LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Naguit

(G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005)

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title
under Section 14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier. "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words
restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated,
and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum antecedent’s fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.

Ong vs. Republic

(G.R. No. 175746, March 21, 2008)

Applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. These requisites involve
questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual
findings of the court a quo is generally binding on this Court except for certain
recognized exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the Court of
Appeals arrived at conflicting findings.

Malabanan vs. Republic

(G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009)

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the
right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right
itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by
P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a
Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his
title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and
the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.

Malabanan vs. Republic

(G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009)

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is
a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may
be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such property may now
fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus
susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription.
Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.

Republic vs. Abrille

(G.R. No. L-39248, May 7, 1976)

And even assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian estate is
registered does not bring ipso facto effect its accretion thereto under the operation of
the Land Registration Act. No decree of registration of the land based upon final
judgment promulgated by a court of competent jurisdiction after due publication, notice
and hearing, has been issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration and transcribed
by the Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry, for the reason that no initial or
original registration proceedings have been instituted by the owner. And the only way
by which a title to the land in question can be issued for the first time is for the Land
Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of registration based upon final judgment
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction after trial.

Grande vs. CA
(G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962)

Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of
that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land
adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibly of registered land is
provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and
Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter
protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by
occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under
the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been
provided.

Ignacio vs. Director of Lands

(108 Phil 335, 1960)

Land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular
Government vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505, this Court said: "The occupation or
material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion, without previous
permission from the proper authorities, although the occupant may have held the same
as owner for seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a
mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains
to the national
domain; it is intended for public uses and for the benefit of those who live nearby."

Heirs of Emiliano Navarro vs. IAC

(G.R. No. 68166, Feb. 12, 1997)

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the
river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the
river. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil
deposited on the estate fronting the riverbank; the owner of such estate is called the
riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the
latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters.
The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by
the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen but is not
automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by
third persons.

Director of Lands vs. IAC and Acme Plywood and Veneer Co. Inc.
(G.R. No. 73002, Dec. 29, 1986)

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering

possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as
the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself
that the possessor(s) shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title.
"No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to
private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession became complete.

Republic vs. Iglesia ni Cristo and Manalo

(G.R. No. 180067, June 30, 2009)

It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the persons
claiming title to a public land should show that their title was acquired from the State or
any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. In the instant case, it is undisputed
that the subject lot has already been declared alienable and disposable by the
government on May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for
registration was filed by INC. The possession of INC has been established not only from
1952 and 1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is also
tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest, the latter possessing the
subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject
lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and occupation to INC––had been
in the concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property.

Susi vs. Razon

(48 Phil 424)

Open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases
to be public land and becomes private land. When Razon applied for the purchase of
the land, Susi had already been in possession thereof personally for more than 30 years.
Given that, Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant,
but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore
being sufficient.
 Rep. vs. CA and Naguit
(G.R. No. 144057, Jan. 17, 2005)

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,
the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already
been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

Republic vs. Herbieto

(459 SCRA 181, May 26, 2005)

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not

exceeding 144 hectares, may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073. Section 48(b), as
amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In
the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June
1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into
ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is very apparent then that
respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required by Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the
Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.

Republic vs. CA, et. al

(G.R. No.155450, August 6, 2008)

Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which
a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification
requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8
recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless
falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in
accordance with law. Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification
requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to
private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become
private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged
that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under
any existing law at that time.

Diaz vs. Republic

(611 SCRA 405, February 2, 2010)

In registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial
confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application
for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res
judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.
Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly,
her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened
into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land
as alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning
compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141
(CA 141) or the Public Land Act. The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released through an official
proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.

Lepanto Consolidated Mining vs. Dumyung

(G.R. Nos. L-31666-68, April 30, 1979)

There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the National Cultural
Minorities; that they have continuously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that
they are not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act at
the time they filed the free patent applications. These qualifications must be established
by evidence. Precisely, the intervenor, petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession
of the lands in question when the private respondents applied for free patents thereon.
It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the
patents awarded to the private respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled
that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as
forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the
hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.
 Carpo vs. Ayala Land
(611 SCRA 436, Feb 3, 2010)

In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should be

accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved
by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the
Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of dubious origin and it is not
therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the
defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been
surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of
Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the
Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled
in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said
case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the
Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence.
Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to
credit and should be rejected."

Director of Lands vs. CA and Abistado

(G.R. No. 102858, July 28, 1997)

In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that
Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication,
(2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with "If the intention of the
law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of
mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree,
include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of
notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its
detailed provision. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in
rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against
all persons,
including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication.

Republic vs. dela Paz

(G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010)
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by
the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.

Republic vs. Tiotioen

(G.R. No. 167215, October 8, 2008)

As this Court ruled in Republic v. Associacion Benevola de Cebu, "to dismiss the
Republic's appeal merely on the alleged ground of late filing is not proper considering
the merits of the case " and to ignore the evidence presented by the provincial fiscal in
behalf of the Director of Forestry in which constituted the crux of the government's case
"would defeat the time honored Constitutional precepts and the Regalian doctrine that
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony." In Heirs of Marina C. Regalado v. Republic, we ruled: The failure of the
Republic to file any opposition or answer to the application for registration, despite
receipt of notice thereof, did not deprive its right to appeal the RTC decision. Relative to
the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did not oppose the
application of herein respondent, as in fact on December 26, 1969 an order of general
default was issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it to say that as stated
by this court in Luciano vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769, 'it is a well-known and settled rule in
our
jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is usually not estopped by mistake or
error on the part of its officials or agents.

Gomez vs. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 77770, Dec. 15, 1988)
Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited
to the period before the court's decision becomes final but may extend even after its
finality but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree. Petitioners
insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is
purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the
court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the
data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they
are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it
is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the
court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings."

Republic vs. Nillas

(G.R. No. 159595, January 23, 2007)

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule
39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to
place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or
issue a decree. The reason is that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and
does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no
motion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the
land is ordered to be registered.

Vencilao vs. Vano,

(G.R. No. L-25660, Feb. 23, 1990)

Thus, the respondent Judge correctly issued the writs of demolition. In Meralco vs.
Mencias, 107 Phil 1071, We held: "If the writ of possession issued in a land registration
proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant
therein, a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter
writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would
be ineffective. The issuance of the writ of demolition is reasonably necessary to do
justice to petitioner who is being deprived of the possession of the lots in question, by
reason of the continued refusal of respondent to remove his house thereon and restore
possession of the premises to petitioner.

Manotok Realty vs. CLT Realty

(G.R. No. 123346, December 14, 2007 and Resolution dated March 31, 2009)

When this is transcribed or spread in toto in the registration book and signed by the
register of deeds, the page on which the transcription is made become the "original
certificate of title," more commonly called the Torrens title. The land becomes a
registered land only upon the transcription of the decree in the original registration
book by the register of deeds. Certificate of title is deemed as regularly issued with the
issuance of the original copy and owner's duplicate. Thus, Section 42 of Act No. 496
provides that the certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in
regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the registration book 'Original certificate
of title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at' (stating
time and place of entry of decree and the number of case). This certificate shall take
effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.

Director of Land vs. CA and Bisnar

(178 SCRA 708, October 26, 1989)

As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act
2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for
doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government,
through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of
discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed
area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry,
the area is needed for forest purposes. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the
government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Unless and until the
land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.

 (G.R. No. 155450, August 6, 2008)

Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular
Government, we ruled: From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is
deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber
zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character,
and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in
general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired
by any private or juridical person. Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest
zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all
Crown lands were deemed alienable. In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the
disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone or reserved for some
public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The
land classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in
1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public
purpose.

Leonardo de Castro vs. Mayor Yap, et. al.

(G.R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008)

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will
be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted
such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of
what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. Our present land law traces its
roots to the Regalian Doctrine.

Amunategui vs. Directory of Forestry

(G.R. No. L-27873, November 29, 1983)
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184)
that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the
ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it
being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It
bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which
is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes. "As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of
the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest."

Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Lastimado

(G.R. No. L-39473, April 30, 1979)

If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the military
reservation at the time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object of any
cadastral nor can it be the object of reopening under Republic Act No. 931. Similarly, if
the land in question, indeed forms part of the public forest, then, possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
Cadastral Court to register under the Torrens System. Even assuming that the
government agencies can be faulted for inaction and neglect (although the Solicitor
General claims that it received no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by
the State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or agents.
Further, we cannot lose sight of the cardinal consideration that "the State as persona in
law is the juridical entity, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land" under basic Constitutional Precepts, and that it is moreover charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.

Laurel vs. Garcia

(G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990)
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It
is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract
of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese
government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that
the property has become patrimonial. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot
is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated, and Its ownership is a special
collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as
a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and
cannot be the object of appropriation.

La Bugal-B’laan Association vs. Ramos

(G.R. No. 127882, Dec. 1, 2004)

All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their exploration, development and
utilization (EDU) must always be subject to the full control and supervision of the State.
More specifically, given the inadequacy of Filipino capital and technology in large-scale
EDU activities, the State may secure the help of foreign companies in all relevant
matters especially financial and technical assistance provided that, at all times, the State
maintains its right of full control. The foreign assistor or contractor assumes all
financial, technical and entrepreneurial risks in the EDU activities; hence, it may be
given reasonable management, operational, marketing, audit and other prerogatives to
protect its investments and to enable the business to succeed. Verily, the mineral wealth
and natural resources of this country are meant to benefit not merely a select group of
people living in the areas locally affected by mining activities, but the entire Filipino
nation, present and future, to whom the mineral wealth really belong.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa

(G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1980)

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended
for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State
all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a
person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his
ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals
without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong. The land is thus
converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the
registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations
to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled
to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings.

Eland Philippines, Inc. vs. Garcia

(G.R. No. 173289, Feb. 17, 2010)

Section 32 provides that a petition for review of the decree of registration may be filed
"not later than one year from and after the date of entry of such decree of registration."
Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition
for review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. However, it has
been ruled that the petition may be filed at any time after the rendition of the court's
decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of
registration for, as noted in Rivera v. Moran, there can be no possible reason requiring
the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim
for fraud. The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a petition to re-open and
review the decree of registration refers to the decree of registration described in Section
31, which decree is prepared and issued by the Land Registration Administrator.

Lopez vs. Padilla

(G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972)

The lower court correctly held that "in ordinary registration proceedings involving
private lands, courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree,
only when application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from
the issuance of the decree of registration. Applied to homesteads the decree of
registration corresponds to the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for
the issuance of the patent and not the actual issue of the patent. The lower court
accordingly held correctly that "the period within which to file the action for review of
the title and to annul the sale to Woolbright has already expired," on the strength of the
ruling of Recido, "that the patent is deemed issued upon promulgation of the order of
the Director of Lands for the issuance thereof."

Ramos vs. Rodriguez

(G.R. No. 94033, May 29, 1995)
The Court declared that "Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a
cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility, until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final
decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final
decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and
the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title
is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it." It is also argued by
petitioners that the issuance of the decree of registration and the certificate of title by the
LRA is a ministerial duty which follows as a matter of course the order of the court
directing it to issue said decree.

Walstrom vs. Mapa

(G.R. No. 38387, January 29, 1990)

It is the teaching of the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration may be

reopened or reviewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five
essential requisites, to wit: (a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right; (b)
that he has been deprived thereof;(c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within
one year from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as yet been
transferred to an innocent purchaser for value. We have ruled before in Amerol vs.
Bagumbaran that notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued
in the name of another person, he can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the
subject property to the rightful owner. The property registered is deemed to be held in
trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. After all, the
Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud
or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.

Palanca vs. American Food Manufacturing Co.

(G.R. No. L-22822, August 30, 1968)

Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or order entered
against a party through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence may be set
aside upon proper petition to that effect. Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient
ground to set aside a judgment. This Court has held that only extrinsic or collateral, as
distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a judgment. Extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation which is
committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys
or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully, and fairly
his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a
litigation during the trial, such as the Use of forged instruments on perjured testimony,
which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.

Frias vs. Esquivel

(G.R. No. L-17366, July 31, 1962)

To justify the setting aside or review of a decree of registration under Section 38 of Act
No. 496, the party seeking relief must allege and prove, inter alia, that the registration
was procured through fraud — actual and extrinsic. It has been held in this connection
that if the fraud alleged in the petition to set aside the decree is involved in the same
proceedings in which the party seeking relief had ample opportunity to assert his right,
to attack the document presented by the applicant for registration, and to cross-
examine the witnesses who testified relative thereto, then the fraud relied upon is
intrinsic. The fraud is extrinsic if it was employed to deprive a party of his day in court,
thus preventing him from asserting his right to the property registered in the name of
the applicant.

Director of Lands vs. CFI of Rizal

(G.R. No. L-31681. July 31, 1987)

However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral
and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case
where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The following ruling spells
out the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. “Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a
prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party, is prevented from presenting fully
and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic fraud taxes the form of "acts of a party in a
litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony,
which did not affect the present action of the case, but did present a fair and just
determination of the case."

Rosales vs. Burgos

(G.R. No. 143573, January 30, 2009)
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair
price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s
claim. The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies
upon one who asserts that status. This onus probandi cannot be discharged by mere
invocation of the ordinary presumption of good faith. As a general rule, every person
dealing with registered land, as in this case, may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and will in no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. However, this rule admits of an
unchallenged exception: a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except
when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of
a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.

Fule vs. De Legare

(G.R. No. L-17951, February 28, 1963)

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that
some other persons has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair
price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other persons in the property. Good faith consists in an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another. However,
we have also laid down the doctrine that there are instances when such a fraudulent
document may become the root of valid title. One such instance is where the certificate
of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while
it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For
then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.

Yu vs. Pacleb
(G.R. No. 172172, Feb. 24, 2009)
The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner
himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a
person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is
registered. While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind
the certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is
expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances
necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in
his capacity to transfer the land. This Court has consistently applied the stricter rule
when it comes to deciding the issue of good faith of one who buys from one who is not
the registered owner, but who exhibits a certificate of title.

Domingo vs. Reed

(G.R. No. 157701, Dec. 9, 2005)

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who
pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of
another person’s claim. The honesty of intention that constitutes good faith implies
freedom from knowledge of circumstances that ought to put a prudent person on
inquiry. Good faith consists in the belief of the possessors that the persons from whom
they received the thing are its rightful owners who could convey their title. Good faith,
while always presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires this well-
founded belief.

St. Dominic Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

(G.R. No. 70623, June 30, 1987)

A mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the certificate of title.
In the absence of anything to excite suspicion, it is under no obligation to look beyond
the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of said
certificate. A person who takes a mortgage in good faith and for a valuable
consideration, the record showing a clear title in the mortgagor, will be protected
against any equitable titles to the premises or equitable claims on the title, in favor of
third persons, of which he had no notice, actual or constructive. The protection extends
to a purchaser at a Sheriff's sale under proceedings on the mortgage although such
purchaser had notice of the alleged equity.

Heirs of Malabanan vs. Heirs of Lebanon

 (G.R. No. 160711, August 14, 2007, citing Vda. De Recinto v. Inciong[1977])

The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not
necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein for he
does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally
included. It is evident from the records that the petitioner owns the portion in question
and therefore the area should be conveyed to her. The remedy of the land owner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one
year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

Agile vs. CFI of Batangas

(G.R. No. L-48335, April 5, 1988)

The law on reconveyance is clear, and jurisprudence thereon is well-settled. This

remedy is available in cases where, as a result of mistake or fraud, property is registered
in the name of a person not its owner. Clerical error in designating the real owner is a
valid ground for reconveyance after the decree shall have become final following the
lapse of one year therefrom. Reconveyance may also be sought where it is established
that a person not entitled to the property succeeded in registering it in his name to the
prejudice of the real owner. The decision in that case was a valid resolution of the
question of ownership over the disputed properties and cannot be reversed now
through the remedy of reconveyance.

Gasataya vs. Mabasa

(G.R. No. 148147, Feb. 16, 2007)

Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the
person with a better right than the person under whose name said property was
erroneously registered. The registration of the properties in petitioner’s name did not
obliterate the fact that fraud preceded and facilitated such registration. Actual or
positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of
misrepresentation of material facts. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon
which benefit is obtained, to the prejudice of another. Consequently, fraud is a ground
for reconveyance.

Benin vs. Tuason

 (G.R. No L-26127, June 28, 1974)

It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he
claims had been wrongly registered in the name of another person must recognize the
validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a reconveyance may
only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in
the name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. No action for
reconveyance can take place as against a third party who had acquired title over the
registered property in good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can be made,
the value of the property registered may be demanded only from the person (or
persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name.

Datu Kiram Sampaco vs. Hadji Sirad Monica Lantus

(G.R. No. 163551, July 18, 2011)

The one-year prescriptive period, however, does not apply when the person seeking
annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot. This is because the action
partakes of a suit to quiet title which is imprescriptible. In David v. Malay, we held that a
person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until
his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his
right, and his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on his title.

Republic vs. Mangotara,

(G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010)

Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. Once vested by law on a particular court or body, the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by
anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law. The power to
change the jurisdiction of the courts is a matter of legislative enactment, which none but
the legislature may do. Congress has the sole power to define, prescribe and apportion
the jurisdiction of the courts. The RTC has jurisdiction over an action for quieting of title
under the circumstances described in Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction.

Lasquite vs. Victory Hills, Inc.

 (G.R. No. 175375, June 23, 2009)

A duly registered certificate of title is considered a public document and the entries
found in it are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can
produce evidence establishing otherwise. Even then, records of public officers which
are admissible in evidence are limited to those matters which the public officer has
authority to record. Indisputably, it was beyond the power of the Register of Deeds to
register a public land based on an invalid, much worse, a non-existent patent. To
sanction an otherwise invalid document in the guise of upholding the stability of our
land registration system would run counter to the judicial devotion towards purging
the system of illicit titles, in accordance with our base task as the ultimate citadel of
justice and legitimacy. The established legal principle in actions for annulment or
reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a
preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to
be reconveyed is his.

Cavile vs. Litania-Hong

(G.R. No.179540, March 13, 2009)

"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater
weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." "Preponderance of
evidence" is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides the
guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence, thus: In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear
upon the trial.

Amerol vs. Bagumbayan

(G.R. No. L-33261, September 30, 1987)
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of
very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that
an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note,
it seems, is Balbin v. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a
reconveyance action is four years.

Daclag vs. Macahilig

(G.R. No. 159578, Feb. 18, 2009)

Being an absolute nullity, the deed is subject to attack anytime, in accordance with
Article 1410 of the Civil Code that an action to declare the inexistence of a void contract
does not prescribe. Likewise, we have consistently ruled that when there is a showing
of such illegality, the property registered is deemed to be simply held in trust for the
real owner by the person in whose name it is registered, and the former then has the
right to sue for the reconveyance of the property. An action for reconveyance based on a
void contract is imprescriptible. As long as the land wrongfully registered under the
Torrens system is still in the name of the person who caused such registration, an action
in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the real owner.

Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Bautista

(G.R. No. L-21362, Nov. 29, 1968)

In the suit before the lower court, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of
the Philippines were likewise made defendants by appellant bank because of its belief
that if no right existed as against appellee Bautista, recovery could be had from the
Assurance Fund. Such a belief finds no support in the applicable law, which allows
recovery only upon a showing that there be no negligence on the part of the party
sustaining any loss or damage or being deprived of any land or interest therein by the
operation of the Land Registration Act. This certainly is not the case here, plaintiff-
appellant being solely responsible for the plight in which it now finds itself.
Accordingly, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the Philippines are
likewise exempt from any liability.