Acap vs.

Court of Appeals
251 SCRA 30

FACTS:

Cosme Pido acquired ownership over a specific lot through a Deed of Sale between him and
Felixberto Vasquez. When ownership was transferred, Teodoro Acap, tenant of a portion of the said land,
continued to be the registered tenant and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter,
upon Pido’s death, to his widow Laurenciana. Upon Pido’s death, his surviving heirs executed a
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights in favor of Edy de los Reyes. Edy filed a notice of an
adverse claim against the original certificate of title and personally informed Acap that he (Edy) had
become the new owner of the land and that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him. Edy and
Acap entered into an oral lease agreement wherein Acap agreed to pay 10 cavans of palay per annum as
lease rental. After the lapse of 4 years, Edy filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against Acap, alleging that as his leasehold tenant, Acap refused and failed to comply with their
agreement. Acap averred that he continues to recognize Cosme Pido as the owner of the land and that
upon Pido’s death, he continued to pay rentals to his widow. He claimed that he had no knowledge about
any transfer or sale of the lot and that assuming the lot was indeed sold to Edy without his knowledge,
R.A. 3844 grants him the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price.

The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Edy. On Appeal, the CA brushed aside petitioner’s
argument that the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights (Exhibit “D”), the document relied upon by
private respondent to prove his ownership to the lot, was excluded by the lower court in its order dated 27
August 1990. The order indeed noted that the document was not identified by Cosme Pido’s heirs and
was not registered with the Registry of Deeds of Negros Occidental. According to respondent court,
however, since the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights appears to have been duly notarized, no
further proof of its due execution was necessary. Like the trial court, respondent court was also convinced
that the said document stands as prima facie proof of appellee’s (private respondent’s) ownership of the
land in dispute.

ISSUE:

1. Is a “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” a recognized mode of acquiring ownership?

2. May a “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” be considered a Deed of Sale?

HELD:

1. NO. A declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the
Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent
among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule
74 of the Rules of Court. An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a
juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or
title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights
are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the
actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into two
(2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual
creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain
contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).

In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are
not the same. In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its
equivalent. Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public
instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the
estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement
between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

2. NO. There is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights.
The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is,
technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of
other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the
succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of
the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other
derivative mode of acquiring ownership. A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove
private respondent’s ownership over the tenanted lot. “A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of
a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court at some
future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in
court.” It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is no
evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido’s heirs and private
respondent transferring the rights of Pido’s heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private
respondent’s right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself
be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent’s name.