Sample Legal Opinion

December 10, 2010

Mr. Peter Banag

Dear Mr. Banag:

Here is the opinion you requested. The facts, gathered from you and your documents, are as
follows:

Your daughter, Mary Banag, about six years old, went to Arthur Sison’s house to buy ice-
candy on September 12 at about 3 PM. Mary knocked on the gate, but having gotten no
response from Arthur who was napping then, she tested the gate by pushing it. Upon doing
so, the gate yielded and Arthur’s dog jumped out, went after Mary and attacked her from
behind, biting her on the leg and arms as she fell to the ground. She was saved by Fred
Puzon, a neighbor, who kicked the dog away and protected her. Awakened by the
commotion and having heard shouts that his dog had attacked a child, Arthur went out, sent
the dog back to his yard and bought Mary to a nearby clinic for treatment, paying the medical
bill thereafter. You asked Arthur to pay Mary P20,000 in damages for the ordeal but all you
got was a letter saying that he cannot grant your demand because he was not at fault. He
based his stand on the following:

1. That there was a sign at the gate warning about the presence of the dog, in effect implying
that if Mary heeded what the sign says, the attack wouldn’t have happened
2. That at the time of the attack she was not accompanied by an adult, impliedly putting the
blame on you as her parent for letting her roam outside unattended and therefore exposing
her to danger; and
3. That he already paid the bill for Mary’s medication.

The issue here is clear: it’s whether or not Arthur is liable to Mary for damages. In my
opinion, Arthur is liable for damages notwithstanding his defenses. First and foremost, what
happened to Mary is classified as a quasi-delict, as defined by Article 2176 of the Civil Code:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
As for the nature of Arthur’s liability, the provision that governs is Article 2183 of the Civil
Code. It provides that:

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall
cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage.

The Supreme Court explained said provision in the case of Vestil v. Intermediate Appellate
Court (G.R. No. 74431, 179 SCRA 47), saying that:

According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based
on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the
animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social
interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the
damage which such animal may cause.

Now, Arthur may say that what happened was brought about by contributory negligence on
Mary’s part as the former implied in his letter, or he may claim that letting Mary roam the
vicinity unaccompanied is negligence on your part and constitutes the proximate cause of
her injuries, notwithstanding his own negligence in leaving the gate unlocked before napping.
Both scenarios are governed by Article 2179 of the Civil Code that provides:

When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

In the first scenario, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 129792, 321 SCRA 375) that “a child under nine years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law” covers Mary,
hence throwing the notion of contributory negligence on her part out the window. As for the
second scenario, the ruling in Umali v. Bacani (G.R. No. L-40570, 69 SCRA 263) provides
that parental negligence in allowing a young child to go out of the house alone may at most
qualify as contributory negligence and as such would be covered by the second sentence of
Article 2179.

Arthur, being the owner of the dog that attacked Mary, is liable for damages, with all possible
defenses taken into consideration. If Arthur didn’t leave the gate unlocked before taking a
nap – an act showing a lack of due care – there would have been no way the dog could have
attacked Mary. Mary could test the gate all day long and she wouldn’t be attacked by Arthur’s
dog had the gate been closed. Of course, he may say that paying Mary’s medical bill should
be enough, but that does not cover the moral damages that Mary is entitled to under Article
2219 (2) of the Civil Code, which specifically pertains to quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries. As mentioned earlier, the only reprieve due him would be a mitigation of his liability.

One thing: my opinion is based on the laws and the jurisprudence applicable to your
situation. If by any circumstance you take your plight to court, I am confident that the case
will be decided in your favor.

Very truly yours,

Emile Justin P. Cebrian