A.

FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE On June 10, 1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution [3] denying the motion to
quash for obvious lack of merit.
ANTONIO C. MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and On July 26, 1996, petitioner was arraigned before the Sandiganbayan, and he
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. entered a plea of not guilty.
DECISION On September 26, 1996, petitioner filed the present recourse.
PARDO, J.: On October 21, 1996, the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on
The petition before the Court for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul the petition, not to file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, and to deny
respondent Sandiganbayans resolution denying petitioners motion to quash the the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order.
informations filed against him for malversation. Petitioner likewise prayed for temporary On January 30, 1997, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Special
restraining order to restrain the Sandiganbayan from further hearing the cases. Prosecutor, filed its comment. On March 19, 1997, the Court resolved to require
We deny the petition. petitioner to file a reply to the comment of the Special Prosecutor. On June 19, 1997,
The facts are as follows: petitioner filed his reply in which he reiterated that the prosecution had not established a
From December, 1986 to January 1988, petitioner was the Officer-in-Charge and prima facie case and consequently, respondent Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse
Acting City Mayor of Caloocan City. As such, he received cash advances from the city of discretion in not quashing the informations.
government which were earmarked for specific projects. Specifically, petitioner received On August 27, 1997, the Court required respondents to file a rejoinder, which the
on or about December 24, 1986, cash advance of P100,000.00, under Disbursement respondent People of the Philippines filed on October 16, 1997.
Voucher No. 32734; on or about January 27, 1987, cash advance of P145,000.00, under As stated at the outset, we deny the petition.
Disbursement Voucher No. 201; on or about January 29, 1987, cash advance of The issue is whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
P300,000.00, under Disbursement Voucher No. 223; and on or about July 23, 1987, cash denying petitioners motion to quash the informations filed against him on the ground that
advance of P200,000.00, under Disbursement Voucher No. 1877. the informations do not charge an offense and that there was no prima facie case.
For failing to liquidate the cash advances despite demands by the City Treasurer,
on June 1, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Francisco L. Ilustre, Jr., filed with the It is an admitted fact that as acting mayor of Caloocan City in 1986 to 1988,
Sandiganbayan four (4) separate informations [1] for malversation of public funds against petitioner received cash advances from the city government in the amounts of
petitioner. The informations were similarly worded except for the dates, voucher P100,000.00, P145,000.00, P300,000.00, and P200,000.00, respectively, for specific
number, amount involved and specific projects. The information in Criminal Case No. projects, and that the City Treasurer subsequently made demands on him to submit a
22791 reads as follows: liquidation of the cash advances. Petitioner failed to do so, and hence, there is a prima
That on or about December 24, 1986, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in Caloocan facie presumption under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that he had malversed
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Antonio the funds to his personal use and benefit.[4]
Martinez, a public officer being then the OIC-Acting Mayor of Caloocan City, who Consequently, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioners motion to quash
having received cash advance under Disbursement Voucher No. 3273 in the amount of the informations. From such denial, the appropriate remedy is not an appeal [5] or review
P100,000.00 from the city government of Caloocan to defray expenses in connection on certiorari brought to a higher court. The remedy is for petitioner to go to trial on the
with special activities entailing civic and political organizations and as such making him merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
an accountable officer, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, authorized by law.[6]
misappropriate and convert for his personal use and benefits the aforesaid amount of Furthermore, the petition may also be dismissed because petitioner had been
P100,000.00, and despite demand made by Norberto E. Azarcon, OIC, Office of the arraigned on July 26, 1996, after the court denied his motion to quash. There is no
Treasurer, directing him to settle and/or liquidate the same, thereby causing damage and showing that he objected to entering a plea because he wanted to question the denial of
prejudice to the Philippine Government in the aforementioned amount. the motion to quash before a superior court. By entering his plea, petitioner waived all
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2] objections which are grounds of a motion to quash. [7] The exceptions thereto have no
On March 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash application.
the informations alleging that the facts charged do not constitute an offense under Article WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition, for lack of merit.
217, Revised Penal Code and that there was no prima facie evidence against him. SO ORDERED.
On April 18, 1996, the Ombudsman filed an opposition to the motion to quash Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
maintaining that the law presumed that failure on the part of a public officer to liquidate
the cash advance he received after demand therefor by a duly authorized officer
constitutes malversation of public fund and hence, there existed probable cause for the
filing of the informations.
On May 27, 1996, petitioner filed a reply to the opposition trying to refute the
arguments of the Ombudsman.
 Generals allegations in its Motion for Consolidation filed in Branch 58-Pasig that the
B. THAT THE COURT TRYING THE CASE HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER three cases form part of a series of transactions which are subject of the cases pending
THE OFFENSE CHARGED: before Branch 26-Manila, all these cases constitute one continuous crime. Respondent
judge further stated that to separately prosecute private respondent for a series of
THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES represented by the PANEL OF transaction would endow it with the functional ability of a worm multiplication or
PROSECUTORS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID G. amoeba reproduction.[12] Thus, accused would be unduly vexed with multiple jeopardy.
NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and In the two orders, respondent judge likewise said that the dismissal of the three
IMELDA R. MARCOS, respondents. seemingly unmeritorious and duplicitous cases would help unclogged his docket in favor
DECISION of more serious suits.[13] The prosecution complied with the twin show cause orders
MARTINEZ, J.: accompanied by a motion to inhibit respondent judge.
On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of On August 6, 1992, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for
Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, [1] in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act consolidation (embodied in the prosecutions compliance with the show cause orders) of
No. 265[2] were filed against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos before Branch 158 of the three informations with those pending before Branch 26-Manila on the ground that
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig (herein Branch 158-Pasig). Said Informations consolidation of cases under Rule 31 of civil procedure has no counterpart in criminal
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and 90386-92 were amended prior procedure, and blamed the panel of prosecutors as apparently not conversant with the
to arraignment.[3] procedure in the assignment of cases. As additional justification, respondent judge stated
After arraignment, where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the People thru that since he is more studious and discreet, if not more systematic and methodical, than
herein petitioner, Panel of Prosecutors from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the the prosecution in the handling of cases, it would be unfair to just pull out the case when
Solicitor General filed separate motions for consolidation of the three (3) Informations he had already studied it.[14]
pending before Branch 158-Pasig with the 21 other cases pending before RTC Branch The next day, August 7, 1992, respondent judge issued an 8-page order
26-Manila (herein Branch 26-Manila). [4] The Solicitor General alleged in its motion that dismissing criminal case no. 92-107942 on the ground that the subject CB Circular is an
the indictable acts under the three informations form part of and is related to the ex post facto law.[15] In a separate 17-page order dated August 10, 1992, respondent judge
transaction complained of in criminal cases 91-101732, 91-101734 and 91-101735 also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases (92-107943 & 92-107944) ruling that
pending before Branch 26-Manila[5] and that these two groups of cases (the Pasig and the prosecution of private respondent was part of a sustained political vendetta by some
Manila cases) relate to a series of transactions devised by then President Ferdinand people in the government aside from what he considered as a violation of private
Marcos and private respondent to hide their ill-gotten wealth. [6] The RTC of Pasig respondents right against double jeopardy. [16] From his disquisition regarding continuing,
granted the motion for consolidation provided there is no objection from the presiding continuous and continued offenses and his discussion of mala prohibita, respondent
judge of Branch 26-Manila.[7] Before the Manila RTC, the three (3) informations were re- judge further ratiocinated his dismissal order in that the pendency of the other cases
raffled and re-assigned instead to Branch 52-Manila presided by public respondent Judge before Branch 26-Manila had placed private respondent in double jeopardy because of
Nitafan wherein the three informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and the three cases before his sala.
90386-92) were re-numbered as Criminal Case Nos. 92-107942; 92-107943 and 92- The prosecution filed two separate motions for reconsideration which respondent
107944. judge denied in a single order dated September 7, 1992 containing 19 pages wherein he
Then, without private respondent yet taking any action or filing any motion to made a preliminary observation that:
quash the informations, respondent judge issued an order dated July 20, 1992 requiring (T)he very civil manner in which the motions were framed, which is consistent with the
petitioners to show cause why criminal case number 92-107942 should not be dismissed high ideals and standards of pleadings envisioned in the rules, and for which the panel
on the ground that it violates private respondents right against ex post facto law.[8] In that should be commended. This only shows that the Members of the panel had not yielded to
order, respondent judge said that a check with official publications reveals that CB the derisive, panicky and intimidating reaction manifested by their Department Head
Circular 960 is dated 21 October 1983 (x x x) and that said regulatory issuance was when, after learning the promulgation of the orders dismissing some of Imelda
imperfectly published* in the January 30, 1984 issue of the Official Gazette. [9] Romualdez-Marcos cases, Secretary Drilon went to the media and repeatedly aired
Respondent judge concluded that since the date of violation alleged in the information diatribes and even veiled threats against the trial judges concerned.
was prior to the date and complete publication of the Circular charged to have been By the constitutional mandate that A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven
violated, the information in this case appears peremptorily dismissible, for to apply the competence, integrity, probity, and independence (Sec 7[3], Art. VIII, judges are
Circular to acts performed prior to its date and publication would make it an ex post precluded from being dragged into running debates with parties-litigants or their counsel
facto law, which is a violation of the Constitution.[10] and representatives in media, yet by reason of the same provision judges are mandated to
On the same day, respondent judge issued another order requiring the decide cases in accordance with their own independent appreciation of the facts and
prosecution to show cause why the two other criminal informations (92-107943 and 92- interpretation of the law. Any judge who yields to extraneous influences, such as
107944) should not be dismissed on the ground that private respondents right to double denigrating criticisms or threats, and allows his independence to be undermined thereby,
jeopardy was violated.[11] It is respondent judges posture that based on the Solicitor-
leading to violation of his oath of office, has no right to continue in his office any minute of respondent judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be expected from respondent judge
longer. to overturn the reasons he relied upon in his different orders without contradicting
The published reaction of the Hon. Secretary is to be deplored, but it is hoped that he had himself. To allow a judge to initiate such motion even under the guise of a show cause
merely lapsed into impudence instead of having intended to set a pattern of mocking and order would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to be neutral, in
denigrating the courts. He must have forgotten that as Secretary of Justice, his actuations effect, acts as counsel for the accused and judge as well. A combination of these two
reflect the rule of law orientation of the administration of the President whom he personalities in one person is violative of due process which is a fundamental right not
represents as the latters alter ego.[17] (emphasis supplied). only of the accused but also of the prosecution.
The dispositive portion of the order denying the motions for reconsideration That the initial act to quash an information lodged with the accused is further
provides: supported by Sections 2, 3 and 8 of Rule 117 which states that:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds no valid reason to Section 2. The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel.
reconsider the dismissals heretofore decreed, and the motions for reconsideration are It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and the Court shall
consequently denied for manifest lack of merit. [18] consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the
Obviously dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case via petition for certiorari, offense charged.
where the primary issue raised is whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on
and subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion to any of the following grounds:
that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latters right a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
against ex post facto law and double jeopardy. b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the
Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: person of the accused;
Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
quash the complaint or information. (emphasis supplied). d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
It is clear from the above rule that the accused may file a motion to quash an information e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws
at any time before entering a plea or before arraignment. Thereafter, no motion to quash prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
can be entertained by the court except under the circumstances mentioned in Section 8 of f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
Rule 117 which adopts the omnibus motion rule. In the case at at bench, private g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
respondent pleaded to the charges without filing any motion to quash. As such, she is justification; and
deemed to have waived and abandoned her right to avail of any legal ground which she h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or
may have properly and timely invoke to challenge the complaint or information pursuant acquitted of the offense charged.
to Section 8 of Rule 117 which provides: Section 8. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore. The failure of the accused to pleads (Emphasis supplied).
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, Section 2 requires that the motion must be signed by accused or his counsel;
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in his motion, Section 3 states that the accused may file a motion, and; Section 8 refers to the
shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no consequence if the accused do not file such motion. Neither the court nor the judge was
offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense mentioned. Section 2 further, ordains that the court is proscribed from considering any
or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of section 3 of ground other than those stated in the motion which should be specify(ied) distinctly
this Rule. (emphasis supplied) therein. Thus, the filing of a motion to quash is a right that belongs to the accused who
It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the may waived it by inaction and not an authority for the court to assume.
accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu It is therefore clear that the only grounds which the court may consider in
proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion resolving a motion to quash an information or complaint are (1) those grounds stated in
contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the the motion and (2) the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, whether or
best position to know on what ground/s he will based his objection to the information. not mentioned in the motion. Other than that, grounds which have not been sharply
Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the pleaded in the motion cannot be taken cognizance of by the court, even if at the time of
case of the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right filing thereof, it may be properly invoked by the defendant. Such proscription on
to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. Such independence and considerations of other grounds than those specially pleaded in the motion to quash is
impartiality cannot be expected from a magistrate, such as herein respondent judge, who premised on the rationale that the right to these defenses are waivable on the part of the
in his show cause orders, orders dismissing the charges and order denying the motions accused, and that by claiming to wave said right, he is deemed to have desired these
for reconsideration stated and even expounded in a lengthy disquisition with citation of matters to be litigated upon in a full-blown trial. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole exception
authorities, the grounds and justifications to support his action. Certainly, in compliance is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged which goes into the competence of the
with the orders, the prosecution has no choice but to present arguments contradicting that court to hear and pass judgment on the cause.
 With these, the rule clearly implies the requirement of filing a motion by the private respondent under the three informations pending Branch 56-Manila would violate
accused even if the ground asserted is premised on lack of jurisdiction over the offense the formers right against double jeopardy.
charged. Besides, lack of jurisdiction should be evident from the face of the information WHEREFORE, Premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and the two orders
or complaint to warrant a dismissal thereof. Happily, no jurisdictional challenge is dated January 20, 1990, as well as the orders dated August 7, 1992, August 10, 1992 and
involved in this case. September 7, 1992 all issued by respondent judge are hereby REVERSED AND SET
Assuming arguendo that a judge has the power to motu proprio dismiss a ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
criminal charge, yet contrary to the findings of respondent judge, the grounds of ex post SO ORDERED.
facto law and double jeopardy herein invoked by him are not applicable.
On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every law carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court. [19] To rule that the
CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither
private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the
lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it
void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action.
With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the
same is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy
connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and
(c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first [20] or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. [21] In this case, it is
manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy terminated.
Section 7, Rule 117 provides:
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessary included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
x x x x x x x x x.[22]
Under said Section, the first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2)
before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. [23]
Other than the Solicitor-Generals allegation of pending suits in Branch 26-
Manila, respondent judge has no other basis on whether private respondent had already
been arraigned, much less entered a plea in those cases pending before the said Branch.
Even assuming that there was already arraignment and plea with respect to those cases in
Branch 26-Manila which respondent judge used as basis to quash the three informations
pending in his sala, still the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Precisely, those Branch
26-Manila cases are still pending and there was as yet no judgment on the merits at the
time respondent judge quashed the three informations in his sala. Private respondent was
not convicted, acquitted nor the cases against her in Branch 26-Manila dismissed or
otherwise terminated which definitely shows the absence of the fifth requisite for the first
jeopardy to attached. Accordingly, it was wrong to say that the further prosecution of C. THAT THE COURT TRYING THE CASE HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED
 That on or about May 9, 1997 and on dates prior thereto, in the City of Manila,
SECOND DIVISION Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named
[G.R. No. 143193. June 29, 2005] accused ALLANDALE SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of Allandale
MELBAROSE R. SASOT AND ALLANDALE R. SASOT, petitioners, vs. Sportslines, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE COURT OF manufacture and sell various garment products bearing the appearance of NBA
OF APPEALS, and REBECCA G. SALVADOR, Presiding Judge, names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to believe that the goods
RTC, Branch 1, Manila, respondents. offered by them are those of NBA to the damage and prejudice of the NBA
DECISION Properties, Inc., the trademark owner of the NBA.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
The case subject of the present special civil action for certiorari is a criminal Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
prosecution against petitioners for unfair competition under Article 189 of the following grounds:
Revised Penal Code, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
(Branch 1), and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-166147.[1] II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
Some time in May 1997, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an OFFENSE CHARGED OR THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED[8]
investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties, Inc., against In support of the foregoing, petitioners argue that the fiscal should have
petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on dismissed Weltss complaint because under the rules, the complaint must be
unfair competition. In its Report dated June 4, 1997, the NBI stated that NBA sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a fax
Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the United transmittal.[9] They also contend that complainant is a foreign corporation not
States of America, and is the registered owner of NBA trademarks and names of doing business in the Philippines, and cannot be protected by Philippine patent
NBA basketball teams such as USA BASKETBALL, CHICAGO BULLS, laws since it is not a registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they have been
ORLANDO MAGIC, LOS ANGELES LAKERS, ROCKETS, PHOENIX SUNS, using the business name ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC. since 1972, and
BULLETS, PACERS, CHARLOTTE HORNETS, BLAZERS, DENVER their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to complainants, and
NUGGETS, SACRAMENTO KINGS, MIAMI HEAT, UTAH JAZZ, DETROIT they do not use complainants logo or design.[10]
PISTONS, MILWAUKEE BUCKS, SEATTLE SONICS, TORONTO RAPTORS, The trial prosecutor of the RTC-Manila (Branch 1), Jaime M. Guray, filed his
ATLANTA HAWKS, CAVS, DALLAS MAVERICKS, MINNESOTA Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash, stating that he has the original
TIMBERWOLVES, and LOS ANGELES CLIPPERS. These names are used on copy of the complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to represent
hosiery, footwear, t-shirts, sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport shirts, and it. Prosecutor Guray also contended that the State is entitled to prosecute the
other garment products, which are allegedly registered with the Bureau of offense even without the participation of the private offended party, as the crime
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer. The Report further stated that charged is a public crime.[11]
during the investigation, it was discovered that petitioners are engaged in the The trial court sustained the prosecutions arguments and denied petitioners
manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit NBA garment motion to quash in its Order dated March 5, 1999.[12]
products. Hence, it recommended petitioners prosecution for unfair competition Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA)
under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.[2] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52151 which was dismissed per its Decision dated
In a Special Power of Attorney dated October 7, 1997, Rick Welts, as President January 26, 2000.[13] According to the CA, the petition is not the proper remedy in
of NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, assailing a denial of a motion to quash, and that the grounds raised therein
Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the companys attorney-in-fact, and to act for and should be raised during the trial of the case on the merits. [14] The dispositive
on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and administrative portion of the assailed Decision reads:
complaints, among others.[3] The Special Power of Attorney was notarized by WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby
Nicole Brown of New York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County DISMISSED. Respondent court is hereby ordered to conduct further proceedings
Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Consul Cecilia with dispatch in Criminal Case No. 98-166147.
B. Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines, New York, authenticated SO ORDERED.[15]
the certification.[4] Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit on February 12, Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision but this was denied by the CA.
1998, before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown of the State of New York.[5] [16]

Thereafter, in a Resolution dated July 15, 1998, Prosecution Attorney Aileen Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Marie S. Gutierrez recommended the filing of an Information against petitioners Court, with issues raised as follows:
for violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. [6] The accusatory portion 1. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED AND LICENSE
of the Information reads: (sic) TO DO BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION.
2. WHETHER AN OFFICER OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION MAY ACT IN Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in
BEHALF OF A CORPORATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM ITS BOARD OF force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the
DIRECTORS. grounds for quashing an information, to wit:
3. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
AND WHOSE EMBLEM IT SOUGHT TO PROTECT IS NOT IN ACTUAL USE IS b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or
ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW. the person of the accused;
4. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND THE PERSONS OF THE d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
ACCUSED. e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing
5. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
DISMISSED THE PETITION.[17] g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
Petitioners reiterate the argument that the complaint filed by Rick Welts of the justification; and
NBA Properties, Inc., is defective and should have been dismissed by the fiscal h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being
because it should have been personally sworn to by the complainant before the convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
investigating prosecutor. They also reiterate the claim that Welts failed to show Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the
any board resolution showing his authority to institute any action in behalf of the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainants capacity to sue as grounds
company, and that the NBAs trademarks are not being actually used in the for a motion to quash.
Philippines, hence, they are of public dominion and cannot be protected by For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Philippine patent laws. Petitioners further contend that they have not committed a complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the
acts amounting to unfair competition.[18] respondent, it is accompanied by complainants affidavit and his witnesses and
The Office of the Solicitor General appeared in behalf of the People, and filed its supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state
Amended Comment to the petition, praying for its dismissal, arguing that the CA prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally
reasons stated in its Decision dated January 26, 2000.[19] examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
The petition must be denied. understood their affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint
The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that
proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. [20] The even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it
proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial invalid.[24] Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the
without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.[25]
his motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is In this case, Weltss Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. [21] Thus, Public Nicole Brown of the State of New York that the same has been
petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with subscribed and sworn to before her on February 12, 1998, [26] duly authenticated
the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterate the special by the Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the complaint-affidavit
defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez stated
circumstances[22] in the present case such that immediate resort to a filing of a that complainants representative will present the authenticated notarized original
petition for certiorari should be permitted. Clearly, the CA did not commit any in court,[27] and Prosecutor Guray manifested that the original copy is already on
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition. hand.[28] It is apt to state at this point that the prosecutor enjoys the legal
Moreover, the Court does not find any justification for the quashal of the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions, which in
Information filed against petitioners. turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy.[29]
For one, while petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from which
facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the trial court has no the prosecutor based his recommendation, to wit:
jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused, [23] their (1) The NBI Report dated June 4, 1997, containing an account of the
arguments focused on an alleged defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal, investigation conducted from April 30, 1997 to May 9, 1997, and the subsequent
complainants capacity to sue and petitioners exculpatory defenses against the search and seizure of several items from petitioners establishment;[30]
crime of unfair competition. (2) The letter dated May 8, 1997 from the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo,
Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell to the NBI, seeking assistance in stopping
the illegal manufacture, distribution and sale of fake products bearing the NBA WHERFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Let the records of
trademark, and in prosecuting the proprietors of aforesaid factory;[31] and this case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 24)
(3) The Joint Affidavit executed by Rechie D. Malicse and Dalisay P. Bal-ot of where Criminal Case No. 98-166147 is presently assigned, for further
the Pinkerton Consulting Services (Phils.) Inc., which was certified to by proceedings with reasonable dispatch.
Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez, attesting to their findings that petitioners were SO ORDERED.
found to be manufacturing, printing, selling, and distributing counterfeit NBA Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
garment products.[32]
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of
manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public
prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such
determination.[33]
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189
of the Revised Penal Code[34] is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the
State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured party. The
complainants capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,[35] a case akin to the present
dispute, as it involved the crime of Unfair Competition under Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the quashal of search warrants issued against
manufacturers of garments bearing the same trademark as that of the petitioner,
the Court succinctly ruled that:
More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What
preceded this petition for certiorari was a letter-complaint filed before the NBI
charging Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code. If prosecution follows after the completion of the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the
information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no
longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal
offense is essentially an act against the State. It is the latter which is
principally the injured party although there is a private right violated.
Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much
significance in the main case. We cannot allow a possible violator of our
criminal statutes to escape prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the D. THAT THE OFFICER WHO FILED THE INFORMATION HAD NO
aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue. AUTHORITY TO DO SO:
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our
courts for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign
corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ZEIDA AURORA B.
states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 19, of the City
which the Philippines and France are parties. We are simply interpreting and of Naga and SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, respondents.
enforcing a solemn international commitment of the Philippines embodied in a DECISION
multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which we entered into because it PUNO, J:
is in our national interest to do so.[36] (Emphasis supplied) For determination in this petition is a question in procedural law - - - whether an
Lastly, with regard to petitioners arguments that the NBA Properties, Inc., is not information filed by a state prosecutor without the prior written authority or
entitled to protection under Philippine patent laws since it is not a registered approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor should be
patentee, that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair competition for dismissed after the accused has entered his plea under the information.
the reason that their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to Petitioner comes before us with a petition for certiorari and mandamus under
complainants, and they do not use complainants logo or design, the Court finds Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to declare as null and void the
that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated and resolved during Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 dated
trial on the merits of the case. February 26, 2002[1] and April 3, 2002[2] which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
the case of People vs. Serafin Saballegue, Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597, on December 21, 2001. A rejoinder to the reply[11] was filed by the accused on
and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. January 21, 2002.
The antecedent facts are undisputed. After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of Section dismiss in its first questioned Order dated February 26, 2002, to wit:
22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court
known as the Social Security Act, in an information which reads: believes and so resolves that the Information has not been filed in accordance
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, thus:
Prosecutor, Legazpi City, accuses SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, as proprietor of Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x
Saballegue Printing Press with business address at 16 San Mateo St., No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
Peafrancia Ave., Naga City for Violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
1997, committed as follows: Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it has
Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the not been approved by the City Prosecutor.
territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, while This Court holds that the defendants plea to the Information is not a waiver to file
being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did then and there willfully, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express
unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions of want of
the premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the amount of SIX jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings (People vs. Eduarte,
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (P6,533.00), Philippine 182 SCRA 750).
Currency, representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from January 1990 The Supreme Court in Villa vs. Ibaez (88 Phil 402) dwelt on lack of authority of
to December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the the officer who filed the information and on jurisdiction at the same time,
amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and pertinent portions run as follows:
28/100 (P11,143.28) computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to quash,
letter in violation of the above-cited provisions of the law, to the damage and and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the information.
prejudice of the SSS and the public in general. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are
CONTRARY TO LAW. concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of section 10 of
Legazpi City for Naga City. 22 June 2001. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions,
(sgd.) ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
State Prosecutor Now, the objection to the respondents actuations goes to the very foundations of
Special Prosecutor on SSS Cases jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among
in Region V[3] other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
The information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an
Tolentino which states: infirmity of the nature noted in the information cannot be cured by silence,
I hereby certify that the required investigation in this case has been conducted acquiescence, or even by express consent.
by the undersigned Special Prosecutor in accordance with law and under oath Prosecutor Tolentino also contends that having been duly designated to assist
as officer of the court, that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense the City Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of all SSS cases by the
has been committed, that the accused is probably guilty thereof and that the Regional State prosecutor as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V,
filing of the information is with the prior authority and approval of the Regional then that authority may be given to other than the City Prosecutor. The Court
State Prosecutor.[4] finds this contention to be devoid of merit. The Regional State Prosecutor is not
The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City the alter ego of the Secretary of Justice but a mere subordinate official and if
presided by respondent judge Hon. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin. On September 24, ever the former files cases, it is by virtue of a delegated authority by the
2001, accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case Secretary of Justice. Potestas delegada non potesta delegare (sic) what has
was set for pre-trial.[5] Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to been delegated cannot be redelegated.
dismiss[6] on the ground that the information was filed without the prior written In his opposition, the state prosecutor also attached a memorandum dated June
authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 22, 2001 by Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan addressed to
112 of the Revised Rules of Court.[7] Provincial Prosecutor and City Prosecutors of Region V directing them to inhibit
The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an opposition, [8] against and to append the following NOTATION after the certification in the Information
which the accused filed a rejoinder. [9] The People filed a reply to the rejoinder [10] for filing.
NOTATION: The herein City/Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting from this case INFORMATION BY RULING ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE FILING OFFICER
and the Special Prosecution Team on SSS Cases in Region V is authorized to TO FILE THE INFORMATION.
dispose of the case without my approval in view of the request for inhibition of The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment [19] in compliance with
the SSS Regional Manager as granted by the Regional State Prosecutor. this Courts Resolution dated September 23, 2002. [20] It opines that the dismissal
A perusal of the Information, however, would readily show that nowhere in the of the information is mandated under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Information has the City Prosecutor of Naga City appended the above-quoted Criminal Procedure.
notation/inhibition. At most, the authority of the special prosecutor is only for the Private respondent contends that:[21] 1) the instant petition was filed out of time;
conduct of preliminary investigations and the prosecution of cases after they are 2) the special State Prosecutor is only authorized to conduct preliminary
filed. The Court, however, believes that the filing of this Information must be in investigation and prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign the information; and
conformity with the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 4 of Rule 3) the City Prosecutor did not expressly inhibit himself from handling SSS cases
112. nor signing the information.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and for lack of jurisdiction, the Court We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent contends that the
hereby resolves to DISMISS this case without pronouncement as to cost. motion for reconsideration filed on April 1, 2002 is late because it was filed
SO ORDERED.[12] eighteen days after March 14, 2002, the date when petitioner received the first
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People contending that as a special questioned order. Respondent has overlooked that the 15th day after March 14 is
prosecutor designated by the regional state prosecutor to handle SSS cases a Good Friday. Hence, petitioners last day to file the motion for reconsideration
within Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is authorized to file the information was on the next working day after Good Friday, April 1.[22]
involving violations of the SSS law without need of prior approval from the city Next, respondent argues that having been considered as a mere scrap of paper,
prosecutor. [13] Letters of commendation from Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner did not toll the running of the
Zuo[14] and Secretary Hernando Perez[15] were offered as proof to show that reglementary period. Respondent, however, erroneously assumes that the
State Prosecutor Tolentinos authority to file the information was recognized. In present case is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. As stated at the outset,
response, the defense pointed out in its opposition that the motion for this is an original petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65.
reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing, hence it is pro forma or a mere scrap Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is clear. It provides that (a) pro forma
of paper. [16] motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of
On April 3, 2002, respondent judge issued the second questioned Order which appeal. (emphases supplied) Hence, the same provision has no application in
reads: the case at bar.
Acting upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. The reckoning date is the receipt of the second questioned Order and not the
Tolentino, Special Prosecutor on SSS cases in Region V, and it appearing that receipt of the first. Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by En Banc Resolution A.M.
the same has failed to comply with the requirement of notice prescribed in No. 00-2-03-SC, September 1, 2000, provides, viz:
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the same is hereby DENIED for Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.-- The petition may be filed not later than
being a mere scrap of paper. sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
SO ORDERED.[17] for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
Hence, this petition by the People through Regional State Prosecutor Santiago not, the sixty (60)- day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
Turingan and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Petitioner attributes grave motion.
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of xxxxxxxxx
respondent judge, viz:[18] As shown by the records, petitioner received the first questioned order dated
1. RESPONDENT JUDGE DISMISSED THE INFORMATION WITHOUT THE February 26, 2002 on March 14, 2002.[23] A motion for reconsideration was
REQUIRED SUPPORTING FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES; timely filed on April 1, 2002[24] which was dismissed for lack of notice of hearing
2. RESPONDENT JUDGE DELIBERATELY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED in an Order dated April 3, 2002. [25] This second questioned order was received
THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION by petitioner on April 11, 2002. [26] A motion for extension of time to file a petition
WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUFFICIENCY OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE. THE for review on certiorari was filed on April 18, 2002.[27] A motion for leave to file
WORD MAY IN SEC. 4, RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT and admit the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed on May 29,
MANDATORY; 2002.[28] Having been filed within the reglementary period, petitioners motion for
3. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DELIBERATELY leave to file the instant petition was granted in this Courts Resolution dated July
IGNORING THE JUDICIALLY KNOWN INHIBITION OF THE CITY 15, 2002.[29]
PROSECUTOR AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER; We now come to the other issue: whether the prior written authority and approval
4. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is necessary in filing
INTERFERING WITH THE PURELY EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF FILING AN the information at bar.
Petitioner takes the unbending view that the approval of the city or provincial is distinguished from the power of supervision and control which includes the
prosecutor is no longer required. It is contended that the Regional State authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
Prosecutor has already directed the city or provincial prosecutor to inhibit from regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the
handling SSS cases.[30] Petitioner cites the letter of Regional State Prosecutor commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
Santiago M. Turingan to SSS Regional Director in Naga City dated June 6, subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and
1997[31] and copies of Regional Orders No. 97-024-A[32] and 2001-033[33] dated programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.[37]
July 14, 1997 and September 28, 2001, respectively, showing the designation of The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of
State Prosecutor Tolentino as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V. administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to
Petitioner relies on Galvez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.[34] and Sanchez v. direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases.
Demetriou, et al.[35] to prop up its contention that given the designation of State At most, he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the
Prosecutor Tolentino, the city prosecutor need not participate in the filing and regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to
prosecution of the information in the case at bar. say the least.
We disagree. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275, the powers of a Regional Petitioner cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In those cases, the
State Prosecutor are as follows: special prosecutors were acting under the directive of the Secretary of Justice.
Sec. 8. The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional State They were appointed in accordance with law. Nowhere in P.D. No. 1275 is the
Prosecutor. - The Regional State Prosecutor shall, under the control of the regional state prosecutor granted the power to appoint a special prosecutor
Secretary of Justice, have the following functions: armed with the authority to file an information without the prior written authority
a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars and rules or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. P.D. No.
and regulations of the Department of Justice relative to the investigation and 1275 provides the manner by which special prosecutors are appointed, to wit:
prosecution of criminal cases in his region. Sec. 15. Special Counsels. - Whenever the exigencies of the service require the
b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city creation of positions of additional counsel to assist provincial and city
fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and cities comprised within his fiscals in the discharge of their duties, positions of Special Counsels may
region. be created by any province or city, subject to the approval of the Secretary
c) Prosecute any case arising within the region. of Justice, and with salaries chargeable against provincial or city funds. The
d) With respect to his regional office and the offices of the provincial and city Secretary of Justice shall appoint said Special Counsels, upon
fiscals within his region, he shall: recommendation of the provincial or city fiscal and regional state
1) Appoint such member of subordinate officers and employees as may be prosecutors concerned, either on permanent or temporary basis.
necessary; and approve transfers of subordinate personnel within the jurisdiction Special Counsel shall be appointed from members of the bar and shall be
of the regional office. allowed not more than the salary rate provided in this Decree for the lowest rank
2) Investigate administrative complaints against fiscals and other prosecuting or grade of assistant fiscal in the province or city where assigned. (emphases
officers within his region and submit his recommendation thereon to the supplied)
Secretary of Justice who shall, after review thereof, submit the appropriate Under Department Order No. 318,[38] Defining the authority, duties and
recommendation to the Office of the President: Provided, that where the responsibilities of regional state prosecutors, then Acting Secretary of Justice
Secretary of Justice finds insufficient grounds for the filing of charges, he may Silvestre H. Bello III ordered the appointed regional state prosecutors (which
render a decision of dismissal thereof. included Regional State Prosecutor Turingan for Region V) to, among others,
3) Investigate administrative complaints against subordinate personnel of the (i)nvestigate and/or prosecute, upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice,
region and submit his recommendations thereon to the Secretary of Justice who specific criminal cases filed within the region. (emphasis supplied)
shall have the authority to render decision thereon. (emphases supplied) In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by the
The power of administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the Secretary of Justice to Regional State Prosecutor Turingan to investigate and/or
department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such prosecute SSS cases filed within his territorial jurisdiction. A bare reading of the
agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and alleged letter of commendation by then Secretary Hernando Perez would show
economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; or require the that it does not amount to a directive or even a recognition of this authority. In
submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance fact, while the letter of Secretary Perez commends the efforts of Regional State
evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and Prosecutor Turingan in successfully prosecuting SSS cases, it also negates his
guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary for the authority to prosecute them. Secretary Perez called the Regional State
proper performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, Prosecutors attention to DOJ Circular No. 27, series of 2001, which states that
abuses and other forms of maladministration; and to review and pass upon all important cases of the SSS should be referred to the Office of the
budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them.[36] This
Government Corporate Counsel.[39] Thus, Regional State Prosecutor Turingan Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 provides, viz:
cannot be considered a special prosecutor within the meaning of the law. No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
Petitioner argues that the word may is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or
prior written approval is not required, and this is one such instance. This is too city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word may is mandatory or directory (emphasis supplied)
depends on the context of its use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior authority
permissive word may should be read together with the other provisions in the or approval by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is an
same section of the Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted infirmity in the information that prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction
provision shows that the word may is mandatory. It states: over the case. Since lack of jurisdiction is a defect that may be raised as an
Sec. 4, Rule 112. x x x objection anytime even after arraignment, the respondent judge did not err in
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall granting the motion to dismiss based on this ground. As basis, they cite the case
forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state of Villa v. Ibaez, et al.[40] where we held, viz:
prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable The defendant had pleaded to an information before he filed a motion to quash,
by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the informations.
the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are
immediately inform the parties of such action. (emphasis supplied) concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of section 10 of
Having settled that the prior authority and approval of the city, provincial or chief Rule 113 of the Rules of Court (now Section 9 of Rule 117), and by a long line of
state prosecutor should have been obtained, we shall now resolve the more uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
important issue: whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial the proceeding. Now, the objection to the respondents actuations goes to
or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an information is a defect in the the very foundation of the jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a
information that is waived if not raised as an objection before arraignment. competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on
We hold that it is not. the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the
The provisions in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that demand accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information
illumination are Sections 3 and 9 of Rule 117 in relation to paragraph 3, Section cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent. [41]
4 of Rule 112, to wit: (emphasis supplied)
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the complaint or The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the part of
information on any of the following grounds: the filing officer prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law while jurisdiction over the
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; case is invested by the act of plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the complaint or information.[42] Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over the
accused; subject matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of the information.
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; In the United States, an information has been held as a jurisdictional
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for requirement upon which a defendant stands trial. Thus, it has been ruled that in
various offenses is prescribed by law; the absence of probable cause, the court lacks jurisdiction to try the criminal
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; offense.[43] In our jurisdiction, we have similarly held that:
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are two or
justification; and more courts having concurrent jurisdiction thereon, is a matter of procedure and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense not jurisdiction, as suggested by appellant, the moment such choice has been
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without exercised, the matter becomes jurisdictional. Such choice is deemed made
his express consent. when the proper complaint or information is filed with the court having
xxx xxx xxx jurisdiction over the crime, and said court acquires jurisdiction over the
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.The failure person of the defendant, from which time the right and power of the court
of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the to try the accused attaches. (citations omitted) It is not for the defendant to
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or exercise that choice, which is lodged upon those who may validly file or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any subscribe to the complaint or information under sections 2 and 3 of Rule
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), 106 of the Rules of Court. [44] (emphasis supplied)
(b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied)
A closer look at Villa would be useful in resolving the issue at hand. In that case, information is null and void for lack of authority to file the same, it cannot be
Atty. Abelardo Subido, Chief of the Division of Investigation in the Office of the cured nor resurrected by amendment. In that case, the Presidential Commission
Mayor of Manila, was appointed by the Secretary of Justice as special counsel to on Good Government (PCGG) conducted an investigation and filed an
assist the City Fiscal of Manila in the cases involving city government officials or information with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr. charging
employees. Pursuant to his appointment, Atty. Subido filed an information him with graft and corruption. The petitioner sought to quash the information on
against Pedro Villa for falsification of a payroll. Atty. Subidos authority to file the the ground that the crime charged did not constitute a Marcos crony related
information was challenged on the ground that he was disqualified for crime over which the PCGG had authority to investigate and file an information.
appointment under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as The Court found that the crime alleged in the information was not among those
amended by Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, to wit: which PCGG was authorized to investigate under Executive Orders No. 1 and 14
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. The Secretary of Justice may of then President Corazon Aquino and ruled that the information was null and
appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a competent void. Of similar import is Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[47] where we
person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting ruled that the information having been filed by an unauthorized party (the
attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein as PCGG), the information was fatally flawed. We noted that this defect is not a
might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General.[45] mere remediable defect of form, but a defect that could not be cured.
We held, viz: In Cudia v. Court of Appeals , et al.,[48] we also reiterated the Villa ruling. The
Appointments by the Secretary of Justice in virtue of the foregoing provisions of accused in that case was apprehended in Mabalacat, Pampanga for illegal
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, were upheld in Lo Cham vs. possession of firearms and was brought to Angeles City where the headquarters
Ocampo et al., 44 Official Gazette, 458, and Go Cam et al., vs. Gatmaitan et al., of the arresting officers was located. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an
(47 Official Gazette, 5092). But in those cases, the appointees were officials or information in the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. We invalidated the
employees in one or another of the bureaus or offices under the Department of information filed by the City Prosecutor because he had no territorial jurisdiction,
Justice, and were rightly considered subordinates in the office of the Secretary of as the offense was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga and his territorial
Justice within the meaning of section 1686, ante. jurisdiction was only in Angeles City. We held that an information, when required
The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above decisions. by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.[49]
Attorney Subido is a regular officer or employee in the Department of Interior, Otherwise, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.[50] It is a valid information
more particularly in the City Mayors office. For this reason, he belongs to the signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction
class of persons disqualified for appointment to the post of special counsel. on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter thereof. The
That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must be either accuseds plea to an information may be a waiver of all formal objections to the
an employee or officer in the Department of Justice is so manifest from a bare said information but not when there is want of jurisdiction. Questions relating to
reading of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code as to preclude lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. An infirmity in
construction. And the limitation of the range of choice in the appointment or the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured
designation is not without reason. by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.[51]
The obvious reason is to have appointed only lawyers over whom the Secretary Despite modifications of the provisions on unauthorized filing of information
of Justice can exercise exclusive and absolute power of supervision. An contained in the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure under which Villa was
appointee from a branch of the government outside the Department of Justice decided, the 1951 Villa ruling continues to be the prevailing case law on the
would owe obedience to, and be subject to orders by, mutually independent matter.[52]
superiors having, possibly, antagonistic interests. Referring particularly to the The 1940 Rules of Court provided in Rule 113, Section 10 that, if the defendant
case at hand for illustration, Attorney Subido could be recalled or his time and fails to move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto, he
attention be required elsewhere by the Secretary of Interior or the City Mayor shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to
while he was discharging his duties as public prosecutor, and the Secretary of quash except (1) when the complaint or information does not charge an offense
Justice would be helpless to stop such recall or interference. An eventuality or or (2) the court is without jurisdiction of the same. (emphasis ours) Among the
state of affairs so undesirable, not to say detrimental to the public service and enumerated grounds for a motion to quash under Section 2 of the same Rule
specially the administration of justice, the Legislature wisely intended to avoid. was (t)hat the fiscal has no authority to file the information. With only the above
The application of the 1951 Villa ruling is not confined to instances where the two exceptions provided by the 1940 Rules, the Court nevertheless made the
person who filed the information is disqualified from being a special prosecutor Villa ruling that if the filing officer lacks authority to file the information,
under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, but has jurisdiction is not conferred on the court and this infirmity cannot be cured by
been extended to various cases where the information was filed by an silence or waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
unauthorized officer as in the case at bar. In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,
[46]
the Court held that it is a fundamental principle that when on its face the
The 1940 Rules of Court was amended in 1964. With only minimal changes
introduced, the 1964 Rules of Court contained provisions on unauthorized filing
of information similar to the above provisions of the 1940 Rules.[53] E. THAT IT DOES NOT CONFORM SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE PRESCRIBED
Then came the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lack of authority of the officer FORM
who filed the information was also a ground for a motion to quash under these
rules. The 1985 Rules also provided for waiver of the grounds for a motion to
quash under Rule 117, Section 8, but enumerated the following exceptions to PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO DESUYO
the waiver: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying alias "TONY," accused-appellant.
the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the DECISION
accused; (c) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) the BELLOSILLO, J.:
accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or MARICEL PERU DESUYO was sleeping beside her younger sister
acquitted of the offense charged. Apparently, the want of jurisdiction under the Aisalyn one late night in September 1996 when she was awakened by someone
1985 Rules refers to jurisdiction over the offense and the person, and not over caressing her breasts. She opened her eyes and saw her father, accused
the case as in Villa where the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for Antonio Desuyo, crouching before her. He was naked except for his underpants
lack of authority of the officer who filed the information. Still, despite the to cover his private parts. Instinctively, she begged her father not to touch her,
enumeration, the Court continued to apply the Villa ruling as shown in the afore- reminding him that she was his daughter. But he paid no heed; instead, he
cited Cruz and Cudia cases. removed her underwear while threatening to kill her should she make any noise.
The 1985 Rules was amended in 2000. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal He mounted her, forced his penis into her vagina and gyrated his hips against
Procedure also provide for lack of authority of the filing officer as among the hers. She wept as she continued to beg him to desist from his fiendish assault
grounds for a motion to quash and the waiver of these grounds. Similar to the on her virtue. Meanwhile, Maricel did not tell her mother about the incident;
1985 Rules, the Revised Rules enumerate the exceptions from the waiver, instead, she kept the ignominy and pain to herself.
namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) that the court Maricel's mother worked as a housekeeper in a faraway town and she did
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) that the criminal not want to give her any trouble. Neither did she inform her relatives who lived
action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been nearby. She feared for her life as her father had threatened to kill her should she
previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him speak to anyone about what he had done to her.
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Under the The accused would repeat his sexual molestation of Maricel almost
regime of the 2000 Revised Rules, we reiterated the Villa ruling in the above- everyday from September 1996 to August 1997. His assaults on her virtue were
cited Romualdez case. With the enumeration of the four exceptions, which was always followed by threats on her that she would be killed should she report
almost a replica of the enumeration in the 1985 Rules, the 2000 Rules did not these to her mother. The sexual abuses of her father were so often that Maricel
intend to abandon Villa. The Villa ruling subsisted alongside the enumerated lost count.
exceptions under the 1985 Rules, and it remains to do so under the enumerated On 14 August 1997, early dawn, as Maricel had been already
exceptions under the 2000 Rules. Neither the Rationale of the 2000 Revised accustomed to, she would be roused from her sleep by her father fondling her
Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on private parts. Again, he undressed her and unleashed his lechery on her. It was
the Revision of the Rules of Court evinces any intent to abandon the doctrine meant to be the last. In her young and impressionable mind, Maricel vowed that
enunciated in Villa. it would not happen to her again.
In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice On 18 August 1997 Maricel summoned enough courage to relate her
designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or ordeal to a police officer who lived nearby. She bravely narrated to Police Officer
a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the Tito Ganggalang and his wife Riza her sordid tale which was actually a
information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without confirmation of what was already circulating around their neighborhood. She
authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a admitted that her father had been sexually abusing her for close to a year
jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in already. Emboldened by the encouragement she received from sympathetic
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, neighbors, she next confided to Luisa Galit, Maricels maternal aunt, who could
the petition is DENIED. The respondent courts orders dated February 26, 2002 only commiserate with her.
and April 3, 2002 are AFFIRMED. Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 is Forthwith, Luisa Galit accompanied Maricel to a doctor who upon
DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new information by an authorized examination found Maricel to have several old hymenal lacerations in her vaginal
officer. area. Thereafter, they repaired to the municipal hall where Maricel instituted a
SO ORDERED. Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez. Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., complaint against her father, accused Antonio Desuyo, for having repeatedly
concur. raped her.
 In the course of the preliminary examination conducted by the municipal At the outset, it must be emphasized that the remedy against an
trial court judge, accused Antonio Desuyo asked forgiveness from his daughter indictment that fails to allege the time of commission of the offense with sufficient
and promised to leave her alone should she withdraw the charge she filed definiteness is a motion for bill of particulars. The records show that the accused
against him. Maricel vehemently refused as her father grovelled for forgiveness. never asked for a bill of particulars in accordance with the Revised Rules of
[1]
As a consequence, an Information was filed against the accused Antonio Criminal Procedure.[9]
Desuyo alias "Tony" for raping his fifteen (15)-year old daughter Maricel. The failure of the accused to move for the specification of the date when
Maricel attested in court to the truth of her accusations. According to her, the alleged crime was committed or for the quashal of the Information on the
ever since her mother worked in a faraway town, her father was dauntless and ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form [10] deprives
unrelenting in sexually abusing her night after night within the confines of their him of the right to object to evidence which could lawfully be introduced and
home. She felt pain and cried everytime her father would forcibly insert his penis admitted under an information of more or less general terms but which
into her vagina; however she kept her ordeal to herself as she was afraid of him. sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime. [11] It is indeed too late in
After having her first menstruation she became apprehensive that she the day for the accused to raise this issue because objections to matters of form
might get pregnant. Her father however was unperturbed and simply dismissed or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. At
her fears by telling her not to worry. A year after the first forced coition, Maricel any rate, it is settled that the exact date of the commission of rape is not an
decided to end her tribulation by unburdening her grief to neighbors who readily essential element thereof and need not be stated in the information.[12] The Court
sympathized with her. She felt relieved after seeing her father locked up behind has sustained the following dates alleged in an information for rape as sufficient
bars.[2] for purposes of complying with the provisions of the Rules of Court, to wit: "from
The accused denied having raped Maricel. He affirmed however that he November 1990 up to July 21, 1994," [13] "sometime in November 1995, and
raised singlehandedly his two (2) daughters Maricel and Aisalyn as his wife was some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto,"[14] "on or about and sometime
serving another household in a distant town. According to him, despite his in the year 1988,"[15] "sometime in the year 1987" [16] and "before and until
guidance, Maricel turned out to be a wayward daughter who entertained suitors October 15, 1994."[17] In any event, a review of the evidence presented by the
at an early age. Once, his daughter Aisalyn confided to him that Maricel was prosecution more than establishes the guilt of the accused for the rape of his
corresponding with a boy from another barrio. He immediately searched through daughter.
her bag and found a letter intended for a certain Jerry. Incensed by his For one, it is highly inconceivable, if not completely preposterous, that
daughter's behavior he mauled her expecting that she would atone for her Maricel, a guileless barrio lass, would concoct a story of rape against her very
mistakes. However, instead of mending her ways, Maricel ran away from home own father, taking into mind the societal humiliation and personal devastation
and instituted this unfounded charge for rape against him. He presented in which such a charge entails. More so, no serious motive, apart from the beatings
evidence Maricel's supposed letter to Jerry as well as a letter from his wife which she supposedly suffered in the hands of the accused, was offered to
pledging her love and support. He averred that Maricel was being inveigled by satisfactorily explain why Maricel would come out and undergo legal scrutiny of
his sister-in-law Luisa and the latter's boyfriend Boy into tormenting him for the unfortunate encounters with her father. Thus, if her testimony meets the test
reasons which he could not fathom.[3] of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
The trial court did not give credence to the bare denials of the accused. An analysis of the records reveals that Maricel testified in a
Solely on account of Maricel's testimony, the court a quo found the accused straightforward, spontaneous and consistent manner. Although Maricel
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "multiple incestuous rape" and expounded only on the first and last instances of rape, failing thus to give an
sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, and to indemnify the accurate account of the other sexual violations, her testimony in its entirety was
offended party P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.[4] forthright, clear and free from any contradictions.
Accused Antonio Desuyo assails in his brief his conviction for "multiple Maricel's failure to immediately inform her mother as well as her relatives
rape" essentially on two (2) grounds, namely, that the Information is defective about her ordeal is consistent with reason. It must be remembered that Maricel
and that the court a quo erred in imposing upon him the penalty of death despite depended on the accused for existence and protection as her mother lived far.
the failure of the prosecution to establish the age of Maricel with certainty.[5] As to her total obedience to her father and the stoic silence she kept about her
Accused avers that the Information for "multiple rape" filed against him is sufferings, these were all brought about by her genuine fear of a man who on
deficient since by merely stating that the sexual assaults were repeated "within account of his moral ascendancy needed no weapon to instill such terror in her.
the month of September 1996 up to August 18, 1997,"[6] it failed to state the [18]
Maricel was convinced of a potential yet real danger posed by a beast
exact dates when the alleged rapes were committed. Quoting heavily from the masquerading as the family's paladin.
early case of US v. Diacho,[7] accused asserts that unless he is informed of the Finally, we take into consideration Antonio's admission before the trial
precise "day, or about the day, he may be, to an extent deprived of the court that he wrote his parents-in-law sometime in March 1998 to ask for their
opportunity to defend himself."[8] forgiveness. Antonio likewise acknowledged when cross-examined that he
begged for Maricel's mercy before the municipal trial judge in the course of the
preliminary examination. No compelling reason was offered by the defense to instead found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape and, accordingly, sentences
explain Antonio's incriminating declarations. Verily, these are judicial admissions him to reclusion perpetua for each count. In addition to paying Maricel Peru
which no man in his right mind would make unless they were true. Desuyo civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, instead of P75,000.00, for
The court a quo convicted the accused of "multiple rape" without stating each count of rape, accused is further ordered to pay moral damages in the
the counts of rape involved. The records however show that the prosecution amount of P50,000.00 also for each count. Costs de oficio.
established beyond doubt that accused was guilty of two (2) counts of rape. SO ORDERED.
Although Maricel insists that she had been raped almost everyday from
September 1996 to August 1997 she was only able to relate with clarity two (2)
of the rapes, the first forced coition sometime in September 1996, and the last on
14 August 1997. She positively narrated in detail the surrounding circumstances
of the sexual assaults committed against her on those two (2) occasions. Indeed,
her recollection of these two (2) rapes was very vivid, leaving no doubt about its
credibility and truthfulness.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the guilt of the accused for two (2) counts
of rape has been conclusively established; however, the death penalty was
erroneously imposed. Under Sec. 11 of RA 7659, death shall be imposed if "the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent x x x of
the victim."
In the instant case, the Information charging the accused with rape
alleges that Maricel is the fourteen (14)-year old daughter of the accused.
However, it is significant to note that other than the testimony of Maricel, no
independent proof was presented to show that she was a minor and that she
was the daughter of the accused. Although Maricel's relationship with the
accused was not contested, nor her age refuted, proof of age and relationship is
critical considering the gravity of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused.[19]
It bears emphasis that the minority of the victim and her filiation to the F. THAT MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE IS CHARGED EXCEPT WHEN WHEN
accused when properly alleged in the information and proved beyond A SINGLE PUNISHMENT FOR VARIOUS OFFENSES IS PRESCCRIBED BY
reasonable doubt during trial elevate the crime of simple rape to qualified rape LAW
and warrant the imposition of the extreme penalty of death. As such, nothing but
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime G.R. No. L-13484             May 20, 1960
with which the accused is charged must be established by the prosecution in THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
order for the penalty of death to be upheld. In fine, the minority of the victim as vs.
well as her relationship with the accused must be proved with equal certainty DOMINADOR CAMERINO, MANUEL PAKINGAN, CRISANTO SARATAN,
and clarity as the crime itself; contrarily, the failure of the prosecution to BIENVENIDO OSTERIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
sufficiently establish the victim's age and relationship with the accused is fatal Actg. Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio for
and consequently bars conviction for qualified rape.[20] appellant.
Perforce, in the present case, the death penalty imposed by the trial court Avelino A. Velasco for appellees.
should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Likewise, the award of P75,000.00 as MONTEMAYOR, J.:
civil indemnity should be modified and adjusted to P50,000.00 since the penalty Dominador Camerino and eighty-six others were accused before the Court of
is likewise lowered to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with prevailing First Instance of Cavite of the crime of sedition, said to have been committed on
jurisprudence, accused Antonio Desuyo should also be ordered to pay Maricel or about and during the period comprised by and between the months of
Desuyo P50,000.00 as moral damages even if there was no proof presented as October, 1953, to November 15, 1953 and for sometime prior thereto; under an
basis therefor since the anguish and pain that complaining witness endured are information charging conspiracy among the said accused in having allegedly
plainly evident.[21] perpetrated for political and social ends, insistent, repeated and continuous acts
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 26, San Jose, of hate, terrorism and revenge against private persons, leaders, members and
Southern Leyte, finding accused Antonio Desuyo alias "Tony" guilty of "multiple sympathizers of the Nacionalista Party in the town of Bacoor, Cavite, and
rape" in its qualified form and ordering him to pay complaining witness Maricel frustrating by force, threats and violence, and intimidation the free expression of
Peru Desuyo P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, is MODIFIED. The accused is the popular will in the election held on November 10, 1953. The information
described in detail the manner in which the alleged seditious acts were killing was done in pursuance of and to carry out the acts constituting sedition. In
performed, specifying the dates and the places where they were committed and case of the People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64, this Tribunal said:
the persons who were victims thereof, under fourteen different overt acts of The nearest analogy to the two crimes of murder and sedition growing out of
sedition. Before arraignment, forty-eight of the practically the same facts, which can be found in the American authorities, relate
eighty-seven accused, headed by Dominador Camerino, filed a motion to quash to the crimes of assault and riot or unlawful assembly. A majority of the American
the information on the ground of double jeopardy, claiming in support thereof courts have held that the offense of unlawful assembly and riot and the offense
that they had been previously convicted or been in jeopardy of being convicted of assault and battery are distinct offense; and that conviction or an acquittal for
and/or acquitted of the offense charged in other cases of the same nature before either does not bar a prosecution for other offense, even though based on the
the court. same acts. (Freeland vs. People (1855), 16 Ill., 380; U.S. vs. Peaco (1835), 27
The Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed written opposition to the motion, saying that Fed. Cas., 477; People vs. Vasquez (1905), 9 Puerto Rico, 488; contra, State vs.
although it was alleged in the information that the accused had been charged Lindsay (18868), 61 N.C., 458.)
with various crimes under different and separate informations, that would not It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as
place them in double jeopardy, because those previous charges were being murder. Sedition is a crime against public order; murder is a crime against
specified in the information only as a bill of particulars for the purpose of persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the State, the
describing in detail the offense of sedition, but not to hold the defendants liable authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a crime
for punishment under said separate and different specifications; in other words, directed against the lives of individuals. (U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437.)
the specifications describing separate crimes were alleged in the information Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances
merely to complete the narration of facts which constitute the crime of sedition. in the state; murder at common law is where a person of sound mind and
Later, all the accused filed a supplemental motion to quash, raising as additional discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with
grounds that more than one offense was charged, and that the criminal action or malice aforethought, express or implied.
liability of said defendants had been extinguished. The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are
On March 14, 1956, the trial court issued an order sustaining the reasons of the perfectly distinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected in point
motion to quash and dismissing the information on the grounds:(1) that the of fact. Not alone are the offenses eonomine different, but the allegations in the
information charged more than one offense, (2) that it was vague, ambiguous body of the informations are different. The gist of the information for sedition is
and uncertain, (3) that it described crimes for which some of the accused had the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to attain by force
either been convicted or acquitted, and (4) some violation of the election law and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge
described in the specification had already prescribed. A motion for upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in
reconsideration filed by the Fiscal was denied. The Government is appealing several places in the city of Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case
from that order of dismissal, as well as the order denying the motion for is that the Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight
reconsideration. persons and gravely wounded three others. The crimes of the murder and
In determining the present appeal, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first serious physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information for
ground of the dismissal of the information by the trial court, namely, multiplicity of sedition; and the defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes
offenses, that is to say, that the information allegedly charged more than one under the first information.
offense. We agree with the Provincial Fiscal and the Solicitor General In the case of U.S. vs. Cernias, 10 Phil., 682, this Court held that while it is true
representing the Government that the accused herein were being charged only that each of those acts charged against the conspirators was itself a crime, the
with one offense, namely, that of sedition, defined in Article 139 of the Revised prosecutor in setting them out in the information did no more than to furnish the
Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 202, and penalized under defendants with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the
Article 140 of the same code. the fourteen different acts or specifications trial, not only as a basis upon which to be found an inference of guilt of the crime
charging some or all of the accused with having committed the offenses charged of conspiracy but also as evidence of the extremely dangerous and wicked
therein, were included in the information merely to describe and to narrate the nature of that conspiracy.
different and specific acts the sum total of which constitutes the crime of sedition. The charge is not defective for duplicity when one single crime is set forth in
Different and separate acts constituting different and separate offenses may different modes prescribed by law for its commission, or the felony is set forth
serve as a basis for prosecuting the accused to hold them criminally liable for under different counts specifying the way of its perpetuation, or the acts resulted
said different offenses. Yet, those different acts of offenses may serve merely as from a single criminal impulse. Neither is there duplicity when the other offense
a basis for the prosecution of one single offense like that of sedition. For described is but an ingredient or an essential element of the real offense
instance, one may be accused of sedition, and at the same time be prosecuted charged nor when several acts are related in describing the offense. (Padilla:
under another information for murder or homicide as the case may be, if the Criminal Procedure Annotated, 1959 ed., p. 101).
In the case of People vs. Bacolod, 89 Phil., 621, the defendant therein was
convicted on a plea of guilty of physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Based on the same facts, he was also accused of having caused public
disturbance. The plea of double jeopardy interposed by the accused was
rejected on the ground that the two offenses were not the same, although they
arose from the same act.
Following the reasoning of the trial court that more than one offense was
charged, the trial court should have ordered that the information be amended, or
if that was not possible, that a new information be filed.
Under section 2 of this Rule, the Court may deny or sustain the motion to quash
but may not defer it till the trial of the case on the merits. In sustaining the
motion, the court may order the filing of a new information or may dismiss the
case. In the new information, the defects of the previous information may be
cured. For instance, if the motion to quash is sustained on the ground that more G. THAT THE CRIMINAL LIABIILITY OR ACTION HAS BEEN
than one offense is charged in the information, the court may order that another EXTINGUISHED
information be filed charging only one offense. But the court may or may not
issue such order in the exercise of its discretion. The order may be made if the
defects found in the first information may be cured in a new information. If the EN BANC
order is made, the accused, if he is in custody, should not be discharged, unless [G.R. No. 152259. July 29, 2004]
otherwise, admitted to bail. But if no such order is made, or, having been made, ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. The Honorable
the prosecuting attorney fails to file another information within the time specified SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES,
by the court, the accused, if in custody must be discharged, unless he is also in respondents.
custody for another charge, or if is out on bail, the bail must be exonerated. In DECISION
such event, however, the fiscal is free to institute another criminal proceeding PANGANIBAN, J.:
since such ground of objection is not a bar to another prosecution for the same Repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal indictment
offense. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. II, pp. 778- prior to plea and trial, however they may be named or identified -- whether as a
779). motion to quash or motion to dismiss or by any other nomenclature -- delay the
In conclusion, we hold that the information filed in this case did not charged more administration of justice and unduly burden the court system. Grounds not
than one offense but only that of sedition; that in specifying the separate and included in the first of such repetitive motions are generally deemed waived and
different criminal acts attributed to the defendants, it was not the purpose or can no longer be used as bases of similar motions subsequently filed.
intention of the Government to hold them criminally liable in the present Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain presidential
proceedings, but merely to complete the narration of facts, though specifying relatives who intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,
different offenses which as a whole, supposedly constitute the crime of sedition. contract or application with the Government. This provision is not vague or
Consequently, we believe that the information is valid. impermissibly broad, because it can easily be understood with the use of simple
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal. statutory construction. Neither may the constitutionality of a criminal statute such
In view of the foregoing, the appealed orders are hereby set aside and the case as this be challenged on the basis of the overbreadth and the void-for-
is hereby remanded to the trial court of further proceedings, without vagueness doctrines, which apply only to free-speech cases.
pronouncement as to costs. The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the November 20, 2001 [2] and the March 1, 2002[3]
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 13736. The first
Resolution disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. The
arraignment of the accused and the pre-trial of the case shall proceed as
scheduled.[4]
The second Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential Commission on Good On June 19, 2001, [the] accused filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before [the anti-graft MOTION TO DISMISS. On June 29, 2001, the [Sandiganbayan] admitted the
court] charging the accused [with] violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019, motion and admitted the attached (third) Motion to Dismiss.
[5]
as amended. The Information reads: The [Motion to Dismiss] raise[d] the following grounds:
That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW OF
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan], [PETITIONER] WAS VIOLATED DURING THE PRELIMINARY
said [petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the INVESTIGATION STAGE IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:
Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity within the third civil A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN THE
degree, did then and there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, INSTANT CASE; AND
for the purpose of promoting his self-interested [sic] and/or that of others, B. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED BY A BIASED
intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and AND PARTIAL INVESTIGATOR
Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [PETITIONER] TO BE INFORMED OF
and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS
corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by former President Ferdinand VIOLATED
E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the III. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION,
BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and [PETITIONER] IS IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and IV. THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known PRESCRIPTION[6]
as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding The Sandiganbayan explained that all the grounds invoked by petitioner, except
and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00. the third one, had already been raised by him and passed upon in its previous
Contrary to law. Resolutions.[7] In resolving the third ground, the anti-graft court pointed out that
On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first MOTION TO DISMISS AND Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution became effective only in 1981 when the
TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT claiming that no valid preliminary investigation was basic law was amended. Since his alleged illegal intervention had been
conducted in the instant case. He asserts that if a preliminary investigation could committed on or about 1975, the amended provision was inapplicable to him.[8]
be said to have been conducted, the same was null and void having been In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan
undertaken by a biased and partial investigative body. passed upon the other grounds he had raised. It ruled that his right to a
On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First Division, issued an preliminary investigation was not violated, because he had been granted a
order giving the accused fifteen days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the reinvestigation.[9] It further held that his right to be informed of the nature and
Office of the Special Prosecutor. cause of the accusation was not trampled upon, either, inasmuch as the
[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court via a petition for Information had set forth the essential elements of the offense charged.[10]
Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order. On January Hence, this Petition.[11]
21, 1998, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to show that [the The Issues
Sandiganbayan] committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed In his Memorandum, petitioner assigns the following errors for our consideration:
order. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and gravely abused its
On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of the Special discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction
Prosecutor a Motion to Quash. I. In not dismissing and/or quashing Criminal Case No. 13736 despite clear and
On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Victorio U. incontrovertible evidence that:
Tabanguil, manifested that the prosecution had already concluded the A. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because its vagueness
reinvestigation of the case. He recommended the dismissal of the instant case. violates the due process right of an individual to be informed of the nature and
Both the Deputy Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutor approved the the cause of the accusation against him;
recommendation. However, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disagreed and B. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because it violates the
directed the prosecutors to let the [petitioner] present his evidence in Court. due process right of an individual to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second MOTION TO proved;
QUASH AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT. C. The constitutional right of petitioner x x x to be informed of the nature and the
On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion for lack of merit. cause of the accusation against him was violated;
D. The constitutional right to due process of law of petitioner x x x was violated
during the preliminary investigation stage in the following ways:
[i] No valid preliminary investigation was con-ducted for Criminal Case No. relief. The hairsplitting distinction posited by petitioner does not really make a
13736; and difference.
[ii] The preliminary investigation was conducted by a biased and partial By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited second
investigator. motion to quash. A party is not permitted to raise issues, whether similar or
E. The criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and different, by installment. The Rules abhor repetitive motions. Otherwise, there
F. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution, petitioner x x x is would be no end to preliminary objections, and trial would never commence. A
immune from criminal prosecution. second motion to quash delays the administration of justice and unduly burdens
And the courts. Moreover, Rule 117 provides that grounds not raised in the first
II. In light of the foregoing, in denying petitioner[s] x x x right to equal protection motion to quash are generally deemed waived. [19] Petitioners Motion to Dismiss
of the laws.[12] violates this rule.
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of Republic Act Constitutionality of
3019 is unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3) whether there the Challenged Provision
was a valid preliminary investigation; (4) whether the criminal action or liability If only for the foregoing procedural lapses, the Petition deserves to be dismissed
has been extinguished by prescription; and (5) whether petitioner is immune outright. However, given the importance of this case in curtailing graft and
from criminal prosecution under then Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 corruption, the Court will nevertheless address the other issues on their merit.
Constitution. Petitioner challenges the validity of Section 5 of Republic Act 3019, a penal
The Courts Ruling statute, on the ground that the act constituting the offense is allegedly vague and
The Petition has no merit. impermissibly broad.
First Issue: It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth [20] and the vagueness[21]
Constitutionality of Section 5, doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not
Republic Act 3019 appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 5 of RA 3019 for the first Mendoza explained the reason as follows:
time in the Sandiganbayan through a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Attached A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
to his December 7, 2001 Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying his overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The theory
Motion to Dismiss was this Supplemental Motion which was, in effect, his third is that [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
motion to quash.[13] We note that the Petition for Certiorari before us challenges construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
the denial of his original, not his Supplemental, Motion to Dismiss. prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
Upon the denial of his original Motion to Quash on February 9, 2000, petitioner expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial. Had reconsideration requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
been turned down, the next proper remedy would have been either (1) a petition could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity. The possible
for certiorari[14] -- if there was grave abuse of discretion -- which should be filed harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
within 60 days from notice of the assailed order; [15] or (2) to proceed to trial outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
without prejudice to his right, if final judgment is rendered against him, to raise deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
the same questions before the proper appellate court.[16] But instead of availing effects of overly broad statutes.
himself of these remedies, he filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 19, 2001. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
Impropriety of terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
Repetitive Motions allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
There is no substantial distinction between a motion to quash and a motion to laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
dismiss. Both pray for an identical relief, which is the dismissal of the case. Such take chances as in the area of free speech.
motions are employed to raise preliminary objections, so as to avoid the xxxxxxxxx
necessity of proceeding to trial. A motion to quash is generally used in criminal In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
proceedings to annul a defective indictment. A motion to dismiss, the analytical tools developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases
nomenclature ordinarily used in civil proceedings, is aimed at summarily or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be
defeating a complaint. Thus, our Rules of Court use the term motion to quash in made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to
criminal,[17] and motion to dismiss in civil, proceedings.[18] such statute, the established rule is that one to whom application of a statute is
In the present case, however, both the Motion to Quash and the Motion to constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it
Dismiss are anchored on basically the same grounds and pray for the same might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional. As has been pointed out, vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or
process typically are invalidated [only] as applied to a particular defendant. [22] rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in
(underscoring supplied) an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the Petitioner also claims that the phrase to intervene directly or indirectly, in any
ground of ambiguity.[23] While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for- business, transaction, contract or application with the Government is vague and
vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu violates his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation
Cong Eng v. Trinidad,[24] the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional against him.[29] He further complains that the provision does not specify what acts
because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. are punishable under the term intervene, and thus transgresses his right to be
Adiong v. Comelec[25] decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. presumed innocent.[30] We disagree.
Finally, Santiago v. Comelec[26] held that a portion of RA 6735 was Every statute is presumed valid.[31] On the party challenging its validity weighs
unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because heavily the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. [32] Any reasonable doubt
of vagueness. about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. [33]
Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass To doubt is to sustain, as tersely put by Justice George Malcolm. In Garcia v.
acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such Executive Secretary,[34] the rationale for the presumption of constitutionality was
invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of actual explained by this Court thus:
case and controversy and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to
context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a
pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:[27] clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
  presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
  upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments.
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[35]
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief In the instant case, petitioner has miserably failed to overcome such
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line- presumption. This Court has previously laid down the test for determining
by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that whether a statute is vague, as follows:
is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they x x x [A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with
might be decided. sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that species
described as a manifestly strong medicine to be employed sparingly and only as of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified
a last resort. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its either by a saving clause or by construction.
provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
conduct with which the defendant has been charged.[28] standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
As conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must be meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to
examined only as applied to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should not be the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord
declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness. persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid;
The questioned provision reads as follows: and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[36] But the doctrine does
for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language
President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to
of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of
directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the activities. The first may be saved by proper construction, while no challenge may
Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. [37]
to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is
has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. [38] It must be manner in any business, transaction, contract or application with the
stressed, however, that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable government. As we have explained, it is impossible for the law to provide in
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or advance details of how such acts of intervention could be performed. But the
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than courts may pass upon those details once trial is concluded. Thus, the alleged
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the vagueness of intervene is not a ground to quash the information prior to the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it commencement of the trial.
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not vague, and that in
especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to any event, the overbreath and void for vagueness doctrines are not applicable to
provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.[39] this case.
A simpler test was decreed in Dans v. People,[40] in which the Court said that Second Issue:
there was nothing vague about a penal law that adequately answered the basic Allegedly Vague Information
query What is the violation? [41] Anything beyond -- the hows and the whys -- are Other than arguing on the alleged intrinsic vagueness of intervene, petitioner
evidentiary matters that the law itself cannot possibly disclose, in view of the further contends that the Information itself is also unconstitutionally vague,
uniqueness of every case.[42] because it does not specify the acts of intervention that he supposedly
The question What is the violation? is sufficiently answered by Section 5 of RA performed.[49] Again, we disagree.
3019, as follows: When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the
1. The offender is a spouse or any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. [50] The
third civil degree of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the pertinent provision in the Rules of Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, which we
Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of quote:
Representatives; and Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a
2. The offender intervened directly or indirectly in any business, transaction, bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The
contract or application with the government. motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the
Applicability of details desired.
Statutory Construction The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient
As to petitioners claim that the term intervene is vague, this Court agrees with particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with and
the Office of the Solicitor General that the word can easily be understood to enable the court to pronounce judgment. [51] The particularity must be such that
through simple statutory construction. The absence of a statutory definition of a persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant by the
term used in a statute will not render the law void for vagueness, if the meaning information.[52]
can be determined through the judicial function of construction. [43] Elementary is While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the
the principle that words should be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning. information,[53] matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts essential to
x x x. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms the nature of the offense -- need not be averred. [54] Whatever facts and
are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined by reference to
[44]
much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes.[55]
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the elements
each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently. Likewise, the
expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a allegations describe the offense committed by petitioner with such particularity
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so as to enable him to prepare an intelligent defense. Details of the acts he
long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole committed are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information.
act x x x. Third Issue:
x x x [I]t is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute Preliminary Investigation
will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary investigation
signification,[45] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or when he questioned before this Court in GR No. 128317 the Sandiganbayans
special legal meaning to those words.[46] The intention of the lawmakers - who Order giving him 15 days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of
are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory the Special Prosecutor.[56] Citing Cojuangco v. Presidential Commission on Good
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.[47] Government,[57] he undauntedly averred that he was deprived of his right to a
The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary acceptation, preliminary investigation, because the PCGG acted both as complainant and as
which is to to come between.[48] Criminally liable is anyone covered in the investigator.[58]
enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any person who intervenes in any
In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had the power to case, the Board of Directors of the Philippine Seeds, Inc. and Development Bank
conduct a preliminary investigation, the latter could not do so with the cold of the Philippines were charged with violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of
neutrality of an impartial judge in cases in which it was the agency that had Section 3 of RA No. 3019, by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
gathered evidence and subsequently filed the complaint. [59] On that basis, this on Behest Loans, created by then President Fidel V. Ramos to investigate and to
Court nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by PCGG and directed the recover the so-called Behest Loans, where the Philippine Government
transmittal of the records to the Ombudsman for appropriate action. guaranteed several foreign loans to corporations and entities connected with the
It is readily apparent that Cojuangco does not support the quashal of the former President Marcos. x x x In holding that the case had not yet prescribed,
Information against herein petitioner. True, the PCGG initiated the present this Court ruled that:
Complaint against him; hence, it could not properly conduct the preliminary In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved
investigation. However, he was accorded his rights -- the Sandiganbayan party, to have known the violations of RA No. 3019 at the time the questioned
suspended the trial and afforded him a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. The transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned
procedure outlined in Cojuangco was thus followed. connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with
The Sandiganbayans actions are in accord also with Raro v. Sandiganbayan,[60] the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the
which held that the failure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation would not respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
warrant the quashal of an information. If the information has already been filed, discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
the proper procedure is for the Sandiganbayan to hold the trial in abeyance while xxxxxxxxx
the preliminary investigation is being conducted or completed.[61] People v. Duque is more in point, and what was stated there stands reiteration:
Fourth Issue: In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not
Prescription immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable
The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to Quash filed by statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time,
petitioner with the Sandiganbayan on October 8, 1999.[62] Such issue should be the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of
disregarded at this stage, since he failed to challenge its ruling debunking his the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts. (Italics supplied)
Motion within the 60-day period for the filing of a petition for certiorari. A party There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest Loans Case and the
may not circumvent this rule by filing a subsequent motion that raises the same present one which lead us to apply the ruling of the former to the latter. First,
issue and the same arguments. both cases arose out of seemingly innocent business transactions; second, both
Furthermore, it is easy to see why this argument being raised by petitioner is were discovered only after the government created bodies to investigate these
utterly unmeritorious. He points out that according to the Information, the offense anomalous transactions; third, both involve prosecutions for violations of RA No.
was committed during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975. He argues 3019; and, fourth, in both cases, it was sufficiently raised in the pleadings that
that when the Information was filed on July 12, 1989,[63] prescription had already the respondents conspired and connived with one another in order to keep the
set in, because the prescriptive period for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 is alleged violations hidden from public scrutiny.
only ten (10) years from the time the offense was allegedly committed. The This Courts pronouncement in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan is quite
increase of this prescriptive period to fifteen (15) years took effect only on March relevant and instructive as to the date when the discovery of the offense should
16, 1982, upon the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195.[64] be reckoned, thus:
Act No. 3326, as amended,[65] governs the prescription of offenses penalized by In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the
special laws. Its pertinent provision reads: aggrieved party, to have known the violations committed at the time the
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the questioned transactions were made because both parties to the transactions
violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetuate fraud against the government. The
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and alleged anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the
punishment. February 1986 Revolution when one of the original respondents, then President
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said date, no person would
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for have dared to question the legality or propriety of those transactions. Hence, the
reasons not constituting jeopardy. counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery
Consistent with the provision quoted above, this Court has previously reckoned of the offense, which could have been between February 1986 after the EDSA
the prescriptive period of cases involving RA 3019 (committed prior to the Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed.[67]
February 1986 EDSA Revolution) from the discovery of the violation.[66] In The above pronouncement is squarely applicable to the present case. The
Republic v. Desierto, the Court explained: general rule that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
This issue confronted this Court anew, albeit in a larger scale, in Presidential Ad of the crime cannot apply to the present case. It is not legally prudent to charge
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto. In the said recent the State, the aggrieved party, with knowledge of the violation of RA 3019 at the
time the alleged intervention was made. The accused is the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos brother-in-law. He was charged with intervening in a sale
involving a private corporation, the majority stocks of which was allegedly owned
by President Marcos.
Prior to February 1986, no person was expected to have seriously dared
question the legality of the sale or would even have thought of investigating
petitioners alleged involvement in the transaction. It was only after the creation [68]
of PCGG[69] and its exhaustive investigations that the alleged crime was
discovered. This led to the initiation on November 29, 1988 of a Complaint
against former President Marcos and petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, the filing of the Information on July 12,
1989 was well within the prescriptive period of ten years from the discovery of
the offense.
Fifth Issue
Immunity from Prosecution
Petitioner argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly
served as a high-ranking naval officer -- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp -- of
former President Marcos.[70] He relies on Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973
Constitution, as amended, which we quote:
The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his
specific orders during his tenure. H. THAT IT CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHCH, IF TRUE, WOULD CONSITUTE
xxxxxxxxx LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION
As the Sandiganbayan aptly pointed out, the above provision is not applicable to
petitioner because the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while THIRD DIVISION
the alleged crime happened in 1975. In Estrada v. Desierto,[71] this Court [G.R. No. 150610. March 25, 2004]
exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in order to determine the FEDERICO A. POBLETE, BIENVENIDO C. POBRE, JUANITO GALANG,
extent of its applicability. We explained therein that executive immunity applied RICARDO FLORES, SALVADOR OLAES, LEO V. PADILLA AND PEDRO
only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non- PATERNO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUSTICES EDILBERTO G.
sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in SANDOVAL, GODOFREDO L. LEGASPI and RAOUL V. VICTORINO, in their
office. The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his capacity as Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division,
immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious HEDLIZA C. ANTHONY, ROSALINDA M. ESPIRITU, ANDREA D. VIASON,
acts of public officials and their close relatives are not acts of the State, and the JOSEPHINE N. RANCE, and MARITES C. MIRAFLOR, respondents.
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as DECISION
any other trespasser. CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In sum, petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its Assailed via petition for certiorari are the Sandiganbayan October 10, 2001
discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions. [72] On the contrary, it acted Resolution[1] denying petitioners Motion to Quash the first amended information
prudently, in accordance with law and jurisprudence WHEREFORE, the Petition filed against them, and November 8, 2001 Resolution[2] granting the prosecutions
is DISMISSED, and the questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan Motion to Admit the second amended information.
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On September 27, 1999, the officers of Samahan ng Lahing Mandaragat ng
Pulborista, Inc., a non-stock, non-profit, non-government organization based in
Barangay Pulborista, Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite, filed a complaint [3] before the
Office of the Ombudsman against the following municipal officials of Kawit for
1995 to 2001: Mayor Federico Poblete, Vice-Mayor Rodrigo Caimol, and
Sanggunuang Bayan (SB) Members Bienvenido C. Pobre, Juanito Galang,
Ricardo Flores, Pedro Paterno, Salvador Olaes, Cherry Rosario Nolasco, Doe
Padilla (who was later identified as Leo Padilla), and Peter Doe (who was later information by inserting the number of the lot under controversy, Lot 4431, and
identified as Hernan Jamir). the amount of P123,123,123.00 representing the price paid by FJI Property
The complaint alleged that the officials caused the registration of foreshore land Developers Inc. for it.
located in Barangay Binakayan, Kawit in the name of the Municipality of Kawit By Resolution[20] of October 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
and subsequently sold the same to a corporation, FJI Property Developers, Inc., Information on the ground that the Motion to Admit it was presented before
notwithstanding that under Commonwealth Act No. 141, specifically, Title III, arraignment and the amendments were mere matters of form. In the same
Chapter [8], Section 59[4] in relation to Section 61, [5] the land is inalienable and resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Reinvestigation on the
cannot be disposed by any mode or transfer, except by lease. ground that it was filed out of time, and the matters raised therein could hardly
The complaint further averred that the sale of the land caused undue prejudice be considered as newly discovered evidence and would be better ventilated
and injury to poor people, especially the indigent families who claimed it as during the trial of the case as defense evidence.
communal fishing grounds since time immemorial, and gave private parties All the accused, except Hernan Jamir and Rosario Cherry Nolasco, filed an
unwarranted benefits, the contract or transaction being manifestly and grossly Omnibus Motion[21] (for reconsideration of the Resolution dated October 17, 2000
disadvantageous to the government and the public. and/or to Quash the Amended Information), to which the prosecution filed its
The respondents to the complaint jointly filed a Counter-affidavit [6] and a Comment and Opposition.[22] Thereafter, the accused filed their Reply[23] to the
Memorandum[7] contending that the land was legally and validly reclaimed; that Prosecutions Comment and Opposition.
the certificate of title was obtained in accordance with existing laws and By Resolution of July 6, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds
regulations; that the sale and transfer were approved by the Commission on Omnibus Motion.[24]
Audit; that there is no communal fishing ground in Kawit; and that In the meantime or on July 12, 2001, the accused-herein petitioner Bienvenido
Commonwealth Act No 141 is inapplicable to the case. C. Pobre was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.[25]
In a related move, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers On July 23, 2001, the accused filed a Motion to Quash[26] the Amended
and Investigations and on Environment and Natural Resources conducted on Information on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
February 7 and 14, 2000 an inquiry in aid of legislation following a September and the information contained averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
27, 1999 privilege speech of Senator Ramon B. Revilla entitled Cavite Land excuse or justification.
Scam bearing on the questioned sale of the land. [8] As the Ombudsman approved on August 31, 2001 a Memorandum [27]
The Senate subsequently approved the above-said Committees Report No. recommending further amendments to the information, the prosecution filed on
227[9] disclosing that the questioned lot is foreshore, and that bad faith attended September 14, 2001 a Motion to Admit Amended Information [28] (second
its registration and titling with the use of falsified documents, and thus Amended Information).
recommending the prosecution of the municipal officials. For lack of merit, the Sandiganbayan, by Resolution [29] of October 10, 2001,
By Order[10] of March 30, 2000, the Ombudsman directed the filing of an denied the Motion to Quash the first amended information.
information against the mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Kawit By a subsequent Resolution[30] issued on November 8, 2001, the Sandiganbayan
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices granted the Motion to Admit the second Amended Information.
Act). Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
The necessary information[11] was thus filed against said officials including herein In determining whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
petitioners, which was raffled to herein public respondent, 2nd Division, in issuing the Resolution of October 10, 2001, it is necessary to re-examine the
Sandiganbayan. grounds invoked by petitioners in their Motion to Quash the first Amended
All the accused filed a Motion for Reinvestigation [12] which the Sandiganbayan Information.
denied by Order[13] of April 28, 2000 on the ground that it had not yet acquired Petitioners Motion to Quash is anchored on Sections 3(a) and 3(h) of Rule 117
jurisdiction over their persons as they had not yet posted bonds nor surrendered. of the Rules of Court which provides:
Except for Hernan Jamir, the rest of the accused filed anew a Motion for Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint
Reinvestigation,[14] averring that they voluntarily surrendered on May 2, 2000 or information on any of the following grounds:
before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite and posted cash bonds of twenty (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
thousand each[15]. xxx
The Ombudsman Prosecutor, by Comment/Opposition[16] to the Motion for (h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
Reinvestigation, contended that the motion was filed out of time and the grounds justification;
relied thereon are evidentiary in nature which could be resolved during trial. To The test for the correctness of the ground under Section 3(a) of Rule 117 is the
this Comment, the accused filed their Reply.[17] sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged,
In an Ex-parte Motion to Admit Amended Information [18] to which the accused if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense
filed their Comment[19], the Ombudsman Prosecutor sought to amend the as defined by law[31] without considering matters aliunde.
The information sought to be quashed is hereinbelow quoted verbatim: 3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosector, Office of the Special Prosecutor, inexcusable negligence; and
hereby accuses Federico Poblete, Rodrigo Caimol, Bienvenido Pobre, Juanito 4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave
Galang, Ricardo Flores, Pedro Paterno, Salvador Olaes, Rosario Nolasco, Leo any party unwarranted benefit, advantage or reference to such parties.[33]
Padilla and Hernan Jamir, of Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise Contrary to petitioners position, the information need not state the manner by
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows: which the injury to the local fisherfolk or the government came about or the
That on or about 28 January 1995 to 28 November 1997 or prior or subsequent extent by which they exhibited partiality, bad faith or negligence in the enactment
thereto, in the Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within of SB Resolution 3-97[34] authorizing the sale of foreshore land, it being sufficient
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, FEDERICO that the information alleges that petitioners acted with manifest partiality, evident
POBLETE, then Municipal Mayor, in conspiracy with then Vice Mayor, bad faith, and took advantage of their public positions by passing SB Resolution
RODRIGO CAIMOL and SB Members BIENVENIDO POBRE, JUANITO No. 3-97 despite the legal prohibition provided under the law, thereby causing
GALANG, RICARDO FLORES, PEDRO PATERNO, SALVADOR OLAES, undue injury to the local fishermen and the government.
ROSARIO CHERRY NOLASCO, LEO PADILLA and HERNAN JAMIR, taking Anent the second ground of the Motion to Quash, it is erroneous for petitioners
advantage of their official positions, with evident bad faith, and manifest partiality to argue that the payment of the amount of P123,123,123.00 by FJI Property
to FJI Property Developers, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and Developers, Inc. for the lot in question, which enriched the coffers of the
criminally give unwarranted benefits to FJI Property Developers, Inc. and cause government,[35] was a legal excuse and justification to free them from criminal
undue injury to the local fishermen and the government sold a foreshore land, liability. For if the elements of the offense violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Lot 4431 through the passage of SB Resolution No. 3-97, Series of 1997 Act 3019 are proven, the proffered excuse is immaterial.
authorizing the sale of the land situated in Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite in favor of The grounds bases of petitioners in the Motion to Quash the first Amended
FJI Property Developers, Inc. in the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY Information being unwarranted, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE of discretion in issuing the Resolution of October 10, 2001 denying the same.
HUNDRED TWENTY THREE PESOS (P123,123,123.00) with the Municipality of Contending that the Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion in
Kawit, Cavite, represented by then mayor FEDERICO POBLETE as vendor, issuing its Resolution of November 8, 2001, petitioners argue that it failed to
despite full knowledge, and in complete disregard, of the legal prohibition under consider Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sections 159 and 61, Commonwealth Act No. 141, against the disposition Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be
through sale of foreshore, and notwithstanding the warning of the Department of amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) on the prohibition against the lease accused enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may
of foreshore lands along Manila Bay towards Cavite and Bataan. [32] only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
(Underscoring supplied). prejudice to the rights of the accused,
The information thus charges petitioners with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. their co-accused co-petitioner Bienvenido C. Pobre having already been
3019, to wit: arraigned[36] under the first Amended Information and cannot thus be made to re-
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices by public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of plead to the second Amended Information without his constitutional right to
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute double jeopardy being violated. Petitioners moreover argue that they and their
corrupt practice of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: co-accused having been charged of acting in concert, they cannot be convicted
xxx on the basis of different informations.
(e) causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving The crux of the issue therefore hinges on whether the amendments in the
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the second Amended Information are mere matters of form which do not prejudice
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest the rights of the accused.
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall The second Amended Information is hereinbelow quoted verbatim:
apply to officers and employees of offices of government corporations charged That on or about 28 January 1995 to 28 November 1997 or sometime prior or
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite, Philippines,
Under settled jurisprudence, the following elements need to be proven in order and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
to constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, viz: public officials, Federico Poblete, then Municipal Mayor, Rodrigo Caimol, then
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions Vice Mayor and Bienvenido Pobre, Juanito Galang, Ricardo Flores, Pedro
or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; Paterno, Salvador Olaes, Rosario Cherry Nolasco, Leo Padilla and Hernan
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his Jamir, then Sangguniang Bayan Members, all of the Municipality of Kawit,
official duty in relation to his public position; Cavite, while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense
in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, with evident bad faith and manifest of the phrase in conspiracy and taking advantage of their official positions found
partiality, cause undue injury to the Government and local fishermen of the in the first Amended Information.
Municipality of Kawit, Cavite in the following manner: the said accused public Section 14, Rule 110 moreover provides that in allowing formal amendments in
officials maliciously sold a foreshore land described as Lot 4431 through the cases where the accused have already pleaded, it is necessary that the
passage of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 3-97, Series of 1997 authorizing amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused.
the sale said land situated in Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite in favor of FJI Property The test on whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment
Developers, Inc. in the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE MILLION of a compliant or information is whether a defense under the complaint or
ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
THREE PESOS (P123,123,123.00) Philippine Currency, despite their full amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be
knowledge, and in complete disregard, of the legal prohibition under Sections inapplicable to the complaint or information.[40]
159 in relation to Section 61, Commonwealth Act No. 141, prohibiting the The mere re-arrangement of the words and phrases in the second Amended
disposition through sale of foreshore land thereby giving unwarranted benefits to Information which are also alleged in the first Amended Information does not
FJI Property Developers, Inc. to the damage and injury to the Government in the change the basic theory of the prosecution, thus creating no material change or
aforementioned amount. (Underscoring in the original) modification in the defenses of the accused.
While petitioners cite People v. Casey[37] which laid down the test in determining Contrary to petitioners position, it having been established that the questioned
whether an amendment is a matter of form or substance, to wit: amendments are merely formal, there is no longer any need for accused
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by an amendment has been Bienvenido Pobre to be re-arraigned on the second Amended Information.[41]
said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would Petitioners additionally argue that the Sandiganbayan failed to consider the
be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant irregularity in the preliminary investigation which they have been harping upon,
might have would be equally applicable to the information in the new form as in the particulars of which were stated in their Motion for Reinvestigation that Lot
the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment No, 4431 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3115 was no longer
to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, foreshore as it had already evolved into a landmass and was ripe for titling, and
which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose that a portion of OCT No. 0-3115 was alienated in accordance with law.
the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the Clearly, petitioners allegations are factual and evidentiary in nature which may
essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an best be considered as matters of defense to be ventilated in a full-blown trial.
opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and Lack of probable cause during the preliminary investigation is not one of the
not of substance not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by grounds for a motion to quash. A motion to quash should be based on a defect
Section 13, Rule 110 (now Section 14) of the Revised Rules of Court, in the information, which is evident on its face. The guilt or innocence of the
they fail to show how or why the amendments may be considered as matters of accused, and their degree of participation, which should be appreciated, are
substance which will prejudice their rights as accused. properly the subject of trial on the merits rather than on a motion to quash.[42]
An objective appraisal, however, of the second Amended Information shows that As for the propriety or impropriety of the filing of the information by the
the amendments are merely formal for they do not touch upon the recital of facts Ombudsman, this Court may not pass. Neither may it independently make a
constituting the offense charged nor on the determination of the jurisdiction of factual finding of whether there was indeed irregularity in the conduct of the
the court. Instead, the amendments merely involve deletions, transpositions and preliminary investigation. For petitioners are not, in the present petition, assailing
re-phrasings, thereby raising the same issue and the same operative facts the denial by the Sandiganbayan of their Motion for Reinvestigation.
already found in the first Amended Information. Petitioners having failed to substantiate the grounds they invoked in their Motion
As laid down by this Court, an amendment is only in form when it merely adds to Quash the first Amended Information, and it having been established that the
specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new amendments introduced in the second Amended Information are mere matters of
and material facts[38], and merely states with additional precision something form, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds Resolutions of October 10, 2001 and November 8, 2001.
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.[39] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The second Amended Information, while adding the word public officers, does SO ORDERED.
not introduce a new and material fact as the accused in the first Amended
Information were referred to as either the Mayor, Vice-Mayor or Members of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
Likewise, in the second Amended Information, the phrase while in the
performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to their
office, conspiring and confederating with each other is but a clearer restatement
 ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. VICENTE Q. ROXAS, IRENE AGBADA-CRUZ, SIXTO
AGBADA CRUZ, MERCEDES ARISTORENAS and ROMEO GOMEZ and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA for brevity) dated November 13, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No.
43884, denying Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyacs petition for certiorari and ruling
that the Regional Trial Court (Branch 227) of Quezon City (RTC for brevity) was
correct in denying petitioners motion to quash the information charging petitioner
with falsification of public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-
49988.
The antecedent facts as borne out by the records of the case are accurately
narrated in the CA Decision dated November 13, 1998, thus:
An information for falsification of public documents docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q-91-18037 at the RTC of Quezon City was filed against petitioner along
with some others. That information reads:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses LOURDES ANGELES,
ESTRELLA MAPA, ATTY. PONCIANO R. GUPIT, and ATTY. REYNALDO P.
DIMAYACYAC of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT (under
Article 172, first and last paragraph in relation to Article 171 paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of 1986, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all private
individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit the act of
falsification of public documents, by then and there falsifying or causing the
falsification of the following documents, to wit:
a) Certification dated March 10, 1986 purportedly signed by a certain Fernando
Dizon, Record Management Analyst of the Bureau of Land, Central Office,
Manila;
(b) Report dated May 5, 1986 purportedly signed by a certain Jose Mariano,
Chief Record Management Division of Bureau of Land, Central Office, Manila;
and
(c) Sales Certificate and Deed of Assignment allegedly issued by the Bureau of
Land in favor of Lourdes Angeles; that despite the fact that said accused knew
all the time that said documents are fake and spurious used the same in the
Petition for Reconstitution of Records of the technical description of Lots Nos.
755, 777, 778 and 783 of the Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. 14, Decree No.
667, GLRO Record No. 5975 and the issuance of Title thereto filed by Estrella
Mapa over and involving the aforesaid lots in Land Registration Case docketed
as LRC Case No. 3369 (86) before Branch 99, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City
and that by virtue of said falsification and the use of the same as evidence in
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY Court Honorable Presiding Judge Godofredo Asuncion issued an order dated
June 30, 1986 granting said petition, and pursuant thereto the Register of Deeds
[G.R. No. 136264. May 28, 2004] of Quezon City issued Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 348156, 348291 and
348292 in the name of Estrella Mapa thereby embracing and/or encroaching the
portions of the properties belonging to Romeo D. Gomez, Sixto Agbada, Irene I. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in disregarding the legal doctrine
Agbada-Cruz and Mercedes Aristorenas whose properties were embraced and that THERE IS DOUBLE JEOPARDY, in the case now pending before
included in the said Transfer Certificates of Titles and in such amount as may be Respondent Judge Vicente Q. Roxas;
awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code. II. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in not adhering to the decisions
CONTRARY TO LAW. of this Honorable Supreme Court, as well as to applicable jurisprudence on the
Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on two (2) matter;
grounds. First, that the officer who filed the information had no legal authority to III. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in not taking into account that
do so, and second, that more than one offense was charged in the information. based on the Manifestation and Motion (To Grant Petition) In Lieu of Comment
Pending resolution of the motion to quash, petitioner was arraigned. filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the ORDER of dismissal of Honorable
By Order of August 23, 1991, Judge Benigno T. Dayaw of Branch 80 of the Judge Benigno T. Dayaw in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 on August 23, 1991
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to whose sala Criminal Case No. Q-91- has become final and executory; and
18037 was raffled, holding that the grant or denial of Motion to Dismiss whether IV. That the Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals ERRED in concluding that
the accused is arraigned or not is discretionary on the part of the Court, it citing an ORDER sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for
People vs. IAC, L-66939-41, January 10, 1987, granted the petitioners motion to the same offense, as it has no legal basis.[5]
quash upon the second ground. Accordingly, the information was quashed.
More than two (2) years after the quashal of the information in Criminal Case No. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that
Q-91-18037 or on October 19, 1993, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed against petitioner, by filing the motion to quash and refusing to withdraw it after he was
the same accused including petitioner two (2) informations for falsification of arraigned, is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy, as his
public documents docketed at the Quezon City RTC as Criminal Case Nos. Q- motion to quash constituted his express consent for the dismissal of the
93-49988 and 49989. The Informations arose from the questioned acts of information. However, the OSG advances the view that the criminal case against
falsification subject of the earlier quashed information in Criminal Case No. Q- herein petitioner may be dismissed for the inordinate delay in the conduct of
91-18037. preliminary investigation for the purpose of filing the proper information, which is
Petitioner later filed with Branch 103 of the RTC of Quezon City to which the a violation of the accuseds constitutional right to due process of law and to
informations were raffled a motion for the quashal thereof on the ground of speedy disposition of cases.
double jeopardy, citing Section 3(h) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Private respondent complainant Irene Agbada-Cruz, in turn, submits that the
Petitioner argued at the court a quo that he would be placed in double jeopardy Court of Appeals committed no error since the dismissal or quashal of an
as he was indicted before for the same offenses and the case was dismissed or information is not a bar to another prosecution except when the motion to quash
otherwise terminated without his express consent. is based on the ground that (1) the criminal action or liability has been
By the assailed Order of December 18, 1996, public respondent, Judge Vicente extinguished or that (2) the accused has previously been convicted or in
Q. Roxas of Branch 227 of the RTC of Quezon City to which the two (2) jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, pursuant to
informations against petitioner, et al, were eventually lodged, held that the Section 6 in relation to Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988 involved a different document as Section 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another
that involved in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 which had already been prosecution; exception. - An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to
quashed. Resolution of the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the
Q-93-49989 was stayed pending the submission by petitioner of the documents grounds specified in Section 3, sub-sections (f) and (h) of this Rule.
required by the court a quo. Public respondent thus denied the motion to quash Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or
the information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988 and ordered petitioners information on any of the following grounds:
arraignment, he holding that said case did not place petitioner in double (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
jeopardy.[2] (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or
Herein petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which denied his the person of the accused;
petition stating in its Decision that since the Information in Criminal Case No. Q- (c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
91-18037, on petitioners motion, was quashed on the ground that more than one (d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
offense was charged pursuant to Sec. 3 (e) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of (e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which
Court,[3] he is not placed in double jeopardy by the filing of another Information existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
for an offense included in the charge subject of the Information in Criminal Case (f) That the criminal action or liability has been
No. Q-91-18037.[4] extinguished;
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari assigning the following errors of
the CA, to wit:
(g) That it contains averments which, if true, would Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
constitute a legal court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the
excuse or case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
justification; and accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).
Was the duplicitous information a valid indictment? We answer in the affirmative.
In People vs. Bugayong,[7] we ruled that when an appellant fails to file a motion
to quash within the time prescribed under Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, he is thus deemed to have waived the defect in the Information. In People
vs. Manalili,[8] we held that an accused, who fails to object prior to arraignment to
a duplicitous information, may be found guilty of any or all of the crimes alleged
(h) That the accused has been previously convicted therein and duly proven during the trial, for the allegation of the elements of such
or in jeopardy of component crimes in the said information has satisfied the constitutional
being convicted, or guarantee that an accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which
acquitted of the he or she is being charged. Verily, a duplicitous information is valid since such
offense charged. defect may be waived and the accused, because of such waiver, could be
(Emphasis supplied) convicted of as many offenses as those charged in the information and proved
during trial.
The validity of the information having been established, we go on to examine
whether the other requisites for double jeopardy to attach are present. In the
present case, although there was a valid indictment before a competent court
and petitioner, as the accused, had already been arraigned therein, entering a
Thus, private respondent Cruz argues that since the previous information was valid plea of not guilty, the last requisite that the case was dismissed or
quashed on the ground of duplicity of offenses charged, the subsequent filing of otherwise terminated without his express consent, is not present.
a proper information is, therefore, not barred.
In their Memorandum, private respondents-complainants Romeo Gomez and It should be noted that the termination of Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was
Mercedes Aristorenas contend that (1) jeopardy does not attach where the upon motion of petitioner who, on April 1, 1991, filed with the court an Urgent
dismissal of the information was effected at the instance of the accused; and (2) Motion to Quash which was granted by Resolution dated August 23, 1991. In
there was no violation of petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case Sta. Rita vs. Court of Appeals,[9] we held that the reinstatement of criminal cases
since he never raised this issue in the trial court nor in the appellate court, against the accused did not violate his right against double jeopardy since the
hence, his silence should be interpreted as a waiver of said right to a speedy dismissal of the information by the trial court had been effected at his own
trial. instance when the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the RTC had no jurisdiction
The issues boil down to (1) whether or not the prosecution of petitioner under the over the case. In this case, considering that since the dismissal of the previous
Information docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988 would constitute double criminal case against petitioner was by reason of his motion for the quashal of
jeopardy, considering that when the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91- the information, petitioner is thus deemed to have expressly given his consent to
18037 was previously quashed, he had already been arraigned, and (2) whether such dismissal. There could then be no double jeopardy in this case since one of
or not petitioners constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case has been the requisites therefore, i.e., that the dismissal be without accuseds express
violated. consent, is not present.

With regard to the first issue, we are in accord with the ruling of the CA that not As to whether the subsequent filing of the two informations docketed as Q-93-
all the elements for double jeopardy exist in the case at bench. In People vs. 49988 and Q-93-49989 constitutes a violation of petitioners constitutional right to
Tac-An,[6] we enumerated the elements that must exist for double jeopardy to be a speedy disposition of cases,[10] we rule in the negative. We are not convinced
invoked, to wit: by the OSGs assertion that the cases of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan[11] or
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,[12] are applicable to the case before us. We
be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the see differently. There is no factual similarity between this case before us and the
first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy cases of Tatad and Angchangco.
must be for the same offense as that in the first. In the Tatad case, there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the
termination of the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October 25,
1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985. The Court found that political What the records clearly show is that petitioner never asserted his right to a
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial speedy disposition of his case. The only ground he raised in assailing the
process[13] against then Secretary Francisco S. Tatad. In the Angchangco case, subsequent filing of the two informations is that he will be subjected to double
the criminal complaints remained pending in the Office of the Ombudsman for jeopardy. It was only the OSG that brought to light the issue on petitioners right
more than six years despite the respondents numerous motions for early to a speedy disposition of his case, and only when the case was brought to the
resolution and the respondent, who had been retired, was being unreasonably appellate court on certiorari. Even in this petition before us, petitioner did not
deprived of the fruits of his retirement because of the still unresolved criminal raise the issue of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Again, it was only
complaints against him. In both cases, we ruled that the period of time that the OSG that presented such issue to us in the Brief for the State which was only
elapsed for the resolution of the cases against the petitioners therein was then adopted by petitioner through a Manifestation dated August 3, 1999. We
deemed a violation of the accuseds right to a speedy disposition of cases are not convinced that the filing of the informations against petitioner after two
against them. years was an unreasonable delay. Petitioner himself did not really believe that
In the present case, no proof was presented to show any persecution of the there was any violation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against
accused, political or otherwise, unlike in the Tatad case. There is no showing him.
that petitioner was made to endure any vexatious process during the two-year The case which is more in point with the present one before us is Dela Pea vs.
period before the filing of the proper informations, unlike in the Angchangco case Sandiganbayan[15] where we ruled that petitioner therein, for failing to assert their
where petitioner therein was deprived of his retirement benefits for an right to a speedy disposition of their cases, was deemed to have waived such
unreasonably long time. Thus, the circumstances present in the Tatad and right and thus, not entitled to the radical relief granted by the Court in the cases
Angchangco cases justifying the radical relief granted by us in said cases are not of Tatad and Angchangco. The factual circumstances surrounding herein
existent in the present case. petitioners case do not demonstrate that there was any violation of petitioners
We emphasize our ruling in Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan[14] where we held that: right to a speedy disposition of his case.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, temporary restraining order issued pursuant to our Resolution dated January 17,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial 2000 is hereby LIFTED and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long 227) is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with petitioners arraignment
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. In the in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988.
determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may SO ORDERED.
be considered and balanced are: the length of the delay the reasons for such
delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay.  
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be  
sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, we shall examine how such aforementioned factors affected herein
petitioners right.
As to the length of delay, it is established that the prosecution did not take any
action on petitioners case for two years. From the time that Criminal Case No. Q-
91-18037 was dismissed on August 23, 1991, the prosecution failed to effect the
very simple remedy of filing two separate informations against petitioner until
October of 1993. Indeed, there was a delay in the refiling of the proper
informations. However, the prosecution was never given the opportunity to
explain the circumstances that may have caused such delay precisely because
petitioner never raised the issue of the length of time it took the prosecution to
revive the case. There is nothing on record to show what happened during the
two-year lull before the filing of the proper informations. Hence, it could not be
ascertained that peculiar situations existed to prove that the delay was
vexatious, capricious and oppressive, and therefore, a violation of petitioners
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.