THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014

FLOR GUPILAN–AGUILAR AND HONORE R.

HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. SIMEON V.

MARCELO; AND PNP–CIDG, REPRESENTED BY DIR.

EDUARDO MATILLANO, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks

to reverse and set aside the July 22, 20091 Decision of the

Court of Appeals and its June 13, 2011 Resolution in CA–

G.R. SP No.88954, affirming the decision of the

Ombudsman in OMB–C–A–03–0327–I that found

petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty and

dismissed them from the service.

The Facts
In June 2003, the Philippine National Police Criminal

Investigation and Detection Group (PNP–CIDG) conducted

an investigation on the lavish lifestyle and alleged

nefarious activities of certain personnel of the Bureau of

Customs, among them petitioners Flor Gupilan–Aguilar

(Aguilar), then Chief of the Miscellaneous Division, and

Honore Hernandez (Hernandez), Customs Officer III.

Aguilar was then receiving a basic annual salary of PhP

249,876. Her year–to–year assets, liabilities and net

worth for CYs 1999 to 2002, taken from her Statement of

Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) for the

corresponding years, are shown below: 

Real
19993 20004 20015 20026
Properties2
House and Lot P1,030,000. P1,030,000.
P880,000.00 P980,000.00 
in Quezon City 00  00
Apartment in
Caloocan P500,000.00 P550,000.00 
P550,000.00 P550,000.00
City 
Personal
Properties7
Car  P450,000.00 P450,000.00 
P450,000.00 P900,000.00
Jewelry  P500,000.00 P600,000.00 P650,000.00 P750,000.00
Appliances  P100,000.00 P120,000.00 
P125,000.00 P135,000.00
Furniture and
P100,000.00 P120,000.00 
P125,000.00 P150,000.00
Fixture 
P2,530,000. P2,820,000. P2,930,000. P3,515,000.
Total Assets 
00  00  00  00
Liabilities        
 GSIS  – P450,000.00 P400,000.00 P300,000.00
Car Loan  – – – P500,000.00
Total
– P450,000.00 P400,000.00 P800,000.00
Liabilities 
P2,530,000. P2,370,000. P2,530,000. P2,715,000.
Net Worth 
00 00 00  00

Her SALNs for the years aforementioned do not reflect any

income source other than her employment. The spaces for

her spouse’s name and business interest were left in

blank.

Following weeks of surveillance and lifestyle probe, the

PNP–CIDG investigating team, headed by Atty. Virgilio

Pablico, executed on July 28, 2003 a Joint–Affidavit,

depicting Aguilar, who, in her Personal Data Sheet,

indicated “Blk 21 Lot 8 Percentage St. BIR Vill, Fairview,

QC” as her home address, as owning properties not

declared or properly identified in her SALNs, specifically

the following: 

Real Properties

1. Lot 6, Blk 21, BIR Village, Fairview,

Quezon City worth approximately
Php1,000,000.00;
2. A 4–bedroom Unit 1007–A Antel Seaview
Towers, 2626 Roxas Blvd., Pasay City
worth Php12,000,000.00, with rights to
4 parking slots; and
 3. Residential lot in Naga City worth
Php148,200.00

Personal
   
Properties
      
 Make/Model Plate No.  Registered Owner 
 Honda CRV BIM–888 Flor G. Aguilar
Isuzu
  HRH–659  Honore R. Hernandez
Trooper 
 BMW (red)  XCR–500  Asia Int’l Auctioneer, Inc.
 BMW (silver)  XFD–441  Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.8

It was also unearthed that, during a four–year stretch,

from July 1999 to June 2003, Aguilar, per the Bureau of

Immigration (BI) records, took 13 unofficial trips abroad,

eight to Los Angeles, California, accompanied most of the

time by daughter Josephine. During the same period, her

two other daughters also collectively made nine travels

abroad. Per the PNP–CIDG’s estimate, Aguilar would have

spent around PhP 3,400,000 for her and her daughters’

foreign travels. 

In view of what it deemed to be a wide variance between

Aguilar’s acquired assets and what she spent for her four–

year overseas travels, on one hand, and her income, on

the other, the PNP–CIDG, through P/Director Eduardo

Matillano––in a letter–complaint of July 28, 2003, with

enclosures, on a finding that she has violated Republic Act

No. (RA) 13799 in relation to RA 301910 and 671311 –

charged her with grave misconduct and dishonesty.

Hernandez was charged too with the same offenses. Upon

evaluation of the complaint and of the evidence

presented, which included the aforementioned joint–

affidavit, the Ombudsman created an investigating panel

which then conducted administrative proceedings on the

complaint, docketed as OMB–C–A–03–0327–I. 

By Order of September 3, 2003, then Overall Deputy

Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio, Jr. placed Aguilar under

preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay.

Another Order,12however, was issued, effectively lifting

the order of preventive suspension on the stated ground

that Aguilar’s untraversed controverting evidence

“considerably demonstrated the weakness of the evidence

in support of the complaint.”

In the meantime, Aguilar filed her Counter–

Affidavit,13 primarily addressing the allegations in the

aforementioned joint–affidavit. In it, she belied allegations

about not declaring Lot 6, Blk 21, BIR Village, Fairview. As

explained, what she considers her dwelling in that area

consists of a duplex–type structure that sits on the Lot 8

she originally owned and the contiguous Lot 6, which she

subsequently acquired from one Norma Jurado. Anent Unit

1007–A of Antel Seaview Towers, Aguilar pointed to her

US–based brother Carlo as owner of this condo unit, the

latter having purchased it from Mina Gabor on July 14,

2003. Carlo, as she averred, has allowed her to stay in

the unit. Appended to Aguilar’s counter–affidavit is a Deed

of Sale14 purportedly executed in Los Angeles in favor of

Carlo.

Aguilar also denied owning the so–called third real

property, the Panicuason, Naga City lot, since she had

already sold it in 1992.

As to allegations that she owns but failed to declare the

four above–listed vehicles, Aguilar admitted to owning

only the subject Honda CRV van, but denied the charge of

failing to declare it in her SALN. She ascribed ownership of

the Isuzu Trooper to Hernandez. As for the red and silver

BMW cars registered in the name of the entities

mentioned in the complaint, Aguilar alleged that they

were merely lent to her by her brother’s friend.

Not being the owner of the properties aforementioned,

Aguilar wondered how she can be expected to include

them in her SALN.

Finally, she claimed having seven brothers and two sisters

in the US who had sponsored her US trips and who at

times even sent airline tickets for her and her daughters’

use.

Hernandez, for his defense, alleged that the complaint

adverted only to his being the registered owner of an

Isuzu Trooper. There is no specification, he added, as to

his acquisition of, and not declaring, unexplained wealth.15

Ruling of the Ombudsman

Based on the evidence on record and the parties’ position

papers, the investigating panel issued for approval a

draft Decision16 dated June 3, 2004, which found Aguilar

guilty of the offenses charged. And while Hernandez was

also charged and investigated, the fallo and even the body

of the proposed decision was silent as to him, save for the

following line: 

x x x the fact that the motor vehicle, Isuzu Trooper with

Plate No. HRH 659 is registered in his [Hernandez’s]
name, does not make him administratively liable.17

Evidently not totally satisfied with the panel’s

recommended action, the Ombudsman directed that a

joint clarificatory hearing be conducted, and one was held

on September 23, 2004. The proceedings resulted in the

issuance of what the investigating panel styled

as Supplemental Decision18 dated January 6, 2005 further

detailing the bases for the earlier finding on Aguilar’s

liability. Like the earlier draft, no reference was made in

the fallo of the Supplemental Decisionto Hernandez’s guilt

or innocence.

Following a review of the two issuances thus submitted,

then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo issued on January 18,

2005 a decision denominated Supplement,19 approving,

with modification, the

adverted Decision and Supplemental Decision. The

modification relates to the liability of Hernandez whom the

Ombudsman found to be Aguilar’s dummy and equally

guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty deserving too

of the penalty of dismissal from the service. Dispositively,

the Supplement reads: 

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 03 June 2004 and

Supplemental Decision dated 06 January 2005 are approved
insofar as it finds respondent Flor Aguilar guilty of the
administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct and
Dishonesty and is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
from the service, with the accessory penalty of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits and perpetual disqualification for re–
employment in the government service.

Further, the undersigned hereby disapproves the ruling

contained in the Decision dated 03 June 2004 with regard
to Honore Hernandez, the latter being likewise found
guilty of the administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct
and Dishonesty and is hereby meted the penalty of
Dismissal from the service, with the accessory penalty of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits and perpetual disqualification for re–
employment in the government service.

SO ORDERED. 

Aguilar and Hernandez moved for but were denied

reconsideration20 via an Order21 of February 28, 2005. The

two then went to the Court of Appeals (CA) on a petition

for review under Rule 43, docketed as CA–G.R. SP No.

88954. Even as they decried what they tag as a case

disposition in installments, petitioners asserted the

absence of substantial evidence to support the allegations

in the complaint, and that the judgment of dismissal is

recommendatory and not immediately executory. 

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA, in its assailed Decision of July 22, 2009, affirmed

that of the Ombudsman, disposing as follows: 

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the

assailed Decision of the Ombudsman finding petitioners
guilty of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, and meted them
the penalty of DISMISSAL from the government service,
with the accessory penalty of cancellation of elibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government
service in OMB–C–A–03–0327–I is AFFIRMED. 

SO ORDERED.[22

Even as it junked petitioners’ contention on the sufficiency

of the complainant’s inculpating evidence and on the

nature of the Ombudsman’s judgment, the CA declared

that petitioners’ remedy under the premises is an appeal

to this Court by force of Section 14 in relation to Sec. 27

of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Sec. 14

provides that “[n]o court shall hear any appeal or

application for remedy against the decisions or

findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme

Court on pure questions of law,” while Sec. 27 states

that “[f]indings of fact by the [OMB] when

supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.” 

On June 13, 2011, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for

reconsideration. 

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues: 

1. Whether or not a Rule 43 petition to assail the

findings or decisions of the Ombudsman in an

administrative case is proper; 

2. Whether or not the acts complained of constitute

grave misconduct, dishonesty or both; 

3. Whether or not there is substantial evidence to

support the assailed findings of the Ombudsman and

the CA; and 

4. Whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman is

but recommendatory or immediately executory. 

Petitioners also invite attention to the June 4, 2012

decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in

Criminal Case No. 08–263022, acquitting Aguilar for

falsification allegedly involving the same disputed

transactions in OMB–C–A–03–0327–I. 
 The Court’s Ruling

The petition, on its procedural and substantial aspects, is

partly meritorious. The Court shall first address procedural

issues and concerns raised in this recourse. 

Petitioners properly appealed to the CA

Petitioners first contend that the CA erred in its holding

that, in line with Sec. 1423 and Sec. 27 of RA 6770, they

should have appealed the Ombudsman’s Decision to this

Court on questions of law instead of filing a Rule 43

petition before the CA. 

Petitioners stand on solid ground on this issue. 

The Ombudsman has defined prosecutorial powers and

possesses adjudicative competence over administrative

disciplinary cases filed against public officers. What

presently concerns the Court relates to the grievance

mechanism available to challenge the OMB’s decisions in

the exercise of that disciplinary jurisdiction. 

The nature of the case before the Office of the

Ombudsman (OMB) determines the proper remedy

available to the aggrieved party and with which court it

should be filed. In administrative disciplinary cases, an

appeal from the OMB’s decision should be taken to the CA

under Rule 43, unless the decision is not appealable owing

to the penalty imposed. 

In the case at bar, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his

administrative disciplinary jurisdiction had, after due

investigation, adjudged petitioners guilty of grave

misconduct and dishonesty and meted the corresponding

penalty. Recourse to the CA via a Rule 43 petition is the

proper mode of appeal. Rule 43 governs appeals to the CA

from decisions or final orders of quasi–judicial agencies.24

Reliance by the CA on Sec. 14 in relation to Sec. 27 of RA

6770 to support its position as to which court a party may

repair to to assail the OMB’s decision in disciplinary cases

is misinformed. As has been held, those portions of said

Sec. 27 and any other provisions implementing RA 6770,

insofar as they expanded the appellate jurisdiction of this

Court without its concurrence, violate Article VI, Sec. 30

of the 1987 Constitution.25 We said so in the

landmark Fabian v. Desierto:26
 WHEREFORE, Section 27 of [RA] 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of [A.O.]. 07
(Rules of Procedure of the [OMB]), and any other
provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid
Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared
INVALID and of no further force and effect. (Emphasis
added.) 

As a consequence and in line with the regulatory

philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi–judicial

agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,

appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in

administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the

CA under the provisions of Rule 43.27Barata v. Abalos,

Jr.,28Coronel v. Desierto,29 and recently Dimagiba v.

Espartero30 have reiterated the pertinent holding

in Fabian.

The Decision of the Ombudsman is mandatory and

immediately executory

This brings us to the issue on the nature of the

Ombudsman’s decisions in administrative disciplinary

suits, it being petitioners’ posture that such decisions, as

here, are only recommendatory and, at any event, not

immediately executory for the reason that the PNP–CIDG

filed the basic complaint on August 20, 200331 when the

ruling in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman32 had still

controlling sway. To petitioners, Tapiador enunciated the

dictum that the Ombudsman’s disciplinary power is only to

recommend, the power to suspend and dismiss erring

personnel being vested in the head of the office

concerned. As a corollary point, petitioners also advance

the argument that the legal situation changed only

when Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of

Appeals33 and Ombudsman v. Samaniego34 were decided

in June 2006 and September 2008, respectively. 

We are not impressed. 

Petitioners’ witting or unwitting invocation of Tapiador is

specious. Administrative disciplinary authority of the OMB

does not end with a recommendation to punish. The

statement in Tapiador that the Ombudsman is without

authority to directly dismiss an erring public official as its

mandate is only to recommend was mere obiter dictum,

and cannot, in the words of Ledesma v. Court of

Appeals,35 “be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the

Supreme Court.” In fact, the pronouncement

in Tapiador on the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority

was only limited to two sentences, to wit: 

x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were

administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority
to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government
service x x x. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can
only “recommend” the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned.36

The terse obiter in Tapiador should be compared with the

holding in Ombudsman v. De Leon37which even chronicled

the pertinent internal rules of procedure in the Office of

the Ombudsman (OMB) and illustrated that, as early as

2000, rules were already enforced by the OMB that

provide for the immediate execution of judgments

pending appeal. As pointed out inDe Leon, Sec. 27 of

the Ombudsman Act of 1989 prescribes the rules on the

effectivity and finality of the OMB’s decisions: 

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1)

All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman
are immediately effective and executory. 

x x x x

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,

directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or
 denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office

of the Ombudsman x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) 

The then Sec. 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07

(AO 07) or the Rules of Procedure of the OMB, in turn,

stated: 

Sec. 7. Finality of decision. – Where the respondent is

absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be
final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision
shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days
from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion
for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall
have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA
6770. (Emphasis supplied.) 

The Court, in Lapid v. Court of Appeals,38 has interpreted

the above–quoted provision to mean that the sanctions

imposed by the Ombudsman other than public censure,

reprimand, suspension of not more than one month or a

fine equivalent to one month salary are not immediately

executory and can be stayed by an appeal timely filed.

The pertinent ruling in Lapid has, however, been

superseded.39 On August 17, 2000, AO 14–A was issued

amending Sec. 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the

OMB. The rule, as thus amended, pertinently reads: 

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where

x x x the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be
final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision
may be appealed x x x. 

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being

executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal
and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be
considered as having been under preventive suspension and
shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that
he did not receive by reason of the suspension or
removal. (Emphasis supplied.) 

Then came AO 17 dated September 15, 2003 further

amending Sec. 7 of Rule III. Thus, the section now

provides: 

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where

the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall
be final, executory, and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals x x x. 

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being

executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal
and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be
considered as having been under preventive suspension and
shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that
he did not receive by reason of the suspension or
removal. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when AO 14–A

was issued, the OMB–imposed penalties in administrative

disciplinary cases were already immediately executory

notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. In this case, it

must be noted that the complaint dated July 28, 2003 was

filed on August 20, 2003 or after the AO 14–A has come

into effect. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA

when it ruled that the penalties imposed by the

Ombudsman against petitioners are immediately

executory. Immediate execution argues against the

outlandish notion that the Ombudsman can only

recommend disciplinary sanctions. 

The acts complained of constitute Dishonesty but

not Grave Misconduct

a. Grave Misconduct

The charges against petitioners for grave misconduct and

dishonesty basically stemmed from their alleged act of

amassing unexplained wealth or acquiring properties

disproportionate to their income, petitioner Aguilar’s

alleged failure to declare them in her SALNs, and for

petitioner Hernandez’s alleged acquiescence to be her

dummy. To our the mind, however, we find that even if

petitioners, for argument, failed to include several

properties in their SALNs, the omission, by itself, does not

amount to grave misconduct. 

Largo v. Court of Appeals40 is instructional as to the

nature of the offense. To constitute misconduct, the

complained act/s or omission must have a direct relation

and be linked to the performance of official duties. The

Court wrote in Amosco v. Magro: 

x x x By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct

such as affects his performance of his duties as an
officer and not such only as affects his character as a
private individual. In such cases, it has been said at
all times, it is necessary to separate the character of
the man from the character of the officer x x x. It is
settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance
warranting removal from office of an officer must have
direct relation to and be connected with the performance
of official duties amounting either to maladministration
or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge
the duties of the office x x x.41

Owning properties disproportionate to one’s salary and

not declaring them in the corresponding SALNs cannot,

without more, be classified as grave misconduct. Even if

these allegations were true, we cannot see our way clear

how the fact of non–declarations would have a bearing on

the performance of functions by petitioner Aguilar, as

Customs Chief of the Miscellaneous Division, and by

petitioner Hernandez, as Customs Operations Officer. It

is non–sequitur to assume that the omission to declare

has served, in some way, to hinder the rendition of sound

public service for there is no direct relation or connection

between the two. Without a nexus between the act

complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of

grave misconduct shall necessarily fail. 

b. Dishonesty

Dishonesty, as juridically understood, implies the

disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty or

probity in principle; lack of fairness and

straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or

betray.42 It is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt

upon one’s ability to perform duties with the integrity and

uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee.43

The inculpatory allegations in the controversy, if proved,

qualify as acts of dishonesty that would merit dismissal

from service. The requirement of filing a SALN is

enshrined, as it were, in the Constitution44 to promote

transparency in the civil service and operates as a

deterrent against government officials bent on enriching

themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law,

it behooves every government official or employee to

make a complete disclosure of his or her assets, liabilities

and net worth in order to suppress any questionable

accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results

from non–disclosure of such matters.45

The significance of requiring the filing of a complete,

truthful, and sworn SALN as a measure to curb corruption

in the bureaucracy cannot be gainsaid. Secs. 7 and 8 of

the Anti–Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) are

emphatic on this point: 

Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. — Every

public officer, within thirty days after assuming office,
and thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April
following the close of every calendar year, x x x shall
prepare and file x x x a true, detailed and sworn
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year x x x. 

Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to

Unexplained Wealth. — If in accordance with the
provisions of [RA 1379], a public official has been found
to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his
 name or in the name of other persons, an amount of
property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be
ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name
of the spouse and dependents of such public official may
be taken into consideration, when their acquisition
through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown.
x x x [M]anifestly excessive expenditures incurred by the
public official, his spouse or any of their dependents
including x x x frequent travel abroad of a non–official
character by any public official when such activities
entail expenses evidently out of proportion to legitimate
income, shall likewise be taken into consideration in the
enforcement of this Section x x x. The circumstances
hereinabove mentioned shall constitute valid ground for
the administrative suspension of the public official
concerned for an indefinite period until the
investigation of the unexplained wealth is completed. 

The aforequoted Section 8 speaks of unlawful acquisition

of wealth and excessive expenditure, the evil sought to be

suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which directs full

disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a means of preventing

said evil and is aimed particularly at minimizing if not

altogether curtailing the opportunities for official

corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the

public service. By the SALN, the public is able to monitor

movement in the fortune of a public official; it serves as a

valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed

properties and wealth.46

The failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubts the

integrity of the officer and would normally amount to

dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere

misdeclaration in the SALN does not automatically amount

to such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to

conceal the truth or to make false statements; otherwise,

the government employee may only liable for negligence,

not for dishonesty.47 In addition, only when the

accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate

to the income of the public officer/employee and income

from other sources, and the public officer/employee fails

to properly account or explain these sources of income

and acquisitions, does he or she become susceptible to

dishonesty.48

Substantial evidence

The core of the controversy in this case lies in whether or

not the complainant’s pieces of evidence extant in and

deducible from the records meet the quantum of evidence

required to justify the dismissal action taken against

petitioners. Petitioner Aguilar argues that the initial

evidentiary assessment by the OMB when it lifted the

order of preventive suspension was correct. To recall, the

OMB declared at that time that the evidence PNP–CIDG

presented was not strong enough to support the basic

complaint. 

In essence, petitioners, Aguilar in particular, urge us to

gauge whether or not the complainant has hurdled the

quantum of evidence requirement in administrative cases

so as to shift the burden of evidence on them.

Respondents, on the other hand, are correct in pointing

out that a review of the evidence would necessarily entail

a corresponding evaluation of facts ascertained by the

Ombudsman and the CA, and that as a general rule, the

Court should refrain from delving into factual questions.

However, we have already held in a catena of cases that

the general rule admits of exceptions, including when the

judgment is based on misappreciation of facts or when the

findings of facts are conflicting.49 In light of the series of

seemingly confusing orders and rulings promulgated by

the Ombudsman, it is beyond cavil that a review of the

facts in this case is warranted. 

a. Evidence against petitioner Aguilar

 i. Lot 6, Block 21, BIR Village, Fairview, Quezon City

Petitioner Aguilar admits owning this parcel of land, but

insists at every turn that she had consistently declared it

in her SALNs. A perusal of her SALNs from 1999–2002

would indeed show that she had declared ownership of the

Fairview property, entering it merely as “House & Lot,

Q.C.” This is as opposed to the allegations of the PNP–

CIDG that what she has been declaring is Lot 8 of Block

21, and not Lot 6. 

We sustain the findings of the Ombudsman contained in

the Supplemental Decision as to the validity of petitioner

Aguilar’s account on this point. As observed by the

Ombudsman, the house and lot she declared as residence

is actually a duplex–type structure, with a party wall in

the middle, erected on two lots, Lots 6 and 8. When

petitioner Aguilar purchased Lot 8 from one Norma

Jurado, she dismantled the dividing wall to make a

solitary unit. 

This explanation finds support from a perusal of her travel

documents wherein she interchanges her address between

said Lot 6 and Lot 8. 

 ii. Antel Towers

Petitioner Aguilar argues next that the four–bedroom

condominium apartment with two parking slots along

Pasay City is actually owned by her US–based brother

Carlo who allegedly purchased it from Mina Gabor, as

evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated July 14, 2003. 

The Court, as were the CA and the OMB, is unconvinced.

A cursory reading of the deed shows July 14, 2003, or a

month after the PNP–CIDG initiated an investigation over

Aguilar’s lifestyle, as its date of execution. On the other

hand, petitioner Aguilar admitted during the clarificatory

hearing conducted on September 23, 2004 that, as early

as 2000, she and her daughter have already been

occupying the apartment, thus: 

Q: You said in your direct clarificatory questioning

that you don’t know when Carlo Gupilan bought this
property? A: Yes, sir. 

Q: But when did you reside in that property for the

first time? A: Mga 2000 pa yun.

Q: When for the first time did you know that Carlo
Gupilan acquired that Antel Towers property? A: Noon
pong sinabi niya: “Ate, napakalayo sa opisina mo ang
bahay mo. Gusto mo gamitin mo yung bahay ko sa Pasay?” 

Q: Mga kailan yun? A: Mga 2000.50

Evidently, a serious disparity exists between the

document presented and the statements petitioner Aguilar

herself made. As the CA observed, citing the

Ombudsman’s findings, petitioner insists that the property

is owned by her brother Carlo who invited her to stay in

his condo unit in 2000. However, per the document she

presented, the alleged Deed of Sale between him and

Gabor, was only executed on July 14, 2003. 

On what authority then she has been staying on the

apartment unit before the alleged Carlo–Gabor sales

transaction was executed remained unexplained. This

aberration coupled by her beneficial ownership of the

property, as demonstrated by her possession and

occupancy of the unit, casts serious doubts as to her

brother’s alleged ownership of the unit since 2000 and

renders dubious the alleged deed of sale. To recall, graft

investigators will not only look into properties in a public

servant’s name, but also those claimed by their relatives

or dummies. The SALN requirement will be a useless ritual

if public officers can easily evade the obligation to disclose

if they register the asset under someone else’s name. 

 iii. Naga City property

As petitioner Aguilar alleged, she purchased the property

from her parents who, in June 1990, executed the

corresponding deed of sale in her favor. This sale may be

documented, but her claim that she subsequently sold the

Naga property to one Rosendo Gonzales sometime in

1992 is not supported by evidence. She has not adduced

any document or deed proving that she no longer owns

the property. On the other hand, the PNP–CIDG was able

to secure from the City Assessor’s office a copy of the tax

declaration of the property in 2002 which, on its face,

clearly yields this fact: the property is still registered

under Aguilar’s name; the alleged sale between her and

Rosendo Gonzales was not annotated. 

iv. Vehicles

There is no quibbling as to the ownership of the Honda

CRV and the Isuzu Trooper. The question pivots only as to

the two (2) BMWs that petitioner Aguilar had

acknowledged using. 

Per petitioner Aguilar’s account, a friend of another

brother, Salvador, has allowed her the use of the BMWs.

As claimed, US–based Salvador is in the business of

exporting used cars from the US to the Philippines and

has local contacts which include the two corporations

under whose names the BMWs are registered. The PNP–

CIDG, on the other hand, submitted pictures51 taken

during its surveillance of Aguilar showing the red and

silver BMWs leaving the parking space of Antel Towers, if

not parked at slots reserved for the use of the unit Aguilar

has been occupying. 

We rule, as the CA and the Ombudsman earlier did,

against petitioner Aguilar on this point. As found by the

Ombudsman and confirmed by the CA, petitioner Aguilar

had control and possession––both attributes of

ownership––of the two BMW vehicles. While she alleged

having only borrowed them, her statement during the

clarificatory hearings that she does not know who the real

owners are over stretches credulity. Her allegation was

that the vehicles were only lent her by her brother’s

friend. But when pressed on how she came into contact

with the friend, who was unnamed, since her brother is in

the US, she was unable to give a direct answer.52

In another perspective, it bears to stress that petitioner

Aguilar, a ranking customs official, had veritably admitted

to receiving benefits from the above named corporations

which had been facilitating her brother’s used car export

business. As correctly observed by the Ombudsman, Sec.

7 of RA 6713 or the Code of Ethical Standards53 prohibits

public officials and employees from directly or indirectly

soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or things of monetary

value from anyone in connection with any operation being

regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by

the functions of their office. The Anti–Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act declares and penalizes similar acts.54

The act complained of as regards the BMW cars for sure is

indicative of corruption, tending to suggest that petitioner

Aguilar had used her position in the customs bureau to

advance her brother’s business interests as well as that of

the two corporations which facilitate the vehicle

exportation and importation business. Thus, even in the

absence of compelling evidence to prove that petitioner

Aguilar is the actual owner of the subject high–priced

BMW vehicles, she can still be held amenable under the

premises for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the

service. 

v. Foreign Travels

Petitioner Aguilar’s exculpating allegations, as earlier

narrated, as to her foreign travels during the period

material fail to convince. 

While indeed some of her siblings executed affidavits

tending to prove they have sufficient income to shoulder

her travels, they stopped short of saying that they did in

fact contribute or entirely pay, as Aguilar urges the Court

to believe, for her and her daughters’ trip to Los Angeles.

Nowhere in the documents was it mentioned that they

defrayed petitioner Aguilar’s expenses for her visits. The

general affidavits merely indicated their jobs and how

much salary they receive monthly. As held in Office of the

Ombudsman v. Racho,55 an unexplained wealth case, the

documents that Racho presented, purportedly showing his

brothers’ financial capability to send or contribute large

sum of money for their business, do not prove that they

did, in fact, contribute or remit money for their supposed

joint business venture. 

As a final note on the matter, petitioner Aguilar had

submitted affidavits56 wherein she averred that all

expenses for her and her daughter’s travel shall be borne

or defrayed by her alone.57So what happens to her claim

that her siblings shouldered most of her travel expenses? 

vi. Summary

Administrative proceedings are governed by the

“substantial evidence rule,” meaning a finding of guilt in

an administrative case may and would issue if supported

by substantial evidence that the respondent has

committed the acts stated in the complaint. Substantial

evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds

equally reasonable might conceivably opine

otherwise.58 Its absence is not shown by stressing that

there is contrary evidence, direct or circumstantial, on

record.59

In the case at bar, the required evidence sufficient to

justify holding petitioner Aguilar administratively liable has

been, to us, as to the CA, satisfied. Not only did she fail to
declare in her SALN the residential lot located at

Panicuason, Naga City, she likewise failed to satisfactorily

explain her beneficial ownership of the Antel Seaview

Towers four–bedroom condominium unit and her use of

the two BMWs registered in the name of different

corporations, which, as the records show, are both based

in Olongapo City. 

Relevant to this determination is Sec. 2 of RA 1379,60 in

relation to Sec. 8 of RA 3019, which states that whenever

any public officer or employee has acquired during his

incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out

of proportion to his salary as such officer or employee and

to his other lawful income and the income from

legitimately acquired property, said property shall be

presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.

When the presumption holds, the burden of evidence then

shifts to the respondent, in this instance petitioner

Aguilar, to show that the financial resources used to

acquire the undeclared assets and her expenditures came

from lawful income. To be sure, petitioner Aguilar has

failed to discharge this burden, as the CA, and the OMB

before it, have determined. The explanation she offered

when confronted with her undeclared acquisitions and

travel splurge is too flimsy compared to her own

admissions as to her beneficial ownership over the

properties. Her SALNs during the years in question clearly

indicated she was a pure compensation income earner.

With an annual salary of PhP 249,876, it is

incomprehensible how she could have acquired her

undeclared assets on top of paying for her annual travels

and living expenses. The discrepancy in the total valuation

of her declared and undeclared assets is also too glaring

for petitioner Aguilar’s omission to be written off as mere

negligence or carelessness. As a result, no error can be

attributed to the CA and the Ombudsman adjudging her

guilty of dishonesty. 

Petitioner Aguilar’s acquittal in Crim. Case No. 08–263022

of the Manila RTC on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence would not carry the day for her. The dismissal of

the criminal aspect of the complaint filed against Aguilar

has hardly any bearing on the administrative case mainly

because the quantum of evidence required to support a

finding of guilt in a criminal case is proof beyond

reasonable doubt. Administrative cases are, as a rule,

separate and independent from criminal suits and are

governed by differing evidentiary criteria. The acquittal of

an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative

case does not conclude the administrative proceedings,

nor carry with it relief from administrative liability. This is

because unlike in criminal cases where the threshold

quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable

doubt, only substantial evidence is necessary in

administrative cases.61

b. Evidence against petitioner Hernandez

Unlike in the case of his co–petitioner, this Court is unable

to make out a case of dishonesty, let alone grave

misconduct against petitioner Hernandez. To be sure, the

OMB investigating panel, in the Decision dated June 3,

2004, recommended petitioner Hernandez’s exoneration.

However, in a bizarre twist, the Ombudsman, in

its Supplement dated January 18, 2005, disapproved the

panel’s own assessment of the sufficiency of evidence as

regards petitioner Hernandez and ruled that, while the

Isuzu Trooper with Plate No. HRH–659 was registered

under his name, it is actually owned by Aguilar.

Accordingly, the Ombudsman decreed Hernandez’s

dismissal for supposedly consenting to act as Aguilar’s

dummy. The Ombudsman, in net effect, used petitioner

Hernandez’s own admission of vehicle ownership against

him and ruled that he could not afford to acquire the car

on his salary of PhP 14,098 a month. 

In ruling for petitioner Hernandez, we do so taking stock

of the pronouncement in the first–issued Decision of the

Ombudsman. There was indeed no specific allegation in

the complaint against him other than his owning an Isuzu

Trooper vehicle, which he declared in his SALN. But mere

ownership is not an actionable administrative offense. The

PNP–CIDG also did not present any additional evidence as

against petitioner Hernandez. We are, thus, at a loss to

understand how the Ombudsman, after saying in not so

many words that Hernandez was not guilty, would

completely reverse itself in the Supplement. Having

already disposed of the issue as regards petitioner

Hernandez in the Decision, it was then quite improper for

the Ombudsman to reverse its findings six months after,

albeit no evidence had been adduced in the interim to

support the new finding. 

While the Ombudsman’s reasoning––as adopted by the

CA, regarding petitioner Hernandez’s purchasing

capability, or lack of it––may be plausible at first blush,

the latter was able to justify his ownership of the Isuzu

Trooper. Evidence on record would show that aside from

his employment, he and his wife have other sources of

income. As he alleged in his pleadings, his wife, Ruth, is a

practicing physician who, besides maintaining a clinic in

both the Seamen’s Hospital in Manila and at the Medical

Center Muntinlupa, engages in OB–GYN consultancy. And

as seen in his SALN for 2002, the couple run Sarah

Katrina’s Drugstore in Las Piñas City and even own shares

of stocks in Medical Center Muntinlupa. A car loan worth

PhP 1,600,000 was also reported in his 2002 SALN.62 In

fine, there is valid reason to conclude that the Hernandez

couple, with their combined income, could very well afford

a medium–priced motor van. 

Given these circumstances, the innocence claim of

petitioner Hernandez becomes all the more credible and

the justifications offered sufficient to absolve him of

administrative liability. It should be understood that the

laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition of unexplained

wealth. Where the source of the undisclosed wealth can

be properly accounted for, as in the case of petitioner

Hernandez, then it is “explained wealth” which the law

does not penalize.63

Under OMB AO 17, if the respondent, meted by OMB the

penalty of suspension or removal, is exonerated on

appeal, he shall be considered as having been under

preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and

such other emoluments that he failed to receive by reason

of that suspension or removal. So it must be in the case of

petitioner Hernandez. 

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The appealed July 22, 2009 Decision and June 13, 2011

Resolution in CA–G.R. SP No.88954 are MODIFIED. The

charge for Grave Misconduct against Flor Gupilan–Aguilar

is DISMISSED, while the appellate court’s finding of her

liability for Dishonesty and the corresponding penalty

imposed are AFFIRMED. 

The CA Decision, however, insofar as it finds Honore

Hernandez guilty of the offenses charged against him, is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint

against him for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty is

accordingly DISMISSED. He is accordingly

ordered REINSTATED immediately to his former or

equivalent position in the Bureau of Customs without loss

or diminution in his salaries and benefits. In addition, he

shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments

corresponding to the period he was out of the service by

reason of the judgment of dismissal decreed by the Office

of the Ombudsman, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 

SO ORDERED. 

Peralta, Bersamin,*Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur. 

Endnotes:

*
 Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1640
dated February 19, 2014. 
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Marlene B. Gonzales–Sison
and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L.
Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Isaias P.
Dicdican.

2
 Valuation based on acquisition cost. 

3
 CA rollo, p. 187. 

4
 Id. at 188. 

5
 Id. at 189. 

6
 Id. at 190. chanrobleslaw

7
 Valuation based on acquisition cost. 

8
 Rollo, pp. 39–40.

9
 An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any
Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Proceedings Therefor.

10
 Anti–Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

11
 Code of Ethical Standard for Public Officials and
Employees.

12
Rollo, pp. 237–241, signed also by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Gervacio, Jr.

13
 Id. at 197–204.

14
 Id. at 205–207.

15
 Ombudsman records, pp. 239–241. 

16
Rollo, pp. 127–144. 

17
 Id. at 142. 

18
 Id. at 145–170. 

19
 Id. at 171–182. 
20
 Id. at 183–194. 

21
 Id. at 209–212.

22
 Id. at 56. 

23
Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction
shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless
there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter
of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy

against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except
the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. 

24
Pleyto v. PNP–CIDG, G.R. No. 169982, November 23, 2007,
538 SCRA 534. 

25
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided
in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence. 

26
 G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 470,
493. 

27
 Id. at 490. 

28
 G.R. No. 142888, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 575, 579–
560. 

29
 G.R. No. 149022, April 8, 2003, 401 SCRA 27, 32–33. 

30
 G.R. No. 154952, July 16, 2012, 676 SCRA 420. 

31
 CA rollo, p. 96. 

32
 G.R. No. 129124, March 15, 2002, 379 SCRA 322. 

33
 G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 92. 

34
 G.R. No. 175573, September 11, 2008, 564 SCRA 567. 
35
 G.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 437. 

36
 Supra note 32. 

37
 G.R. No. 154083, February 27, 2013. 

38
 G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738. 

39
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
159395, May 7, 2008, 554 SCRA 75. 

40
 G.R. No. 177244, November 20, 2007, 537 SCRA 721,
730–731. 

41
 A.M. No. 439–MJ, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 107,
108–109. 

42
Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC–Regional Office
No. 11, G.R. No. 167916, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 293,
307. 

43
Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, A.M. No. OCA–01–
5, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA 1, 11–12. 

44
 Art. XI, Section 17. A public officer or employee
shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter
as may be required by law, submit a declaration under
oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the
case of the President, the Vice–President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or
flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law. 

45
Ombudsman v. Racho, G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011,
641 SCRA 148, 159. 

46
Ombudsman v. Valeroso, G.R. No. 167828, April 2, 2007,
520 SCRA 140. 

47
Pleyto v. PNP–CIDG, G.R. No. 169982, November 23, 2007,
538 SCRA 534. 

48
Ombudsman v. Racho, supra note 45, at 163. 
49
Cirtek Employees Labor Union–Federation of Free Workers
v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515, June 6,
2011, 650 SCRA 656, 660. 

50
 CA rollo, p. 568. 

51
 Id. at 154–156, 158, 160, 162. 

52
 Id. at 547–551. 

53
 RA 6713, Sec. 7(d). 

54
 RA 3019, Sec. 3(b). 

55
 Supra note 45. 

56
 CA rollo, p. 132. 

57
 Id. at 111–112. 

58
Office of the Ombudsman v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 181598,
March 6, 2013. 

59
 Picardal v. Lladas, No. L–21309, December 29, 1967,
21 SCRA 1483. 

60
 An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any
Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Proceedings Therefor. 

61
Barillo v. Gervacio, G.R. No. 155088, August 31, 2006,
500 SCRA 561, 572. 

62
 CA rollo, p. 272. 

63
 See Ombudsman v. Racho, supra note 45.