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THIRD DIVISION

JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and G.R. No. 196894

NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO,
Petitioners, Present:

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
-versus- BERSAMIN,*
MENDOZA, and
LEONEN,JJ

JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, Promulgated:
Respondent. March 3, 2014

)( ------------------------------------------------------------------
:-;:

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

1
of Court challenging the May 6, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA). in CA-G.R. SP No. 03896-MIN, which affirmed the September 27,
3 4
2010/ October 7, 2010 and November 9, 2010 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14 (RTC-Br. 14), in Civil Case No. 33,551-
2010, an action for Cancellation of Lien. It is entitled "JEWM Agro
Industrial Corporation v. The Registry of Deeds for the City of Davao.
Sheriff Robert Medialdea. John & Jane Does. and all persons acting under
their directions.

• Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad. per Special Order No. 16-40
dated February 19,2014.
1
Rollo, pp. 26-36. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justice Pamela Ann
Abella Maxino and Associate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, concurring.
2
Id. at 13 3- I 3
7.
'1d.at141.
4
1d. at 142-143.
DECISION 2 G.R. No.
196894

This controversy stemmed from various cases of collection for sum of

money filed against So Keng Kok, the owner of various properties including
two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 292597 and 292600 (subject
properties), which were attached by various creditors including the
petitioners in this case. As a result, the levies were annotated on the back of
the said titles.

Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo (Spouses

Crisologo) were the plaintiffs in two (2) collection cases before RTC,
Branch 15, Davao City (RTC-Br. 15), docketed as Civil Case Nos. 26,810-
98 and 26,811-98, against Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al. Respondent
JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation (JEWM) was the successor-in-interest of
one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection case before RTC, Branch
8, Davao City (RTC-Br. 8), docketed as Civil Case No. 26,513-98, against
the same defendants.

On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8 rendered its decision based on a

compromise agreement, dated October 15, 1998, between the parties
wherein the defendants in said case were directed to transfer the subject
properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold the subject
properties to one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the same to JEWM on June 1,
2000. Thereafter, TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676 were eventually issued in
the name of JEWM, both of which still bearing the same annotations as well
as the notice of lis pendens in connection with the other pending cases filed
against So Keng Kok.

A year thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate

collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15 against Robert Lim So and So Keng
Koc (defendants). Thus, on July 1, 1999, the said defendants were ordered to
solidarily pay the Spouses Crisologo. When this decision attained finality,
they moved for execution. On June 15, 2010, a writ was eventually issued.
Acting on the same, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale scheduling an
auction on August 26, 2010. The notice of sale included, among others, the
subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676, now, in the
name of JEWM.

In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit of

Third Party Claim and the Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam. It prayed for the
exclusion of the subject properties from the notice of sale. In an order, dated
August 26, 2010, however, the motion was denied. In turn, the Spouses
Crisologo posted a bond in order to proceed with the execution.
DECISION 3 G.R. No.
196894

To protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation

of lien with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction before RTC-
Br. 14, docketed as Civil Case No. 33,551-2010. It prayed for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject
properties covered in the writ of execution issued pursuant to the ruling of
RTC-Br. 15; the cancellation of all the annotations on the back of the
pertinent TCTs; and the issuance of a permanent injunction order after trial
on the merits. “The Register of Deeds of Davao City, Sheriff Robert
Medialdea, John and Jane Does and all persons acting under their
direction” were impleaded as defendants.

At the scheduled hearing before RTC-Br. 14 on September 22, 2010,

Spouses Crisologo’s counsel appeared and filed in open court their Very
Urgent Manifestation questioning the authority of the said court to restrain
the execution proceedings in RTC-Br. 15. JEWM opposed it on the ground
that Spouses Crisologo were not parties in the case.

On September 24, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed an Omnibus Motion

praying for the denial of the application for writ or preliminary injuction
filed by JEWM and asking for their recognition as parties. No motion to
intervene was, however, filed as the Spouses Crisologo believed that it was
unnecessary since they were already the John and Jane Does named in the
complaint.

In the Order, dated September 27, 2010, RTC-Br. 14 denied Spouses

Crisologo’s Omnibus Motion and granted JEWM’s application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.

On October 1, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed a Very Urgent Omnibus

Motion before RTC-Br. 14 praying for reconsideration and the setting aside
of its September 27, 2010 Order. This was denied in the RTC Br.-14’s
October 7, 2010 Order for lack of legal standing in court considering that
their counsel failed to make the written formal notice of appearance. The
copy of this order was received by Spouses Crisologo on October 22, 2010.
It must be noted, however, that on October 27, 2010, they received another
order, likewise dated October 7, 2010, giving JEWM time to comment on
their Very Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on October 1, 2010. In its Order,
dated November 9, 2010, however, RTC-Br. 14 again denied the Very
Urgent Motion previously filed by Spouses Crisologo.
DECISION 4 G.R. No.
196894

On November 12, 2010, JEWM moved to declare the “defendants” in

default which was granted in an order given in open court on November 19,
2010.

Spouses Crisologo then filed their Very Urgent Manifestation, dated

November 30, 2010, arguing that they could not be deemed as defaulting
parties because they were not referred to in the pertinent motion and order of
default.

On November 19, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a

petition for certiorari5 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
RTC-Br. 14 orders, dated September 27, 2010, October 7, 2010 and
November 9, 2010, all of which denied their motion to be recognized as
parties. They also prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

In its Resolution, dated January 6, 2011, the CA denied the

application for a TRO, but directed Spouses Crisologo to amend their
petition. On January 19, 2011, the Spouses Crisologo filed their Amended
Petition6 with prayers for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, the annulment of the aforementioned orders of RTC Br. 14, and
the issuance of an order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued
in favor of JEWM.

Pending disposition of the Amended Petition by the CA, JEWM filed

a motion on December 6, 2010 before RTC-Br. 14 asking for the resolution
of the case on the merits.

On January 10, 2011, RTC-Br. 14 ruled in favor of JEWM, with the

dispositive portion of its Decision7 stating as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is

hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as follows:

1. the preliminary writ of injunction issued on October 5, 2010

is hereby made permanent;

5
Dated November 15, 2010.
6
Rollo, pp. 146-159.
7
Id. at 175-177. Penned by Judge George E. Omelio.
DECISION 5 G.R. No.
196894
2. directing herein defendant Registry of Deeds of Davao City
where the subject lands are located, to cancel all existing
liens and encumbrances on TCT No. T-325675 and T-325676
registered in the name of the plaintiff, and pay the

3. cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.8

Spouses Crisologo then filed their Omnibus Motion Ex Abudanti ad

Cautelam, asking RTC- Br. 14 to reconsider the above decision. Because no
motion for intervention was filed prior to the rendition of the judgment, a
certificate, dated March 17, 2011, was issued declaring the January 10, 2011
decision final and executory.

On May 6, 2011, the CA eventually denied the Amended Petition

filed by Spouses Crisologo for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of
preliminary injunction subject of the petition was already fait accompli and,
as such, the issue of grave abuse of discretion attributed to RTC-Br. 14 in
granting the relief had become moot and academic. It further held that the
failure of Spouses Crisologo to file their motion to intervene under Rule 19
rendered Rule 65 inapplicable as a vehicle to ventilate their supposed right
in the case.9

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

I. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the action

for Cancellation of Annotations may proceed even
without notice to and impleading the party/ies who
caused the annotations, in clear contravention of the
rule on joinder of parties and basic due process.

II. The Court of Appeals erred in applying a very

constrictive interpretation of the rules in holding that a
motion to intervene is the only way an otherwise real
party in interest could participate.

III. The Court of Appeals erred in denying our application

for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.

8
Id. at 177.
9
Id. at 36.
DECISION 6 G.R. No.
196894

IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the issues

raised by petitioners before it [had] been mooted by the
January 10, 2011 decision of RTC Branch 14.10

Spouses Crisologo submit as error the CA affirmation of the RTC- Br.

14 ruling that the action for cancellation may proceed without them being
impleaded. They allege deprivation of their right to due process when they
were not impleaded in the case before RTC-Br. 14 despite the claim that
they stand, as indispensable parties, to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the action for the cancellation of annotations covering the
subject properties. They cite Gonzales v. Judge Bersamin,11 among others,
as authority. In that case, the Court ruled that pursuant to Section 108 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, notice must be given to all parties in
interest before the court may hear and determine the petition for the
cancellation of annotations on the certificates of title.

The Spouses Crisologo also question the statement of the CA that

their failure to file the motion to intervene under Rule 19 before RTC-Br. 14
barred their participation in the cancellation proceedings. They put emphasis
on the court’s duty to, at the very least, suspend the proceedings before it
and have such indispensable parties impleaded.

As to the ruling on the denial of their application for the issuance of a

TRO or writ of preliminary injunction, Spouses Crisologo claim that their
adverse interest, evinced by the annotations at the back of the certificates of
title, warranted the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction
against JEWM’s attempt to cancel the said annotations in violation of their
fundamental right to due process.

Lastly, Spouses Crisologo cast doubt on the CA ruling that the issues
presented in their petition were mooted by the RTC-Br. 14 Decision, dated
January 10, 2011. Having been rendered without impleading indispensable
parties, the said decision was void and could not have mooted their petition.

In their Comment,12 JEWM asserts that Spouses Crisologo’s failure

to file a motion to intervene, pleadings-in-intervention, appeal or annulment
of judgment, which were plain, speedy and adequate remedies then available
to them, rendered recourse to Rule 65 as improper; that Spouses Crisologo
lacked the legal standing to file a Rule 65 petition since they were not

10
Id. at 11.
11
325 Phil. 120 (1996).
12
Rollo, pp. 241-262.
DECISION 7 G.R. No.
196894
impleaded in the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14; and that Spouses
Crisologo were not indispensable parties since their rights over the
properties had been rendered ineffective by the final and executory October
19, 1998 Decision of RTC-Br. 8 which disposed unconditionally and
absolutely the subject properties in favor of its predecessor-in-interest.
JEWM further argues that, on the assumption that Section 108 of P.D. No.
1529 applies, no notice to Spouses Crisologo was required because they
were not real parties-in-interest in the case before RTC-Br. 14, or even if
they were, their non-participation in the proceedings was because of their
failure to properly intervene pursuant to Rule 19; and, lastly, that the case
before RTC-Br. 14 became final and executory because Spouses Crisologos
did not perfect an appeal therefrom, thus, rendering the issues in the CA
petition moot and academic.

In their Reply,13 Spouses Crisologo restate the applicability of Section

108 of P.D. No. 1529 to the effect that any cancellation of annotation of
certificates of title must be carried out by giving notice to all parties-in-
interest. This they forward despite their recognition of the mootness of their
assertion over the subject properties, to wit:

Again, we respect JAIC’s position that “the claims of

subsequent attaching creditors (including petitioners’) have been
rendered moot and academic, and hence the entries in favor of said
creditors have no more legal basis and therefore must be
cancelled.” But we likewise at least ask a modicum of respect by at
least being notified and heard.14

The Ruling of the Court

The crux of this controversy is whether the CA correctly ruled that

RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion in failing to recognize
Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of
lien.

In this respect, the Court agrees with Spouses Crisologo.

In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the

back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as indispensable include
those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No.
1529,15 to wit:

13
Id. at 335-340.
14
Id. at 338.
15
Entitled as “Amending and Codifying the Laws relative to Registration of Property and for other
purposes.”
DECISION 8 G.R. No.
196894

Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. -No

erasure, alteration or amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the
Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First
Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in
registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with
the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply
by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered
interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant
inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased;
or that new interest not appearing upon the certificates have arisen
or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering
a certificate or memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate
certificate; x x x or upon any other reasonable ground; and the
court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all
parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a
new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon
a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and
conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may
consider proper.

In Southwestern University v. Laurente,16 the Court held that the

cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without
giving notice to the parties annotated in the certificate of title itself. It
would, thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is required to
be given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the back of a
certificate of title.

Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo’s liens were

indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as
persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be benefited or injured by
any order relative to the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In
other words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final
disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders.

As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been joined

as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. –

Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. 17

16
135 Phil. 44 (1968).
17
Rule 3, Rules of Court.
DECISION 9 G.R. No.
196894

The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is

the complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the
parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be affected by
the judgment.18

In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Spouses Crisologo

to be recognized as indispensable parties, failed to implement the mandatory
import of the aforecited rule.

In fact, in Sps. Crisologo v. Judge George E. Omelio,19 a related

administrative case, the Court found the trial judge guilty of gross ignorance
of the law when it disregarded the claims of Spouses Crisologo to
participate. In part, the Court stated:

This is not the first time Judge Omelio has rendered a decision
affecting third parties’ interests, without even notifying the
indispensable parties. In the first disputed case, JEWM Agro-
Industrial Corporation v. Register of Deeds, Sheriff Medialdea, John
& Jane Does and all persons acting under their directions, Judge
Omelio failed to cause the service of proper summons upon the John
and Jane Does impleaded in the complaint. Even when Sps.
Crisologo voluntarily appeared in court to be recognized as the John
and Jane Does, Judge Omelio refused to acknowledge their
appearance and ordered the striking out of Sps. Crisologos'
pleadings. For this reason, the Investigating Justice recommended
admonishing Judge Omelio for failing to recognize the Sps.Crisologo
as indispensable parties in that case.

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, the cancellation of the annotation of the sale without

notifying the buyers, Sps. Crisologo, is a violation of the latter’s right
to due process. Since this is the second time that Judge Omelio has
issued an order which fails to notify or summon the indispensable
parties, we find Judge Omelio guilty of gross ignorance of the law,
with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a
stiffer penalty in the future.

xxx

WHEREFORE, … We find Judge George E. Omelio GUILTY

of four counts of the serious charge of gross ignorance of the law for
the following acts: (a) refusing to recognize Spouses Jesus G.

18
Moldes v. Villanueva, 505 Phil. 767 (2005).
19
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2321, October 3, 2012, 682 SCRA 154.
DECISION 10 G.R. No.
196894
Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo as indispensable parties; … in
violation of the latter's right to due process. Accordingly, we impose
upon Judge George E. Omelio the penalty of fine of Forty Thousand
Pesos (₱40,000.00), with a warning that repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.20

The trial court should have exercised prudence in denying Spouses

Crisologo’s pleas to be recognized as indispensable parties. In the words of
the Court, “Judge Omelio should be penalized for failing to recognize Sps.
Crisologo as indispensable parties and for requiring them to file a motion to
intervene, considering that a simple perusal of the certificates of title would
show Sps. Crisologo’s adverse rights because their liens are annotated at the
back of the titles.”21

This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a

grave abuse of discretion.

In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel

22
Belen, the Court held as inexcusable abuse of authority the trial judge’s
“obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure.” Such
level of ignorance is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to “evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law,”23 or in essence, grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a

cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the
laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence requires
no less. 24

Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of

RTC-Br. 14, JEWM asserts technical grounds on why the CA did not err in
dismissing the petition via Rule 65. It states that:

a) The Crisologos could have used other available remedies

such as intervention under Rule 19, an appeal of the
judgment, or even an annulment of judgment, which are,

20
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2321, October 3, 2012, 682 SCRA 192-193.
21
Crisologo v. Omelio, supra note 19, at 182.
22
A .M . No . R T J- 10-221 6 , Jun e 26 , 2012,67 4 SC R A 47 7 .
23
Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 580 Phil. 135, 140 (2008).
24
Enriquez v. Judge Caminade, 519 Phil. 781 (2006), citing Abbariao v. Beltran, 505Phil. 510 (2005).
DECISION 11 G.R. No.
196894
by all means, plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law;

b) The Crisologos lack legal standing to file the Rule 65

petition since they were not impleaded in the Branch 14
case.

The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if
there is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was available to

Spouses Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65.

Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have been availed of,

failing to use this remedy should not prejudice Spouses Crisologo. It is the
duty of RTC-Br. 14, following the rule on joinder of indispensable parties,
to simply recognize them, with or without any motion to intervene. Through
a cursory reading of the titles, the Court would have noticed the adverse
rights of Spouses Crisologo over the cancellation of any annotations in the
subject TCTs.

Neither will appeal prove adequate as a remedy since only the

original parties to an action can appeal.25 Here, Spouses Crisologo were
never impleaded. Hence, they could not have utilized appeal as they never
possessed the required legal standing in the first place.

And even if the Court assumes the existence of the legal standing to
appeal, it must be remembered that the questioned orders were interlocutory
in character and, as such, Spouses Crisologo would have to wait, for the
review by appeal, until the rendition of the judgment on the merits, which at
that time may not be coming as speedy as practicable. While waiting,
Spouses Crisologo would have to endure the denial of their right, as
indispensable parties, to participate in a proceeding in which their
indispensability was obvious. Indeed, appeal cannot constitute an adequate,
speedy and plain remedy.

The same is also true if recourse to Annulment of Judgment under

Rule 47 is made since this remedy presupposes a final judgment already
rendered by a trial court.

25
Spouses Leynes v. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 154462, January 19,
2011,640 SCRA 25, 40.
DECISION 12 G.R. No.
196894

At any rate, the remedy against an interlocutory order, not subject of

an appeal, is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that
the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Only then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed
to be resorted to.26

This takes particular relevance in this case where, as previously

discussed, RTC-Br. 14 acted with grave abuse of discretion in not
recognizing Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties to the pertinent
action.

Based on the above, recourse to the CA via Rule 65 would have

already been proper, except for one last issue, that is, Spouses Crisologo’s
legal standing to file the same. JEWM cites DBP v. COA27 where the Court
held:

The petition for certiorari under Rule 65, however, is not

available to any person who feels injured by the decision of a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial
functions. The ‘person aggrieved’ under Section 1 of Rule 65
who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains
only to one who was a party in the proceedings before the court
a quo, or in this case before the COA. To hold otherwise would
open the courts to numerous and endless litigations.

Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their

averment that the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo in
the case before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the latter’s recourse via Rule 65.

This case, however, is an exception. In many instances, the Court has

ruled that technical rules of procedures should be used to promote, not
frustrate the cause of justice. Rules of procedure are tools designed not to
thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid
application may, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way to, and
be subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the
normal cause. 28

26
Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 553, 567-568, citing 1F
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 540 (8th revised ed.).
27
467 Phil. 62 (2004).
28
Santos v. Litton Mills, Incorporated, G.R. No. 170646, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 510. citing Fiel v.
Kris
Security Systems, Inc., 448 Phil.657, 662 (2003).
 DECISION 13 GR. No. 196894

Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as indispensable

parties is to preclude the judgment, orders and the proceedings from
attaining finality. Time and again, the Court has ruled that the absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to
those present. Consequently, the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14 were null
and void including the assailed orders, which may be "ignored wherever
29
and whenever it exhibits its head."

To tum a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper
the recourse to Rule 65 by the lack of legal standing is to prolong the denial
of due process to the persons whose interests are indispensible to the final
disposition of the case. It will only result in a protracted litigation as
Spouses Crisologo will be forced to rely on a petition for the annulment of
judgment before the CA (as the last remaining remedy), which may again
reach this Court. To prevent multiplicity of suits and to expedite the swift
administration of justice, the CA should have applied liberality by striking
down the assailed orders despite the lack of legal standing on the part of
Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65 petition before it. Besides, this lacking
requirement, of which Spouses Crisologo were not even at fault, is precisely
the reason why this controversy arose.

All told, the CA erred in dismissing the amended petition filed before
it and in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 6, 201 l

Decision of the Court of Appeals is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The
September 27, 2010, October 7, 2010 and November 9, 2010 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Davao City, are likewise NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 33,551-2010 is hereby REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings. The respondent is ordered to implead
all parties whose annotations appear at the back of Transfer Cet1ificate of
Title Nos. 325675 and 325676.

SO ORDERED.

JOSEC ENDOZA

2
q Buena v. Sapnay. 116 Phil. I 023 ( 1962), citing Banco Espaiioi-Filipino v. Palwu:a, 37 PhiL 921 ( 1918):
Lipan{!\'. Court o(First Instance o(Cavite, 74 Phil. 18 ( 1942).
DECISION 14 GR. No. 196894

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO . VELASCO, JR.

Associate .Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had een reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer oft e opinion of the

Court's Division.

PRESBITERO . VELASCO, JR.

Asso iate .Justice
Chairpe on, Third Division
DECISION 1 G.R. No.
5 196R94

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice