminary investigation conducted by the 11th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Malabuyoc-Ginatilan-Algeria:
COURT

Q Madilyn, do you know that if you will not tell the truth you will commit a sin?

A Yes.

Q And now you are ready to tell the truth?

A Yes.

Q If you will not tell the truth you will commit a sin?

A Yes.

Q If you will commit a sin you will be in hell?

A Yes.

Q On March 25, 1991, can you still remember who was your companion while you were sleeping?

A Dodong Gamay, Mama Lucia and Papa Ruben.

Q While you were sleeping were you able to wake up?

A Yes.

Q What was the reason why you woke up at that time?

A I cannot sleep anymore because it was noisy.

Q What was the reason that (sic) it was noisy (sic) at that time?

A They were quarreling.

Q What were they quarreling about?

A Because he was not able to pay at (sic) Danilo.

Q At that time that they were quarreling, what did your father get?

A A hunting (knife) and a bolo.

Q What did your father do with the hunting (knife) and the bolo?

A He hacked Mama at the feet.

Q What else?

A On the neck. (Witness pointing to her neck.)

Q What else?
A On the hands, on the armpit, on the breast and the other breast was sliced.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q In the following morning, what happened to your mother?

A She was already dead.

Q And on the following morning your father was no longer there?

A No more.

Q You said that your father stabbed your mother with a hunting (knife), where did your father get the said
hunting knife?

A From the cabinet.

Q And you saw your father g(e)t the hunting knife from the cabinet?

A Yes. 7

Shortly after the incident, appellant went to the police authorities and told them about the same. The following
day, March 26, 1991, he was investigated by Pfc. Alfredo Cavalina of the Office of the Station Commander,
Philippine National Police (PNP) at Ginatilan, Cebu for having killed his wife. During that investigation,
Reynaldo Singco, also a policeman, was then present and listening about three (3) meters away from them,
Singco, testifying for the prosecution, declared that he did not hear appellant state the reason why he killed his
wife, and neither did appellant mention that he came from fishing that night.8

Appellant appears to have had a propensity for inexplicable resort to violence against the members of his
family. Irene Takbobo, a 16-year old daughter of appellant, testified before the trial court that on one occasion
before her mother's death, and apparently for no reason, one of her fingers was cut and the third finger of her
older sister was split by a bolo wielded by her father, thus: "Suddenly, he hacked us and I was hit, and I was
able to cover my head so it was my head he strike (sic) and I parried, that is the reason why my finger was
cut."9

Appellant, on the other hand, would like to impress upon the Court that he killed his wife because he caught her
sleeping with another man. This version of the defense is repeated in appellant's brief as follows:

. . . At about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of March 25, 1991 while he just arrived home from a sea fishing
activity, he was surprised when, upon opening their door, he saw his wife sleeping with another man, who
happened to be their neighbor, Cadiz Catulong. He tried to kill him by stabbing him but his wife pushed the
man who then immediately jumped out of the window. As a result, his wife was hit by his thrust. He then found
out that his wife had no panty. He tried to look for Cadiz Catulong but failed to find him. He immediately
related the incident to the police though he was not able to execute his affidavit as he was then very confused.
10

Correspondingly, in his aforesaid brief, the trial court's decision is impugned by appellant for not having
appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, voluntary surrender and
voluntary plea of guilty. 11
We have conducted a thorough and careful study of the records of this case and we find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and conclusions of the court below. Appellant admits the killing of his wife but contends
that his act was justified since he surprised his wife in a compromising situation with a neighbor, one Cadiz
Catulong. He would, therefore, avail of the specific extenuating circumstance 12 provided for and applicable
only under the situations contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. This contention of the
appellant does not engender credence. His lone testimony, without any other evidence to prove his claim, will
not tilt the scales of justice in his favor.

The exceptional circumstance contemplated in Article 247, just like any circumstance which may either absolve
or exempt an accused from liability or modify his penalty, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Having admitted the killing of his wife, the onus probandi has shifted to appellant to establish that he did so
while his wife was in sexual congress with another person, either while his wife was in sexual congress with
another person, either while they were in flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter. On this score, appellant
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the supposed weakness of that for the prosecution.

In the instant case, there was failure of the defense to prove the alleged discovery of the sexual act between the
victim and Cadiz Catulong. Nowhere in the records of this case do we find any basis for doubting the
testimonies of child witnesses have long been matters of favorable judicial experience. 13 The alleged
adulterous interlude was not proven. On the contrary, the uncorroborated testimony of appellant that his wife
committed the ultimate act of infidelity is contradicted by the facts established in this case, hence his bare
protestations are unavailing.

Furthermore, appellant gave inconsistent answers on the witness stand which cannot but cast a cloud of serious
doubt on his story, to say the least. Initially he declared:

COURT

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q What was (your) wife doing before the killing?

A My wife was sleeping with another man, I just arrived from fishing.

Q You are sure about that?

A Yes, sir, the man in fact jumped out the window.

Q Before you went up the house, he jumped?

A I observed. 14

Then, in a later part of his testimony, when asked by the lower court what he saw upon his arrival from the sea,
he gave a completely different answer:

COURT

Q What was the man doing?

A The man was already putting on his pants, they have already finished the carnal act. 15
Appellant likewise claimed that "(his) purpose was to kill the man but she pushed the man and my wife was
killed. 16 He accordingly wants it to appear that he had no intention of killing his wife. However, the physical
evidence, as represented by the pictures taken of the deceased victim, 17 disclose that she was killed with the
multiple stab wounds. The manner of infliction and the number of physical injuries negate the claim of
appellant that he did not intend to kill his wife.

Appellant adamantly insisted in his testimony before the lower court, and also in his brief, that his wife had no
panties on the night he allegedly saw her with another man. 18 However, on a closer examination of the pictures
marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" for the prosecution, we can not entirely believe the claim of the defense, since
two of the exhibits 19 contradict such contention. The records do not show nor has appellant essayed any
explanation why in those two exhibits the deceased was apparently wearing her panties.

Finally, from the testimony of Pat. Reynaldo Singco, which the trial court took pains to quote in its decision, 20
during the custodial investigation appellant never mentioned that he surprised his wife in the act of infidelity or
that, on that occasion, Catulong was present or was inside their house or, for that matter, anywhere in the
vicinity thereof. If it was true that there was really a man inside the house of appellant, the normal human
reaction would be to tell that fact to the police right after the stabbing incident when appellant went to the PNP
station and/or during the investigation thereafter.

On the issue of whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of passion
and obfuscation, voluntary surrender any voluntary plea of guilty, we agree with appellant and the Solicitor
General that the crime was attended by the last two mitigating circumstances. The records of the case confirm
the compliance by appellant with the requisites for the appreciation of voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of
guilty. Both appellant and appellee concur on these particular points. Appellant indeed voluntarily surrendered
himself to agents of a person in authority before his arrest could be effected. He likewise admitted his guilt in
open court prior to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution.

With respect to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, however, it should be noted that the
following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity.
21

In the case at bar, the trial court did not agree with the submission of the defense on this matter. We have earlier
discussed that appellant was not able to prove by convincing evidence that he saw his wife sleeping with
another man. Hence, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, that allegation of appellant "is a
afterthought to lessen his liability," 22 and that what appears is that appellant killed his wife because "he was
not in his right mind." 23 Appellant cannot, therefore, be credited with this mitigating circumstance.

Notwithstanding the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, we do not
agree with the argument of appellant and, surprisingly, the recommendation of the Solicitor General to reduce
the penalty to reclusion temporal. This would patently run counter to the rules for the application of invisible
penalties under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the petinent portions of which provide:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—

xxx xxx xxx

In all cases in which the law precribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall
be observed in the application thereof:

xxx xxx xxx

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The trial court correctly found the accused guilty of parricide as charged in the information. Article 246 defines
the crime of parricide and imposes thereof the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Article 63,
when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the penalty cannot be lowered by one degree, no
matter how many mitigating circumstances are present. What obviously misled the parties in this case is that
they overlooked the fact that the so-called special ** mitigating circumstance that they rely on, that is, when
there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance the court shall impose the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, is found in paragraph 5 of Article 6 4, which, as its epigraph
shows, provides the "(r)ules for the application of penalties which contain three periods," meaning, divisible
penalties. The inapplicability thereof to the present case has long been settled.

In a number of cases, 24 we have held that when there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance but the imposable penalties are indivisible in nature, the court cannot proceed by
analogy with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article 64 and impose the penalty lower by one degree. Thus, in a
parricide case, 25 the trial court imposed the penalty next lower, which is reclusion temporal, applying
paragraph 5 of Article 64 since the crime was attended by two mitigating circumstances without any
aggravating circumstance. In reversing the decision of the lower court, we ruled that the penalty imposed was
not correct since the rule applicable in said case is found in Article 63, and not in Article 64, of the Code.

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing considerations demostrative of the lack of merit of the instant appeal, the
assailed judgment of the court a quo id hereby AFFIRMED.

July 26, 2017

G.R. No. 210615

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ABENIR BRUSOLA y BARAGWA, Accused-Appellants

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

There is never any justification for a husband to hit his wife with a maso (mallet).

This resolves the appeal1 of the Court of Appeals' July 17, 2013 Decision,2 affirming the February 4, 2010
Decision3 of Branch 206, Regional Trial Court, Muntinlupa City, which found Abenir Brusola (Abenir) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the children of the deceased the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.4

In the Information dated July 14, 2006, accused-appellant Abenir was charged with the killing of his wife, Delia
Brusola (Delia), as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of July 2006, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the husband of complainant DELIA BRUSOLA y
RAMILO, now deceased, with intent to kill and with the use of ball hammer (maso), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit his said wife, DELIA BRUSOLA y RAMILO with the said ball
hammer on her head, thereby causing fatal injury to the latter which directly caused her death.

Contrary to Law.5

On August 1, 2006, accused-appellant Abenir was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. After pre-trial, trial on the
merits ensued.6

The prosecution's version of the events was as follows:

Abenir and Delia's children, Joanne, Abegail, and Kristofer,7 testified that they, together with their parents and
other sister Jessica, were at home on July 12, 2006, at around 6:45 p.m. Their house was a one (1)-storey
building and had an open sala, a kitchen, and one (I) bedroom. Kristofer was asleep in the bedroom. Joanne was
eating with her back turned to her father, who was preparing for work. Jessica, Abegail, and Delia were
watching the television, with Delia seated on the floor near the toilet. Joanne would occasionally glance at her
father and noticed that he seemed restless. Suddenly, Joanne saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso. A
second blow hit the cement wall. Joanne yelled, "Tay!" and tried to pacify Abenir, asking why he did it. Abenir
said he saw a man in the bathroom with Delia. Joanne looked in the bathroom but saw no one. Kristofer was
awoken. When he emerged from the bedroom, he saw his father still holding the maso while his sisters Joanne
and Abigail were attending to Delia, who was on the floor and had blood on her head. Kristofer held Abenir.
Delia was rushed to the hospital by their neighbors. Joanne lost consciousness but arose when their neighbors
massaged her head. Abenir was brought to the police station. The next day, their neighbor Joy Tabamo
informed the Brusola siblings that Delia had passed away.8 Dr. Joseph Palmero, a medico-legal officer of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, testified on the cause of Delia's death.9

The defense's version of the events, as testified by Abenir, is as follows:

Abenir worked in Saudi Arabia as a mason, a steel man, and a pipe fitter from 1986 until he returned in 1992,
when his sister informed him that Delia had a paramour. He and his family lived in Muntinlupa City while he
worked for the Makati Development Corporation until 2001, when he moved them to Batangas where Delia's
family could take care of them, considering that he was often at work. Sometime in September 2002, at around
2:00 a.m., he was on his way to their house in Batangas when he saw his brother-in- law on the road. When his
brother-in-law saw him, he ran inside Abenir's house and re-emerged with a shirtless man. When Abenir went
inside, he asked Delia why she was still awake and who the shirtless man was. Delia just nagged him so he slept
as he was very tired. The following day, he went to the store, and some men mocked him. Abenir later asked
Delia about the shirtless man again. Delia responded by throwing a glass at him. Thus, Abenir went back to
Alabang in 2006 to avoid mockery and a fight with his brother-in-law.10

On the night of July 12, 2006, Abenir came home at around 7:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m. Two (2) of his children were
asleep and one (1) was watching the television. While Abenir was preparing things, Delia went outside. She
appeared to be waiting for somebody. After taking a bath, she fixed her face. When Abenir asked if Delia was
going somewhere, she said it was none of his business. Abenir went to the bathroom for his personal effects.
While inside, he heard people talking outside and looked out through a crack in the plywood wall. He saw a
man and a woman kiss and identified the woman as Delia, who told the man, "Huwag muna ngayon, nandiyan
pa siya." The man embraced her, and groped her breast and private parts. Abenir picked up the maso, went
outside, and approached them, who were surprised to see him. Abenir attacked the man who used Delia as a
shield and pushed her toward Abenir, causing them to stumble on the ground. Delia went inside while Abenir
chased the man. After a failed pursuit, he returned to the house where Joanne hugged him and inquired what
happened. Abenir answered that Delia was having an affair. He noticed that Kristofer was carrying Delia whose
head was bleeding. He instructed his children to take her to the hospital. He informed Joanne that he would
surrender and asked his children to call the barangay officials and the police. He voluntarily went with the
officers to the police station where he learned that Delia was hit on the head. He asserted that he planned to
attack the man whom he saw was with his wife but accidentally hit Delia instead.11

In the Decision12 dated February 4, 2010, the trial court found Abenir guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. The dispositive portion read:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Abenir Brusola y Baragwa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused is likewise ordered to pay the children of the
deceased, Delia Brusola y Ramilo, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with the period of his preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.13

Abenir appealed the trial court Decision to the Court of Appeals.14 He argued that there was inconsistency
between the testimonies of Joanne and Abegail.15 Moreover, Joanne, the prosecution's lone eyewitness to the
attack, purportedly had ill motive against him since he had opposed her plans of early marriage.16 Further, in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the trial court did not consider the mitigating circumstances of
passion, obfuscation, and voluntary surrender.17

The Court of Appeals found no merit in Abenir's arguments. Thus, in the Decision18 dated July 17, 2013, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision, dated February 4, 2010, of the Regional Trial Comt
of Muntinlupa City, Branch 206, in Criminal Case No. 06-650, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.19

Abenir filed a Notice of Appeal. In compliance with its Resolution20 dated August 23, 2013 which gave due
course to accused-appellant Abenir's notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals elevated the records of this case to
this Court. In the Resolution21 dated March 10, 2014, this Court directed both the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Public Attorney's Office to file their respective supplemental briefs. Both parties filed their
respective manifestations that they would not be filing supplemental briefs.22

After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, this Court resolves to dismiss accused-
appellant Abenir's appeal for failing to show reversible error in the assailed decision.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The trial court appreciated the evidence presented by the parties, considered the credibility of their respective
witnesses, and found that all the elements of the crime of parricide were sufficiently proved by the prosecution.
There was no dispute as to the relationship between the accused-appellant and the victim.23 As for the act of
killing, the trial court held:

With respect to the killing by the accused of his wife, their daughter Joanne clearly testified that she suddenly
saw her father hit the head of her mother with a small mallet. Joanne's straightforward and candid narration of
the incident is regarded as positive and credible evidence, sufficient to convict the accused. Well settled is the
rule that it is unnatural for a relative, in this case the accused's own child, who is interested in vindicating the
crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her to do so is to let the guilty go free. Where
there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive
declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.24 (Citations omitted)

Thus, this Court quotes with approval the Court of Appeals' Decision:

It is hornbook doctrine that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to the highest respect. Having seen and heard the witnesses and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying, the trial court is deemed to have been in a better position to weigh the evidence. The reason for this is
that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. Thus, the trial court's evaluation shall be binding on the
appellate court unless it is shown that certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied. There is no reason to deviate from the rule.

The alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of Joanne and Abigail does not affect the credibility of either
witness. What Abigail [and] Joanne were actually doing at the precise moment that appellant struck his wife
with a maso is absolutely insignificant and unsubstantial to merit consideration . . . Inconsistencies that refer
only to minor details do not weaken the credibility of witnesses but are rather signs that the witnesses were not
rehearsed.

What is important is that the prosecution witnesses were consistent on the principal occurrence and the identity
of the accused. Thus, Joanne narrated in a direct and forthright manner how she saw appellant hit her mother
with a maso on the head and her testimony is supported by the physical evidence of the injury sustained by the
victim. While Abigail and Kristofer did not actually see appellant in the act of hitting their mother, nevertheless,
they saw appellant holding the murder weapon and their mother fallen on the floor with a bloodied head
immediately after the criminal act was committed ...

The alleged ill motive of Joanne is hardly worthy of consideration and belief. Joanne and her siblings had lost
their mother and they also stood to lose their father to prison, leaving them virtual orphans. Assuming that
appellant had previously disapproved of Joanne's early marriage, such would not have been a sufficient motive
for her to wrongly accuse her own father of a heinous crime ...25 (Citations omitted)

Moreover, the trial court properly sentenced accused-appellant Abenir to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. As
appreciated by the Court of Appeals, where there are mitigating circumstances in a parricide case, the proper
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.26 In People v. Sales,27 this Court explained:

As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death . . . the presence of only one
mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the
imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in
part as follows:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.

-...

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules
shall be observed in the application thereof:

....

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

....

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one
mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.28 (Citation
omitted)

Accused-appellant Abenir cited People v. Genosa29 to support the imposition of a lower penalty in light of the
mitigating circumstance.30 True, this Court in Genosa applied Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, instead of
Article 63, to determine the penalty for parricide:

The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the
commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5
of the same Code. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two
mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other
modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense. Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -
prision mayor - and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.

Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already
served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole.31 (Citations
omitted)

However, there is no basis to apply Article 64 to the crime of parricide. Articles 63 and 64 of the Revised Penal
Code provide:

Article 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules
shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty
shall be applied.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall
reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of
applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

Article 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods. - In cases in which the
penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three
different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the
courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are
not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by
law in its medium period.

2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in
its minimum period.

3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty
in its maximum period.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of
one class against the other according to their relative weight.

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court
shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable,
according to the number and nature of such circumstances.

6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a
greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.

7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number
and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced
by the crime.

Considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties-reclusion perpetua to death-
Rule 63, and not Rule 64, is applicable. Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.

In line with current jurisprudence,32 the civil indemnity and the moral damages awarded to the victim's children
are increased to ₱75,000.00 each and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages is added.

The promise of forever is not an authority for the other to own one's spouse. If anything, it is an obligation to
love and cherish despite his or her imperfections. To be driven to anger, rage, or murder due to jealousy is not a
manifestation of this sacred understanding. One who professes love should act better than this. The accused-
appellant was never entitled to hurt, maim, or kill his spouse, no matter the reasons. He committed a crime. He
must suffer its consequences.

WHEREFORE, this Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals in its
July 17, 2013 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04419. Accused-appellant Abenir Brusola y Baragwa is
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
heirs of the victim are entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00
as exemplary damages. The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.

G.R. No. 133438            January 16, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WILSON LAB-EO, accused-appellant.

CARPIO, J.:

An Information to be sufficient must contain all the elements required by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. In
the crime of murder, the qualifying circumstance raising the killing to the category of murder must be
specifically alleged in the Information. The Information is sufficient as long as the qualifying circumstance is
recited in the Information, regardless of whether designated as aggravating or qualifying, or whether written
separately in another paragraph or lumped together with the general averments in a single paragraph.

The Case

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 35,
Bontoc, Mountain Province, convicting the appellant Wilson Lab-eo of the crime of murder. The appellant
postulates that he should only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide.

The Charge

The appellant was indicted for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No.
7659, under the following Information2 :

"That on or about October 21, 1996, at the Barangay Hall, Poblacion, Tadian, Mountain Province, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and with the
use of a sharp knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike and
stab Segundina Cay-no with a well-honed and pointed knife and thereby inflicting a mortal stab wound
upon the victim as reflected in that medico-legal certificate, to wit:

Stab wound infrascapular area left, penetrating with massive hemathorax, which caused the death of the
victim thereafter.

That the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength and
craft attended the commission of the offense.

Contrary to law."
 Arraignment and Plea

When arraigned on June 19, 1997, the appellant, duly assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The Trial

The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the following: (1) Nancy Gaoan, Julie Dang-la and Nelson
Apyoten, eyewitnesses to the actual stabbing of Segundina Cay-no; (2) Jerry Cay-no, son of the deceased; (3)
Police Officers Leonardo Cea and Angelito Beddy who were in-charge of the investigation of the stabbing
incident; and (4) Drs. Elizabeth Tican and Milagros Inhumang, the attending physicians at the Luis Hora
Memorial Hospital where the deceased was brought. For its part, the defense presented the appellant himself as
well as Inspector Eleuterio Camtugan and Mrs. Gantula Latap, as witnesses.

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the facts of the prosecution as follows:

"Segundina Cayno was engaged in the business of selling rummage goods. Early in the morning of
October 21, 1996, her son, Jerry Cayno, went to the "dap-ayan" or barangay hall, in front of the Tadian
Public Market at Tadian, Mountain Province, to display the goods for sale while his mother was still at
their boarding house. After displaying the goods, Segundina arrived and took over while he proceeded to
their new boarding house to do some cleaning (TSN, July 16, 1997, pp. 3-15, 28).

At about 9 o'clock that morning, Nancy Gaoan and Julie Dangla went to see Segundina to be massaged
by the latter ("hilot") (TSN, July 16, 1997, p. 3; TSN, July 29, 1997, p. 68).

At about 11:20 a.m., Nelson Apyoten arrived in order to wait for a ride going to Masla. He saw Nancy
and Segundina and sat with them while waiting for his ride (TSN, July 30, 1997, pp. 2-4).

Before noontime, while Nancy and Julie were plucking the white hair strands of Segundina, appellant
Wilson Lab-eo arrived and approached his aunt, Segundina. Upon seeing him, Nancy went to a distance
of about 2 meters while Julie was still near Segundina. Appellant sat down in front of his aunt and
uttered something to her in a very soft voice. Nancy did not hear what he said because of her distance
from them while Julie could not make out the conversation because of the sound coming from a running
motor engine. What they only heard was Segundina's answer which was uttered in a loud angry voice
"koma-an ka tay baka mahigh bloodac" ("you get out because I might suffer high blood). They saw
appellant leave (TSN, July 16, 1997, pp. 8-9, 16, 19; TSN, July 29, 1997, pp. 72, 78-79).

When appellant left, Nancy and Julie were looking at some of the clothes being sold by Segundina
(TSN, July 29, 1997, p. 72).1âwphi1.nêt

In the meantime, appellant proceeded to the market place, which was just about 5 meters away. Thereat,
he saw at the butcher's shop of a certain Gaskiw, a 15-inch knife with a 9-inch blade with a width of 1
inch at its widest and 1 cm. at its point. He took it and right away returned to the "dap-ayan" (TSN,
September 11, 1997, p. 4).

When appellant returned about 3-5 minutes after, Segundina was sitting on a low rattan stool. In front of
her were Nancy and Julie, as she was showing to them how to repair and put garter on the pants Nancy
had bought for her child. Engrossed, they did not notice appellant's return, especially Segundina who
had her back to appellant. When Julie saw appellant approach Segundina from the back, Julie thought
that he would just box his aunt because she did not see the knife, which was wrapped in his blue jacket.
 Then appellant suddenly made a thrusting motion and he stabbed Segundina on the left portion of her
back. He then ran away leaving the knife at the victim's back with the jacket he had covered it with,
hanging by the knife's handle. The entire length of the knife's 9-inch blade had penetrated the victim's
body. Upon seeing that Segundina was stabbed, Julie removed the knife with the jacket from the victim's
back and placed them down on the pavement while Nancy, Nelson and the other people who saw the
incident shouted for help (TSN, July 16, 1997, pp. 4, 6-8, 11, 20, 24-26; TSN, July 29, 1997, pp. 72, 76,
80-81, 83-84; TSN, July 30, 1997, pp. 5-6, 21).

Seeing that appellant had ran in the direction of the Municipal Hall, Nelson, together with one Mario
Talicwad, and some other people, went after him to find out if he was going to the police station. They
saw him enter the office of Inspector Leonardo Cea, the then Chief of Police of Tadian Police Station.
Upon his surrender, the police authorities took custody of him. The fact of his surrender was entered in
the police blotter as Entry # 21, page 86. Because of the report of the stabbing incident, Police Officer
Angelito Beddy proceeded to the crime scene. Thereat, he recovered the knife wrapped with the jacket,
which bore a hole as the knife pierced it (TSN, July 30, 1997, p. 6; TSN, July 29, 1997, p. 58, 60-64;
TSN, September 9, 1997, pp. 1-2; TSN, July 17, 1997, pp. 42-44).

In the meantime, Julie had ran towards the boarding house where Segundina was staying and she
informed the latter's son, Jerry, of what happened to his mother. When they returned to the "dap-ayan",
they saw Segundina aboard the Dolidoan Trans enroute to the Luis Hora Memorial Hospital in Abatan,
Bauko, Mountain Province. Hence, Jerry, along with Nelson and some other people, packed the dry
goods Segundina was selling and thereafter followed his mother to the hospital (TSN, July 16, 1997, p.
29-30; TSN, July 29, 1997, p. 73; TSN, July 30, 1997, pp. 6-7; TSN, August 26, 1997, p. 99).

Upon her admission at the Luis Hora Hospital, she was attended by Dr. Milagros B. Inhumang. The
latter found that the victim had a 2.5 cm stab wound at her back, left scapula, which penetrated the left
lung. X-ray revealed that she had suffered massive bleeding in the thorax cavity. Before she could be
transferred to the Baguio General Hospital for more specialized treatment, Segundina died in the
morning of the following day (October 22, 1996). The cause of death was determined to be
"hypovolomic shock secondary to massive hemorrhage" (TSN, July 31, 1997, pp. 92-93; TSN, August
26, 1997, pp. 100-106)."3

Version of the Accused

The appellant does not deny stabbing Segundina Cay-no. However, he maintains that neither treachery nor
evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. The appellant contends that the crime committed
should only be homicide and not murder.

Stripped of the details that led to the actual stabbing of the deceased, the appellant's version of the incident is
similar to that of the prosecution. The appellant recounted the incident in this wise:

"Appellant Wilson Lab-eo testified that on October 21, 1996, at Dap-ayan, Tadian, Mountain Province,
he was teasing Segundina Cayno that he be her baggage boy of the clothes that she was vending.
Segundina got mad and berated herein accused in front of many people. She told accused to go away
because she does not want to see his face there. The accused felt so bad and left the place. Humiliated,
he returned to where Segundina was selling clothes and then and there stabbed her at the back with a
knife. Thereafter, he surrendered to the Chief of Police (TSN, Decision, pp. 5-6)."4

The Trial Court's Ruling

After evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, together with the object evidence presented, the trial court
found the appellant guilty of the crime of murder in its Decision5 dated January 16, 1998. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, the accused Wilson Lab-eo having been found guilty of the crime of Murder as
charged and defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code beyond reasonable
doubt, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim Segundina Cay-no in the amount of P50,000 in consonance with the current case law and
policy in death indemnity; to pay the victim the actual expenses that the said heirs incurred relative to
the death of the same victim in the total sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P125,500.00) PESOS, Philippine currency; and to pay the cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED."

The Issues

In this appeal, appellant Wilson Lab-eo asks this Court to declare him guilty of the crime of homicide instead of
murder as found by the lower court. The appellant assigns as errors the following:

I.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

MURDER.

II.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE QUALIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IS ATTENDANT IN THE CASE AT BAR.

III.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF PASSION AND OBFUSCATION AND SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

IV.

GRANTING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, THE

LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.6

The Court's Ruling

We affirm the conviction of appellant Wilson Lab-eo for the crime of murder.

In the first assigned error, the appellant faults the lower court for finding him guilty of murder even when the
Information, as written, could only have charged him with the crime of homicide. The appellant points out that
although the Information7 is captioned as murder, the allegations in the body of the Information are constitutive
only of the elements of the crime of homicide.

The Information, as written, consists of two paragraphs. The first paragraph contains the allegations of the date,
time, place, the acts constituting the offense, and the name of the victim. Written in a separate paragraph are the
"aggravating circumstances" of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength and craft, alleged as
attending the commission of the crime. The appellant insists that the circumstances enumerated in the second
paragraph should be considered merely as generic aggravating circumstances, not qualifying circumstances, for
two reasons. First, the circumstances are not part of the recital of facts constituting the offense as charged in the
first paragraph. Second, the circumstances are designated merely as generic aggravating circumstances.

The arguments of the appellant find no basis in law.

The Information was correctly captioned as one for murder since the Information actually recited the qualifying
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by RA No. 7659, provides:

"Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provision of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of Murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

xxx

5. With evident premeditation;

xxx." (Emphasis supplied)

The fact that the qualifying circumstances were recited in the second paragraph and not in the first paragraph of
the Information, as commonly done, is a matter of form or style for which the prosecution should not be faulted.
That the Provincial Prosecutor decided to write the Information differently did not impair its sufficiency.
Nothing in the law prohibits the prosecutor from adopting such a form or style. As long as the requirements of
the law are observed, the Information will pass judicial scrutiny.

The prosecution is correct in its argument that although the recital of facts constituting the crime charged was
contained in two separate paragraphs, the two must be "read in (their) entirety and not just truncated portions
thereof."8 The Information is not just the first, second or third paragraph of the prosecutor's sworn accusation
taken individually or separately, but all the allegations made therein taken together in their entirety.

The fact that the circumstances were described as "aggravating" instead of "qualifying" does not take the
Information out of the purview of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 248 does not use the word
"qualifying" or "aggravating" in enumerating the circumstances that raise a killing to the category of murder.
Article 248 merely refers to the enumerated circumstances as the "attendant circumstances." In the instant
case, the Information specifically alleges that evident premeditation, treachery, and abuse of superior strength
"attended the commission of the offense." This is more than sufficient to comply with the requirements of
Article 248. Well-settled is the rule that when evident premeditation, treachery, or abuse of superior strength is
present and alleged in the Information, it qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder.9

Moreover, there are four kinds of aggravating circumstances, namely: (1) generic or those that can generally
apply to all crimes; (2) specific or those that apply only to particular crimes; (3) qualifying or those that change
the nature of the crime; and (4) inherent or those that must of necessity accompany the commission of the
crime.10 Thus, except for scoffing at the victim's corpse, all the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code are also aggravating circumstances because they are likewise found in Article 14
of the same Code enumerating the aggravating circumstances.11
The rule on sufficiency of information is found in Section 6, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.12 This was the applicable rule at the time of the commission of the crime. Section 6 of Rule 110
states:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of Information - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information. (6a)

Under Section 6, the Information is sufficient if it contains the full name of the accused, the designation of the
offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the
approximate date, and the place of the offense. The Information in this case complied with these conditions.13
The Information included the specific allegation that the "aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
treachery, abuse of superior strength and craft attended the commission of the offense."14 With the allegation of
these aggravating circumstances, the first three of which qualify the killing to murder, the Information correctly
used murder as the proper designation given by law pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the
charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly.15 The rule is that qualifying circumstances must
be properly pleaded in the Information in order not to violate the accused's constitutional right to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.16 The purpose is to allow the accused to fully
prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial. Significantly, the appellant never claimed that he
was deprived of his right to be fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him because of the style or
form adopted in the Information.

The New Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, re-enacted verbatim Section 6,
Rule 110 of the old Rules on sufficiency of the Information. Sections 8 and 9, Rule 11017 of the new Rules,
moreover, now require that both the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in
the Information to be appreciated as such. Under the old Rules, only the qualifying circumstances were required
to be alleged in the Information, and aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged, could still be appreciated,
except in cases where an aggravating circumstance would result in the imposition of the death penalty.18 In any
event, even if Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the new Rules, which are more favorable to the accused, are applied
to this case, the Information for murder against the appellant would still remain sufficient and valid. Three of
the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code raising a killing to murder are
specifically alleged in the Information in this case, satisfying Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the new Rules.

On the second assigned error, the appellant argues that treachery was not employed in the stabbing of the
victim. However, the prosecution counters that treachery attended the commission of the crime because the
appellant stabbed the victim from behind, without warning and without an opportunity to defend herself.

We hold that treachery19 attended the stabbing of the victim Segundina Cay-no.

As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if he deliberately
adopted such mode of attack with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat.20

To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution which tend
directly and specially to insure the accomplishment of the crime without risk to the assailant arising from the
defense the victim might make; and (2) a deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution.21 When a
victim is unexpectedly attacked from behind, depriving him of any opportunity to defend himself, undeniably
there is alevosia.22 The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.23

In this case, the victim was stabbed, undoubtedly from behind. Dr. Milagros Inhumang, the physician who
attended to the victim at the time of the incident, testified that the wound inflicted on the victim was found at
the back, left side portion.24 The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses substantiate this medical finding. The
appellant was behind the victim when he stabbed her. Nancy Gaoan, a 26-year old farmer, resident of Kayan,
Tadian, Mountain Province, and an eyewitness to the stabbing of the victim, testified:

"Q.       While you were at the market on that day having hilot do you remember of any unusual incident
that happened?

A.       There is sir.

Q.       And what is that incident, madam witness?

A.       They stabbed Mrs. Segundina Cayno.

Q.       Who stabbed Mrs. Segundina Cayno?

A.       Wilson Labeo sir.

Q.       When Wilson Labeo stabbed Segundina Cayno, where were you?

A.       I was facing both of them.

Q.       And about how far were you from them?

A.       About one meter away.

Q.       And what part of the body of Segundina Cayno was stabbed?

A.       At her back sir.

Q.       You said that you were in front of Segundina Cayno when she was stabbed, where did this
Wilson Labeo come from?

A.       From the back of Mrs. Segundina Cayno.

Q.       And you said Madam Witness, that the accused Wilson Labeo stabbed Segundina Cayno at her
back, did you see with what weapon he stabbed Segundina Cayno?

A.       Knife, sir."25

Based on the foregoing, it was established that the appellant emerged from behind the victim when he stabbed
her. Furthermore, not only did the appellant deliberately attack from behind, he did it without any warning to
the victim. The appellant executed the assault in a manner that left the victim defenseless and without any
opportunity to even escape or flee, at the same time avoiding risk to himself from any defense the victim might
make.
The fact that the appellant used a very sharp butcher's knife, 15 inches long with a 9-inch blade,26 shows that
the appellant had chosen well his weapon of attack. The deadly nature of the weapon used, the traitorous
manner of the assault, and the location of the wound inflicted upon the victim, conjointly demonstrate a
deliberate and determined assault with intent to kill.27

We also affirm the lower court's finding that abuse of superior strength was absorbed in treachery.28

Likewise, the lower court correctly held that craft was absorbed in treachery as shown by the fact that the
appellant hid the knife under his jacket to prevent the victim from seeing it and from being alerted of an
impending assault. Craft may be absorbed in treachery if it is deliberately adopted as the means, method or form
for the treacherous strategy.29 It may co-exist independently from treachery only when both circumstances are
adopted for different purposes in the commission of the crime.30 In this case, craft could not be appreciated
independently from treachery because the appellant deliberately utilized it as a means of accomplishing his
treacherous plan. The appellant made sure that the knife he was carrying was totally unseen by the victim and
the people around her, thereby giving the victim no forewarning and leaving her utterly defenseless.

In his third assigned error, the appellant argues for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstances of passion
and obfuscation, as well as of sufficient provocation, in his favor. There is no justification for this.

In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following elements should
concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; (2) the act
which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.31

For a person to be motivated by passion and obfuscation, there must first exist an unlawful act that would
naturally produce an impulse sufficient to overcome reason and self-control.32 There is passional obfuscation
when the crime is committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper
acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.33 In asking the appellant to leave, the
victim did not do anything unlawful. There is an absolute lack of proof that the appellant was utterly humiliated
by the victim's utterance. Nor was it shown that the victim made that remark in an insulting and repugnant
manner. The victim's utterance was not the stimulus required by jurisprudence to be so overwhelming as to
overcome reason and self-restraint.

Neither was the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation by the victim proven. From the testimonies of
witnesses, it was shown that it was in fact the appellant who provoked the victim. All the witnesses testified that
when the appellant initially approached the victim, he said something to her that prompted the latter to raise her
voice at him.

Moreover, this Court has held that the provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to the
gravity of the retaliatory act.34 In People vs. Leonor35 , this Court rejected the plea of the accused that a push
and "bad words" justified retaliation with a knife, the provocation being insufficient to deserve the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance of prior provocation by the offended party.36 In this case, the victim merely shouted at
the appellant and asked him to leave. Stabbing her to death could hardly be proportionate in gravity to her act of
shouting, no matter how loud.

There is, however, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender duly proven during the trial which must
be considered in favor of the accused. It was established that shortly after the incident, the appellant went to the
municipal hall and surrendered to the authorities. This fact was admitted by Inspector Cea, Chief of Police of
the Tadian Police Station, to whom the appellant voluntarily surrendered on the day of the incident.37

Treachery attended the stabbing of Segundina Cay-no, thereby qualifying the killing to murder which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death38 . However, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, the lower of the two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua and death shall be meted out in
accordance with Article 6339 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, for the murder of Segundina Cay-no,
the appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

As his final assigned error, the appellant would also fault the lower court for its failure to apply to him the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.1âwphi1.nêt

The Indeterminate Sentence Law40 is not applicable in this case. Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
states that it shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. In the
case of People vs. Aquino41 , this Court held that the appellant could not avail of the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law because this law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua.

As civil indemnity for the death of Segundina Cay-no, the accused shall pay the amount of ₱50,000 to the
victim's heirs. Consistent with settled rule, the amount is awarded without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime42 and the consequent death of the victim.

An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of this Court
to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not.43
Therefore, we modify the award of ₱125,500.00 as actual damages made by the lower court and instead reduce
it to ₱82,500.00. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable.44 Since all
the receipts presented in evidence add up to only ₱82,500.00, then only this reduced amount shall be awarded.
We also award ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for the wounded feelings and moral shock45 of the heirs, as
testified to by Jerry Cay-no, son of the deceased.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision convicting WILSON LAB-EO of the crime of murder and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION
that appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Segundina Cay-no ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱82,500.00 as
actual damages, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

October 4, 2017

G.R. No. 203986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JERSON DASMARINAS y GONZALES,, Accused-Appellant

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

The failure of the information supposedly charging murder to aver the factual basis for the attendant
circumstance of treachery forbids the appreciation of the circumstance as qualifying the killing; hence, the
accused can only be found guilty of homicide. To merely state in the information that treachery was attendant is
not enough because the usage of such term is not a factual averment but a conclusion of law.

The Case

Under review is the decision promulgated on May 28, 2012,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04865 the judgment rendered on January 10, 2011 in Criminal Case No.
08-0168 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 255, in Las Piñas City (RTC) finding accused Jerson Dasmariñas
and Nino Polo guilty of murder as charged.2

Antecedents

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged Dasmariñas and Polo with murder, the accusatory
portion of the information dated January 25, 2008 being as follows:

That on or about the l 6th day of June 2007, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them
mutually helping and aiding each other without justifiable motive, with intent to kill and with treachery, abuse
of superior strength, and evident premiditation (sic), did then and there knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence upon one PO2 MARLON N. ANOYA, by then and there shooting
him twice on his head, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which directly caused her (sic) death.

The killing of the aforesaid victim is qualified by the circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and
evident premiditation (sic).

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Polo, when arraigned on April 1, 2008, entered a plea of not guilty. Dasmariñas also entered his plea of not
guilty on April 24, 2008.4 The Prosecution presented Aries Perias; the victim's widow, Lourdes Anoya; SPO I
Roland Abraham; and Dr. Voltaire Nulud as its witnessesin- chief. On the other hand, the Defense relied on
Erica Camille Pascua and Dasmariñas himself. On rebuttal, the Prosecution called Asst. City Prosecutor
Benthom Paul Azares, while the Defense recalled Dasmariñas on sur-rebuttal.5

The CA adopted the RTC's summation of the versions and evidence of the parties, to wit:

1. Mr. Perias

Mr. Perias, a sign art vendor, disclosed that in June 2007 he used to sell com in front of N arra Beerhouse. He
recalled that last 16 June 2007, at around 2:00 in the morning, he was beside the Sabnarra Beerhouse along
Naga Road, Las Pinas City which is near his residence. According to him, he saw victim P02 Marlon Anoya
who is known to him as he frequents (sic) the said place. As far as he knows, the said victim was already drunk
when he was in front of the beerhouse. At the time, there were other people most of whom were guest relations
officers (GROs). The victim left the place on board a motorcycle but he returned after around 15 minutes .
While the victim was standing in front of the beerhouse still drunk 2 men came from his right side and shot him.
He recognized one of the men as accused Dasmariñas while the other person was then wearing a cap. The
assailants then rode a jeep towards Zapote after shooting the victim. It was clarified by him that the victim was
approached at the back and shot on his head. To him it was accused Dasmariñas who shot the victim using a 9
mm gun. Also, the victim was shot twice at the back of the head and on the right side of his face. He recalled
that the victim fell down after being shot and his gun was being (sic) taken by the companion of the accused
Dasmariñas. It was recalled by him that the companion of the accused Dasmariñas was about 5'8" or 5'9" tall.
The victim was then brought by him and Capt. Alex Nase to the hospital but he was declared dead on arrival.
When he went to the San Juan City Jail he then saw the accused. Later on, it was Police Officer Abraham who
brought him to the Quezon City Jail where he identified accused Dasmariñas and pointed to him as the suspect
while behind a tinted glass. xxx

On cross-examination he mentioned that he first saw accused Dasmariñas during the time of the incident last 16
June 2007. At the time, he does not know the name of the said accused. He told the police about what he
witnessed on the said date. As such, there was a cartographic sketch of the accused Dasmariñas. Also, the
description he gave was that of the accused whom he described as about 5'6" tall, fair complexioned and has
short hair or semi-bald. He admitted that only accused Dasmariñas was presented to him at the Quezon City
Jail. While he was brought to the San Juan City jail in August 2007. It was only in December 2007 that he
executed his statement as he was afraid to give one. However, his conscience bothered him so he executed a
statement before police officer Abraham in the presence of the wife of the victim. He recalled that he was about
2 meters away from the crime scene and the black colored gun was fired with the barrel pointing towards him. x
x x6

Private complainant Anoya

In her testimony private complainant Anoya alleged that she is the wife of victim P02 Marlon Anoya per the
marriage certificate that she presented. According to her, the victim is already dead and he was shot last 16 June
2007 at Pulang Lupa, Las Pinas City. She mentioned that at around 2:30 in the morning of said date, a text
message was received by her from her cousin, Christopher Kanalis. At that time, she was told that her husband
was at the Las Pinas City District Hospital. As she did not believe the news, her cousin and her father went to
their house around 4:00 in the morning. When she was given the cellular phone and wallet of her husband she
then believed that the latter was already dead. On account thereof, she lost consciousness and eventually went to
the Funeraria Filipinas together with her relatives. She saw her husband with gunshot wounds on his head.
While the wake of the victim was at Funeraria Filipinas he was buried in Leyte last 27 June 2007. The remains
of her husband were brought to Leyte via Cebu Pacific after 3 days of wake at said funeral parlor. She spent
about ₱3,600.00 in transporting the remains of her husband. Also, the sum of ₱38,000.00 in expenses was
incurred by them at the Funeraria Filipinas. The 9 days wake at Leyte also cost them about ₱56,712.00. With
respect to the said expenses, she identified a summary that she prepared and the receipts on the above
transportation and funeral expenses. She mentioned that her husband was a police officer in Manila earning
about ₱14,000 a month. At the time of his death the victim was 33 years old. However, they did not have
children at the time of his death. She felt sad about the killing of her husband and has not yet recovered from his
death. To her, no amount can equal the pain she suffered due to the untimely demise of her husband. Still, she
asks (sic) the payment of ₱100,000.00 in damages for the death of the victim. She insisted that the accused shot
her husband as narrated by Mr. Perias. It was explained by him that Mr. Perias became known to her after he
was pointed to by the police investigator as a witness to the incident.

When cross-examined, she admitted that the circumstances of her husband's death were only relayed to her.
Also, the names of the accused were known to her from the investigator and the witness. Mr. Perias.7

The parties stipulated on the testimonies of SPO 1 Abraham and Dr. Nulud, which the trial court also
summarized as follows:

SPO 1 Abraham

In his stipulated testimony, it was determined that SPO l Abraham was the police officer who investigated the
complaint of private complainant Anoya regarding the death of her husband P02 Marlon Anoya pursuant to the
account given by Mr. Perias. As such, he prepared an Investigation Report dated 14 December 2007. However,
it was admitted that he has no personal knowledge about the shooting incident and the information that he
obtained were only relayed to him by some other person.8

Dr. Nulud

With his stipulated testimony it was shown that Dr. Nulud that he was the one who conducted an autopsy on the
body of victim P02 Marlon Anoya that resulted in Medico Legal Report No. N-308-07 being prepared by him.
Likewise, he prepared anatomical sketches and other documents regarding the autopsy that he did. Still, he did
not witness the incident resulting in the death of the victim. xxx"9

Accused Dasmariñas

Accused Dasmariñas denied killing victim PO2 Marlon Anoya together with accused Polo. According to him, at
around 9:00 in the evening last 15 June 2007 he was at the house of his live-in partner Erica Camille Pascua at
Vicencio Street, Barangay Sta. Lucia, San Juan. At that time, he came from the house of his mother Anna
Gonzales in San Juan where he was looking after his other siblings. He then slept around 10:00 in the evening
last 15 June 2007 and woke about 5:00 in the morning of 16 June 2007 since his live-in partner was going to her
school at Dominican College, San Juan. After bringing his live-in partner to school he went back to the house of
his mother to look after his siblings as his mother had to go to work as laundrywoman. He learned about the
herein case when police officers went to his house last 29 June 2007. However, he alleged that he was arrested
in connection with another case since a warrant was issued against him for robbery. He recalled being brought
to the Molave Detention Center in Quezon City and Las Pinas police authorities then took him to their station. It
was only then that he learned that he has a murder case filed against him. He met other accused Polo in court.
As far as he was concerned, there was no preliminary investigation regarding the herein case and no witness
was presented against him. Also, he was not charged before for murder and there is no reason why the instant
case should be filed against him.

On cross-examination, he mentioned that he has been a prisoner at the Quezon City Jail since 25 July 2007. He
denied his signatures in the minutes of the preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Las Pinas last 9 January 2008. It was insisted by him that he had nothing to do with herein case as he was
present at the place when the supposed killing of the victim happened. He could not recall when he was brought
to the Quezon City Jail. Instead, he pointed out that he was detained at the San Juan, Molave Detention Center
and Quezon City Jail. Mr. Perias then appeared at the Quezon City Jail whom he did not know at that time. To
him, he saw Mr. Perias only at the courtroom and he has no knowledge why he would testify against him.
Again, he pointed out that he met accused Polo only in court. What he knows is that accused Polo is a resident
of Mandaluyong City and he is detained thereat. It was reiterated by him that he was arrested by virtue of
warrant of arrest for robbery filed against him which is still pending. He confirmed that another case for
homicide was filed against him."10

Ms. Pascua

When she testified Ms. Pascua confirmed that accused Dasmariñas is her live-in partner. They live together with
her parents' house inside a compound. On the night of 15 June 2007 she alleged that she was with accused
Dasmariñas, 2 of her aunts Ria Salvador and Sally Salvador and her grandfather Carlos Salvador. She recalled
that they then slept at around 10:30 in the evening and she woke up at around 6:00 in the morning the following
day. It was the accused who woke her up and they then ate breakfast. It was pointed out by her that the accused
brought her to her school at around 8:00 in the morning. As far as she knows, the accused usually goes home to
their house to attend to his siblings at Barangay Rivera, San Juan which was only a ride away from their house.
The mother of the accused who is a laundrywoman usually leaves their house so the accused has to attend to his
siblings. Her classes then end by 3:00 in the afternoon so she is fetched by the accused. She denied that the
accused went to Las Pinas in the evening of 15 June 2007 as their gate was closed in the evening. Her
grandfather usually holds the key to their gate which is quite high. x x x
During her cross-examination, she mentioned that she was told that she will testify as a witness by the accused.
As such she was not reluctant in testifying for the accused. She insisted that in 2007 she was already in college
and her classes were held from 8:00 in the morning up to 3:00 in the afternoon. It was the accused who would
bring her to school and then fetch her later. The accused was not then working at that time and he used to be
employed with Mcdonald's restaurant for about 3 to 4 months. She alleged that Mr. Perias and accused Polo are
not known to her. As far as she was concerned they slept at around 10:00 in the evening last 15 June 2007.
Before testifying she was told about the case against the accused in Las Pinas City. Still, she did not execute a
statement regarding what she testified on although she has a handwritten statement that she prepared last 19
April 2009. The said statement was executed by her after being asked by the counsel for the accused.11

The Prosecution presented Asst. City Prosecutor Azares as a rebuttal witness, and his testimony was summed up
by the RTC, to wit:

Prosecutor Azares

Prosecutor Azares testified that he was the one who conducted a preliminary investigation regarding the case
against accused Dasmariñas. With respect thereto, he recalled sending out subpoenas. As such said accused
appeared during the scheduled investigation per the minutes for the same. He remembered the accused waiving
his right to submit a counter-affidavit. xxx

On cross-examination, he confirmed that there was no minutes involving accused Polo as he did not appear at
the scheduled investigation. Also, no more subpoena was issued to accused Polo since the subpoena earlier sent
to him was returned. As such, there was no preliminary investigation conducted on accused Polo.12

The Defense presented Dasmariñas on sur-rebuttal, and his testimony was encapsulated by the RTC thusly:

Accused Dasmariñas

Accused Dasmariñas insisted that he did not receive a subpoena from Prosecutor Azares for a preliminary
investigation last 09 January 2008. Also, he was not yet detained at the Quezon City Jail at that time and was
still free. The signature appearing in the subject minutes was denied by him as his. He then presented his
Certificate of Detention dated 12 October 2009 showing that he was detained on 25 July 2007. x x x13

After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment dated January 10, 2011,14 finding and pronouncing Dasmariñas
guilty of murder but acquitting Polo, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court finds accused Jerson Dasmariñas GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for shooting to death victim P02 Marlon Anoya and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, as well as to suffer the accessory penalties
provided for by law.

Likewise, accused Dasmariñas is hereby ordered to pay complainant Ms. Lourdes Anoya the following sums,
thus:

₱98,393.70 as actual compensatory damages;

₱50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the herein victim;

₱l00,000.00 as moral damages; and

₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages.

With respect to accused Nino Polo, the Court finds him NOT GUILTY of the crime of murder for which he was
herein charged. As such, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the instant case as his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

With costs de officio as against accused Dasmariñas.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, Dasmariñas submitted that:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN HIS
OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION WAS TAINTED WITH GRAVE INFIRMITIES

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.15

On May 28, 2012,16 the CA affirmed the conviction with modification by declaring that Dasmariñas would not
be eligible for parole, and by revising the civil liability, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated 10 January 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 255, Las Pinas City in Criminal Case No. 08-
0168 finding accused-appellant Jerson Dasmariñas y Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder under Article 245 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellant, in
addition to his penalty, is NOT eligible for parole and he is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the following amounts: (1) Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) Php50,000.00 as moral damages; (3)
Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (4) Php43,231.70 as actual damages; (5) Php2,498,724.20 as loss of
earning capacity; and (6) interest on all damages awarded at that rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.17

Hence, this appeal, with Dasmariñas insisting on his innocence. It is noted that he and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) have adopted and reiterated their respective briefs filed in the CA.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit, but the Court holds that the conviction of Dasmariñas for murder cannot be upheld. He
is properly liable only for homicide.

In its assailed decision, the CA noted the arguments posited by

Dasmariñas, and the response to the arguments by the OSG, as follows:

Accused-appellant contends, inter alia, that: the procedure conducted by the police officers in identifying the
perpetrator of the crime is seriously flawed and gravely violated his right to due process, as it denied him his
right to a fair trial to the extent that his in-court identification proceeded from and was influenced by
impermissible suggestions; beforehand, the police officers have already fixed in the mind of the witness Perias
that accused-appellant was the assailant; the procedure of bringing a suspect alone to the witness, for the
purpose of identification, is seriously flawed; only accused-appellant was brought before Perias for possible
identification of the perpetrator; the narration of Perias failed the totality of circumstances test; Perias described
the height of assailant as about 5'6 to 5'7" but accused-appellant is only 5'4"; Perias' position at the time of the
incident does not demonstrate, with moral certainty, that he had an opportunity to view the face of the assailant;
Perias identified accused-appellant only on 25 July 2007, thus, there was a sufficient lapse of time from the time
the crime occurred up to the time of accused-appellant's purported identification; and the police investigators
also suggested the identity of accused-appellant when it was only he who was showed to Perias.

Plaintiff-appellee counters, inter alia, that: the prosecution had proven to a moral certainty accused-appellant's
guilt for the crime of murder, thus his conviction is in order; Perias saw accused-appellant at close range, shoot
PO2 Anoya; accused-appellant was facing Perias at the time of the shooting and the latter had an unobstructed
view of accusedappellant's face at such short distance of only two (2) meters; accusedappellant failed to impute
any sinister motive on the part of Perias why he would falsely testify against him; the out-of-court identification
of accused-appellant bolsters the prosecution eyewitness' version of the incident; applying the totality of
circumstances test, the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant (which is a show-up) is admissible and
not in any way violative of his constitutional right; treachery attended PO2 Anoya's killing; accused-appellant's
alibi is unavailing since he failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission; accused-appellant's corroborating witness was his girlfriend, who is obviously not a
disinterested witness; the award of civil indemnity should be increased from Php50,000.00 to Php75,000.00
while the award of moral damages should be decreased from Phpl00,000.00 to Php75,000.00 in accordance
with current jurisprudence; and since there is no aggravating circumstance, the award of exemplary damages
has no basis and must be deleted.18

In ruling against Dasmariñas, the CA opined and concluded that his out-of-court identification by eyewitness
Perias was "free from impermissible suggestions,"19 pointing out as follows:

Accused-appellant merely argued that that procedure conducted by the police officers in identifying the
perpetrator of the crime is seriously flawed and gravely violated the accused-appellant's right to due process, as
it denied him of his right to a fair trial to the extent that his in-court identification proceeded from and was
influenced by impermissible suggestions.

Accused-appellant cited the rulings in People v. Rodrigo, GR No. 176159 September 11, 2008 and People v.
Meneses, GR No. 111742

March 26, 1988. In People v. Rodrigo, the identification was done for the first time through a lone photograph
shown (to witness) at police station and subsequently by personal confrontation at the same police station at an
undisclosed time. The Court said that the initial photographic identification carries serious constitutional law
implications in terms of the possible violation of the due process rights of the accused as it may deny him his
rights to a fair trial to the extent that his in-court identification proceeded from and was influenced by
impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic identification.

In People vs. Meneses, the Court doubted the identification process of the suspect in stabbing incident in view
of the statement in the Advance Information prepared by Police Investigator that the witness (son of the victim)
can identify the suspect if he can see him again. The suspect turned out to be the uncle-in-law of the witness and
who is known to the witness before the incident. The Police investigator contradicted himself on whether the
witness readily pinpointed the suspect during the confrontation. Thus, the Court said that the identification is
dubious.
In the instant case, the eyewitness Aries Perias does not know the person of the accused-appellant but the
eyewitness gave a description of the accused-appellant and the police prepared a cartographic sketch of the
accused-appellant. The identification of the accused-appellant at the Quezon City Jail is only for the purpose of
confirmation. The eyewitness at that time was behind a tinted glass. Thus, the identification of the accused-
appellant in this case is free from impermissible suggestions. The rulings in People vs. Rodrigo and People vs.
Meneses are not applicable in this case.

In this case, accused-appellant was positively identified as one of the assailants by the eyewitness. The
eyewitness Aries Perias was only two (2) meters away from the accused-appellant when the crime was
committed. The accused-appellant and his companion approached the victim PO2 Marlon Anoya from behind
and accused-appellant with a 9mm pistol shoot twice· hitting the victim's nape and below the right ear. The
victim fell down and the companion of accused-appellant got the service pistol of the victim. Accused-appellant
and his companion left and rode a jeepney. The victim was brought to a hospital but he was pronounced as dead
on arrival.20 (Emphasis ours)

We agree that the out-of-court identification of Dasmariñas by Perias as one of the two assailants did not result
from any impermissible suggestion by the police or other external source; and that it could not have been
influenced unfairly against Dasmariñas. It is notable that Perias repeated his identification in court during the
trial. The reliability of the identification was based on Perias' having witnessed the shooting from the short
distance of only two meters away. Also, although the shooting occurred at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning
of June 16, 2007, there was adequate illumination because the scene of the crime was in front of the Sabnarra
Beerhouse along Naga Road in Las Piñas City.21 The proximity of his point of observation and the adequacy of
the illumination provided to him the means to make the reliable identification of Dasmariñas.

Anent the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the CA rendered the following finding, to wit:

The killing of PO2 Anoya is attended by treachery. The victim was already drunk and he was shot at his back
without any warning. The victim was defenseless and was not able to offer any resistance. The accused-
appellant and his companion employed means for the easy commission of the crime. There is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might take.22

We cannot sustain the finding of the CA that the killing was attended by treachery. Although the information
averred that:-

x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and
aiding each other without justifiable motive, with intent to kill and with treachery, abuse of superior strength,
and evident premiditation (sic), did then and there knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one PO2 MARLON N. ANOYA, by then and there shooting him twice on his head,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which directly caused her (sic) death x x x.23

the acts constitutive of treachery were not thereby sufficiently averred. The mere usage of the term treachery in
the information, without anything more, did not suffice for such term was a conclusion of law, not a factual
averment.

The sufficiency of the information is judged by the rule applicable at the time of its filing. In this case, that rule
is Section 9, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides thusly:

Section 9. Cause of the accusations. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily
in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment. (9a) (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

The text of the rule requires that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated
"in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances." In other words, the nature and character of the crime charged are determined
not by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated but by the facts stated in the
indictment, that is, the actual recital of the facts in the body of the information, and not the caption or preamble
of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
being conclusions of law.24 Indeed, the facts alleged in the body of the information, not the technical name
given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the character of the crime.25

Dasmariñas was presumed innocent of wrongdoing, and thus was unaware of having committed anything wrong
in relation to the accusation. Hence, the information must sufficiently give him the knowledge of what he had
allegedly committed. Justice Moreland suggested in United States v. Lim San26how this objective could be
accomplished, viz.:

x x x Notwithstanding apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say and
hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is immaterial and
purposeless, and that the facts stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the
defendant stands charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the
Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common sense and with the requirements of plain
justice.

xxxx

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name
of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. xxx. That to which his
attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts
alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but
did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of
no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the
crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from
the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the
crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need
not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial
rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" If
he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes
the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named. x x x.

In People v. Dimaano,27the Court has reiterated the foregoing guideline thuswise:

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor,
but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

The consequences are dire for the State if the standards of sufficiency defined by Section 9, supra, are not
followed because the accused should be found and declared guilty only of the crime properly and sufficiently
charged in the information. The significance of the propriety and sufficiency of the charge made in the
information is explained in People v. Manalili:28

x x x an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict
him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of this
constitutional right. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged
or necessarily included in the information filed against him.

Treachery, which both the CA and the RTC ruled to be attendant, has basic constitutive elements. Article 14,
paragraph 16, of the Revised Penal Code states that "[t]here is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might
make." For treachery to be appreciated, therefore, two elements must be alleged and proved, namely: (1) that
the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or
retaliate; and (2) that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted,29 that is, the means,
methods or forms of execution must be shown to be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender.30

The information herein did not make any factual averment on how Dasmariñas had deliberately employed
means, methods or forms in the execution of the act - setting forth such means, methods or forms in a manner
that would enable a person of common understanding to know what offense was intended to be charged - that
tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from the defense that the
victim might make. As earlier indicated, to merely state in the information that treachery was attendant is not
enough because the usage of such term is not a factual averment but a conclusion of law.

Consequently, Dasmariñas could not be properly convicted of murder, but only of homicide, which is defined
and penalized under Article 249, Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Article 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another
without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed
guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

Dasmariñas is entitled to the benefits under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In view of the absence of any
modifying circumstance, the minimum of his indeterminate sentence is taken from prision mayor, and the
maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence is nine years
of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum.

The heirs of the late PO2 Marlon M. Anoya are entitled to recover civil liability. In that regard, the CA awarded
civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00; ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; actual damages of ₱43,23 l.70; indemnity for
loss of earning capacity in the amount of ₱2,498,724.10; and imposed interest of 6% per annum on all such
damages from the finality of the judgment until full satisfaction. Conformably with People v.
Jugueta,31however, we modify the awards by granting civil indemnity of 1250,000.00; moral damages of
₱50,000.00; actual damages of ₱43,231.70; and indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of ₱2,498,
724.10, plus 6% per annum interest on all such damages from the finality of the judgment until full satisfaction.

We further grant exemplary damages of ₱50,000.00 despite our finding that the crime was only
homicide.1âwphi1 This is because we uphold the conclusion of the CA that treachery was shown to have
characterized the shooting of the victim. The averment in the information of the facts constituting treachery was
not indispensable for this purpose considering that the recovery of exemplary damages by the heirs of the victim
was a matter of the civil law, and would not implicate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. We have held so in People v. Catubig:32

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each
of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award
of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however,
is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for
an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability
of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 28, 2012 by the Court of Appeals
subject to the MODIFICATION that: (1) accused-appellant JERSON DASMARINAS is found and pronounced
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and, ACCORDINGLY, is punished with the indeterminate
sentence of nine years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; (2) accused-appellant JERSON DASMARINAS y GONZALES is ORDERED TO
PAY to the heirs of the late P02 Marlon N. Anoya, represented by his widow, Lourdes Anoya, civil indemnity
of ₱50,000.00; moral damages of ₱50,000.00; actual damages of ₱43,23 l.70; ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of ₱2,498, 724.10, plus 6% per annum
interest on all such items of civil liability from the finality of the judgment until full satisfaction.

The accused-appellant shall further pay the costs of suit.

G.R. No. 135981             January 15, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
 DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the "battered
woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not
entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected
attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.

Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.

But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumulative
provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This "psychological paralysis" she
suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered
that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with
their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her
reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn child's.

Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on parole, because she has
already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.

The Case

For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic
Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a
generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused
with the penalty of DEATH.

"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."2

The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:

"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband,
 with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing]
the following wounds, to wit:

'Cadaveric spasm.

'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.

'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its
sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.

'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in]
laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the
brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.

'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.

'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'

which caused his death."4

With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3, 1997.6 In
due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the facts in this wise:

"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter,
they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben's younger brother,
Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from
Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children,
namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.

"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They
each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben's house before reaching
his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look
for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the
evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home
passing the side of the Genosas' rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which Ben
replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also
noticed that since then, the Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.

"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about
fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy
check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan
who unfortunately had no money to buy it.

"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc
when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag,
locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50)
meters behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to
Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.

"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from
his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but
the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed
the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only
after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked
bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on
his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head.
Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son's misfortune.
Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.

"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at
Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas' rented house. Together with
SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went
inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet.
There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at
the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall.
The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2)
inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in
disarray.

"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside at
the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence
of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo
found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The
postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later
filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].'

"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995, she
got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday.
With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel,
Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas' house. Ecel
went home despite appellant's request for her to sleep in their house.

"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She
allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework.
Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping
knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to appellant,
Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her
around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed
his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben
allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the
neck, and told her 'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that she
was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-
inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him
to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about
to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
 "Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly
'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the
bedroom."7 (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:

"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage,
Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husband's death, as a Secretary to the Port
Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie
Bianca.

"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang;
they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their
relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness
developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.

"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together with Ben's brother, Alex,
in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'. But apparently, soon
thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.

"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and Marivic
married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk,
Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a
kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the
house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Ben's forgiveness. In another incident
in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood
from Ben's forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had
apparently again asked for Ben's forgiveness.

"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic married in
'1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as the marriage went along, Marivic
became 'already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic's two sons,
there were 'three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife
through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the
forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear' and
her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already
transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered as 'the bone cracked.'

"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.

"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 'After we collected our
salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which
they went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought
barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben,
after which he went across the road to wait 'for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because
during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners
so that I can place my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing.
They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one 'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his
fighting cocks. Basobas' testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was
Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent.'
Basobas thought they were joking.

"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence. Basobas
admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he
once told Ben 'before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that he should leave her
and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him 'so many times'.

"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been
quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only one
(1) year.

"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual
drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and
sometimes beat her.

"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben would
follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she
would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These
doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would
beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.

"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and
violence she received at the hands of Ben.

'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on November
15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through
the open jalousies, he saw the spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He
did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that
testified to by Arturo Busabos.8 )

'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he
heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window
of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw 'the spouses grappling with each other then
Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after a
while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back
to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note
that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).

'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte.
His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be
living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him
that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house
and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified 'if somebody would come.' He
testified that while Ben was alive 'he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our
house and he will say, 'Teody' because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's
go and look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben 'would box his wife and I would see
bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as
according to her a knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been
injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon
of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in
the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied
Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house 'because she might be battered
by her husband.' When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that
'her husband was already there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was drunk 'because of his
staggering walking and I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel
noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano
testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be
afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was
awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple 'were very noisy in the sala and I
had heard something was broken like a vase.' She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the
door. When Ben couldn't get in he got a chair and a knife and 'showed us the knife through the window
grill and he scared us.' She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination,
she said that when she left Marivic's house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.

'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel,
Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr.
Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical
injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS
Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert
witness.'

xxx   xxx   xxx

'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23)
separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos
Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries
reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'

"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries
were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine
the psychological make-up of the patient, 'whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.'

'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified that about
two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help
to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing 'family troubles'. He told Marivic to
return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed 'that they might have settled with
each other or they might have forgiven with each other.'

xxx   xxx   xxx

"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who
began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted
to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal
Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born
prematurely on December 1, 1995.

"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but
that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was
violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x
x x Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the bedroom;
that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that
she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented
herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not
tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she
was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.

'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did not know
what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him once'; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with
the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and dragged her
towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.'

"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of the
foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses
and some defense witnesses during the trial.

"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time
of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such
as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist.
She merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the
Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw 'some police officer and neighbor around.' She saw
Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was
wearing only a brief.

xxxxxxxxx

"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the
head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3
days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.

"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.

"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the
crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the
use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'

"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September
1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.

"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito
L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic
guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating
circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.

"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24
January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as
counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had
prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.

"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of
appearance of undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the
Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief
Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her 'Brief without counsels' to the Court.

"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.

"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court on
19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death;
allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a
quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.

"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only
qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as
culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a
lead pipe.

"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivic's
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the 'battered woman syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days
from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the
copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.'

"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L.
Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.

"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic
Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but
that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done at her clinic.

"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own private
clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she was the
Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology
at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph's College; and was the counseling psychologist of the
National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a
Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was
the past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American
Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about
68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy, recently
lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence
and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She
has written a book entitled 'Energy Global Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan
Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is
the first case of that nature.

"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and psychological
profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a
period of ten (10) years and discovered that 'there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital
conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of psychological abuse,
verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.'

xxx   xxx   xxx

"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself.
She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of
themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they
were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and
even sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional
family or from 'broken homes.'

"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a very low opinion of himself.
But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very
aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they
are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.' The batterer also
usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do
anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so 'there is a lot of modeling of
aggression in the family.'

"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her husband:
poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her
husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the
children.

xxx   xxx   xxx

"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock
themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering 'physical violence on both of
them.' She said that in a 'normal marital relationship,' abuses also happen, but these are 'not consistent,
not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out.' In an 'abnormal marital relationship,' the abuse
occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and 'even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even
death on the victim.'

xxx   xxx   xxx

"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her
opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because 'inspite of her feeling of self-
confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation
which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still has the imprint
of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.'

xxx   xxx   xxx

"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for nullity
or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of
herself as a victim.

xxx   xxx   xxx

"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared and
testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board
of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry
for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the Veterans
Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was
called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for
twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier
General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of
the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical
Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.

"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy
from the Period 1954 – 1978' which was presented twice in international congresses. He also authored
'The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000', which was likewise published
internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-
Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use
of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.

"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and neurology
deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor
degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.

"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already
encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty
thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.

"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there is
physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an
unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very
healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and
physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to
precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'

"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the 'anxiety neurosis or
neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming brutality, trauma.'

xxx   xxx   xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were
real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks 'of nothing but the suffering.'

xxx   xxx   xxx

"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and
she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity
and her 'self-world' is damaged.

"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's illness, such as the
deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally 'internalizes
 what is around him within the environment.' And it becomes his own personality. He is very
competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong façade 'but in it there are
doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.'

xxx   xxx   xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who
administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual
cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.'

xxx   xxx   xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves, and
'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate
surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the household.' He said a victim resorts to
weapons when she has 'reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on
her but to act decisively.'

xxx   xxx   xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for two (2)
hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help
in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.

xxx   xxx   xxx

"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her
husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-experiencing the trauma.' He said 'that we are
trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will
just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of
the trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he interviewed Marivic 'she was more subdued, she was not
super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.'

xxx   xxx   xxx

"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor.
Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a
quo were elevated."9

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence that
appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic
aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed --
lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.

The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.

Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse;
and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review
or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts' testimonies.

On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's Motion, remanding the case
to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman
syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as
to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.

Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clinical
psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan10 and Alfredo Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their
testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower court
before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case.12

The Issues

Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's consideration:

"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the
evidence adduced as to self-defense.

"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married
and that she was therefore liable for parricide.

"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.

"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and
unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further
gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.

"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.

"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and her subsequent
apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.

"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of treachery.

"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the
existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic
Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death."13

In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense and in
defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Collateral Factual Issues

The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution of the
principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence
of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the case.14

In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or misappreciation
of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's disposition of the case. In any event, we will now
briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.

First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the
evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona
summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and
of the documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page
discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may
not agree with the trial judge's conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that
he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.

Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty" manner. The Information
had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were
held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his
judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him,
much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled the case
should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.15

Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally married,
despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,16 this Court held:

"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide
of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may
be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to."

Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's deceased spouse --
attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.17 The defense raised no objection to these testimonies.
Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to Ben.18
Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is
a showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.19
Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the
admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable
mistake.

Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's death -- whether by a gunshot
or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000
Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting
his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is
unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the victim's death." Determining
which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.

Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler,
womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel
defense of "battered woman syndrome," for which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-
defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-
defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the
death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence
at the time.

Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellant's children. As correctly
elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to
present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from
presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them to
testify.

Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her
subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn
child. Any reversible error as to the trial court's appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the
final resolution of the case.

First Legal Issue:

Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus

Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense of her
unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed
justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-
defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to
the defense.22

The Battered Woman Syndrome

In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new in
Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or,
at the least, incomplete self-defense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who
has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time."24

A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time,
and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."25

Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home,
the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept
responsibility for the batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.26

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of violence,"27 which
has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or,
at least, nonviolent) phase.28

During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or
another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind,
nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be
abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence
exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her "placatory" and passive
behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.

However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the
verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension
and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the
more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive.
Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control" and leads to an acute battering
incident.29

The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death.
The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no
control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its
explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with
him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.

At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly
remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the
batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is
futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent
bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.30

The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil
period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing
behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for
her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to
convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that
this "good, gentle and caring man" is the real person whom she loves.

A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing
his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his
reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him.
Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this
phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.

The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In this phase, she and
her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her
forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each partner may believe
that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning
without the other.31

History of Abuse
in the Present Case

To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses. She herself
described her heart-rending experience as follows:

"ATTY. TABUCANON

Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?

A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and a behavior
of habitual drinker.

Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you and cruel. In
what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?

A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me down on the
bed and sometimes beat me.

Q How many times did this happen?

A Several times already.

Q What did you do when these things happen to you?

A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.

Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?

A He is following me, after that he sought after me.

Q What will happen when he follow you?

A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to him and he
said 'sorry'.

Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by your husband,
were you able to see a doctor?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who are these doctors?

A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.

xxx   xxx   xxx

Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who inflicted these injuries?

A Of course my husband.

Q You mean Ben Genosa?

A Yes, sir.

xxx   xxx   xxx
 [Court] /to the witness

Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?

A Everytime he got drunk.

Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred, after
your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?

A Everytime he got drunk.

Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?

A Three times a week.

Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?

A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me." 32

Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing
bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:

"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your clinic?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?

A I did.

Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.

A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness of eye.
Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;

2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion (R) breast.
Attending physician: Dr. Canora;

3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;

4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;

5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and

6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician:
Dr. Canora.

Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending physician, is that
correct?

A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What do you
mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?

A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough substance if force is
applied.

Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?

A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.

Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?

A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning
there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.

Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?

xxx   xxx   xxx

Q Were you able to talk with the patient?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did she tell you?

A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told me that it
was done to her by her husband.

Q You mean, Ben Genosa?

A Yes, sir.

xxx   xxx   xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month of
November, 1995 when this incident happened?

A As per record, yes.

Q What was the date?

A It was on November 6, 1995.

Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?

A Yes, sir.

Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant?

A Yes, sir.

Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?

A Eight (8) months pregnant.

Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her pregnancy or for
some other findings?

A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.

Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?

A Yes, sir.

Q For how many days?

A One day.

Q Where?

A At PHILPHOS Hospital.

xxx   xxx   xxx

Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to examine her
personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.

What is this all about?

A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I have a
record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times.

Q For what?

A Tension headache.

Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension?

A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not response
when the medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or less stress related and
emotional in nature.
 Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?

A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history in line of
giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all
comes from the domestic problem.

Q You mean problem in her household?

A Probably.

Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?

A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which is
unfortunately does not response to the medication.

Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the accused?

A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.

Q Is this considered hypertension?

A Yes, sir, severe.

Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood pressure?

A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34

Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he
had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would run to him with
bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.35

Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa
house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did
sleep over, she was awakened about ten o'clock at night, because the couple "were very noisy … and I heard
something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running into Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben
showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.

On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but they were
unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might
hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she
heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.

On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw or heard the
couple quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed
out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:

"ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I boarded the
service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his
father, then my second child said, 'he was not home yet'. I was worried because that was payday, I was
anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I
prepared dinner for my children.

Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?

A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.

Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you come back to your house?

A Yes, sir.

Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?

A Bilwang.

Q Is this your house or you are renting?

A Renting.

Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?

A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.

Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?

A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time because I
had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I requested my
cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen again last
year.

Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?

A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.

Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?

A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.

Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?

A Yes, 8 months.

Q How advance was your pregnancy?

A Eight (8) months.

Q Was the baby subsequently born?

A Yes, sir.

Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?

A Marie Bianca.

Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time?

A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.

Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?

A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.

Q What was he yelling all about?

A His usual attitude when he got drunk.

Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if any?

A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.

Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?

A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried he might
be overly drunk and he would beat me again.

Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?

A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for fear that
he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he
switch off the light and I said to him, 'why did you switch off the light when the children were there.' At
that time I was also attending to my children who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me
for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to
stop me from watching television.

Q What did he do with the bolo?

A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.

Q What else happened after he cut the wire?

A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he was already
holding the bolo.

Q How do you described this bolo?

A 1 1/2 feet.

Q What was the bolo used for usually?

A For chopping meat.

Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?

A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.

Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?

A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.

Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?

A I screamed for help and then he left.

Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?

A Yes, sir.

Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?

A Outside perhaps to drink more.

Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?

A I packed all his clothes.

Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?

A I wanted him to leave us.

Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?

A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his clothes, then he
dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.

Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

COURT INTERPRETER:

The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Where did he bring you?

A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that 'you
might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.'

Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is there in the drawer?

A I was aware that it was a gun.

COURT INTERPRETER:

(At this juncture the witness started crying).

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it
because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long
and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade
fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to
pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment
everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same
when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.

COURT INTERPRETER:

(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

xxx   xxx   xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?

A Outside.

Q In what part of the house?

 A Dining.

Q Where were the children during that time?

A My children were already asleep.

Q You mean they were inside the room?

A Yes, sir.

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches
long, how does it look like?

A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.

Q Is it a flexible blade?

A It's a cutter.

Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

A Yes, because he once used it to me.

Q How did he do it?

A He wanted to cut my throat.

Q With the same blade?

A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38

In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in
understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about
seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latter's ordeal to the court a quo as follows:

"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in layman's term describe
to this Court what her life was like as said to you?

A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering emotional
anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical
abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of
the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even
womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very angry and which will trigger a lot of
physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the
husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not
his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware,
almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out." 39

In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put
forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her about three
hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?

A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important information were
escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.

Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts of the case
or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?

A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as substantial.

xxx   xxx   xxx

Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond of
battering their wives?

A I also heard that from her?

Q You heard that from her?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of battering
their wives?

A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their wives.

Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her
husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?

A She told me about that.

Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?

A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.

Q Several times in that room?

A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really happened.

Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think that is the
first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?

A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a self-defense.
I also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she became a disordered person.
She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she became an
abnormal person who had lost she's not during the time and that is why it happened because of all the
physical battering, emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she had experienced from her
husband.

Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?

 A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40

Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:

"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this] all
about?

A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that test is to
find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.

Q What do you mean by that?

A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can exaggerate
or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]

Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?

A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust. That the data
that I'm gathering from her are the truth."41

The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric Report,42
which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first
three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy --
until "Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x
x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees."

The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly to his wife.
The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically
abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a
painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree].
They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was battered and
maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk."

Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the Report,
"[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling
ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more frequent and more
severe. x x x."43

From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind that Appellant Marivic
Genosa was a severely abused person.

Effect of Battery on Appellant

Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary,
reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has
aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law
partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it?
The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why
should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of
requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why
does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted
with the so-called 'battered wife syndrome.'"44

To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary,
reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings
may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar experience.
Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about battered women.45

The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has had a
significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in
which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the
cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter's "ability to act
decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape."46 In her
years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered
women are in greater danger of dying then."47

Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman usually has a very low opinion
of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would
happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that]
they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them."48

According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave an abusive
partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's belief that she provoked the violence, that she
has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope
for her spouse to change.49

The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in suits
involving violent family relations, having evaluated "probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family disputes
within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience with
domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got
involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman
would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.50

Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a
form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered
persons "may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute
battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping responses to the trauma at the
expense of the victim's ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x
the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect."52

A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that "even if
a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that
situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape." He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the
individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as "learned helplessness."
"[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the individual's set of beliefs or perceptions
concerning the situation. Battered women don't attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem
to outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they
or anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances."54

Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior of her
partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no escape.55 Battered women feel
unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.56 Unless a shelter is available,
she stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she
fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more.57

In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to
the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the
battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a
conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential
characteristics of BWS.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court
a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-
building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage.
However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove
that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.

How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic
normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation
from developing into the next (more violent) stage?

Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned
that she would usually run away to her mother's or father's house;58 that Ben would seek her out, ask for her
forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.

Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she
was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-
being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did
both of them regard death as preferable to separation?

In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that would
clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.

The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to
explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually
evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse.
They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of
actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had
related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.

We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in order to
be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the
battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.

BWS as Self-Defense

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the
woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.59

From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state
of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense60 -- she must have actually feared imminent harm
from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat
on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.61 Thus,
the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense:62

"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:

"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.63 It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.64 In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and
went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer
in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based on past violent
incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then,
the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already
suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required.
Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by
installment.'"65 Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes)
prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy
the required imminence of danger.66 Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense
may be appreciated.

We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.67 In the absence of
such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.68 Thus,
Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.

Mitigating Circumstances Present

In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances that would
alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her
criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any
issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties.69

From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation
Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:

"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced with
her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological
resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of
impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser
 husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part."
70

Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of "repetitious pain taking,
repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as the severity and the prolonged administration of
the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:

"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?

A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the battering.
Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and the
psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social support
available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....

xxx   xxx   xxx

Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the
postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?

A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to
the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face,
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation
therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very
susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the
anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.

Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?

A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.

Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?

A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest now a
severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most
[acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.

Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?

A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer
than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you
become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical
one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how
you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder." 72

Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:

"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her
mental capacity?

A Yes, your Honor.

 Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?

A Of course obfuscated."73

In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in "cumulative
provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control," "psychological paralysis,"
and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."

Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness that
diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her
acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
paragraphs 974 and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her
favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76

In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is
present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.77 To appreciate this circumstance,
the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.78

Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by
Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had
kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was
likewise on that of her fetus.79 His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of
both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even
though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her,
she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were
about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the
weapon and used it to shoot him.

The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of time within
which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's testimony80 that with
"neurotic anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality [or] trauma" -- the victim
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot
control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of
nothing but the suffering." Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances,
must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her
normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.

It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation
-- did not arise from the same set of facts.

On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by
the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her
psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to
the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her
as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced
passion and obfuscation on her part.

Second Legal Issue:

Treachery

There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.81
In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing
itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of
evidence.82 Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the
killing itself.83

Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon appellant.
It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying
in bed with an "open, depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and when
he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the following
testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:

"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

COURT:

The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)

A And he dragged me towards the door backward.

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Where did he bring you?

A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that 'you
might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me'

Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is there in the drawer?

A I was aware that it was a gun.

COURT INTERPRETER

(At this juncture the witness started crying)

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it
because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long
and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade
fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to
pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment
everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same
when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.

COURT INTERPRETER

(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

xxx   xxx   xxx

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches
long, how does it look like?

A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.

Q It is a flexible blade?

A It's a cutter.

Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

A Yes, because he once used it to me.

Q How did he do it?

A He wanted to cut my throat.

Q With the same blade?

A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.

xxx   xxx   xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?

A Yes, because I smashed him.

Q What happened?

A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the
other room.
 Q What else happened?

A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was
about to die because of my blood pressure.

COURT INTERPRETER:

(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the same time
pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?

A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took pity on myself and I felt
I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.

COURT

/to Atty. Tabucanon

Q You shot him?

A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84

The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the victim's
position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the
assailant.85

Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been
consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk
from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.86 There is no showing, though, that the present
appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself
from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun
occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of
any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the
crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.87

Proper Penalty

The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the
commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph
588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that
two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other
modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense.90 Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower
in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion
temporal.

Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already
served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole.91

Epilogue

Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple to
analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply
the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made
-- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper
resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to
understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person.
Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant's counsel, Atty.
Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.

While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of law,
jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code.
Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the
final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person's
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the
existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However,
there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the
offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the
director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that
she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.

AGGRAVATING

G.R. No. L-27758             July 14, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DEMETRIO NABUAL, LUIS NABUAL and ELPIDIO BACHICHA, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor
Hector C. Fule for plaintiff-appellee.
Zaida Ruby S. Alberto and Guido A. Lavin, Jr. for defendants-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

This case is before Us on automatic review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar, convicting
defendants Demetrio Nabual, Luis Nabual and Elpidio Bachicha, of the crime of robbery with homicide, under
an information alleging:

That on or about the 7th day of January 1967, in the Municipality of Calbiga, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another with one Cresencio Mabute who is still at large, armed
with guns and a knife, with intent to kill and to gain, by means of force, violence against and
intimidation of persons, and at nighttime, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter
the house of one Carlota P. Ocenada, and once inside thereat, pointed their guns at said Carlota P.
Ocenada and demanded money from her and because of fear that she might be killed, said Carlota P.
Ocenada handed said accused money in cash which was placed inside their trunk, amounting to One
Hundred Thirty Five (P135.00) Pesos, and accused forcibly opened the suitcase and got another money
in cash amounting to Four hundred (P400.00) Pesos, which the said accused took, stole and carried away
with them, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the total sum of Five Hundred Thirty Five
(P535.00) Pesos, Philippine currency; and accused pursuant to their conspiracy and on such occasion
thereof and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away with them the said amount of
money, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab several times one
Pablo Ocenada, husband of said Carlota P. Ocenada with said knife with which the said accused had
conveniently provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said Pablo Ocenada several
wounds on the different parts of his body which wounds caused his death.

That in the commission of the crime the following aggravating circumstances were present: (1)
Nighttime; (2) the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having been
giving provocation for it; (3) habituality or reiteration, they having been convicted on September 5,
1962, in the Court of First Instance of Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, for murder, in Criminal Case No.
6074, and was sentenced to imprisonment from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years
of prision mayor, with accessory penalties provided by law and indemnify jointly and severally the heirs
of Loreto Cabrillas and pay the costs; as to accused Luis Nabual and Demetrio Nabual; (4) evident
premeditation; (5) taking advantage of superior strength in number and arms.

When the case was called for arraignment, counsel de officio for the defendants informed said Court of their
intention to enter a plea of guilty whereupon His Honor, the trial Judge, propounded to them the questions and
the defendants gave the answers quoted hereunder:1äwphï1.ñët

COURT — (To the three accused)

Q. — Your lawyer has manifested to this court that you desire to enter the plea of guilty to the offenses
charged. Do you agree to that manifestation of your lawyer?

A. — Yes, sir (all the three accused).

Q. — Do you know that by so agreeing to that manifestation of your lawyer you will be admitting the
commission of the crime charging you with robbery with homicide? .

A. — Yes, sir (all the three accused).

Q. — And for which this court will sentence you to death or of imprisonment for which length of time
that it will determine?

A. — Yes, sir (all the three accused).

Q. — And, notwithstanding what was explained to you, you still insist your desire to enter the plea of
guilty to the offense charged?

A. — Yes, sir (all the three accused).

Q. — The court would like to inform you again that this robbery with homicide is punishable with
reclusion perpetua with death.

A. — Yes, sir (all the three accused).

Q. — And there is a likelihood that you might be sentenced to death.

A. — Yes, sir (all the three accused).

Q. — And, notwithstanding what is explained to you by the court you still insist in your desire to enter
the plea of guilty?

A. — Yes, sir (all the three accused).

COURT

Arraign the accused.

INTERPRETER

(Reading the information to the three accused).

INTERPRETER

Q. — Did you understand what was read to you? (Interpreter asking the same question to the three
accused)

A. — Yes, sir (all the three accused).

Q. — What is your plea Demetrio Nabual?

A. — Guilty.

Q. — What is your plea Luis Nabual?

A. — Guilty.
 Q. — What is your plea Elpidio Bachicha?

A. — Guilty.

COURT

Q. — Why did you enter the plea of guilty to the crime charged?

A. — I pleaded guilty because I have done it. (All the three accused answering one by one).

Thereupon, the trial court rendered judgment finding the defendants guilty of robbery with homicide, with the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, in
addition, insofar as Luis Nabual and Demetrio Nabual are concerned, to the aggravating circumstance of
reiteration, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of any of said defendants except that of plea of guilty,
which is, however, insufficient to offset all of the aforementioned aggravating circumstances, and, accordingly,
sentenced them to death, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Pablo Ocenada in the sums of P6,000
and P535, which latter sum represents the amount stolen, and to pay the costs. Hence, the present automatic
review.

During the pendency thereof, or on December 24, 1968, Demetrio Nabual died in consequence of injuries
sustained when prison guards fired at him, as he, together with other prisoners, tried to escape from the New
Bilibid Prisons, where he was undergoing preventive imprisonment. By resolution of this Court, dated February
21, 1969, the case against him was, therefore, dismissed, so that the present decision refers exclusively to
defendants Luis Nabual and Elpidio Bachicha.

Conceding that propriety of the judgment of conviction against these defendants, their counsel de officio
maintains 1 that the lower court erred in considering that the crime charged was committed with the aggravating
circumstances of reiteration, nighttime and evident premeditation; that the commission of said crime was
attended by no other aggravating circumstances than those of dwelling and abuse of superior strength; that these
two (2) aggravating circumstances should be deemed offset by the plea of guilty entered by the defendants, so
that they should be sentenced merely to life imprisonment; and that said judgment should be modified
accordingly.

As regards the aggravating circumstances of reiteration and nighttime, it is urged that, according to the
information, the defendants had been previously "convicted" of the crime of murder and "sentenced" therefor;
that there is no allegation that they had served the sentence; that actual punishment or service of the sentence is
essential to the aggravating circumstance of reiteration, 2 unlike recidivism, for which previous conviction of a
crime falling under the same title of the penal code is sufficient; and that the information fails to aver that
nighttime had been purposely or especially sought or that the defendants had taken advantage thereof in order
either to facilitate the commission of the offense or to afford them impunity. We deem it unnecessary however,
to discuss these aggravating circumstances, because even if we discarded them, the result would be the same.

Indeed, appellants affirm that evident premeditation is inherent in the crime of robbery and that robbery with
homicide is essentially a crime against property. It is true that in the case of People v. Valeriano, 3 which was
one of robbery with homicide, it was held that:

Evident premeditation is not considered as an aggravating circumstance in crimes of robbery because the
same is inherent in the crime specially where it is committed by various persons; they must have an
agreement, they have to meditate and reflect on the manner of carrying out the crime and they have to
act coordinately in order to succeed. ....

          However, in the same case, this Court added:

 ... But in the crime of robbery with homicide, if there is evident premeditation to kill besides stealing, it
is considered as an aggravating circumstance... In the instant case, it has been proven that the accused,
on various occasions before committing the crime, planned and decided not only to steal but also to kill
Judge Bautista. Hence, there is present evident premeditation.

Similarly, in the case at bar, the information explicitly alleges that the "accused conspiring, confederating
together and helping one another ... armed with guns and a knife ... with intent to kill ... did ... willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the house" of the offended parties and steal the aggregate sum of P535, and
"pursuant to their conspiracy, ... did ... stab several times ... Pablo Ocenada ... with said knife with which said
accused had conveniently provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said Pablo Ocenada
several wounds ... which ... caused his death." This allegation was admitted by the defendants, who acted,
therefore, with evident premeditation to kill.

Independently, therefore, of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and reiteration, evident premeditation,
dwelling, and abuse of superior strength should be considered from at the commission of the offense. In the
light of the conditions obtaining in the present case, we believe that defendants' plea of guilty is insufficient to
offset these three aggravating circumstances, and that the extreme penalty was properly meted out to Luis
Nabual and Elpidio Bachicha.

We have not overlooked the fact that, in People v. Apduhan, 4 we refrained from imposing the extreme penalty,
for lack of the number of votes necessary therefor, despite the existence of three aggravating circumstances as
against the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. Such case should not be construed, however, as implying
that this mitigating circumstance has as much weight as three aggravating circumstances, whatever the latter
may be. Obviously, some aggravating circumstances are graver than others. Indeed, the same aggravating
circumstances may connote a greater degree of malice or perversity in one case than in another. Conversely, the
same mitigating circumstance may merit more weight in one case than in another, depending upon the
conditions surrounding each. In the very nature of things, judges must exercise their sound judgment in the
appraisal thereof.

In the present case, the defendants had planned not only the robbery. They had entered the house of their
victims with the intent to kill. For this purpose, they had armed themselves with deadly weapons. This,
notwithstanding the fact that they had been previously convicted of and sentenced for murder. Even if the legal
feasibility of considering such conviction and sentence as sufficient to establish the aggravating circumstance of
reiteration may be debatable, said fact is undoubtedly indicative of the marked moral perversion of the
defendants and of the grave danger they pose to society.

Then, again, there is every reason to believe that the plea of guilty entered into by them was prompted, not by a
feeling of regret or remorse and a willingness to pay their debt to society, but by a desire to avail themselves of
the only means to create a possibility, no matter how remote, of preventing imposition of the death penalty, by
establishing one mitigating circumstance in their favor. This assertion is based upon the fact that otherwise the
prosecution would have, in all probability, proven that nighttime had been purposely sought or taken advantage
of, and that the defendants had not only been convicted of and sentenced for murder, but, also, served the
sentence therefor. In fact, the lower court found — upon informed examination of the documents that the
prosecution intended to introduce in evidence, had the defendants chosen to proceed to trial — that Luis Nabual
and Demetrio Nabual were parolees, so that they must have served part of their aforementioned sentence. In
short, had a plea of not guilty been entered, there was a great likelihood that the following aggravating
circumstances would have been established, namely: (1) nighttime; (2) dwelling; (3) abuse of superior strength;
(4) evident premeditation; and (5) as regards Luis Nabual and Demetrio Nabual, reiteration. With no mitigating
circumstances to offset any of these aggravating circumstances — in the absence of a plea of guilty —
defendants' chances of avoiding the extreme penalty were nil. Hence, they had no choice but to enter said plea.
WHEREFORE, modified as to the indemnity of P6,000 which is hereby increased to P12,000, in addition to the
stolen sum of P535, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, in all other respects, with costs against
defendants, Luis Nabual and Elpidio Bachicha. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 191197               June 22, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RODRIGO LAPORE, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

For review is the conviction of accused-appellant RODRIGO LAPORE (Lapore) of rape as defined in Article
266-A and penalized under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed against AAA.1
The Decision2 dated 20 March 2007, rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Puerto Princesa
City, in Criminal Case· No. 15286 was affirmed by the Decision3 dated 12 October 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02771.

The Information

That sometime in the month of October, (sic) 1998, at Barangay Berong (sic) Municipality of Quezon, Province
of Palawan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with force, threat,
violence and intimidation and with lewd designed, (sic) did and (sic) then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have (sic) carnal knowledge with one AAA, a girl of 13 years of age, against her will and consent,
to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law.4

While a warrant of arrest was issued on 26 January 1999, Lapore remained at large until his arrest on 11
February 2000. During his arraignment, Lapore pleaded not guilty to the crime. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The Prosecution Evidence

The victim, AAA, is thirteen (13) years old and illiterate. She lives with her parents in Baranga y Berong,
Municipality of Quezon, Palawan. On 1 October 1998, when AAA’s parents went to Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan, AAA was left at their house with her older brother, two (2) younger siblings , and accused-appellant
Lapore who was staying at their house as a guest. Lapore was a pastor in their church.5

One evening, AAA’s older brother left the house to go fishing while AAA was asleep. Lapore went inside
AAA’s room and removed AAA’s panty. Lapore then removed his underwear and inserted his penis into her
vagina. AAA cried. When she tried to shout, Lapore pointed a knife at her neck and threatened to kill her.
With his penis still insider her vagina, Lapore made push and pull movements and then left.6

On 20 October 1998, when AAA’s parents returned home, AAA reported her ordeal to her parents. When
AAA’s parents confronted Lapore, Lapore admitted to the rape and promised to marry AAA. After the
confrontation, Lapore left. Three (3) months passed. Lapore failed to return. Thus, AAA and her mother
reported the incident to the Barangay Chairman and to the police. AAA was brought to Dr. Josieveline M.
Abiog-Damalerio, the Municipal Health Officer of Quezon, Palawan, for medical examination. On 23
December 1998, AAA filed the instant criminal complaint for the crime of rape against Lapore.7

AAA’s mother, BBB, testified and presented AAA’s Birth Certificate to prove that AAA was born on 16
December 1984. The authenticity of the certificate was admitted by the defense.8

Dr. Alma Feliciano-Rivera testified and interpreted the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Josieveline M. Abiog-
Damalerio. The Medical Certificate revealed that AAA was diagnosed with healed lacerations, which may have
been sustained a week prior to the examination and that AAA’s physical virginity was lost.9

The Evidence of the Defense

Lapore first knew AAA in April 1999 when he began helping AAA’s family by doing apostolic work for them
for six (6) months. In the evening of one Sunday, while the mother, BBB, was having a drink with the locals,
AAA approached Lapore. They talked for several hours. After the conversation, AAA offered herself to Lapore
in marriage but he advised AAA to instead pray. Since then, AAA offered herself to Lapore for marriage for
two (2) more occasions.

On the first two attempts, Lapore pitied AAA. However, on her third attempt, Lapore finally accepted AAA’s
proposal but told her that they had to wait until AAA gives birth as she was four (4) months pregnant then.10

Lapore spoke to AAA’s parents regarding their plan to marry, but the marriage did not pursue because AAA
filed a criminal case accusing Lapore of rape. According to Lapore, the criminal complaint was a personal
vendetta because he reprimanded AAA’s mother, BBB, for having vices, such as drinking and selling alcohol.
Because of their anger, they told Lapore to leave and never to return. Also, Lapore insinuated that it was AAA’s
boyfriend, in the person of a certain Julio Flores, who impregnated AAA. Lapore averred that AAA was already
pregnant when he saw her, and because he pitied her, he agreed to marry her only after she has given birth.11

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC found La pore guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The pertinent portion of
the dispositive of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RODRIGO LAPORE @
"DIGING" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, as defined and penalized under Article
266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 8353. In view of the presence of the special
aggravating circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon and the generic aggravating circumstance of the abuse
of confidence or obvious ungratefulness, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the costs. He is likewise ordered to pay the victim AAA the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity and FIFTY THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS as moral
damages.12

As defense, Lapore alleged that the prosecution failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crime.
According to Lapore, AAA was inconsistent in identifying the accused:

Q: You did not see his face?

A: No, Sir.

Q: When he started to rape you, how did you notice that it was Lapore?

A: Because I lighted a lamp.

Q: While you were being raped?

A: There is a light coming from his room.

Q: But the room of Lapore is separated by a wall from your room, is it not?

A: Our rooms are beside each other.

Q: So it means that you did not light a lamp?

A: I did not, Sir.13 (Emphases supplied)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Contrary to the defense’s allegation, the Court of Appeals resolved that AAA positively identified Lapore as the
man who perpetrated the crime because AAA’ s account of the incident was clearly expressed in a
straightforward manner. The inconsistency in AAA’s testimony is minor and inconsequential in nature. As
resolved by the Court of Appeals, "[w]hat is controlling is that AAA remained intractable and consistent in
identifying the accused as the person who raped her."

Furthermore, AAA’s testimony is corroborated by a medical examination which revealed that AA A had healed
lacerations and that her physical virginity was lost. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated that "hymenal laceration
is a telling, irrefutable and best physical evidence of forcible defloration."14 Further, the medical certificate
belied Lapore’s allegation that AAA was five (5) months pregnant with AAA’s boyfriend.15

With regard to the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals modified the penalty imposed by the RTC. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness, minority, and use of a deadly weapon cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime from simple
rape to qualified rape. According to the Court of Appeals, "to justify the

imposition of death penalty, the two qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur as
provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and must be alleged in the information and duly proven
during the trial by the quantum of proof required for conviction".16 Thus, there being no modifying
circumstances to be appreciated, the Court of Appeals ruled that the crime committed is only simple rape,
punishable by reclusion perpetua . The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the RTC Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused is further ordered to
pay ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.17

Our Ruling

We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

The inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony are minor. These inconsistencies add to the veracity of her already
truthful account of her ordeal in the hands of Lapore. Besides, Lapore’s conviction is not based solely on
AAA’s positive identification of Lapore as the perpetrator of the crime. Her testimony was corroborated by the
medical examination and testimony of witnesses, Dr. Feliciano Rivera, the medico-legal expert, who interpreted
the medical certificate, and BBB, AAA’s mother, who testified that AAA was mentally retarded and narrated
the incident that occurred when they went home from Puerto Princesa City to Quezon, Palawan. The
prosecution has gone beyond the principle, where, the sole testimony of a witness, if found credible, would
suffice to sustain a conviction.18

With regard to the presence of abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness, minority, and use of a deadly
weapon, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals.1âwphi1 Although the prosecution has duly proved the
presence of abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness, minority, and use of a deadly weapon, they may
not be appreciated to qualify the crime from simple rape to qualified rape.

Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that for qualifying and aggravating
circumstances to be appreciated, it must be alleged in the complaint or information.19 This is in line with the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.20 Even
if the prosecution has duly proven the presence of the circumstances, the Court cannot appreciate the same if
they were not alleged in the Information. Hence, although the prosecution has duly established the presence of
the aforesaid circum stances, which, however, were not alleged in the Information, this Court cannot appreciate
the same. Notably, these circumstances are not among those which qualify a crime from simple rape to qualified
rape as defined under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Thus even if duly alleged and
proven, the crime would still be simple rape.

Therefore, as all the elements necessary to sustain a conviction for simple rape are present: (1) that Lapore had
carnal knowledge of AAA; and (2) that said act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation,21
we find Lapore guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 October 2009 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02771,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rodrigo Lapore alias ‘Diging’" finding accused-appellant Rodrigo Lapore
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as
to the civil damages:

1. Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity;

2. Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages; and

3. Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages.

Interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum is likewise imposed on all the damages awarded in this case
from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
G.R. No. L-19491           August 30, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, ET AL., defendants,
APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Alberto M. Meer for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an automatic review of the judgment rendered on August 30, 1961 by the Court of First Instance of
Bohol (Judge Hipolito Alo presiding) convicting Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. of robbery with homicide and
sentencing him to death and "to idemnify the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Miano in the amount of
P6,000.00, to indemnify the heirs of the other deceased Norberto Aton in the same amount of P6,000.00 ..."

On August 2, 1961 the accused Apduhan, then represented by Atty. David Ocangas, together with his co-
accused Rodulfo Huiso and Felipe Quimson, both represented by Atty. David Tirol, pleaded not guilty to a
second amended information which recites:.

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Apolonio Apduhan, Jr., alias Junior, Rodulfo Huiso and
Felipe Quimson of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, in the Municipality of
Mabini, Province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named accused and five (5) other persons whose true
names are not yet known (they are presently known only with their aliases of Bernabe Miano, Rudy,
Angel-Angi, Romeo and Tony) and who are still at large (they will be charged in separate information or
informations as soon as they are arrested and preliminary proceedings in Crim. Case No. 176 completed
before the Justice of the Peace Court), all of them armed with different unlicensed firearms, daggers, and
other deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, by means of violence, the dwelling house of the
spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano, which was also the dwelling house of their children, the
spouses Geronimo Miano and Herminigilda de Miano; and, once inside the said dwelling house, the
above-named accused with their five (5) other companions, did attack, hack and shoot Geronimo Miano
and another person by the name of Norberto Aton, who happened to be also in the said dwelling house,
thereby inflicting upon the said two (2) persons physical injuries which caused their death; and
thereafter the same accused and their five (5) other companions, did take and carry way from said
dwelling house cash money amounting to Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00), Philippine
Currency, belonging to Honorato Miano and Geronimo Miano, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Honorato Miano and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Miano in the sum of Three Hundred Twenty-
two Pesos (P322.00) with respect to the amount robbed, and also to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of deceased Geronimo Miano and Norberto Aton by reason of the death of these two persons.

Act committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code with the special
aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms
(Art. 296, Rev. Penal Code), and other aggravating circumstances, as follows:

1. That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended parties without any provocation from
the latter;

2. That nighttime was purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime; and.
 3. That advantage was taken of superior strength, accused and their companions, who were fully armed,
being numerically superior to the offended parties who were unarmed and defenseless.

When the case was called for trial on August 9, 1961, Atty. Tirol informed the court a quo that he was
appearing also for Apduhan, but only as counsel de oficio. In view of this manifestation, the trial court
appointed Atty. Tirol as counsel de oficio for the said accused. Forthwith, Atty. Tirol manifested that Apduhan
would change his former plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty. The record discloses that after the trial, judge had
repeatedly apprised Apduhan of the severity of the offense for which he was indicted and the strong possibility
that the capital penalty might be imposed upon him despite a plea of guilty, Apduhan persisted in his intention
to plead guilty with the request, however, that the death penalty be not imposed. Then after hearing the
arguments of Provincial Fiscal Jesus N. Borromeo and Atty. Tirol on the effect of articles 295 and 296 of the
Revised Penal Code on the case at bar, the trial judge advised the herein accused anew that he could be
sentenced to death notwithstanding his projected plea of guilty, but the latter reiterated his desire to confess his
guilt on the specific condition that he be sentenced to life imprisonment. Eventually, however, Apduhan
desisted from pleading guilty and let his previous plea stand on record after further warnings that he faced the
grave danger of being sentenced to death in view of the circumstances of his case. But the aforesaid desistance
was merely momentary as it did not end the accused's equivocation on the matter of his plea. After a five-
minute recess requested by Atty. Tirol in order to confer with the accused, the former informed the court a quo
that his client would insist on entering a plea of guilty. The following appears on record:

Atty. D. TIROL:

Your Honor, please, I had a conference with the accused and I apprised him with the situation of the
case and after hearing our apprisal he manifested that he will insist on his entering a plea of guilty, Your
Honor. I made it clear to him that we are not forcing him to enter the plea of guilty.

COURT (To accused Apolonio Apduhan, Jr.)

Q. Is it true that you are withdrawing your plea of not guilty?

A. I will just enter the plea of guilty.

Q. Have you been forced to enter the plea of guilty by your lawyer?.

A. No, Sir.

Q. And why do you said "I will JUST enter the plea of not guilty"?

A. I have proposed to enter the plea of guilty even before.

Q. Now the Court warns you again. Are you conscious of the fact that notwithstanding your plea of
guilty the Court may impose upon you the penalty of death?

A. I will just enter the plea of guilty, at the discretion of the Court.

Q. Even with all those dangers mentioned by the Court to you? .

A. Yes, Sir. (t.s.n. pp. 23-25).

Subsequently the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel de oficio resumed their oral arguments regarding the effect
on the instant case of articles 295 and 296, particularly the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating
circumstance under the latter article. Also discuss were the existence and effect of the alleged mitigating and
aggravating circumstances. All of these points will be later analyzed.

When the lower court subsequently reviewed the proceedings, it found that the accused's plea of guilty was
ambiguous. Hence, on August 30, 1961, the case was reopened with respect to Apduhan, and on said date the
latter entered a categorical plea of guilty, as evidenced by the record:

COURT (To Accused Apduhan, Jr.):

The Court reopened this case because after a review of the proceedings it found that your plea was not definite.
In answer to a question of the Court you simply said "I will just enter the plea of guilty". The Court wants to
know whether you enter the plea of guilty of the crime charged in the second amended information.

ACCUSED APDUHAN:.

I enter the plea of guilty.

COURT (To same accused Apduhan):

Q. Therefore, you admit that you have committed the crime charged in the second information?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

Q. Is it necessary for you that the second amended information be read again?

A. No more; it is not necessary.

Q. Do you want that the second amended information be read to you again?

A. No more, Your Honor. (t.s.n. pp. 50-51).

On the same day, the court a quo rendered its decision, the pertinent dispositive portion of which reads:.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment finding accused Apolonio Apduhan, Jr., alias
Junior guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide, punished by Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Article 296 of the game Code, as amended, and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of death.

Considering that Apduhan had voluntarily confessed his guilt in open court, then the only aspect of the case
properly subject to review is the correctness of the penalty imposed by the court a quo. In this respect, the
appreciation of the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance (art. 296) in fixing the
appropriate penalty for robbery with homicide (Art, 294 [1]) committed by a band with the use of unlicensed
firearms, and the interplay and counter-balancing of the attendant mitigating and aggravating circumstances,
would determine the severity of the penalty imposable.

The disposition of the question at hand necessitates a discussion of the interrelation among articles 294, 295 and
296 of the Revised Penal Code. For this purpose the said articles are hereunder quoted:

ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties. — Any person guilty
of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on
occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of article 263
shall have been inflicted.

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the
physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, shall have been inflicted.

4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have
been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when in the
course of the execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its
commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said article 263.

5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
period in other cases. (As amended by Rep. Act 18.).

ART 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and by a band, or with the
use of firearm on a street, road or alley. — If the offenses mentioned in subdivisions three, four, and five
of the next preceding article shall have been committed in an uninhabited place or by a band, or by
attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle or airship, or by entering the passengers'
compartments in a train or, in any manner, taking the passengers thereof by surprise in the respective
conveyances, or on a street, road highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of a
firearm, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the proper penalties. (As amended by
Rep. Acts Nos. 12 and 373.) (Emphasis supplied) .

ART. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof.— When more than three
armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed
by a band. When any of the arms used in the commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm the
penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty
provided by law, without prejudice to the criminal liability for illegal possession of such unlicensed
firearm.

Any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as
principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent
the same. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 12). (Emphasis supplied).

The afore-quoted art. 294 enumerates five classes of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons and prescribes the corresponding penalties. The case at bar falls under art. 294(1) which defines
robbery with homicide and fixes the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.

Article 295 provides, inter alia, that when the offenses described in subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of art. 294 are
committed by a band, the proper penalties must be imposed in the maximum periods. The circumstance of band
is therefore qualifying only in robbery punished by subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Consequently, art. 295 is
inapplicable to robbery with homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, and lesiones graves resulting in insanity,
imbecility, impotency or blindness. If the foregoing classes of robbery which are described in art. 294(1) and (2)
are perpetrated by a band, they would not be punishable under art. 295, but then cuadrilla would be a generic
aggravating under Art. 14 of the Code.1 Hence, with the present wording of art. 2952 there is no crime as
"robbery with homicide in band." If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense
would still be denominated as "robbery with homicide" under art. 294(1), but the element of band, as stated
above, would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

Article 296, as quoted above, defines "band", creates the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm, and provides the criminal liability incurred by the members of the band. The ascertainment of the
definite function and range of applicability of this article in relation to articles 294 and 295 is essential in the
disposition of the case at bar.

In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appears to have accorded validity to the Provincial Fiscal's
contention that in robbery with homicide committed by a band, the use of unlicensed firearm must be
appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance pursuant to art. 296. Thus convinced, the trial judge stressed
in his decision that "under the express mandate of the law, we cannot escape the arduous task of imposing the
death penalty." Subscribing to the said position, the Solicitor General adds that the "penalty for robbery under
the circumstances mentioned in Articles 294, paragraph 1, and 296 of the Code is the maximum of reclusion
perpetua to death, or the supreme penalty of death. This is mandatory." .

On the other hand, Atty. Alberto M. Meer, the accused's counsel de oficio in the present review, contends that
the use of unlicensed firearm, if ever appreciated in the case at bar, must be considered a generic aggravating
factor which "may be off-set by the existence of mitigating circumstances so that the penalty to be imposed
should be the penalty of reclusion perpetua." .

Both the foregoing contentions are untenable.

After a perceptive analysis of the provisions of art. 296, we reach the considered opinion that the said article is
exclusively linked and singularly applicable to the immediately antecedent provision of art. 295 on robbery in
band, as the latter article, in turn, is explicitly limited in scope to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294.
Consequently, although the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance under art. 296, as
amended by Rep. Act 12, 3 it cannot be appreciated as such in relation to robbery with homicide, described and
penalized under paragraph 1 of art. 294.

As previously stated, art. 295 provides that if any of the classes of robbery described in subdivisions 3, 4, and 5
of art. 294 is committed by a band, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the proper penalty.
Correspondingly, the immediately following provisions of art. 296 define the term "band", prescribe the
collective liability of the members of the band, and state that "when any of the arms used in the commission of
the offense be in unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum
of the corresponding penalty provided by law." Viewed from the contextual relation of articles 295 and 296, the
word "offense" mentioned in the above-quoted portion of the latter article logically means the crime of robbery
committed by a band, as the phrase "all the malefactors" indubitably refers to the members of the band and the
phrase "the corresponding penalty provided by law" relates to the offenses of robbery described in the last three
subdivisions of art. 294 which are all encompassed within the ambit of art. 295. Evidently, therefore, art. 296 in
its entirety is designed to amplify and modify the provision on robbery in band which is nowhere to be found
but in art. 295 in relation to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Verily, in order that the aforesaid special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm may be appreciated to justify the imposition of the
maximum period of the proper penalty it is a condition sine qua non that the offense charged be robbery
committed by a band within the contemplation of art. 295. To reiterate, since art. 295, does not apply to
subdivision 1 and 2 of art. 294, then the special aggravating factor in question, which is solely applicable to
robbery in band under art. 295, cannot be considered in fixing the penalty imposable for robbery with homicide
under art. 294(1), even if the said crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms.

The legislative intent of making art. 296 corollary to art. 295 with respect to robbery in band was unmistakably
articulated by Congressman Albano in his sponsorship speech on H. B. No. 124 (subsequently enacted as Rep.
Act No. 12, amending, among others, articles 295 and 296 of the Revised Penal Code). Said Congressman
Albano: "Article 296 as a corollary of Article 295 would change the definition heretofore known of the term
"band" under the law. The purpose of this amendment is to inject therein the element of aggravation, when any
member of the band carries an unlicensed firearm . ." 4.

The special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, however, was initially applicable to all the
subdivisions of art. 294 since the said Rep. Act No. 12 also amended art. 295 to include within its scope all the
classes of robbery described in art. 294. With the then enlarged coverage of art. 295, art. 296, being corollary to
the former, was perforce made applicable to robbery with homicide (art. 294[1]). Thus, in People vs. Bersamin,
5 this Court, in passing, opined: "The use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstanceapplicable
only in cases of robbery in band (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3, Republic Act No.
12)." .

In the said case, this Court declared in effect that in robo con homicidio the use of unlicensed firearm is not a
special aggravating circumstance when the said offense is not committed by a band. Inferentially, had the
robbery with homicide in Bersamin been perpetrated by a band, the use of unlicensed firearm would have been
appreciated. This implied pronouncement would have been justified under art. 296 in relation to art. 295, as
amended by Rep. Act 12. But the aforesaid inference lost all legal moorings in 1949 with the enactment of Rep.
Act 373 which excluded subdivisions 1 and 2 of art. 294 from the coverage of art. 295. Since art. 296, as
repeatedly emphasized above, is corollary to art. 295, the diminution of the latter's scope correspondingly
reduced the former's extent of applicability. In other words, the passage of the foregoing amendment did not
only jettison the first two subdivisions of art. 294 from the periphery of art. 295 but also removed the said
subdivisions (which pertain, inter alia, to the offense of robbery with homicide) from the effective range of art.
296.

Notwithstanding that the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm cannot be appreciated in
the instant case, we are constrained, in the final analysis, to observe that the imposition of the death penalty on
the accused Apduhan would appear to be a logical legal consequence, because as against the attendant
mitigating circumstances the aggravating circumstances numerically and qualitatively preponderate.

After Apduhan had pleaded guilty, the defense counsel offered for consideration three mitigating circumstances,
namely, plea of guilty, intoxication, and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. Subsequently, however, the
defense withdrew the last mentioned mitigating circumstance after the prosecution had withdrawn the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The following manifestations appear on record: .

"FISCAL BORROMEO: .

"In fairness to the accused, because the crime charged is robbery in band (the case at bar is actually
robbery with homicide), it is natural that in robbery in band there is already abuse of superior strength,
so we will just withdraw that superior strength.

"COURT (To Atty. D. Tirol): .

"What do you say now? .

"ATTY. D. TIROL: .

"Such being the case, we will not insist on presenting evidence in support of our contention that the
accused did not intend to commit so grave a wrong.

"COURT: .
"Moreover by the mere use of firearm the accused cannot claim that he did not intend to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed. So now you withdraw your petition that you be allowed to present
evidence to that effect? .

"ATTY. D. TIROL: .

"Yes, Your Honor." (t.s.n. pp. 47-48).

Thus, only two alleged mitigating circumstances remain for consideration.

Anent the plea of guilty, we believe that under art. 13 (7) its appreciation in the case at bar is beyond
controversion.

However, apropos the alternative circumstance of intoxication, we find no evidence on record to support
the defense's claim that it should be considered as a mitigating factor. This absence of proof can be
attributed to the defense's erroneous belief that it was not anymore its burden to establish the state of
intoxication of the accused when he committed the offense charged since anyway the prosecution had
already admitted the attendance of the said mitigating circumstance on the ground that the State did not
have strong evidence to overthrow the accused's claim of non-habituality to drinking. The record
discloses the following pertinent discussion: .

"COURT (To Fiscal Borromeo):.

"Do you agree, Mr. Fiscal, that the non-habitual intoxication of the accused be also taken into account in
his favor as a mitigating circumstance? "FISCAL BORROMEO: .

"We have no evidence exactly to know at this time that the accused was intoxicated, but his affidavit
states that before the commission of the crime they took young coconuts and there is no mention about
the taking of any liquor, so that, as it is now, we are constrained to object.

"COURT (To the Fiscal): .

"But do you have evidence to counteract that allegation? .

"FISCAL BORROMEO: .

"We do not have any evidence to counteract that.

"COURT (To the Fiscal): .

"But do you not admit the attendance of that circumstance? .

"FISCAL BORROMEO: With that manifestation we submit because actually we do not have evidence
to counteract that he was a habitual drinker. "COURT (To the Fiscal): .

"But do you prefer to admit that mitigating circumstance or you need that evidence be presented to that
effect? "FISCAL BORROMEO: .

"Inasmuch as we do not have strong evidence to contradict that circumstance in fairness to the accused,
we would rather submit.
 "COURT (To the Fiscal): .

"The attendance of the mitigating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication? .

"FISCAL BORROMEO: .

"Yes, Your Honor." (t.s.n. pp. 7-9) (Emphasis supplied) .

From the above proceedings in the trial court, it would appear that what the prosecution actually intended to
admit was the non-habituality of the accused to drinking liquor, not as a matter of fact, but due to the State's
inability to disprove the same. The prosecution apparently did not concede the actual intoxication of the
accused. We are of the firm conviction that, under the environmental circumstances, the defense was not
relieved of its burden to prove the accused's actual state of intoxication. Otherwise, to appreciate the attendance
of a mitigating factor on the mere allegation of the accused, coupled with the dubious acquiescence of the
prosecution, would open wide the avenue for unscrupulous and deceitful collusion between defense and
prosecution in order to unduly and unjustly minimize the penalty imposable upon the accused.

The last paragraph of art. 15 of the Code provides:.

"The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the
offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to
commit said felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional it shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. (Emphasis supplied).

Under the foregoing provision, intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or intentional, that is, not
subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. However, to be mitigating the accused's state of intoxication must
be proved. 6 Once intoxication is established by satisfactory evidence, 7 then in the absence of proof to the
contrary" it is presumed to be non-habitual or unintentional. 8 .

In People vs. Noble 9 the defendant testified that before the murder he took a bottle of wine and drank little by
little until he got drunk. The policeman who arrested the accused testified that the latter smelled wine and
vomited. The Court held that the evidence presented was not satisfactory to warrant a mitigation of the penalty.
Intoxication was likewise not competently proved in a case 10 where the only evidence was that the defendant
had a gallon of tuba with him at the time he committed the crime.

In the case at bar the accused merely alleged that when he committed the offense charged he was intoxicated
although he was "not used to be drunk," 11This self-serving statement stands uncorroborated. Obviously, it is
devoid of any probative value.

To recapitulate, the accused has in his favor only one mitigating circumstance: plea of guilty. As
aforementioned, the defense withdrew its claim of "lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong" and failed to
substantiate its contention that intoxication should be considered mitigating.

While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an admission of all the material
facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein recited. 12 The four
aggravating circumstances are (1) band; (2) dwelling; (3) nighttime; and (4) abuse of superior strength. The
circumstance of abuse of superiority was, however, withdrawn by the prosecution on the ground that since the
offense of robbery with homicide was committed by a band, the element of cuadrilla necessarily absorbs the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. We believe that said withdrawal was ill-advised since the
circumstances of band and abuse of superiority are separate and distinct legal concepts. The element of band is
appreciated when the offense is committed by more than three armed malefactors regardless of the comparative
strength of the victim or victims. Hence, the indispensable components of cuadrilla are (1) at least four
malefactors and (2) all of the four malefactors are armed. On the other hand, the gravamen of abuse of
superiority is the taking advantage by the culprits of their collective strength to overpower their relatively
weaker victim or victims. Hence, in the latter aggravating factor, what is taken into account is not the number of
aggressors nor the fact that they are armed, but their relative physical might vis-a-vis the offended party.

Granting, however, that the said withdrawal was valid, there still remain three aggravating circumstances which
render inutile the solitary extenuating circumstance of plea of guilty. The prosecution does not need to prove the
said three circumstances (all alleged in the second amended information) since the accused by his plea of guilty,
has supplied the requisite proof. 13 Hence, we will not belabor our discussion of the attendance aggravating
circumstances.

The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, 14 like the
offense at bar. The rationale behind this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be committed without
the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. Morada is inherent only in crimes which could be
committed in no other place than in the house of another, such as trespass and robbery in an inhabited house. 15
This Court in People vs. Pinca, 16 citing People vs. Valdez, 17 ruled that the "circumstances (of dwelling and
scaling) were certainly not inherent in the crime committed, because, the crime being robbery with violence or
intimidation against persons (specifically, robbery with homicide) the authors thereof could have committed it
without the necessity of violating or scaling the domicile of their victim." Cuello Calon opines that the
commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and produces greater
alarm. 18.

Nocturnity is aggravating when it is purposely and deliberately sought by the accused to facilitate the
commission of the crime 19 or to prevent their being recognized or to insure unmolested escape. 20
Nocturnidad must concur with the intent and design of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity
afforded by the darkness of night. 21 In the case at bar, the affidavit (exh. I-1) of the accused Apduhan shows
that he and his co-malefactors took advantage of the nighttime in the perpetration of the offense as they waited
until it was dark before they came out of their hiding place to consummate their criminal designs.

In his decision, the trial judge recommends to, the President of the Republic the commutation of the death
sentence which he imposed on the accused to life imprisonment. The Solicitor General supports this
recommendation for executive clemency.

We find no compelling reason to justify such recommendation. Contrary to the trial judge's observation, the
accused's plea of guilty was far from "spontaneous" and "insistent". It will be recalled that his initial plea was
one of not guilty. Later, he changed his plea but with the persistent condition that he be sentenced to life
imprisonment, not death. It was only after much equivocation that he finally decided to "just" plead guilty.
Because his plea was still ambiguous, the court a quo had to reopen the case to ascertain its real nature.
Conceding, however, that his plea was "spontaneous" and "insistent," such manifestation of sincere repentance
cannot serve to obliterate the attendant aggravating circumstances which patently reveal the accused's criminal
perversity.

It appears from a cursory reading of the decision under review that the trial judge also anchored his
recommendation on the ground that there is "the possibility that the firearm was used in order to counteract the
resistance of the deceased." This is no justification at all for executive clemency. Firstly, the above observation
is a mere conjecture - in the language of the presiding judge, a "possibility." Secondly, even granting that the
said observation relates to the actual happening, to employ a firearm in subduing the lawful resistance of
innocent persons is a criminal act by any standard.

Even as we purge the decision under review of its errors, we must hasten to commend the trial judge, the Hon.
Hipolito Alo, for his earnest and patient efforts to forestall the entry of an improvident plea of guilty by the
accused Apduhan, notwithstanding that the latter was already represented by a counsel de oficio and hence
presumed to have been advised properly. Judge Alo made sure that the accused clearly and fully understood the
seriousness of the offense charged and the severity of the penalty attached to it. When the accused proposed to
confess his guilt, Judge Alo repeatedly warned him that the death penalty might be imposed despite his plea of
guilty. As aforementioned, when it appeared that Apduhan's plea of guilty was ambiguous, Judge Alo reopened
the case to determine with definitiveness the nature of his plea.

The virtue of Judge Alo's efforts in ascertaining whether Apduhan pleaded guilty with full knowledge of the
significance and consequences of his act, recommends itself to all trial judges who must refrain from accepting
with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty
bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning
of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.

As a final commentary on the criminal conduct of the accused herein, it must be emphasized that the instant
review was delayed for several years because he escaped from the New Bilibid Prisons on June 17, 1963, less
than six months after he was committed to the said penitentiary. He was recommitted on July 10, 1964 with a
new mittimus from the Court of First Instance of Leyte for robbery in band in criminal case 10099, for which he
was sentenced to serve a prison term of from 8 years and 1 day to 12 years and 1 day commencing on October
31, 1963. 22 His recommitment was reported to this Court only on July 5, 1966.

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, for failure to secure the required number of votes, the penalty of
death cannot be legally imposed. The penalty next lower in degree - reclusion perpetua - should consequently be
imposed on the accused.

ACCORDINGLY, with the modification that the death sentence imposed upon Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. by the
court a quo is reduced to reclusion perpetua, the judgment a quo is affirmed in all other respects, without
pronouncement as to costs.

March 5, 2018

G.R. No. 217974

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
RESURRECT ON JUANILW MANZANO, JR. and REZOR JUANILLO MANZANO, Accused
REZOR JUANILLO MANZANO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Rezor Juanillo Manzano (accused-appellant) from the 29 October
2014 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Twentieth Division in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01473 affirming in
toto the 17 April 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Article (Art.) 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

THE FACTS

The accused-appellant and his elder brother Resurrecion Manzano (Resurrecion) were charged with murder
before the RTC of San Jose, Antique, in an Information3 docketed as Crim. Case No. 10-07-8009, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 19th day of March 2010, in the Municipality of Hamtic, Province of Antique, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed
with knives, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with said knives one Lucio Silava, thereby
inflicting upon the latter wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death.

With qualifying circumstance of treachery and abuse of superior strength.

Contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The parties agreed to have an inverted trial after the accused-appellant who, pleading not guilty during the
arraignment, raised the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Resurrecion remained at large.

To prove his claim of self-defense, the accused-appellant himself testified. SP02 Roberto Javier (SP02 Javier)
of the Hamtic police office took the witness stand to prove that the accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered.

The prosecution tried to prove its case against the accused-appellant by calling to the witness stand Dr. Ma. Eva
D. Pacificador (Dr. Pacificador), Victoria N. Silava (Victoria), Atty. Rean S. Sy (Atty. Sy), and Luisa P.
Monteclaro (Luisa).

Version of the Defense

At about 9:30 p.m. on 19 March 2010, while the accused-appellant was home sitting by the window, he saw
Lucio Silava (Lucio) throwing stones at his house. The electric lamppost was lighted, thus, the
accusedappellant, who was then eighteen years old, was sure that it was Lucio.4

The accused-appellant immediately went out to inquire from Lucio why he was throwing stones at his house but
Lucio threw a stone at him that hit his right knee and caused him to fall down. Lucio rushed towards the
accused-appellant to stab him with a knife but was unsuccessful as they grappled for its possession. It was at
that instance that the accused-appellant called out to Resurrecion, who was home that time, to run away so that
he would not be involved. Because Lucio was very drunk, the accusedappellant was able to take hold of the
knife, but blacked out and started stabbing Lucio. Thereafter, the accused-appellant ran away and proceeded to
the house of Reno Manzano (Reno), an elder brother, at Barangay San Angel, San Jose, Antique, where he also
met Resurrecion. The following day, the accused-appellant surrendered to the police authorities.5

The accused-appellant had known Lucio for eight years already since the latter's house was in front of his house
and were separated only by the road. Accused-appellant was as tall as Lucio but the latter had a bigger body
build. Resurrecion had a dislocated right shoulder and a smaller build than that of Lucio and the accused-
appellant.6

Version of the Prosecution

At about 9:00 p.m. on 19 March 2010, the spouses Lucio and Victoria were inside their store fronting the
accused-appellant's house. Lucio was having his dinner at the kitchen inside the store while Victoria was
watching the store when the accused-appellant and Resurrecion called out from the gate saying that they would
buy cigarettes. Because the gate leading to the store was already closed, Lucio told the accused-appellant and
Resurrecion to come.7

Resurrecion stood outside the store and told Victoria that he wanted to buy Fortune white cigarettes and handed
her ₱20.00. The accused-appellant entered the store and proceeded to where Lucio was having dinner. After
realizing that she had no more stock of the Fortune white cigarette, Victoria told Resurrecion who, in reply, said
that he would no longer buy cigarettes and then proceeded towards the kitchen. Thereafter, Victoria heard Lucio
ask, "What wrong have I committed?" Victoria rushed to the kitchen and there saw Lucio bloodied and leaning
on the door, while the accusedappellant and Resurrecion were stabbing him.8

Victoria went out of the store shouting for help and saying that the accused-appellant and Resurrecion were
stabbing Lucio. When Victoria went back inside, she saw Lucio run outside the store but still within the fenced
premises, and the accused-appellant and Resurrecion were going after him. From where she stood, Victoria saw
Resurrecion hold Lucio's hands while the accused-appellant, who was positioned behind Lucio, held Lucio’s
body with one arm while with his other hand stabbed Lucio’s back. When Resurrecion released his grip on
Lucio, the latter fell face down but the accused-appellant and Resurrecion continued to stab him causing
Victoria to utter, "I will let you eat the whole body of my husband alive." The accused-appellant and
Resurrecion thereafter ran towards the direction of the farm.9

Lucio was brought to the hospital but Victoria had to stay behind to find money for his medical expenses. On
her way to the hospital, Victoria was informed that Lucio had died. Luisa, a cousin of Lucio, took pictures of
the dead body. Victoria had the pictures10 developed and secured Lucio's death certificate.11 Victoria incurred
a total of ₱15,000.0012 for the funeral expenses.13

On 23 March 2010, Dr. Pacificador conducted a postmortem examination on the body of Lucio, the results of
which follow:

Left Anterior Thorax

StabWound # 1 - Horizontal in direction about 3 cm in length located at the left anterior chest below the left
clavicle penetrating the upper lobe of the left lung and aorta.

StabWound # 2 - Vertical in direction about 3 cm in length located below wound #1 resulting into fracture of
3rd rib.

Right Anterior Thorax

StabWound # 3 - Vertical in direction about 2 cm in length on the left shoulder, non-penetrating.

StabWound # 4 - Vertical in direction about 4.5 cm in length located below right clavicle penetrating the upper
lobe of the right lung.

StabWound # 5 - Vertical in direction about 4 cm in length below the sternum penetrating the liver.

StabWound # 6 - Vertical in direction about 4.5 cm in length about 3 cm below wound # 5 penetrating the
liver.

StabWound # 7 - Vertical in direction about 1.5 cm in length below wound # 6 non-penetrating.

Extremities

StabWound # 8 - Vertical in direction about 3.5 cm in length located on the left upper arm going through the
axilla.

StabWound# 9 - Horizontal in direction about 2.5 cm in length on the left lower arm below the left antecubital
fossa, nonpenetrating

StabWound# 10 - Horizontal in direction about 3 cm in length just below wound # 9 left lower arm.

StabWound # 11 - Horizontal in direction about 2 cm in length located below left wrist, non-penetrating.

Posterior Thorax

StabWound # 12 - Vertical in direction about 2.5 cm in length just below the neck in between scapula, non-
penetrating.

StabWound # 13 - Vertical in direction about 5 cm in length just below wound# 12, non-penetrating.

StabWound # 14 - Vertical in direction about 2 cm in length below wound# 13, non-penetrating.

StabWound # 15 - Horizontal in direction about 1.5 cm in length on the right lumbar area, non-penetrating.

Cause of death:

Hypovolemic Shock secondary to Hemorrhage secondary to Multiple Stab Wounds.14

It was a week after the stabbing incident that Atty. Sy took pictures15 of the place where Lucio was attacked.
He saw splatters of dried blood inside the store and within the fenced perimeter enclosing the crime scene.16

The Ruling of the RTC

According to the RTC, a careful and deeper examination of the facts and circumstances tend to contradict the
accused-appellant's version of the incident and his claim that he acted in self-defense. In so ruling, the RTC
considered the following: that if there was no intention on the part of the accused-appellant and Resurrecion to
kill Lucio, they could have easily overpowered him because he was very drunk at that time; it was not
convinced that Lucio hit the accused-appellant on his right knee causing him to fall since the latter failed to
present a medical certificate notwithstanding his contention that he was brought by a police officer to a doctor
for his knee injury; it was not satisfied with the accused-appellant's version that after he fell down, Lucio held
his neck and stabbed him because not once was the accused-appellant hit; the number of stab wounds sustained
by Lucio negates self-defense; the serious injuries sustained by Lucio demonstrate the accused-appellant's intent
to kill; the splattered blood inside the store and on the bamboo slats serving as wall of the kitchen are proofs
that the incident started at the kitchen of Lucio’s store and continued outside but still within the fenced
perimeter; that when the accused-appellant blacked out, he was still able to shout at Resurrecion to run away so
as not to be involved in the incident; the portrayal on how the accused-appellant singlehandedly stabbed Lucio
was not worthy of credence; the claim of the accused-appellant that he hit Lucio frontally was denied by the
postmortem examination results; the only plausible explanation for Lucio's back injuries was that these were
inflicted by either the accused-appellant or Resurrecion or by both of them; and the accused-appellant had not
assailed or contradicted, by testimonial or documentary evidence, the truthfulness and trustworthiness of
Victoria's testimony.17
On the one hand, the R TC found that the accused-appellant and Resurrecion conspired as shown by their
concerted action of surprising Lucio in the kitchen and, without justifiable reason, helping each other assault
their victim. Moreover, the RTC ruled that the commission of the felony was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of noctumity which facilitated the assailants' escape. According to the RTC, it was unfortunate
that this circumstance was not properly appreciated as this was not alleged in the information.18

The RTC, however, was not convinced that the accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered considering the
following reasons: he fled from the locus criminis and proceeded to Reno's house in San Jose instead of going
to the Hamtic police station; he did not surrender to the San Jose police; and it was Reno who informed the
Hamtic police station of the accused-appellant's presence in San Jose, thus, the policemen proceeded to Reno's
house and took custody of the accused-appellant.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered convicting accused REZORMANZANOy

JUANILLO, beyond reasonable doubt, of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua.

He is also ordered to indemnify the legal heirs of Lucio Silava the amount of ₱75,000.00 for the death of the
said victim and to pay the said legal heirs actual expenses in the amount of ₱15,000.00 as well as moral
damages amounting to ₱25,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.19

Feeling aggrieved with the decision of the RTC, the accused-appellant appealed before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA noted the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of Lucio which made the claim of self-defense
unavailable. According to the CA, the accused-appellant must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on
the weakness of the prosecution's evidence since he had admitted that he killed Lucio. The CA held that there
was no proof that the RTC failed to appreciate facts and circumstances which would have merited the accused-
appellant's acquitta1.20

The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC that treachery and abuse of superior strength attended the killing of
Lucio, and that the accused-appellant had not voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities.21

In view of its findings, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 20, 2012 of the RTC, Branch 12, San
Jose, Antique in Criminal Case No. 10-07-8009 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.22

ISSUES

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND

IMPROBABLE TESTIMONY OF VICTORIA SILAVA.
 II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE BY

ACCUSED-APPELLANT REZOR MANZANO, AS A PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ACTED WITH
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S

VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.23

OUR RULING

The appeal does not deserve any merit.

The findings of the RTC

as to the credibility of

witnesses should be

respected especially

when these are affirmed

by the CA.

It has been trenchantly maintained in a catena of cases that when the issues involve matters of credibility of
witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
effect.24 The assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial
court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude under gruelling examination. These factors are the most significant in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.25 The factual findings of
the R TC, therefore, are accorded the highest degree of respect especially if the CA adopted and confirmed
these,26 unless some facts or circumstances of weight were overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted as to
materially affect the disposition of the case.27 In the absence of substantial reason to justify the reversal of the
trial court’s assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been
overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings.28

It must be noted that it is a general rule in criminal cases that an examination of the entire records of a case may
be explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion; as an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole
case open for review, it being the duty of the appellate court to correct such error as may be found in the
judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subject of the assignment of errors or not.29 It is for this
reason that the Court has painstakingly reviewed the records of this case; yet, it found no reason to depart from
the well-entrenched rule that the findings of the R TC as to the credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed
considering the absence of any showing that it had overlooked a material fact that otherwise would change the
outcome of the case or had misunderstood a circumstance of consequence in their evaluation of the credibility
of the witnesses.30

The testimony of Victoria identifying the accused-appellant and Resurrecion as the ones who assaulted Lucio
was positive, convincing, and straightforward, viz:

Q. You said a while ago that your store is lighted with bulb, what is the voltage of the electric bulb?

A. Ten (10) watts.

Q. So, what did you do after you heard your husband said those words?

A. I immediately went towards the door of the store towards the kitchen area and I saw my husband leaning on
the wall full of blood and the two accused simultaneously stabbing my husband.

Q. So both of them are holding a knife?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you saw both of them stabbing your husband?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Please tell us how near is your door to the [location] of your husband when he was stabbed?

A. (Witness as this juncture pointed at the distance from the witness stand to the place occupied by Atty. Rivero
which is estimated to be about two (2) meters, as agreed upon by the prosecution and the defense, as the
distance from the door to the [location] where the husband was stabbed.)

Q. And when you came out of your door that was your distance from your husband after he was being stabbed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And please describe to us what did you do immediately after coming out of that door?

A. From the door, I saw my husband leaning on the wall full of blood with the two accused simultaneously
stabbing him.

Q. And you saw that there was no structure blocking your side?

A. No, sir.

Q. While they were stabbing your husband, can you tell us if the two accused uttered any words?

A. Nothing, sir.

Q. Can you recall while standing how many times did the two accused stab your husband?

A. I cannot count how many times the two accused stabbed my husband but I saw both of them stabbing my
husband.
Q. At that time your husband is facing you?

A. Yes, sir because he was leaning on the wall.

Q. What did you do next?

A. After that I ran out of [the] house and ran towards the fence and shouted that Resurrecion and Rezor are
stabbing my husband and I went back inside the house after saying those words.

Q. When you said those words you came back to your house, please tell us when you came back to your house,
you entered the main gate or front of the road?

A. Just in front of our store when I shouted for help.

Q. While standing on the road facing your husband, please tell us what did you see?

A. While I was standing on the road, I saw Resurrecion holding my husband and holding [his] hands while
Rezor was behind my husband and one hand was holding the body of my husband and the other hand was
stabbing at the back of my husband.

Q. At that point did you see on what portion of the body of your husband was Rezor stabbing him?

A. At the back.

Q. How far were you from them?

A. Very near. (x x x two (2) meters, as agreed upon by both counsel)

Q. Please tell us, when the two accused Resurrecion and Rezor were holding your husband and Resurrecion was
stabbing on the back, in what portion were they located?

A. In front of our store.

COURT:

Q. Are you telling the court that the two accused were already outside the store?

A. Yes, sir.

ATTY. SY:

Q. Outside the store but within the gate?

A. Yes, sir.

COURT:

Q. From inside the kitchen, can you tell the court where did the three pass by?

A. My husband was able to run outside the house.

Q. So when your husband ran outside the house, the two accused followed him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you saw your husband and the two accused in that position they were directly in front of your store but
still within the gate?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is this store lighted?

A. Yes, sir, it is lighted with a bulb.

Q. And from your position you can properly see their faces?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Tell us what happened next?

A. At that particular moment, I saw Resurrecion holding the two hands of my husband while Rezor's [other]
hand was holding my husband while the other hand was stabbing my husband. I cannot recall which hand was
used by him in stabbing my husband.

xxxx

Q. So, are you telling the court that Rezor was in the grip of your husband?

A. Yes. Sir.

xxxx

Q. Now, do you realize that both injuries of your husband were in [the] front portion of his body?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. About how many times did you see Resurrecion stab your husband while he was at the back of your
husband?

A. I saw Rezor stabbed my husband once and that was the time that Resurrecion released my husband from his
grip and so my husband fell to the ground facing down.

xxxx

ATTY. SY:

xxxx

Q. So, when your husband fell down, what did you do next?
A. Rezor and Resurrecion helped each other in stabbing him and at that point in time I told Rezor and
Resurrecion "I will let you eat the whole body of my husband alive," and then that was the time the two accused
ran away."31

It was clear from the testimony of Victoria that she was able to personally witness when the accused-appellant
and Resurrecion assaulted Lucio; and that she could not be mistaken as to the assailants' identity since the place
where the crime happened was well-lighted.

Accused-appellant tried to dent the credibility of Victoria by asserting that she did not actually see the scuffle
between him and Lucio as verified by her admission during the cross-examination by the defense.32

The contention of the accused-appellant is without merit. The records bear out that Victoria admitted that right
after she heard Lucio utter "What wrong did I commit," she immediately went to the kitchen and found her
husband leaning on the kitchen door, bloodied, while the accused-appellant and Resurrecion were stabbing him.
Contrary to the claim of the accused-appellant, a review of the testimony of Victoria would show that what she
claimed she did not witness was the scuffle, if there was any, between Lucio and the accused-appellant prior to
her hearing her husband utter "What wrong did I commit?" It was also pointed out that Victoria had claimed
that she did not hear anything from the accused-appellant and Resurrecion before she heard Lucio utter these
words in a soft and pleading manner, hence, accentuating the fact that no such scuffle had taken place.

In the same vein, the position of the accused-appellant that Victoria could not have seen the actions of Lucio
and the accused-appellant as she had gone out of the house to ask for help,33 fails to persuade. Victoria stated
that after running out to the street and shouting for help, she went back inside the fenced premises of the store;
thus, she was able to see Lucio run outside from the kitchen, and saw the accused-appellant and Resurrecion
follow Lucio, get hold of him, and stab him again.34

In stark contrast to the allegation of the accused-appellant that Victoria's statements before the trial court were
inconsistent and incredible, a perspicacious review of her testimony sustains a finding that her narration of what
happened on that fateful day of 19 March 2010 was plausible, being consistent in all important details. For sure,
the records are bereft of any showing that Victoria's testimony was inspired by ill motive or was attended by
bad faith. Jurisprudence holds that when there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the
witness to testify falsely against the accused or to pervert the truth, the logical conclusion is that no such motive
exists, and that the former's testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.35

We underscore that, except for the alleged inconsistencies which to the mind of the Court are inconsequential,
the accused-appellant failed to proffer any convincing and material variations in the testimony of Victoria that
would warrant the Court to reverse the RTC’s finding as to her credibility. It is settled in this jurisdiction that as
long as the testimony of the witness is coherent and intrinsically believable as a whole, discrepancies in minor
details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of the witnesses'
declarations.36 Of utmost meaning to this case is the ruling laid down in Velasquez v. People,37 viz:

Jurisprudence is replete with clarifications that a witness' recollection of [a] crime need not be foolproof:
"Witnesses cannot be expected to recollect with exactitude every minute detail of an event. This is especially
true when the witnesses testify as to facts which transpired in rapid succession, attended by flurry and
excitement." This is especially true of a victim's recollection of his or her own harrowing ordeal. One who has
undergone a horrifying and traumatic experience "cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an
accurate account" of every minutiae.

The accused-appellant

assumes the burden of

establishing his plea of

self-defense by credible,

clear, and convincing

evidence.

Jurisprudence instructs that an accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article 1138 of the Revised
Penal Code admits to the commission of acts, which would otherwise engender criminal liability.39 Corollary
thereto, the rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admit that they are the
authors of the death of the victim, and their defense is anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon
them to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.40 With this admission, the burden of
evidence is shifted to the appellant to prove that all the essential elements of self-defense are present.41 Verily,
to invoke self-defense effectually, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the
life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable
means to resist the attack.42 Self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it.43 Conviction
follows if the evidence for the accused fails to prove the existence of justifying circumstances.44

Accused-appellant contends that he merely repelled the unlawful aggression of Lucio, viz: when Lucio threw a
stone at him that hit his knee; and when Lucio rushed towards him to stab him. Additionally, accusedappellant
avers that his testimony was credible that he alone inflicted the stab wounds on Lucio.45

To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.46

On the first element, the consistent teaching by the Court on unlawful aggression is as follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the
presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real
peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary
threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression,
namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at
least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent
unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his
hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.47

The evidence before the Court palpably lend negative credence to the presence of unlawful aggression.
Primarily, when compared to Victoria's testimony which withstood the crucible of intense cross-examination by
the defense and the clarificatory questioning by the trial court, accused-appellant’s testimony was not only
incongruous with the evidence on record but also improbable.
The version of the defense was that the unlawful aggression began with Lucio who was outside the accused-
appellant's house throwing stones at its roof. Allegedly, Lucio likewise threw a stone at the accused-appellant
when he came out of the house which hit his knee and caused him to fall down. Lucio was about to stab the
accused-appellant with a knife but then a scuffle ensued for its possession. When the accused-appellant got hold
of the knife, he "blacked out" and stabbed Lucio several times.

The defense’s version of the events is swiftly denied by the prosecution’s pictures48 showing Lucio’s blood
splattered in the kitchen of Victoria's store and at the fenced premises. These pictures are silent evidence that
confirm the truth of Victoria's testimony and easily weaken the defense's version that when the accused-
appellant acted in self-defense to Lucio’s unlawful aggression, they were at the road in front of accused-
appellant’s house. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonies of witnesses, the
primacy of the physical evidence must be upheld.49

It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant has neither witness nor evidence to fortify his claim that the unlawful
aggression started with Lucio. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.50 The fact that Resurrecion is
still in hiding instead of giving his testimony before the trial court to boost the theory proffered by the accused-
appellant well confirms the finding that the defense's version of the events was contrived.

To amplify his position that he acted in self-defense, the accusedappellant tried to make issue of his absence of
motive to stab Lucio. The accused-appellant basically anchored his position on the ruling laid down by the
Court in Borguilla v. Court of Appeals, 51 that "the absence of motive is important in ascertaining the truth as
between two antagonistic theories or versions of the killing. Herein, it was the victim who had reason to harm
the accused."52

The quoted ruling in Borguilla does not find meaning in this case considering that the identity of the accused-
appellant as the assailant of Lucio has been firmly established by the prosecution. For sure, even the accused-
appellant admitted that he stabbed Lucio several times after he blacked out. In Borguilla, because of the
contradictory accounts of the event by both parties, the Court resorted to searching for facts or circumstances
which could be used as valuable aids in evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony; thus, the
Court had appreciated the presence of motive of the victim to harm the accused in ascertaining which of the
versions was true. In the present case, however, both the testimonial and documentary evidence of the
prosecution demonstrably disproved the defense's version that unlawful aggression was initiated by Lucio. Also
revealing was that, in contrast to the Borguilla ruling, there was conspicuous dearth of evidence to establish that
Lucio had motive to kill the accused-appellant.

Notwithstanding the accused-appellant's contention that he has no motive in killing Lucio, we point out that
motive is not material in this case. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged
does not show guilt; and the absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the
crime charged such as murder.53 To emphasize, "motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively
identified by an eyewitness. Intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive alone is not a proof and is hardly
ever an essential element of a crime."54

It is vigorously underscored that the pith and soul of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is the presence
of unlawful aggression; thus, the absence of this requisite readily converts the claim of self-defense into
nothingness even with the existence of the other elements because the two other essential elements of self-
defense would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel.55 As case
law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person
who resorted to self-defense.56

Accused-appellant's plea of self-defense is controverted by the nature, number, and location of the wounds
inflicted on the victim, since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to
defend.57 The postmortem examination58 conducted by Dr. Pacificador on the body of Lucio revealed that he
sustained fifteen wounds, four of which were fatal, and that the cause of his death was hypovolemic shock
secondary to hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds. The findings of Dr. Pacificador justify a
declaration that there was undeniable intent on the part of the accused-appellant to kill Lucio.

The absence of unlawful aggression on the part of Lucio in this case unmistakably belies the accused-
appellant’s claim of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. In view of this, the Court finds no reason to
further discuss the other elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense and will proceed to determine
the offense committed by the accused-appellant.

The crime committed by

the accused-appellant

was murder.

The accused-appellant averred that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder; he maintained that he was
guilty only of homicide in view of the absence of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength .59

The crime of murder, under Article (Art.) 24860 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is committed by any person
who, not falling within the provisions of Art. 24661 of the same Code, shall kill another with treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity.62 Jurisprudence provides that to warrant a conviction for the
crime of murder, the following essential elements must be present: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the
accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Art. 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.63

There is no question that the first, second, and fourth elements are present in this case. It is the resolution of the
issue on whether the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength that attended the
killing of Lucio can determine whether the accused-appellant should be held liable for murder. The presence of
any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as
murder.64 On the one hand, if the qualifying circumstances are not present or cannot be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused may only be convicted with homicide under Art. 24965 of the RPC.66

Both the trial and the appellate courts appreciated treachery and abuse of superior strength in convicting the
accused-appellant of murder.

Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.67 Treachery is not presumed but must
be proved as conclusively as the crime itself.68 Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and
competently and clearly proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder.69

For the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following elements must be shown: (1) the
employment of means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the
defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender.70
Relative to the first element, the legal teaching consistently upheld by the Court is that the essence of treachery
is when the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow.71

As to the second element, jurisprudence requires that there must be evidence to show that the accused
deliberately or consciously adopted the means of execution to ensure its success72 since unexpectedness of the
attack does not always equate to treachery.73 The means adopted must have been a result of a determination to
ensure success in committing the crime.74

Additionally, in murder or homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill; otherwise, the offender is liable
only for physical injuries.75 The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used; the
nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at
the time of or immediately after the killing of the victim.76

The prosecution established that the accused-appellant and Resurrecion deliberately made it appear to Victoria
and Lucio on the night of 19 March 2010, that their main purpose in coming to the store was to buy cigarettes.
They came at night when neighbors were probably asleep which would make it impossible for them to lend
assistance to Lucio. Once the accused-appellant and Resurrecion were allowed to enter the premises, the
accused-appellant immediately went inside the store and proceeded to the kitchen where Lucio was having
dinner. In the meantime, Resurrecion engaged Victoria in a talk by pretending that he was buying cigarettes but
he, too, forthwith went to the kitchen upon being told by Victoria that she had run out of the cigarette he was
looking for. Thereafter, Victoria heard Lucio uttering softly, "What wrong have I committed"; and then she saw
her bloodied husband being stabbed by the accused-appellant and Resurrecion. The absence of scuffle among
Lucio, the accused-appellant, and Resurrecion substantiate the finding that the attack was swift and deliberate
so that the unarmed and unsuspecting Lucio had no chance to resist or escape the blow from his assailants.

The intent to kill by the accused-appellant and Resurrecion was confirmed by the fact that they were armed with
knives when they attacked Lucio who sustained a total of fifteen wounds. Despite the fact that Lucio was
already bleeding from his wounds, he was able to run away from his assailants who pursued him. Resurrecion
stood in front of Lucio while the accused-appellant held him at the back and both assailants continued to stab
him. According to Dr. Pacificador, there were four fatal wounds inflicted on Lucio, i.e., wounds numbered 1, 4,
5, and 6 which penetrated his major organs.77

It must be pointed out that since treachery had qualified the crime to murder, the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former.78

The RTC and the CA

were correct in not

appreciating the

mitigating circumstance

of voluntary surrender.

For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present,
to wit: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority
or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.79 The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and
the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his
search and capture.80
Records show that it was Reno who went to the Hamtic police station to request that they take custody of the
accused-appellant who was then in his house.81 Undoubtedly, when the police went to Reno's house at San
Angel, San Jose, Antique, it was for the purpose of arresting the accused-appellant and not because he was
surrendering to them voluntarily. Simply put, Reno merely facilitated the accused-appellant's arrest. Thus,
without the elements of voluntary surrender, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the
inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and therefore cannot be
characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.82

The penalty to be imposed

upon the accused-appellant

Pursuant to Art. 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Art. 63(2)83
of the RPC, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties, i.e., reclusion perpetua, shall be imposed upon the
accused-appellant in view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that attended the killing
of Lucio.

Following the jurisprudence laid down by the Court in People v. Jugueta, 84 accused-appellant shall be held
liable for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00 each. It was
also ruled in Jugueta that when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded. In this case, Victoria showed that she spent a
total of ₱13,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Lucio. In conformity with the jurisprudence in Ocampo v.
People,85 the temperate damages of ₱50,000.00 shall likewise be awarded instead of the damages substantiated
by the receipts. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all monetary
awards from date of finality of this decision until fully paid.86

On the loss of earning capacity, it is noted that Victoria failed to substantiate her claim that her husband was
receiving a monthly income of ₱20,000.00. The Court reiterates its ruling that "for lost income due to death,
there must be unbiased proof of the deceased' average income. Self-serving, hence unreliable statement, is not
enough. "87

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 01473 finding the accusedappellant Rezor Juanillo Manzano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as
to the award of damages to the heirs of Lucio Silava, as follows: civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00; moral damages
of ₱75,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱75,000.00; and temperate damages of ₱50,000.00. In addition, interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from the date of finality of
this decision until fully paid.
 

PERSONS LIABLE

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 84163. October 19, 1989.]

LITO VINO, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.

Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the resolution of this Court dated
January 18, 1989 denying the herein petition is whether or not a finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can
stand in the light of the acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate proceeding.

At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos Street,
Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At around 11:00 P.M.,
while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out
in a loud voice saying that he had been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights
of their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They
went down to meet Roberto who was crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbors
responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting
Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was
the one driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto’s house, they
stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.

Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta took his ante-
mortem statement. In the said statement which the victim signed with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was
identified as his assailant.

The autopsy report of his body shows the following —

"Gunshot wound

POE Sub Scapular - 5-6 - ICA. Pal

1 & 2 cm. diameter left.

Slug found sub cutaneously,

2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.

CAUSE OF DEATH

Tension Hemathorax" 1

Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordoño
in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court
indorsed the case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of
the military, while the case against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.
Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal’s office who then filed an information charging Vino of the crime
of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.

Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an answer. On January 21, 1986, 2 a decision
was rendered by the trial court finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on him
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8
years of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and to pay the costs.

The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered affirming the judgment of the lower court. 3

Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are invoked:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. "THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE CRIME OF

MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS BEING
CHARGED SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE
CRIME PROVED IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.

2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO

CONVICT AN ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19 IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE
OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST BE
ACTUAL;

3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PRINCIPAL VIOLATES

PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS." 4

During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar in the JAGO was remanded
to the civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He was later charged with murder in the same
Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated
November 14, 1988, petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was acquitted by the trial court in a
decision that was rendered on August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment was submitted by the Solicitor
General in behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court resolved to deny the petition for failure of
petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned
judgment. Hence, the present motion for reconsideration to which the respondents were again required to
comment. The required comment having been submitted, the motion is now due for resolution.

The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information as a principal for the
crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The answer is in the affirmative.

Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under Article 16 of the Revised
Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for the commission of the same offense are the
accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder had been committed and that the
evidence tended to show that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was present during its
commission or must have known its commission is the only logical conclusion considering that immediately
thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they left
shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that
petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner’s liability is that of an accessory.

This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved or established by the
evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, in which case the
defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged
included in that which is proved. 5

In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that there was a mistake in
charging the proper offense, and the defendant cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other
offense necessarily included therein, in which case the defendant must not be discharged if there appears to be a
good cause to detain him in custody, so that he can be charged and made to answer for the proper offense. 6

In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission of the said crime
was established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the offense committed. The variance is in the
participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the
information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The
greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or
accessory under an information charging him as a principal.

At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory right then and there. The degree
of responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the evidence. At any rate, this lapse did not violate the
substantial rights of petitioner.

The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the
result of the separate charge against the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the
commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the determination of the liability of the
accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.

The third question is this - considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can the conviction of
the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?

In United States v. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that
notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity (Article
12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact established.
Corollary to this is United States v. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson case that the acquittal of the
principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that no crime was committed
inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the accessory.

In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as an
accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt that the commission of the same offense had
been proven in the separate case against Salazar who was charged as principal. However, he was acquitted on
the ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory. The trial court held that
the identity of the assailant was not clearly established. It observed that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar
carrying a rifle while riding on the bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two
other witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian, who were listed in the information, who can corroborate
the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not presented by the prosecution.

The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim pinpointing Salazar as his
assailant on the ground that it was not shown the victim revealed the identity of Salazar to his father and brother
who came to his aid immediately after the shooting. The court a quo also deplored the failure of the prosecution
and law enforcement agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the bullet slug recovered from the body of the
victim and the two empty armalite bullet empty shells recovered at the crime scene and to compare it with
samples taken from the service rifle of Salazar. Thus, the trial court made the following
observation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the ineptitude of the law enforcement agencies
to gather material and important evidence and the seeming lack of concern of the public prosecutor to direct the
production of such evidence for the successful prosecution of the case." 9

Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of the prosecution to adduce
the quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he was not positively identified as the person who
was seen holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.

A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified person as
passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after the commission of the crime
of murder. The commission of the crime and the participation of the principal or assailant, although not
identified, was established. In such case, the Court holds that the accessory can be prosecuted and held liable
independently of the assailant.

We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he could be tried and
sentenced. Should the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the commission of the offense and the
responsibility of the accused as an accessory was duly proven? The answer is no, he should be held criminally
liable as an accessory.

Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as two
witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as
above discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the
man with the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did not
even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt
in that he assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no
material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be
identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is FINAL.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 123176               October 13, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MELCHOR RAFAEL y LEGASPI, MARIO RAFAEL y LEGASPI, and MAXIMO RAFAEL y
MACASIEB, accused,
MAXIMO RAFAEL y MACASIEB, accused-appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

On automatic review is the consolidated decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in
Criminal Cases No. Q-94-59454, and No. Q-94-59453. In the first case, it convicted appellant of the crime of
murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P94,000.00 as funeral expenses, and to pay the costs. In the second, it
convicted appellant of the crime of frustrated murder, sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum, and ordering
him to indemnify the victim the amount of P36,500.00, and to pay the costs.

Appellant and his two sons, Melchor and Mario, were accused of the crime of murder for stabbing to death
Gloria Tuatis-Rafael, niece-in-law of appellant, and of the crime of frustrated murder of Alejandra Macaraeg-
Rafael, sister-in-law of appellant.

The facts, based on the records, are as follows:

On August 28, 1994, at around 8:00 P.M., at Rosal Street, Pingkian III, Pasong Tamo, Quezon City, Alejandra
and her daughter-in-law Gloria, were preparing dinner in the kitchen when they heard a commotion outside the
house. Without warning, appellant and his two sons, Melchor and Mario, barged inside the kitchen. Appellant
was unarmed while Melchor and Mario were armed with bolos. Suddenly, Melchor hacked Alejandra’s left
hand, severing it from her body. Alejandra slumped in a corner and pleaded with Melchor not to kill her.
Appellant stood in front of the kitchen door watching the grisly incident unfold. After hacking Alejandra,
Melchor turned to Gloria and hacked her on the head. Gloria managed to run outside the house but Mario
chased her. At this point, Alejandra could no longer see what was happening to Gloria because of the
continuous bleeding of her hand. Melchor turned to Alejandra anew and continued to stab her on the different
parts of the body. Alejandra feigned death by lying still. Believing that Alejandra was dead, Melchor left her
and went outside. Alejandra heard appellant telling his two sons in the Pangasinan dialect, "Patayin, patayin iran
amen!" (Kill them all!).2
The commotion woke Rogelio Rafael, who was sleeping upstairs.3 When Rogelio peeped through the jalousie
window, he saw Melchor and Mario chasing his wife Gloria. The scene was illuminated by a light coming from
the nearby piggery. When Gloria stumbled, Melchor and Mario repeatedly hacked her. Rogelio shouted at them
to have mercy on his wife. He frantically rushed downstairs to help her. When he got outside, however, the
assailants had already fled. He tried to run after them but failed. When Rogelio went back to check on his wife
and mother, he found his wife, Gloria, dead, and his mother, Alejandra, with her left hand severed. He requested
his brother-in-law, Paking Aragon, to rush Alejandra to the hospital.4 Paking brought Alejandra to the East
Avenue Medical Center where she was diagnosed to have "traumatic amputation, L. wrist. Hacking wound base
of 2nd finger and base of mid phalanx 3rd finger, R."5 Thereafter, Rogelio reported the stabbing incident to the
Batasan Police Detachment.6

On October 25, 1994, appellant and his two sons were charged under the following Informations:7

Criminal Case No. Q-94-59454 (MURDER)

That on or about the 28th day of August 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation, treachery and superior
strength, by then and there hacking her with the use of a bolo and hitting her on the different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which was the direct and immediate cause of her death,
to the damage and prejudice of the herein (sic) of said GLORIA TUATIS-RAFAEL.

Criminal Case No. Q-94-59453 (FRUSTRATED MURDER)

That on or about the 28th day of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation, treachery and superior
strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of ALEJANDRA MACARAEG-RAFAEL, by then and there hacking her
with a bolo and hitting her on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal
wounds which ordinarily would cause the death of said ALEJANDRA MACARAEG-RAFAEL, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of MURDER, as a consequence but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to said ALEJANDRA MACARAEG-RAFAEL which prevented her death, to her damage
and prejudice.

Only appellant was arrested. His two sons remain at large. Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.8 Joint trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Alejandra Macaraeg-Rafael, the victim whose left hand
was severed; (2) Leonardo Rafael, her husband, and brother of appellant, who testified that a possible motive
for the killing was a dispute over an aborted sale of a parcel of land, whose sale Alejandra blocked, which
angered appellant; (3) Elvira Hamoy, sister of Gloria, who witnessed the killing of Gloria from her house; (4)
Rogelio Rafael, husband of Gloria; (5) Dr. Florante F. Baltazar, Chief of the Philippine National Police Central
Crime Laboratory Service, who conducted the autopsy on the body of Gloria and who testified that Gloria
suffered 18 wounds and the cause of death was the hacking and stab wounds on her head, body, and
extremities.9

The defense presented the following witnesses: (1) Benedicto Dizon, a factory worker and friend of appellant,
(2) appellant, (3) Leo Rafael, appellant’s 15 year-old son, and (4) Lisa Rafael, appellant’s daughter.

Appellant interposed the defense of alibi and denial. He claimed that on August 28, 1994, at around 7:30 P.M.,
he and his son Leo were on their way home from the FEU FERN where appellant works as a caretaker. When
they passed by Dizon’s house in Sapphire St., Fern Village, Quezon City, they saw Dizon, one Mang Samuel
and Jaime Mayapis engaged in a conversation about fighting cocks. Appellant and his son joined the
conversation for about 30 minutes. Thereafter, they headed towards their house which was located some 400
meters away. That same night, while appellant and Leo were resting, several policemen came to their house
looking for Melchor and Mario. Appellant and Leo were ordered to step out of the house and lie on the ground
while the policemen searched their house for Melchor and Mario. When these two could not be found, appellant
and Leo were brought to Precinct No. 6 where they saw Rogelio, Gloria’s husband. They were later brought to
Precinct No. 3 which had jurisdiction over the crime. Thereafter, they proceeded to the house of Rogelio where
they found a severed hand. Afterwards, they went home and the policemen got the pictures and identification
cards of Melchor and Mario.10

On October 30, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision11 finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and in consideration of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling,
MAXIMO RAFAEL is hereby sentenced:

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59453 - to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify Alejandra Rafael y Macaraeg the
amount of thirty six thousand five hundred pesos (P36,500.00) and to pay the costs.

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59454 - to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the heirs of Gloria Rafael the
amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity (People v. Molas, G.R. No. 93437-39, February 5, 1993, 218 SCRA
473) and ninety-four thousand pesos (P94,000.00), representing the funeral expenses and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present automatic review. Appellant prays for acquittal or, in the alternative, for a lower penalty by
being held liable merely as an accomplice. He claims that the trial court committed the following errors:12

I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY RELATIVE TO THE
INCIDENT IN QUESTION.

II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND UNDUE CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE, UNPERSUASIVE, INCONSISTENT IF NOT CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE
DEFENSE.

III. THE COURT A QUO MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION IN

CRIM. CASE NOS. Q-59453 AND Q-94-59454 DESPITE THE FACT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S
GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

In brief, we are asked to consider the following issues: (1) whether the witnesses for the defense were credible;
(2) whether conspiracy was sufficiently proved; and (3) whether the guilt of appellant was proved beyond
reasonable doubt either as a principal or merely as an accomplice.

On the first issue, regarding credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not disturb the findings of the
trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule admits of certain
exceptions, such as: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court,
or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence.13 The Court is likewise not
precluded from making its own assessment of the probative value of the testimony of the witnesses on the basis
of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs) thereof.14
After conducting a thorough review of the records, however, we see no cogent reason to fault the factual
findings of the trial court. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when pieced together, jibe in material
points to give the whole picture of the stabbing incident. Alejandra testified as to the circumstances surrounding
the inception of the attack, while prosecution witnesses Elvira and Rogelio testified as to subsequent events
which occurred outside the house. Further, the alleged inconsistencies pointed out by appellant pertain to minor
details which do not detract from the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The test is whether their
testimonies agree on the essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent whole.15 When
queried, appellant himself could not think of any reason why the prosecution witnesses would falsely implicate
him in the commission of the crimes.16 Absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution
witnesses to perjure themselves, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their
testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.17

Moreover, it appears that appellant’s own version of the incident lacks persuasiveness. He denies participating
in the gory incident, claiming that he was not at the crime scene but on his way home from the FEU FERN and
that he passed by Dizon’s house in Sapphire St., Fern Village, Quezon City. However, two prosecution
witnesses, namely Alejandra and Elvira, saw appellant at the locus criminis, Gloria Rafael’s residence in
Pingkian III, Pasong Tamo, Quezon City. Being his relatives, they could not have possibly been mistaken as to
his identity. Thus, in the face of his positive identification as one with the assailants, his defense of denial and
alibi must fail.18

Regarding the second issue, appellant insists that conspiracy was not established by clear and convincing
evidence. The prosecution, appellant claims, failed to prove that he and his two sons had a prior plan to kill the
victims. Even granting that appellant shouted "Patayin, patayin iran amen," he could not be held liable as a
principal because when he uttered those words, the other accused had already fatally wounded the victims.

Further, appellant points out the following inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses - First,
Alejandra testified that after Gloria ran from the kitchen, she did not see what happened next. However, she
later testified that she saw accused Melchor and Mario hacking Gloria. Second, it was unclear from Alejandra’s
testimony whether the kitchen door was open or closed at the start of the attack. Third, Elvira, a neighbor
testified that she was attending to her children when the incident occurred, but later testified that she and her
husband (actually, he was the husband of Gloria, not Elvira) were already sleeping in their bedroom with their
children. Fourth, Elvira testified that during the attack, appellant was shouting in front of the kitchen but later
testified that he was merely watching the incident. Fifth, while Elvira testified that Gloria suffered injuries on
her breast and right side of the face, Alejandra testified that Gloria was merely stabbed in the head once. Sixth,
Alejandra wavered in her testimony as to whether appellant was carrying a bolo at the time of the incident.
Appellant also argues that because prosecution witness Elvira testified that when she saw the gruesome
incident, she "lost her presence of mind", she could not have been in a proper state of mind to recall the details
of the incident. Further, he points out that while Alejandra testified that appellant was present at the crime
scene, prosecution witness Rogelio testified seeing only accused Mario and Melchor at the locus criminis.

The Office of the Solicitor General counters that conspiracy was duly proven by the prosecution. The culprits
arrived together at the crime scene, and acted in concert in their criminal design. Appellant oversaw the carnage
and directed his sons to kill the victims, shouting "Patayin, patayin iran amen." Thereafter, appellant and his
sons fled together. Thus, the surrounding circumstances indicate a community of criminal intent, which is the
essence of conspiracy.

Appellant was convicted of the crime of murder and frustrated murder because of the alleged conspiracy among
the three accused. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it.19 Conspiracy, like the crime itself, must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.20 Mere presence, knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime, with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.21
On record, appellant’s participation in the commission of the crimes consisted of his presence at the locus
criminis, and his shouting "Patayin, patayin iran amen!" (Kill them all!) during the later stage of the fatal
incident. The prosecution witnesses did not see him bearing any weapon or using one to inflict any injury on the
victims. He did not run away with the two other accused still at large. Thus, we are far from convinced that
conspiracy existed between appellant and any of his sons. Conspiracy cannot be logically inferred from the
overt acts of herein appellant. We have previously ruled that relationship or association alone is not a badge of
conspiracy.22 When there is doubt as to whether a guilty participant in the killing has committed the role of a
principal or that of an accomplice, the court should favor the milder form of responsibility.23

Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes as accomplices those who, not being included in Article 17
(which enumerates those liable as principals), cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts. Appellant herein had no direct part in the execution of the killing and maiming of the
victims. Nothing on record shows that he had induced his two sons to go on a stabbing frenzy. The prosecution
witnesses themselves testified that appellant shouted "Patayin, patayin iran amen!" after Melchor had already
hacked Alejandra’s hand and after Mario gave chase to Gloria outside the house.24 Evidently, appellant’s
utterances could not have been the determining cause of the commission of the crimes.25 If at all, it merely had
further inflammatory effect on the accused. As such, appellant cannot be considered a principal by inducement.
Neither can appellant be held liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. By his proven acts, appellant
could be held liable only as an accomplice.

In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following requisites must concur: (1) community of
design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in
his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the
intention of supplying material and moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that
there be a relation between the acts and those attributed to the person charged as an accomplice.26 In this case,
appellant’s acts of going to Gloria’s house with his sons and his encouraging shouts clearly demonstrated his
concurrence in their aggressive design and lent support to their nefarious intent and afforded moral and material
support to their attack against the victims. Hence, we are convinced he must be held liable as accomplice in the
commission of the crimes.

May the liability of an accomplice be determined in the absence of trial of the supposed principals? In Vino v.
People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals,27 we held that "[t]he corresponding responsibilities of the
principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can
be duly established in evidence the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal." Hence, we find no legal impediment in the determination of appellant’s
liabilities for the crimes committed.

The qualifying circumstance of treachery clearly attended the killing of Gloria and the maiming of Alejandra, as
the two conditions for the existence of treachery are present, i.e., (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method, or form of attack employed by him.28 Appellant’s sons went to Gloria’s house armed with bolos,
which ensured the execution of their nefarious deed evidently without risk to themselves and without affording
their victims any real chance to defend themselves.29 The killing of Gloria having been attended by treachery,
it is without doubt murder.1âwphi1

As to Alejandra, the crime committed was frustrated murder because Melchor performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will.30 The numerous wounds inflicted on Alejandra displayed the clear
intent to kill. She was hacked on the right wrist, the palm, lower wrist, fingers, and her head.31 These wounds
would have caused her death had there been no timely medical intervention.32 Melchor desisted from further
assault when the gravely wounded Alejandra feigned death. He then turned to Gloria believing that he had
already killed Alejandra.33 Thus, the crime committed against Alejandra was frustrated murder.
While both Melchor and Mario were armed with bolos, the two victims, who were women, were not armed.
Hence, abuse of superior strength, which was alleged in the information, attended the commission of the crime.
But treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength so the same need not be
appreciated separately.34 However, the elements of evident premeditation in the commission of the offenses
charged and the pertinence of dwelling in regard to appellant’s participation were not sufficiently proven.

Appellant should therefore be found guilty as an accomplice in the crimes of frustrated murder and murder.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by the death penalty law, is
reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty for an accomplice in murder is one degree lower than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony.35 One degree lower would be reclusion temporal.36 There being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty should be taken from reclusion temporal medium,
and the minimum of the penalty should be within the range of prision mayor.

The penalty for an accomplice in frustrated murder is the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by
law for the frustrated felony.37 In effect, the penalty for an accomplice in the crime of frustrated murder is two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which after applying the rules on graduating penalties, would be
prision mayor.38 Considering that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
crime, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period.39 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum of the penalty should be taken from prision mayor medium and the minimum thereof taken within the
range of prision correccional.

The actual damages awarded by the trial court were duly supported by receipts,40 and should be allowed. Moral
damages should likewise be awarded pursuant to Article 2219 (1) of the New Civil Code which provides that
moral damages may be recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries,41 understood in the
generic sense. Rogelio categorically stated during his testimony that he suffered mental anguish over the death
of his wife.42

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59454, appellant is found guilty as an ACCOMPLICE in the
crime of MURDER for the death of Gloria Tuatis-Rafael, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
eight (8) years, eight months and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, and
to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P94,000.00 as actual damages and
P50,000.00 as moral damages;

(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59453, appellant is found guilty as an ACCOMPLICE in the
crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER of Alejandra Macaraeg-Rafael, and sentenced two (2) years,
eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional medium as minimum to eight
(8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as maximum, and ordered
to pay the victim Alejandra Macaraeg-Rafael the amount of P36,500.00 as actual damages, and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Costs de oficio.

THIRD DIVISION
 [ G.R. No. 210920, December 10, 2018 ]

MARTINIANO "MARTIN" B. SALDUA A.K.A. MARLON SALDUA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

J. REYES, JR., J.:

The Case

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] questioning the Decision[2] dated April 30, 2013 and the
Resolution[3] dated December 10, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)-Cebu City, in CA-G.R. CEB-C.R. No.
01675 which affirmed with modification the Decision dated December 17, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dumaguete City in Criminal Case No. 2006-17956 finding Martiniano "Martin" B. Saldua a.k.a.
Marlon Saldua (petitioner), guilty as an accomplice for the crime of murder.

The Facts

Petitioner and Gerry Lalamunan (Lalamunan) were charged with murder in an Information, which reads:

That on or about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of November 12, 2005, at Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of
Zamboanguita, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to kill, and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shoot Jill Abella with
the use of a handgun which accused was then armed and provided thereby inflicting upon said victim the
following injuries:

1. Gunshot wound, point of entry (R) arm penetrating (R) chest and (L) chest;
2. R/I Injury major vessels of the heart; and
3. Hypovolemic shock secondary to massive blood loss

that caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[4]

Lalamunan fled and remained at-large up to present. Petitioner surrendered and faced his accusers. He was
arraigned on February 29, 2008 and pleaded not guilty.

Evidence for the prosecution

From the combined testimonies of its witnesses, the prosecution tends to establish that on November 11, 2005,
at 10:00 a.m., Lalamunan, Wilson Vertudez (Vertudez) and petitioner Saldua arrived at the kiosk owned by
Victor Palalon (Palalon) on board a red XRM Honda motorcycle. Palalon's son-in-law witness Demetrio Flores
(Flores), was also at the kiosk. Lalamunan introduced himself to Palalon and Flores as a nephew of Palalon. He
also introduced Vertudez and petitioner Saldua to them. Petitioner Saldua was in maong pants, while
Lalamunan was wearing a black long-sleeved shirt and camouflage shorts. At around noontime, they left the
kiosk on board the same motorcycle.

On the following day of November 12, 2005 at 10:00 a.m., Vertudez and petitioner Saldua returned to the kiosk
wearing the same clothes. At 6:30p.m., Lalamunan arrived and the three of them left on foot towards the
national highway. Lalamunan walked ahead to where the motorcycle was parked at a banana grove beside
Magallanes Street, while petitioner Saldua and Vertudez went to the house of the victim, Jill Abella (Abella).
Vertudez was next seen to be firing at the garage of the house of Abella, with an armed Saldua behind him.
Abella was able to shoot back and hit Vertudez. Saldua and Vertudez left the area on foot towards where the
motorcycle was parked. Vertudez collapsed due to his gunshot wound. Meanwhile, Saldua and Lalamunan left
the area on board the motorcycle, leaving Vertudez behind. Abella was found dead that day from gunshot
wounds. Vertudez was also found dead the next day at the banana grove from gunshot wound.

Evidence for the defense

Only petitioner Saldua was apprehended. The other accused, Lalamunan, remains at-large, while Vertudez died
as a result of gunshot wound that he sustained.

Saldua denied killing Abella. He insisted that he was in another place on November 12, 2005. He narrated that
he was with his family in their home in Barangay San Jose, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental from November 10 to
15, 2005. He accounted for his whereabouts on the entire day of November 12, 2005 as follows: At 6:00 a.m.,
he went to his farm to weed out his peanut shrubs. At 10:00 a.m., he went home to eat lunch. At 2:00 p.m., he
went back to his farm. And at 7:00p.m., he tried to buy medicine for his ailing 5-year-old daughter by
borrowing the XRM Honda motorcycle of Rommel Awing, but the river was flooded making him unable to
cross it, hence, he went back home. In the afternoon of November 15, 2005, he left for Bacolod City to render
duty in time for the South East Asian Games.

Ruling of the RTC

On December 17, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting petitioner as an accomplice to the crime of
murder. The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish by circumstantial evidence that Vertudez
killed the victim while Saldua was proven to be armed and behind Vertudez. The RTC also considered the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as the attack appeared to be planned. The dispositive portion
of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Martiniano "Martin" B. Saldua is GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as an accomplice of the crime of Murder. There being neither mitigating or aggravating circumstances
and applying the indeterminate sentence law, Martiniano Saldua is sentenced to serve the penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

The accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jill Abella in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
pesos.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Dissatisfied, petitioner Saldua appealed before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, with modifications.

The CA gave weight to the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. It was established that it was Vertudez who
shot Abella, while petitioner Saldua, who was armed, was behind Vertudez during the incident. The CA,
likewise, sustained the RTC as to the existence of evident premeditation to qualify the killing of the victim to
murder. The CA, however, reduced the civil liability of petitioner and apportioned the same pursuant to the rule
that a principal should have greater accountability than an accomplice, citing the case of People v. Tampus.[6]
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated December 17, 2010 rendered
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Dumaguete City in Criminal Case No. 2006- 17956 finding
appellant Martiniano "Martin" Saldua a.k.a. Marlon Saldua guilty as an accomplice for the crime of Murder is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay to [sic] the heirs of the victim the amount of
Php25,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php16,667.00 as moral damages. Costs against accused-appellant.[7]

Petitioner Saldua filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA issued a Resolution dated December 10, 2013
denying the said motion. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition.

The Issues

The issues which petitioner interposed before this Court may be summarized as follows:

1) Whether or not the CA is correct in convicting petitioner as an accomplice to the crime of murder.
   
2) Whether or not the CA is correct in affirming the RTC when it disregarded petitioner's defense of
alibi.
Findings
of the
RTC on
the
credibility
of the
witnesses
are
binding
on this
Court.

In his appeal, petitioner Saldua questions the credibility of the witnesses by whose testimonies were relied upon
by the trial court for his conviction. Credibility of witnesses is essentially a question of fact and is a matter
peculiarly within the province of the trial judge. As such, the findings of the RTC that was affirmed by the CA
in this case, that the witnesses of the prosecution were credible, is binding on this Court[8] given the clear
advantage of a trial judge over an appellate magistrate in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. Absent any
showing that the trial court's calibration of the credibility was flawed, we are bound by its assessment.[9] Thus:

It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses
command great respect and consideration especially when the conclusions are supported by the evidence on
record, and will not ordinarily be disturbed or interfered with. The only exception to the rule is when the trial
court plainly overlooked certain facts and circumstances of weight and influence which, if considered, will
materially alter the result. Such exception does not exist in the case at bench.[10]

No cogent reason exists which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessment on the credibility of the
witnesses. It bears to stress that the conviction of petitioner Saldua does not rest solely upon the uncorroborated
testimony of witness Lemecito Pecore (Pecore) who testified that he saw Vertudez shooting into the garage of
Abella, hitting the latter[11] with the armed petitioner Saldua behind him.[12] Pecore, however, did not see
petitioner Saldua fire into the garage.[13] He also narrated how he had taken a closer look at their faces, when
after the shooting incident, Vertudez and petitioner Saldua fled towards his direction.[14] This testimony was
further bolstered by witnesses Flores and Palalon who recounted that at the date of the incident, the three
accused were within the vicinity of the incident. All in all, the prosecution's witnesses positively identified
petitioner Saldua, together with Vertudez and Lalamunan, to be present at the crime scene.

Prosecution's positive identification

prevails over petitioner's defense of alibi.

Petitioner maintained that he was at their house in Barangay San Jose, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental from
November 10-15 and he left on November 16, 2005 to Bacolod City. While the defense presented a certification
mentioning persons who could attest that petitioner was at his house, not one of them was presented in court. As
correctly ruled by the CA, said certification cannot be given probative value. Neither could we rely on the
affidavits executed by a certain Rommel Awing and Henry Lalamunan which purportedly corroborate
petitioner's defense. Apart from the fact that they did not appear before the court to be cross-examined,
affidavits are usually not a complete reproduction of what the declarant had in mind.[15] Often times, affidavits
are prepared by the administering officer and cast in the latter's language or according to the latter's
understanding of what the affiant has said, while the affiant would simply sign the affidavit after it has been
read to him.[16] Being ex parte, they are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate and as such, affidavits
are generally considered to be inferior to a testimony given in court although these factors do not denigrate the
credibility of witnesses.[17] As in this case, the said affidavits executed by the defense's witnesses cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies given in open court by the prosecution’s witnesses.[18]

As the identity of petitioner is now a settled issue, we now proceed to determine his criminal liability for the
crime charged.

Evident premeditation was not proven,

hence, the crime committed was only
Homicide.

For the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused killed
him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.[19]

In this case, the fact of death of Abella is undisputed and the killing was not parricide or infanticide. It was,
likewise, established that Vertudez killed the victim. In qualifying the crime to murder, the RTC, as sustained
by the CA, appreciated the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. To prove evident premeditation,
three requisites are needed to be proven: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an
act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.[20]

Premeditation presupposes a deliberate planning of the crime before executing it.[21] The execution of the
criminal act, in other words, must be preceded by cool thought and reflection.[22] As here, there must be showing
of a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to execute
the crime.[23] The record is bereft of any evidence to show when Vertudez reflected on his decision to kill the
victim. There was no direct evidence whatsoever of any plan or preparations to kill the victim nor of the time
when the plot to kill was conceived. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill
was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.[24]
Then again, the premeditation to kill must be plain and notorious; it must be sufficiently proven by evidence of
outward acts showing the intent to kill.[25]
What was clearly shown was the presence of the three accused at the kiosk the day before and the very day of
the fatal incident. The CA held that their presence at the kiosk was to study the neighborhood and the
surroundings and make the kiosk a staging area for their plan to kill the victim. However, these were all
inferences devoid of any basis. No clear and convincing evidence was adduced to establish that these were the
purpose why the accused were at the kiosk before and on the day of the incident. As a matter of fact, the
prosecution even narrated that one of the accused, Lalamunan, even introduced himself as nephew of Palalon,
and also introduced Vertudez and petitioner Saldua. On that day, the three accused stayed at the kiosk from
10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon then came back again at 2:00 p.m. They went back the day after. Verily, it leaves us in
doubt why the accused would volunteer their true identity and flaunt their faces in the neighborhood if they
were indeed hatching a plan to kill someone in the vicinity. In the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere
presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient.[26]

It bears reiterating that a qualifying circumstance such as evident premeditation must be proven as clearly as the
crime itself.[27] Corollarily, every element thereof must be shown to exist beyond reasonable doubt and cannot
be the mere product of speculation.[28] Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that the court below erred
in concluding that the crime of murder was committed. Absent the qualifying circumstances of evident
premeditation, an accused could only be held liable for homicide.

Petitioner was guilty as an accomplice to

homicide.

In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following requisites must concur: (1) that there be
community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs
with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that
there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice.[29]

At the time the crime of homicide was committed, it was established that petitioner Saldua, who was armed,
was present, as he was behind Vertudez when the latter fired his gun. However, mere presence does not make
one a co-conspirator in the crime. The rule is that the existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed.[30] Just like
the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[31] Because witnesses are
rarely present when several accused come to an agreement to commit a crime, such agreement is usually
inferred from their "concerted actions" while committing it.[32] Indeed, the line that separates a conspirator by
concerted action from an accomplice by previous or simultaneous acts is slight.[33] Accomplices do not decide
whether the crime should be committed; but they assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment.[34]

Other than being present, it was not established what petitioner's purpose was when he stood behind Vertudez
bearing a firearm. By merely standing behind Vertudez, it cannot be ascertained whether petitioner had prior
knowledge of the criminal design of the principal perpetrator or that he was there to give moral support. What
was clear is that he was armed and he did not stop Vertudez from shooting the victim. The mere fact that a
person is present when a crime is committed, when such presence does not have the purpose of encouraging the
criminal and when there is no previous agreement between them as to the commission of the crime, will make
the former responsible only as accomplice in the crime committed.[35] This conclusion is in keeping with the
principle that when there is doubt, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. Thus:

It was held that when there is doubt as to whether a guilty participant in a homicide performed the role of
principal or accomplice, the Court should favor the "milder form of responsibility." He should be given the
benefit of the doubt and can be regarded only as an accomplice. x x x Hence, in the case at bar, the accused x x
x should be granted the benefit of doubt and should be considered merely as accomplices and should be meted a
penalty one degree lower than that to be imposed on accused x x x who is unequivocally the principal.[36]
Hence, in this case, lacking sufficient evidence of conspiracy, and there being doubt as to whether petitioner
acted as principal or just a mere accomplice, the doubt should be resolved in his favor and, thus, he should be
held liable only as an accomplice.

Variance in the participation in the offense

between what was alleged in the
Information and what was proven is not a
ground for acquittal.

The defense insists that there was variance between the allegations of the Amended Information and the proof
adduced by the prosecution during trial which is prejudicial to petitioner and fatal to his conviction. The defense
explains that the allegation in the Amended Information states that petitioner shot and killed Abella with a
handgun and he is charged with murder. The same is substantially at variance with the proof adduced which
was that petitioner never fired a shot but was merely behind the perpetrator.

Under Sections 4[37] and 5[38] Rule 120 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when there is variance between the offense
charged in the Information and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that
which is charged.[39] Here, accused was charged as principal to murder because of the qualifying circumstance
of evident premeditation. Since the prosecution was not able to prove the said qualifying circumstance, it is
correct that the accused should only be sentenced to the lesser crime of homicide which is necessarily included
in murder.[40] At any rate, this variance between the offense alleged and the offense proven did not violate
petitioner's substantial rights. Petitioner's right to be informed of the charges against him has not been violated
because where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime
but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein.[41]

The variance in the participation or complicity of the petitioner is likewise not sufficient to exonerate him.
While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced,
however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accomplice. Jurisprudence has taught that an accused
can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal.[42] The
greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser.[43]

Proper Penalty

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Since petitioner is
only an accomplice, the imposable penalty is one degree lower than that imposable for the principal, i.e.,
prision mayor. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the said penalty shall be imposed
in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Saldua is, accordingly, sentenced to
suffer the prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum.[44]

As to petitioner's civil liability, the ruling in the case of People v. Tampus[45] is instructive. In the said case, the
Court ruled that the penalty and liability, including civil liability, imposed upon an accused must be
commensurate with the degree of his participation in the commission of the crime. Thus, the Court held that the
principal must be adjudged liable to pay two-thirds of the civil indemnity and moral damages, while the
accomplice should pay one-third portion thereof.[46]

In People v. Jugueta,[47] the amount of damages to be paid by the principal for consummated homicide are as
follows: (1) P50,000.00, as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00, as moral damages without exemplary damages
being awarded; and (3) P50,000.00 as temperate damages when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral
expenses is presented in court.

Pursuant to the ruling in the above-mentioned case of People v. Tampus, in relation to People v. Jugueta,
petitioner, as accomplice in the crime of homicide is liable to pay P16,667.67 as civil indemnity, P16,667.67 as
moral damages and P16,667.67 as temperate damages. The Court also clarified that the accomplice would not
be subsidiarily liable for the amount allotted to the principal if the latter dies before the finality of the Decision.
The reason for this is that there would be nothing that could be passed to the accomplice as the principal's
criminal liability, including the civil liability arising thereon, had been extinguished by his death.[48]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated April 30, 2013 and the Resolution dated
December 10, 2013 of the Court of Appeals-Cebu City are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that
petitioner Martiniano "Martin" B. Saldua, a.k.a. Marlon Saldua is held guilty as accomplice to homicide and is
accordingly sentenced to a prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify
the heirs of Jill Abella the amount of P16,667.67 as civil liability, P16,667.67 as moral damages and P16,667.67
as temperate damages.

  SIM vs CA
428 SCRA 459

G.R. No. 133489 & G.R. No. 143970            January 15, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RONALD a.k.a "ROLAND" GARCIA y FLORES,* RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES, ROTCHEL
LARIBA y DEMICILLO, and GERRY B. VALLER, accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 accused-appellants Ronald a.k.a Roland Garcia y Flores, Rodante Rogel y
Rosales, Rotchel Lariba y Demicillo and Gerry B. Valler, along with a certain Jimmy Muit, were charged with
and convicted of kidnapping for ransom and were sentenced each to death, except aforementioned Jimmy Muit
who has remained at large, for obvious reasons, and to indemnify their victim Romualdo Tioleco P200,000.00
and to pay the costs.1

In a related case, Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050, which was decided jointly with Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049,
accused-appellants Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel were also found guilty of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition and each sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, nine (9) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00 plus the costs.2 No notice of appeal3 was filed in
this criminal case; nonetheless, for reasons herein below stated, we take cognizance of the case.

Atty. Romualdo Tioleco was jogging alone at Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, at about 5:30
o'clock in the morning of 5 October 1996.4 He was heading towards 4th Avenue when he noticed a blue car
parked at the corner of this street.5 As he was about to cross 4th Avenue, the car lurched towards him and
stopped.6 Two (2) men quickly alighted from the car.7 One of them pointed a gun at Atty. Tioleco while the
other hit his back and pushed him into the back seat of the car.8 Once inside, he saw two (2) other men, one on
the driver's seat and the other on the back seat directly behind the driver.9 He found out later the identities of the
driver whom he undoubtedly recognized during the abduction to be accused-appellant Gerry Valler, and of the
other person on the passenger seat behind Valler as accused-appellant Roland "Ronald" Garcia.10 He described
the man who disembarked from the car and who pushed him inside to be 5'5" or 5'6" in height, medium built,
and the other, who threatened him with a gun, at 5'4" or 5'5" in height, dark complexioned and medium built
although heftier than the other.11 These two (2) persons have since the commission of the crime have remained
at large.

While inside the car Atty. Tioleco was made to crouch on the leg room.12 As it sped towards a destination then
unknown to the victim, the men on board feigned to be military men and pestered him with the accusation of
being a drug pusher and the threat of detention at Camp Crame.13 As they were psyching him down, "they
started putting blindfold on [him] and packaging tape on [his]face and handcuffed [him] on the back of [his]
body."14 His eyeglasses were taken off "when they were putting blindfold on [him] x x x."15 Then they
divested him of his other personal belongings, e.g., his keys, wristwatch, etc.16

The car cruised for thirty (30) to forty-five (45) minutes.17 When it finally stopped, Atty. Tioleco was told to
alight, led to a house and then into a room.18 He remained blindfolded and handcuffed throughout his ordeal
and made to lie down on a wooden bed.19 During his captivity, one of the kidnappers approached him and told
him that he would be released for a ransom of P2 million20 although the victim bargained for an amount
between P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 which according to him was all he could afford. While still under
detention, one of his abductors told him that they had mistaken him for a Chinese national and promised his
release without ransom.21 But he was just being taken for a ride since the kidnappers had already begun
contacting his sister Floriana Tioleco.

Floriana was at her office when her mother called up about her brother's kidnapping.22 Floriana hurried home
to receive a phone call from a person who introduced himself as "Larry Villanueva" demanding P3 million for
Atty. Tioleco's ransom.23 Several other calls to Floriana were made during the day and in one of those calls the
ransom was reduced to P2 million.24 Around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, 5 October 1996, P/Sr.
Insp. Ronaldo Mendoza of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) arrived at Floriana's house to
monitor her brother's kidnapping upon the request of her friends.25 Floriana received the following day about
eight (8) phone calls from the kidnappers still demanding P2 million for her brother's safe release.26

By the end of the day on 7 October 1996 Floriana was able to raise only P71,000.00,27 which she relayed to the
kidnappers when they called her up.28 They finally agreed to set her brother free upon payment of this amount,
which was short of the original demand.29 The pay-off was scheduled that same day at around 8:00 o'clock in
the evening at Timog Avenue corner Scout Tuazon in Quezon City near the "Lighthaus" and "Burger
Machine."30 Upon instruction of P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza, Floriana together with only two (2) female friends
proceeded to this meeting place.31 They reached there at 8:40 o'clock in the evening and waited for the
kidnappers until about 10:30 or 11:00 o' clock that evening.32

Meanwhile, P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza relayed the information about the pay-off and other relevant facts to P/Chief
Insp. Gilberto Cruz at the PACC headquarters.33 With the information from P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza, P/Chief Insp.
Cruz, together with P/Chief Insps. Winnie Quidato and Paul Tucay with P/Sr. Insp. Nilo Pagtalunan,
immediately went to Timog Avenue corner scout Tuazon near the "Lighthaus" and "Burger Machine" in
Quezon City.34 They surveyed this site and saw a blue Toyota Corona with three (3) persons on board
suspiciously stopping about five (5) meters from Floriana and her friends and remaining there for almost two
(2) hours.35

Floriana and her friends left the "pay-off site" after waiting for two (2) hours more or less;36 so did the blue
Toyota Corona almost simultaneously.37 No payment of ransom took place.38 P/Chief Insp. Cruz then ordered
P/Chief Insps. Quidato and Tucay and their subordinates to tail this car which they did all the way to the De
Vega Compound at Dahlia Street in Fairview, Quezon City.39 This compound consisted of one bungalow house
and was enclosed by a concrete wall and a steel gate for ingress and egress.40 They posted themselves thirty
(30) to forty (40) meters from the compound to reconnoiter the place.41 Meanwhile, the kidnappers explained
in a phone call to Floriana that they had aborted the pay-off on account of their belief that her two (2)
companions at the meeting place were police officers.42 But she assured them that her escorts were just her
friends.43

At around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 8 October 1996 Floriana received a call from the kidnappers at her
house44 who wanted to set another schedule for the payment of the ransom money an hour later or at 2:00
o'clock.45 This time the rendezvous would be in front of McDonald's fastfood at Magsaysay Boulevard in Sta.
Mesa, Manila.46 She was told by the kidnappers that a man would go near her and whisper "Romy" to whom
she would then hand over the ransom money. Floriana agreed to the proposal. With her two (2) friends, she
rushed to the place and brought with her the P71,000.00.47 About this time, the same blue Toyota Corona seen
at the first pay-off point left the De Vega Compound in Fairview.48 A team of PACC operatives under P/Chief
Insp. Cruz again stationed themselves in the vicinity of McDonald's.49

Floriana arrived at the McDonald's restaurant and waited for a few minutes.50 Not long after, the blue Toyota
Corona was spotted patrolling the area.51 The blue car stopped and, after dropping off a man, immediately left
the place. The man approached Floriana and whispered "Romy" to her.52 She handed the money to him who
took it.53 Floriana identified this man during the trial as accused-appellant Roland (Ronald) Garcia.54

The PACC operatives tried to follow the blue car but were prevented by traffic.55 They were however able to
catch up and arrest Garcia who was in possession of the ransom money in the amount of P71,000.00.56 They
brought him inside their police car and there apprised him of his custodial rights.57 Garcia informed the PACC
operatives that Atty. Tioleco was being detained inside the De Vega compound in Fairview.58 With this
information, P/Chief Insp. Cruz ordered P/Chief Insps. Tucay and Quidato who had been posted near the
compound to rescue the victim.59

The two (2) PACC officers, together with their respective teams, entered the compound and surged into the
bungalow house where they saw two (2) men inside the living room.60 As one of the PACC teams was about to
arrest the two (2) men, the latter ran towards a room in the house where they were about to grab a .38 cal.
revolver without serial number loaded with six (6) rounds of ammunitions and a .357 cal. revolver with six (6)
live ammunitions.61 The other PACC team searched the house for Atty. Tioleco and found him in the other
room.62 The two (2) men were arrested and informed of their custodial rights. They were identified in due time
as accused-appellants Rodante Rogel and Rotchel Lariba.63

P/Chief Insp. Cruz arrived at the De Vega compound64 and coordinated with the proper barangay authorities.65
While the PACC operatives were completing their rescue and arrest operations, the house phone rang.66
Accused-appellant Rogel answered the call upon the instruction of P/Chief Insp. Cruz.67 Rogel identified the
caller to be accused-appellant Valler who was then driving towards the De Vega compound.68 In the same
phone call, Valler also talked with accused-appellant Garcia to inquire about the ransom money.69

Then a blue Toyota Corona arrived at the De Vega compound.70 Valler alighted from the car and shouted at the
occupants of the house to open the gate.71 Suspicious this time, however, he went back to his car to flee.72 But
the PACC operatives pursued his car, eventually subduing and arresting him.73 The operations at the De Vega
Compound ended at 8:30 in the evening and the PACC operatives, together with Atty. Tioleco and the accused-
appellants, left the De Vega compound and returned to their headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City.74 The
ransom money was returned intact to Atty. Tioleco.75

When arraigned, accused-appellants Ronald "Roland" Garcia, Rodante Rogel, Rotchel Lariba and Gerry Valler
pleaded not guilty to the charge of kidnapping for ransom in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049, although during the
trial Garcia admitted complicity in the abduction of Atty. Tioleco and in the receipt of the ransom money from
the victim's sister Floriana.76 In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050 for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition,
Rodante Rogel and Rotchel Lariba also pleaded not guilty.77
During the trial, Gerry Valler denied being part of the kidnapping for ransom and asserted that he was at the De
Vega compound where he was arrested on 8 October 1996 solely to pay for the fighting cocks he had bought
from one Jimmy Muit, alleged owner of the compound.78 Accused Ronald Garcia, despite his admission to the
crime, nevertheless disowned any role in planning the crime or knowing the other accused-appellants since his
cohorts were allegedly Jimmy Muit and two (2) others known to him only as "Tisoy" and "Tony."79 He also
alleged that it was Jimmy Muit's red Toyota car that was used in the crime.80 Explaining their presence at the
De Vega compound at the time they were arrested, Rogel claimed that he was employed as a helper for breeding
cocks in this compound81 while Lariba's defense focused on an alleged prior agreement for him to repair
Jimmy Muit's car.82

Accused-appellants filed separate appellants' briefs. In the brief submitted by the Public Attorneys Office in
behalf of accused-appellants Garcia, Rogel and Lariba, they argue that the crime of kidnapping for ransom was
not committed since Atty. Tioleco was released from detention by means of the rescue operation conducted by
the PACC operatives and the ransom money subsequently recovered.83 They conclude that their criminal
liability should only be for slight illegal detention under Art. 268, of The Revised Penal Code. Accused-
appellants Rogel and Lariba further assert that they could not be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition since neither was in complete control of the firearms and ammunition that were recovered when
they were arrested and no evidence was offered to prove responsibility for the presence of firearms and
ammunition inside the room.84

The brief filed for accused-appellant Gerry B. Valler asserts the same defense he made at the trial that he was at
the De Vega compound only to pay his debts to Jimmy Muit,85 arguing that Atty. Tioleco did not have the
opportunity to really recognize him so that his identification as the driver of the car was tainted by police
suggestion, and that P/Chief Insp. Cruz' testimony is allegedly replete with inconsistencies that negate his
credibility.86

Encapsulated, the issues herein focun on (a) the "ransom" as element of the crime under Art. 267 of The
Revised Penal Code, as amended; (b) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove kidnapping for
ransom; (c) the degree of responsibility of each accused-appellant for kidnapping for ransom; and, (d) the
liability for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under RA 8294, amending PD 1866.

First. We do not find any quantum of merit in the contention that kidnapping for ransom is committed only
when the victim is released as a result of the payment of ransom. In People v. Salimbago87 we ruled -

No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so long as it
was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim's freedom. In municipal criminal law,
ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment
of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. It is enough if the crime was committed "for the
purpose of extorting ransom." Considering therefore, that the kidnapping was committed for such
purpose, it is not necessary that one or any of the four circumstances be present.

So the gist of the crime, as aptly stated in American jurisprudence from which was derived the crime of
kidnapping for ransom,88 is "not the forcible or secret confinement, imprisonment, inveiglement, or kidnapping
without lawful authority, but x x x the felonious act of so doing with intent to hold for a ransom the person so
kidnapped, confined, imprisoned, inveigled, etc."89

It is obvious that once that intent is present, as in the case at bar, kidnapping for ransom is already committed.
Any other interpretation of the role of ransom, particularly the one advanced by accused-appellants, is certainly
absurd since it ironically penalizes rescue efforts of kidnap victims by law enforcers and in turn rewards
kidnappers for the success of police efforts in such rescue operations. Moreover, our jurisprudence is replete
with cases, e.g., People v. Chua Huy,90 People v. Ocampo91 and People v. Pingol,92 wherein botched ransom
payments and effective recovery of the victim did not deter us from finding culpability for kidnapping for
ransom.1âwphi1.nêt

Second. Issues of sufficiency of evidence are resolved by reference to findings of the trial court that are entitled
to the highest respect on appeal in the absence of any clear and overwhelming showing that the trial court
neglected, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance affecting the
result of the case.93 Bearing this elementary principle in mind, we find enough evidence to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the cooperation of all accused-appellants in the kidnapping for ransom of Atty. Tioleco.

Truly incriminating is the judicial confession of accused-appellant Garcia of his participation in the commission
of the crime. He admitted that he took part in actually depriving Atty. Tioleco of his liberty94 and in securing
the ransom payment from Floriana Tioleco.95 He could not have been following mechanically the orders of an
alleged mastermind, as he claims, since by his own admission he was neither threatened, forced or intimidated
to do so96 nor mentally impaired to resist the orders.97 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, he is
presumed to be in full possession of his faculties and conscience to resist and not to do evil.

We cannot also give credence to Garcia's asseveration that the persons still at large were his co-conspirators.
This posture is a crude attempt to muddle the case as discerned by the trial court from his demeanor when he
testified -

Because he had been caught in flagrante delicto, Roland Garcia admitted his participation in the crime
charged. From his testimony, however, there appears a veiled attempt to shield Gerry Valler from
conviction. First, Garcia claimed that the car they used was reddish in color (TSN, October 20, 1997, pp.
9, 19 & 20). Then he added that the owner of the car was Jimmy Muit and not Gerry Valler (TSN,
October 20, 1997, p. 9). Next, he said that there was no conspiracy and he did not know then Gerry
Valler, Rodante Rogel and Rogel Lariba until they were placed together in Camp Crame (Ibid., p. 22).

The Court however cannot simply accept this part of his story. To begin with, his repeated reference to the color
of the car as reddish is quite suspicious. He conspicuously stressed the color of the car in three (3) instances
without being asked. The transcripts of the notes bear out the following:

ATTY. MALLABO: Did you use any vehicle while you were there at Gilmore Street?

A:       Yes, sir.

Q:       What kind of vehicle was that?

A:       Jimmy's car, a Toyota, somewhat reddish in color x x x x

Q:       By the way, what car did you use when you were roaming around Quezon City on October 6 in
the evening?

A:       Jimmy's car, which was somewhat red in color. Reddish.

Q:       And what car did you use the following day when you took the bag? The same car?

A:       The same car, the Toyota car which was somewhat reddish in color.

Such a clear attempt to mislead and deceive the Court with such unsolicited replies cannot succeed. On
October 8, 1996, in the vicinity of McDonald's, he was seen alighting from the blue Toyota Corona
(TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 28-32). As earlier pointed out, the blue Toyota Corona car is owned by
 Gerry Valler who was the one driving it in the afternoon of the same day to the De Vega compound
(TSN, April 28, 1997, pp. 64-67; and November 10, 1997, pp. 22-28). Gerry Valler was also identified
by Atty. Tioleco as the driver of the dark blue car used in his abduction (TSN, April 10, 1997, pp. 10-11;
and TSN, April 14, 1997, pp. 21-27).98

Accused-appellant Valler's profession of innocence also deserves no consideration. Various circumstances

indubitably link him to the crime. For one, he was positively identified by Atty. Tioleco to be the driver of the
dark blue Toyota car used in the abduction on 5 October 1997, which car was seen again twice during the
occasions for ransom payment. This was followed by a telephone call made by Valler to the house where Atty.
Tioleco was being detained and in fact talked with accused-appellant Rogel to tell him that he was coming
over99 and with accused-appellant Garcia to ask from him about the ransom supposedly earlier collected.100
Given the overwhelming picture of his complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the defense that he was
only trying to pay his debts to Jimmy Muit when he was arrested.

We find nothing substantive in Valler's attempt to discredit the victim's positive identification of him on the
trifling observation that Atty. Tioleco was too confused at the time of his abduction to recognize accused-
appellant's physical features accurately. It is truly evident from the testimony of Atty. Tioleco that his vision
and composure were not impaired by fear or shock at the time of his abduction and that he had the opportunity
to see vividly and remember unerringly Valler's face -

Q:       Where were these two unidentified men positioned inside the car?

A:       One of them was at the driver's seat and the other one was immediately behind the driver's seat.

Q:       Now, could you please describe to this honorable court the person who was seated on the driver's
seat?

A:       He has a dark complexion, medium built and short hair at that time.

Q:       If you see that person again will you be able to identify him sir?

A:       Yes, sir.

Q:       And if he's present in the courtroom will you be able to point to him?

A:       Yes, sir.

Q:       At this juncture your honor we would like to request with the court's permission the witness be
allowed to step down from the witness stand and approach the person just described and tap him on his
shoulder.

COURT INTERPRETER: Witness stepping down from the witness stand and approached the person he
had just described and tapped him on his shoulder and who when asked to identify himself he gave his
name as Gerry Valler.101

Even on cross-examination, Atty. Tioleco was steadfast in his reference to Gerry Valler -

Q:       What stage was that when your eyeglasses were grabbed by these persons inside the car?
 A:       That was after the other accused entered the vehicle and the car zoomed away, that was when
they were putting a blindfold on me, that was the time when they started removing my eyeglasses, sir x
x x x102

Q:       So when you were inside the car, you had difficulty seeing things inside the car because you were
not wearing your eyeglasses?

A:       No, sir, that is not correct, because they were close, so I can see them x x x x103

Q:       And as a matter of fact, it was the PACC operatives who informed you that the person being
brought in was also one of the suspects, am I correct?

A:       That is not correct, sir. They said that, but I know that is one of the suspects because he was the
person who was driving the vehicle at the time I got kidnapped. So I know him.

Q:       So you saw him at the time you were kidnapped that is why you were able to identify him when
he was ushered in?

A:       When he was brought into the kitchen I saw him. When I saw him, I knew he was one of the
suspects.

Q:       When you saw him, he was in handcuffs?

A:       Yes, sir, that is correct.

Q:       You were informed that his name is Gerry Valler?

A:       When he went inside the house and the kitchen, they started interviews, that is where I learned his
name, Gerry Valler x x x x104

Q:       But I thought that when you were pushed inside the car, you were pushed head first, how can you
easily describe this person driving the vehicle and the person whom you now identified as Roland
Garcia?

A:       Even if they pushed my head, there was an opportunity for me to see the face of the accused.105

As we held in People v. Candelario,106 it is the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to
remember the faces of their assailants and the manner in which the craven acts are committed. There is no
reason to disbelieve Atty. Tioeleco's claim that he saw the faces of his abductors considering that they brazenly
perpetrated the crime in broad daylight without donning masks to hide their faces. Besides, there was ample
opportunity for him to discern their features from the time two (2) of his kidnappers approached and forced him
into their car and once inside saw the other two (2), including Gerry Valler, long enough to recall them until he
was blindfolded.

The victim's identification of accused-appellant Valler is not any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention
Valler's name in his affidavit. It is well-settled that affidavits are incomplete and inaccurate involving as they do
mere passive mention of details anchored entirely on the investigator's questions.107 As the victim himself
explained -

Q:       Now, in Question No. 5 and I quote x x x Why did you not identify here the name of the driver as
one Gerry Valler?
 A:       Because they never asked me the name. They just asked me to narrate what happened. Had they
asked me the name, I could have mentioned the name.108

In light of the positive identification by the victim of accused-appellant Valler, the latter's denial must fall
absolutely. Clearly, positive identification of the accused where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over his defense.109 When
there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify
falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.110

Finally, we do not see any merit in Valler's enumeration of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of P/Chief
Insp. Gilbert Cruz concerning (a) the time and place of meeting between the PACC operatives and Floriana
Tioleco; (b) the schedule of the first and second ransom pay-offs; (c) the number of Floriana Tioleco's
companions during the aborted first pay-off; (d) the number of occupants in the blue Toyota car; and, (e) the
PACC operatives' recognition of Floriana Tioleco during the ransom payments. This is an argument that
clutches at straws. For one, the purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations of time or
number, hence, the reference thereto by the witness would understandably vary. Furthermore, they are too
minor to warrant the reversal of the judgment of conviction. They do not affect the truth of the testimonies of
witnesses nor do they discredit their positive identification of accused-appellants. On the contrary, such trivial
inconsistencies strengthen rather than diminish the prosecution's case as they erase suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony and negate any misgiving that the same was perjured.111

We also do not believe that accused-appellants Rogel and Lariba are innocent bystanders in this case. It taxes
the mind to believe Rogel's defense that as a caretaker of the place where Atty. Tioleco was detained, he
observed nothing unusual about this incident. An innocent man would have immediately reported such
dastardly act to the authorities and refused to sit idly by, but a guilty person in contrast would have behaved
otherwise as Rogel did.112

Accused-appellant Lariba's defense is similarly incredible. He joins Gerry Valler in proclaiming that he too was
allegedly at the wrong place at the wrong time for the wrong reason of just wanting to tune up the car of Jimmy
Muit. But for all these assertions, he failed to produce satisfactory evidence that he was indeed there to repair
such car. Of all the days he could have discharged his work, he chose to proceed on 8 October 1997 when the
kidnapping was in full swing. There was even no car to repair on the date that he showed up. Like the
submission of Rogel, Lariba's defense falls completely flat for he could have so easily observed the kidnapping
of Atty. Tioleco that was taking place in the house of Jimmy Muit.

In sum, accused-appellants cannot rely upon the familiar phrase "reasonable doubt" for their acquittal. As
demonstrated by the fastiduous references of Valler to alleged inconsistencies of P/Chief Insp. Cruz, not all
possible doubt is reasonable since in the nature of things everything relating to human affairs is open to some
imaginary dilemma. As we have said in People v. Ramos,113 "it is not such a doubt as any man may start by
questioning for the sake of a doubt; nor a doubt suggested or surmised without foundation in facts or testimony,
for it is possible always to question any conclusion derived from testimony. Reasonable doubt must arise from
the evidence adduced or from the lack of evidence, and it should pertain to the facts constitutive of the crime
charged." Accused-appellants have not shown the presence of such fatal defects in this case. Clearly, all the
elements and qualifying circumstances to warrant conviction for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious
illegal detention have been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Third. We go into the criminal liability of each accused-appellant. There is no doubt that Gerry Valler and
Ronald Garcia are principals by direct participation and co-conspirators in the kidnapping for ransom of Atty.
Tioleco. Their respective participation in perpetrating the crime cannot be denied. As regards their liability as
co-conspirators, we find the same to have also been shown beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it for
which liability is joint.114 Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the felonious covenant
itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during, and after the commission of the crime
disclosing a common understanding between them relative to its commission.115 The acts of Valler and Garcia
in coordinating the abduction, collection of ransom and detention of their victim indubitably prove such
conspiracy.

Lariba and Rogel were caught inside the house where Atty. Tioleco was detained. P/Chief Insp. Paul Tucay
testified on their involvement -

Q:       Okey, when you stormed the place, do you know where these two men were?

A:       The two men were seated at the sala during that time, sir.

Q:       They were seated at the sala when you entered the place?

A:       Yes, sir.

Q:       What happened after entering the gate?

A:       We announced that we were police officers of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.

Q:       Do you know what happened with these two men during that time?

A:       They were caught by surprise and they were about to run to the first room.

Q:       What happened when these two men who were at the living room or at the sala, when they ran to
the first room?

A:       We surprised them and cornered them in that room.

Q:       What about the team of Major Quidato, where did they proceed?

A:       Major Quidato's team proceeded to the second room where Atty. Tioleco was being kept.

Q:       According to you, you gave chase to these two men who were earlier in the sala and they ran
upon your announcement that you were police officers?

A:       When we cornered them in that room, they were about to grab the two revolvers loaded with six
(6) rounds of ammunitions.

Q:       Where were these revolvers placed, Mr. Witness?

A:       They were placed on top of a cabinet, which, when you enter in the room, is placed on the right
side of the room.

Q:       How many revolvers were you able to recover?

A:       There were two revolvers.

Q:       And can you please describe these revolvers to this Honorable Court?
 A:       Yes, sir x x x x The revolvers confiscated on that raid are one (1) .38 caliber revolver without
serial number loaded with 6 rounds of ammunition, live ammo, one .357 also loaded with 6 rounds of
live ammunitions.116

Correlating the above testimony with the other evidence, it is clear that at the time Lariba and Rogel were
caught, Atty. Tioleco had already been rendered immobile with his eyes blindfolded and his hands handcuffed.
No evidence exists that he could have gone elsewhere or escaped. At the precise moment of their apprehension,
accused-appellants Lariba and Rogel were unarmed although guns inside one of the rooms of the house were
available for their use and possession.

Assessing these established circumstances in the manner most favorable to Lariba and Rogel, we conclude that
they were merely guarding the house for the purpose of either helping the other accused-appellants in
facilitating the successful denouement to the crime or repelling any attempt to rescue the victim, as shown by
the availability of arms and ammunition to them. They thus cooperated in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts by means of which they aided or facilitated the execution of the crime but without
any indispensable act for its accomplishment. Under Art. 18 of The Revised Penal Code, they are mere
accomplices.

In People v. De Vera117 we distinguished a conspirator from an accomplice in this manner -

Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design.
Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such
course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and
only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be
committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be
committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the
authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.

In the instant case, we cannot deny knowledge on the part of Lariba and Rogel that Valler and Garcia had
kidnapped Atty. Tioleco for the purpose of extorting ransom and their cooperation to pursue such crime. But
these facts without more do not make them co-conspirators since knowledge of and participation in the criminal
act are also inherent elements of an accomplice.118 Further, there is no evidence indubitably proving that
Lariba and Rogel themselves participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. As the evidence stands,
they were caught just guarding the house for the purpose of either helping the other accused-appellants in
facilitating the success of the crime or repelling any attempt to rescue the victim as shown by the availability of
arms and ammunition to them. These items contrast starkly with the tried and true facts against Valler and
Garcia that point to them as the agents ab initio of the design to kidnap Atty. Tioleco and extort ransom from
his family.1âwphi1.nêt

Significantly, the crime could have been accomplished even without the participation of Lariba and Rogel. As
stated above, the victim had been rendered immobile by Valler and Garcia before the latter established contacts
with Floriana Tioleco and demanded ransom. The participation of Lariba and Rogel was thus hardly
indispensable. As we have held in Garcia v. CA, "in some exceptional situations, having community of design
with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the
perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character."119 At any rate, where
the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking and doubt created as to whether the accused
acted as principal or accomplice, the balance tips for the milder form of criminal liability of an accomplice.120

We are not unaware of the ruling in People v. Licayan that conspiracy can be deduced from the acts of the
accused-appellants and their co-accused which show a concerted action and community of interest. By guarding
Co and Manaysay and preventing their escape, accused-appellants exhibited not only their knowledge of the
criminal design of their co-conspirators but also their participation in its execution.121 But the instant case is
different. Considering the roles played by Lariba and Rogel in the execution of the crime and the state the
victim was in during the detention, it cannot be said beyond reasonable doubt that these accused-appellants
were in a real sense detaining Atty. Tioleco and preventing his escape. The governing case law is People v.
Chua Huy122 where we ruled -

The defendants' statements to the police discarded, the participation of the other appellants in the crime
consisted in guarding the detained men to keep them from escaping. This participation was simultaneous
with the commission of the crime if not with its commencement nor previous thereto. As detention is an
essential element of the crime charged, as its name, definition and graduation of the penalty therefor
imply, the crime was still in being when Lorenzo Uy, Tan Si Kee, Ang Uh Ang, William Hao and
Young Kiat took a hand in it. However, we are not satisfied from the circumstances of the case that the
help given by these accused was indispensable to the end proposed. Our opinion is that these defendants
are responsible as accomplices only.

Fourth. In the beginning, we noted that neither Lariba nor Rogel who were both convicted of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 filed a notice of appeal in accordance with
established procedures, although the records show that accused-appellant Gerry Valler needlessly did so
exclusively in his behalf.123 But in light of the enactment of RA 8294 amending PD 1866 effective 6 July
1997,124 and our ruling in People v. Ladjaalam125 followed in Evangelista v. Siztoza,126 we nonetheless
review this conviction to give effect to Art. 22 of The Revised Penal Code mandating in the interest of justice
the retroactive application of penal statutes that are favorable to the accused who is not a habitual criminal.127

In Ladjaalam we ruled that if another crime was committed by the accused he could not be convicted of simple
illegal possession of firearms under RA 8294 amending PD 1866 -

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court
convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended
by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor x x x x

The trial court's ruling and the OSG's submission exemplify the legal community's difficulty in
grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on
how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:

Sec. 1. - Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

Sec. 1.     Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44,
.45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .
22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of
two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
 If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as
an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or
entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their
employment.

The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed
firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.

x x x x A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any
crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other
crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of
RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is
justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms
and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and
not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance x
x x x The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided
that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the
third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates accused-appellants x x x of illegal possession
of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While
the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second, it is only prision correccional. Indeed, an
accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing
an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable
by arresto menor. This consequence necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294 the wisdom of
which is not subject to review by this Court.128

Accordingly, we are constrained to dismiss Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 and set aside the judgment of
conviction therein since accused-appellants Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel cannot be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions there being another crime - kidnapping for ransom - which they were
perpetrating at the same time.

In fine, we affirm the conviction of Gerry Valler and Ronald "Roland" Garcia as principals and Rotchel Lariba
and Rodante Rogel as accomplices for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. This
Court is compelled to impose the supreme penalty of death on Valler and Garcia as mandated by Art. 267 of
The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.
The penalty imposable on Lariba and Rogel as accomplices is reclusion perpetua, the penalty one degree lower
than that prescribed for the crime committed pursuant to Art. 52 in relation to Art. 61, par. (1), of the Code. We
however set aside the judgment in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 convicting Lariba and Rogel of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition in light of the foregoing discussion.

As regards the moral damages against accused-appellants to be paid by them in solidum, we find the amount of
P200,000.00 to be reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings Atty. Tioleco and his family
endured due to accused-appellants' inhumane act of detaining him in blindfold and handcuffs and mentally
torturing him and his family to raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological ordeal which constitute the bases for moral damages under the Civil Code129 is too
obvious to require still the recital thereof at the trial through the superfluity of a testimonial charade.

Following our finding that only Gerry Valler and Ronald "Roland" Garcia are principals by direct participation
and conspirators while Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel are accomplices, we apportion their respective
responsibilities for the amount adjudged as moral damages to be paid by them solidarily within their respective
class and subsidiarily for the others.130 Thus, the principals, accused-appellants Ronald "Roland" Garcia and
Gerry Valler, shall pay their victim Atty. Romualdo Tioleco P150,000.00 for moral damages and the
accomplices P50,000.00 for moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 (G.R. No.
133489) accused-appellants RONALD "ROLAND" GARCIA y FLORES and GERRY B. VALLER are
declared guilty as PRINCIPALS of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and are sentenced each
to death, while accused-appellants RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES and ROTCHEL LARIBA y DEMICILLO
are convicted as ACCOMPLICES and are ordered to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessories provided by law for the same crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention.
Accused-appellants are further ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, with the principals
being solidarily liable for P150,000.00 of this amount and subsidiarily for the civil liability of the accomplices,
and the accomplices being solidarily liable for P50,000.00 for moral damages and subsidiarily for the civil
liability of the principals.1âwphi1.nêt

Finally, in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050 (G.R. No. 143970) the Decision of the court a quo convicting
RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES and ROTCHEL LARIBA y DEMICILLO of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition is REVERSED and SET ASIDE in light of the enactment of RA 8294 and our rulings in
People v. Ladjaalam131 and Evangelista v. Siztoza.132

Four (4) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the
finality of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the
possible exercise of Her Excellency's pardoning power. Costs against accused-appellants.

[G.R. No. 131925. March 9, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARIO CABANAS CUAL, and DARIO

MARANAN VILLOCENO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION
 GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In an information 1 dated February 28, 1994, Accused-appellants Dario Cabanas Cual and Dario Maranan
Villoceno were charged with the crime of murder before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 20. The information reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about February 26, 1994 at more or less 9:00 o’clock in the evening, near NHA, Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named two (2) accused,
with deliberate intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, conspiring, confederating and, mutually
helping with one another, armed with a sharp bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and wound one Ramil Macasalhig Sabturani by then and there suddenly and abruptly hacking
and stabbing said victim with the use of accused’s said bolo, which directly caused said victim’s instantaneous
death at the scene of the crime due to ‘shock due to hemorrhage due to multiple hacking wounds’, to the great
damage and prejudice to the injured party, his aggrieved family as well.chanrobles.com : law library

Accused’s commission of the above felony was attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength.

Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 14, Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon arraignment, the two accused-appellants pleaded not guilty and thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish conviction, the prosecution anchored its case on the testimonies of four witnesses, namely:
Leodivico Caayao, Amy Sabturani, Dr. Jerry Abroguena, and SPO1 Vicente Apag.

The first witness, Leodivico Caayao, a twenty-year old trisikad driver, testified that on February 26, 1994 at
around 9:00 in the evening, he was sitting in his trisikad watching the television inside a store in Balulang,
Cagayan de Oro City when he noticed a commotion taking place nearby. 2 He turned to see what the
commotion was about and saw accused-appellant Dario Villoceno and the victim, Ramil Sabturani, grappling
for the possession of a steel pipe. The two were two (2) arms length away from him. 3

While the two were grappling for the possession of the steel pipe, he saw accused-appellant Dario Cual arrive at
the scene and hack Ramil Sabturani with a bolo. 4 Thereafter, Sabturani ran towards his trisikad and attempted
to drive it. Ramil Sabturani was only able to make a turn on the trisikad before he was caught by Cual. Cual
then repeatedly hacked Sabturani with the bolo while the latter was inside the trisikad. 5 He heard the victim
plead for mercy and say "that is enough because it was only a little trouble and you pity me." 6 He then saw
Cual slam the victim inside the trisikad and thereafter Cual walked away. At the time when Cual was hacking
the victim inside the trisikad, he was about four meters away from the incident. 7 When he left the scene of the
crime to talk with his employer, Ramil Sabturani was still breathing.

On cross-examination, he stated that he was not able to see how the commotion started as he only turned his
attention to the incident while Dario Villoceno and Ramil Sabturani were already grappling for the possession
of the steel pipe. 8 He likewise recalled seeing something at the tip of the steel pipe although he was not sure
whether it was a pointed object.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

Amy Sabturani, the widow of the victim, for her part, recalled that on the night of February 26, 1994, at around
9:00 p.m., her late husband asked permission from her to buy cigarettes. 9 After a while, a certain Julie Sison
informed her that her husband was ganged up upon and so she went outside to check up on her husband. She
was shocked to see her husband lying face down with a number of wounds on his back. It was her brother-in-
law who brought her husband to the hospital as she was still in shock. 10
She disclosed that her late husband was employed with G&P Builders at the time of his death with a weekly
average income of P2,500.00. 11 On account of her husband’s death, she testified that she incurred twenty five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) for the casket, the vigil, and other incidental expenses. 12 When asked whether her
grief could be reduced to monetary terms by way of damages, she decided to leave the same to the discretion of
the court. As to the motive behind the killing, she opined that it must have been work-related and that the
accused-appellants pretended to be plumbers. Thus, they were able to take over the contract which was
supposed to be for her husband. 13

On cross-examination, she admitted that she did not actually see how the incident happened. She likewise stated
that the receipts for the expenses she incurred were in the possession of her brother-in-law. 14

Dr. Jerry Abroguena, the physician who conducted the post-mortem examination of the victim, testified that the
victim suffered a total of twenty-one hacking and stab wounds on different parts of his body. He opined that the
instrument probably used in the hacking and stabbing of the victim was a sharp-bladed weapon like a bolo. 15
He explained that all the wounds sustained by the victim contributed to his demise and that not one of the
wounds, taken alone, will cause the death of the victim. In this regard, he pointed out that the cause of death of
the victim was shock due to hemorrhage due to multiple hack wounds. 16 He further noted that the wounds on
the back of the victim could have been inflicted while he was lying down or in the prone position. 17

On cross-examination, he speculated that there was probably a struggle between the victim and his assailant as
there was a wound on his left hand. He also stated that there were instances when the victim was facing the
assailant due to the presence of wounds at his front. 18

The last witness for the prosecution, SPO1 Vicente Apag, testified that on the evening of February 26, 1994 at
about 9:00 p.m., he was on duty at the Carmen Police Precinct when he received a report that someone was
killed in Balulang, Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City. 19 Upon receipt of the report, several policemen left the
precinct to investigate the matter and when they returned, they brought with them accused-appellant Dario Cual
so that the incident could be blottered. Afterwards, Accused-appellant Cual was brought to the Maharlika
Rehabilitation Center. 20 With respect to accused-appellant Dario Villoceno, he stated that he was brought to
the precinct later that night. He also identified the bolo which was allegedly used in the killing of Ramil
Sabturani and which was turned over to him by the apprehending officer.

On cross-examination, he stated that he was not the one who went to investigate the incident in Balulang,
Cagayan de Oro City and that he based his report only on the testimony of those who responded to the call and
on the testimony of witness Caayao. 21 He further testified that he did not investigate the accused Dario
Villoceno when he came in and he just asked the apprehending officer if Villoceno had anything to do with the
killing. He stated that he could not remember whether accused-appellant Villoceno had injuries when he was
brought to the precinct but he recalled the said accused telling him the following morning that he had some
contusions and bruises. 22 When asked whether he knew whether accused-appellant Cual was pursued or
whether he surrendered, he stated that he was only told that the accused was apprehended. He was not told
whether the said accused voluntarily surrendered or whether the latter was pursued by the apprehending
officers. 23

The defense, for its part, introduced the testimonies of the two accused-appellants to support their contention
that they were innocent of the crime charged against them.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accused-appellant Dario Villoceno first narrated the events which led to the killing incident. He testified that
two days before the incident or on February 24, 1994, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, the victim Ramil
Sabturani approached him and challenged him to fight while he was eating his snack near the house which he
was working on in Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. 24 He admitted that he and the victim often worked together
as sub-contractors. He surmised that the reason the victim was angry with him was because the project engineer
had given him a task that was originally assigned to the victim but which had been delayed. 25 He did not
accept the challenge and instead he simply stepped back, which prompted the victim to throw stones at him. He
was able to evade the attack and afterwards, he ran towards the house he was working on while he saw the
victim run towards the house of a certain Julie Sison. He surmised that the victim was looking for a weapon at
this time as he heard somebody shout "do not do that." When the victim emerged from the house, he again
threw stones at accused-appellant and his companion, the other accused Dario Cual. 26 They then retaliated by
also throwing stones at the victim but they were not able to hit him. Afterwards, the victim went home but he
returned soon thereafter brandishing two knives. The victim commenced hurling stones at them but again they
were not hit. They then ran away from the victim but not before seeing the victim being disarmed by the guard
of the NHA Subdivision. 27 They then went back to the house where they were staying in.

On that same day, at around 9:00 in the evening, Ramil Sabturani, his wife and a certain Rey Ligan threw stones
at their house and shouted at them to go down. Instead of confronting the victim, Accused-appellants decided to
hide inside their house. Eventually, the group of the victim stopped their stone-throwing as the accused-
appellants did not retaliate or answer back at them 28 . They were not able to report the incident to the police
the following day as the victim and Rey Ligan were waiting for them. They were only able to report the incident
and to have the same blottered at around 10:00 a.m. of February 26, 1994. They were then told that they should
clear things up with the Barangay Captain of Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City but they were unable to do so as it
was a Saturday and the offices were closed. 29

Later that day, at around 8:00 in the evening, he, together with Dario Cual, decided to work overtime at their
place of work. However, when they were about fifteen (15) meters away from their place of work, Ramil
Sabturani and Rey Ligan ran after them. Ramil Sabturani was armed with a lead pipe. They ran away from their
pursuers but eventually, Ramil Sabturani was able to catch up with him. Ramil Sabturani then proceeded to hit
him with the lead pipe. He recounted that he was hit on left shoulder, right arm, forehead, and left jaw and that
he fell down after being hit. Once he fell down, his companion, Accused-appellant Dario Cual, approached and
helped him by hacking Ramil Sabturani with a bolo. He explained that Dario Cual brought a bolo with him as
they were going to use it in rendering overtime work at the house they were building. 30 He was not able to
clearly see what happened to Ramil Sabturani afterwards as he immediately proceeded home after he stood up.
The accused Cual also followed him to his house a while later but afterwards, Cual told his wife that he was
going to surrender. Cual then immediately left the house.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

A policeman later arrived at his house and brought him to the police station where he and Cual were both
investigated. Initially only Cual was brought to the Maharlika Center as the arresting officer stated that he had
nothing to do with the incident. However, upon the prodding of a certain Engineer Eleno Dingue, the cousin of
the victim, he was likewise detained. 31

On cross-examination, Accused-appellant Villoceno explained that the bolo Cual was carrying was to be used
for forming the wood for mixing the cement. At that time only Cual was carrying a bolo, as the work they were
doing did not require a good finish. 32 He likewise testified that it was the victim who carried a lead pipe while
his companion did not carry anything. Consequently, it was the victim who beat him up with the lead pipe. He
did not know what the latter’s companion was doing while this was happening. He likewise stated that the
accused Cual helped him by hacking Ramil Sabturani with the bolo he was carrying. He further stated that once
the attention of Ramil Sabturani was on Dario Cual, he stood up slowly and left while the two were still
fighting. 33 Before leaving the scene, he stated that he saw the victim ride a trisikad and attempt to bump Dario
Cual.

The other accused, Dario Cual, corroborated the testimony of Dario Villoceno as to the events that led to the
killing incident including the challenge made by the victim to his co-accused and the stone-throwing incidents.
As to the reason for these confrontations, he stated that Villoceno and the victim had a previous quarrel
regarding a certain plumbing job which was given to Villoceno by the project engineer. 34
Dario Cual had a different version as to the events which happened on February 26, 1994. He testified that on
that date at around 8:00 in the evening, he and Villoceno decided to render some overtime work. On their way
to work, they saw the victim and Rey Ligan run towards them. They tried to run away but Villoceno was caught
by Ramil Sabturani and beaten with a lead pipe. 35 After he saw Villoceno being hit with the lead pipe, he
approached the two and told Ramil Sabturani to stop what he was doing. Thereafter, Ramil Sabturani faced him
and tried to stab him with the lead pipe which had a knife at the other end. The victim kept on trying to stab him
while he kept on moving backward. When his back was against the wall, he hacked the victim on the head with
the bolo he was carrying. 36 Afterwards, the victim ran towards a parked trisikad and rode on it. The victim
then attempted to run over him but he was only hit by the steering wheel of the vehicle. Thereafter, he hacked
the victim again although, he could not remember the exact number of times he was able to hit the victim. 37
He denied that he pursued the victim when the latter ran to the trisikad and he maintains that he stood his
ground and that it was the victim who went to him. 38

After the incident, he walked towards his house where he met his wife who was already crying because of the
incident. When they reached their house, he talked with his wife and told her he was going to surrender. 39 He
was not able to reach the police station as he met the policemen on the way to the precinct at Balongis. When
the policemen got off their vehicle, he gave them his bolo and he told them that he was going to surrender. 40

On 25 September 1996, the court a quo rendered its questioned decision the dispositive portion of which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In view of the foregoing observations and deliberate perception of this court, this court is morally convinced
that the guilt of the two (2) accused was duly established and proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt over the crime charged in the information and as such the accused DARIO CUAL is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA for not being a heinous crime. The other
accused DARIO VILLOCENO is likewise found guilty of the crime herein charged as an accomplice and he is
hereby sentenced to the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is the next lower in degree to that of
reclusion perpetua under Art. 52 in relation to Art. 27 of the Revised Penal Code in consummated
felonies.chanrobles.com.ph:red

Both accused are further condemned, jointly and severally, to pay to the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for the death of Ramil M. Sabturani and the further sum of P100,000.00 for actual
and moral damages plus costs.

SO ORDERED." 41

The trial court was of the impression that the prosecution’s version of the events and witnesses was more
credible than those of the defense. It struck down appellant’s tale of self-defense particularly of the contention
of the defense that the victim was the aggressor and that he was armed with a lead pipe. 42 Moreover, the court
stated that the presence of twenty-one (21) stab wounds could not have been inflicted without the conspiracy
and mutual participation of the two Accused-Appellants.

The Court held that the killing was qualified to murder in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The several stab wounds received by the victim which is beyond the normal impulse of a person who is
attacked has rendered the victim so helpless and unable to defend himself from the superior strength abusively
applied by the accused Dario Cual thus qualifying the present case to the crime of Murder punishable and
defined under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.

Both accused never denied that the cause of the death of the victim was the twenty-one (21) stab wounds
inflicted by Dario Cual on the person of Ramil Sabturani during the incident. Evidence was clearly shown that
Dario Cual suddenly stabbed the victim with a bolo with such tenacity and persistence that the presence of
twenty-one (21) stab wounds amounts to abuse of superior strength thereby employing means to weaken the
defense of the victim who was then unarmed." 43

With respect to accused-appellant Dario Villoceno, the court was convinced that he was an accomplice to the
murder as his act of grappling with the victim for the possession of a lead pipe gave accused-appellant Dario
Cual the "necessary inspiration and impetus in consummating the act of murder." 44

In this appeal accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I.

THE COURT A QUO ERRONEOUSLY CONVICTED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF

MURDER NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY
DISCLOSE THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS ONLY HOMICIDE.chanrobles.com.ph:red

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN QUALIFYING THE KILLING TO MURDER ON THE BASIS
OF THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH CONSIDERING
THAT THE SAME WAS NEVER ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.

III.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF

VOLUNTARY SURRENDER, INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT SO
GRAVE A WRONG IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED DARIO CUAL.

IV.

ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED AS AN ACCOMPLICE BUT

SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED. 45

We will first take up the liability of accused-appellant Dario Cual.

A cursory analysis of the arguments offered by accused-appellant Cual in his appellant’s brief shows that he is
praying, not for his acquittal, but that he be convicted only of homicide and thus be made to suffer a reduced
penalty corresponding thereto. Accused-appellant Cual admits that he killed the victim and the force he used in
doing so was excessive. However, Accused-appellant argues that the evidence on record cannot sustain the
conclusion that murder had indeed been committed considering that no qualifying circumstance was established
by the prosecution to qualify the killing to murder.

There is merit in accused-appellant’s plea.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

In order to qualify the killing to murder, the prosecution must prove that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Moreover, the
prosecution is necessarily limited by the allegations in the complaint as to the qualifying circumstances that
attended the killing of Ramil Sabturani, namely evident premeditation, treachery, and abuse of superior
strength. 46
To arrive at a conviction, the prosecution principally relied on the testimony of the alleged eyewitness, Leodico
Caayao who testified as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: And while you were watching TV, can you recall if there was any unusual incident that happened that
evening?

A: There was.

Q: And tell the court what was that unusual incident?

A: There were two persons grappling for the possession of the steel pipe.

Q: And how far were these two persons from you whom you said was grappling for the possession of the steel
pipe?

A: About two arms length.

Q: And did you recognize these two persons whom you said was grappling for the possession of the steel pipe?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who were these two persons?

A: Ramil and Dario Villoceno.

x        x       x

Q: When you saw Ramil Sabturani and Dario Villoceno grappling for the possession of the steel pipe, what
happened next?

A: Another person arrived?

Q: And who was this person that arrived?

A: Dario Cual.

x        x       x

Q: What happened when Dario Cual arrived at the scene?

A: He hacked Ramil.

Q: What weapon did you see was used by Dario Cual in hacking Ramil?

A: A bolo.

Q: Did you see what part of the body of Ramil Sabturani was hacked by Dario Cual?

A: I did not see anymore.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

Q: What happened after Ramil Sabturani was hacked by Dario Cual with a bolo?

A: Ramil was able to run to my trisikad.

Q: And when Ramil reached your trisikad, what did he do?

A: He attempted to drive my trisikad.

Q: Was he able to drive away your trisikad?

A: He was able to only make a turn.

Q: Why was he able to make only a turn of your trisikad?

A: Because he was then chased upon and caught.

Q: Caught by whom?

A: Dario Cual.

Q: What happened when Dario Cual caught Ramil?

A: He then hacked successively Ramil Sabturani.

Q: Using the same bolo?

A: Yes, the same bolo.

Q: Where was Ramil hacked by Dario Cual, inside your trisikad?

A: Inside.

x        x       x

Q: Did you hear anything coming from Dario Cual or from Ramil Sabturani while he was being hacked by
Dario Cual?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you hear and from whom did you hear?

A: I heard Ramil asking for pity or mercy.

Q: What exactly were the words uttered by Ramil Sabturani pleading for mercy from Dario Cual?

A: And he said, that is enough because that was only a little trouble and you pity me.chanrobles.com.ph : red

Q: Did you hear if Dario Cual also replied for a plea of mercy from Ramil Sabturani?

A: None. 47
From the above narration, it is clear that evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. For evident premeditation
to aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements:
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to
his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time, between determination and execution, to allow himself to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. 48 As shown above, however, the prosecution failed to prove any
element of this qualifying circumstance as their only eyewitness merely testified on the actual commission of
the crime. Where there is no showing as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed
before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered to exist. 49

We likewise find that no treachery attended the killing. The requisites for appreciating alevosia in the
commission of a crime are: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(2) appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of the attack
employed by him. 50

In the instant case, although accused-appellant Dario Cual initially attacked the victim while the latter was
grappling for the possession of a lead pipe, this circumstance by itself does not amount to treachery. For one, it
cannot be said that the victim was not given any opportunity to defend himself. As narrated by Leodivico
Caayao, the victim was able to defend himself after the initial assault made by Cual as he even managed to run
away — without success however, — before Cual hacked him to death. Moreover, there was absolutely no
evidence produced by the prosecution which show that accused-appellants consciously and deliberately
employed this specific form of attack which would especially and directly ensure its commission without
impunity. 51 The decision by accused-appellant Cual to attack the victim could have been a product of
impulsiveness or a spur of the moment decision provoked by the struggle of the victim with his friend, Accused
Villoceno. Hence, it was unlikely that he deliberated on the means to carry out his decision. 52

To summarize, the presence of treachery in the case at bench has not been proven as fully and convincingly as
the crime itself. The doubt must, therefore, be resolved in favor of the appellant. 53

With respect to the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, we likewise find that it is not
attendant under the circumstances. In order to appreciate this qualifying circumstance, there must be evidence
introduced that the two accused-appellants were physically stronger that the victim and that they abused such
superiority by taking advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. 54 In the case at
bench, the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence as to the relative physical strength of the parties
involved. In fact, the lone eyewitness to the incident, Leodivico Caayao, was non-committal on this
aspect:chanrobles.com.ph:red

"Atty. Merlas (to the witness)

Q: And this Sabturani, you can recall is builded. Is it not?

A: Tall and slim. I could not tell correctly as to his height.

Q: When you say taller, between this accused Villoceno and the deceased Sabturani, who is taller?

A: Sabturani was taller.

Q: And, in fact, he was also bigger than the accused?

A: I did not see clearly because he was seated." 55

Moreover, the testimony of the eyewitness shows that at no point did the two accused-appellants attack the
victim simultaneously as it was only accused Cual who deliberately attacked the latter. And even assuming that
accused-appellant Cual was stronger than the victim, abuse of superior strength still cannot be appreciated as
there is no showing that accused-appellant deliberately intended to take advantage of such superiority.

In sum, the prosecution failed to prove any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information. As
such, Accused-appellant can only be convicted of the crime of homicide.

Accused-appellants next argue that the trial court should have appreciated in favor of accused Cual, the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, incomplete self-defense and lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong.

We agree with the accused-appellants that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been
appreciated. As we have previously held, the following requisites must be proven for voluntary surrender to be
considered: (1) the offender had not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. On this point, Accused-appellant testified as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q: Now after the incident, can you tell us where did you proceed after that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?

A: After the incident I walked towards home and then before reaching the house I met my wife who was already
crying so I brought her home. But before we reached the house the wife of Ramil Sabturani (i.e. the victim),
Amy Sabturani, quarreled with my wife.

Q: Now, were you able to finally reach your house?

A: Yes, sir. When we reached home, I talked with my wife and then I told her since we cannot do anything and
it already happened, you just wait and stay here because I am going to surrender.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Q: Before whom?

A: I wasn’t able to reach the police station but I met the policemen at Balongis.

Q: So, what did you do when you saw the policemen?

A: When they saw me they then alighted from their vehicle and then I gave then the bolo and told then that I am
going to surrender." 56

From this narration, it is evident that accused Cual’s surrender satisfied the above-mentioned requisites. He had
not been arrested as the police were, in fact, still looking for him to verify his participation in the crime. Upon
seeing the policemen, he immediately gave them his weapon and told them that he was surrendering. Finally,
his surrender was through his own volition as he was on his way to the precinct when he was met by the police.

The Solicitor-General, in his Appellee’s Brief, disputes accused Cual’s statement that he voluntarily
surrendered by stating that it was only upon the arrival of the policemen at his house that he was forced to go
out of his house to surrender. 57 However, we have examined the records carefully and we find no evidence to
this effect. In fact, the policeman who actually arrested accused-appellant Cual was supposed to be called to the
witness stand but due to his failure to appear, despite summons, the prosecution dispensed with his evidence.
Verily, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should properly be appreciated as the prosecution
failed to dispute the same. 58

The Court does not, however, agree to the argument of accused-appellant Cual that he should also benefit from
the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The sheer number of wounds,
twenty-one in all, inflicted by the accused-appellant Cual on the body of the victim brings forth in bold relief
the intention of the accused to snuff out the life of the deceased, and definitely negates any pretense of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong. 59

The Court cannot likewise appreciate the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Under
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code 60 , in order to avail of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense, Accused-appellant must prove the existence of a majority of the requisites for self-
defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 61

On this point, Accused-appellant admits that the numerous hack and stab wounds found on the victim negates
complete self-defense. However, they argue that accused-appellant Dario Cual should still be given the benefit
of the said privileged mitigating circumstance considering that the defense was able to prove aggression on the
part of the victim and the lack of provocation on the part of the defendant.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We do not agree.

Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, there can be no defense, complete or incomplete unless the victim
committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending. 62 The testimony of witness Leodivico Caayao
effectively negated any pretense that there was aggression on the part of the victim as against accused Cual. The
witness, who had no motive to fabricate his testimony, clearly stated that the victim was locked in a struggle
with accused Dario Villoceno when accused Cual approached the victim and hacked him with the bolo. After
the initial assault made by Cual, the victim immediately ran from Dario Cual to go to a parked trisikad where he
was immediately pursued by Cual. 63 At no instance did the witness see the victim attack or hit accused Cual.
Thus, as proven by the prosecution, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim Ramil Sabturani.

Moreover, even assuming that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, such unlawful
aggression had already ceased when the victim ran away from accused Cual to a parked trisikad. At this point,
there was no longer any reason for accused-appellant Dario Cual to pursue the victim and inflict more injuries.
Once the unlawful aggression had ceased with the victim’s attempt to escape, Accused-appellant Dario Cual
was no longer justified in pursuing the victim and inflicting the fatal wounds.

In sum, Accused-appellant Dario Cual should only be convicted of the crime of homicide with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Applying the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law 64 , Accused-
appellant Dario Cual should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum.chanrobles.com : red

We shall now look into the participation of accused-appellant Dario Villoceno in the crime. As stated
previously, the lower court convicted Dario Villoceno as an accomplice to the crime. It reasoned that Villoceno
deliberately grappled with the victim for the possession of a steel pipe and thus gave accused Cual the necessary
impetus and inspiration to consummate the deed. 65

Under current jurisprudence, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following requisites
must concur: (1) community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material and moral aid in the execution of the
crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts and those attributed to the person
charged as an accomplice. 66

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the
previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as
an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation. 67

In the case at bench, there is nothing in the records which show that accused-appellant Villoceno knew that
accused Cual was going to hack Ramil Sabturani. Neither was it shown that accused-appellant Villoceno
concurred in the criminal design of his co-accused.

The only involvement of accused-appellant Cual in the incident was when he was engaged in a struggle with the
victim just before Villoceno made his initial attack on the victim. This circumstance does not by itself show his
unity with the criminal design of Villoceno. On this point, we are inclined to believe his testimony that the
struggle was not deliberate on his part and that, in fact, it was the victim who initiated the struggle. The victim,
who had just been deprived of a job opportunity by accused-appellant Cual, surely had more reason to feel
aggrieved and thus engage accused-appellant Cual to a fight.

The fact that accused-appellant Cual immediately disengaged from his struggle with the victim after Villoceno’s
attack is yet another indication that he is innocent of the charge against him. Verily, if he had indeed conspired
with Villoceno, he would have continued to hold the victim and prevent him from escaping until he expired
from Villoceno’s attack.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

The prosecution having failed to establish that there was community of design between accused Villoceno and
Cual, the former cannot be held liable as accomplice to the homicide. Accused-appellant Dario Villoceno
should therefore be acquitted of the charges against him.

The last issue to be resolved is the whether the heirs of the victim Ramil Sabturani are entitled to the damages
awarded by the trial court, namely P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P100,000.00 as actual and moral
damages. 68

We affirm the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Ramil Sabturani as this is in accord with current
jurisprudence. 69 However, we note that the trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of the victim the lump sum
of P100,000.00 as actual and moral damages. These are separate in nature and require separate determination.

With respect to actual damages, according to Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, one is entitled to adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Moreover, only expenses
supported by receipts and which appears to have actually been expended in connection with the death of the
victim should be allowed for actual damages. 70 In the case at bench, the wife of the victim testified that she
spent the amount of P25,000.00 on account of the death of her husband. 71 However, she failed to produce any
receipt to support these expenses as these were allegedly with her brother. 72 Thus, we cannot take these
expenses into consideration, as these are unsupported by any documentary evidence.chanrobles.com.ph:red

However, the heirs are entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Ramil Sabturani. The
fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said damages. 73 The testimony of the victim’s
wife, Amy Sabturani, as to the earning capacity of her husband sufficiently establishes the basis for making
such an award. It was established that Ramil Sabturani was 24 years old at the time of his death in 1994. His
average weekly income was P2,500.00. 74 Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality that has been consistently adopted by the Court 75 , the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Award for = 2/3 [80 – age at time of death] x [gross annual income – 80% (GAI)]
Lost earnings

= 2/3 [80 – 24] x [P130,000.00 – 80% (P130,000.00)]

= (37.3333) x (P26,000.00)

= P970,666.65

Finally, the heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to moral damages considering that the wife of the deceased
asked for it and testified that she experienced moral suffering. An award of P50,000.00 is sufficient to
compensate the heirs of the victim for the injuries to their feelings. 76

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the judgment appealed from. As
MODIFIED, the accused-appellant DARIO CUAL is found guilty of the crime of homicide as defined and
penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Ramil Sabturani the sum of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for the latter’s death, the sum of P970,666.65 as compensation for lost earnings and the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Accused-appellant Dario Villoceno is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.chanrobles.c