Narcisa Avila vs Benjamin Barabat G.R. No.
141993 March 17 2006
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
J, Corona
Facts:
This involves a real property situated in Toledo City, Cebu with an area of 433 square-
motors Anunciacon Bahena vda de Meno upon her death, the property was transferred to her 5
children petitioners Narcisa Avila, Natividad Macapaz, Francisca Adlawan, Leon Nemeño and
Jose Bahena and built there respective houses on there lot. In 1964 Benjamin Barabat leased a
housed owned by Avila. Avila transferred to Cagayan however she returned to Toledo in 1979
she offered her house and share to her siblings but no body was interested in buying it so she
offered it to respondent Barabat which he agreed. Avila sold the house and lot for 8,000 pesos.
However after such sale was made the siblings of Avila together with their lawyers informed
Barabat of the period that they were allowed to stay since, the siblings bought it from Avila.
Respondent Refused and demanded that Avila execute a public document evidencing the sale,
but she refused hence prompting respondent to file a quieting of title at the RTC of Toledo, it
was further amended to include an annulment of the deed of sale to the spouses Adlawan,
specific performance, partition and damages as additional causes of action. The trial court ruled
in favour to respondent and as well as the C.A. Hence this petition
Issues: WON such was a Equitable Mortgage or Sale?
Ruling:
Petitioners contend that 1602 and 1604 must apply.
For Articles 1602 and 1604 to apply, two requisites must concur:
(1) the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale and
(2) their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.
Furthermore, contrary to petitioners’ claim, the trial court found that it was respondents who took
over the payment of real property taxes after the execution of Exhibit "A." There is no reason to
depart from these factual findings because, as a rule, factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on the Court and
generally will not be reviewed on appeal to us.5 There is no reason for us to deviate from this
rule.
Petitioners’ claim of gross inadequacy of selling price has no basis. They failed to introduce
evidence of the correct price at the time the land was sold to respondents in 1979. How can we
therefore conclude that the price was grossly inadequate? In the absence of evidence as to the
fair market value of a parcel of land at the time of its sale, we cannot reasonably conclude that
the price at which it was sold was inadequate
Petitioners’ rely on Article 1623 in relation to Article 1620 of the Civil Code to justify their right of
redemption. This is incorrect.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
The regime of co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons.8 By the nature of co-ownership, a co-owner cannot point to any specific
portion of the property owned in common as his own because his share in it remains intangible
and ideal.
The purpose of partition is to separate, divide and assign a thing held in common among those
to whom it belongs.14 By their own admission, petitioners already segregated and took
possession of their respective shares in the lot. Their respective shares were therefore
physically determined, clearly identifiable and no longer ideal. Thus, the co-ownership had been
legally dissolved. With that, petitioners’ right to redeem any part of the property from any of their
former co-owners was already extinguished. As legal redemption is intended to minimize co-
ownership,15 once a property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the
community ceases to exist and there is no more reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.
Under the law, subject to certain conditions, owners of adjoining urban land have the pre-
emptive right to a lot before it is sold to third parties, or the redemptive right if it has already
been sold. In particular, Article 1622 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1622. Whenever a piece of urban land is so small and so situated in that a major portion
thereof cannot be used for any practical purpose within a reasonable time, having been bought
merely for speculation, is about to be re-sold, the owner of any adjoining land has a right of pre-
emption at a reasonable price.
If the re-sale has been perfected, the owner of the adjoining land shall have a right of
redemption, also at a reasonable price. When two or more owners of adjoining lands wish to
exercise the rights of pre-emption or redemption, the owner whose intended use of the land in
question appears best justified shall be preferred.
However, this provision does not apply here. Aside from the fact that petitioners never raised it
as an issue, the conditions provided for its application were not met. While the property may be
considered as urban land, it was not shown or even alleged that its area and location would
render a major portion of no practical use within a reasonable time. Neither was there any
allegation to the effect that the disputed property was bought merely for speculation.
