SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 108926. July 12, 1996.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS

and HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO O. PLAZA , respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Esmeraldo U. Guloy for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; OWNERSHIP; TAX DECLARATION AND PAYMENT OF

REALTY TAX CONSTITUTE AT LEAST PROOF THAT THE HOLDER HAS A CLAIM OF TITLE
OVER THE PROPERTY. — Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in
the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that
is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that
the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS;
FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE ON THE SUPREME COURT; EXCEPTIONS. — Well settled and oft-
repeated is the rule that ndings of facts of the Court of Appeals are nal and conclusive
on the Supreme Court except: 1.) when the conclusion is a nding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2.) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3.) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4.) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5.) when the ndings of facts are
con icting; 6.) when the Court of Appeals, in making its ndings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7.)
when the ndings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; and 8.)
when the ndings of fact are conclusions without citation of speci c evidence on which
they are based.
3. CIVIL LAW; NATURE OF THE LAND REGISTRATION LAWS. — Registration does not
vest title. It is merely evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give the
holder any better title than what he actually has. When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certi cate of title being issued. The Torrens
system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land, as it
merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.

DECISION

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 TORRES , JR. , J .:

Petitioner implores this Court to review and set aside the decision 1 of February 8,
1993 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34950 which a rmed the decision of June
14, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in LRC Case No. M-99 con rming
respondent Democrito O. Plaza's title over Rel. Plan 1059, which is the relocation plan of
Psu-97886. llcd

After the ling of private respondent's Comment, this Court, in its resolution of May
24, 1993, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda. The petitioner led its Memorandum on June 29, 1993 while
private respondent filed his Memorandum on July 6, 1993.
The factual background is summarized in the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals as
follows:
"According to petitioner-appellee, the subject property situated at Liwanag,
Talon (formerly Pamplona), Las Piñas, Rizal, now Metro Manila, having an area
of 45,295 sq. m., was rst owned by Santos de la Cruz who declared the same in
his name under Tax Declaration Nos. 3932, for the year 1913; 3933 for 1917; and
6905, for 1921 (Exhs. 2-B, 2-C and 2-D, Exh. K for petitioner-appellee, pp. 514-516,
Record). Subsequently, the subject property was successively bought or acquired
by Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. To
evidence their respective acquisition of the property in question, Tax Declaration
Nos. 7937, for the year 1923; 8463, for 1927, 9467, for 1934; and 2708 (year not
available) were presented. 3 After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extrajudicially
partitioned the subject property and declared it in their names under Tax
Declaration Nos. 5595 and 5596 for the year 1960. 4 On 5 July 1966, they
executed a "Deed of Sale With Mortgage" deeding the subject property to
petitioner-appellee for P231,340.00 payable in three (3) installments, the payment
of which was secured by a mortgage on the property. Upon receipt of the full
payment, they executed a "Release of Mortgage" on 1 August 1968. 5 After the
sale, petitioner-appellee took possession of the subject property and paid the
taxes due thereon for the years 1966 up to 1986, and in 1985 declared it in his
name under Tax Declaration Nos. B-013-01392 and B-013-01391. 6 He appointed
Mauricio Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the administrator and caretaker thereof,
respectively. Due to losses, the property in question was cultivated only for a
while. Five (5) years according to Mauricio Plaza, and from 1966 up to 1978
according to Jesus Magcanlas. 7

"On 14 November 1986, petitioner-appellee led a petition, which was

amended on 17 July 1987, for the registration and con rmation of his title over
the subject property alleging, among others, that:

1. by virtue of the deed of sale, he is the owner thereof:

2. he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property
prior to, and since 12 June 1945;

3. other than himself, there is no other person occupying, or having any

interest over the property; and,

4. there are no tenants or agricultural lessees thereon. 8

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 "On 24 February 1988, oppositor-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic, for brevity), led its opposition maintaining, among others, that: (1)
petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniment of title and tax
declarations as well as tax payments relied upon do not constitute su cient
evidence of a bona de acquisition of the land by petitioner-appellee and of his
open, continuous possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner
since 12 June 1945, or prior thereto, and (3) the subject property pertains to the
public domain and is not subject to private appropriation. 9
"On 9 March 1988, after the compliance of the jurisdiction requirements
was proved and, on motion, the lower court issued its order of general default. 1 0

"Aside from the Republic, there were others who opposed the petition and
led their opposition thereto prior to, or were allowed to submit their opposition
despite, and after, the issuance of the order of general default. They are:

(a) Arsenio Medina who withdrew his opposition on 29 May 1989; 1 1

(b) Emilio, Leopoldo and Abraham, all surnamed Borbon; Heirs of Andres
Reyes; Maximo Lopez; and, Marilou Castanares who prayed that the
lower court direct petitioner-appellee to see to it that their respective
property, which adjoins the land in question, are not included in the
petition; 1 2

(c) the Heirs of Santos de la Cruz and the Kadakilaan Estate. Upon their
respective motion, the order of default was set aside as to them and
they were allowed to file their opposition.

"The Heirs of Santos de la Cruz argue that: (1) their predecessor-in-interest,

Santos de la Cruz, is the 'primitive owner' of the subject lot; and, (2) he, his heirs,
and upon their tolerance, some other persons have been in open, peaceful,
notorious and continuous possession of the land in question since time
immemorial until the present.
"The Kadakilaan Estate contends that: (1) by reason of its Titulo de
Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree 01-4, with approved plans registered
under the Torrens System in compliance with, and as a consequence of, P.D. 872,
it is the owner of the subject property; and, (2) petitioner-appellee or his
predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945
or earlier. 1 3
(d) the Heirs of Hermogenes Rodriguez. They allege, among others, that by
reason of a Titulo de Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891; Royal Decree
No. 01-4, Protocol No. 1891; Decree No. 659, approved Plan of the
Bureau of Lands No. 12298 dated 10 September 1963, their
predecessor-in-interest is the owner of the subject property. Despite
(sic) that their motion to lift order of default as to them and admit
their opposition, which motion was opposed by petitioner-appellee,
does not appear to have been acted upon by the lower court, they
were able to present one (1) witness; 1 4 and,
(e) Phase II Laong Plaza Settlers Association, Inc. It led a motion to
intervene in the case but the motion does not appear to have been
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 acted upon by the lower court. 1 5
"On 13 March 1990, the Community Environment and Natural Resources
O ce, West Sector (CENRO-WEST) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources requested the lower court to furnish it photocopies of the
records of the petition as the property in question was the subject of a request for
a Presidential Proclamation reserving the land in question for Slum Improvement
and Resettlement Site (SIR) of the National Housing Authority. 1 6
"On 22 June 1990, upon order of the lower court, an ocular inspection was
conducted on the subject property by the court-appointed commissioner who
submitted his report on 2 July 1990. 1 7
"On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President of
the Republic of the Philippines withdrawing the subject property from sale or
settlement and reserve (the same) for slum improvement and sites and services
program under the administration and disposition of the National Housing
Authority in coordination with the National Capital Region, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources subject to actual survey and private rights if
any there be, . . .' The National Housing Authority was authorized to develop,
administer and dispose of the area in accordance with LOI 555, as amended (by
LOI Nos. 686 and 1283), and LOI 557. 1 8

"On 31 May 1991 petitioner-appellee led his memorandum. 1 9 The

oppositors did not. Nevertheless, among them, only the Republic and the Heirs of
Santos de la Cruz formally offered their evidence." 2 0

On 14 June 1991 the lower court rendered the judgment referred to earlier.
On 8 July 1991, from among the oppositors, only the Republic led a notice of
appeal which was approved on 10 July 1991. 2 1 By reason of the approval thereof, the
motion led on 23 July 1991 by the Heirs of Hermogenes Rodriguez for the
reconsideration of the judgment was denied on 1 August 1991. 2 2
On February 8, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision a rming the trial
court's judgment.
Hence, this petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines alleging that:
"THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AND IS CONTRARY
TO LAW, THE EVIDENCE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE."

Petitioner argues that the burden rests on the applicant to show by convincing
evidence that he has a registrable title over the property sought to be titled, which the
latter failed to do.
According to petitioner, aside from mere tax declarations all of which are of recent
vintage, private respondent has not established actual possession of the property in
question in the manner required by law (Section 14, P.D. 1529) and settled jurisprudence
on the matter. Thus, no evidence was adduced that private respondent cultivated much
less, fenced the subject property if only to prove actual possession. The actual fencing of
the property was done only starting 1988 when the actual occupants were forcibly ejected
and driven out from their respective abodes and that its witnesses namely: Elascio
Domitita, Manuel Dolom, Bernadette Aguinaldo and Virginia Franco, who were all actual
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 residents of the questioned area, categorically testi ed on this score, summarized as
follows:
1. In their long stay in the area, the longest staying occupant being
Domitita who had been in the premises for more than thirty (30) years nobody
ever claimed ownership over the subject property;

2. It was only in 1988 that they learned that private respondent had led a
petition to have the property titled in his name;

3. Private respondent had not introduced any improvement nor was there a
caretaker assigned by him to look after the property; and,

4. Aside from them, there were about 200 more families residing in the area
but through force, intimidation and illegal demolitions, were driven out by private
respondent from the premises.

We are not persuaded. On this point, the respondent Court correctly found that:
"Proof that petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest have
acquired and have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the subject property for a period of 30 years under a bona de claim of
ownership are the tax declarations of petitioner-appellee's predecessors-in-
interest, the deed of sale, tax payment receipts and petitioner-appellee's tax
declarations. The evidence on record reveals that: (1) the predecessors-in-interest
of petitioner-appellee have been declaring the property in question in their names
in the years 1923, 1927, 1934 and 1960; and, (2) in 1966, petitioner-appellee
purchased the same from the Heirs of Gil Alhambra and since then paid the taxes
due thereon and declared the property in his name in 1985.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Considering the dates of the tax declarations and the realty tax
payments, they can hardly be said to be of recent vintage indicating petitioner-
appellee's pretended possession of the property. On the contrary, they are strong
evidence of possession in the concept of owner by petitioner-appellee and his
predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, the realty tax payment receipts show that
petitioner-appellee has been very religious in paying the taxes due on the property.
This is indicative of his honest belief that he is the owner of the subject property.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that petitioner-appellee has proved that he and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for a period
of 30 years since 12 June 1945 and earlier. By operation of law, the property in
question has become private property. 2 3

"Contrary to the representations of the Republic, petitioner-appellee had

introduced some improvements on the subject property from the time he
purchased it. His witnesses testi ed that petitioner-appellee developed the subject
property into a rice eld and planted it with rice, but only for about ve years
because the return on investment was not enough to sustain the continued
operation of the riceland. Though not in the category of permanent structures, the
preparation of the land into a rice eld and planting it with rice are considered
'improvements' thereon." 2 4

Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of
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 owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. 2 5 They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an
act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 2 6
Neither do we nd merit in the assertions of petitioner's witnesses Elascio Domitita,
Manuel Dolom, Bernadette Aguinaldo and Virginia Franco. As properly stated by the public
respondent,
". . . Their alleged possession is not based on any right. Neither do they
claim to have any title or interest over the subject property. As a matter of fact,
they did not bother to oppose the petition. The most that can be said of their
alleged possession is that it was only with the tolerance of rightful owners of the
property — plaintiff-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest, hence, is no bar to
the granting of the petition. We do not see why we should accept the bare
assertions of the alleged occupants at their face value as against the claim of
ownership of plaintiff-appellee backed up by legal documents, tax declarations,
and tax receipts." 2 7

Well-settled and oft-repeated is the rule that ndings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are nal and conclusive on the Supreme Court except: 1.) when the conclusion is a
nding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2.) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3.) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; 4.) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5.) when the
ndings of facts are con icting; 6.) when the Court of Appeals, in making its ndings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; 7.) when the ndings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; and 8.) when the ndings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based. 2 8
Concededly, none of the above exceptions obtains in the case at bar.
Petitioner also alleges that the land in question had been withdrawn from the
alienable portion of the public domain pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 679
entitled "Reserving for Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Sites and Services of the
National Housing Authority, A Certain Parcel of Land of the Public Domain Situated in the
Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila," which was issued on January 7, 1991 or almost 6
months prior to the issuance of the trial court's decision. cdtai

The Court of Appeals opined that "the issuance of the proclamation did not have any
effect on the subject property as the proclamation only withdrew it from sale or
settlement and reserved the same for slum improvement and sites and services program,
but subject to actual survey and existing private rights. The proclamation did not prohibit
the registration of title of one who claims, and proves, to be the owner thereof." We agree.
At any rate, registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title. 2 9 Our land
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of
title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. 3 0
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 Of particular relevance is the nding of the respondent Court of Appeals to the
effect that —
"We have found that petitioner-appellee has proven his claim of ownership
over the subject property. As provided in the proclamation itself, his ownership of
the subject property must be respected and he cannot be barred from having the
land titled in his name. This does not contravene or negate the intention of the
proclamation. Besides, its implementing Letters of Instruction recognize that there
may be lands declared included in the Slum Improvement Resettlement (SIR)
program that are privately owned. Paragraph 10 of LOI No. 555 provides that if
the land declared to be included in the SIR program is privately owned, the
concerned local government, upon the approval by the National Housing Authority
of its project plan, shall acquire the property through expropriation. In LOI No. 686
paragraph 3, it is mandated that the NHA, upon request of the local government,
expropriate or otherwise acquire land for the SIR program. Proclamation No. 679
is, therefore, not a valid justification to deny the petition.
. . . At the time the Proclamation was issued, the controversy over the
subject property was sub-judice. The con icting rights over it had been presented
to the court for resolution. That jurisdiction could not be removed from it by
subsequent legislation. The President must have been aware of this. Hence, the
inclusion of the cautionary clause 'subject to existing private rights.' " 3 1

Over time, Courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is
inconvenient or contrary to reason is not allowed in law — Quod est inconveniens, aut
contra rationem non permissum est in lege. Undoubtedly, reason and law nd respondent
entitled to rights of ownership over the disputed property.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision dated February 8, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED
and the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Luis A. Javellana, ponente; Minerva P. Gonzaga Reyes and
Consuelo Ynares Santiago, concurring.

2. Rollo, pp. 18-27; Decision, pp. 1-6.

3. Record, pp. 564-577. Penned by the Honorable Julio R. Logarta, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region, Branch LXIII, Makati, Metro Manila.
4. Exhs. "M", "K" and "L", pp. 1-3 and 7-8, Folder of Exhibits.
5. Exh. "H" and Annex "1", pp. 21-25, Record.
6. Exhs. "P" up to "P-180", pp. 9-89, Folder of Exhibits and Exhs. "I" and "J", pp. 13 and 17,
Record.
7. TSN, 23 June 1988, pp. 5-9, and TSN, 20 April 1989, pp. 7-8.
8. Record, pp. 1-4 and 55-60.

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 9. Ibid., pp. 81-83.
10. Ibid., p. 99.

11. Ibid., pp. 88-89 and 218-219.

12. Ibid., pp. 113-116 and 125-128.
13. Ibid., pp. 202, 162-165 and 149-150.
14. Ibid., pp. 272-273 and 318-320; and TSN, 14 May 1990.
15. Ibid., pp. 301-302.

16. Ibid., p. 219.

17. Ibid., pp. 360 and 578-579.
18. Ibid., pp. 507-509 (87 O.G. No. 5, 4 February 1991, pp. 733-734).
19. Ibid., pp. 536-561.

20. Ibid., p. 570.

21. Ibid., pp. 580-584.
22. Ibid., pp. 581-583 and 585.
23. Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Kristo, 200 SCRA 606, 609.
24. Court of Appeals Decision, p. 7.

25. Heirs of Severino Legaspi, Sr. vs. Vda. de Dayot, 188 SCRA 508, 517; G.R. No. 83904, August
13, 1990.

26. Director of Lands vs. IAC, 209 SCRA 214; G.R. No. 68948, May 22, 1992.
27. Court of Appeals Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 26.
28. Geronimo vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 494; G.R. No. 105540, July 5, 1993.
29. Embrado vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 335; G.R. No. 51457, June 27, 1994.
30. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567; 108998, August 24, 1994.

31. Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 9 & 10; Rollo, pp. 26-27.

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