CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein Represented by City Mayor, Agustin R.

Perdices,
Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 168973 | 2011-08-24

FACTS:

On October 14, 1998, the City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Remollo, filed
before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with
improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete, under the Property
Registration Decree. The application was docketed as LRC Case No. N-201. The
Republic filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the
ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The Republic
argued that Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 refers only to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership. Since the subject is a
foreshore land, as explicitly testified to by petitioner's own witness, Engr. Dorado, it is
not alienable and disposable, nor registerable.

RTC granted the Motion and decreed in the end ruled that "the instant application for
original registration is dismissed for lack of merit." Upon a Motion for Reconsideration
by the City, the Republic again opposed it and posited that Full- blown trial in LRC Case
No. N-201 was no longer necessary as the evidence so far presented by petitioner had
already established that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

RTC initially agreed with the Republic and denied the MR but after taking into
consideration the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, the RTC issued
another Order dated December 7, 2000, setting aside its first Order, in the interest of
justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual issues in LRC
Case No. N-201. Republic sought recourse to the CA after its MRs were denied by the
RTC. The CA found merit that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction thus setting aside the RTC Order for a full-blown trial.

Error of law: The Court of Appeals erred on question of law in setting aside the Orders
of the RTC. The said Orders of the trial court were made in order to determine factual
issues and to correct its error in its findings on the September 7, 2000 Order. Thus, the
Court of Appeals decision is contrary to law, justice, equity and existing jurisprudence.

Was the dismissal by the RTC of LRC Case No. N-201 for lack of jurisdiction is
patently erroneous?

YES.

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of
the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
 
As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise,
the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

Under the Land Registration Act, as amended, jurisdiction over all applications for
registration of title to land was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFI) of the
respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered was situated. Jurisdiction
over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired upon the filing in court
of the application for registration, and is retained up to the end of the litigation.
The land registration laws were updated and codified by the Property Registration
Decree, and under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land
registration was still vested on the CFI of the province or city where the land was
situated.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, created the
RTC in place of the CFI. Presently, jurisdiction over an application for land registration
remains with the RTC where the land is situated, except when such jurisdiction is
delegated by the Supreme Court to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under certain circumstances.

It is not disputed that the Application for Original Registration of Title filed by petitioner
before the RTC of the City of Dumaguete conformed to Section 15 of the Property
Registration Decree, which prescribes the form and contents of such applications. In its
Application, petitioner prayed that its title to the subject property, which it repeatedly
alleged to have acquired through continuous and adverse possession and occupation of
the said property for more than 30 years or since 1960, be placed under the land
registration laws. The allegations and prayer in the Application of petitioner
were sufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC over the said Application upon
the filing thereof.

It is true that petitioner, as the applicant, has the burden of proving that the subject
property is alienable and disposable and its title to the same is capable of registration.
However, the RTC, when it issued its Order dated September 7, 2000, had so far heard
only the testimony of Engr. Dorado, the first witness for the petitioner. Petitioner was
no longer afforded the opportunity to present other witnesses and pieces of evidence in
support of its Application. The RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 - already
declaring the subject property as inalienable public land, over which the RTC
has no jurisdiction to order registration - was evidently premature.
 
The RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 has not yet become final and executory as
petitioner was able to duly file a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration of the same, which the RTC eventually granted in its Order dated
December 7, 2000. Admittedly, said motions filed by petitioner did not comply with
certain rules of procedure. Ordinarily, such non-compliance would have rendered said
motions as mere scraps of paper, considered as not having been filed at all, and unable
to toll the reglementary period for an appeal. However, we find that the exceptional
circumstances extant in the present case warrant the liberal application of the rules.

Thus, it is proper to resort to a full-blown trial since as to whether or not the

ADDITIONAL:
The grant of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion exists where an act is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.
 
The Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent. The
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when, in its Orders dated December 7,
2000 and February 20, 2001, it set aside the order of dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201
and resolved to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual issues in said case.
 
Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial
justice, the former must yield to the latter. In Basco v. Court of Appeals, we allowed a
liberal application of technical rules of procedure, pertaining to the requisites of a
proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the importance of the subject matter of
the controversy.