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TEN FORTY REALTY V CRUZ

(G.R. No. 151212, September 10, 2003)
On Ownership

FACTS:
Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation alleged that it was the owner of a parcel
of lot and residential house, having acquired the same from one Barbara Galino. Ten
Forty came to know that the same property was sold to respondent Cruz, who
immediately occupied the property and which occupation was merely tolerated by the
corporation.

Later on, Ten Forty demanded Cruz to vacate and pay for the use and occupation of the
property, but the latter refused. Hence, a complaint for ejection was filed.

The MTCC ruled in favor of Ten Forty. However, the RTC reversed, ruling that Cruz’s
entry to the property is by virtue of Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights and Deed
of Sale in her favor, and that execution of deed of sale without actual physical
possession did not have effect because there was no delivery of the object. The CA
sustained, and further held that the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Cruz’s occupation is by tolerance, thus making unlawful detainer the correct
action
2. W/N Cruz’s possession or occupation of said property is in the nature of an
exercise of ownership

RULING:
1. NO. Forcible entry is the correct action.
2. YES.

RATIO:
1. Petitioner failed to substantiate its case for unlawful detainer. To justify an action
for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at the
beginning of the possession. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the
start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.

In this case, there was no averment of fact recited that would substantiate the
claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property. As
the bare allegation of Ten Forty’s tolerance of such occupation has not been
proven, the possession should be deemed illegal. Thus, the ejectment case
should have been for forcible entry – an action that had prescribed, as it is
reckoned from the date of the occupant’s actual entry into the land.

FORCIBLE ENTRY UNLAWFUL DETAINER

● One is deprived of physical ● One unlawfully withholds
possession of property by possession of property after the
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means of FISTS termination of his right to hold

such
● Possession is illegal from the ● Possession was originally lawful
beginning

2. In a contract of sale, the buyer acquires the thing sold only upon its delivery, or in
any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred
form the vendor to the vendee. However, ownership is transferred not by
contract, but by tradition or delivery.

A Deed of Sale does not give a conclusive, but only a prima facie presumption of
delivery. Being presumptive, it is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to
take actual possession of the land sold. It is undisputed that petitioner did not
occupy the property from the time it was allegedly sold or at any time thereafter.
Thus, these circumstances derogated Ten Forty’s claim of control and
possession of the property.

DELA CRUZ V CA
(G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006)
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On Public Dominion and Patrimonial Property

FACTS: Lourdes Dela Cruz leased a lot owned by the Reyeses, which she religiously
paid rent for over 40 years. However, in 1989, a fire destroyed Dela Cruz’s dwelling and
she later rebuilt her house. Dela Cruz has received both verbal and written demands to
vacate, but she refused. Despite this, no court proceedings were initiated by the
Reyeses.
In 1996, the lot was sold by the Reyeses to Tan Te. Despite the sale, Dela Cruz did not
give up the lot. This prompted Tan Te to file an ejectment case for forcible entry against
Dela Cruz.
MeTC ruled in favor of Tan Te and ordered Dela Cruz to vacate the premises. RTC set
aside such decision and ruled that the one-year prescriptive period has expired since
Dela Cruz’s intrusion, and because of this, the suit had become accion publiciana
cognizable by the RTC. The CA, however, reinstated MeTC decision.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the suit had become accion publiciana
2. Who is entitled to physical possession of the lot or possession de facto?

RULING:
1. NO. It is a complaint for unlawful detainer.
2. TAN TE.

RATIO:
1. Based on the foregoing, the ejectment complaint is a complaint for unlawful
detainer.
It was admitted that Dela Cruz was a lessee of the Reyeses, thus she was
initially the legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a contract of lease.
When the fire destroyed her house, the Reyeses considered the lease
terminated, but Dela Cruz persisted in occupying it without the consent of the
owners. However, such occupancy was tolerated.
An ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance is a specie of unlawful
detainer cases, which falls under the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

MeTC JURISDICTION RTC JURISDICTION

 Accion interdictal, such as  Plenary actions, such as accion
forcible entry and unlawful publiciana and accion
detainer reivindicatoria
2. Dela Cruz fully knows that her stay in the subject lot is at the leniency of the
Reyeses and later of Tan Te; and her acquiescence to such use of the lot carries
with it an implicit and assumed commitment that she would leave the premises
the moment it is needed by the owner. When respondent Tan Te made a last,
written demand Dela Cruz breached her promise to leave upon demand, she lost
her right to the physical possession of the lot.
LALUAN V MALPAYA
(G.R. No. L-21231, July 30, 1975)
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On Ownership

FACTS:
Petitioners Laluans, et al, filed with the CFI a complaint against Malpaya, et al, for
recovery of ownership and possession of two parcels of land. They base their claim on
their alleged right to inherit from Malpaya's wife, who died intestate without any children.
On Parcel 1, they allege that it was a paraphernal property of the deceased and that
Malpaya, taking advantage of the senility of his wife, sold the land. As for Parcel 2, they
allege that it was a conjugal property of the Sps Malpaya, but Malpaya, having the right
to sell only half thereof, sold the whole property after the death of his wife.
Malpaya, et al, denied the allegations and claimed that the parcels of land belonged to
Malpaya as his exclusive property. Furthermore, they aver that the Malpaya had the
right to dispose of the said land and that they bought the properties in good faith,
unaware of any flaw in the title of their vendor.
CFI declared the deed of sales as null and void, except as regards the half portion of
Parcel 2. CA set aside the CFI’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Who owns the properties in question?

RULING: PARCEL 1 – remanded to CFI for new trial; PARCEL 2 – Sps Malpaya

RATIO:
PARCEL 1:
Laluan, et al, failed to establish any evidence indicating that the land sold by the
Malpaya corresponds with any of the parcels described in the deed of donation propter
nuptias that they presented. They failed to specify precisely which of the parcels subject
of donation constitutes the very land delimited in the sale. This gave rise to a grave
doubt to the specificity of the land subject of sale.
The applicable rule is that in order to maintain an action to recover ownership, the
person who claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his
ownership of the property claimed, but also the identity thereof. The party who desires
to recover must fix the identity of the land he claims. Where doubt exists, a court should
resolve the question by recourse to the pleadings and the record, as well as to
evidence.
The SC remanded the case to the CFI for a new trial on the matter.

PARCEL 2:
Art. 1407, SCC, establishes the presumption that the property of the spouses shall be
deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
Sps Malpaya acquired the said parcel of land during the marriage. Following the rule
then that proof of acquisition of the property in dispute during the marriage suffices to
render the statutory presumption operative, it seems clear enough that the parcel
covered by the sale pertains to the conjugal partnership of the Sps Malpaya.
HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC V HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC
(G.R. No. 149679, May 30, 2003)
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On Ownership

FACTS:
Various parcels of real property formed part of a lot originally belonging to one Claudio
Ermac. Upon his death, the lot was inherited and partitioned by his children. The title
over the property, however, was registered under the name of one of the Claudio’s
grandchildren, Clemente Ermac. Despite having done so, Clemente did not disturb or
claim ownership over those portions occupied by his relatives even up to his death.

Respondents Heirs of Vicente Ermac, et al, claim ownership over portions of the lot by
right of succession and by purchase. They allege that their ownership and possession
had been undisturbed, until the Heirs of Clemente Ermac filed an action for ejectment
against them. Because of the cloud of doubt caused by such filing of ejection, they were
prompted to file an action for quieting of title.

The Heirs of Clemente, on the other hand, claimed that Clemente was in possession in
the concept of an owner of the entire lot and never surrendered such ownership or
possession to the respondents.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Heirs of Clemente. The CA held that the fact
Clemente claimed the entire property did not discredit the claims of Heirs of Vicente, et
al.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the OCT issued in the name of Clemente Ermac is indefeasible and
incontrovertible under the Torrens System
2. W/N the tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the
property in the name of Clemente Ermac
3. W/N the ownership of the Heirs of Vicente is barred by prescription and latches

RULING:
1. NO.
2. YES, when accompanied by possession of property.
3. NO.

RATIO:
1. While it is true that the Property Registration Decree provides that the decree of
registration becomes inconvertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an
aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the Torrens System
would be impaired if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.

Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a CT. Registering a piece of land

under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. A CT is merely an evidence of ownership.
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2. Tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, but
they may constitute strong evidence of such when accompanied by possession
of property. Considering that the Heirs of Vicente have in possession of the
property for a long period of time, there is legal basis for their use of tax
declarations and receipts as additional evidence to support their claim.

3. When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a CT, a constructive trust is

created in favor of the defrauded party. Since Claudio is established as the
original owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente meant that
the latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since the Heirs of
Vicente were in actual possession of the property, the action to enforce the trust
and recover the property does not prescribe.

GERMAN MANAGEMENT V CA
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(G.R. No. 76217, September 1989)

On Ownership

FACTS:
Sps Jose executed an SPA authorizing petitioner German Management to develop their
property into a residential subdivision. Despite securing the necessary permits, it was
found that the property was occupied by private respondents Gernale, Villeza, and 20
others. German Management advised such occupants to vacate the premises, but the
latter refused. Nevertheless, German Management proceeded with the development.

Gernale and Villeza filed an action for forcible entry, alleging that German Management
deprived them of their property without due process of law.

MTC dismissed the complaint, and the RTC sustained such dismissal. However, the CA
reversed and held that since Gernale and Villeza were in actual possession of the
property they were forcibly ejected, they have a right to commence an action for forcible
entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.

ISSUE:
W/N Gernale and Villeza are entitled to file a forcible entry case against German
Management

RULING:
YES.

RATIO:
Gernale and Villeza, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against
German Management because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a
quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate.

In this case, it is undisputed that at the time German Management entered the property,
Gernale and Villeza were already in possession thereof. There is no evidence that the
Sps Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, Gernale and
Villeza’s peaceable possession was manifested by the fact they even planted crops
years prior to German Management’s act of destroying such.

A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his
favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until
he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by plenary action.

ANECO REALTY V LANDEX DEVELOPMENT

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(G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008)

On Ownership

FACTS:
FHDI subdivided the tract of land it owned and sold 22 lots to petitioner Aneco Realty
and 17 lots to respondent Landex Development.

The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its
lots. To restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction, and later,
supplemental complaints seeking to demolish the wall and hold Landex liable for
damages.

Landex asserted that Aneco was not deprived access to its lots due to the construction
of the wall, since Aneco has its own entrance to its property. The access, however, was
rendered inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building on the street where it was on.
Landex also claimed that FHDI sold ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco.

The RTC ruled in favor of Landex, which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
W/N Aneco may enjoin Landex from constructing a concrete wall on its own property

RULING:
NO.

RATIO:
The right to fence flows from the right of ownership.

Article 430, NCC, gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement
by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. As owner of the land, Landex
may fence his property subject only to the limitations and restrictions provided by law.
Absent a clear legal and enforceable right, as here, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise of an essential attribute of ownership.

Aneco failed to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much less restrain, Landex from
fencing its own property.

JACINTO V DIRECTOR OF LANDS

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(G.R. No. L-26374, December 31, 1926)

On Ownership
FACTS:
Petitioner Jacinto obtained friar lands in an auction sale. The sale was registered in the
Bureau of Lands, the sales certificates were duly recorded, and the certificates of
assignment were issued and delivered to Jacinto.
Later on, the Metropolitan Water District instituted proceedings for the condemnation of
certain parcels of land for the construction of a dam and a highway. The CFI issued an
order authorizing the MWD to take possession of said parcels of land. By virtue of this,
MWD entered into occupation of the land and began the construction of permanent
improvements thereon. Included in the land sought to be expropriated were owned by
Jacinto. He demanded indemnity for the expropriation, and MWD considered his
demand excessive and declined to pay
When Jacinto tendered payment to the Director of Lands to cover the balance of the
sales price and to demand the deed of conveyance, the latter rejected the tender and
refused to execute and deliver the instrument of conveyance demanded from him.
The present action for mandamus was thereupon brought.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Jacinto is entitled to a conveyance of the land upon payment of the
purchase price to the Government
2. W/N mandamus is the proper remedy

RULING:
1. YES.
2. YES, only to the extent that the Director of Lands has the duty to receive the
purchase money.

RATIO:
1. The proprietary rights, except the right of occupation, are not affected by the
condemnation proceedings until the title has passed to Jacinto, and that does not
occur until the award of compensation or damages has been satisfied.

2. Mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce purely contract rights such as
that here sought to be enforced. Additionally, such writ cannot issue unless it
appears that the Director of Lands unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.
The land in question is private or patrimonial property of the Philippine
Government and there is no law specially enjoining upon the Director of Lands
the duty to execute deeds of conveyance to purchasers of such lands; that duty
is devolved upon the Governor-General.

The Director of Lands is, however, charged with the duty of receiving the
purchase money payable and may therefore be compelled by mandamus to
receive, as a purely ministerial act, such purchase money when tendered.
CITY OF MANILA V GARCIA
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(G.R. No. L-26053, February 21, 1967)

On Ownership

FACTS:
Shortly after the liberation, several persons entered upon these premises owned by the
City of Manila and built thereon houses of second-class materials without the City’s
knowledge and consent.

In 1947, the presence of these occupants was discovered, so the Mayor issued written
permits – labeled as ‘lease contracts’ – to occupy specific areas in the property. For
their occupancy, they were charged nominal rentals.

Later on, however, the premises were needed by the City to expand a school. The
occupants were directed to vacate and remove their constructions, but they refused,
contending that they were ‘tenants’.

Hence, this suit was instituted by the City of Manila to recover possession of the
property.

ISSUE:
W/N the defendants have the right to possess the land as ‘tenants’

RULING:
NO.

RATIO:
The occupants entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without
the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, they are squatters:

The Court is of the view that City Mayor of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into
public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or, for that matter, executing
leases. Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city
officials will elevate it into a lawful act.

Additionally, the constructions made by the squatters constitute public nuisance per se,
as they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building.
Thus, they can be summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the
aid of the courts.