Al Ghazali
In keeping with the then traditional treatment of the question of the obligatory character of the
Caliphate, al-Ghazali first directs his argument against those who deny the Shar'i character of
the Caliphate, and then against those who deny its obligatoriness altogether
The first argument is a positive one, and concerns the institutional authority for the Caliphate.
The second is a negative argument, and sheds light on the nature of the Caliphate and the duties
attached thereto.
After dealing with these two arguments we shall discuss his treatment of the constitutive
process with special reference to the qualifications of the Caliph and the constituent power.
Al – Ghazali follows the accepted Sunni line, but he develops his argument in a more logical
fashion, adding new elements.
First, he states that the Caliphate does indeed have utility, but he traces the proof of the Shar'i
obligation of appointing an Imam first to ijma' and, second and more importantly, to the
deduced will of the Prophet.
He contends that the will of the Prophet was the source of the consensus of the community.
His argument is that the Prophet's purpose was the formal establishment of the religion of
Islam.
To secure this end both life and livelihood must be protected.
The appointment of an Imam is therefore obligatory.
He also indicates that only through the performance of formal religious observances may the
bliss of the hereafter be achieved.
Sunni insistence upon the Shar’i character of the Caliphate inadequate for the definition of the
institutional authority of that office.
In supporting this view, the Sunni theorists point to no specific provisions of the Shari'ah.
Instead they reason from the prescribed duties, deducing the executive institution
The weakness of their argument is manifest, for as we have seen, the Caliphate existed in fact
before any of its duties were defined.
By the addition of new elements to this argument, al-Ghazali goes much further towards a
definition of the institutional authority of the Caliphate.
The most important innovation is his reference to the consensus of the community, which is no
less than the historical practice of the community.
Evidently, this is historical legislation.
Technically, the consensus by which the community has authorized the institution of the
Caliphate has reference to the consent of the Companions of the Prophet to the establishment
of the Orthodox Caliphate.
The phrase "consensus of the community" is sufficiently vague to include the consensus of other
generations as well.
However, the consensus of the community is not actually a legislative process, but merely
evidence of the fact that what has been approved by the community is actually provided for in
the Shari'ah.
Despite this legal detail, we must conclude that the authority for the institution of the Caliphate
is derived from the community of the Muslims.
By the time al-Ghazali wrote, the consensus of the community had become a source of the
Shari'ah in its own right.
The community at large has been endowed by the grace of God with a special character,
summed up in the words of the Prophet, "My Community will never agree in error."
The important thing to note is that consensus implies unanimity, or very nearly that.
The community as a source of authority is then considered collectively.
Ijma' is, as has been said, primarily a conservative principle, tending to approve and perpetuate
existing phenomena.
But it is correlatively a dynamic principle, expressing in a way the historical continuity of the
Islamic community.
The institution of the Caliphate is intimately bound up with the collective unity of the
community, as well as with its historical continuity.
Al-Ghazali's logical bent of mind will not allow him to be satisfied with the mere evidential fact
of ijma'.
Clearly, ijma' itself contains no logic, while al-Ghazali's intention is to frame the requirements of
the Shari'ah in a manner best calculated to convince the protagonists of reason.
Therefore, he goes back to the source of the ijma' which is, he says, the intention of the Prophet
to organize the establishment of Islam
Primarily, he is referring to the establishment of external observances of the religion such as
prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage; the execution of the hudud punishments for such transgressions
as drinking and adultery; the maintenance of the Shari'ah Law in such matters as marriage and
inheritance; and the administration of Islamic justice by means of the Qadis.
Under these headings come the collection of taxes and the government administration, for
these are included either directly or indirectly in the Shar'i requirements concerning them.
The Prophet may have desired to accomplish other, less concrete things as well, but here the
main point is his purpose of organizing the administration of the (Sunni) religion.
Although it is here presented in slightly different terms, this is the same old argument leading to
the functional or circumstantial authority of the Caliphate.
Al-Ghazali's argument goes on to show that the requirements of the Shari'ah imply the
requirement of an institution of some sort to execute them.
That institution, the form of which has been authorized by the consensus of the community, is
the Caliphate.
Though al-Ghazali rejected the argument of the Mu'tazilah that the obligatory character of the
Caliphate based upon reason, he agrees with them that it does have utility.
Utility is a concept with a minimum of religious connotation.
We have seen that the Shari'ah contains very many material provisions, but none of these could
be classified by a Muslim as merely utilitarian.
Obviously, al-Ghazali is referring to governmental functions common to all centralized coercive
orders, such as the maintenance of order and the security of life and property.
This utility can only exist where power is present.
The subject of utilitarian power comes into al-Ghazali's argument again when he attempts to
prove that the Imamate is necessary for the realization of the Prophet's goal.
It enters when he says that material security is a prerequisite for carrying out of the Shariah
The concrete character of so many of the Shari'ah provisions necessitates, in the establishment
of the Shari'ah the setting up of a civic religious institution.
Obviously, this implies the existence of a favourably disposed political power.
This is provided by the Sultanate
His conclusion is that the Caliphate because of its relationship with the Sultanate is required as a
result of the objective of the Prophet
In the progress of this argument the Sultanate is brought in without any explanation of the
relationship of the bearer of power to the Caliph; the function of the Sultanate is an essential
element of the authorized Caliphate
In a later argument al Ghazali opposes those who deny the obligatory character of the Caliphate
altogether
The contention of al – Ghazali’s opponents is that the Caliphate has lapsed because there is no
qualified person to serve in that capacity
The implication of their statement is that the Caliphate is not, therefore, a rigid requirement of
the Shari'ah.
At least this is in some measure the way in which al-Ghazali chooses to understand their
argument.
In his own approach al-Ghazali definitely confuses the terms obligatory (moral) and necessary
(natural).
The argument is simply: there ought to be a Caliph; therefore, there must be a Caliph; therefore,
there is a Caliph.
From this we are probably justified in deducing that the opposing argument runs: there is no
Caliph, therefore there need not be a Caliph, therefore there is no obligation to appoint a
Caliph.
Al-Ghazali's final argument on this question is his asking what would become of all those
religious, social, economic, and political phenomena which are regulated by the Shariah if there
were no Caliph
He contends that without the existence of the Caliphate no judgment of a Qadi, no contract, no
testament would be valid.
In other words, the power of all Qadis and government officials is derived from the Caliph.
In theory, Islamic government is perfectly centralized.
The authority which any individual Qadi has is completely derived from the Caliph, and not from
the task he performs, as is the case of the Caliph's own authority.
It is inconsistent, but there is no circumstantial authority for subordinate officials; their authority
is only constitutive
Thus, the absence of the Caliphate would turn every normal human relationship into sin, and
lead to disorder and strife.
He does not say what effect such social disintegration might have on the chances of the
individual Muslim for salvation; but from other indications we may conclude that they would be
considerably reduced.
The nature of the Caliphate in al – Ghazali’s theory:
1. The Caliphate comprehends the necessary power to accomplish the maintenance of
order
2. It represents or symbolizes the collective unity of the Muslim community and its
historical continuity
3. Deriving its functional and institutional authority from the Shari'ah, it is the only
legitimate form of government in Islam.
The legitimacy of the Caliphal form of government validates all acts of a legal and political
nature, and it establishes the Caliphate as the focal point of the Shari'ah in the community as
well as the symbol of the divine guidance of the Sunni community by virtue of its obedience to
the Shari'ah.
It is not coincidental that these three aspects of the Caliphate correspond to al-Ghazali's three
sources for the obligatory character of the Caliphate:
1. Utility
2. Ijma'
3. The objective of the Prophet
Al – Ghazali joins the earlier theorists in giving a long list of qualifications required for the office.
Ideally, al-Ghazali's qualifications are the same as those of al-Mawardi's.
The Caliph must be without physical as well as mental defects.
He must be honourable, courageous, wise, and so on.
It must not be thought that these qualifications are mere words.
They do not represent abstract qualities, but rather their concrete equivalents.
Thus, he must be able to defend the Muslims against their enemies and maintain internal order.
He must be able to make judgments in accordance with the Shari'ah.
He must be able to administer the affairs of the State.
Finally, he must be of Quraishite descent.
Al – Ghazali adds that he must be an Abbasid
These requirements are very great, and it is not surprising that they were in reality never
completely fulfilled.
The only stipulation which had been fulfilled was that of Quraishite lineage, and for three
hundred and more years before al-Ghazali the Quraishite Caliph had been an 'Abbasid.
This fact more than anything else represented the unity and historical continuity of the Sunni
community.
The inconsistency in al-Mawardi's theory stems from the fact that he insisted upon these
qualifications in the Caliph, while permitting the Caliph to be inactive.
On the Caliph's inactivity he clearly contradicts his own words.
At one point al-Mawardi insists on the personal activity of the Caliph, while at another he
validates his being constrained by one of his military aides.
The reasons which might have justified al-Mawardi's equivocation were no longer effective in al-
Ghazali's time.
We find al-Ghazali facing the problem of the inactivity of the Caliph, and the related problem of
his qualification
Al Ghazali states that the necessity of having an Imam is so great that it compels the alteration
of the qualifications when there is no other way out
The license of duress has, indeed, been applied previously by Al – Mawardi to validate the rule
of Amirs by Conquest, but he does not seem to have been able to bring himself to do the same
for the constrainer of the Caliph.
At any rate, al-Mawardi did not permit, even in a case of duress, the lowering of the
qualifications of the Imamate.
Perhaps al-Mustazhir was obviously unqualified, or it might be that al-Ghazali was more honest
than al-Mawardi; anyway al-Ghazali is willing to concede many of the qualifications in order to
maintain the Caliphate.
About the only concrete thing that he insists upon is that the Caliph be of Quraishite lineage.
As a result, the personal qualifications of the Caliph are hardly applicable to the nature of the
Caliphate.
On the other hand, the symbolic character of the Caliph could not be more sharply drawn.
In other words, the Caliph himself represents only one of the three major aspects of the
Caliphate.
The qualifications of the Caliph are probably the most well-developed part of the constitutive
process in the hands of Islamic theorists.
But they are very vague in their description of the constituent power.
Al-Ghazali says there are three ways in which one of those who is qualified for the Caliphate may
be chosen: by designation of the Prophet, by designation of the ruling Caliph, or by designation
of the holder of actual power.
Al-Ghazali tells us that only the last alternative applies to his time
Designation alone is not sufficient for appointment, for there must be the bai'ah as well.
The bai'ah must be performed by the great men and the people of "loosening and binding" (ahl
al-hall w-al-aqd)
It is not easy to ascertain who these people are, but we take the great men to be those with
some measure of power; and the people of loosening and binding to be the 'ulama'; in concrete
terms this means that the most powerful Saljuq leader appoints the Caliph, then the appointee
is recognized by the lesser Saljuqs, local princes, and the chiefs of the bureaucracy; and finally,
the appointment receives the consent of the 'ulama,'.
There is probably a fourth stage in which the appointment is announced in the mosques, and
the people accept the decision handed down from above
The whole of the constitutive process beyond the bare fact of appointment by the Sultan is a
formality.
Al-Ghazali's treatment of the constitutive process by no means contravenes the accepted
requirements of the Shari'ah in this matter.
It is true that al- Mawardi sets up special qualifications for those who choose the Caliph, as well
as for the Caliph himself.
But, generally speaking, the Sunni theorists are sufficiently vague about the question of
selectors to allow al-Ghazali's theory to meet their standards, particularly since some of them at
least insist that there need not be more than one selector.
On the other hand, it is quite possible that he belittles the importance of the bai'ah of the
'ulama' too much.
His reason for this is probably that the important question for him was whether or not the
Sultan would choose anyone at all.
But, of course, the Sultan's primary concern was that his choice should be acceptable to the
'ulama' and the people.
Were he not concerned with the attitude of these groups, and perhaps his own salvation, the
Sultan might dispense with choosing a Caliph altogether.
Having chosen a Caliph, he has gone so far towards preserving law and order and the
"establishment of Islam" that al-Ghazali cannot conceive of the repudiation of his choice by the
'ulama' or the people.
The constitutive process is, then, loosely speaking, a Shar'i process, but the constituent power is
the Sultan.
The limitations upon the Sultan's choice are real, as is the importance of the general bai'ah, but
since these have much greater reference to the functional and institutional authority of the
Caliphate, we shall do no more than make a mental note of them here.
Our conclusion is that the constituent authority for the appointment of the Caliph is the Sultan.
There is no contradiction between this conclusion and our previous statement that the source of
all authority in Islam is the Shari'ah, for the Shari'ah has a tendency to recognize existing power
in the constitutive process.
Besides, so long as the Caliph had no power to do anything, the most important aspect of
Shari'ah authority, i.e., functional authority, does not become operative.
As a result, the constituent authority of the Sultan is the critical political factor.
One might argue that the Sultan derives this authority from the Shari'ah, but that would not be
what al-Ghazali himself has argued.
The Caliph is different from the Caliphate, and that the authority for one differs from the
authority for the other.
If the Caliph does not satisfy all the requirements of the Caliphate in himself, it is at least clear
that he is its principal personal representative.
We have already established that the Caliph himself has a special connection with the
authoritative source of ijma.
On the other hand, since he has no power.
Contrarily, no governmental act, unless performed directly or indirectly by the Caliph, has any
validity.
The Sultan is in some measure the authority for the Caliphate.
However, the actual government in the world of Islam is carried out by the Sultan.
Circumstantial authority is not considered sufficient to legitimize the government of the Sultan
even if it is not in conformity with the Shariah
The only way in which the government of the Sultan is valid and authorized is through its
recognition of the Caliph.
No government other than that of the Caliph is valid under the Shari'ah, and subordinate
officials have only delegated authority, not functional.
Thus, the validity of the government of the Sultan is established only upon the Sultan's oath of
allegiance to the Caliph, and the Caliph's appointment of the Sultan.
By his exercise of the constitutive authority, the Sultan recognizes in fact the institutional
authority of the Caliphate, which rests primarily in the Islamic Sunni community, and in theory
the functional authority which rests with the Shari'ah proper.
The fact that al-Ghazali accepts this compromise sheds some light on the political objectives of
Sunni theorists.
The total achievement of this arrangement is the recognition by the holder of power that the
Shari'ah is the organizing principle of the Sunni community, and, in more concrete fashion, the
establishment of Sunni Islam.
The element of compromise enters when al-Ghazali argues for the legitimacy of this
arrangement, even though the Sultan actually ignores many provisions of the Shari'ah.
Recognition of the Shari'ah by the Sultan without obedience to its provisions is form without
content.
This leads us to the second objective of the Sunni theorists, that is, the establishment of order
and the maintenance of discipline.
The governmental scope of the Sultanate included very few of the interests which concern
modern governments
By the establishment of order and the maintenance of discipline the Sultanate merely provided
a favourable field for the activity of the established Islamic institution.
Al-Ghazali, therefore, felt justified in validating the government of such a Sultan.
He was willing to make concessions regarding a limited number of Shari'ah regulations in order
to preserve the religious life of the community.
Just as the Caliphate comprehends the function of the Sultan, so does it also comprehend the
religious and legal duties imposed by the Shari'ah.
The Caliphate is a religious as well as a political institution of Islam.
We have also seen that al-Ghazali does not insist upon the qualifications which the Caliph must
have in order to carry out his religious duties.
If necessary, the Caliph may enlist the aid of the most outstanding learned people of the day
The principal political function of the ulama is the interpretation of the Shari'ah in terms of the
problems facing the community.
In short, by their approval of the Sultan's choice of the Caliph (bai'ah) and by their fatwas, the
'ulama' express the functional authority of the Shari'ah.
The term Caliphate stands for the whole of Islamic government.
Although al-Ghazali seems to follow the traditional prejudices in favour of autocracy, it is
obvious that his is a multilateral conception of the Caliphate.
In it there are three main elements: The Caliph, the Sultan, and the 'ulama,', each corresponding
to some aspect of the authority behind Islamic government, and each performing a function
required by that authority.
The greatest virtue of al-Ghazali's theory is its political realism, and yet he has maintained the
essentials of the traditional theory.
Each of the parts of the Caliphate represents not only an aspect of authority and a function of
Islamic government, but also one of the major elements of political power in the Sunni
community.
