FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-38510. March 25, 1975.]

SPOUSES DOLORES MEDINA and MOISES BERNAL , petitioners, vs.

THE HONORABLE NELLY L. ROMERO VALDELLON OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MALOLOS, BULACAN, SPOUSES CIPRIANO
VILLANUEVA and RUFINA PANGANIBAN , respondents.

Ponciano H. Gupit (Citizen Legal Assistance Office) for petitioners.

Rosendo G. Tansinsin, Jr. for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Respondent Judge dismissed petitioner's action for recovery of possession of a

parcel of land on the ground that a land registration case between the same parties
involving the same parcel of land is pending in another branch of the same court.
Petitioners assailed the trial court's dismissal order and raised the following legal
issues for resolution of this Court: (a) whether or not the pendency of a land
registration case bars the institution of an action for recovery of possession; and in the
negative, (b) whether or not the respondent judge correctly dismissed the latter case in
view of the pendency of the land registration case. The Supreme Court annulled the
questioned order and directed the court below to revive the complaint and amended
complaint and consolidate the trial of the two cases in one branch.

SYLLABUS

1. COURTS; POWER OF CONTEMPT; COUNSEL MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT

OF COURT FOR DISRESPECTFUL STATEMENT. — For making in his manifestation
and/or comment a statement which the Court considered as disrespectful, counsel for
respondent was declared in contempt of court and suspended from the practice of law
for three months. However, on motion for reconsideration the Court reconsidered the
order of suspension and imposed instead a fine P300.00
2. ID.; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE AS COURT LIMITED AND SPECIAL
JURISDICTION; EXTENT THEREOF. — Court of First Instance acting as land registration
court has a limited and special jurisdiction con ned to the determination of the legality
and propriety of the issue of title over the land subject matter of registration, and it has
no power to entertain issues of rightful possession and claim for damages emanating
from ownership.
3. ACTIONS; UNLAWFUL DETAINER DEFINED. — An action for unlawful
detainer is de ned as "withholding by a person from another for not more than one
year, of the possession of a land or building to which the latter is entitled after the
expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession by virtue of a
contract, express or implied."
4. ID.; ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION MAY BE FILED IN THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE WITHOUT REGARD TO THE ONE YEAR PERIOD
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 CONTEMPLATED IN RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT. — Where defendants withheld
the possession of land from the plaintiffs for more than the one year period
contemplated in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court concerning actions for forcible entry and
detainer, plaintiffs' remedy is to initiate a plenary action for recovery of possession
(accion publiciana) in the court of rst instance which can be led before the expiration
of the one year period, or thereafter, provided no action for forcible entry and detainer
had been commenced during that time in the inferior court.
5. ID.; DISMISSAL; DISMISSAL OF ACTION ON GROUND OF PENDENCY OF
ANOTHER UNIDENTICAL ACTION BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES IS ERRONEOUS. —
The dismissal of the action for recovery of possession because there is pending in
another branch of the same court a land registration case between the same parties
over the same parcel of land is precipitate; for while identity of parties exists, there is
no identity of cause of action, rights asserted, or relief prayed for in both cases, so that
a judgment rendered in one case is not res judicata for the other case. The rights
sought to be enforced and the relief prayed for in the action for recovery of possession
are separate and distinct from those sought in the land registration case.
6. ID.; ID.; MERE PLEA OF TITLE OR OWNERSHIP NOT A GROUND FOR
DISMISSING ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION. — It is a fundamental principle
in the law governing unlawful detainer (including recovery of possession cases) that a
mere plea of title or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used
as a sound legal basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession because an
action for recovery of possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the
property.
7. ID.; JUDGMENT IN AN ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION IS NOT
CONCLUSIVE AS TO QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP. — An action for recovery of
possession is totally distinct and different from action for recovery of title or
ownership and a judgment rendered in a case of recovery of possession is conclusive
only on the question of possession and not that of ownership; hence, it does not bind
the title or effect the ownership of the land or building.
8. ID.; CONSOLIDATION; NATURE OF EVIDENCE AS GROUND THEREFOR. —
While the issues raised in both cases are not exactly identical, if the evidence involving
the issues of possession and ownership over the land are related and its presentation
before one court would redound to a speedy disposition of the cases, the consolidation
of the trial of both cases may be ordered.

DECISION

ESGUERRA , J : p

Petition to review by certiorari the order dated October 23, 1973 of the Hon.
Nelly L. Romero Valdellon, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I,
which dismissed with costs against the plaintiffs its Civil Case No. 4353-M, entitled
"Spouses Dolores Medina and Moises Bernal, plaintiffs, vs. Spouses Cipriano Villanueva
and Rufina Panganiban, defendants."
The complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
alleges that plaintiffs (petitioners in this case) are the owners of a parcel of land
situated at Bo. San Pascual, Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an assessed value of P800.00
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 which was purchased sometime in April 1967 from Margarita Punzalan, Rosal Punzalan,
Quaquin Gaddi and Paulina Gaddi; "that as defendants are family friends of the
plaintiffs, defendants were allowed to remain in the premises and to construct their
residential house, subject to the condition that defendants will return unto the plaintiffs
the premises upon demand"; "that much to the surprise of the plaintiffs-spouses, on
demand, defendants-spouses refused and remain obstinate in their refusal to surrender
the property in question"; that because of said defendants' unjusti ed acts plaintiffs
had to institute action and incur damage of P500 as expenses for court litigation; that
"the reasonable value of the use of the premises is P100 a month, taking into
consideration its commercial value"; and prayed that the defendants be ordered "to
vacate the premises and surrender unto plaintiffs" the said property and defendants he
ordered to pay plaintiffs "the amount of P500 as incidental expenses and the amount of
P100 a month from the ling of this action to the time they surrender its possession to
the plaintiffs".
A subsequent motion to amend and admit amended complaint was led by
plaintiffs, the amendment consisting of:
"4. That as defendants-spouses are family friends of the plaintiffs,
they (defendants) were allowed to build a small house in the premises in April
1967, subject to the condition that they will return to the plaintiffs the premises in
1969;

"5. That much to the surprise of the plaintiffs-spouses on demand,

defendants-spouses refused and remains obstinate in their refusal to surrender
the property in question claiming that they are the owners thereof;"

A motion to dismiss the complaint and an opposition to the motion to amend

and admit the amended complaint led by the defendants (respondents in this case)
preceded the respondent court's questioned order of October 30, 1973, that dismissed
the complaint on the ground of "there being another case pending between the same
parties over the same property, namely Land Registration Case No. 2814 of this Court."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court in its order
dated February 8, 1974.
The only legal issues raised are:
"Whether or not the pendency of a land registration case will bar the
institution of an action for the recovery of possession; and in the negative,
whether or not the respondent judge can be countenanced in her act of
dismissing the latter case in view of the pendency of the land registration case."

When this Court (First Division) on May 10, 1974, resolved "without giving due
course to the petition, to require the respondents to comment thereon, within 10 days
from notice, and both parties to state whether or not there is any valid reason why Civil
Case No. 4353-M of the respondent court should not be tried and decided jointly with
Land Registration Case No. 2814 of Branch VI of said court, considering that the claim
of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4353-M (herein petitioners) for damages due to
alleged illegal occupancy of the land involved by the defendants (respondents herein)
may not be properly passed upon and adjudicated in the land registration case, where
only the question of title to the property sought to be registered will be decided
between the applicants and oppositors," counsel for respondents, Rosendo G.
Tansinsin Jr., included in his Manifestation and/or Comment, dated May 20, 1974, the
following statement: "nevertheless, from the reading of the resolution aforequoted, one
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 will certainly have no doubt that there is no need for the respondents to make any
comment on the matter as the same will be an exercise of futility since this Honorable
Court has not only given due course to the petition, but has actually decided the same, .
. ." By reason of the disrespectful tone of the aforesaid statement, said counsel was
required by this Court's (First Division) resolution of May 29, 1974, to show cause why
he should not be dealt with for contempt of court.
The petitioners by way of compliance with this Court's aforementioned
resolution of May 10, 1974, requested that the order of October 30, 1973 of the
respondent court be set aside and that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch I
and VI) be ordered to consolidate, try and decide Civil Case No. 4353-M of Branch I and
L. R. C. Case No. 2814 of Branch VI.
The explanation submitted by respondents' counsel, although it contained an
apology, was not considered satisfactory by this Court. Hence in its resolution of July
10, 1974, Atty. Rosendo G. Tansinsin Jr. was declared in contempt of court and
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months. His subsequent
motion for reconsideration and personal plea for leniency, sympathy and
understanding, coupled with his repeated apology and regret and the fact that his act
appeared to be his rst offense of that nature, made this Court reconsider the
suspension from the practice of law and, instead, ordered him to pay a ne of P300.00
which he has paid.
On the principal issues raised in this case, We have no doubt that the nature of
the action embodied in the complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M is one for recovery of
possession brought before the Court of First Instance by the alleged owners of a piece
of land against the defendants who were supposed to have unlawfully continued in
possession since 1969 when they were supposed to return it to plaintiffs, plus
damages. That the action is not for unlawful detainer contemplated in Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, which falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the city courts or
municipal courts, is very apparent because an action of unlawful detainer is de ned as
"withholding by a person from another for not more than one year of the possession of
a land or building to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the
former's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract express or implied". (Tenorio
vs. Gomba 81 Phil. 54; Dikit vs. Ycasiano 89 Phil. 44) On the basis of the allegations of
the complaint in Civil Case No. 4363-M, the defendants withheld possession from the
plaintiffs since 1969 or very much more than the one year period contemplated in
unlawful detainer cases at the time the complaint was led in July of 1973. Not all
cases of dispossession are covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court (Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer cases) because whenever the owner of property is dispossessed by
any other means than those mentioned in the aforementioned rule, he may initiate and
maintain a plenary action to recover possession in the Court of First Instance, and it is
not necessary for him to wait until the expiration of one year before commencing such
action. (Gumiran vs. Gumiran 21 Phil. 174) It may also be brought after the expiration of
said period of one year, if no action had been initiated for forcible entry and detainer
during that time in the inferior court. This plenary action to recover possession (accion
publiciana) must be instituted in the Court of First Instance as was done in this case.
The respondent court's action in dismissing Civil Case No. 4353-M on the ground
that there is another pending case (L.R.C. No. 2814 of Branch VI of the same court)
between the same parties over the same property is to Our mind rather precipitate, for
We nd su cient merit in petitioners' contention that the rights sought to be enforced
and the reliefs prayed for in Civil Case 4353-M (recovery of possession and damages)
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 are entirely separate and distinct from that sought in L. R. C. Case No. 2814 (where
petitioners as oppositors are seeking the exclusion of their land from that of private
respondents' claim of title over a bigger tract of land). It is likewise true that the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI) acting as a land registration court has a limited
and special jurisdiction con ned to the determination of the legality and propriety of
the issue of title over the land subject matter of registration, and it has no power to
entertain issues of rightful possession and claim for damages emanating from
ownership. It is a fundamental principle in the law governing unlawful detainer cases
(including recovery of possession cases) that a mere plea of title or ownership over the
disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as a sound legal basis for dismissing an
action for recovery of possession because an action for recovery of possession can be
maintained even against the very owner of the property. (Prado vs. Calpo et al, G. R. No.
L-19379, April 30, 1964) In the case at bar, there is not even a plea of title on the part of
private respondents over the disputed property but a mere allegation that there is
another action (L. R. C. No. 2814 pending in Branch VI of that court) for registration of
title to that land the possession of which is being recovered by petitioners in Civil Case
No. 4353-M. An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and different from
an action for recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a case of
recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not that
of ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court).
The inevitable conclusion from the foregoing is that Civil Case No. 4353-M (for
recovery of possession and damages) was arbitrarily and erroneously dismissed on the
basis of the alleged pendency of another action (L. R. C. No. 2814 pending in Branch VI
of the same court), because while identity of parties may be established in both cases,
there is no identity of cause of action or of rights asserted and relief prayed for, so that
judgment which may be rendered in one case would not necessarily result in res
judicata for the other case.
We cannot see any su cient reason for any of the parties in this case to object
to the consolidation of the trial of both cases (L. R. C. Case No. 2814 and Civil Case No.
4353-M), since the evidence that may be presented by the parties involving possession
and ownership of the disputed parcel of land may facilitate an expeditious termination
of both cases. While the issues raised in both cases are not exactly identical, the
evidence involving the issues of possession and ownership over the same land must be
related and its presentation before one court of justice would redound to a speedy
disposition of this litigation.
WHEREFORE, the respondent court's orders of October 30, 1973, and February 8,
1974, are hereby declared null and void and set aside; the complaint and amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M revived; both the respondent Judge and the
Presiding Judge, Branch VI, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, being directed to
consolidate the trial of L. R. C. No. 2814 and Civil Case No. 4353-M in one branch of that
court. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com